Since 2011, Libya has been a failed state; the country has no single functioning government that can claim control over the entire territory, and, despite increasing instability, the international community has done little to help salvage the dire political situation. As a result of this lack of intervention, Libya has regressed further into anarchy, allowing the Islamic State (IS) to spread its branches outside of Syria and Iraq and form a satellite group in Libya—placing the radical Islamist organization dangerously close to Europe.

When the country’s longtime dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, was ousted and later murdered in the 2011 Libyan civil war, the international community was not immediately concerned; in line with the common initial reaction to the Arab Uprisings, many trumpeted the newfound potential for democracy and human rights for which Libya could now strive.

But Libya was a divided country long before Gaddafi’s reign. Since Italian occupation in the early 20th century, the territory making up today’s Libyan state has been split into three regions: the more cosmopolitan region of Tripolitania in the northwest, the largely unpopulated desert region of Fezzan in the southwest, and the oil- and natural gas-heavy region of Cyrenaica in the east.  Even after World War II, when the regions were politically united, the religious, ethnic, and tribal differences between the peoples of the three regions have kept Libyans from developing a sense of nationalism. Instead, intra-state regionalism divides the people ideologically. Once the authoritarian government under Gaddafi fell apart in 2011 with no other unifying force present to retain order, the three Libyan regions fell into chaos.

There have been attempts to install a democratically elected government. After the civil war in 2011, the popular National Forces Alliance (NFA) political party – promoting a secular, moderate pro-business platform – won the 2012 democratic elections with 98% of the vote. But when it came to actually forming a government, the NFA could not organize itself as well as the less popular Islamist political party, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction party, which enjoyed alliances with many of the free-roaming militia groups. Libya quickly fell into a cycle of continuous revolution perpetuated by these Islamist-leaning militias, which prevented the official formation of a government each time the Islamist party lost the democratic elections. Without a uniting government, the divisions between the three regions have widened even further, and the militia groups roam freely without a policing force to fill the political void.

Currently, there does exist a democratically elected Libyan Parliament that governs Benghazi (the de facto capital of Libya since January of 2014), and is supported, at least in theory, by the UN, the US, and the EU. However, this Benghazi government has had to retreat out of Libya’s other major cities: the General National Congress (GNC), which has occupied the former de jure capital of Tripoli since 2014 and is controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction party and their militia allies, removed the Parliament from Tripoli in 2014. Meanwhile, smaller militias, tribal organizations and other groups roam the rest of the anarchic state, especially in Cyrenaica, where very little authority structure exists. Little has been done to assist this Western-backed government and its military in Benghazi as they have tried to regain control of Tripoli, and little seems to be in place to make future policy changes.

This lack of interest and support owes to the fact that Libya has rarely been a primary strategic interest for international powers. Though oil sales drove the Libyan economy in the late 20th century and into the 2000’s, few developed countries were willing to deal with Gaddafi’s uncooperative economic policies. Then, after the 2011 civil war, the economy collapsed entirely.

It didn’t help that, following the 2011 uprisings across the region, the US preoccupied itself with shaping Egyptian politics; Egypt was considered more of a national interest largely because of longstanding US-Egyptian relations and Egypt’s relatively favorable relationship with Israel. In Libya under Gaddafi, no alliances with the US were ever made. No other state would come to the rescue either, because Gaddafi’s Libya had always remained separate from North African, Arab and oil state politics. This isolation was largely due to Gaddafi’s rampant paranoia, fearing that other Arab governments would try to overthrow him and subsequently refusing to participate regional politics.

As a result, Libya, right next door to Egypt, never garnered the global attention it perhaps required during and after the 2011 uprising and civil war. It would take the assassination of the American ambassador in Benghazi in 2012 to force the world to take seriously the worsening political situation. But, as has occurred in many of the conflicts throughout the MENA region, failing states are often left to fail.

The devolution of Libya has become clear with the appearance of a branch of the IS in Libyan cities. On February 12, 2015, a group of radical Islamists claiming ties to the IS beheaded 21 Coptic Christian Egyptians on a beach, a bloody massacre that drew mass attention from around the world and caused Egypt to begin launching airstrikes on Libyan militia groups. Since then, however, the IS branch has marched through the broken country, gained territory and eventually reached the coastal city of Sirte.

IS is now officially on the Mediterranean. The EU, which on the whole has remained comparatively inactive in the fight against IS in the deeper MENA region, is now forced to pay more attention to the conflicts.

The sudden cause for concern is the proximity of this new IS cell to Europe. While an attack on EU-owned oilrigs or trade centers in Libya would indeed elevate IS’ acts of terror against America and Europe from beheadings to the destruction of property, the possibility of IS moving into European territory is even more dangerous. The Libyan coast is only about 400 miles from the southern shores of Sicily; Italy has already been experiencing for some years now a problematically large influx of immigrants from North Africa. Many immigrants board ships from Libyan or Tunisian shores and attempt to cross the sea with the goal of reaching Italian soil and a European way of life. While many of these immigrants sadly do not survive the dangerous crossing, many others do arrive safely on European shores. Italian government- and EU-funded ocean policing programs have attempted to stem the tide of immigrants into Italy in the past, as the Italian state is struggling to support such a massive influx of people.

Now, though, the problem of immigration has become a potential terror threat. If IS fighters are on the shores of Libya, what is to prevent them from commandeering a boat and traveling straight to Italy? What is to prevent them from coming ashore and occupying a European city, potentially to commit acts of terror?

Indeed, the IS video of the Egyptian Christian beheadings stated that IS “will conquer Rome.” Many Italians have reacted to the threat with humor, but the European community does have serious cause for concern—especially after the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris back in January. And while al-Qaeda alone is to blame for the Charlie Hebdo shootings, it is clear that terrorist attacks in major European cities are certainly possible. As of now, the EU anti-immigration programs in Italy are simply not advanced enough to process every immigrant arriving by boat from North Africa to ensure that there are no IS militants hidden among the crowds.

What is the potential solution to this threat, then? Better immigration security into Italy by sea is certainly necessary, but it is only a short-term solution for a long-term problem. IS, especially as a political ideology, doesn’t look to be disappearing anytime soon. There instead needs to be a fix for Libya itself: the international community needs to engage in salvaging the country’s government and democratic potential.

To accomplish this, the “Western-backed” Benghazi parliament needs to be supported and allowed to eventually create a functioning government that can unite and represent the three Libyan regions and their various ethnic groups. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has called for a UN coalition to intervene in Libya by lifting the arms embargo against the country and arming the Benghazi government and its military so that they can fight back against the radical Islamist militias and take back lost territory; the GNC itself has. The coalition would also attempt to disarm the radical militias and keep better tabs on weapons in Libyan territory.

