Glimpse Senior Correspondents Luke Phillips and Miles Malley spoke to Dr. Paul Pillar about US foreign policy in the Middle East.

Dr. Paul Pillar is a 28-year veteran of the U.S. intelligence community, culminating in service as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia; and is the author of several books on national security, including Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform, and Why America Misunderstands the World: National Experience and the Roots of Misperception. He holds a PhD from Princeton University.

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If history has taught us anything beyond that conflict is inevitable, it’s that wars often prove self-correcting. In other words, a particular war can be so devastating that the pendulum then necessarily swings in the direction of peace and non-intervention. However, drone warfare—the warfare currently a la mode—is so much less visible and costly to its perpetrators, that it stands as a stark exception. Far from correcting itself, it seemingly has the capacity to self-perpetuate. The invention and proliferation of drone use might have made war too easy.

After the trauma of World War II, European countries realized continental integration may be the solution to mitigating the radical nationalism that had devastated the region. This led to the 1948 Hague Congress, and the creation of the European Movement International and the College of Europe, precursors of the European Union. After the French colonial wars in Algeria and Indochina proved significantly harder and bloodier for France than anticipated, referendums for independence were granted quickly—without conflict—to all remaining French colonies. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was so destructive that it left in its wake an international understanding nuclear weapons should never again be used and, despite  their proliferation, they never have been. The Vietnam War triggered a more inward-looking America, reluctant to engage in costly intervention overseas.

Each case reflects the impact of popular fatigue with, and apprehension towards, any war after experiencing a particularly scarring one, in turn making a democratically-elected government more reluctant to engage in conflict for fear of losing popularity. Like European populations after World War II and French citizens after the colonial wars, the war in Iraq had this effect on the American public, which witnessed the considerable human and material costs of ill-considered foreign intervention.

The graph below depicts this phenomenon. In 2002, right before the invasion of Iraq, only 30% of US citizens agreed that the US should mind its own business internationally; this coincides perfectly with the fact that in 2002, only 32% of US citizens thought invading Iraq was a mistake. But almost immediately following the invasion, both those numbers began to increase. By 2013, 52% of US citizens wanted a more isolationist agenda, and 53% thought the war in Iraq was a mistake.

That those numbers essentially match reflects the impact of the Iraq War on public attitudes toward outside intervention. American citizens had begun to look at foreign policy solely through the lens of the Iraq war, and were thus far less interventionist.

But the post-Iraq era has been marked by a paradox—popular opinion opposes foreign intervention (hence the more passive attitude towards Syria and President Obama’s decision to resist calls for intervention), but drone warfare has risen dramatically.

Post-Iraq anxiety and war-weariness has failed to limit this particular form of warfare: in a New York Times article, Micah Zenko, a scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, was quoted as saying that “an average of separate counts of American drone strikes by three organizations, the New America Foundation, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the Long War Journal, finds that 522 strikes have killed 3,852 people” since the Obama administration came into office. This is no “non-interventionist” policy.

No wars end all wars. But the speed with which we have transitioned from war-fatigue to war-footing is troubling, and it’s because drone warfare is different. Unlike in the past, with drone warfare there is no self-correction; no inherent ceiling or reason to believe the appeal will drop and the pendulum will swing back again.

War is meant to be difficult and costly; in fact, its difficulty and cost–in terms of lives lost, money expended, political capital expended–are the primary motives for deterrence. Drones have managed to essentially nullify these “inconveniences”. US lives are spared when unmanned drone-strikes are used rather than troop deployment, and targeted drone-strikes don’t come close to the fiscal costs of staging an Iraqi-style intervention. But it’s the last cost–the cost of political capital–that is probably at once the least talked about, and the most important.

General public angst and rejection of wars after a specifically disturbing one generally mean that a President and his administration notice and heed this ideological shift, and thus refrain from conflict, for the sake of re-election and public approval.

This novel and more sterile form of warfare explains another paradox: US popular stance on American foreign policy and their view of Obama’s job performance are directly at odds with one another. While polls indicate a continual increase in Obama’s approval rating, they have also shown a continuously growing reluctance to intervene abroad—all while large-scale drone use has expanded.

Though there are certainly other factors at work (Obamacare, economic growth, decrease in unemployment, etc. all could have contributed to the increasing approval rating), it is still hard to square Obama’s approval rating rising in parallel to his rising drone use despite growing non-interventionist popular sentiment. This in fact illustrates another way in which drones have made war easier to wage: it has allowed the governments to engage in covert warfare without much public recognition or understanding of the conflict.

Recently, persistent calls for transparency led the administration to release data on the number of civilian casualties from drone-strikes. The administration reported at least 64 innocent casualties (and at most 116). But this statistic fell far short of every single other thorough research report published by independent, nonpartisan and nonprofit organizations, with some extending up to at the very least 500 civilian casualties, demonstrating the real lack of public transparency in the US drone-program.

President Obama oversaw the historic Iran nuclear deal, began the process of lifting the embargo on Cuba, and withdrew tens of thousands of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. By almost any measure, he has been a strong foreign policy president, resisting the impulse to send troops abroad, and trusting in the good sense of the American people.

Which is precisely why this isn’t an attack on Obama’s presidency, nor on the use of drones in general. Drone-use is not inherently evil; to the contrary, in most respects its use has proved remarkably efficient in combating terrorists without risking hundreds of American lives, destroying or destabilizing entire countries, or generating an even greater number of innocent victims. But therein lies the problem. The proliferation of military drone-strikes may have just made war too easy. It was the tremendous, palpable cost of World War II, the French colonial wars, the bombing of Japan or the Vietnam War that prompted public wariness of conflict in the respective countries, thereby pushing the governments towards peace and non-intervention, at least temporarily. If war’s ceiling–the level at which a population yells “No More!”–is removed, then the pendulum will cease its backward swing. The price of drone warfare is invisible to those who prosecute it, while destructively tangible to those on its receiving end. It’s for this reason we must make sure not to remove war’s ceiling.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Policy Pear President Lina Abisoghomyan and Glimpse From the Globe Senior Correspondent Luke Phillips sat down to discuss overarching American grand strategy in the War on Terror, referencing “Bringing and End to the Forever War” at War On the Rocks. Should counterterrorism focus on alleviating the conditions leading to terror (nation-building,) or on tactical strikes against terrorist forces (containment)?

The views expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

As an employee of the United States Federal Government, the views presented by Ms. Lina Abisoghomyan are hers and hers alone. They are not stated on behalf of the Federal Government, nor are they representative of the official position of the United States on these issues.

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The end of European integration?

