Trade wars are unequivocally bad; most experts agree that economic efficiency is lost and everyday consumers ultimately bear the brunt of the pain. Both the United States and China have trillions of dollars in export revenues at stake in a global trade war, and contrary to President Trump’s tweets, trade wars are neither “good” nor “easy to win.”

While still in its early stages, a trade confrontation between the two powers is rapidly brewing. The Trump Administration’s proposed $50 billion in tariffs against China are still only threats, but carry a very real possibility of being enacted if last-minute negotiations prove unsuccessful. The already escalating rhetoric between China and the United States has the potential to wreak havoc not only on the two countries, but also on the entire global economy. How can such a damaging foreign policy maneuver possibly be in the interests of the US?

Frankly, China is the single-biggest threat to the continuation of the liberal economic order. Dedicated to the principles of open markets and private property, the Bretton Woods system was established at the end of World War II and led to the creation of liberal institutions like the International Monetary Fund in 1945 and World Trade Organization in 1995.

This liberal system fostered investment and competition in developing countries that helped spread prosperity across the globe. Between 1990 to 2010, more than 1 billion people were lifted out of extreme poverty and the worldwide poverty rate was cut in half. These benefits clearly spilled over to China, where poverty rates fell from over 80% in 1980 to 6.5% in 2012. Mao Zedong’s Five Year Plans and a command economy were eventually replaced by Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy, which enacted greater capitalist reforms and opened China to foreign investors after decades of isolation. China’s gradual progress towards economic liberalization culminated in the accession of China to the WTO in 2001, symbolizing its full assimilation into this international order.

Valid Grievances

Fast-forward more than a decade and China’s market reforms have largely stalled and even started backsliding. A sixteen-year member of the WTO and the second largest economy in the world, China has abdicated its responsibility of encouraging open markets and competition. While its current protectionist policies today are nowhere near as severe as earlier hardline Communist laws, they clearly violate the liberal principles China committed to when it entered the WTO.

First, China imposes capital controls on foreign money transfers and has been controversially accused of currency manipulation in the past. Many believe that in the past China has kept the Yuan artificially devalued through foreign exchange operations.

Second, China has enacted significant hurdles to foreign investment. In certain industries like finance and automotives, China requires foreign investors to operate as joint-ventures with domestic Chinese firms. In many industries, foreign firms have to share technology and customer data with their Chinese partners in order to gain market access.

For example, in 2017, Apple was forced to comply with a new Chinese cybersecurity regulation by agreeing to store the data of all iCloud users registered in mainland-China with a national firm within Chinese borders. Significant backlash over privacy and human rights concerns erupted immediately as the move likely makes that user data available to Chinese authorities. Apple’s Chinese data host, Guizhou Cloud Big Data, is owned by the Guizhou provincial government and has ties to the national Communist Party government. Prior to this move, requests for user data had to be conducted under US privacy laws and courts. Instead, requests or search warrants for user data are now subject to negligible Chinese privacy rights. Other American-based firms like Amazon and Microsoft have similarly been forced to partner with Chinese firms in order to continue operations in China.

Third and most concerning is the intellectual property theft of American and European proprietary technology by Chinese enterprises–and the fact that President Xi Jinping’s government has largely turned a blind eye towards it.

In January 2018, Chinese wind turbine manufacturer Sinovel was found guilty of stealing the software code of a US company, ASMC. Sinvoel submitted an $800 million parts order with ASMC, but instead secretly downloaded software that the Chinese firm then used to build the parts themselves. The $50 billion value proposed by the Trump Administration’s tariffs is largely based on a seven-month investigation by US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer that valued US business losses due to IP theft by Chinese firms at between $225 billion and $600 billion annualized.

Robert Atkinson, President of the U.S. based technology think tank Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, remarked on the recent 15-year anniversary of China’s accession to the WTO that “trade with China has been one step forward, two steps back for 15 years. Each time China claims to move toward opening up trade, it turns around and introduces another new mercantilist trade barrier to counteract it.”

Historically, the United States and EU have enforced international trade policy through WTO dispute resolution mechanisms, but these have proved laughably ineffective in changing Chinese trade practices. China, unfazed by weak complaints or rulings in the WTO, has continued to impose various measures that have stifled competition and foreign investment in its economy. International condemnation has rarely succeeded in constraining Chinese behavior, whether in the military matters like the South China Sea or in trade disputes.

Time Is Running Out

The Western liberal order must strike back before it is too late–now may be its last chance to coerce China into changing its unacceptable behavior. Over the past decade, shifting market dynamics in international trade and in China’s domestic market have been gradually undermining the effectiveness of any US response.

Although China’s $375 billion trade deficit with the United States may lead some to believe it has more to lose on in an economic confrontation, other statistics show a different picture. For instance, China’s economic reliance on exports peaked in 2006 at 37% of GDP. As of 2016 that statistic was 19.64% and falling. As China’s economy further matures, rising domestic consumption will continue to diminish the leverage of the United States and EU.

However, these two trading partners still account for almost 40% of China’s exports, providing a window of real opportunity to effect change. While a trade war will absolutely hurt both the West and China in the near-term, sometimes short-term interests need to be sacrificed for greater gains down the road. To preserve the integrity of the WTO and liberal economic order that has spread so much prosperity in the world, a starkly more forceful response of retaliatory tariffs and measures is in order–and a trade war may be the only instrument left to do so.

Although a trade war will undoubtedly hurt every participant in the near-term, there is a lot more at stake to the West than $100-odd billion in exports. The current free market principles not only form the foundation of American and European economic strength, but also lead to global development by promoting democracy through the trade of goods and ideas. Without the liberal economic system, the global innovation driving human progress would be stifled by the forces of inequality and corruption.

The Flawed Response of the Trump Administration

Alarmingly, President Trump and his administration have failed to understand that a trade war could only be truly effective against Chinese practices through multilateralism. Traditional threats of raised import tariffs and tit-for-tat escalation will never move a China that is supremely confident in its economic trajectory.

The Trump Administration’s “America First” position and recently declared steel and aluminum tariffs have already proven inadequate. China is only a minor exporter to the US of both materials, giving these extremely questionable measures no real bite. Even worse, threatening European and North American allies with these same tariffs further undermines the Trump Administration’s ability to lead a united response against China. Only with a return to the roots of liberal internationalism through cooperation among a wide coalition of countries can the West achieve real progress with China.

Many in the EU institutional framework see the urgent need to uphold the values of free trade in China. European Commission Vice-President for Jobs, Growth, Investment, and Competitiveness, Jyrki Katainen told Bloomberg in April, “we expect reciprocity from China, though we understand that it doesn’t happen overnight.” EU countries from Germany to the Netherlands have similar complaints about Chinese trade policies and would likely be willing to form an international coalition with the United States.

President Trump has a point in criticizing mercantilist Chinese practices, but his ignorance of multilateralism prevents any impactful change. Cooperation between the EU, US, and other partners like Canada and Japan has significantly higher chances of success than the Trump Administration’s foolhardy approach.

However, such retaliatory measures would not represent a final solution. The United States, European Union, and China are the three biggest trading powers in the world and must continue to trade with each other in a mutually beneficial manner. A trade war could create the leverage needed by the West prior to negotiations, but a multilateral agreement is the only permanent solution that could concretely open China’s market.

There is immense political pressure on Trump and Xi as they seek a deal that allows China to save face while making the necessary concessions. But China will not be bullied— the West would need to offer significant incentives in any deal. America and the EU would need to lower certain tariffs or sign investment deals, while in return China would have to take very significant steps towards liberalizing its domestic economy to foreign investors.

A trade war is only beneficial if a long-term pact is the legitimate goal both parties seek. The frightening question is whether Trump or Xi are even entertaining this possibility.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Katya Lopatko: A Win for Centrists

“On Sunday, the people of France annoyingly retained their traditional right to claim intellectual superiority over Americans.” The New Yorker’s celebrated political satirist Andy Borowitz summed up the dramatic and drawn-out French election with this quip, but French seeking to maintain cultural superiority are not the only ones breathing sighs of relief this morning. Moderates and centrists all around the world are cheering; neoliberalism lives on in an age of right-wing populism hysteria dominating political discourse.

