When I arrived in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, a landlocked, mountainous country in Central Asia and the smallest and poorest in the region, I was prepared for the ubiquity of Russia’s regional influence. Our advisors from the Critical Language Scholarship program in Persian warned us that Tajiki Persian, unlike the Iranian Persian we were accustomed to learning, had been heavily influenced by Russian, even adopting the Cyrillic alphabet after usage of the traditional Arabic script was abolished. Due to Soviet governance in Tajikistan, which only ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, most Tajiks had at least some Russian proficiency, and Russian is still viewed as an important lingua franca. Indeed, upon arriving, I quickly became jealous of my classmates who could speak Russian; when their Persian failed them, they could still easily communicate with most of the locals.

What I was less prepared for was just how much influence China had gained in the country. I knew that China was making significant inroads into Central Asia under a strategy known as the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), but I never expected the pervasiveness of Chinese brands and products, the Chinese characters emblazoning nearly every piece of heavy construction machinery and the Tajik-Chinese Friendship Buses occasionally running up and down Rudaki Avenue, the main street of Dushanbe. Most of all, I had no idea just how many Chinese people and firms were working in Tajikistan, an oft-forgotten part of the world. Indeed, the wide extent of Chinese penetration in Russia’s historical backyard was enough to leave me a little stunned, a true testament to one of the hidden successes of Chinese foreign policy.

“There are a lot of Chinese here,” almost every Chinese person tells me. I found myself swiping pictures of construction projects on a phone, the manager saying, “These are all the projects I’ve worked on in my time here.”

“This is in Dushanbe?” I asked.

“No, this one is near Kulob.”

Kulob is a relatively major city to the south of Tajikistan, four hours away by car from Dushanbe on a good day, nestled in the rolling golden hills of the Khatlon region. The Chinese have projects all around the country, even in the remote and forbiddingly mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province (GBAO). This is an area noted for recent violence between government forces and rebels in 2012 and for its record of supporting separatism during the Tajik Civil war. It was only after this conversation that I realized just how strong the Chinese presence in Central Asia was.

News outlets covering Tajikistan and Central Asia are few and often riddled with skewed, if not outright erroneous, information. An outbreak of violence in Dushanbe on September 4, 2015 was blamed on Islamic militants by many Western outlets, despite insufficient evidence and reasonable cause to suspect other motivations. Far from the Islamic frenzy many Western pundits were eager to point to, the incident was really a politically-motivated rebel group led by a former minister fighting against the central government.

It should have come as no surprise then why I had initially underestimated China’s presence in Tajikistan and much of Central Asia. Despite relative interest in China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, few Western outlets seem invested in or capable of reporting on China’s expanding ties with the region, and what the One Belt, One Road strategy (OBOR) and SREB means for China’s foreign policy.

The OBOR strategy is a development framework proposed by China, invoking the storied historical Silk Road in order to encourage regional integration and economic development so that Eurasia once again becomes a coherent region with stable and integrated economies. The OBOR strategy encompasses both a land-based SREB and a Maritime Silk Road, which aims to foster positive relations with Indian Ocean states and secure shipping and transportation lines in the Indian Ocean.

For China, this push into Central Asia is a multi-pronged project, attacking many goals at once. For one, it is a ploy to expand elsewhere in light of the American “Pivot to Asia”, which threatens to check Chinese ambitions in the Pacific. Central Asia is also rich in natural resources, in particular natural gas in Turkmenistan and oil in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, making it a region of interest for Chinese energy extraction. Even if Tajikistan is not rich in high-demand natural resources itself (although it does boast large reserves of aluminum and coal), its location makes it a vital lynchpin in China’s Central Asian plans.

The move also has a domestic angle, as China seeks to assuage ethnic tensions between the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China’s expansive desert province in the Northwest. Tensions have resulted in riots and incidents of terrorism, generally stemming from the Uyghur’s frustration with denial of opportunity, as provincial economic growth benefits mostly incoming Han migrants to the province. Through development and expansion of economic opportunity, China seeks to turn the provincial capital Urumqi into an economic hub for the greater Central Asian region. This integration would not only stimulate China’s own economy through healthier trade ties, but also promote region-wide stability that would help bring order to Xinjiang, allowing China to manage its terrorism concerns.  

For Tajikistan, this means expansion of already strong Chinese economic ties, welcome in a country where remittances – money sent home from work abroad – make up over half of the national GDP. Already Tajikistan relies heavily on Chinese manufacturers and capital for everything from basic necessities to road repair and construction; 45% of Tajik imports are from China, and while China is the destination for only 11% of Tajik exports, total trade volume approaches $1.8 billion, making China one of Tajikistan’s largest trading partners.

The Chinese in Tajikistan are predictably praised for their prowess in infrastructure, having become important partners in numerous construction projects. The Shahriston Tunnel is China’s crowning achievement: bypassing hours of dirt one-lane mountain roads linking Dushanbe with the northern Sughd region, including the major city Khujand. It is especially valuable in the winter, when the dirt roads become dangerous and transportation becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

Of the three dominant powers in Central Asia, China is the clear frontrunner in the region’s developmental economic sphere, enjoying “unassailable economic supremacy”. As the Russian economy wanes, Central Asians are becoming all too aware of the dangers of reliance on Russia, especially remittance-dependent Tajikistan, where most Tajik males must go to Russia to find work. The US has found itself in a quagmire in Afghanistan, and shows little attention to the region due to its focus on the Middle East and the Pacific, leading to misinformed decision-makers and a lack of coherent strategy. This leaves China, an active participant in the development and stability of the region for a decade, constructing much needed roads and supplying copious volumes of investment and capital.

Russia still leads Central Asia in many ways. Teenagers blast Russian music and serenade their hopeful dates in Russian, indicating Russia’s sharp edge in soft power. Russian language is still a necessity, given that most Tajik men are forced to search for work in Russia or Kazakhstan. Russia is also the main security provider of the region; when the Tajik government struggled with the rogue minister in early September, it turned to Russia rather than China for security aid and cooperation.

Yet here I continue to experience China’s ever expanding influence. I often see literal truckloads of Chinese workers, and run across them everywhere, from Rudaki Avenue to villages far off the beaten path. Tajiks say “nihou” (unable to correctly pronounce the sound “ao”) even to non-Chinese people. Nobody casts a second glance at the Chinese characters on their packets, boxes or machinery. Even working for a Chinese firm seem to be a point of pride for some Tajiks eager to tell me about their place of occupation. Passing by the Chinese Embassy on my way back home, I once saw a long list of Tajik students who had been granted full scholarships to study all across China for their undergraduate education.  

All of these examples point to China’s rapid accumulation of influence in a region where it had little, if any presence twenty years ago. In that time, it has not only left its mark on Tajik development, but has also won the hearts of Tajiks, amazed at China’s growth trajectory and its perceived no-strings-attached approach to international development (as opposed to Western methods of intervention and structural adjustment in exchange for aid, epitomized by IMF and World Bank policies). In a fast-paced theater famous for games of spies and intrigue, China stands poised to surge in regional influence if other powers are not able to formulate better regional strategies.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Biz Peabody

While the parameters reached yesterday qualify only as “an understanding” to what will hopefully become a fully-fledged agreement within the next three months, and while this understanding currently holds for only 15 years, it is remarkable that such an understanding even exists after more than 30 years of sanctions. Now that Western sanctions on Iran will be loosened and potentially lifted, the Iranian people can expect a significant economic upturn.

15 years seems like a short amount of time for an agreement that regards nuclear capabilities and therefore the safety of the region. However, let’s remember that the Islamic State (IS) only first reared its ugly head last summer, and is now a major global issue. Events such as regime changes, land grabs, alliance breaks and regional squabbles evolve rapidly in the Middle East, and the Iranian government under President Rouhani has proven itself (thus far) to be fairly rational and even-keeled relative to other governments in the region, many of whom are US allies.