While today we often take the close friendship between European nations for granted, in reality it is an astonishing feat considering the region’s bloody history. Only since World War II have European leaders begun to view each other as allies by virtue of shared heritage and values, rather than enemies vying for influence and territory. The foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950 set Europe on a trajectory of increasing unity, exemplified by the Common Market and later the European Union. Removing trade barriers between countries was instrumental in allowing Europe to rebuild after the destruction of the war and sustain impressive growth for decades: in the second half of the twentieth century, GDP per capita tripled while average hours worked fell by a third as goods, services, money and people moved freely throughout the continent. Beyond the tangible economic measures, such increasing interconnectedness no doubt contributed to preserving the longest stretch of peace in European history.  

Because the image of a tolerant, peacekeeping and socialist-leaning Europe has grown so entrenched, it is easy to forget this is a relatively recent phenomenon. Far from a permanent fixture, these values reflect an ideology specific to a time in history, one that is on the decline in Europe today. The Brexit vote reflects a public opinion shift away from internationalism, not just in Britain but to varying degrees across the continent.  According to recent surveys, favorable views of the EU have dropped in each of the seven EU countries surveyed since 2004; in Greece, France, Spain and the UK, a higher percentage of respondents expressed a negative attitude toward the EU over a positive one. While part of this discontent can be attributed to dissatisfaction over the EU’s handling of issues like the economic and migrant crises, it is also importantly indicative of a general questioning of the necessity of such a close union between European countries – whether the EU actually helps Europeans address today’s most pressing problems.

Some dissatisfaction with the EU can be attributed to economic issues, especially in countries on the receiving end of the EU’s controversial monetary policy and forced austerity after the Eurozone financial crises. Greece unsurprisingly has the highest rate of disapproval of EU economic policy (92%), though wealthier economies like Germany also harbor discontent over being forced to finance bailout after bailout to keep the euro healthy. Such realities call into question the trade and currency integration that are the foundation for the EU: while the Common Market has no doubt bolstered the post-war European economy, backlash against the financial obligations of EU membership formed part of the driving force of Brexit. Despite the fact that the British economy has no doubt taken a hit in the aftermath of the ‘Leave’ vote, the decision nonetheless shows Europeans feeling more burdened than bolstered by economic integration, and beginning to envision a future outside of the Common Market.

Beyond economics, much discontent with the EU links to social tensions. Again, Eurasia Group’s 2016 prediction holds true: “a combination of inequality, refugees, terrorism, and grassroots political pressures pose a fundamental challenge to [EU] principles.” With an overwhelming majority of Europeans unhappy with the EU’s handling of refugees, many question the freedom of movement policy central to the EU model. A recent Pew Global poll reveals that collectively, Europeans view ISIL as their single greatest threat, a fear obviously related to the string of terrorist attacks linked to the radical Islamist group over the past several years. But instead of turning to the EU as a resource of collective defense, many believe that the solution lies in strengthening national borders; in most countries polled, the majority agreed that accepting more refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks at home.

This view tends to translate into isolationist, anti-EU sentiment. In most countries, the majority favors some return of power to national governments and maintains that countries should deal with their own problems before helping others with theirs. In the words of Ian Bremmer of Eurasia Group, the emerging “closed Europe” is one that “closes itself to the outside world, and whose countries close themselves up to one another.”

This opinion is most prevalent among self-identified conservatives; in the majority of countries surveyed, those who identify politically with the left were significantly more likely to support the EU than right-wing respondents, linking anti-EU sentiment to rising tides of nationalism and  populist politics. From France’s Front National to the Alternative for Germany, many European countries are experiencing recent electoral revivals of far-right parties (detailed visual breakdown here) while the center-left, the traditional stronghold of European politicians, undergoes a decline. Not surprisingly, problems with immigration and terrorism bring out xenophobic tendencies in populations and thus empower nationalistic, reactionary candidates promising to restore safety through the reestablishment the integrity of the nation.  

One might imagine fear of the ‘other’ would inspire European unity, especially given the common view that Islamist terrorism represents an attack on the entirety of Western culture. Moreover, it seems clear from the outside that ISIL can only be defeated by a concerted European – and global – effort; it is futile for individual nations to fight a group which indiscriminately hates the West. But as Brexit has illustrated, the impulse to withdraw, isolate and draw up protective barriers proves stronger than this logic.

Walls and trade deals: US presidential elections

On the other side of the Atlantic, isolationist sentiment proves just as strong a force in the upcoming US presidential elections. As in Europe, economics and immigration constitute two central issues in the campaign: according to a recent poll, the economy and terrorism are the two topics most widely considered “very important” by 84% and 80% of voters, respectively.

Both the Democratic and Republican nominees have denounced a free trade deal with China as part of their platform, reflecting overwhelming American anxiety about the effects of economic globalization on domestic jobs and prosperity. Even Clinton, an avid supporter of the TPP in the past, has admitted she understands “a lot of Americans have concerns about our trade agreements” and adjusted her platform accordingly. Meanwhile Trump has declared that globalization moves “our jobs, our wealth and our factories to Mexico and overseas.” Even democratic runner-up candidate Bernie Sanders spoke out against opening the US further to global trade.

Such a harmony of opinion on a major issue across parties is remarkable, not least because, despite increasing volatility and competition in some industries, free trade has a wealth-generating effect on economies. Most economists agree that openness to trade in conjunction with smart policy that protects the negatively impacted is the soundest path for growth in today’s globalized economy. A recent US complaint against Chinese export taxes in the WTO illustrates the crucial role that free trade plays in economic prosperity; because key US industries rely on imports of Chinese raw materials, they lobby hard for duty-free imports to remain competitive.

The near-universal backlash against globalization does not represent a logical solution to economic hardship; economies are too far gone down this path to make turning back a viable option. Rather, it is as an emotional response to a perception that free trade brings predatory competition and benefits big business at the expense of the so-called average American worker. Trump especially serves up globalization as the scapegoat for America’s economic hardships in the same way that he pins social issues on immigration. His loud call for a wall to protect the border is a crude representation of Americans’ greatest fears surrounding race, religion and terrorism, making this opinion impossible to ignore. His proposition to ban all Muslims from entering the country shows that xenophobic fears are on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic.  

The verdict on isolationism: understandable but ultimately futile

For better or worse, from European explorers to American imperialism, the West has championed the ascent of globalization. Today, however, attitudes are shifting as Europeans and Americans alike increasingly embrace isolationism as a solution to their economic troubles and security fears. In a world characterized by the ever-heightening volatility of global markets and rising hysteria over ISIL and radical terrorism, it is hardly shocking that more and more people seek protection within their own borders.