Macron is untraditional in all ways but policy–the banker turned politician has championed policies that would not be out of place on any American Democratic platform. Though he represents a rupture for French politics, clearly breaking from the Socialists, the traditional Left, Macron’s outsider credentials come from his youth, his scandalous relationship, and his new En Marche! party. Appearances aside, he is not a populist candidate–but in an age when populism has such an ugly, xenophobic face, maybe that’s not such a bad thing.

Miles Malley: Macron’s Foreign Policy Inexperience 

When it comes to domestic economic issues, there is little doubt that Emmanuel Macron knows what he is talking about, whether you agree with him or not. He comes in with more knowledge of the financial sector than maybe any other French President has had at the time of their election. Unfortunately, this knowledge does not seem to translate to foreign-policy expertise. According to sources, Macron had to cancel two different major foreign-policy interviews with French newspapers out of fear that he wasn’t prepared enough.

In this vein, Macron comes into office with an essentially blank-slate foreign policy doctrine. As the US is witnessing with Trump (who, by comparison, makes Macron look like a foreign policy guru) this means that first impressions with other countries can potentially shape entire policies and politics. This makes for a fascinating, if not dangerous, relationship between Macron and Putin’s Russia, who Macron and his team have publicly blamed for the President-elect’s hacked emails, rumors of homosexuality, and a barrage of other tactics intended to swing the election. Whether this all has turned Macron into a reactionary Russian-hawk is now one of the biggest foreign policy questions in all of Europe.

Aziza Kasumov: Not as Popular as you Think

France, on Sunday, seemed peacefully unified after centrist and liberal candidate Emmanuel Macron won the presidential election with a two-third majority of the vote over Marine Le Pen, the candidate of the extreme right. As Macron vowed to respect his political opponents, protesters, for the most part, stayed off the streets, sending an image into the world of a country that seemed, at least for the moment, at ease with itself, pressing “pause” on its internal divisions.

But let’s take a closer look at the numbers: Yes, Macron won with 66 percent of the vote, leaving Le Pen with only 34 percent. Yet more than one out of three French eligible voters either abstained (25.4 percent) or cast a spoilt ballot paper (12 percent). This shrinks Macron’s votes to less than 50 percent (41.4 percent, to be precise) of the total number of in theory available ballots — a record low. Only in 1969, when two center-right candidates made it to the run-off in the second round, the rate of abstention was higher than last Sunday. This election’s number of spoilt ballot papers, on the other hand, proved to be at an all-time record for the French Republic. Macron’s win wasn’t one of true conviction — and that will be a fragile fundament for a presidency that builds on its popular-vote legitimacy unlike any other in the Western world.

Will Macron be able to increase his margin of popular support? It depends on the success of his proposed policies and whether he’ll be able to implement them through legislative and European support. One thing, however, is for sure: The protesters who spared him on Sunday instead marched the streets on Monday. And they surely won’t cease to criticize him throughout the next five years.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Introduction

Recently, the EU has undergone significant changes due to external factors including, but not limited to, the 2008 economic crisis, the Arab Spring uprising, the emergence of Islamic State in the Middle East and the Syrian refugee crisis. Combined with the European Union’s already shaky sense of identity, these events have heightened tensions among and within states. In the UK, the trend of Euro-skepticism among a portion of UK citizens led Prime Minister David Cameron to promise to hold an EU referendum. Although the UK has always had a more distant relationship with the EU than other member states have, on June 23, 2016, the UK surprised the international community by choosing to leave the union.

Assessing the Current Situation

Britain’s exit from the EU, commonly referred to as Brexit, has created a host of economic and political issues for the EU, UK and the wider international community. For the EU, its size and stature in the global arena may be significantly decreased, as the union is losing over sixty-five million people and 94,525 square miles. Even more importantly, the UK is the second largest economy in Europe and the fifth largest economy in the world. Not to mention, London is arguably the most competitive financial center in the world. Without the UK’s large market and its economic status, the EU may experience a decline in internal movement of capital and may also have a harder time obtaining favorable trade deals externally.

For smaller member states, this is particularly worrisome as the UK is no longer present to act as a counterweight to Germany’s dominance in the economic sector as well as France’s dominance in the political arena. While some argue that the two remaining powers will balance each other out, Germany is still very much a reluctant hegemon in Europe and may be unwilling to go toe-to-toe with France. Furthermore, the UK has served as a bridge between the EU and US in the past. A more distant US leads to an even larger power vacuum within the union.

The instability caused by this change might encourage other disenfranchised member states to think about leaving due to a perception that the union is disintegrating. As general anti-immigration and anti-establishment sentiments have increased, a wave of populist discontent with the status quo seems to be sweeping across Europe. Right-wing parties have grown in power, either surging in popularity, as is the case in France and Germany, or even taking control of the government, as is the case in Finland, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania. With leaders of populist Eurosceptic parties in countries such as France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and Sweden proposing to hold their own EU membership referendums, many fear that Brexit may have triggered a chain reaction that will ultimately lead to the dissolution of the UE.

Yet, for Britain, there are even larger implications. In terms of the domestic political situation, Prime Minister David Cameron of the Conservative Party resigned, leaving Theresa May to step in as the new Prime Minister. Although she is the leader of the Conservative Party, she is seen to have a more balanced stance than her predecessor, which will change the political climate of the UK. To add to the turbulence, with the UK leaving the union and sixty-two percent of Scottish voters wanting to remain in the EU, another Scottish UK referendum has been proposed. Although the one in 2014 narrowly failed, a future referendum may prove successful, as many analysts believe the majority of Scottish citizens would prefer to be part of the EU over the UK.

Outside of policy, the economic effects of the EU may have an even larger role in the future of the UK. Immediately after the announcement of Brexit, the British pound decreased in value to an over thirty year low and over two trillion dollars were wiped off shares globally. Perhaps most importantly, many bilateral trade relationships must be renegotiated or formed as the EU has many standing relations that the UK will no longer a part of.

Policy Proposals

The next steps for managing UK and EU relations must fall within the provisions of Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union. Now that Prime Minister May has officially triggered Article 50, divorce talks with the EU are underway. According to the first two sections of this article, although the member state may choose to withdraw based on its own methods—in Britain’s case, a popular referendum—the EU must negotiate and settle on a withdrawal agreement with the member state in the next two years. This may be an arduous process as member states often find it hard to agree on topics of importance. Although there are many routes that the UK can choose to take, three categories of viable options exist for these negotiations when determining the implementation of their exit from the EU.

The first of these constitutional options would be for the UK to make a relatively quick and complete break from the EU, including all its institutions and organizations. If the UK chose this option, it would have to fill the legal vacuum of EU legislation with its own new regulations in regards to areas such as customs, transport, food production, agriculture and fisheries. The nation would also have to form a completely new identity for itself and relationship with the EU, as well as other countries that have relations with the EU. For example, within Europe, the UK will have to redefine its relationship and set up new trade agreements with countries such as Switzerland and Turkey. Internationally, the UK would have to establish new bilateral relations while considering the effect on current trade partners and trilateral relations in circumstances where the EU already had or is in the process of developing bilateral relations.

Known as “hard Brexit,” this approach may take more time to implement given the many new regulations that will have to be formulated and approved. Undoing all the treaties formed over the 43 years that the EU has been around and determining how to fill the vacuum left is further complicated by the fact that the move to leave the EU is unprecedented. According to foreign secretary Philip Hammond, the whole process, including negotiating a new trade deal, will most likely take between four to six years, clearly over the two year provision of Article 50. However, if this happens, the EU-UK relationship will default to the mechanisms outlined by the WTO. This may be extremely detrimental, as it would mean EU’s external tariff would include trade with the UK.

The second option would be for the UK to attempt to maintain as much of its current relationship as possible. In order to do this, the UK would probably try to stall the actual implementation of leaving the EU and all its institutions and organizations. During this period, it would try maintain old and establish new economic ties by negotiating a bilateral free-trade arrangement with the EU block. Because Article 50 states that the withdrawing member state will remain within the EU until an agreement has been reached, the UK will have a buffer period to determine how it will proceed in the future. During this time, the UK will continue to have a say in EU proceedings and influence policy other than those directly concerning its withdrawal. The UK could use this opportunity to secure favorable trade agreements and international deals that will benefit both the EU and UK and will allow them to work as partners in the long run.