Iran could, if it hasn’t already been doing so, assist in the battle against IS. Regardless of whether Israel and Saudi Arabia are uncomfortable with this nuclear deal, and regardless of whether the US would rather have the Sunni Gulf monarchies take down IS instead of Iran, the fact remains that a regional coalition will be needed to restore peace. At this point, peace in the Middle East should be the most pressing goal–a peace that involves the input of all the powerful regional actors, regardless of religion or ethnicity. Perhaps this is a naive hope, but this nuclear arrangement with Iran could move the region in the right direction if the other regional powers can somehow get on board.

As President Obama said yesterday: “when critics of the deal sound off, ask this simple question: do you really think that this verifiable deal is worse than the risk of another war in the Middle East?”

Nathaniel Haas

Don’t disable the Google alerts for “Iranian nuclear talks” just yet. The “deal,” not codified until June 31, is as good as monopoly money until then. Be they 47 Republican senators or the stubbornness of Prime Minister Netanyahu, a myriad of “wild cards” remain.

If the deal does go through, then consider the $1.6 billion a month in oil revenue — hardly monopoly money — that Iran would accrue as a result of the lifted sanctions. With that, expect Iran to scale up its influence for Shiite minorities around the Middle East, be they the President Assad-led government in Syria, or the Houthi minority in Yemen. Continuing to support Shiite governments (and rebel Shiite groups, in the case of the Houthi’s), whose continued exclusion of Sunni Muslims from the governing table has given momentum to the growth of IS, is a most dangerous game of which anyone who hopes for stability in the Middle East must remain aware.

The agreement is only for 15 years–a blip on the screen for a country like Iran, which has been bent on accruing nuclear capabilities for decades. If a permanent agreement is not possible, then world powers can be expected to hope (and tacitly encourage) an eventual regime change in Iran to remove the constant threat of a nuclear theocracy with breakout capabilities.

The way the media has covered the talks, you’d think the Peace of Westphalia has just been signed. As it stands, the deal is a good, albeit temporary one, but leaves much to remain cognizant of in the Middle East. Reducing the threat of a nuclear Iran is important, but certainly not the endgame. Now, consider modifying the Google alerts: “Iranian sphere of influence.”

Jack Anderson

President Obama has wanted to get the US out of the Middle East since taking office. This automatically leaves a military power vacuum that could be filled by Iran. Pulling out of Iraq and the wider Middle East to a substantial degree without coming to some kind of accommodation with Iran would have been disastrous for the US and its Sunni allies in the region. The Middle East has not had to worry about overt Iranian incursions since before the time of Saddam Hussein, as he and other rulers retained Sunni power in the majority of nearby nations. Israel and the Gulf states can easily withstand covert Iranian efforts and the works of its proxies, but overt influence from Tehran is about to become a real factor.

Iran is not the sum of the headlines it generates, and neither is Israel or Saudi Arabia. All three use extreme rhetoric to appear tougher in the international arena. This deal is about structuring a balance of power in the region that Saudis, Iranians, Israelis and Americans can all live with, regardless of how it tastes. The key is stability. States need to prosper in order to be stable, and Iran has not been prospering. This deal seeks to give Iran a chance at prosperity and internal stability, even with a nuclear industry, in exchange for less aggression and regional calm. If it works, then Obama would actually deserve a Nobel Peace Prize.

Dan Morgan-Russell

This is not that big of an accomplishment. There is no deal yet; there is only an agreement on the framework of a deal. Baby steps don’t count when nuclear weapons are involved.

Furthermore, is this drawn-out and likely fruitless diplomatic effort even worth it?

President Obama is wasting too much time, effort and political capital on this deal with Iran to call this a victory. The risks of a nuclear Iran are not that great. While I normally disagree with neorealists like American political scientist Kenneth Waltz, I agree that letting Iran get the bomb would not radically change the Middle Eastern political landscape. Israel, with its sizeable nuclear arsenal, will still be there in the morning. Saudi Arabia, Syria and other regional powers will not begin building their own weapons. The president needs to save his political capital in the Middle East for combatting IS or encouraging the Palestinian peace process.

If Iran will not come to the table so the US can focus on bigger fish, then leave the table and let the sanctions and the centrifuges continue.

Jason Tse

I tend to be a bit of an optimist about US-Iran relations. While it is true that this is at most a medium-term agreement with plenty of barriers to a final agreement by June, today’s news was an encouraging step in the process.

Others have spoken on security implications, so I’d like to present other reasons why the US should continue pushing towards an agreement with Iran, and why the lifting of sanctions is good not only for Iran, but also for the US.

The reasons are twofold: commercial and cultural. Iran’s economic woes are pronounced due to the sanctions. Conversely, the economic potential of Iran is robust. Consider that in 2014, the IMF calculated Iran’s nominal GDP as 32nd in the world, ahead of countries such as South Africa, Malaysia and Chile. 2013 UN data estimate Iran to be 27th, ahead of even Taiwan and Thailand. If Iran achieved this under crippling isolation, I can only imagine what greater integration into the global economy will yield for both ends of the economic relationship.

More intangibly, increased exposure between Americans and Iranians can inspire new and currently unimaginable ideas. Iran stands on a rich history, whereas modern American culture holds strong appeal among Iranians. There is much to learn from each other. Greater connectivity also tends to reduce the chances of serious conflict, much like how chances of conflict between China and the US are significantly mitigated given the levels of contact between everyday peoples.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Correction: The previous version of Jack’s response erroneously mentioned “Sunnis, Shia, Jews and Americans” as key players in the nuclear agreement. The article has been corrected to list Saudis, Iranians, Israelis and Americans.

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The Pacific Rim

In Alfred Thayer Mahan’s seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, he argued that sea power was the key to national might. Sea power is measured by the size and power of a given state’s navies. A powerful naval military guards the merchant navy, securing global trade routes. Sea power guarded the very arteries of nations, explaining the supremacy of Great Britain in the Age of Imperialism. Likewise, Mahan argued, the Industrial Revolution in the US created such a surplus of manufactured goods that the US could no longer afford to ignore the need for expanding to new markets. The US needed to expand to new markets to ensure continued prosperity and thus needed to build and maintain a strong naval military.

It is in the Pacific Ocean that the continuing importance of sea power manifests itself. It was indeed Mahan’s ideas concerning sea power that drove US foreign policy in the early 20th century. In an age of commercial imperialism, the US secured Hawaii’s annexation and gained the Philippines as spoils from the Spanish-American War in the interest of expanding to Asian markets. For Mahan, trade and prosperity came from the barrel of a gun: it was the strength of the navy that ensured trade, a la the “gunboat diplomacy” of Commodore Perry, who forced the opening of the Japan to the outside world in 1852. As the 21st century is making clear, however, influence in the Pacific is also won through other means, namely economic ties. China’s meteoric rise and outflow of investment has won it many partners, and for the US to maintain its primacy in the Pacific, it must more convincingly demonstrate its commitment to the security and prosperity of its Pacific partners.

The Pacific Century?

Throughout history, the geographic center of gravity in world politics has shifted between the major oceans of the world. In ancient times, it was the Indian Ocean, as the hotbed of the Maritime Silk Road between the Emperors of China and the Sultans of the Ottoman Empire. The Europeans by contrast were on the outside looking in, as they tried to carve out their own stake in the trade of silks, spices, ideas and technology stretching from Hangzhou to Constantinople.

The monarchs of Portugal, Spain, England and France looked westward to circumvent the Ottomans and engage more actively with the Indian Ocean trade network. What they found, instead, was a new continent, and the emerging triangular relationships between Europe, the Americas and Africa became the centerpiece for geopolitics starting from the 17th century. The center of gravity of the world shifted westward to the Atlantic during the pre-modern era, where it remains the central ocean today. NATO, a security alliance between the US and Western European countries formed during the Cold War, became the epitome of Atlantic dominance of the world’s oceans. However, as the EU continues to be ensnared in the Eurocrisis, the preeminence of the Atlantic is starting to fade.