Unfortunately, shutting our eyes and borders to the outside world will not resolve any of our ever-growing array of crises. Eventually, this approach will fall through and we will be forced to address problems that only intensify the longer we push them away. Reactionary isolationism will not provide any lasting solutions, just a temporary respite.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Jack Anderson

Belgium is reeling from its recent terror attacks. The tactics employed worked around post-9/11 security measures at Zaventem Airport, maximizing casualties and undermining public faith in the security apparatus. Terrorists have learned to leverage the vulnerability of locations like transportation hubs, stadiums and other public venues where large crowds gather with minimal physical security. And the world has yet to find a reasonable solution. Terrorists are able to run amok in Europe’s major cities. The attacks in Brussels and Paris have proven that terrorists can procure arms within European nations and move easily from one city to the next, often blending in with Muslim communities. It should surprise no one if jihadists linked to the Paris and Brussels attacks later return to strike Amsterdam or Cologne next.

Europe cannot solve its security, immigration or economic problems with disjointed policies and practices. European countries can solve these problems for themselves with independent immigration policies and segmented border fences, or it can integrate its policies and practices to reduce the level of uncertainty in European politics and economics. A major problem is that no one knows who is in charge. Europe needs to empower a stronger EU government or divert sovereign powers completely back to each nation-state. Until they do, Europeans will have to endure more terror attacks so long as strict privacy laws and generally liberal immigration policies remain in place. These attacks will only grow in sophistication and number, regardless of how many bombs are dropped on jihadists in Syria and Iraq.

Edoardo Del Vecchio

The threat of the Islamic State (IS) has compelled many international observers to call for “more Europe”. Though I would wholeheartedly support any political measure that might consolidate the EU as a political union, the rise of nationalistic populism and divergent geopolitical interests suggest that “more Europe” is just a dream for the well-educated minority of European citizens.

The Five Star Movement and the Lega Nord in Italy, Marine Le Penn in France, fascism in Hungary and Greece and many other far-right populist and nationalistic parties are on the offensive all over Europe. The situation is critical, and the European political establishment fails to understand and address the fears of its people. Intellectuals and experts call for “more Europe”, but the comment sections of their own articles confess a deep divide between what they think is right and what people really fear and care about.

This intellectual and political blindness adds up to an underlying dichotomy in the constitution of the European Union itself. Europe is not a federation of states; rather, it is a confederation. This means that while the EU is a single economic entity (a single market), it is not a single political entity. A group of countries choosing to cooperate, but still maintaining their own foreign policies.

When the Ukrainian crisis exploded, Putin met with Francois Hollande and Angela Merkel, not with Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Both Germany and France enjoy a productive relationship with Russia, while countries of the so-called “New Europe” (Baltic states) and the UK see it as “public enemy number one.” What this means to show is that a coordinated European foreign policy is highly improbable, and it’s by design. Ultimately, what we should expect is a strengthened cooperation between intelligence and security agencies, which, albeit with limited capacity and poor results, has already started.

Steve Helmeci

As someone who lived and worked in Brussels and who loves the city, I am deeply saddened and angered by the attacks of March 22. Emotional responses after attacks are customary, but importantly human. Having witnessed the societal structure of Brussels, however, not only makes me feel closer to its people, but also makes worry about how the usual post-attack community building might regionalize Belgian and European society.

European societal pillarization is a common topic, never more so than after the religion and ethnicity-inspired attacks on Paris and Brussels. While the “no-go zones” that European experts Bobby Jindal and Fox News focused on in the wake of the Paris attacks are oversimplified and reductionist, it is undeniable that pillarization in the Dutch tradition has been the preferred societal structuring across Europe. This creates a separation between ethnicity and class in most major cities, and Brussels is no exception. Divides are not always as easy to define as the Middle Eastern-European one currently under scrutiny; French speaking and Dutch speaking portions of the city are plainly divided, and even the two major universities are one French-speaking, one Dutch-speaking. A society already prone to division is one at risk of deepening those divisions in the wake of tragedy and in the midst of mass fear.

The response I’ve seen from my friends and colleagues has helped assuage doubts about the future of Brussels, Belgium and Europe in general. Yes, more care will be taken to prevent future attacks, and to an extent that is necessary. But the people of Brussels do not want to live in fear. They do not want to discriminate or hate. They just want life to return to normal. As the capital of Europe, Brussels’ response should drive European response. And, if Europe reacts as its capital does, we should not only see a hasty return to business as usual, but a more connected Europe. In the wake of both Paris and Brussels, the best possible response could be an increase in information and intelligence sharing across the Schengen area. Sovereignty aside, living in a free movement area necessitates such sharing, as outlined by Ali Soufan in the Guardian. As far as changes going forward, increased information sharing is the only potential change I see. The people of Europe are invested in the society they’ve built, and isolated incidents can only make it stronger, not bring it grinding to a halt with needless fear and over-securitization. Especially in Brussels, the mood is one of sadness and regret, but also one of resolve to move forward with life and with the European project.

I’ll conclude with the words of Sven Biscop, a program director at the Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels:  “When our values are under attack, the answer cannot be to abandon them – that would amount to capitulation… No European democracy will collapse, unless we ourselves give up on democracy.”

Tess Murray

In the wake of the attacks, much of the world’s focus has been on Belgium; however, its effects are starting to be felt in other areas. In the UK, immediately after the attacks, the disparity between public opinions about Brexit narrowed, indicating the increased support for a rather selfish movement towards British isolation. It is important to consider what will transpire when Britain votes on Brexit at the UK’s EU referendum on June 23 and the message it will send to the rest of the world.

Leaders in favor of Brexit were quick to use the siege on the EU’s capital as reason to leave. The UK Independence Party says that restricting the 508 million EU citizens who can freely pass into the UK would better equip the nation to keep suspicious people out. Although a reduced flow of immigrants into the UK appears to lessen vulnerability to attacks, using Brussels to encourage pro-Brexit support is inappropriate and a distasteful way to react to such violence. A response of this fashion is exactly the type ISIS hopes to incite. Not only will leaving the EU spiral Britain into a period of uncertainty and force the nation to renegotiate trade relations, it will also trigger intensified xenophobia in the region. The global repercussions of a Brexit would constitute a statement of retreat and isolation for the UK, rather than one of leadership in the war on terror.

With the British public becoming more evenly split on the issue, it is crucial for British Prime Minister David Cameron and the UK to encourage support for remaining in the EU by standing with Belgium and pledging to fight extremism. Rather than making the antagonistic decision for Brexit, Britain must coalesce with the rest of the EU to prevent future tragedies. Already, Britain has seen backlash for even considering a Brexit, and other EU countries are becoming frustrated with the UK’s inability to cooperate. As terrorist attacks continue to devastate Europe, the region must be wary of how isolationist solutions can create distrust among nations, especially in times when international collaboration is critical.