The difficulty with this option lies in convincing Euroskeptics, including sixty Tory MPs, to accept the compromise. They maintain that in this scenario, the UK would not truly be a sovereign nation without the ability to negotiate its own bilateral trade deals or implement its own border controls. Because this would require the UK to continue to accept certain policies and agreements that come with being a part of the EU, such as unlimited EU migration and required payment into the EU budget, “hard Brexiteers” may argue that this defeats the purpose of leaving the EU.

The third option lies somewhere in between these two choices. This would allow for a “customized special deal” for the UK, where the UK and EU would choose which part of EU membership to apply to the UK. For example, the UK could opt out of more costly and less popular portions of membership such as free movement or budgetary contributions. In fact, while the UK was still a member of the EU, it had already opted out of many of these institutions and agreements, such as the European Monetary System and the Schengen Agreement. Out of all the options, this one seems most probable because it would cause the least amount of political and economic disruption with the most benefits for both the union and the UK.

One proposed mechanism to facilitate this process and ease the transition is known as the Great Repeal Bill. This piece of legislation would initially copy all EU laws into domestic laws. These placeholder laws could then be changed or repealed by the UK Parliament. Yet even if this bill is passed, there are other significant obstacles to overcome. For one, revising each law on a case-by-case basis may be overly ambitious, as the UK government will have many other external issues to deal with. Also, trying to negotiate a favorable trade deal without paying EU dues will be extremely difficult and may lead to a prolonged process of formalizing the withdrawal.

Conclusion

In light of the many factors that are tied to the UK’s former role in the union, Brexit has deep and lasting implications. Political and economic repercussions within the continent and internationally are hard to determine, but may demand immediate solutions. Already, Prime Minister May has called for snap elections on the grounds that this will help the UK in the upcoming Brexit negotiations by unifying Westminister. Whichever option the UK decides to pursue, as an international power, it has a duty to establish its new position and the world and re-assert its leadership in various spheres of power and specific international organizations. Whether or not this change will lead to more positive or negative consequences remains to be seen.

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The end of European integration?

While today we often take the close friendship between European nations for granted, in reality it is an astonishing feat considering the region’s bloody history. Only since World War II have European leaders begun to view each other as allies by virtue of shared heritage and values, rather than enemies vying for influence and territory. The foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950 set Europe on a trajectory of increasing unity, exemplified by the Common Market and later the European Union. Removing trade barriers between countries was instrumental in allowing Europe to rebuild after the destruction of the war and sustain impressive growth for decades: in the second half of the twentieth century, GDP per capita tripled while average hours worked fell by a third as goods, services, money and people moved freely throughout the continent. Beyond the tangible economic measures, such increasing interconnectedness no doubt contributed to preserving the longest stretch of peace in European history.  

Because the image of a tolerant, peacekeeping and socialist-leaning Europe has grown so entrenched, it is easy to forget this is a relatively recent phenomenon. Far from a permanent fixture, these values reflect an ideology specific to a time in history, one that is on the decline in Europe today. The Brexit vote reflects a public opinion shift away from internationalism, not just in Britain but to varying degrees across the continent.  According to recent surveys, favorable views of the EU have dropped in each of the seven EU countries surveyed since 2004; in Greece, France, Spain and the UK, a higher percentage of respondents expressed a negative attitude toward the EU over a positive one. While part of this discontent can be attributed to dissatisfaction over the EU’s handling of issues like the economic and migrant crises, it is also importantly indicative of a general questioning of the necessity of such a close union between European countries – whether the EU actually helps Europeans address today’s most pressing problems.

Some dissatisfaction with the EU can be attributed to economic issues, especially in countries on the receiving end of the EU’s controversial monetary policy and forced austerity after the Eurozone financial crises. Greece unsurprisingly has the highest rate of disapproval of EU economic policy (92%), though wealthier economies like Germany also harbor discontent over being forced to finance bailout after bailout to keep the euro healthy. Such realities call into question the trade and currency integration that are the foundation for the EU: while the Common Market has no doubt bolstered the post-war European economy, backlash against the financial obligations of EU membership formed part of the driving force of Brexit. Despite the fact that the British economy has no doubt taken a hit in the aftermath of the ‘Leave’ vote, the decision nonetheless shows Europeans feeling more burdened than bolstered by economic integration, and beginning to envision a future outside of the Common Market.

Beyond economics, much discontent with the EU links to social tensions. Again, Eurasia Group’s 2016 prediction holds true: “a combination of inequality, refugees, terrorism, and grassroots political pressures pose a fundamental challenge to [EU] principles.” With an overwhelming majority of Europeans unhappy with the EU’s handling of refugees, many question the freedom of movement policy central to the EU model. A recent Pew Global poll reveals that collectively, Europeans view ISIL as their single greatest threat, a fear obviously related to the string of terrorist attacks linked to the radical Islamist group over the past several years. But instead of turning to the EU as a resource of collective defense, many believe that the solution lies in strengthening national borders; in most countries polled, the majority agreed that accepting more refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks at home.

This view tends to translate into isolationist, anti-EU sentiment. In most countries, the majority favors some return of power to national governments and maintains that countries should deal with their own problems before helping others with theirs. In the words of Ian Bremmer of Eurasia Group, the emerging “closed Europe” is one that “closes itself to the outside world, and whose countries close themselves up to one another.”

This opinion is most prevalent among self-identified conservatives; in the majority of countries surveyed, those who identify politically with the left were significantly more likely to support the EU than right-wing respondents, linking anti-EU sentiment to rising tides of nationalism and  populist politics. From France’s Front National to the Alternative for Germany, many European countries are experiencing recent electoral revivals of far-right parties (detailed visual breakdown here) while the center-left, the traditional stronghold of European politicians, undergoes a decline. Not surprisingly, problems with immigration and terrorism bring out xenophobic tendencies in populations and thus empower nationalistic, reactionary candidates promising to restore safety through the reestablishment the integrity of the nation.  

One might imagine fear of the ‘other’ would inspire European unity, especially given the common view that Islamist terrorism represents an attack on the entirety of Western culture. Moreover, it seems clear from the outside that ISIL can only be defeated by a concerted European – and global – effort; it is futile for individual nations to fight a group which indiscriminately hates the West. But as Brexit has illustrated, the impulse to withdraw, isolate and draw up protective barriers proves stronger than this logic.

Walls and trade deals: US presidential elections

On the other side of the Atlantic, isolationist sentiment proves just as strong a force in the upcoming US presidential elections. As in Europe, economics and immigration constitute two central issues in the campaign: according to a recent poll, the economy and terrorism are the two topics most widely considered “very important” by 84% and 80% of voters, respectively.

Both the Democratic and Republican nominees have denounced a free trade deal with China as part of their platform, reflecting overwhelming American anxiety about the effects of economic globalization on domestic jobs and prosperity. Even Clinton, an avid supporter of the TPP in the past, has admitted she understands “a lot of Americans have concerns about our trade agreements” and adjusted her platform accordingly. Meanwhile Trump has declared that globalization moves “our jobs, our wealth and our factories to Mexico and overseas.” Even democratic runner-up candidate Bernie Sanders spoke out against opening the US further to global trade.

Such a harmony of opinion on a major issue across parties is remarkable, not least because, despite increasing volatility and competition in some industries, free trade has a wealth-generating effect on economies. Most economists agree that openness to trade in conjunction with smart policy that protects the negatively impacted is the soundest path for growth in today’s globalized economy. A recent US complaint against Chinese export taxes in the WTO illustrates the crucial role that free trade plays in economic prosperity; because key US industries rely on imports of Chinese raw materials, they lobby hard for duty-free imports to remain competitive.

The near-universal backlash against globalization does not represent a logical solution to economic hardship; economies are too far gone down this path to make turning back a viable option. Rather, it is as an emotional response to a perception that free trade brings predatory competition and benefits big business at the expense of the so-called average American worker. Trump especially serves up globalization as the scapegoat for America’s economic hardships in the same way that he pins social issues on immigration. His loud call for a wall to protect the border is a crude representation of Americans’ greatest fears surrounding race, religion and terrorism, making this opinion impossible to ignore. His proposition to ban all Muslims from entering the country shows that xenophobic fears are on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic.  