For once, I agree with President al-Sisi’s foreign policy. For too long the international community has allowed Libya to descend into violence, disarray and anarchy. No effective initiative has been taken to fix the problem, despite many Western governments’ insistence that diplomacy – and not arming the Benghazi government – is the only way to mitigate the political vacuum in Libya. But diplomacy has not worked with the small Islamist militias nor, for that matter, the Islamic State: their path towards continued violence is so far inexorable, with Europe now easily within reach.

In addition, there are simply too many separate radical militia groups for the Benghazi government to even dream of working towards a common solution. If the UN can show solidarity towards the government it has professed to support, then lifting the arms embargo to Libya and carefully managing an arms transfer could be the only way to salvage Libyan politics. Of course, heavy monitoring and the assistance of UN forces on the ground (potentially volunteered from the EU governments that cannot afford an IS terrorist attack on their own soil) will be essential to ensure the security of the situation. However, simply continuing to promote “diplomacy” – which so far has meant a complete lack of action on the part of the UN, the US and the EU – will not help Libya and will not ensure the security of Europe.

The post The Islamic State’s Presence in Libya and its Implications for Europe appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Biz Peabody

While the parameters reached yesterday qualify only as “an understanding” to what will hopefully become a fully-fledged agreement within the next three months, and while this understanding currently holds for only 15 years, it is remarkable that such an understanding even exists after more than 30 years of sanctions. Now that Western sanctions on Iran will be loosened and potentially lifted, the Iranian people can expect a significant economic upturn.

15 years seems like a short amount of time for an agreement that regards nuclear capabilities and therefore the safety of the region. However, let’s remember that the Islamic State (IS) only first reared its ugly head last summer, and is now a major global issue. Events such as regime changes, land grabs, alliance breaks and regional squabbles evolve rapidly in the Middle East, and the Iranian government under President Rouhani has proven itself (thus far) to be fairly rational and even-keeled relative to other governments in the region, many of whom are US allies.

Iran could, if it hasn’t already been doing so, assist in the battle against IS. Regardless of whether Israel and Saudi Arabia are uncomfortable with this nuclear deal, and regardless of whether the US would rather have the Sunni Gulf monarchies take down IS instead of Iran, the fact remains that a regional coalition will be needed to restore peace. At this point, peace in the Middle East should be the most pressing goal–a peace that involves the input of all the powerful regional actors, regardless of religion or ethnicity. Perhaps this is a naive hope, but this nuclear arrangement with Iran could move the region in the right direction if the other regional powers can somehow get on board.

As President Obama said yesterday: “when critics of the deal sound off, ask this simple question: do you really think that this verifiable deal is worse than the risk of another war in the Middle East?”

Nathaniel Haas

Don’t disable the Google alerts for “Iranian nuclear talks” just yet. The “deal,” not codified until June 31, is as good as monopoly money until then. Be they 47 Republican senators or the stubbornness of Prime Minister Netanyahu, a myriad of “wild cards” remain.

If the deal does go through, then consider the $1.6 billion a month in oil revenue — hardly monopoly money — that Iran would accrue as a result of the lifted sanctions. With that, expect Iran to scale up its influence for Shiite minorities around the Middle East, be they the President Assad-led government in Syria, or the Houthi minority in Yemen. Continuing to support Shiite governments (and rebel Shiite groups, in the case of the Houthi’s), whose continued exclusion of Sunni Muslims from the governing table has given momentum to the growth of IS, is a most dangerous game of which anyone who hopes for stability in the Middle East must remain aware.

The agreement is only for 15 years–a blip on the screen for a country like Iran, which has been bent on accruing nuclear capabilities for decades. If a permanent agreement is not possible, then world powers can be expected to hope (and tacitly encourage) an eventual regime change in Iran to remove the constant threat of a nuclear theocracy with breakout capabilities.

The way the media has covered the talks, you’d think the Peace of Westphalia has just been signed. As it stands, the deal is a good, albeit temporary one, but leaves much to remain cognizant of in the Middle East. Reducing the threat of a nuclear Iran is important, but certainly not the endgame. Now, consider modifying the Google alerts: “Iranian sphere of influence.”

Jack Anderson

President Obama has wanted to get the US out of the Middle East since taking office. This automatically leaves a military power vacuum that could be filled by Iran. Pulling out of Iraq and the wider Middle East to a substantial degree without coming to some kind of accommodation with Iran would have been disastrous for the US and its Sunni allies in the region. The Middle East has not had to worry about overt Iranian incursions since before the time of Saddam Hussein, as he and other rulers retained Sunni power in the majority of nearby nations. Israel and the Gulf states can easily withstand covert Iranian efforts and the works of its proxies, but overt influence from Tehran is about to become a real factor.

Iran is not the sum of the headlines it generates, and neither is Israel or Saudi Arabia. All three use extreme rhetoric to appear tougher in the international arena. This deal is about structuring a balance of power in the region that Saudis, Iranians, Israelis and Americans can all live with, regardless of how it tastes. The key is stability. States need to prosper in order to be stable, and Iran has not been prospering. This deal seeks to give Iran a chance at prosperity and internal stability, even with a nuclear industry, in exchange for less aggression and regional calm. If it works, then Obama would actually deserve a Nobel Peace Prize.

Dan Morgan-Russell

This is not that big of an accomplishment. There is no deal yet; there is only an agreement on the framework of a deal. Baby steps don’t count when nuclear weapons are involved.

Furthermore, is this drawn-out and likely fruitless diplomatic effort even worth it?

President Obama is wasting too much time, effort and political capital on this deal with Iran to call this a victory. The risks of a nuclear Iran are not that great. While I normally disagree with neorealists like American political scientist Kenneth Waltz, I agree that letting Iran get the bomb would not radically change the Middle Eastern political landscape. Israel, with its sizeable nuclear arsenal, will still be there in the morning. Saudi Arabia, Syria and other regional powers will not begin building their own weapons. The president needs to save his political capital in the Middle East for combatting IS or encouraging the Palestinian peace process.

If Iran will not come to the table so the US can focus on bigger fish, then leave the table and let the sanctions and the centrifuges continue.

Jason Tse

I tend to be a bit of an optimist about US-Iran relations. While it is true that this is at most a medium-term agreement with plenty of barriers to a final agreement by June, today’s news was an encouraging step in the process.

Others have spoken on security implications, so I’d like to present other reasons why the US should continue pushing towards an agreement with Iran, and why the lifting of sanctions is good not only for Iran, but also for the US.

The reasons are twofold: commercial and cultural. Iran’s economic woes are pronounced due to the sanctions. Conversely, the economic potential of Iran is robust. Consider that in 2014, the IMF calculated Iran’s nominal GDP as 32nd in the world, ahead of countries such as South Africa, Malaysia and Chile. 2013 UN data estimate Iran to be 27th, ahead of even Taiwan and Thailand. If Iran achieved this under crippling isolation, I can only imagine what greater integration into the global economy will yield for both ends of the economic relationship.