The Pacific, long impassable due to its vastness and violent weather, only emerged as a tangible region in the 19th century as the Europeans began establishing Pacific colonies and forcibly opening markets through superior naval military power. India became the Crown of Britain—the anchor of a rich Asian-Pacific trade. The Netherlands likewise gained a foothold in the region through its colonization of Indonesia. China, Japan and Korea were all forcibly opened to world trade by Western or Westernized naval power (Britain and France in China, America in Japan, and Japan in Korea). The US also came into its own as a Pacific merchant empire through trade and conquest. The US’s conquests of Pacific islands such as the Philippines, Guam and Hawaii, combined with the establishment of San Francisco and Los Angeles as thriving ports of trade, solidified the its position as a great power in the Pacific.

The trade-oriented Pacific became a strategic warzone during World War II and the Cold War. Island hopping was the fundamental strategy of the US Pacific Theater, laying the foundation for later American dominance of the Pacific. The Cold War’s stalemate in Europe meant that most of the hot conflicts were actually played out in the Pacific (Korea, Vietnam and China).

The Pacific was given new life with the rise of the Asian Tigers, the newly industrialized economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore that secured the Pacific’s title of the world’s most economically dynamic region. Combined with Japan’s resurgence and the rise of other economies before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, the Pacific’s centrality looked inevitable.

Keeping the Edge

Looking towards the future, it is quite possible that the Pacific will be the new center of gravity of the world. The rise of China has both revived the economic dynamism of the region post-1997 and added a new strategic element to the Pacific once again, as hopes of China happily cooperating with the US and/or transitioning to democracy seem slimmer by the day, and the two states’ relationship status as partners or rivals is constantly in flux.

For the US to keep the edge in the Pacific, its leaders must keep two things in mind. First, despite the continual preeminence of naval military power in the concept of sea power, the Pacific of the 21st century revolves around more than raw military strength.

Pacific power sees an added dimension in multilateral institutions, where China is beginning to compete with the US in trade agreements and economic institutions. The recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit sparked conflicts between the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Chinese-led free trade initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). Some see the US-led TPP, “a free trade agreement that seeks to set high-standard rules for trade, and address vital 21st-century issues within the global economy”, as an intentional move to exclude China. The agreement’s strong emphasis on elimination of trade protection and promotion of intellectual property is seen as a means to gain influence in the region to the detriment of China. China’s RCEP, in response, excludes the US, with Beijing taking leadership over the proposed FTAAP, which the US attempted to shut down.

Additionally, the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank now challenges the Asia Development Bank (Asia’s regional version of the World Bank). The US has pressured countries to not join the bank, seeing the bank as a potential competitor to the US-led World Bank and IMF. Developing countries – and even South Korea – have sour relations with the World Bank and IMF, the latter owing to the austerity measures imposed by the IMF on South Korea during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The IMF’s insistence on conditional loans and structural adjustment programs (basically allowing IMF interference in internal policy in exchange for loans) angers developing countries. By contrast, China’s non-interference doctrine seems to be reflected in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, thus providing a possible counter to US influence in the Pacific.

In light of all these developments, it becomes all the more important to readjust current US strategy in the Pacific. Heavy-handed measures like “high-standard trade-agreements” are inappropriate to truly counter China in the Pacific and gain greater influence in the Pacific. Innovative approaches to addressing issues in the region are needed, and these are likely to be found in both trade and non-traditional security and environmental issues. Particularly in poorer Southeast Asian and Pacific Island states, growing environmental concerns are matters of national security. For instance, rising sea levels could increase the salinity of the Mekong Delta, endangering key economic sectors in Vietnam. Likewise, rising sea levels endanger the very survival of small, low-lying Pacific Island states. As a leader in scientific research and an innovator in conservation practices, the US could take leadership in these non-traditional security concerns, providing expertise and knowledge and demonstrating commitment to its regional partners. In doing so, the US could not only create opportunities for cooperation, but also provide solutions that China cannot provide, enhancing its regional leadership.

Second, unlike the Atlantic region, it is currently not possible to dominate the Pacific region. Rising powers and the sheer size and diversity of the Pacific mean that the US cannot adopt a Monroe Doctrine in the Pacific as they did in the Western Hemisphere. Instead, the US should focus on facilitating a healthy web of relationships between Pacific countries.

Current US strategy revolves around the “hub-and-spokes” arrangement implemented during the Cold War. The US attempts to control the Pacific through important relationships and alliances with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan and Australia. These countries, however, do not have particularly good relations with each other. Japan and South Korea continue to rehash historical controversies, with South Korea showing signs that it enjoys China’s partnership better than Japan’s. While the “hub-and-spokes” arrangement functioned in the Cold War due to the US’s military and economic might vis-à-vis its Asian allies who were devastated by World War II, newly assertive and powerful states require a reconfiguration.

The way to a better Pacific security architecture could very well be a greater focus on economic and non-traditional security, with an emphasis on creating win-win situations that allow for more partnerships in areas such as economic development and environmental protection (vital for vulnerable small Pacific island nations). How to handle China is an entirely separate topic, but for now, the US should focus on making the Pacific a rich and prosperous region capable of encouraging healthy economic ties and settling disputes peacefully. It is not enough to only bolster US naval presence in the Pacific or to compete with China with the TPP. The US must take initiative and find creative ways to enhance regional security, reaffirming its commitment and influence in the increasingly vital Pacific region.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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Today, Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, will be sworn in as the president of Indonesia. His election has ignited optimism among the populace, who believe that he will deliver much needed reforms to increase Indonesians’ standard of living.

Jokowi’s rise from humble origins and status as a political outsider are the main reasons for his victory and popular support. Despite growing up in a slum, Jokowi managed to attend Gadjah Mada University and graduate with a degree in forestry. After working briefly for a state enterprise in Aceh in the forestry business, Jokowi returned to his hometown of Surakarta to become a furniture salesman. There, his entrepreneurial success led him to run for mayor of Surakarta, which he won and served two terms. His success in Surakarta prompted him to run for governor of Jakarta, where he defeated the incumbent in 2012.

Many in the Indonesian populace believe that Jokowi is a hands-on politician who is committed to passing reforms. He regularly conducts impromptu visits with constituents (known as blusukan) to discuss concerns, cultivating relationships with marginalized communities. To ensure efficiency, he has also paid impromptu visits to bureaucrats, at one point firing an official caught playing video games on the job.

Despite the public’s optimism, Jokowi might find himself restricted in his ability to act once he assumes office. Indonesia finds itself with a slowing economy (at its slowest rate since 2009) and fiscal limits. Jokowi also has little experience in national politics, so he must be afforded time to become acclimated to parliamentary politics and to the elite interests that still dominate Jakarta.

Indeed, Jokowi’s greatest political challenge still remains: his popularity base is with the people, but his power base is not with existing political institutions. Corruption is rife, and Jokowi is not even the leader of his own party, The Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle. Former Prime Minister, Megawati Sukarnoputi, daughter of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, leads the party, which could lead to power struggles during Jokowi’s administration. Additionally, Indonesia ranks 114^th on the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, alongside countries such as Vietnam and Nepal. Indeed, if Jokowi does not effectively tackle corruption as the people hope him to, then he might run the risk of rapidly losing legitimacy and popularity.

However, the greatest immediate national challenge to Jokowi is perhaps the fuel subsidy, which was supported by outgoing president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Fuel subsidies are quite common in developing countries as a way to guard against inflation and protect citizens against high energy prices. The fuel subsidy, however, is constantly under fire by economists, who cite Indonesia’s growing debt and inability to fund other projects such as education and infrastructure as failures of the policy.

Though Jokowi recognizes that reducing the fuel subsidy will be unpopular, he is determined to do so. As the Jokowi administration’s opening act, Jokowi hopes to reduce the budget deficit and spur the Indonesian economy by redirecting the funds to subsidies for farmers and fishermen. By freeing up the budget, Jokowi also hopes to have more room to implement greater healthcare coverage and develop civil infrastructure.