The verdict on isolationism: understandable but ultimately futile

For better or worse, from European explorers to American imperialism, the West has championed the ascent of globalization. Today, however, attitudes are shifting as Europeans and Americans alike increasingly embrace isolationism as a solution to their economic troubles and security fears. In a world characterized by the ever-heightening volatility of global markets and rising hysteria over ISIL and radical terrorism, it is hardly shocking that more and more people seek protection within their own borders.

Unfortunately, shutting our eyes and borders to the outside world will not resolve any of our ever-growing array of crises. Eventually, this approach will fall through and we will be forced to address problems that only intensify the longer we push them away. Reactionary isolationism will not provide any lasting solutions, just a temporary respite.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The post Beyond Brexit : A Rising Tide of Isolationism appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Why deal with the external dimension, if the internal union is in disarray? Rather than restating the internal benefits of being a member of the Union, we should not forget the perks of membership with regard to foreign affairs. One can argue that it is the external dimension in which the EU is strongest and in which it now has the chance to reinvigorate its raison d’être. If this is too delicate a time for further internal integration, maybe it is the time for strategic external readjustment.  This is not a new idea and indeed, through its fledgling foreign policy, the Union has already become more than just the sum of its parts. This is most obvious in the trade dimension: united, the EU is the biggest trading block world-wide, with a larger GDP than that of the US. Split into 27 individual member states, most of these countries will relapse into insignificance. Take President Obama’s word for it, when he dampens Brexiteer’s rejoice by placing them ‘at the end of the queue’ in trade relations with the US.

Reducing the EU to its identity as a trade giant however would be a severe oversimplification: in its stated aims at least, it looks to contribute to international peace and security, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the promotion of democracy and the rule of law.

With consequent institutional reforms and increasingly prominent foreign policy operations, the EU has indeed proven that its foreign policy dimension has potential, but it has yet to convince with a coherent external vision. As a post-Westphalian construct in a world of sovereign states, it needs to clarify EU identity on the world stage, rid itself of double standards and identify strategic interests.

Struggling with Identity:
The Union is often characterized as an actor between federalist state and intergovernmental organization. Yet certain scholars argue that it should in fact be treated as a sui generis entity. This nature is often described as ‘post-Westphalian’ in contrast to the Westphalian, sovereign concept of the state, where realism and balance of power dominate. The Union can be viewed as a manifestation of internal, rule-based multilateralism, a principle that is central to its external relations as well. At times it is referred to as a Normative Power, where moral values are thought central to an actors’ aims; a Civilian Power; and a Trading State – and in all cases, as a “compulsive multilateralist”. Pursuing a rule-based global order is common to all of these identities, but their aims differ: should this be a normative global order, a civilian one or one that prioritizes stability for trade relations?

Normative aspects are strong in the EU’s rhetoric and aims: its treaties specify the foreign policy aims of promoting democracy and human rights. In reality, however, its priorities mostly lie in ensuring stability and establishing relationships for trade. For example, the EU’s Neighborhood policy is widely criticized for superficial engagement towards authoritarian regimes: its push for ‘good governance’ reforms remains painfully ineffective and is not followed up by genuine incentives. While it is questionable how much the EU could achieve in terms of structural, normative change without attracting accusations of neo-colonialism, it is apparent that it has chosen the complacent approach by working with regimes rather than genuinely engaging civil societies.

Ever since the EU’s wake-up call to its military unpreparedness (the NATO operation in Yugoslavia and Kosovo), the Union has been increasingly aware of a changing security environment (read: Crimea, Syria) and its dependence on US-led NATO protection. An EU army remains a distant daydream and the security debate now centers around how the Union can profile itself as an indispensible element within NATO, rather than as incapable junior partners to the US. With increasing calls for rearmament and multiple ongoing peacebuilding missions, it appears that the EU is also rethinking its civilian power outlook.

The only identity that appears to hold up is that of the Trading State. The Union has established a wide-ranging network of bi- and multilateral frameworks across the globe, ensuring trade relations with former colonies, developing countries and emerging economies. While its trade relations can be labeled economically successful, they do not necessarily contribute to a positive perception of its “actorness” on the world stage. This can be largely attributed to two phenomena: the upholding of double standards especially with regards to its trade regime, and a lack of shared strategic interests.

Double Standards:
The once dominant normative power narrative has been severely eroded by fingers pointing at the Union’s double standards in both trade and values. The European Union remains the single largest donor of development aid globally and supposedly supports development through preferential trade agreements. However, the EU’s internal market situation skews the playing field significantly: while market access is still preferential to a certain extent, developing economies’ main exports such as sugar, rice and milk cannot compete with the highly subsidized local production of these goods. What is given in the form of aid is thus practically discounted through the EU’s trade policies, where the protection of local agriculture reigns supreme.

Furthermore, emerging economies hold the EU liable for being a multilateralist only when it suits its own interests. Seeing its dominant role within the WTO, the EU has chosen to play conservative and continues to pose a counter-force to reform in Doha round negotiations. Powers on the rise such as China and India are disappointed by the EU’s unwillingness to push for more democratization at the international level; speaking values while promoting pragmatism has not furthered the Union’s reputation on the world stage. To enhance its image, the EU needs to address the double standards inherent to its current foreign policy, and turn its narrative down a notch. The EU should promote an outlook of ‘global responsibility’ in place of ‘ethical power’.

Strategic Interests:
While it has begun to stretch its arms beyond the neighborhood and towards traditional allies, the ‘domaine reservee’ of ex-colonies and emerging strategic partners, these relationships remain little more than trade pacts. While the EU holds extensive association agreements and strategic partnerships with all major powers, it seems to build these partnerships on the lowest common denominator, rendering the term ‘strategic partnership’ practically meaningless: instead of restricting its outreach to regions where it holds strategic interests, its policy of constructive engagement resembles a friendly overstretch. A failure to define these partnerships significantly weakens its external image, encouraging emerging countries, especially Russia and China, to return to bilateral diplomacy with member states of special interest to them.

Possible Remedies?
We have seen that EU foreign policy has become more than a natural outgrowth of the Union’s day-to-day business – it has become a decisive tool in determining the Union’s relevance on the global stage for the next 5-10 years. While internal unity is a natural prerequisite for a strengthened EU foreign policy, I would suggest that initiative for reform must now come from the institutions (especially the European External Action Service and the current High Representative) formulating a Foreign Policy vision that can convince its member states of the benefits of further integration when it comes to foreign policy, as well as a united voice abroad.

Creating a new vision for itself, one that escapes the usual criticisms leveled at its normative power narratives will require a serious rethinking of its identity and role in global affairs. Coming to terms with a changing global system is a first step towards placing itself between civilian and hard power, normative and trading power extremes. Acknowledging overstretch and contradiction in its ambitions and identities lies at the center of a reorientation. A second step, and one that it can avoid no longer, is addressing the tension between development and trade and promoting a higher degree of value coherence in its actions. Lastly, the problem of superficial partnerships can only be addressed once the EU has found a durable identity for itself, one that allows for the concrete, strategic aims of an actor that is larger than the sum of its member states.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The post Diagnosis: Compulsive Multilateralism & Identity Disorder appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Nisha Kale
In London, Brexit seems to have taken the city by shock. Walking through the streets of central London, people stand everywhere with political signs, and the news plays in every open shop. There is an air of panic and uncertainty. Some taxi drivers are waving Union flags as they drive down the street in celebration of a perceived “independence”.  In front of Parliament crowds have begun to gather; some waving flags in celebration, others with signs reading “#REMAIN” looking angry and lost. London seems to recognize, like the rest of the world, the uncharted water it is now in. Britain leaving the EU is nothing short of catastrophic; not only has the pound fallen to a historical low, but the current government seems to have no idea how to even execute a departure from the EU.

Ultimately Britain’s exit sets a terrible precedent for how a country handles increased immigration. Having traveled England the last two weeks, I have heard different viewpoints on the Brexit from English citizens in both the city and countryside. While people in the city seem to overwhelmingly support staying, many in the countryside expressed to me their fear of immigrants, especially northern African and Eastern European ones, undercutting local jobs and putting stress on their housing and public services. A vocal leader of the “Leave” group Nigel Farage has echoed these sentiments, expressing concern that refugees carry extremist viewpoints. In a statement channeling Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, he suggested refugees increase the likelihood of mass attacks, and, “when ISIS says they will use the migrant crises to flood the continent with jihadi terrorist they probably mean it.”