More intangibly, increased exposure between Americans and Iranians can inspire new and currently unimaginable ideas. Iran stands on a rich history, whereas modern American culture holds strong appeal among Iranians. There is much to learn from each other. Greater connectivity also tends to reduce the chances of serious conflict, much like how chances of conflict between China and the US are significantly mitigated given the levels of contact between everyday peoples.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Correction: The previous version of Jack’s response erroneously mentioned “Sunnis, Shia, Jews and Americans” as key players in the nuclear agreement. The article has been corrected to list Saudis, Iranians, Israelis and Americans.

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The last century has seen the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) and the countries that form it repeatedly fall into disarray and instability. Authoritarian regimes led by dictators and monarchs have oppressed millions of people and killed thousands more. Ethnic clashes and religious divides create borders not recognized by the international system. This perpetual conflict forces the governments of the “legitimate” states that enfold these conflicts to resort to brutal ways of retaining a semblance of stability. As the region falls into further disarray with the Islamic State (IS) invading Syrian and Iraqi territory this past summer and fall, and, since then, imposing the most austere form of Sharia law over those conquered, the world wonders why such extensive, unending atrocities continue to occur.

The borders separating the MENA countries were drawn by British and French imperialists in the early 20^th century with no regard for the ethnic, religious and ideological divides of the people inhabiting the region. The unnatural borders largely explain why MENA as a region has been so unstable and, with the exception of Tunisia, yet unable to form true democracy. The state borders are unnatural for the people living there, and, almost a century after they were drawn, are beginning to break down.

In past centuries, the geopolitics of the MENA region have been defined by ideological conflict between religions and sects, in addition to smaller wars over the rich resources and land. During the height of the Ottoman Empire’s power in the 17^th, 18^th, and 19^th centuries, the vast spread of the Empire’s lands created a common market under which the region could unite. Eventually, the Ottomans also opened the area to European imperial and colonial powers that were interested in securing ownership of the region’s resources, as well as controlling land access to Asian markets. At the fall of the Ottoman Empire, European powers such as France, Britain and Italy took control of the region and divided it amongst themselves based on their interests. These colonial powers expanded their empires and imposed their own (usually oppressive) forms of governance and law, thereby creating the basis for deeply held anti-Western sentiments within MENA’s civil populations.

However, the existence of oil in the MENA region has shaped the region’s role as a paramount focus of the rest of the world. The innovations of oil extraction – and the discovery of the world’s greatest oil deposits throughout the MENA region – sealed the region’s fate as a strategic foreign policy interest for the rest of the world. Oil is the global economy’s lifeblood, and thus it penetrates the crucial interests of all states. Such reliance on one resource forces states to engage in the global economy, especially when dealing with the politics of the “arteries” – oil pipelines – that physically connect countries through trade.

In one sense, the global reliance on oil allows the MENA countries containing oil deposits – especially those located in the Persian Gulf that possess a great proportion of the oil fields – to affect the global economy with their manipulation of oil prices, and, in turn, reap enormous economic benefits. We’re seeing a dramatic example of this price manipulation today as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is blamed for the current oil glut and sharp drop of prices, which is negatively affecting the global oil companies and the global market.

When a government is able to garner the vast majority of its income from its own natural resources, the government does not need to rely on taxes from the populace for income. It will therefore be less likely to acknowledge the political preferences of the population, and more likely to form an authoritarian and/or monarchical state than a democratic one; this type of government is called a rentier state. As a result, the vast monetary benefits of the oil economy on the MENA region points to the main consequence of this resource monopoly: that the oil-rich states have also historically been politically oppressive of their citizens. The nature of the relationship between the populace and the government leads to repeated instances of unrest, instability and human rights violations in every oil-rich MENA country, bar none. This social and political flux is one side effect of the “resource curse,” a concept that describes the comparatively slow political, economic and social development of countries with an abundance of natural resources in relation to countries without such extensive assets.

The external effects of the global oil market have reinforced these negative political tendencies. Powerful Western governments, in particular the US, prioritize oil and the stability of the oil markets as a vital national interest. In order to control access to the oil – a position for which the world powers heavily jockeyed during and after the Cold War – the US and its Western allies facilitated the overthrow of any Arab leaders not sympathetic to Western interests. At the same time, the US also placed and supported certain leaders who would most likely ensure political stability and protect US oil interests. In most, if not all, of these cases, these new leaders overly oppressed the populace in order to prevent political opposition and rebellion. This constant oppression throughout MENA explains why the region is the most militarized in the world; authoritarian Arab states’ militaries are funded by the US and other Western governments so that stability – both within and between the MENA states, and regardless of the consequences to the populace – is ensured.

But the regional standard of oppression and Western control was to end abruptly with the intraregional popular uprisings that began in 2011. The Arab Spring three years ago was supposed to represent a symbol of pan-Arabism – the unity of all Arabs prioritized over nationalistic or even ethnic or religious boundaries – and a sign of solidarity against the constant oppression of the people, regardless of ideology or background. Yet, the oil-rich Gulf States failed to join the Spring movement, and some of the offending regimes were able to retain power. Now, the ethnic and ideological boundaries are once again creating widespread instability.

In these ways, largely driven by not only the global dominance of the oil market, but also the geopolitical history of the region long before oil was discovered, it is possible to see why the MENA region has continuously remained unstable and insecure. Regional geopolitics also explain why the Arab Spring of 2011 was so surprising to scholars of the region, why authoritarian regimes and bureaucratic monarchies continue to rule the region despite the democratization of much of the rest of the world, and why US interests have focused so singularly on a region without prioritizing the well-being of the people there. The future of the MENA region, from that of its literal borders to the existence of its governments, is still cloudy and may continue to remain so until the region settles into an identity acceptable to all the countries, groups, religions and people who must share its space.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

The post The Contemporary Geopolitics Series: The Middle East and North Africa appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Luke Phillips

Finally. Decades after the Castro regime ceased being a true geopolitical threat, the US and Cuba will finally begin the long, slow process of formalizing their relationship, thawing it out of the Cold War-era stalemate and opening the way for something new and potentially fruitful.

A quick look at the map of the Caribbean reveals that, if controlled by a hostile power, Cuba could be a dagger pointed at the heart of the US. But, if controlled by a power friendly to US interests, it could easily prove a huge boon to the economy of the Greater Caribbean–the necessary piece for a great network of ports, refineries and passageways from which the mineral and agricultural goods of the US and Mexican heartlands might be improved and offered to the world. This network was the diamond in the eyes of pre-Castro US and Latin American statesmen, but the Cuban Revolution halted it in its tracks. Now that there can be real economic and political progress between the US and Cuba, expect all the Caribbean countries, especially the US, Mexico and Cuba, to reap the benefits of a rejuvenated trade network in the Greater Caribbean Basin.