Jokowi has little experience on the foreign policy front. It remains to be seen what stance he’ll take towards Indonesia’s neighbors. The two most critical issues to be immediately addressed are China’s ambiguity in regards to the Natuna Islands and redefining relations with Australia following last year’s espionage scandal. While Indonesia is not currently in a dispute with China, part of China’s territorial claim includes small areas of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone, leading to suspicion and caution. As for Australia, the spying scandal only seems to confirm the Indonesian public’s suspicion that its southern neighbor does not truly respect them. Yudhoyono could not even get an apology from Canberra, leaving the public frustrated. Jokowi inherits this soured relation with Australia, and although the two can cooperate in many issues including human trafficking, it will be difficult to mend this relationship while still preserving Indonesia’s dignity.

Indonesia also finds itself at a critical geopolitical junction. In addition to an assertive China making provocative maneuvers in the South China Sea, the US and India are also reasserting their influence in the Pacific. Indonesia must correctly manage these global power dynamics, while remaining a regional leader. Its ongoing strategy seems centered on reasserting ASEAN’s importance as an effective regional bloc. As ASEAN’s largest and most influential member, Indonesia needs to prove that ASEAN can tackle pressing issues, such as conflicts in the South China Sea and turmoil in Thailand. Indonesia could leverage its role as a neutral mediator to take charge in ASEAN’s search for regional solutions, countering prevailing notions that ASEAN is merely a “talk-shop.”

Indonesia has the potential to reach prosperity, and maybe even become a regional leader. It has the fourth largest population in the world. It is a vibrant and multi-ethnic democracy, despite being burdened by the shadows of the Asian Financial Crisis, ongoing violence against minorities and corrupt political elites. That this country would peacefully elect a humble man can only be a cause for careful optimism, even if Jokowi’s future challenges seem insurmountable on his inauguration day.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Correction: Indonesia’s population figure was updated to reflect more accurate data on 10/21/2014. 

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Its nine streams touching the gateways of the city,

This river runs beyond heaven and earth,

Where the color of the mountains both is and is not.

The dwellings of men seem to float

On ripples of distant sky –

These beautiful days here in the city

Make drunken my old mountain heart!

–Wang Wei

It’s difficult to do justice to Hong Kong. It is one of the densest places in the world with seven million calling a city of 1100 square kilometers home (6550 people per square kilometer). This teeming island city is the quintessential urban jungle, a vast forest of concrete and neon lights, juxtaposed by expansive ocean and forested peaks. Visitors are taken aback by “the world’s most beautiful skyline” and delight in navigating the Constantinople of our times.

But one particular aspect of Hong Kong is especially fascinating. While Hong Kong, like any other city, is a place you could easily get lost in, it is also a city where you can easily lose a sense of space. As much as you move left and right, you are also moving rapidly up and down.

This is a phenomenon unique to Hong Kong. Urbanists seeking answers have described Hong Kong as lacking the traditional concept of ‘ground’. In the majority of cities around the world, one primarily moves laterally. If one goes up and down, it is usually in an isolated skyscraper or down to a subway station. Connectivity, and thereby movement of people, relies on channels situated on a planar ‘ground’, usually roads, pedestrian walkways and street-level public spaces.

In Hong Kong however, civic life thrives not just on the street level, but also in spaces suspended in the sky and in corridors three stories underground. Subway stations become extensive shopping centers, providing convenience stores for busy office workers scurrying home. Central, Hong Kong’s central business district, is punctuated by sky walkways, allowing citizens easy access between skyscrapers and the ability to cross highways and roads. In Soho, one finds moving sidewalks snaking up the side of Victoria Peak. The Hopewell Center, embracing the Peak, has two entryways and lobbies, one 17 floors above the other, allowing visitors convenient access to two different parts of the Wan Chai District.

Any walking trip from Point A to Point B in Hong Kong may require much vertical movement. More than any other urban center on Earth, Hong Kong is a three-dimensional city.

In creating this unique urban configuration, Hong Kong is mostly an ‘accidental pioneer’. A tiny colony on a rock that was trapped between a Communist giant and the Pacific, quick adaptation was the key to survival. All forces, natural and human, conspired to spell Hong Kong’s failure.

It is a city faced with a difficult situation of high population density on limited space. Numerous mountains and uneven hills rivet what little land the city has, which further constrains development potential. Typhoons are common in the summer, and poor infrastructure at the time meant frequent flooding and mudslides.

Compounding geographic difficulties, social chaos and highly strained resources characterized the post-Japanese Occupation era of Colonial Hong Kong. Refugees from World War II swelled with refugees fleeing a newly Communist China. A transformed China also stripped Hong Kong of its purpose. It had served as the West’s entrepôt to China much like Shanghai in colonial times. With a China then closed off to the capitalist West, Hong Kong once again became an unproductive rock in the ocean.

Despite all these difficulties, Hong Kong eventually developed into one of the successful newly industrialized countries called the Four Asian Tigers (the others being Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore), specializing in light industry. Economists in the West heralded the Four Asian Tigers as model economies, correctly pursuing export-oriented development by finding a niche in the global economy and then practicing free trade to quickly gain prosperity. When China re-opened in the late 20^th century, Hong Kong once again found its niche as an entrepôt to the Mainland, and Hong Kong boomed as the financial center of Asia. Hong Kong was and is still upheld as an example of a successful laissez-faire system, with high business competitiveness, low taxes, loose customs and a thriving financial sector.

Like the other Asian Tigers, however, the truth is more nuanced. While most trumpet the success of laissez-faire economics in shaping the city of Hong Kong, in truth, Hong Kong can thank a large part of its own prosperity on sound governmental decision-making.

On Christmas Night 1953, a fire broke out in the district of Shek Kip Mei, leveling a slum and leaving 58,000 people homeless. The government immediately set to work temporarily resettling the destitute while isolating the root of the problem. Poor sanitation and infrastructure, combined with the many refugees living in abject conditions as squatters, convinced the colonial government to pursue the development of public housing.

It was with subsidized public housing that Hong Kong’s prosperity and urban form took shape. Using government and resettlement programs, the Hong Kong Housing Authority was able to offer most of the poor population homes.

In turn, these residential blocks, conceived of as single-use, became vibrant communities. Ground level floors became areas to shop and set up markets. Roofs became ideal spots for cottage industry, schools and playgrounds. The economy of space, a sense among the people that given limited space and resources public and private life should be organized as efficiently as possible, became the very basis of Hong Kong urbanism.

Hand-in-hand with the economy of space came the question of connectivity. There was a need to link the old central districts of Central and Kowloon Peninsula with other expanding communities on the fringes of the city. Again, the government took many initiatives, constructing tunnels connecting Hong Kong Island to Kowloon and other highways that traverse difficult mountainous terrain.

Most importantly perhaps, the government set the groundwork for the Mass Transit Rail (MTR) system. A luxury at first, the MTR system has grown to become a staple system for the lives of Hong Kong’s citizens. Fast service and clean stations well connected with different landmarks in their respective districts are characteristic of the MTR, and given the difficulties of parking, most citizens came to rely on the MTR and buses. 90% of Hong Kong’s vehicular transportation is, in fact, public. Side benefits of such connectivity are public spaces becoming thriving pockets of social interaction.

Forests and oceans are never far from Pokfulam District. Buildings here adapt to the hills and mountains, using extensive elevator, escalator, walkways and promenade systems to create convenient paths while always keeping a sense of nature. August 2011. (Author’s own)

Despite these urban triumphs, Hong Kong has also managed to practice harmony with the environment. 40% of Hong Kong’s limited land is protected by the government as state parks. In 2010, Hong Kong emitted about 5.2 metric tons of CO₂ emissions per capita, significantly lower than the American average of 17.6 metric tons per capita. This is in no doubt attributable to Hong Kong’s reliance on public transportation and the preservation of green spaces.

Hong Kong has also developed many creative architectural solutions to accommodate the environment. One example is the Soho escalators aforementioned. Another well-known example is buildings with holes in the middle. Designed with Feng Shui principles in mind, the buildings also help solve the “wind wall” problem Hong Kong Island has experienced. Due to the high number of high-rises, natural wind was not reaching the mountain vegetation behind the skyscrapers, causing them to wither and the local ecosystem to suffer. While not a perfect solution, buildings constructed with the ‘Feng Shui hole’ help mitigate this since wind can pass freely through the center.

