Summary of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action

Summary of the Preface and General Provisions, pages 1-5:

  • Iran affirms that it will never seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons, and the JCPOA’s implementation will ensure that the Iranian nuclear program is solely used for peaceful purposes under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
  • The JCPOA will gradually result in the lifting of all UN sanctions, multilateral sanctions and national sanctions against Iran. A “Joint Commission” consisting of representatives from all signatories will be formed to oversee the implementation of the JCPOA.
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will handle the inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities and report on the JCPOA’s implementation regularly to the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council.
  • The E3/EU+3 and Iran will hold formal meetings biannually to discuss ongoing implementation of the JCPOA, or more frequently if necessary.

Summary of Enrichment, R&D, and Stockpiling, pages 6-8:

  • Iran’s Enrichment Research and Design (R&D) activities will be strictly limited during the next 8 years, to be followed by gradual increases in allowable R&D. Uranium enrichment R&D will be done only with a limited number of IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 type centrifuges for the next ten years. R&D activities will not accumulate any enriched uranium, but rather any enriched uranium will be reduced to its natural state or exported.
  • For the next ten years, Iran will keep its actual enrichment capacity completely housed at the existing Natanz facility, which will have a capacity of 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges. This is about a third of Natanz’s current capacity; excess materiel will be stored and monitored by the IAEA. After ten years, the IR-1 centrifuges will begin to be phased out. For the next 15 years, Iran will keep its uranium enrichment levels at or below 3.67% at Natanz.
  • The Fordow facility will be effectively shut down and converted into a limited research center. It will retain 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges. Most of these will go unused and remain idle, while the remainder will be used for non-uranium stable isotope production. Remaining materiel will be stored and monitored by the IAEA.
  • Iran will limit its nuclear stockpile to 300 kilograms of 3.67% enriched uranium for the next 15 years. Excess uranium will be sold on the international market or blended back down to natural radiation levels. Remaining uranium oxide that is enriched at levels between 5% and 20% will be converted into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). If the TRR needs any more fuel in the next 15 years, it will have to buy it from an international vendor.

Summary of Arak, Heavy Water and Reprocessing, pages 8-9:

  • The heavy water reactor at Arak will be redesigned and rebuilt to use 3.67% enriched fuel for medical and industrial research purposes; it will not produce weapons grade plutonium. Iran will have no other heavy water facilities for the next 15 years.
  • Spent fuel and excess heavy water from Arak will be exported from Iran, and no waste materials will be reprocessed inside Iran for the next 15 years.

Summary of Transparency and Confidence Building Measures, pages 9-10:

  • Iran will apply the provisions of two documents to build transparency and confidence for the outside world. The “Additional Protocol” to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement will make amendments to Iran’s internal nuclear policies, and the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues” will be promptly followed by Iran to modify its programs to IAEA standards. It must implement the Roadmap by October 15, 2015 and submit these changes to the IAEA for verification and approval on or by that date.
  • The IAEA will be allowed to monitor Iranian programs to ensure that the Iranian government adheres to the aforementioned terms. Additionally, it will monitor uranium ore concentrate production for 25 years, contain and surveil centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years, and implement other safeguards against overproduction of enriched materials or meddling in IAEA efforts.

Summary of Sanctions changes, pages 11-17:

  • As soon as the IAEA verifies that Iran has completed its Roadmap obligations, the UN Security Council will terminate all provisions of its previous resolutions concerning the Iranian nuclear issue. These are resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929 and 2224.
  • Pending IAEA approval of Iran’s implementation of the Roadmap, the EU will make the following changes in its policies:
    • Financial activities between EU and Iranian institutions and persons will become legal
    • EU insurers and reinsurers will be allowed to do business in Iran
    • Financial messaging services, including SWIFT, will become available to specified Iranian institutions
    • The EU will make financial assistance, concessional loans and grants available to the Iranian government
    • The EU will open up to trade with Iran, particularly in the areas of hydrocarbons, raw materials and natural resources
    • Iranian ships and planes will be able to access the EU
  • The EU will drop all provisions concerning Iran’s nuclear program under the EU Regulation after 8 years or when the IAEA reports that all Iranian nuclear material remains in peaceful activities, whichever comes first.
  • The US will remove restrictions on doing business with Iran in the areas of finance, energy, mining, automobiles and shipping, pending the IAEA’s approval of Iran’s implementation of the Roadmap.
  • The US will also remove several persons and entities from its various sanctions lists and terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645 and sections 5, 7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628.
  • The US will allow the export of commercial aircraft to Iran and the sale of Iranian carpets and foodstuffs in the US.
  • Either 8 years after the adoption of the JCPOA, or sooner (at the behest of the IAEA), the US will seek legislative action to terminate sanctions against Iran’s acquisition of nuclear related commodities and services. The goal is to have Iran treated consistently with other non-nuclear states under US law.

Summary of the Implementation Plan, pages 18-19:

  • Finalization Day is the day on which the E3/EU+3 and Iran conclude their negotiations and sign the JCPOA and submit it to the UN Security Council for approval. This was July 14, 2015. The UN Security Council endorsed the deal on July 20, 2015.
  • Adoption Day will be 90 days after the UN gave its endorsement, or earlier by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants. The JCPOA and its commitments begin to come into effect on that date, which will be October 18. On that day, signatories will begin to formally prepare to make their JCPOA commitments. Iran will submit a formal report on the status of its nuclear program to the IAEA by this date.
  • Implementation Day will be the date when the IAEA finishes its audit of the Iranian nuclear program and verifies that Iran has taken the necessary measures to meet JCPOA requirements. This verification will be submitted to the UN, at which point the US and UN will remove the sanctions specified in Sections 16-18 of Annex V.
  • Transition Day is 8 years after Adoption Day. The EU and US will take actions to remove sanctions as prescribed in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V of the JCPOA, and Iran will seek ratification of the Additional Protocol for advancing its peaceful nuclear program.
  • UN Security Council Termination Day will be 10 years after Adoption Day, provided everyone has met their requirements prior to that date. The UN will terminate its resolution endorsing the JCPOA, and the EU will meet its final set of requirements, as pursuant to Section 25 of Annex V.

Summary of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, pages 19-20:

  • A Joint Commission (JC) would handle any disputes. If Iran believed an E3/EU+3 party was not meeting its commitments, it could refer the issue to the JC, which would have 15 days to resolve the issue.
  • If any participant feels the JC did not do a fair job, the issue would be referred to the Foreign Ministers or equivalent officials of each party. The Foreign Ministers would have 15 days to figure it out.
  • If the Foreign Ministers’ decision were unfavorable to a party in the dispute, it would be kicked up to the three-member Advisory Board. Each side in the dispute would be able to pick one member of the board, while a third would be independent. The Advisory Board must issue a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If that is not satisfactory, the JC will consider the opinion for 5 days. If found unsatisfactory, the issue goes to the UN Security Council.
  • Upon an appeal to the UN Security council, the complaining party may act to cease some or all of its commitments under the JCPOA until the issue is resolved by the Security Council, which may decide to snap prior sanctions under aforementioned resolutions back into place. If this were to occur, Iran would indemnify itself of its JCPOA commitments.


Annex I – Nuclear Related Measures, pages 21-50

Annex II – Sanctions-Related Commitments, pages 50-135

Annex III – Civil Nuclear Cooperation, pages 135-144

Annex IV – Joint Commission, pages 144-152

Annex V – Implementation Plan, pages 152-159