Jack Anderson

It’s nice to see that Cuba is no longer a potential destination for the Marine Corps. Cuba now needs to become a destination for the Peace Corps. Under US embargoes, Cuban economic development stalled for years. For instance, stories of well-educated doctors abandoning their medical profession to drive taxis were commonplace. Furthermore, the Castro regime’s reform efforts have not been able to bring many improvements. Revived US-Cuba and Latin America-Cuba relations may provide the spark needed for development (and possibly the emigration of Cubans from Miami to Havana).

Additionally, this reconciliation gives Cuba greater international recognition for its role in the Colombia-FARC negotiations, which have been traditionally held in Havana. Reconciling with the US and brokering a peace settlement in Latin America’s longest running conflict may very well put Raul Castro in contention for a Nobel Peace Prize, if he can pull it off successfully.

Biz Peabody

Obama noted that reopening the US-Cuba relationship is geared towards “renewing our leadership in the Americas” and that this sudden policy change — if it gets through Congress — is clearly going to boost what has been a steadily declining economic situation for the Cuban people.

But let’s look at this issue from an international perspective: the US, though certainly correct to pursue this policy shift for the good of Cuba, its people, and US business and ideological interests, needs to be wary of how the international community will view the new partnership. US allies in other parts of the world are bound to question this 180-degree policy shift towards a regime that has been an ideological enemy for fifty years. Our allies in the Middle East, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which are primarily concerned with IS’s territorial advancements and the extent of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, have relied almost exclusively on US commitment to their causes. Now, after a few years of watching the US teeter back and forth between potential rapprochement with Iran and, more recently, flirt with an official alliance with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in the face of the IS crisis, long-term US allies have to watch as the US fixes its relations with an oppressive, communist regime without demanding or requiring any real changes on Cuba’s part. Who’s not to say the Obama administration will pull another wildcard from its deck and do the same with Iran — and this time, at the expense of valuable, long-standing alliances?

Nathaniel Haas

While the decision by the Obama administration to normalize relations with the Cuban government is important for both geopolitical and economic reasons, it is mostly significant for an entirely different reason.

Beginning to normalize relations did not happen in a vacuum isolated from domestic political factors. US policy towards Cuba has been obsolete for years; the 1996 Helm’s Burton Act that codified the embargo was only passed after the Cuban air force shot down two civilian planes operated by a Miami-based Anti-Castro cohort. If normalizing relations was so important from an economic and foreign policy perspective, then it would have been done long ago. Instead, the unique political position of the Obama administration made steps toward normalization both possible and practical.

The political genius of Obama’s decision is threefold. First, with midterm elections out of the way, the announcement at reconciliation signals Obama’s desire to leave a legacy as a President not afraid to act on his own and who refuses to be encumbered by Congressional gridlock. Second, with an incoming Republican majority in both houses of Congress and an upcoming Presidential election, the decision could not be more timely. While the President was able to unilaterally ease some travel and trade restrictions, only Congress can totally lift both the travel ban and the embargo on economic activity originally put in place in 1996. Doing so has already exposed divisions between potential Republican Presidential nominees: it was assailed by Florida conservatives Marco Rubio and Jeb Bush, but embraced by Libertarian Rand Paul. Third and finally, polls reveal the decision is widely popular among the young Latino voting base, not just in the Cuban-heavy and perennially important swing state of Florida, but across the country–another valuable contribution to the Democrat effort to hold the White House come 2016.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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In the 2012 Burmese elections, Aung San Suu Kyi – the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) – won a seat in parliament after spending years under house arrest. Her triumph represented a shift in the power wielded by the ruling military dictatorship. Though the transition to a true democracy is unfinished, Suu Kyi’s election placed Burma/Myanmar in a positive global spotlight.[1] Such a peaceful transition contrasts that of Egypt, which appears to be returning to military-dominated governance only three years after a popular coup ousted Hosni Mubarak and six decades of authoritarian regime. Despite the two countries’ vastly different histories, identities and economic and international interests, can Burma’s success story be a potential analog for Egypt?

Military dictatorships are not uncommon in today’s world, especially in developing countries. This is perhaps because civil society widely considers militaries to be the most capable institution to rule, or because the military is able to organize itself enough to claim power over a burgeoning democratic movement. The current prevalence of this form of government, in which the military institution controls the politics and governance of the nation-state, is thought to exist mainly as a leftover of the Cold War era bipolar order in which the United States and the Soviet Union “collected” allies to their cause. Training developing countries’ militaries to control public resistance within its borders – instead of existing solely to protect citizens from enemies coming from outside – was the cornerstone of a US Cold War foreign policy termed “national security doctrine.”[2] The US retained allies by providing military and financial aid, and teaching foreign governments to recognize and destroy communist cells. In return, these countries would remain loyal to the US cause, championing democracy and capitalism.

As a result of this Cold War doctrine, the highly trained military emerged as the dominant institution within developing countries. These institutions were easily able to take control of the government and, believing their own systems and bureaucracy to be most well-equipped to run the country, assumed political control. In many of these cases, global society did not object to these military governments, because the great powers were more focused on retaining allies than on the rights of the people living within the allied countries. The problem with favoring the power of the military over the rights of the people, though, is that eventually these policies will have consequences—the populace can only be repressed for so long before they will rebel against the government.

The key to working around the interests of these powerful militaries, whose interests lie more in retaining power than in providing quality lives for their people, is to co-opt the institution into having a stake in democracy. In Burma, the efforts and sacrifices of Suu Kyi and NLD were certainly effective in battling the dictatorship on both the global and domestic levels using her image as a human rights icon.

However, it could be argued that the key actor in affecting this ideological change in the military is actually the global economic system. Burma is rich in natural resources, and has struggled with China, which is attempting to turn Burma into a quasi-vassal state. Since Burma has demonstrated what could be the beginning of a successful transition towards democracy it has begun to establish economic and political relations with the US. The US, meanwhile, is interested in Burma’s success because it has interests in competing with and containing China, and being seen as a global supporter of democracy. In this way, Burma’s military elites have slowly been co-opted into ceding power to the democratic government: with increased levels of democracy come increased levels of investment in the country. In November 2015, it will be interesting to note how the military responds to the coming elections, and particularly whether it will allow Suu Kyi to run for the presidential seat she covets.

In Egypt, the opposite transition is taking place, and it remains to be seen whether cooptation of the military, as has occurred in Burma, could eventually save the potential for Egyptian democracy. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the former defense minister and army Field Marshal, was “elected” to the Egyptian presidency in June 2014. Amidst the excitement of “elections” in Egypt, it was clear that they were not exactly democratic; Sisi won the presidency with 96% of the vote, with only one opponent taking 4% and the rest of the political parties abstaining from the elections in protest against the military and its treatment of opposition groups.