It is clear that in current times, as more people move to urban environments and resources become more limited, Hong Kong offers powerful ideas for the future of cities. Urbanists in America are just now starting to realize the harmful side effects of urban sprawl. Environmental degradation, wasteful use of space and inefficient public transportation are only some of the problems facing many American cities.

This does not mean that solutions that worked in Hong Kong can work in any other city in the world, but if there are two lessons the city of Hong Kong can teach to the world it is these:

1) Some of the best long-term innovative solutions to problems today can be achieved through careful interplay between socially-conscious governmental actions (a reactive, establishing force: the construction of public housing and of the MTR metro system) and bottom-up entrepreneurial behavior (a proactive, expanding force: the conversion of single-purpose housing to efficient and productive communities, the transformation of MTR stations from merely transportation centers to commercial ones and the formation of creative architectural designs in harmony with traditional Chinese culture and Hong Kong’s environment and topography).

2) There is value in the ideas of the economy of space, increased connectivity and harmony with the environment. Hong Kong’s urbanism is an experience that forces a rethinking of current urban modes. In Hong Kong, efficient public transportation led to not only some alleviation of traffic and environmental pressures, but also strong, healthy civic places full of life and social activity in central districts. Hong Kong’s solutions cannot apply everywhere because not every city is a dense rock in the ocean. However, these three ideas are important components in sustainable development, and can help reverse the decline of inner cities and downtowns across the United States.

For those interested in reading more on Hong Kong urbanism, I suggest a visual guidebook called Cities Without Ground, which shows three-dimensional maps of Hong Kong, and The Making of Hong Kong: From Vertical to Volumetric, which provides a succinct planning history of the city, including architectural illustrations.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

The post Neon City, Shimmering Skyline: Hong Kong’s Urban Modes for the 21st Century appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

On July 15, during the latest BRICS Summit at Fortaleza, Brazil, the five countries of the BRICS Group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) announced the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB), a new international development bank aimed at assisting international development in the global South. The five countries also agreed on a Contingency Reserve Agreement (CRA), setting aside funds for emergency situations and to solve short-term liquidity crises.

What was once a Goldman Sachs acronym meant for businessmen looking for opportunities to tap new markets has now become a bloc of countries claiming to be the leaders of the developing world. The establishment of the BRICS institutions has given rise to much interest and speculation in the West.

Grievances Against IMF

The NDB and CRA are the latest institutions established in response to the Western-dominated international financial system. Set up at the end of the Second World War to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Great Depression, the Bretton Woods institutions were meant to act as the lender of last resort and provide governance over the international economy. Since then, the Bretton Woods institutions have acquired a rather sour reputation among developing nations.

The perception that the West dominates the Bretton Woods institutions is hard to disprove. Both the IMF and the World Bank are headquartered in Washington, DC. In the World Bank, only the United States holds vetoing power, while in the IMF, the United States alone controls 16.75% of voting power, while the BRICS combined hold only 11.03%.

The Bretton Woods institutions are also accused of acting on behalf of the West as interventionist powers. Whereas the IMF is meant to provide emergency funds in the crisis situations, often aid comes with strings attached. The IMF will subsequently work towards restructuring economies, forcibly opening markets for Western investors and imposing harsh austerity and fiscal responsibility measures. Developing and emerging countries from Brazil and Russia to South Korea and Argentina (where the government recently defaulted much to the ire of American creditors) blame IMF restructuring programs for historical or current economic woes. In the South Korean case, heavy-handed intervention in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (1997 AFC) resulted in harsh austerity measures and near-excessive Western acquisition of Korean assets. Public anger against the IMF and perceived economic neo-colonialism remains to this day in South Korea, where the 1997 AFC is called the IMF Crisis.

Dissatisfaction with the current Bretton Woods institutions have left developing countries searching for alternate funding sources. In the aftermath of the 1997 AFC, Asian nations set up a currency swap called the Chiang Mai Initiative to pool resources should another crisis arise. The Bank of the South was established in 2009 also to circumvent use of the Bretton Woods institutions for South American states. However, neither has been used to date. Furthermore, none of these initiatives sought to directly challenge the Bretton Woods institutions on a global scale until now.

The rising power of emerging economies, particularly of China, combined with Western economic debilitation during the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has convinced the BRICS that they can now carve their own destinies. As the BRICS themselves say, the BRICS combined make up 41.6% of the world’s population, 19.8% of global GDP, 16.9% of total global trade (combined value of exports and imports), and their combined GDPs grew more than 300% in the last decade. They deserve more than 11.03% of voting power and condescending Western negligence.

What’s at Stake

As the BRICS countries come together to establish new institutions, they pledge to do things differently from the Bretton Woods institutions. The NDB will practice an equal voting system, with all of BRICS having one vote in the Bank. The idea is that as collective leaders of the developing world, all should have equal say in NDB matters.

Beneath the façade of cooperation however is an arena broiled in politics. Of particular interest are Russia’s interventionist intentions and Indian and Chinese competition for global leadership.

For Russia, increasing international pressure from the West has forced Russia to look East and beyond for much needed cash and support. The NDB is the perfect candidate for such a support base. Perhaps the NDB will end Russia’s dependence on the Bretton Woods institutions. Should this come to pass, Russia will be more emboldened in its actions knowing it can afford to lose sympathy from the West.

For India, the NDB provides much needed catalyst for Modi’s new presidency. The Modi Administration’s publishing of the first budget had led to some disappointment due to lack of direction. For Modi, this was a chance to re-galvanize enthusiasm for his administration by showing global leadership. Yet, much to India’s disappointment, high expectations for the BRICS institutions have been dashed. India was the party that fought the hardest against China during negotiations, wishing to base the NDB in India rather than China. The compromise was that the first President of the NDB would be Indian, but it is clear that India must look elsewhere to reach its potential and exercise leadership.

For China, nothing short of global leadership is at stake. Being the richest of the BRICS nations, China sees itself as the natural leader of the BRICS and sees the potential to use these new institutions to widen its global influence. The decision to place the headquarters of the NDB in Shanghai as well as China’s large contributions to the CRA clearly signals China’s dominance in the group.

The BRICS Institutions also lend China a much-needed chance to bolster its reputation abroad. China’s aid is notorious for propping up authoritarian states and for turning a blind eye to the benefactors’ human rights abuses. Chinese aid is largely perceived to be merely a tool in China’s overall geopolitical strategy. While it is clear the American government uses aid to further national interest, the IMF and World Bank help “legitimize” American aid, making it more politically palatable. The BRICS institution promises to fulfill the same function for China, with the CRA’s objective of non-interference also matching up nicely with China’s own protocol of non-interference.

Future for the BRICS Institution?

Many see the NDB as a potential rival to the IMF and World Bank. Some may even see it as the latest development in an ongoing Sino-American rivalry, with the newly established Shanghai-based NDB rising to challenge the Washington-backed IMF. Others still, including the World Bank President Jim Yong Kim, believe the new institutions can complement the Bretton Woods institutions.

Whatever the viewpoint, it is clear that there are still many questions going forward for the NDB and CRA. The first concern is simple. There seems to be a lack of overall vision and inner coherency for the NDB and CRA. The BRICS countries indeed have little in common with each other. The starkest difference is that Brazil, South Africa and India are democratic, while Russia and China share authoritarian systems. China’s economy is 28 times the size of South Africa’s. Some have even speculated that the only thing holding the BRICS together is their dealings with China. In contributing to the NDB pot, China had wished to shell out more, but South Africa could only spare $10 bn. Constrained by equal contributions and equal voting power, the Chinese had to lower funding for the NDB from $100 bn to $50 bn, already exposing a potential problem in the BRICS institutions.

Second is a concern over leadership capabilities. None of the five BRICS countries have extensive experience governing multilateral organizations. Perhaps the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of China, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) of Russia, South African participation in the African Union and Brazilian participation in Mercosur may count as multilateral experience. However, the former two are seen as extensions of national ambitions rather than true instances of multilateral governance, while all of the mentioned organizations are restricted in their membership by continental and regional lines. In terms of leading a global front, all five BRICS will find themselves experimenting and improvising, without the IMF’s wealth of experience gained from decades of consensus building and programs.