However, an exit from the EU will not reverse the ethnic changes in Britain’s population. The vote was a reaction to migration and increasing economic hardship, and now Britain will be caught in uncertain turmoil for the next two years as the Brexit is formally worked out. The backlash effects of this vote are already showing themselves; Italy, France, Sweden, and Germany’s conservative parties have now declared a push for referendum. Scotland, Wales and Ireland have begun to prepare for a referendum to leave the United Kingdom in the interest of remaining in the EU. David Cameron recently just announced he is stepping down in October, leaving the new prime minister to vote on article 50, which determines Britain’s exit strategy from the EU. This means it will be another 2.5 years before Britain’s exit is formalized. The historically unprecedented fragmentation of Europe has begun. Anti-immigration movements are at their core anti-immigrant; today Britain and the world are facing the reality of reactionary conservative politics.

Jack Anderson
It’s just past 2:00 AM here in New York. A few minutes ago, I finished watching the movie Now You See Me, which my girlfriend recommended. Afterwards I checked the result of the British referendum on EU membership. In the movie, four talented street magicians are brought together for a series of theatrical Robbin Hood-esque robberies using smoke and mirrors. 

The leaders of the Brexit movement have pulled off their own magic trick. Britain’s decision to leave the EU will do financial damage to Europe. London’s wealthy elite have been politically deposed, and whatever changes occur within Britain in the future may very well be at the disadvantage of the longstanding, internationalist political and economic power holders. When the Brexit movement began, few took it seriously. But by the time Brexit was deemed a credible threat, it was already too late. The “Bremain” leadership moved to protect a safe that had already been looted. Large corporations have benefited the most from EU membership, and their bottom lines will feel the pain of leaving.

The commoner in Britain, perhaps a blue collar worker once victimized by an insurance company, may not see a significant or immediate economic effect on his or her life, despite inflation and stock market turbulence. The moral victory is one many Britons wanted. The attention, the hype and the underdog win are worth more in the minds of the people than the value of the pound or gross domestic product. Britain’s leaders forgot this very important fact. Think about it: when was the last time that anyone felt like Europe accomplished something? In the age of terrorism, refugee crises and economic inequality, Western populations are starving for a victory, or at least a good show. Politics is show business. If the people are not entertained, they’ll make their own fun. Surely, Shakespeare must have understood that.

One last thing worth noting is that technically the referendum is not legally binding on the government, and the act of leaving the EU will take quite some time. We will have to wait and see if the Brexit movement has the resolve to continue its performance; the movement finally has to confront the reality its organizers have designed.

Kara Junttila
Britain has chosen economic uncertainty and political reticence at a time when Europe needs strength and unity. This hotly contested referendum will have world-shaking consequences for British politics, global markets and the European project. Prime Minister David Cameron’s feeble and ultimately failing support for the “Remain” campaign has brought down his government – Cameron resigned as PM this morning. Scotland again shows itself differentiated from England and will likely push for a sequel to the Scottish independence referendum.

Global markets will react extremely negatively to the shock and uncertainty of Brexit in the coming days and weeks. The economic downside for the British economy can already be seen in the plummeting pound sterling, and more fallout is certain to come – especially since the consensus assumption seems to have been that Brexit was unlikely. Heightened risk and uncertainty will characterize global markets in light of Brexit, with economic pain reverberating from London.

Finally, Britain has chosen to vote against the European Union, the postwar project for European peace, modernity and civilization. This is necessarily a vote for British isolationism. When Britain could have been a leader, working from within the EU to implement better policy where needed, it has chosen retreat. This is a politically symbolic decision – a big day for Europe and a bad day for European unity. The risks of other countries seeking to follow Britain or renegotiate the terms of their EU membership are real. For those who believe in the political ideals enshrined at the European Union, this is a sad day. The bulwark countries of the EU should remain strong and united in the face of Brexit – their leadership will be needed as Britain steps back.

Steve Helmeci
Today marks one of the greatest disasters for global cooperation – both on a social and economic level – in history. Uncertainty and fear now rule the day, in minds as well as in markets. Many questions now have to be answered that have no business even being asked, but in the coming days we have to start figuring out solutions. Make no mistake, though: June 23, 2016 will live in infamy. Whether it lives in infamy in Britain alone or across the globe remains to be seen.

The following is what we know. We know that the markets are floundering. Less than five hours on from the confirmation of Leave’s victory, the pound has already fallen below $1.35 in the global currency markets – its lowest level since 1985. This dip is paralleled by the devaluation seen with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. We know that the crisis is not only within the currency markets. Stock markets across the world have already seen significant dips:  the Japanese Nikkei has already fallen 8.3%, Hong Kong’s Hang Seng fell 4.9%, London stock futures are down 7% and the Dow is expected to fall 700 points at opening. India’s stock market is already trading down as well. Individual stocks, especially those in large British financial institutions, have fared even worse, with HSBC down 12% in Asian markets and Standard Chartered down 13%. We know that the British economy will retract as a result of this decision. The government itself has projected a 6.2% decrease in GDP by 2030 should the Leave vote win. We also know that the uncertainty does not end with the referendum. Should the UK choose to move forward with leaving procedures under article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, those negotiations will take (at the most generous estimate) two years.

Those above points are about all that we know. What we do not know is  far scarier, and it all stems from the aforementioned uncertainty. Will France and Holland have referendums on EU membership? What will happen to the millions of migrants in the UK? What will the floor be for the pound? Will the UK be able to recreate or renegotiate trade access and trade deals that facilitate its import and export markets? Its deal with the US alone accounts for 16.6% of its trade and will need to be renegotiated.

The British people have not built a new, free United Kingdom. They have shrunk their global power and influence, hurt their biggest institutions, made it harder for trade, raised the prices on imported goods, lowered the value of their currency and jeopardized a cooperation that has stabilized the continent for over six decades.

Brandon Whitehill
For many, Britain’s vote to be first country to leave the European Union is a shock, an upset victory of historic proportions. Make no mistake, these results should be anything but surprising; Brexit represents an assertion of the most fundamental right a free society possesses—the right to govern itself. Any system that subjugates its people to the will and whim of unelected and unrepresentative Eurocrats in a foreign country does not deserve to be called a democracy. Last night in a referendum that always transcended economics and current affairs, Britons turned out in record numbers to reclaim their sovereignty and send a worldwide message that timeless tenets like self-determination still matter. 

Last night’s result does not represent an ill-advised populist outburst, nor will it spell economic suicide for the world’s fifth-largest economy, but many pressing questions remain. The referendum is not legally binding, meaning Parliament must act pursuant to the result in what is sure to be a slow withdrawal. The Remain campaign’s defeat strikes a fatal blow not only to David Cameron’s premiership, but also the progressive wave that replaced Boris Johnson with Sadiq Khan. As for Johnson, his political future (future prime minister, perhaps?) looks as bright as the EU’s does dark. Looking to Britain’s example, many countries may find themselves not well-served by an institution incapable of retaining its most influential members. The greatest change, however, will be subtler. British calendars will henceforth hail June 23 as the day that a free people solemnly declared and published their independence from the illiberal Leviathan that the EU has become. Happy Independence Day, Britain.

Gesine Höltmann

Following the last minutes of the referendum count this morning and seeing the inevitability of the outcome, I did not feel like I could comment so coolly on current events. I, like so many Europeans alongside me, take this result personally. You may call that attitude exaggerated. But it is only beginning to sink in that so many of our friends, as well as millions of fellow Europeans lost their EU rights over night. This was one political gamble too many, at a time when Europe is in dire need of solidarity. While we cannot begin to imagine Europe without the process of integration of the past decades, it is just as impossible to imagine the repercussions of this referendum, and the implications of a ‘no return’ scenario. This has led me to severely question the notion of referenda: is it the ends or the means that we are pursuing? And can an outcome that deprives so many of their rights and daily reality be called a democratic decision?