The military, which has trained and educated every Egyptian president since Nasser’s Free Officers movement, has always retained some level of control on Egypt’s fate. In 2011, during the Arab uprisings, the military refused to side with authoritarian president Mubarak and allowed the popular uprising to succeed, before it took over interim control of the government as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). Even once elections were held in Egypt, the military retained tight control of politics, executing a coup to remove the democratically elected Mohamed Morsi from office and massacring hundreds of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.

It has become clear that the Egyptian military, with Sisi as president and a literal army of his military allies surrounding him in government, is in absolute control of state politics. Global society has not denounced this takeover. This could be because allied states have prioritized the military regime’s suppression of Islamist movements over the establishment of democracy. The US and its allies want a stable Egypt for many strategic reasons; forcing the military to hold true elections and effectively deposing Sisi and his military elite system would throw the country into greater chaos. Egypt’s military has enjoyed significant influence in the country’s politics since independence in 1952: what actor would fill the power vacuum if the military were to be entirely sidelined?

Egyptians have already cited countless human rights violations, including the massacres occurring against dissenters to Sisi’s regime. The media is also being curtailed: Bassem Youssef’s political satire television show was cancelled and al-Jazeera journalists have been jailed and sentenced to life in prison. The judicial system now allows the military to try civilians without logical justification. Human rights are slowly disappearing in Egypt, and, currently, no countries have the means or the interest to coerce the military into ceding power, especially when the state of the global economic system makes it beneficial to the US and its allies to keep Egypt stable.

As demonstrated by the evolving experience in Burma, the only way to regain at least a semblance of democracy in Egypt is to co-opt the military into a democratic agenda by providing it with interests in further structural reforms. The actors who can accomplish this, and how they will do so, remains to be seen. But it is through observing the potentially successful transitional steps occurring in countries like Burma that those working towards democratic reform in Egypt can convince the military to cede some of its power and truly adopt positive change in Egypt.

Correction: The previous version of this article mistakenly identified the National Democratic Party, or NDP, as a major political party in Burma. No such party exists. The article has been corrected and identifies the National League for Democracy, or NLD, as the opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Other Works Cited

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Tunisia will hold parliamentary elections at the end of October. A month later, presidential elections will follow. To see a country in the Middle East preparing to hold democratic elections, particularly in the current climate of regional instability, is nothing short of remarkable. And yet, a cursory Google search of the world’s major news outlets offers few descriptions or analyses of these elections and the Tunisian political parties angling for victory.

The lack of media coverage on these upcoming elections isn’t entirely puzzling—the region is in turmoil. The conflict with IS has, understandably, dominated regional coverage of the Middle East for the past few months. The Syrian civil war is unending. Last year, the Egyptian military pulled off a coup removing their democratically elected president and replacing him with a military general whose impact on Egypt is still unclear. The fact that conflict is currently dominating the Middle East / North Africa region (MENA) unfortunately means that Tunisia’s success – the state’s institutional and psychological capacity to hold what hopefully will be a free and fair democratic election – is greatly overshadowed.

However, the path to these elections hasn’t been easy. Tunisia, like many of the Arab countries in the Middle East, was ruled for decades by an authoritarian leadership that favored capitalist cronyism and suppressed dissention, including the demand for basic human rights. Conditions in Tunisia before 2011 were horrendous for those who were not part of the small circle of profiteers circling the country’s leader, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. It took a 26-year old Tunisian fruit seller, Mohamed Boazizi, to self-immolate in protest of the immense injustice of Tunisia’s corrupt society to spread the fervor of revolution to the rest of the country. Within weeks, that fervor had spread all over MENA in what is known as the Arab Spring or the Arab uprisings.

The Arab uprisings began in Tunisia, and the first democratic elections in MENA post-Spring were held in Tunisia just six months after Ben Ali was forced to flee the country. Now, three years after the revolution, Tunisia is also the first of the affected countries to hold what many scholars agree will be free and fair democratic parliamentary elections.

The biggest and most organized political party in Tunisia, and arguably the one that has had the greatest impact on the country’s path to democracy since the uprising three years ago, is the Ennahda Movement (“the Renaissance Movement” in Arabic). Ennahda was the majority party of Tunisia’s first elected government back in 2011. After two years of controversial policies and two assassinations of opposition leaders by Islamist groups, Ennahda faced harsh criticisms that the party had not been able to satisfactorily run the government. As a result, Ennahda voluntarily, albeit with significant political pressure stepped down from its majority seat in the government in January 2014, ceding power to a caretaker government until a new round of elections could be held. Despite Ennahda’s missteps in being able to efficiently govern the country for the first two and a half years of democracy, the party’s willingness to step down from power signaled a significant shift from the authoritarian party politics so common in the region to a more democratic mindset.

The contrast of Ennahda’s action to that of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood party, which refused to step down from power and was removed by a military coup, became especially stark. Though the results of both of these cases in Tunisia and Egypt did eventually lead to democratic elections, Egypt’s path has been significantly rockier. Thousands of Muslim Brotherhood supporters have been massacred or jailed and sentenced to death, while the elections back in June yielded 96% of the vote to military leader Al-Sisi – hinting that the elections were not exactly democratic. Meanwhile, Tunisia is prepping for parliamentary and presidential elections – and Ennahda has voluntarily removed itself from the presidential elections in November so as to ensure an inclusive government in Tunisia this time around.

The nature of Ennahda and its decision-making, the rocky but direct path to democracy and constitutional reform that Tunisia has undergone, and the individuals working towards the end goal of the first truly democratically elected Arab government are, when viewed in the context of the rest of the region, clearly something of an anomaly. It is for this reason that, in the coming weeks, the media needs to start paying attention to these elections. Students of the region need to start examining in greater depth and detail the mechanisms that have brought Tunisia to this point. And we should be questioning the democratic process as it unfolds and ensuring that it truly is “as good as it sounds.”

It is the responsibility of the media, academics and global society, which are currently too consumed by the violence occurring in the region, to shift the focus to encouraging events like those in Tunisia. How can the world believe in positive change in the Middle East if all we see of the region is religious fanaticism and ethno-cultural conflicts? And how can those living in the region develop any hope for the future, or any strategies for improvement? How else can regional leaders and political parties understand that working together – not shutting out opposition with violence – is the only way to move forward as a country? Simply focusing more on these elections in Tunisia, and directing some of the attention away from airstrikes on IS, will build much needed global, regional and national confidence in the Middle East. It will encourage those working towards these elections in Tunisia to ensure that the elections truly are as democratic and inclusive as they are advertised. And it will force the leaders, parliaments, parties and people of other Middle Eastern countries to consider how they might best end years of conflict.