Kara Junttila

For Parisians, the November terrorist attacks in Paris were an utter shock. The March 22nd attacks in Brussels, however, were tragically less-than-unexpected. Belgium has been on high alert for months, and despite frequent counterterrorism raids by Belgian security forces, it took far too long to capture key plotters behind the Paris attacks who were able to shelter just outside of Brussels. There is a clear need to strengthen Belgium’s counterterrorism and intelligence capabilities; the European Union must quickly collaborate to aid Belgium in countering the very significant threat of further attacks.

But if the goal of these terrorists was indeed to ‘terrorize’ the European people, I can confidently say they have failed. Paris and Brussels are linked so closely by terror that an attack against one is a warning to the other. But in the heart of Paris where I currently live, Parisians remained undaunted. Planned strikes or manifestations against labor law reforms continued (although one might think congregating in the street a day after a major terrorist attack would be too frightening). Although more police were indeed deployed in the streets, the majority of these were just there to watch as Parisians practiced their cherished freedom of assembly. Across Europe, cartoonists, artists, and everyday people continue to share positive images and messages of hope, individuality, diversity and defiance of fear. In France, public support is not building behind a “war” on terror as declared by President Hollande. This is all to say, Europe’s fight against terrorism will be very different and more subtle than America’s, although Europe may indeed face a much more severe and direct daily threat. Expect bureaucratic reform and behind-the-scenes counterterrorism enhancement – but not much more.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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An important aspect of the negotiations at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) was the financing of climate-adaptation projects in less-developed countries. Climate change poses a more severe threat to stability in developing countries, where government resources are scarce and local economies are reliant on agriculture. Droughts linked to climate change have already contributed to the escalation of violent conflicts in Sudan and Syria. These events have had serious negative consequences for western countries, including a massive migration of refugees to Europe and an escalation of terrorist attacks.

The agreement reached in Paris this summer was an important step in the right direction, guaranteeing developing countries $100 billion per year in adaptation funding by 2020. But will it be enough to stave off the instability and conflict that is sure to accompany global warming?

Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to climate change, and by extension the instability that comes with it, because of their dependence on agriculture. In Africa nearly 60% of the labor force is employed by agribusiness. The World Bank estimates that by 2080 droughts linked to climate change will reduce crop yields in Sub-Saharan Africa 15%, forcing millions of people into poverty. The governments of African countries will be put to the test as they attempt to respond to climate-driven food scarcity and unemployment.

Although climate shocks do not necessarily lead directly to conflict, they act as a threat multiplier, increasing the likelihood that political and ethnic tensions will result in violence. For example, in Sudan an extreme drought fueled the start of the conflict in Darfur. Prior to its beginning in 2003, rainfall was down by approximately 30% for multiple decades in a row, leading to high rates of poverty and malnutrition among farmers and herders in the region. The Sudanese government put in place policies granting additional water rights to people from Arab regions, generating an escalation of ethnic tensions. The region has since descended into civil war, with the Janjaweed – an Arab militia – and the Sudanese government carrying out ethnic cleansing against Darfur’s African population.

Similarly, a report published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences found a strong connection between the Syrian conflict and climate change. A severe drought lasting from 2006 to 2009 – exacerbated by the “misguided agricultural and water-use policies of the Syrian government” – caused mass crop failure, impoverishing farming communities. As a result, approximately 1.5 million people migrated from rural to urban areas. This influx of people strained government programs and increased the rate of unemployment, resulting in social unrest and eventually an uprising against President Bashar al-Assad in 2011. These events have created a power vacuum for terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra to gain legitimacy amongst portions of the Syrian population by providing them with social services (e.g. education, health care).

Western countries have not gone unscathed. European countries have welcomed unprecedented amounts of refugees, angering their native populations and putting an additional burden on their economies, which have yet to fully recover from the Great Recession. Large-scale terrorist attacks have been carried out in France, and Cologne experienced a mass sexual assault at the hands of largely North African and Arab immigrants. It would be inaccurate to depict climate change as the principal cause of these events, but it is certainly not unconnected.

In order to avoid instability, developing countries will have to implement adaptation programs to prepare for climate change. Currently only 6% of African farmland is irrigated, leaving farmers defenseless against shifts in patterns of precipitation. With more severe and frequent droughts, farmers will need to construct sophisticated irrigation systems and switch to drought-resistant crops. These adaptation measures must be encouraged by government policy, which could provide low-income farmers with subsidies and consultation services.  

However, governments in developing countries often do not possess the financial resources to implement these programs, and are in need of assistance. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was created at COP16 with the mission of providing less-developed countries (LDCs) with the financial resources to respond to climate change. Then at COP21, developed countries agreed to increase adaptation financing from $10 billion to $100 billion by 2020—a monumental achievement. Following the signing of the final agreement, the South African Minister of the Department of Environmental Affairs, Ms. Bomo Edna Molewa, proclaimed that the delegates had reached an “ambitious, fair and effective legally binding outcome of which we as all South Africans can be proud.” Nevertheless, past funding pledges have failed largely because western countries have been insulated from the effects of climate change; with the continuation of the European refugee crisis, western leaders may begin to develop a greater appreciation for adaptation funding.

Developed countries will have to increase their climate aid substantially in the future in order to meet the growing demand for adaptation projects in the developing world. At COP21, negotiators agreed to establish a new funding goal before 2025 (using $100 billion as the baseline). The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that by 2050 LDCs will require between $210 billion and $300 billion in assistance per year, more than double the current pledged funding from developed countries.

International organizations have also increased their climate aid in an attempt to reach the UNEP’s looming funding-target. In November 2015, the World Bank announced the African Climate Business Plan. The Bank plans to “build up the continent’s resilience to climate shocks” by devoting $16 billion to adaptation projects. These projects will include climate-resilient infrastructure (e.g. irrigation, dikes, paved roads), energy infrastructure and climate data gathering.

It is important that world leaders follow through with the financial promises they made at COP21, keeping in mind the security implications of their actions. Global warming is not an isolated issue and should not be treated like one. A failure to fund adaptation programs in LDCs could have serious ramifications in the realm of high politics and national security. The future stability of the international system is largely dependent on the willingness of developed countries to expand adaptation funding in the next couple decades. Defense hawks who often pride themselves as “climate-skeptics”, should take another look at the facts. Climate change has had a devastating effect on fragile states, initiating a set of destabilizing chain-reactions that are almost impossible to stop once begun. This “Pandora’s Box” effect – if unaccounted for by adaptation funding – will have serious geopolitical consequences.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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As the United States edges ever closer to another presidential election in 2016, foreign policy discussion on the campaign trail has turned ugly. A leading candidate for the Republican Party nomination openly stated that they would ban all Muslims from immigrating into the country, while another mused aloud on the feasibility of glow-in-the-dark sand in the deserts of the Middle East. Given these first few months, it appears a number of candidates feel that apocalyptic force is the only viable US foreign policy strategy.