This outcome reminds me more of the dictatorship of the majority. Of course, you will say, if you dislike the outcome of a vote, you are likely to reject it as undemocratic. But what has happened to the conception that democracy is not confined to voting? Now more than ever, with cleavages between social classes and populist movements on a home-run, we need to return to democracy as the art of finding consensus – or at least consistently working towards consensus. We cannot sustain societies, where 51% decide the fate of 49% who identify as Europeans – we need to wake up to the deep cleavages that we find across European populations, and we need to address them through communicative action, not referenda.

The views expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.


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The EU deadlock on refugee policy is not so much an immigration crisis as it is one of European solidarity. Plans of redistribution quotas between member states have failed repeatedly. Of the 160,000 refugees to be distributed as a result of a hard-won agreement in September 2015, just 481 refugees have been resettled. What seemed like initial stubbornness has developed into a hardened front of isolationism and self-interest in the majority of EU member states; the final version of the Turkey-EU refugee deal enforced on March 20 reveals just how far its members are willing to go in sacrificing EU standards and values—so long as they can avoid responsibility.

The deal promises a total of 6 billion euros in aid to Turkey until 2018. In exchange, Turkey promises to secure its borders and improve living conditions (including education and health services) for the 2.7 million Syrians already residing in the country. What the deal adds to previous negotiations is the direct exchange of “irregular” refugees for “regular” refugees between Turkish and Greek territories. (“Irregular” migrants are those who enter EU territory “illegally” — without an entry visa — while “regular” migrants enter legally through a visa system that the EU is launching for an extremely limited number of refugees.)

Each “irregular” migrant that enters Greece will be deported back to Turkey, and in exchange, the EU will resettle a Syrian refugee from Turkey legally into Schengen up to a predetermined limit. This regulation applies exclusively to “irregular” refugees arriving from Turkey onto Greek territory, and Greece is responsible for registering, processing and assessing the claims of the refugees prior to deportation. A migrant is only safe from deportation if they can prove that they face danger from prosecution within Turkey itself.

Turkey is expected to uphold its end of the deal by receiving and registering the deported refugees from Greece, who will then be placed at “the end of the line” in standard visa applications to the EU. In return for Turkey’s agreement to be a destination of deportation, the EU will open two chapters of negotiations for accession into the EU with Turkey, one of them being the visa-free entry of the Schengen area for Turkish nationals.

The problems of this deal are three-fold. Firstly, the new arrangement of “exchanging refugees” allows for severe humanitarian problems on the Greek islands and is unlikely to curb the trafficking network until the legal immigration mechanism is realistically enforced. Secondly, it poses severe legal problems by violating conventions to protect refugees through detention and forced return to the Turkish mainland, creating what the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is referring to as “mass deportations”. Lastly, in brokering this deal the EU knowingly contributes to the legitimization of a new and dangerous status quo in Turkey.

Humanitarian Problems

Greece is simply not prepared to implement what has been decided on paper: while up until March 20 the partial suspension of the Dublin accords allowed refugees to move to other countries and register there, Greece is now obliged to organize the registration, processing and the return of every single “irregular” migrant to Turkey. The Greek government and international agencies are already struggling to provide for the basic needs of those arriving and simply does not have the resources to implement the demands of the pact, which require it to set up tribunals with appeal procedures and mechanisms for deportation.

As part of the Turkey-EU agreement, newly arriving refugees are now being separated and involuntarily detained from those who arrived before the deal’s closure. This has led to backlash from the UNHCR and aid agencies such as Doctors Without Borders, who have begun to cease their services in protest. Those who arrive after an arduous journey by boat are now awaited by a hastened trial, which lays the burden of proof on the refugee; unless they can prove that they are not safe in Turkey, the verdict guarantees forced return.

As long as these changes remain unknown to the majority of refugees in Turkey and beyond, the deal is unlikely to deter traffickers who capitalize on the asymmetry of information.[1] In an official statement, the UNHCR explains that “uncertainty is making the new arrivals nervous. Many still hope that the border will open. Many have run out of money. There is also an urgent need for information.” Since the deal is explicitly restricted to transfer between Turkish and Greek territories, it still allows plenty of leeway for traffickers to exploit other routes, for example via Libya, Morocco and Bulgaria. If the “new option” of legal immigration directly from Turkey is to diminish the traffickers’ network in any way, the main sources of information for refugees need to be more accessible and targeted, and the quotas for “regular” migrants dramatically increased.

Unquestionably, the EU needs to put an end to the dangerous trafficking practices by sea. But this cannot happen at the cost of creating mass detention centers with dire humanitarian standards, and most importantly, it will not happen by allowing only a mere 72,000[2] refugees to enter the EU legally. European Member States cannot evade the inevitable solution of inner-EU distribution.

Legal Problems

While providing for individual case assessments and immediate appeal mechanisms is a good thing, a policy that leaves the burden of proof on refugees within a constrained time window is only a marginal improvement to the original plan of mass deportations, which are clearly prohibited by the European Convention on Human Rights.

The EU-Turkey deal relies on the principle that a refugee can “legally” be deported or returned to a third “transit country” on the grounds that they had or will have adequate protection there. This reasoning is only sound if Turkey is considered a safe third country, meaning a refugee is able to claim refugee status and is protected by the Geneva Convention. But Turkey only partly ratified Geneva by restricting it to Europeans, and currently only grants partial refugee status to Syrians. Its fulfillment of the “safe country” requirements is thus more than questionable: recent Human Rights Watch reports name instances of refusals of entry to Syrians fleeing from Aleppo in the midst of the Russian-backed offensive. Those who reach Greece report either detainment in dire conditions or lack of basic sustenance; only 10% of 2.5 million live in refugee camps. Additionally, even after the issuance of work permits for Syrian refugees, those who do find work are severely underpaid and disillusioned. Promises on the side of the EU that Turkey will fulfill adequate standards of refugee protection by the time deportations begin are clear signs of desperate and deliberate self-deception.

Political Problems

In spite of critics claiming the Turkish government should not be the recipient of aid in the realm of 6 billion euros, it is not the monetary side of the deal that is problematic. In fact, the EU’s promise of addressing the conditions in transit countries is long overdue considering that Turkey currently hosts the largest refugee population and has played a significant relief role, spending close to 8 billion euros from its own pockets.[3]

However, extending this safe country quality stamp to Turkey is now followed by resumed negotiations for accession into the EU: an all-too predictable bargaining chip. Having applied for EU membership first in 1987, the revival of the lengthy accession process comes at a time when Turkey has hit a new low concerning political human rights, freedom of expression and juridical independence—developments that clearly do not align with the standards demanded of an aspiring EU member.

Not only has Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared war on the left-wing Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), but he is also clamping down on Turkey’s southeastern, predominantly Kurdish regions; REUTERS and the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey have called attention to the mobilization of troops and bans on media in the area. Simultaneously, some of the country’s most renowned journalists are being tried for disclosure of state secrets in the larger context of a severely deteriorating freedom of journalistic expression over the past year. Erdogan’s strategy of power consolidation has even led his government to attack German journalists’ conduct and inflamed public debate abroad.

Consequently, the EU is well aware that it has placed its humanitarian responsibility in the hands of a government that is testing its power domestically and is not afraid to make use of its newly won leverage against the Union. It has struck a deal that is unquestionably condemnable and that will be unable to confront the same problems it faced originally: pressure from other channels of immigration and an unwillingness to distribute the limited number of refugees who can now arrive legally.

[1] Refers to the economic concept of an imbalance of information between buyer and seller; in this case it refers to the exploitation of a refugee’s lack of knowledge about regulations and migration routes.

[2] The number of 72,000 is already the envisioned maximum. Short-term limits are set at 18,000, which are then to be expanded by a further 54,000 if necessary. Looking back at the failed redistribution of refugees already residing within the EU, it is questionable whether the intended distribution scheme for these legal immigrants will be more successful. To compare: 2.5 million refugees are currently residing in Turkey, 700,000 migrants have been registered in Germany since the beginning of 2015 and the original EU redistribution plan envisioned 120,000 refugees to be allocated amongst Member States.

[3] While Germany will have spent 50 billion euros by 2017, the majority of EU Member states will each have spent less than 1 billion euros.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Libya is running out of time.