It is by observing the successes and failures that Tunisia has experienced in the last few years that other countries will be able to learn about their own systems’ potential for change. True enough, the eyes of Middle East regional specialists will be trained on Tunisia for the next two months, but that’s not good enough. We must look behind us at Tunisia’s past in order to move forward in building security in the Middle East in the future.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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Several years ago, I studied abroad for the summer in Madrid, Spain. The best friend of my Spanish host sister had just left Madrid to study at a boarding school in Barcelona. I remember listening to her talk to my host sister on the phone, and hearing her stories when she returned to Madrid for visits. “It’s like another country over there,” she said. “I can’t even speak the language.” Barcelona, the capital of the Spanish region known as Catalonia, is a mere four-hour drive from Madrid, and yet, as I learned during my first summer living in Spain, all Spaniards – no matter what region they come from – think of Catalonia as a foreign land.

The Catalans think no differently. They believe in their autonomy from the rest of the country. They purposefully speak their own language, Catalan – not the Castilian Spanish that the rest of the country and the Spanish-speaking world use. No wonder my host sister’s friend had so much trouble – Catalans intentionally foster an independent language and culture than those of every other Spaniard.

For many centuries, the histories of Catalan and Spain were linked only by geographic proximity. The first text in the Catalan language was published in the 12^th century, and the Catalan Parliament was first assembled in 1283. But, in 1410, the crown of the House of Barcelona was passed to Ferdinand of Aragon, who married Isabella I of Castile, and the two regions united what is more or less modern day Spain. The Castilians did not take long to overpower the Catalan people and gain control of the peninsula. Over the following 300 years, the Catalans repeatedly attempted to regain their independence, until they backed the losing Hapsburg side in the War of Spanish Succession. On September 11^th, 1714, Catalonia officially lost all remaining independent political freedoms, and rejoined Spain once again. Two years later, Barcelona lost its capital city status to Madrid, and the Catalan language was banned from the country.

But the people and the region have not forgotten their original goal. Just last week, on September 11^th, the 300^th anniversary of the loss of Catalan independence, hundreds of thousands of Catalans took to the streets around the region to demonstrate and raise awareness for the latest campaign for freedom.

These demonstrations were also timed purposefully to shadow the Scottish referendum voting campaigns that seek to grant Scotland independence from the UK. While there are of course many differences between the two semiautonomous states – smaller regions existing with some level of political and economic autonomy within larger, internationally recognized nation states – of Scotland and Catalonia, perhaps the greatest difference between the two regions’ quest for independence is their freedom to seek it. The UK granted Scotland a vote, meaning that it’s now up to the Scottish people to vote “yes” for independence or “no” to stay in the UK.

As of now, there is no such choice in Catalonia. The Spanish government has declared the secession of any region of Spain unconstitutional. Therefore, the government will not grant Catalonia the same vote given to Scotland by the UK. What’s more, the Spanish constitution gives the Spanish military the right to intervene in order to keep the union of the country whole: Catalonia could face war if they push independence too far.

Even if Catalonia was granted the right to vote for independence from Spain, and even if a majority of the people voted to secede, there would certainly be enormous obstacles to face as a new country – similar obstacles to what Scotland would have to deal with if they vote to secede this week. The economic burden of separating from the ‘mother country’, the political burden of building new alliances and relationships with other states and becoming members of the EU, the social burden of creating a new collective identity: all of these problems and more would have to be faced head on by the Catalans in economically damaged global and regional systems that require alliances to affect change. It would be a daunting task to build a new country in today’s climate, and the Spanish government is working very hard to remind the Catalans of this reality.

Regardless of these challenges, the Catalans are focused unwaveringly on the freedom they believe has been taken from them for 600 years. The President of Catalonia, Artur Mas, has said that the Catalans understand that independence would have its costs. What the Catalans want most of all, though, is their share in democracy – and for the Spanish government to give the Catalans their own choice and a vote for independence. “Catalans want to vote,” Mas said. “We want to vote in order to become masters of our own future.”

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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The CNN app on my phone, which informs me of global and domestic events multiple times throughout the day, has stopped mentioning the current Gaza crisis. Is my phone getting tired of hearing about these continuous attempts to broker successful peace talks between Israel and Hamas? Is it losing faith in diplomacy’s ability to instill some kind of change in this conflict? Is that also why the media’s reporting on this crisis has slowly trickled out?

In the past two weeks, the Egyptian-sponsored talks between the two sworn enemies first fell apart when Hamas rejected a US-backed, Israeli-supported peace proposal; Hamas cited that none of its demands were met. Rockets and airstrikes were exchanged until last Tuesday, when the Egyptians brokered a new ceasefire. The new proposal appears only slightly more neutral, however, directing Israel to loosen its hold over Gaza’s border only to allow humanitarian organizations to begin rebuilding. But the accepted proposal does not directly address the larger issues of the Israeli blockade on Gaza and Hamas’ demands for a seaport and airport. Egypt promises to reopen negotiations within the month to address these larger issues. It’s not surprising that Egypt has been playing such a patient role in these negotiations, though: the country has a lot riding on peace between these two entities.

I want to get something straight first. It’s not unusual that Egypt has taken up the role as peacemaker. Historically, Egypt has pushed and prodded its image as the “Arab leader” of the Middle Eastern states: it is by far the most populated country in the region, has for the most part kept up a strong military alliance with the United States and was the first Arab country to acknowledge Israel as a state when Egypt’s leader, Anwar Sadat, signed the Camp David Accords in 1978. In this sense, it isn’t hard to see why Egypt is and has for many years taken a lead role in facilitating peace between Palestine and Israel whenever conflicts arise. If Egypt succeeds in establishing peace, even if for a little while, then it will be praised for its diplomatic genius by the US and regional peers. And, if Egyptian diplomats fail, well, at least they tried, right?

Yet, what is so curious about this round of conflict resolution is that the Egyptian cease-fire proposal has continuously favored Israel’s interests. In the original proposal, the Israeli blockade of Gaza’s borders and economy would simply be loosened, not lifted, and Israel would be allowed to retain its hold on the Gaza territory: unacceptable conditions from Hamas’ perspective. In the past, failure to appease the Palestinian delegation would result in Egypt rushing to fix its proposal to better suit both sides; favoritism towards the Palestinians – Egypt’s Arab allies – was not uncommon. This time was different: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan called on Hamas to accept the proposal. Since when does the Arab world conspicuously side with Israel over Palestine? And since when do the Arab states in the Middle East region support the Jewish state over another Arab one?

