On Sept. 22, 2025, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said he was open to resuming talks with the United States if Washington “drops the absurd obsession” with denuclearization. Just weeks later, Pyongyang unveiled the latest version of its Hwasong intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—sparking renewed fears among U.S. policymakers over the country’s nuclear advancement.
Since the breakdown of inter-Korean ties and the failed Trump-era talks in 2019, North Korea has doubled down on nuclear weaponization. In 2022 alone, the regime tested over 70 ballistic and cruise missiles. It also reportedly continues to produce advanced fissile material, which experts say can fuel up to 90 nuclear warheads.
Pyongyang’s growing alignment with Moscow and Beijing has deepened the crisis. In exchange for supplying Russia with artillery shells, ballistic missiles and even troops for its war on Ukraine, North Korea has gained valuable political cover—and likely technological support—from the Kremlin. China, meanwhile, has provided an economic lifeline for the isolated nation and brushed off Western countries’ requests to pressure the regime. This emerging axis has emboldened Pyongyang, enhancing its missile and nuclear capabilities while forming a united front that threatens U.S. influence and the security of Japan, South Korea and the U.S. mainland.
Taken together, these developments cast doubt on the sincerity of Kim’s statement and the notion that talks could alter the North’s strategic calculus. Nonetheless, Washington seems intent on restoring diplomacy with Pyongyang in the hopes of resetting relations.
Even if such a summit were to occur, it would likely yield little progress. For decades, the United States has insisted on denuclearization as the foundation for improving ties, oscillating between diplomacy and military threats as a way of bringing about the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear program. Successive administrations have tried different approaches—including the 1994 Agreed Framework, which temporarily froze the North’s plutonium production, and the 2012 Leap Day Deal, which briefly halted nuclear and missile testing—but each of these efforts ultimately unraveled as Pyongyang reneged on its commitments and pressed ahead with weaponization. Kim’s position on denuclearization continues this pattern, pouring cold water on the prospect of a negotiated settlement.
What, then, motivated Kim to make such a statement? Given Pyongyang’s upgraded weapons arsenal, he lacks the same incentive to extract concessions from Washington as during Trump’s first term. Back then, North Korea displayed a markedly different attitude toward negotiations; the historic Panmunjom Declaration with the South in April 2018 affirmed their shared goal of achieving “a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula,” and the Singapore Summit with Trump later that year fueled hope that U.S.-North Korea relations were entering a new chapter.
The talks ultimately collapsed in October 2019 due to disagreement between both sides over sanctions relief and the terms of complete denuclearization. This was because, despite the economic incentives, Kim was fundamentally unwilling to abandon the regime’s most important source of security and status—an arsenal his family had spent nearly half a century developing. Knowing that nuclear weapons were his regime’s primary source of leverage and domestic legitimacy, he concluded that maintaining this arsenal was worth the economic cost.
Nearly seven years later, Pyongyang’s upgraded nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities have strengthened Kim’s leverage. However, his demands have fundamentally changed: rather than seeking comprehensive sanctions relief or warmer ties with Washington and Seoul, he is solely focused on persuading the White House to recognize North Korea’s nuclear status.
This would confer several benefits to his regime on the domestic and international stage. Shaped by the trauma of the Korean War (1950-53) and President Harry Truman’s nuclear threats, North Korea has long viewed its nuclear arsenal as the sole means to guarantee its survival. For years, Kim has cited the examples of Libya and Iraq as cautionary tales against denuclearization. In this vein, recognition by the United States would not only strengthen his regime’s legitimacy, but also the narrative that North Korea’s nuclear status is irreversible and a key pillar of its national identity—boosting Kim’s leverage at home and abroad.
Nuclear recognition would also give North Korea more room to maneuver between Moscow and Beijing. China remains wary about Pyongyang’s rapprochement with the Kremlin, fearing it will undermine both its economic leverage and its ability to balance between the United States and its allies in the region. It has thus adopted a more cautious stance toward the nuclear issue, officially supporting denuclearization yet refusing to meaningfully pressure the regime; such caution would evaporate if Washington were to recognize Pyongyang as a nuclear power. Although this would not eliminate all sources of friction within the Russia-China-North Korea axis, it would enable Kim to effectively balance ties between Moscow and Beijing, strengthening the regime’s regional and global influence.
Given Kim’s hardened stance on the nuclear issue, the United States must develop a clear, comprehensive strategy to constrain Pyongyang. Instead of yielding to Kim’s demands, Washington should reaffirm its commitment to denuclearization as a way to blunt the axis’s destabilizing influence and avoid nuclear brinkmanship in East Asia. This includes tightening enforcement of existing sanctions on North Korea and imposing secondary sanctions on Russian and Chinese firms that enable Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Washington should also continue to deepen trilateral security cooperation with South Korea and Japan, expanding joint military exercises, facilitating allied weapons transfers and increasing high-level coordination among top security officials as a strong signal to the regime of the alliance’s continued resolve. President Trump’s Asia trip last October was a positive step in that direction, but the administration must continue to build on this momentum and pursue additional measures to counter the regime.
Additionally, Washington should craft a long-term strategy to deter the regime militarily. That includes reaffirming its extended deterrence commitments to Tokyo and Seoul, and, if necessary, maintaining the option of targeted strikes against North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities. Such action would be both unlikely and unwise, but it must remain viable to cast a shadow of power across the negotiating table.
The North Korean nuclear threat has grown dire in recent years. The regime’s rapidly advancing weapons arsenal and strategic alignment with Moscow and Beijing present an increasingly complex challenge for the United States and its allies. Although Kim’s offer to resume talks may seem like a tempting diplomatic offramp, Washington should stand firm and marshal all available resources to achieve the goal of peaceful denuclearization. This would not only bring stability to the Korean Peninsula but also strengthen Washington’s credibility among its allies in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, an outcome that would reaffirm U.S. leadership at a moment when it is being tested on multiple fronts.
The views expressed in opinion pieces do not represent the views of Glimpse from the Globe.