The good news is that polls and pundits alike do not anticipate Donald Trump or Ted Cruz to occupy the Oval Office come January. Professional consensus on the 2016 election sees the Democratic frontrunner, Hillary Clinton, becoming President at the end of the year, partly as a result of her vast experience in the realm of foreign policy.

Despite the positive perception of her experience, her foreign policy ideas must be examined independently—and they prove to be outdated and dangerous. It is true that Clinton’s foreign policy platforms are neither apocalyptic nor isolationist, making them preferable to those of Cruz or Trump. But that is setting an incredibly low bar for presidential foreign policy. Based on two defining moments during her tenure as Secretary of State – her council on regime change in Libya and her response to the Arab Spring in Egypt – Hillary Clinton has shown herself to be a Cold War-era realist, much like Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon (perhaps even Margaret Thatcher). Clinton operates under the assumption that any international entity not pro-US must be anti-US and, as happened during the tenures of the aforementioned leaders, that view has often lead to involvement or escalation in unnecessary, unproductive conflicts.

The most visible example of Secretary Clinton’s realist ideology came when she advocated for aggressive regime change in Libya without a strategy in place for the aftermath. Muammar Gaddafi was certainly a tyrant who treated his people horribly and masterminded an attack on US soldiers in Berlin before the turn of the century. But the willingness on the part of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to destabilize Libya originated in a Cold War ideal. In explaining his choice to use force in the country, President Obama said that if Gaddafi were left in power, “The democratic values that we stand for would be overrun.” In the estimation of President Obama and Secretary Clinton, foreign leaders are either “with us or against us”, and those against us should be deposed. Interestingly, when the Muslim Brotherhood was voted into power in 2014, a CIA-trained, Libyan-born, US citizen named General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar assumed control of the Libyan government. General Haftar has since threatened to disband governmental institutions in an attempt to seize power—in effect, rule as Gaddafi did. Should Secretary Clinton become President, a willingness to open up power vacuums by toppling regimes considered anti-American could pose a number of problems.

The lack of a clear strategy for implementing traditional democracy in Libya, as evidenced by the early success of the Muslim Brotherhood and the subsequent chaos that rendered the country a hotbed for loose weapons and terrorists, calls into question Secretary Clinton’s ability to handle a similar situation. Bashar al-Assad has overstayed his welcome as leader of Syria, and more damning evidence of infringements on democratic values has been brought against him than Gaddafi. Given Secretary Clinton’s council to President Obama on how to handle Gaddafi, President Clinton would surely do her best to depose Assad. She has even alluded to wanting to depose Assad before tackling the problem of ISIS in Syria.

Her argument that rebels on the ground would be more invested in fighting ISIS if Assad was gone is incredibly naïve for a woman of her experience. Nature abhors a vacuum, so the most organized group will surely fill the power void left by a deposed Assad. Unless Clinton has a miracle plan for organizing the moderate forces in Syria, ousting Assad would clear a path for ISIS to seize even more control in the country. Hasty regime change in Libya led to the Muslim Brotherhood gaining power; why would that pattern not continue in Syria?

Secretary Clinton’s support of the pro-democracy Libyan intervention is made all the more curious when considering how she handled the Arab Spring. Following the Tahrir Square protests in 2011, Secretary Clinton warned President Obama and his foreign policy team that the protesters would not be able to govern themselves if Mubarak was overthrown. According to Dennis Ross, Clinton feared that if the US backed protesters it would be turning its back on a long-time friend in Mubarak. Even Ross, a man described as “a hard-headed realist”, felt Clinton was “putting too much stock in…old friends.” Surely Mubarak was opposed to democratic values, but he was pro-US. Therefore, Secretary Clinton fought to protect Mubarak until President Obama chose to support the protesters.

Hypocrisy aside, Secretary Clinton’s desire to stand behind “friends” at all cost could deprive the US of a great opportunity during her Presidency: a shift away from its alliance with Saudi Arabia. The political, social and economic timing could not be better. Saudi Arabia has grown increasingly violent, and rang in the New Year by executing 47 dissidents. Domestic shale oil production in the US continues to decrease petroleum imports, meaning less business with Gulf States. The nuclear deal with Iran has opened the door to a more friendly relationship. The times are changing, and such a strong alliance with Saudi Arabia may no longer be required. Under President Clinton, however, the policy of defending “friends” would allow for no such maneuvering, lest the US be seen as turning its back on an ally. It is therefore plausible that in order to placate her ally, President Clinton would keep Iran at arms length (putting strain on a still-tenuous relationship), ignore human rights violations and allow democratic ideals like free speech to be punished by beheadings and public crucifixions.

Supporters of Secretary Clinton might argue that these events took place years ago and don’t reflect her current thinking on today’s challenges. However, while she has not had to defend her position on the Arab Spring movement, Secretary Clinton has reaffirmed her position on the Libyan intervention multiple times during debates in October and December of 2015. Moreover, while new situations pose new challenges, the overarching premise remains the same—renegade leaders who do not heed American warnings (Gaddafi and Assad) and decades-old alliances made untenable by leaders who systematically oppress their people (Mubarak’s Egypt and Saudi Arabia).

In fact, if Clinton embraces a foreign policy as President similar to the one she exhibited as Secretary, the ramifications will be more severe. Russia is openly backing Assad, which could lead to increased hostility if the US directly attacks Syria in an attempted regime change. ISIS, rather than the comparatively benign Muslim Brotherhood, would likely fill the power vacuum left post-Assad. And the escalation of proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran could lead to potential US involvement on the Saudi side, calling into question the burgeoning diplomatic relationship with Iran.

Despite her vast experience in the field of foreign policy, Hillary Clinton is a Cold War-era realist. Her worldviews perpetuate conflict and utilize the same “us vs. them” mentality that saw the US become involved in countless aggressions from World War II until the 1990s. While Clinton may not be screaming incoherencies about the evils of Muslim people and is certainly not actively seeking apocalyptic nuclear conflict, her agenda isn’t that of peace and cooperation. I cannot say for certain why Secretary Clinton feels the need to exude toughness and operate based on the realist ideas of old, but I can say for certain that her ideas will not move the world in a positive direction. One can only hope that American voters concentrate on the reality of Secretary Clinton’s foreign policy rather than accept experience alone as a qualifying factor for the Presidency.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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As 2015 draws to a close, every region of the world is experiencing some amount of volatility that will persist into 2016. Some countries around the world will resolve their problems and thrive;  others will fail to meet their challenges and continue to suffer.