The country’s economic situation is dire—it is estimated that Libya’s foreign reserves are around $50 to $60 billion, less than half of what they were just two years ago. Low oil prices have forced the country to run a deficit of up to $2 to $3 billion a month, and its internal chaos has led to a dearth of foreign investment and obstruction of traditional forms of government revenue. Libya’s main financial institutions, such as the Central Bank, National Oil Corporation and sovereign wealth fund also remain institutionally divided. Since the fall of longtime dictator Muammar Gadhafi in 2011, a political and security vacuum has emerged, with different militant and civilian interest groups battling for control in a rapidly deteriorating security landscape. The humanitarian crisis is deteriorating as food shortages mount. The Islamic State has taken advantage of the country’s weakness by expanding its presence; the group is thought to maintain 6,500 fighters and control over 150 miles of coastline. It has established a stronghold in the central coastal city of Sirte, as well as parts of Benghazi in the east and near Sabratha in the west. For ISIS, a country on the brink of economic collapse is a prime opportunity for expansion.

Back in December of 2015, the international community thought Libya had turned a page in its bloody internal civil war. The warring Dawn and Dignity factions, as well as an international coalition of actors, signed the UN-backed Libyan Political Agreement with provisions for a new Presidential Council and Government of National Accord. The UN-backed Presidential Council led by Prime Minister Fayez Seraj arrived in Tripoli on March 30 and began operating out of a heavily-guarded naval base.

However, the Libyan Political Agreement was signed without guaranteeing an adequate governance structure and, more importantly, without a sufficient security sector arrangement to back the political system. Tripoli’s self-declared National Salvation (Dawn) government announced they were stepping down on April 5, but the new unity government’s 18 members have so far failed to secure a vote of approval from internationally supported Tobruk-based House of Representatives (Dignity), as required by the agreement.

Over the past few years, the Dawn and Dignity factions have splintered to the point where they exist in name only, and many local actors view the national leaders who signed the agreement as unauthorized to act on their behalf. Dawn and Dignity remain more focused on fighting each other than the Islamic State; they use ISIS as a pretext to fight local rivals over political supremacy, turf and economic resources. Both continue to accuse each other of collaborating with ISIS.

This is complicated with the involvement of outside actors: Turkey, Qatar and Sudan support the Islamist Dawn faction in western Libya based in Tripoli, while Egypt and the United Arab Emirates support the more secular, internationally recognized Dignity faction in the east, in Tobruk. The faction in the Tobruk-based House of Representatives opposes the agreement because it excludes their revered General Khalifa Haftar, while in the west, the faction wants a greater share of the country’s resources. Both sides hold deeply ingrained prejudice and mistrust for one another.

The US has a strong stake in a secure Libya, thanks to its proximity to US allies, abundant oil reserves and potential for the conflict to spill over and cause further instability in the region. The West continues to monitor the situation in Libya with concern. In late February, Italy granted the US permission to launch drone strikes from Sicily against ISIS efforts in Libya and northern Africa. The Pentagon has proposed some $200 million for the coming year to train and equip North and West African armies. The US military is also in the process of building a base in Agadez, Niger, which is strategically positioned for its Reaper surveillance aircraft to conduct missions in Libya.

Most significantly, the US, France and the UK have been preparing to launch a second intervention in Libya for months, and have already set up a Coalition Coordination Center in Rome. Officials at the U.S. Africa Command are developing dozens of potential targets across Libya for American and European warplanes, ranging from the ISIS stronghold in Sirte to Ajdabiya, Sabratha and the militant stronghold of Derna. The EU held a meeting on April 5 to consider deploying a civilian security mission in Libya to back the new unity government, helping train security forces and improving border security.

However, such an outside intervention without a clearly unified government or security force would be a disaster. It would, at the very least, sharpen political fault lines. Continuing the current Western strategy of special operations forces training and advising Libyan militias could exacerbate factional conflict and reduce the incentives for political reconciliation. There is no clear answer as to who and what faction will control the country’s armed forces. The US and its allies should be careful not to rush into Libya with a mass of weapons and force without a clearly defined road for political and economic development.

The overarching goal and method in Libya should be discreet and encourage the formation of a political and security strategy—one that brings the political and armed factions into a singular government, which has not existed for the last two years. Currently, the US, Britain, and France have military advisers operating on the ground, as well as aircraft conducting reconnaissance flights and strikes. These allies as well as organizations such as NATO should lend military assistance in a way that promotes reconciliation and cooperation between rival ground forces and ties the military assistance in the fight against ISIS to a process of integration of local militias into a national command structure. The US, Europe, and other Arab nations also should make firm military commitments to the Libya International Assistance Mission, which will help legitimize the unity government and impose order. US counterterrorism efforts must include the establishment of larger regional coordination mechanisms among local militias, setting the stage for a cohesive, democratically controlled and centralized military. It is imperative that the US get the Gulf States on the same page, but this is complicated by the lack of foreign embassies in Libya and direct dialogue with faction leaders. Tunisia has re-opened its embassy in Tripoli following the installation of the new GNA and France has stated its intention to do so, a promising first step.

Once the unity government is firmly established, the US and its allies need to address the root causes of radicalism by reforming the oil-driven economy, supporting civil society and municipal development, and carefully training the army and police while restructuring defense institutions. The West needs to ensure that the strategy against ISIS unites local forces instead of polarizing them. The reality on the ground is a complicated one: a transactional society, hundreds of militias, competing ethnic and tribal affiliations, aggressive regional loyalties that any one day can include home-grown and foreign-born radicals, neighbors simply seeking to defend their homes and families, gangs stealing oil and wealth and engaging in gratuitous violence, tribes in states of cold and hot wars against one another for generations, and regional actors exploiting or protecting natural resources like oil and water. But a stable Libya is critical to ensuring the security of US allies in North Africa, especially Egypt and Tunisia, and the US should be willing to provide full backing to a unified Libyan government through economic, security and counter-terrorism assistance—that is, once (and if) it becomes firmly established.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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The title of the piece was “Irish Anxiety: Economic Dependence in an Independent Country.” Since this article, the disbandment of the Eurozone has become less of a concern. However, an economic bust is still a possibility, and the UK leaving the EU is becoming an even more serious threat. The IMF recently released a report indicating that a Brexit could cause instability in trade flows between Britain and the rest of the EU, including Ireland. Another report by Irish stockbroking firm Merrion indicates that a Brexit could cut bilateral trade flows between Ireland and the UK by 20%.

The fears surrounding a Brexit are only one example of Ireland’s dependence on the European Union and it’s member countries. The island country has heavily leaned on the Union since it first joined.

Ireland became a part of the European Economic Community in 1973 (which then became the European Union in 1991). At the time, Ireland was relatively insignificant economically, having only separated from the United Kingdom about fifty years prior. The choice to join the EEC was an effort to boost a waning economy — which had been predominately secluded from the rest of Europe — by increasing exports to other European countries. The European Commission, the executive branch of the EU, has continued to significantly bolster the Irish economy in recent years.

Take, for example, Dublin’s “Temple Bar” district. Before 1991, the area was one of the most run-down in Dublin. The European Commission then invested 47 million euros in to re-building Temple Bar both physically and economically, and now the area is known to be Dublin’s center for tourism, entertainment and nightlife.

The money from the Commission was used to make more pedestrian-friendly walkways and signage, fund business growth, create parks and instate important cultural institutions. For example, the fund created a new Viking museum, Dublina, a children’s theater, The Ark, and a film institute.

This beautiful park was also a part of the Temple Bar revival project —it was designed to be a helicopter landing site and now is a beautiful hideaway behind the Dublin Castle.

The EU has also invested heavily in Dublin’s light rail system, which is integral to the city. It invested over 42 million euros in re-vitalizing Dublin’s public transportation, creating the red and green lines still in function today. Below is a photo is of the Green Line station by St. Stephen’s Park.

The EU has funded many other less-photographable initiatives in Ireland, the full list of which can be found here. The European Commission also boasts major growth in Ireland since its ascendance to the EU, including a 90 times increase in trade, 700,000 new jobs and an increase in foreign investment from 16 to 30 million euros.