This is no longer about the Arabs of the region versus the Israelis. It’s about stamping out Islamism and every one of its far-reaching tendrils, which includes groups like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (both of which, by the way, are internationally recognized terrorist organizations). Even the powerful Arab governments in Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which may have funded extremist Sunni religious groups in the past, are quickly denying any involvement in these groups’ actions once the groups gain power in the region. These Arab governments, regardless of their alleged shared interests with these groups in the past, are terrified of Islamism once it is powerful enough to threaten their national security. Because of Islamism’s proven ability to topple regimes, they consider such terrorist groups a direct threat to their security. It’s a complicated situation that varies for each government and their relations with each group, but, as pertains to the current Palestinian-Israeli crisis, the Arab governments are willing to put aside their previous fervent dislike for Israel if it means they might be able to destroy Hamas.

The reason why this issue hits so close to home for Egypt is clear if we look at its recent past. Not too long ago, Egypt elected President Mohammad Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood party—a political choice that disintegrated fairly quickly when Morsi and his party began showing signs of taking more liberties than democracy would allow. The Egyptian military ousted Morsi and, since this past June, has put Al-Sisi, a military man, in his place. Al-Sisi, for his part, is determined to destroy any remnant of the Brotherhood in Egypt. He has declared them a terrorist organization and has in the past year imprisoned and killed many of their followers. With Hamas, too, Al-Sisi is clear about his position, announcing in a statement that Hamas, and not Israel, is to blame for the countless civilian deaths in Palestine throughout the crisis this summer. Even the Egyptian media condemns Hamas for being a “tool of a regional Islamist plot” to destabilize Egypt yet again.

So, for arguably the first time, the states leading the Arab region find their interests aligned with those of Israel. It is in the best interests of both to delegitimize and destroy Hamas, and both will work together towards achieving this goal. Does this mean Israel has finally found its regional niche in this united Arab-Israeli fight against a terrorist group? Perhaps—though with the current uncertainty in the region it’s hard to tell in the long run, and long-held biases don’t necessarily die so easily. For now, though, Egypt and its peers are focused wholeheartedly on the desperate quest for regional stability.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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Biz Peabody

Nationalism: long thought to be one of the strongest forces in the world. The exact definition of nationalism is the amalgamation of feelings, principles and efforts in the name of patriotic pride for one’s nation or country. The psychological concept of nationalism has always been present in humans, because we’re “programmed” to identify with our groups – our “herds” – who we work with to ensure our survival as individuals and as a species.

What we’re witnessing as these two crises in Gaza and Ukraine unfold is a phenomenon that is becoming clearer as the world globalizes: the clash of nationalism and technology. In the past, the only way for a nation to defend itself was through large-scale war against other nations, but technology is allowing smaller entities to assert themselves on the global stage. In the tragedy of 9/11, it became clear that large-scale war was no longer the paradigm. A group – Al-Qaeda – was able to wage war on the hegemon – the US – and the hegemon was forced to wage its “War on Terror” on an ideology.

In a similar group-against-nation dynamic, the war between Hamas and Israel is driven by nationalist sentiments, and so is the war fought between Ukraine against its pro-Russian rebels. Aside from the tragedies these two conflicts have created – most recently pro-Russian rebels shooting down commercial flight MH-17, and the 500+ deaths in Gaza and Israel – the conflicts reveal that it is becoming easier for smaller and smaller groups to assert their own brand of nationalism on bigger and bigger entities. Diplomatic efforts to end these conflicts, therefore, must begin focusing more on the global, collective good and less on emphasizing “peace talks” between warring nations. Continuing to simply call for peace between nationalistic entities only underlines differences between groups, which in turn strengthens nationalistic mentalities and further separates peoples.

Jason Tse

Two major crises could not come at a more inopportune time. Now the United States faces trouble on three fronts: the ISIS crisis in Iraq, the MH-17 disaster, and the war in Gaza.

I wrote in a recent piece for Glimpse about how rapprochement with Iran was expedient for our interests in the Middle East. In the US-Iran engagement, Russia had always positioned itself as a close partner with Iran, able to sway Iran to a favorable agreement similar to China’s promises on North Korea.

But, the MH-17 disaster complicates things. Facts are still surfacing, but with the US Intelligence Community confirming that the weapon systems used to shoot down MH-17 were moved quietly back to Russia and Putin’s public attempts to shift blame onto Kiev, it is almost certain that Russian-backed and armed rebels shot down the plane.

This leads the US to a new dilemma: choosing which foe represents the larger threat: Russia or Iran. While it is clear that Russia must be held accountable, the US should take care not to completely back the bear into a corner. At the same time, greater action against Russia, which seems likely considering the global outrage, would signal that a rapprochement with Iran is no longer merely expedient to fighting the ISIS crisis, but necessary now that Iran’s partnership (or at least being out of Russia’s orbit) is required to address both ISIS and Russia. This unfortunately gives the Iranian hand a significant boost as the Americans and Iranians return to the table for extended negotiations.

Luke Phillips

I don’t have too many thoughts on either crisis boiling up this week, not the one in Gaza or the one in Ukraine. I do have thoughts, however, on what the American and overall Western reaction will be to each.

If the timeline of the Ukraine crisis up to this point is any guide, then I think it can safely be said that there won’t be very much in the way of policy innovation in the wake of the tragedy of MH-17. Sure, a few more impassioned speeches will be made in Brussels and Washington about heavier sanctions on Moscow, and much energy will be expended in the time-tested act of finger-waving. But no one in the European Union or US has the political will to make truly meaningful actions against Putin’s Russia, and I don’t necessarily think they should. MH-17, for the tragedy it is, is not particularly important. But, if Russia’s actions began to directly threaten the Baltic States or Poland, then we might see some shuffling of feet in the West.

As for Gaza, that’s even easier. The fight will go on for a few weeks or months, Palestinian and Israeli apologists will absolve themselves and accuse the other side, and one happy autumn day the flag of truce will go up. Give it three years, maybe less, and there will be peace talks in America again. Another few years and they’ll be back at war. However, shifting geopolitical dynamics in the broader Middle East might alter the equation somewhat. In particular, if Iranian-American relations normalize, and the US distances itself from Israel, the Jewish State may be compelled to engage in more vigorous diplomacy. Conversely, if the massive war underway in neighboring Syria and Iraq spreads into Jordan, a more security-paranoid Israel could take aggressive measures in Gaza and even the West Bank to forestall the violence from penetrating its borders.

Time will tell. Prudence is all we can ask of our leaders, restraint all we can ask of those abroad.

Abigail Becker

Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in November 2013, the fighting in Crimea has unfortunately involved many civilians. Because of the nature of the fighting, the death of more innocent people is not surprising. What distinguishes the attack on MH-17 from previous conflicts is the international nature of the event. The crisis in Ukraine has, of course, been an international headline from the start, but for most people beyond the Ukraine/Russia border, it has remained a distant threat. The crash of MH-17 shatters that feeling of safe separation. Almost every continent was represented on the flight, and a number of countries issued statements of sadness and anger. The Netherlands, which lost 193 citizens, has been particularly vocal, and rightfully so.