Another valid question is whether the BRICS Bank merely reflects the Beijing Consensus. Considering clear Chinese dominance of the BRICS, speculation arises as to whether China through the NDB will truly provide a voice for emerging economies, or whether the NDB is only an extension of China’s national ambitions. The BRICS countries accept Chinese leadership only with great caution. While all are eager to use the BRICS institution as an expedient way to gain access to Chinese cash, they are mistrustful of Chinese intentions in leading the BRICS institution. The levels of mistrust combined with the lack of coherence leads to serious questions about the potential effectiveness of the institutions.

Finally, the effectiveness of NDB and CRA themselves are in serious question. Both the NDB and CRA have small cash pools, with $50 bn and $100 bn respectively. While the NDB seeks to provide developmental loans to the developing world, development projections by the World Bank for South Asia alone estimates $2.5 trillion over the next 10 years. Argentina’s recent default saw it drop about $15 bn in debt. Should Argentina, along with many other developing countries, look to the NDB and CRA for an IMF workaround, those institutions would likely face such challenges.

It’s still far too early to predict the trajectory of the newly established BRICS institutions, but its clear that many challenges still remain. If the BRICS institution can gain traction and become a powerful international financial institution, it might very well become the IMF’s next competitor or partner, depending on whatever trajectory the BRICS set. It’s difficult to tell whether the BRICS institutions will become an extension of Chinese economic diplomacy, a formalized way to gain access to Chinese funds, or a truly multilateral institution reaching out to the developing world and providing an alternate voice to a global economy dominated by Bretton Woods.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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Biz Peabody

Nationalism: long thought to be one of the strongest forces in the world. The exact definition of nationalism is the amalgamation of feelings, principles and efforts in the name of patriotic pride for one’s nation or country. The psychological concept of nationalism has always been present in humans, because we’re “programmed” to identify with our groups – our “herds” – who we work with to ensure our survival as individuals and as a species.

What we’re witnessing as these two crises in Gaza and Ukraine unfold is a phenomenon that is becoming clearer as the world globalizes: the clash of nationalism and technology. In the past, the only way for a nation to defend itself was through large-scale war against other nations, but technology is allowing smaller entities to assert themselves on the global stage. In the tragedy of 9/11, it became clear that large-scale war was no longer the paradigm. A group – Al-Qaeda – was able to wage war on the hegemon – the US – and the hegemon was forced to wage its “War on Terror” on an ideology.

In a similar group-against-nation dynamic, the war between Hamas and Israel is driven by nationalist sentiments, and so is the war fought between Ukraine against its pro-Russian rebels. Aside from the tragedies these two conflicts have created – most recently pro-Russian rebels shooting down commercial flight MH-17, and the 500+ deaths in Gaza and Israel – the conflicts reveal that it is becoming easier for smaller and smaller groups to assert their own brand of nationalism on bigger and bigger entities. Diplomatic efforts to end these conflicts, therefore, must begin focusing more on the global, collective good and less on emphasizing “peace talks” between warring nations. Continuing to simply call for peace between nationalistic entities only underlines differences between groups, which in turn strengthens nationalistic mentalities and further separates peoples.

Jason Tse

Two major crises could not come at a more inopportune time. Now the United States faces trouble on three fronts: the ISIS crisis in Iraq, the MH-17 disaster, and the war in Gaza.

I wrote in a recent piece for Glimpse about how rapprochement with Iran was expedient for our interests in the Middle East. In the US-Iran engagement, Russia had always positioned itself as a close partner with Iran, able to sway Iran to a favorable agreement similar to China’s promises on North Korea.

But, the MH-17 disaster complicates things. Facts are still surfacing, but with the US Intelligence Community confirming that the weapon systems used to shoot down MH-17 were moved quietly back to Russia and Putin’s public attempts to shift blame onto Kiev, it is almost certain that Russian-backed and armed rebels shot down the plane.

This leads the US to a new dilemma: choosing which foe represents the larger threat: Russia or Iran. While it is clear that Russia must be held accountable, the US should take care not to completely back the bear into a corner. At the same time, greater action against Russia, which seems likely considering the global outrage, would signal that a rapprochement with Iran is no longer merely expedient to fighting the ISIS crisis, but necessary now that Iran’s partnership (or at least being out of Russia’s orbit) is required to address both ISIS and Russia. This unfortunately gives the Iranian hand a significant boost as the Americans and Iranians return to the table for extended negotiations.

Luke Phillips

I don’t have too many thoughts on either crisis boiling up this week, not the one in Gaza or the one in Ukraine. I do have thoughts, however, on what the American and overall Western reaction will be to each.

If the timeline of the Ukraine crisis up to this point is any guide, then I think it can safely be said that there won’t be very much in the way of policy innovation in the wake of the tragedy of MH-17. Sure, a few more impassioned speeches will be made in Brussels and Washington about heavier sanctions on Moscow, and much energy will be expended in the time-tested act of finger-waving. But no one in the European Union or US has the political will to make truly meaningful actions against Putin’s Russia, and I don’t necessarily think they should. MH-17, for the tragedy it is, is not particularly important. But, if Russia’s actions began to directly threaten the Baltic States or Poland, then we might see some shuffling of feet in the West.

As for Gaza, that’s even easier. The fight will go on for a few weeks or months, Palestinian and Israeli apologists will absolve themselves and accuse the other side, and one happy autumn day the flag of truce will go up. Give it three years, maybe less, and there will be peace talks in America again. Another few years and they’ll be back at war. However, shifting geopolitical dynamics in the broader Middle East might alter the equation somewhat. In particular, if Iranian-American relations normalize, and the US distances itself from Israel, the Jewish State may be compelled to engage in more vigorous diplomacy. Conversely, if the massive war underway in neighboring Syria and Iraq spreads into Jordan, a more security-paranoid Israel could take aggressive measures in Gaza and even the West Bank to forestall the violence from penetrating its borders.

Time will tell. Prudence is all we can ask of our leaders, restraint all we can ask of those abroad.

Abigail Becker

Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in November 2013, the fighting in Crimea has unfortunately involved many civilians. Because of the nature of the fighting, the death of more innocent people is not surprising. What distinguishes the attack on MH-17 from previous conflicts is the international nature of the event. The crisis in Ukraine has, of course, been an international headline from the start, but for most people beyond the Ukraine/Russia border, it has remained a distant threat. The crash of MH-17 shatters that feeling of safe separation. Almost every continent was represented on the flight, and a number of countries issued statements of sadness and anger. The Netherlands, which lost 193 citizens, has been particularly vocal, and rightfully so.

To make matters worse, the rebels handled the aftermath of the crash with an unbelievable lack of tact and decency. The bodies of the victims were hidden for days after the crash in train cars and the crash site was kept on strict lockdown. Unsurprisingly, there has been no apology from the rebels, Putin or the Ukrainian government. All parties have instead chosen to play the blame game – though most everyone agrees the Russians and rebels are responsible. The botched handling of the victims’ bodies has only increased tensions and polarized the opposing sides. This is no longer a crisis between a state and rebels—it is a conflict between the rebels and Putin, and angered people around the world.

Luodanni Chen

Let’s talk facts. The 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine began on February 23, 2014. During the past five months, two Ukrainian military planes have been shot down in the region: one in June and one just three days before the attack on MH-17. The plane crash in June has been identified as the work of pro-Russian separatists. The large Ukrainian military transport jet was shot down using a shoulder-fired missile when the jet was trying to land at an airport in Luhansk. One month later, another military plane was shot down when it was flying at 6,500 meters. This distance is well beyond the range of shoulder-fired missiles. Ukrainian officials speculated that a more powerful missile had brought down the plane, and the missile was perhaps fired from territories within the Russian Federation. A powerful anti-aircraft weapon that is capable of doing such damage is called the Buk surface-to-air missile. The Buk missile system was developed by the Soviet Union and was in service since 1979. Buk is “capable of detecting air targets at ranges of up to 160 km and hitting them at full altitude range at a distance of over 30 km,” according to the Russian Defense Ministry information. Obama has already confirmed the use of surface-to-air missile in the MH-17 disaster on July 18^th. By connecting these dots, Putin has his fingerprints all over this. What is his next play and how will the international community respond?