Europe continues to muddle through its occasional economic crises while bearing the weight of a politically fractious influx of Middle Eastern refugees. Russia is attempting to punch above its weight in conflicts on its near abroad while NATO beats its chest in response. Former Soviet states in the Caucasus and Central Asia have seen their economies take a collective nosedive, following the descent of both oil prices and the Russian ruble. China’s government is grappling with a domestic economic slowdown while trying to secure a sphere of influence. The rest of Asia, suspicious of Beijing’s initiatives, is coalescing around security concerns, but each nation there is dealing with its own domestic challenges. Latin America is enduring simultaneous political crises in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. Several countries in Africa are dealing with persistent terrorist threats from Islamic State (IS) affiliates, while others have seen their domestic politics unwind into violence. In North America, the United States is witnessing the ugly sides of domestic politics emerge as the November 2016 presidential election looms. Looking forward, it is better to focus on larger international issues rather than the futures of individual states.

Global Economic Outlook

The global economy is slowly piecing itself back together. Europe has pushed through a number of economic crises, East Asian economies are still moving along and North America is rebounding well. “The Economist” predicts a global growth of 2.7% in 2016. They also predict that Asia, Africa and North America will grow at or above 3% in the coming year. With the US Federal Reserve set to hike interest rates, this seems plausible, but financial markets will need time to adjust. This will also have consequences for the value of currencies worldwide—the rate hike is meant in part to stave off inflation in the US where years of quantitative easing have flooded the economy with cheap dollars. A rebounding dollar could hit developing states hard, especially in emerging markets across Latin America and Asia. But it would also make their exports more attractive compared to American goods and services.

Natural resource exporters will suffer from low commodity prices. The addition of Iranian and American hydrocarbons to world markets will keep energy prices depressed. These same low prices can help fuel growth in other countries that leverage the availability of cheap energy and raw materials. More developed and sophisticated economies like India and South Korea are best positioned to take advantage of cheap, plentiful energy. Economies that depend on a sole supplier – especially those in Eastern Europe that depend on Russian hydrocarbons – may use this time to diversify their supply options.

The Cyber World

Cybersecurity continues its rise in importance and prominence. Developed nations will compete to create better cyber capabilities to protect utilities, banks and other types of infrastructure that are connected to the internet, and the demand for skilled information technologists will continue to surge worldwide. Developing nations, beset with other challenges, will struggle to keep apace. The most advanced countries, such as the US, China and Russia, may begin to offer cyber capabilities to developing nations in efforts to gain influence.

Meanwhile, increased government interest in the cyberworld will be matched by private citizen efforts to protect internet freedoms. Nations will settle debates over the competing importance of security and privacy differently. Those that land on the side of security and surveillance may find themselves under scrutiny from both hacker collectives like Anonymous and prominent civil liberties advocates. But mass surveillance and data collection will continue across the world; internet privacy for individuals will continue to be dismantled in 2016.

Terrorism

Terrorism will remain a worldwide security concern in 2016. Countries across the globe will continue to collaborate to combat terror threats, although different governments will implement vastly different measures. Inevitably, headline-grabbing attacks will be attempted in the West and Asia this year. The victimized nations will ramp up their security capabilities, possibly at the expense of civil liberties.

The Islamic State’s appeal to jihadists will remain strong, but it will remain physically isolated within parts of Iraq and Syria and focused on securing and legitimizing its caliphate. While fresh attacks are all but certain, an event on the scale of 9/11 is highly unlikely based on what information is available. IS cannot match al-Qaeda’s former capabilities, and multinational efforts will likely prevent IS from reaching that level. Al-Qaeda itself is no longer potent enough to carry out major attacks on the West, and it does not seem capable of resurrecting itself this year.

Politics and Security in the Middle East

The Syrian crisis won’t be resolved. Refugees will continue to flee the conflict zone and surrounding nations must deal with the consequences. As the Islamic State is continually bombarded, outside actors like the United States, Russia and Iran will pick their proxies on the ground and commit to them this year. The US will continue to back Iraq as long as possible, but with Iranian and Russian military advisors also present in Baghdad, the Iraqi-American relationship may start to unravel. As relations deteriorate, the US will have no choice but to put its weight behind the Kurds. Washington must attempt to forge a mutual understanding between Kurdish leaders and Turkey to bring them both together against IS and the Assad regime. But the US will likely fail to create a meaningful Turkish-Kurdish alliance, unless both the Islamic State and the Assad regime cause all three enough pain to bring them together.

Turkey will not stand for the Kurds, IS or Assad gaining power in Syria and will vehemently protest American support for Iraqi Kurds. It will consider a unilateral incursion into Syria, and taking some of northeastern Syria under its control is likely. However, Turkey will not aim to engage Russian forces, limiting its activities to Kurdish and IS territories.

Russia and Iran will continue to support the Assad regime. However, they will seek a diplomatic solution where Assad remains in power over the Alawite-controlled areas of Syria between the western cities of Damascus and Aleppo. Russia will push hard for a diplomatic solution ensuring Assad’s survivability, even if that means leaving the regime with a smaller territory and putting the rest up for grabs among rebel groups. Assad’s forces have lost substantial manpower, and Russia needs to get out and focus its attention on issues closer to home. Iran has apparently begun withdrawing some of its forces from Syria. If IS becomes threatening enough to demand the full attention of other rebel forces, a settlement may become a possibility. But rebel enmity for Assad will not fade this year, and no agreement will be reached.

Sunni Arab nations will mull the possibility of extending support to non-Islamic State Sunni factions in Iraq and Syria, but will not get deeply involved unless a major Shia-led atrocity occurs. But in this conflict, the possibility of genocide cannot be ruled out. Arabs will maintain their strong focus on the civil war in Yemen where they will increase their support for anti-Houthi forces. Kuwait recently became involved on the ground alongside Saudi, Bahraini and Emirati forces; all these nations will redouble their efforts to eliminate the Houthi rebels. On the other side of the conflict, Iran will struggle to provide comparable aid to the Houthis due to Saudi Arabia’s effective blockade around Yemen. Yemen’s civil war could end this year in favor of the ousted Sunni government. The coalition of Sunni forces are certainly stronger right now, but they must achieve a decisive victory over the Houthis to see the conflict end. Iranian support will not enable the Houthis to push back, but economic pressure on the Gulf nations may diminish the total commitment that coalition members can make, delaying the end of the conflict.

Maritime Claims in Asia

China will continue to aggressively exert control over its proclaimed possessions in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Japan and South Korea will hold fast against these claims in the East; Japan’s recent apology to South Korea for atrocities committed during World War II is a sign of the two states’ emerging strategic alliance. Similar apologies may be coming out of Tokyo to nations such as the Philippines or Vietnam, but Beijing will get no such treatment.

In the South China Sea, the US will publicly raise the profile of its military and diplomatic support for nations with maritime claims competing against China. The US has announced its intent to base more forces in the Philippines, and it has also declared its intent to hold more multilateral exercises with ASEAN nations, obviously to deter Chinese aggression. America will be successful in forging a common cause across Asia to prevent the spread of China’s navy, but a formal alliance of nations aimed at deterring China is unlikely.