The Eurozone’s large impact in Dublin and the rest of Ireland further reinforces the irony of its independence. Yes, the country has technically been autonomous for nearly a century, but without money and services from the EU, it is unclear as to whether it could support itself. It can even be argued that Ireland wouldn’t exist independently without the 85 billion euro bailout it received from the European Central Bank in 2010. So while Ireland spent this past Easter celebrating 100 years of its independent rule, it should also give thanks to its friends in the EU for its current economic success.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The post Reflecting on Irish Anxiety: The EU’s Presence in Dublin Through Photos appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Jack Anderson

Belgium is reeling from its recent terror attacks. The tactics employed worked around post-9/11 security measures at Zaventem Airport, maximizing casualties and undermining public faith in the security apparatus. Terrorists have learned to leverage the vulnerability of locations like transportation hubs, stadiums and other public venues where large crowds gather with minimal physical security. And the world has yet to find a reasonable solution. Terrorists are able to run amok in Europe’s major cities. The attacks in Brussels and Paris have proven that terrorists can procure arms within European nations and move easily from one city to the next, often blending in with Muslim communities. It should surprise no one if jihadists linked to the Paris and Brussels attacks later return to strike Amsterdam or Cologne next.

Europe cannot solve its security, immigration or economic problems with disjointed policies and practices. European countries can solve these problems for themselves with independent immigration policies and segmented border fences, or it can integrate its policies and practices to reduce the level of uncertainty in European politics and economics. A major problem is that no one knows who is in charge. Europe needs to empower a stronger EU government or divert sovereign powers completely back to each nation-state. Until they do, Europeans will have to endure more terror attacks so long as strict privacy laws and generally liberal immigration policies remain in place. These attacks will only grow in sophistication and number, regardless of how many bombs are dropped on jihadists in Syria and Iraq.

Edoardo Del Vecchio

The threat of the Islamic State (IS) has compelled many international observers to call for “more Europe”. Though I would wholeheartedly support any political measure that might consolidate the EU as a political union, the rise of nationalistic populism and divergent geopolitical interests suggest that “more Europe” is just a dream for the well-educated minority of European citizens.

The Five Star Movement and the Lega Nord in Italy, Marine Le Penn in France, fascism in Hungary and Greece and many other far-right populist and nationalistic parties are on the offensive all over Europe. The situation is critical, and the European political establishment fails to understand and address the fears of its people. Intellectuals and experts call for “more Europe”, but the comment sections of their own articles confess a deep divide between what they think is right and what people really fear and care about.

This intellectual and political blindness adds up to an underlying dichotomy in the constitution of the European Union itself. Europe is not a federation of states; rather, it is a confederation. This means that while the EU is a single economic entity (a single market), it is not a single political entity. A group of countries choosing to cooperate, but still maintaining their own foreign policies.

When the Ukrainian crisis exploded, Putin met with Francois Hollande and Angela Merkel, not with Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Both Germany and France enjoy a productive relationship with Russia, while countries of the so-called “New Europe” (Baltic states) and the UK see it as “public enemy number one.” What this means to show is that a coordinated European foreign policy is highly improbable, and it’s by design. Ultimately, what we should expect is a strengthened cooperation between intelligence and security agencies, which, albeit with limited capacity and poor results, has already started.

Steve Helmeci

As someone who lived and worked in Brussels and who loves the city, I am deeply saddened and angered by the attacks of March 22. Emotional responses after attacks are customary, but importantly human. Having witnessed the societal structure of Brussels, however, not only makes me feel closer to its people, but also makes worry about how the usual post-attack community building might regionalize Belgian and European society.

European societal pillarization is a common topic, never more so than after the religion and ethnicity-inspired attacks on Paris and Brussels. While the “no-go zones” that European experts Bobby Jindal and Fox News focused on in the wake of the Paris attacks are oversimplified and reductionist, it is undeniable that pillarization in the Dutch tradition has been the preferred societal structuring across Europe. This creates a separation between ethnicity and class in most major cities, and Brussels is no exception. Divides are not always as easy to define as the Middle Eastern-European one currently under scrutiny; French speaking and Dutch speaking portions of the city are plainly divided, and even the two major universities are one French-speaking, one Dutch-speaking. A society already prone to division is one at risk of deepening those divisions in the wake of tragedy and in the midst of mass fear.

The response I’ve seen from my friends and colleagues has helped assuage doubts about the future of Brussels, Belgium and Europe in general. Yes, more care will be taken to prevent future attacks, and to an extent that is necessary. But the people of Brussels do not want to live in fear. They do not want to discriminate or hate. They just want life to return to normal. As the capital of Europe, Brussels’ response should drive European response. And, if Europe reacts as its capital does, we should not only see a hasty return to business as usual, but a more connected Europe. In the wake of both Paris and Brussels, the best possible response could be an increase in information and intelligence sharing across the Schengen area. Sovereignty aside, living in a free movement area necessitates such sharing, as outlined by Ali Soufan in the Guardian. As far as changes going forward, increased information sharing is the only potential change I see. The people of Europe are invested in the society they’ve built, and isolated incidents can only make it stronger, not bring it grinding to a halt with needless fear and over-securitization. Especially in Brussels, the mood is one of sadness and regret, but also one of resolve to move forward with life and with the European project.

I’ll conclude with the words of Sven Biscop, a program director at the Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels:  “When our values are under attack, the answer cannot be to abandon them – that would amount to capitulation… No European democracy will collapse, unless we ourselves give up on democracy.”

Tess Murray

In the wake of the attacks, much of the world’s focus has been on Belgium; however, its effects are starting to be felt in other areas. In the UK, immediately after the attacks, the disparity between public opinions about Brexit narrowed, indicating the increased support for a rather selfish movement towards British isolation. It is important to consider what will transpire when Britain votes on Brexit at the UK’s EU referendum on June 23 and the message it will send to the rest of the world.

Leaders in favor of Brexit were quick to use the siege on the EU’s capital as reason to leave. The UK Independence Party says that restricting the 508 million EU citizens who can freely pass into the UK would better equip the nation to keep suspicious people out. Although a reduced flow of immigrants into the UK appears to lessen vulnerability to attacks, using Brussels to encourage pro-Brexit support is inappropriate and a distasteful way to react to such violence. A response of this fashion is exactly the type ISIS hopes to incite. Not only will leaving the EU spiral Britain into a period of uncertainty and force the nation to renegotiate trade relations, it will also trigger intensified xenophobia in the region. The global repercussions of a Brexit would constitute a statement of retreat and isolation for the UK, rather than one of leadership in the war on terror.

With the British public becoming more evenly split on the issue, it is crucial for British Prime Minister David Cameron and the UK to encourage support for remaining in the EU by standing with Belgium and pledging to fight extremism. Rather than making the antagonistic decision for Brexit, Britain must coalesce with the rest of the EU to prevent future tragedies. Already, Britain has seen backlash for even considering a Brexit, and other EU countries are becoming frustrated with the UK’s inability to cooperate. As terrorist attacks continue to devastate Europe, the region must be wary of how isolationist solutions can create distrust among nations, especially in times when international collaboration is critical.

Kara Junttila

For Parisians, the November terrorist attacks in Paris were an utter shock. The March 22nd attacks in Brussels, however, were tragically less-than-unexpected. Belgium has been on high alert for months, and despite frequent counterterrorism raids by Belgian security forces, it took far too long to capture key plotters behind the Paris attacks who were able to shelter just outside of Brussels. There is a clear need to strengthen Belgium’s counterterrorism and intelligence capabilities; the European Union must quickly collaborate to aid Belgium in countering the very significant threat of further attacks.

But if the goal of these terrorists was indeed to ‘terrorize’ the European people, I can confidently say they have failed. Paris and Brussels are linked so closely by terror that an attack against one is a warning to the other. But in the heart of Paris where I currently live, Parisians remained undaunted. Planned strikes or manifestations against labor law reforms continued (although one might think congregating in the street a day after a major terrorist attack would be too frightening). Although more police were indeed deployed in the streets, the majority of these were just there to watch as Parisians practiced their cherished freedom of assembly. Across Europe, cartoonists, artists, and everyday people continue to share positive images and messages of hope, individuality, diversity and defiance of fear. In France, public support is not building behind a “war” on terror as declared by President Hollande. This is all to say, Europe’s fight against terrorism will be very different and more subtle than America’s, although Europe may indeed face a much more severe and direct daily threat. Expect bureaucratic reform and behind-the-scenes counterterrorism enhancement – but not much more.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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