To make matters worse, the rebels handled the aftermath of the crash with an unbelievable lack of tact and decency. The bodies of the victims were hidden for days after the crash in train cars and the crash site was kept on strict lockdown. Unsurprisingly, there has been no apology from the rebels, Putin or the Ukrainian government. All parties have instead chosen to play the blame game – though most everyone agrees the Russians and rebels are responsible. The botched handling of the victims’ bodies has only increased tensions and polarized the opposing sides. This is no longer a crisis between a state and rebels—it is a conflict between the rebels and Putin, and angered people around the world.

Luodanni Chen

Let’s talk facts. The 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine began on February 23, 2014. During the past five months, two Ukrainian military planes have been shot down in the region: one in June and one just three days before the attack on MH-17. The plane crash in June has been identified as the work of pro-Russian separatists. The large Ukrainian military transport jet was shot down using a shoulder-fired missile when the jet was trying to land at an airport in Luhansk. One month later, another military plane was shot down when it was flying at 6,500 meters. This distance is well beyond the range of shoulder-fired missiles. Ukrainian officials speculated that a more powerful missile had brought down the plane, and the missile was perhaps fired from territories within the Russian Federation. A powerful anti-aircraft weapon that is capable of doing such damage is called the Buk surface-to-air missile. The Buk missile system was developed by the Soviet Union and was in service since 1979. Buk is “capable of detecting air targets at ranges of up to 160 km and hitting them at full altitude range at a distance of over 30 km,” according to the Russian Defense Ministry information. Obama has already confirmed the use of surface-to-air missile in the MH-17 disaster on July 18^th. By connecting these dots, Putin has his fingerprints all over this. What is his next play and how will the international community respond?

Kshitij Kumar

Both the Gaza crisis and the Malaysian Airlines tragedy have resulted in unfortunate, devastating civilian deaths. These were 800+ individuals (400 noncombatants and counting in Gaza, 298 on MH-17) that had no say, no involvement in either conflict. They were casualties of crossfire, and whether their deaths are labeled accidents or unfortunate necessities resulting from the use of civilians as human shields, the loss of innocent life is unjust and disturbing. While the technology of war has evolved to allow high precision targeting and supposedly minimize collateral damage, clearly, this is not what is happening. To add insult to injury, the deaths are being politicized! Headlines earlier suggest that the remains of the dead of the Malaysian aircraft are pieces in an international political ‘game’; a Wall Street Journal article suggested that the very election of Hamas in Gaza forfeited civilians’ rights to be safe from war. The sanctity of life no longer seems to have any value; those who have lost loved ones are apparently not even allowed to mourn.

Yes, there is a bigger picture to look at—there is a greater good (everyone has a different opinion as to what that constitutes) to consider. But in these physical and verbal battles between nations, groups, passions and beliefs, it is imperative that we remember the humanity of those lost—as well as our own.

Update: Kshitij Kumar’s portion received minor corrections 

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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I heard a joke once. The joke was that Winston Churchill, who in 1921 was serving as Secretary of State of the British colonies, had created the British protectorate Transjordan (now the country of Jordan) by drawing an arbitrary line through Saudi Arabia. The odd zig-zag shape the border creates is supposedly the result of Churchill’s hiccups following a particularly drunken lunch.

Some joke, when thousands of people are displaced because of a hiccup. But whether or not Churchill told this story in jest, and whether or not he really had one too many the day he created the border between what is now Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the fact remains that it is no joke, and no secret, that the borders of the Middle East were artificially created by the French and British almost one hundred years ago. Today, the world watches in disbelief as many of the Middle Eastern countries repeatedly collapse into instability.

It’s important to study the history of this instability before proposing solutions. In 1915, the Ottoman Empire had been watching its power decline in the face of European global domination for almost two hundred years. Its final, fatal mistake was joining World War I on the side of Germany. As the war continued, it became clear that the Ottoman Empire was not going to survive. Britain and France, the two imperial powerhouses at the time, signed a secret pact called the Sykes-Picot Agreement, splitting the Ottoman territories of the Middle East based on their strategic interests. The agreement drew the borders of (roughly) modern day Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine and Egypt. It placed each state under the control of either French or British mandate, allowing the two powers to rule those territories “until each mandated state was judged fit to govern itself.”

The system that the Sykes-Picot Agreement forged in the Middle East was not to last long. All of the states created under the agreement eventually did gain independence from their mandate powers. And all of these states have experienced at least occasional, if not continuous, instability and strife in the last one hundred years since the mandate system split them apart.

Above all, instability created by the Arab Spring in 2011 was a wake up call. Not only for the authoritarian regimes that had dominated the governments of the Middle Eastern states since “independence” who were overthrown, but also for the millions of people in the Middle East who had been living under severe repressive conditions for decades. The entire world, too, was shocked by the spread and success of the Arab Spring; few times in history have we observed the stability of an entire region completely fall apart at the same time.

It should have been clear then that if that many people were demanding and fighting for change, something was wrong with the physical nature of the Middle East and its role in global society – the Arab Spring was but a delayed reaction to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The countries that make up the region had been forced into the Westphalian system – where nation states, not ethnicities or religions, are the dividers of people – by imperialistic powers that cared only for geostrategic and economic dominance. The ethnicities, religions and politics of the people of the region had absolutely nothing to do with the borders that separated them. Could this be why the Middle East has been condemned to conflict? Has democracy never seemed to work in these countries because they cannot be governed by people who never intended to interact with each other?

This question was not voiced during the Arab Spring. The question of borders has only recently been provoked by the near-collapse of the Iraqi state under the Sunni militant group ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), which aims to create its own Islamic state under Sharia (strict Islamic law). At the time of this writing, ISIS has invaded and taken control of southwestern Syria and major northern Iraqi cities, officially declaring a caliphate – an Islamic state – in the region. Within the border of what was only a month ago the state of Iraq, there remains a makeshift Kurdish state in the northeast and the significantly weakened Shia majority government in Baghdad.

Many of the questions posed in the last few weeks by the media and global governments are centered on how to stop ISIS from destroying Iraqi and Syrian “sovereignty” – basically, the governmental “right” to control the land defined by the current, Westphalian borders. The insinuation is that ISIS does not have the right to claim the territory that it has taken over. Based on the history of the region and how it was created, though, it has been debated whether the rest of the world has a right to decide this question.

It is not disputed that ISIS has already been the cause of countless human rights violations. But, so have the Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes that found that the only way to tie together their disparate groups of citizens was to strap them together with oppression and violence. Perhaps what the Middle Eastern states need in order to finally end a century of instability is to be allowed to split by natural borders – by borders drawn based on ethnicities, religions and political groups – not by those borders created by arbitrary, imperial hiccups.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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