Kshitij Kumar

Both the Gaza crisis and the Malaysian Airlines tragedy have resulted in unfortunate, devastating civilian deaths. These were 800+ individuals (400 noncombatants and counting in Gaza, 298 on MH-17) that had no say, no involvement in either conflict. They were casualties of crossfire, and whether their deaths are labeled accidents or unfortunate necessities resulting from the use of civilians as human shields, the loss of innocent life is unjust and disturbing. While the technology of war has evolved to allow high precision targeting and supposedly minimize collateral damage, clearly, this is not what is happening. To add insult to injury, the deaths are being politicized! Headlines earlier suggest that the remains of the dead of the Malaysian aircraft are pieces in an international political ‘game’; a Wall Street Journal article suggested that the very election of Hamas in Gaza forfeited civilians’ rights to be safe from war. The sanctity of life no longer seems to have any value; those who have lost loved ones are apparently not even allowed to mourn.

Yes, there is a bigger picture to look at—there is a greater good (everyone has a different opinion as to what that constitutes) to consider. But in these physical and verbal battles between nations, groups, passions and beliefs, it is imperative that we remember the humanity of those lost—as well as our own.

Update: Kshitij Kumar’s portion received minor corrections 

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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Over the past few years, the largest obstacle to Iran’s power projection and influence in the greater Middle East has been sanctions levied against Tehran by the United States, Europe and the United Nations. Tehran’s nuclear program is the main cause, but festering wounds caused by Iran’s own vehement anti-Americanism and the 1979 Hostage Crisis endure, with Iran’s support of Hezbollah against Israel causing even more strain.

Optimism in the West for rapprochement with Iran surged with the swearing-in of the relatively moderate President Rouhani. After President Rouhani visited New York City, held a phone conversation with President Obama – the highest level talk between the two countries since 1979 – and then offered to sit down and talk about proliferation and the possible ending of sanctions, the West was ready to listen. With a possible rapprochement on the line, it is a prime time for the US to analyze Iran’s geostrategic objectives in the context of American involvement in the Middle East and the ongoing Iraqi crisis.

Iran’s Current Geopolitical Position

Iran geopolitical position is unenviable. A look at it’s neighborhood reveals that, contrary to hardliners’ fears of a post-sanctions Iran ruling the Middle East, Iran finds itself in a tar pit of dangers.

Iran is only one of four majority Shi’a countries, the others being Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan. Despite Iran viewing itself as the leader of the Shi’a world, relations with each of these Shi’a countries are strained. Iraq is deteriorating by the day. Bahrain mistrusts Iran due to Iranian sentiments expressing the desire to annex Bahrain, igniting Bahraini Arab nationalism. Azerbaijan and Iran, despite sharing strong cultural, religious and historical ties, mistrust each other. Iran remains suspicious of possible Azeri irredentist ambitions (four of Iran’s provinces are considered part of “Greater Azerbaijan”), while Azerbaijan also remains suspicious of Iran’s maneuvers, particularly after Iran’s support for Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Due to its size, its ability to project significant power and its historical and cultural influences, Iran is a contender for establishing regional hegemony in the Middle East. It faces two rivals, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, one a parallel Sunni theocracy and the other a secular republic. Despite Turkey’s recent political instability, their friendship with the Iraqi Kurds and existing image as an effective partner for the West in Middle Eastern affairs renders it a significant regional power. Saudi Arabia is determined to oppose Iran at every turn. Leveraging its status as a strategic American ally, Saudi Arabia has liberally asserted itself in the greater Middle East, endeavoring to isolate Iran and funding Sunni movements against Iran and its allies. Wikileaks documents reveal that despite warming relations, Saudi Arabia encouraged the Americans to attack Iran in the heyday of the Israel-Iran standoff.

Thus, Iran is relatively isolated in the world. While Iran does have powerful friends in China and Russia, the former does not wish to be heavily involved in the politics of the region and Iran cannot consistently rely on their help. Syria is the only reliable regional ally, but unfortunately for Iran, Assad has been severely weakened in his fight with the rebels, leaving Iran, in terms of immediate surroundings, with few options.

Therefore, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities for its own power projection is understandable. Furthermore, Iran’s overall regional strategy relies on soft power. Facing a Sunni Saudi Arabia backed by the Americans, Iran has opted for pan-Islamic leadership by taking foremost action against its arch-nemesis Israel, thereby not only attempting to rally Muslims to the Palestinian cause, but also attempting to encourage the people of the Middle East to expunge American influence from the region.

ISIS Crisis

The origins of the ISIS Crisis are studded with irony. Before ISIS established a Caliphate, the underground group was funded largely by wealthy patrons in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, secretly wishing to ignite an anti-Shi’a jihad. Although Saudi Arabia has since reduced donations to ISIS, it is clear that America’s traditional allies in the region indirectly contributed to the disintegration of the Iraqi state. This is not to say that Maliki’s own sectarian policies, and by extension Iran’s own meddling in Iraq, share no part of the blame. It is only to say that in this current climate, the US finds itself in an awkward, and oddly opportune, position of needing new allies to help stabilize Iraq.

As painful as it may be for us to work with a member of the “Axis of Evil,” and as upsetting as it is to continue supporting al-Maliki as he violates principles of democratic governance, regional stability in the Middle East is the highest priority for America. The most preferable short-term stable state of affairs would be one in which al-Maliki reigns as a reliable client in Baghdad, a state we are increasingly unable to maintain.

Iran, having carved a sphere of influence through Iraq to Syria, cannot allow a fundamentally anti-Iranian Sunni insurrection to disrupt Iranian designs, much less allow a disruption so close to Iran’s own homeland. Iran also recognizes that in the current situation with a weakened Assad, an increasingly assertive Turkish-backed Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region and a reluctant America, it cannot combat ISIS alone. The Syrian Civil War drained Iran of much political capital as it sought to keep Assad in power. Indeed, it seems increasingly likely that Iran will have to choose which ally to save: Syria or Iraq. Needing stable borders and to prevent spillover conflicts, Iran will likely choose Iraq and seek American partnership.

Rushing into the limelight during ongoing talks between the West and Iran concerning proliferation and the ending of sanctions, ISIS seems to provide an incentive for the Americans and Iranians to recognize their common interests and pursue greater cooperation. For now, the Eagle’s priorities align with the Lion’s.

Future Trajectory

While neat parallels do not exist between 2014 Iran and 1972 China, Nixon and Kissinger’s bold move reminds us today that daring statecraft will always be necessary. America would gain much needed Iranian support in stabilizing Iraq. Additionally, less pressure on Tehran would allow Iran to further entertain the possibility of an Iraq without al-Maliki. While al-Maliki is a reliable ally of Tehran, even the Iranians realize that al-Maliki’s divisive politics are not a suitable long-term strategy for the Iranian sphere of influence, a realization made all the more apparent by ISIS’ insurrection.

Another possible boon is that Iran can play a role in ensuring the survival of the Afghan state. Iranian covert support of the Taliban may run counter to American interests, but in the short term Iran also wishes for a stable Afghanistan, which cannot be guaranteed should American support and manpower in the region dwindle.

Security and politics aside, Iran also brings a largely untapped market to the table. Sanctions have prevented Western businesses from pursuing opportunities in Iran. With Iranian overdependence on oil exports, cueing the need for diversification and a rich resource base that includes large reserves of hydrocarbon, investment and partnership opportunities for American businesses abound. For instance, California-based World Eco Energy has reportedly signed a conditional $1.175b deal in Iran to turn waste into energy.

Iran, for its part, will perhaps have even more to gain from a partnership with the Americans. Booming economies, solutions to macroeconomic woes brought about by sanctions and liberalized oil exports aside, Iran would simply have more space to maneuver. No longer drawing the ire of a powerful ally of Saudi Arabia, Iran can set out to expand its economic and political influence.