However, China will not be intimidated. It will continue its strategy of building and developing artificial territory that it claims for its own. No country will resort to the use of force against China in defense of an uninhabited island, but inhabited islands will be actively defended. China may succeed in taking control of most of its desired area, but won’t prevent American naval vessels from patrolling throughout the South China Sea. Neither side will provoke a military conflict; the economic impact would be disastrous.

Western Hegemony

The United States will remain the world’s superpower throughout 2016 and NATO the most potent military coalition. When bundled together, the European, North American and Australian economies dwarf the rest of the world, and this is the foundation of Western power today. However, the political appeal of the West has been diminishing and will continue to decline; China has proven that economic growth can be achieved without implementing democracy and developing nations have taken notice. The West cannot rely on its own perceived political superiority or glorifying human rights to influence other nations. Economic strength and cultural appeal are the foundations of Western soft power.

Vibrant economies will also support hard power, financing Western military expeditions worldwide as the West continues its global counterterrorism campaign. America’s combat mission in Afghanistan will also continue unabated through this year and the next American president will decide its fate. Eastern European NATO members will be bolstered as NATO’s original nemesis continues to revive itself. Russia may be seething at the loss of a jet to Turkey, but it will not seriously entertain the idea of confronting NATO. With the economy reeling, Putin cannot afford any defeat in foreign affairs, much less one with such astronomical consequences.

Trade between Eastern and Western economies will hold steady, with Western demand keeping manufacturing alive in East Asia and providing a basis for the expansion of the services sector. China and India will continue to feed off this energy to grow and diversify their own economies. American growth and European steadiness will keep demand for goods high. Dollars and Euros will continue to circulate globally as the preferred currencies for trade, and Western financial institutions will remain the standard bearers of the economy. Alternative financiers like the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will see their influence grow, but the West will maintain a strong lead in available capital. China will counter the West by attempting to invest faster and more actively in infrastructure projects across Asia and Africa, but its own economic slowdown will constrain its capabilities.

Overall, Western hegemony may not remain as powerful as it has been, but the West’s economic and military strength will persist even as other states ascend into regional powers.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Ever since the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, US and NATO relations with Russia have been frozen, including the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), arguably the most valuable tool of NATO-Russian cooperation. Its function is essential to build trust and confidence through shared institutions. In March 2014, sanctions were imposed on Russian officials and NATO Foreign Ministers suspended the NRC, stalling “all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia.” As the US and Russia have a number of shared interests, the revival and enhancement of cooperation would benefit both countries tremendously. The US should take two steps to build a constructive and sustainable foreign policy towards Russia: resuming diplomatic relations in the NRC and cooperating in the field of information systems.

Even before the Ukraine crisis, lack of trust and suspicions between Moscow and Washington were a main reason for recurring crises and tensions in the region. Before the crisis, the NRC allowed open communication and cooperation on common interests such as counterterrorism, building trust and increasing efficacy in endeavors of common concern. The current suspension of the NRC undermines this consultation and cooperation between Russia and NATO. Fighting the imminent international threat of ISIS and solving the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine could be more effective if the NRC’s diplomatic and military tools were reinstated.

As a second pillar, next to the (resumed) NRC, further expansion of NATO-Russian cooperation is in America’s national interest. Distinguished military fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program, Vladimir Dvorkin, proposed that the US should seek rapprochement with Russia and pursue “computer-assisted joint missile defense exercise[s].” This increases the effectiveness of both countries’ intermediate-range ballistic missiles interception and embeds Russia into a greater Atlantic-European community—crucial for long-term stability. A Western-oriented Russia that shares operational systems with the NATO leader is less likely to carry out belligerent acts in the future. Also, Russian withdrawal from arms control treaties would become more unlikely, strengthening the international law regime and security in the region. However, a joint data center with shared administrative responsibilities does bear the risk of having information on US technology leaked to Russian-friendly terrorist organization or countries such as North Korea or Iran.

Another hurdle to overcome for a constructive relationship is the power structure of future NATO-Russian or US-Russian cooperation. Previous attempts to engage in data sharing failed due to mistrust on Russia’s side about the US domination of NATO-Russian relations and negotiations. Barack Obama initiated a “reset” of US-NATO relations to let both parties rethink their strategies. Although the US administration now further takes into account Russian concerns, the latter still does not perceive itself as an equal partner. Therefore, the US should further “rethink” its position in NRC negotiations and be more accommodative of Russian interests.

A number of issues on the security agenda of NATO, the US and Russia must be tackled in the near future, and are most effectively addressed through established diplomatic channels; moving beyond the current freeze is vital. Fundamental questions to be solved include arms reduction treaties and the ongoing Syrian civil war.

In June, Vladimir Putin announced the addition of 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs with 3,400 miles range) to Russia’s nuclear arsenal by the end of 2015. Both Russia and the US are bound by the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, INF, and the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, New START. According to some US sources, Russia’s use of its R-500 cruise missile exceeds the 300 miles range granted by the INF Treaty, constituting a breach of the agreement. Contrary to these sources, Russia claims that the R-500 is equivalent to US land-based SM-3 antiballistic missile. This “current nuclear hysteria” and fears of confrontation between the US, NATO and Russia appear to be ungrounded, partly because Russia would suffer significantly more if a new arms race were to happen.

More recently, incumbent US Defense Secretary Ash Carter distanced himself from Russia’s operation, claiming that Russia will pay for its airstrikes in Syria as resentment is growing in the rebel-supporter Saudi Arabia. Recent terrorist attacks by ISIS in Syria, the Sinai and Beirut, however, worsened the situation and currently pressure the US and Russia to overcome disagreements on alliances in the war and take immediate action.

Irrespective of whether targeting immediate threats such as ISIS or developing a long-term policy for the Atlantic-European region, US foreign policy towards Russia through NATO should be aimed at softening the fronts between the two camps to ensure and possibly enhance national security. At the same time, the US should reassure NATO members to improve confidence in the defense alliance, especially after NATO only provided limited military assistance in the Ukraine crisis. The dismissal of the INF Treaty or New START, however unlikely, could provoke a renewed arms race and increase instability. Therefore, norms of the international law regime on strategic and non-strategic nuclear arms reduction should be protected and strengthened.