For instance, recognizing the apprehension of surrounding Gulf States to the possibility of a resurgent Iran, Tehran sent a delegation to Kuwait, the UAE and Oman. This move is beneficial on many fronts since it allows Tehran to look past sectarian differences and work towards solutions for the ISIS crisis, perhaps even paving the way for future talks on Gulf cooperation and energy policy.

On the flip side of the coin, increased room for Iranian maneuvers might also mean greater Hezbollah activities against Israel. However, this can be checked by greater American security commitments to Israel, agreements with the Iranians themselves, or by the simple fact that solving the ISIS crisis will require even more political capital and resources from Iran, already partially depleted from the Syria Civil War.

Of course, any partnership does not make Iran our friend. Iranian support of Hezbollah and Taliban cannot go unheeded. The values and interests of Iran still clash with the American’s. Iranian ambitions must still be curbed through continued support and reassurances of key allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. It is a fine game the Americans must play: to engage in offshore balancing without too often lending a hand to any one party. Nevertheless, cooperation with Iran can expedite Middle Eastern stability, giving the United States much needed breathing room to address domestic problems and reevaluate its foreign policy strategy in the Middle East.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

The post The Case for Rapprochement with Iran appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

In the spring of 763 CE, eight years of rebellion came to an unceremonious end. The An Lushan Rebellion, started by its namesake, a Chinese general of Turkic descent, sought to carve a new dynasty centered in the Chinese capital of Luoyang to replace the corrupt and decadent Tang Dynasty. Although An Lushan was motivated by personal ambition and not by what we would now classify as ethno-nationalism, the immediate consequences of the rebellion were clear: the Tang turned their backs on the Silk Road-based cosmopolitanism that once defined their glorious empire in favor of homogeneity. The days of rich Persian merchants parading the streets of Guangzhou, of Turkic generals patrolling the northern deserts and of Chinese citizens exploring new cultures in art and expression were long gone. In its place was a new era of mistrust, where Uyghurs (the exact relationship between Tang Dynasty’s Uyghurs and today’s Uyghurs is disputed) were forbidden from wearing their ethnic dress and anti-miscegenation laws were promulgated. The weakened dynasty never regained its glory, leading to a long decline as corruption and rebellions weakened its ranks before ultimately falling in 907.

Recent attacks in Xinjiang, China’s western-most province and home to a prominent Uyghur community, and elsewhere threaten to force a similar pivot to intolerance in contemporary China. The knife attack in Kunming that left 33 dead and the recent market bombing in Urumqi have been met with predictably harsh government reactions. In a spectacular display of political theatrics, the Chinese convicted 55 people of terrorism charges in a mass trial, sentencing three to death and the others to incarceration in front of an audience of 7000.

Though many in the West may label the trial as a typically oppressive action by an authoritarian government, these measures are understandable. The Han majority’s faith in the central government’s ability to protect its own turf from domestic terrorism is waning. The Kunming attack is especially disconcerting, as it took place in a multicultural province where Islam is not the majority religion. To the average Han, the subsequent bombing in volatile Han-majority Urumqi would leave little doubt in the eyes of many Han Chinese that a new era of separatist action was upon them: a new War on Terror must be waged to protect China.

But the mass trial is already a serious blunder on the part of the government. The Uyghurs see the trials as nothing more than the latest in a string of alienating and marginalizing policies. A Han Party Secretary, who takes precedence over a largely symbolic Uyghur governor, rules in the supposedly autonomous Uyghur Province. In everyday life, Uyghurs experience economic marginalization, denial of opportunity and the destruction of homes and old districts in the name of economic progress. And now, the Uyghur community is being blamed for attacks that many had nothing to do with, harassed by security and facing the ire of their neighbors.

Americans of Middle Eastern descent faced similar experiences in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Faced with paranoia and a blind hate towards all things Islamic, many Americans faced levels of discrimination from stares at airports to having their fundamental rights blatantly violated. The collapse of trust between citizens took years to recover. However, mistrust and intolerance continue to this day, exacerbated by America’s interventions throughout the Muslim world.

If intolerance spurred by acts of terrorism caused American progress to stumble, then it is sure to threaten geopolitical stability for China, a country with relatively little experience in maintaining a society that is just to citizens of all ethnicities. Ethnic tensions boiled over in 2009 with the Urumqi Riots and relations now between the Han and the Uyghurs can only sour after these attacks and show trials. In the interest of maintaining stability and of ultimately expanding the role Xinjiang can play in China’s domestic and international politics, the Chinese government must resist giving in to short-term interests and sentiments and adopt a longer-term vision for Xinjiang.

Traditionally, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has relied on top-down control to preserve stability. During the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the CCP re-emphasized the fact that national reforms must proceed at the hands and whims of the government. The autonomous ethnic provinces of Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi are, contradictory to their name, tightly controlled by the Central state.

However, this approach is no longer viable in Xinjiang. As the world decentralizes and new forces are unleashed on the stage of global politics, non-state movements and actors become better organized and more powerful. East Turkestan is once again in the spotlight because many Turkic minorities do not feel “Chinese,” thanks to cultural, political and economic isolation. “Ethnic harmony,” as promoted by the top-down government, hardly soothes a people without a home.

The government must be prepared to accept that unless some bottom-up policies are allowed to flourish, minorities’ animosity towards the CCP will grow. This mistrust is the basis of the violence and independence movements that fuel those seeking East Turkestan today. The government must take extra care that in curbing terrorism they do not foster the next generation of anti-Han minorities.

In order to achieve a truly stable Xinjiang, China must allow the local population to represent their own localities. Although people’s elections for their own mayors are largely symbolic, since real power resides with the Party Secretary of a region, the Party can still exercise more sensitivity by cultivating talented Uyghurs and allowing them political leeway. Too often, the frontier is seen as a stepping-stone for power-hungry Han officials eager for promotion to the capital. They quickly set to work bulldozing buildings, displacing people and building apartments that no local person can afford, calling it economic progress.

In a broader perspective, as China seeks to reconstruct the Silk Road and once again extend its influence over the steppes, it cannot fully strengthen continental relations without a strong Xinjiang. A strong Xinjiang requires a strong citizenry of Uyghurs, Han, Kazakhs and other ethnicities free to express themselves and honor their heritages while also feeling included in the Chinese state and its destiny. A strong Uyghur citizenry will be eager to serve and represent the country and, since four out of the five Central Asian countries share Turkic cultural and linguistic backgrounds, can find themselves uniquely positioned to build strong ties between their home country and Central Asia. It only makes sense that the Chinese government should actively cultivate and develop the region and its people, to truly make Urumqi into a gateway to Central Asia rather than a slogan claiming it as such.

To truly bring Xinjiang into China’s fold and give the Uyghurs a home in a Chinese nation, “ethnic harmony” is not enough. Acceptance of heterogeneity is the ultimate solution. As radical an idea as it might sound considering the tense environment of contemporary China, it is an idea present even in the annals of Chinese history. Taizong (ruled 626 – 649 CE), the second Tang emperor, is still considered one of the greatest emperors in Chinese history. Taizong himself was not fully Chinese, having been born a quarter Turkic and his wife, the Empress Zhangsun, fully Turkic. He understood the importance of a diverse China, and actively encouraged foreign trade and interaction, even going so far as to promote any man of talent, regardless of whether he was ethnically Chinese or not, thus ushering in an era in which Chinese ships and porcelain could be found as far west as the Horn of Africa and where the influence of the realm could be felt all across the vast steppes into Central Asia and the golden city of Samarkand.

Both the Uyghurs and Han yearn for a stable Xinjiang. For China to truly achieve a prosperous and flourishing society, Xinjiang and the Uyghur community must also be empowered. Reactions to terrorism mustn’t repeat the same mistake of the Tang after the An Lushan Rebellion. Diversity and openness, as in the Taizong years, must be favored over intolerance and marginalization.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff and editorial board.

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