Focusing on the benefits of cooperating with Russia and of a NATO-Russian rapprochement through the NRC allows greater Europe to go beyond the “post-Crimean” security discourse of frozen diplomacy and cooperation. For a political solution to the Ukraine Crisis, the NRC should operate as a facilitator of negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and NATO members. US openness to Russia’s concerns is instrumental for Russian commitment not to carry out irredentist interventions in the future and to give more consideration to international law. Embedding Russia in Europe’s security architecture as an equal partner through cooperation in information systems is a viable path towards stability and a post-Crimean chapter in European security.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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The Syrian Civil War has been going on for several years now and has become more complex and protracted than ever. Although the international community has been reluctant to take action in the conflict, the ongoing refugee situation in Europe and numerous terrorist attacks by ISIS have brought the issue of the Syrian Civil War back on the agendas of global leaders. The international community is at a pivotal moment in which resources can be jointly mobilized to solve both these pressing conflicts. As ISIS and the Syrian Civil War are ultimately interwoven, they must be approached comprehensively.

I seized the opportunity of my semester abroad at the George Washington University in Washington, DC to interview Faress Jouejati, a highly involved young academic and professional. Mr. Jouejati is an American-Syrian Adjunct Professor of International Political Economy at the George Washington University. He has established and worked with a network of citizen journalists and organizations to disseminate information about the Syrian revolution and to coordinate humanitarian efforts for the Syrian people.

Background

GLIMPSE: What do you consider the root causes of the Syrian Civil War?

JOUEJATI: A fairly large, and unprecedented, demonstration was held in central Damascus on February 17, 2011, after police beat a shopkeeper in the famous al-Hamidiya market. Although an isolated event, this was the start of the Syrian revolution. Then on March 6, more than 15 children were arrested for spraying anti-government graffiti on school walls. During their internment, the citizens of Daraa held unprecedented protests against the regime. These kids were returned to their families days later, bruised and tortured, which led massive protests in Daraa and across the country. While those are the root causes of the Syrian revolution, it is important to look at the political consequences of Bashar al Assad’s neoliberal economic policies (state-business actors, free trade agreements, outsourcing the provision of shelter to private development companies), as well as the handling of the 2009 drought.

From when Bashar took office in 2000 until 2010, state-business actors, such as Rami Makhlouf, were obtaining ever-increasing rents from the country – partly because Bashar was unable to muster enough force to prevent this scale of corruption. The gap between rich and poor increased significantly in those years. This, combined with the torture of the Daraa school children and Arab Spring protests across the region, created the ripe situation in which Syrians began to protest against the regime.

GLIMPSE: What are the main obstacles to resolving the conflict?

JOUEJATI: There are a number of reasons as to why the Syrian conflict is so difficult to solve. On the international level, there are a lot of competing interests (US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, France, Turkey, Egypt, etc.). Because of these competing interests, the international community has been unable – or unwilling – to devise a comprehensive strategy to restoring peace in the country in a way that serves the interests of each of these states. On the domestic level, we are dealing with a half-century-old dictatorship. If you look at the regime’s military strategies and rhetoric, it is quite clear they are not interested in a political solution. Rather, the regime has relied on the “security solution” to defeat all opposition—moderate or otherwise. Their stance is reinforced by what Shabiha gangs have frequently scribbled on the walls of buildings across the country: “al assad ow mna7req al balaad” (the Assad regime or we will torch the country).

On the Syrian Opposition

GLIMPSE: What kind of vision do the representatives of Assad’s opposition (National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces) have for post-war Syria?

JOUEJATI: The Syrian opposition represents all segments of Syrian society and has representation on the ground in Syria. They envision a democratic Syria where all people are equal under the rule of law regardless of race, religion, ethnicity and gender.

GLIMPSE: How representative of the Syrian people is the opposition force?

JOUEJATI: The opposition is very representative of the Syrian people and is composed of all segments of Syrian society including Sunni, Shiite, Alawite, Christian, Kurds, Druze and Assyrians.

GLIMPSE: How unified is it?

JOUEJATI: This is a difficult question to answer. In short, with each passing day and in the absence of any kind of meaningful intervention, the opposition – both armed and unarmed, inside and outside the country – becomes more and more fragmented, and this obviously has big implications for [the]uprising. For example, one of the main purposes of the expatriate opposition is to represent popular resistance on the ground in Syria, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and to lobby on their behalf. Since the expatriate opposition has been unable to win any meaningful support from the international community (in the form of weapons or money to the FSA), the FSA and other popular resistance groups have increasingly separated themselves from the expatriate opposition.

As a result of failing to obtain weapons for the FSA, FSA members find themselves in a huge dilemma: either stay true to the goals of the revolution by remaining in the FSA (which is the most popular resistance group among Syrians) or alternatively, switch allegiance to better-funded, better-armed militias, which tend to be more Islamist. From the perspective of FSA, you either stay in this isolated but popular army, which will likely result in your death, or you join other groups that have better weapons and more money. So, in the absence of any meaningful support, the opposition becomes increasingly divided.

The international community could reverse this situation with ease, though. Arming the FSA would not only cause defections from the Syrian army, but it would decrease the incentive for Syrians to join other extremist militias, and it would give incentive for the FSA to reiterate its allegiance to the expatriate opposition—the only party which represents all segments of the Syrian society.

GLIMPSE: How do the Assad regime and other international actors strengthen or weaken the opposition?

JOUEJATI: Beyond the supply of canned food, blankets, walkie-talkies and some light weaponry, the international community has not given much support to the opposition. This is partly because one of President Barack Obama’s conditions to arming the FSA is that they fight ISIS, and ISIS only. Most Syria experts agree that this condition is unrealistic because it is the Assad regime that is responsible for the overwhelming majority of murder in the country. As a result, some of the most armed resistance groups have rejected US assistance. On the other hand, the regime has deliberately targeted the leadership of all opposition forces – armed and unarmed – in an effort to leave the opposition leaderless. By targeting teachers, merchants, doctors, engineers, lawyers and popular commanders, the regime hopes to further fragment and divide the opposition. If the regime succeeds at doing so, the world would see the Syrian conflict in terms of only two options, Bashar al Assad on the one hand and ISIS on the other.

On The International Community

GLIMPSE: In your opinion, should and will the war be resolved domestically or internationally?

JOUEJATI: Despite unequal capacities due to Assad’s weapons support from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, and the supremacy of the government in terms of money and fighters, the conflict is currently in a stalemate. Of course, it is preferable for the war to be resolved domestically. But again, the regime has taken the ‘security solution’ to solving this conflict—resorting to force to quell protests rather than engaging in negotiations to address the protesters’ needs. So, the international community must balance the playing field in order for this war to be resolved. Only when the opposition is closer to being a strong opponent, the regime will be forced into a position to negotiate in good faith. The reason why all previous negotiations failed (in Moscow, DC, Montreux, Geneva, Luasanne, etc.) is precisely because the playing field is not leveled.

GLIMPSE: What role do you think the “international community” should play in efforts to resolve the war?

JOUEJATI: The international community should balance the playing field in Syria by arming the Free Syrian Army, which would force the Assad regime into serious negotiations. Let us not forget that there already is foreign intervention in Syria: Russia, Iran and Hezbollah have all been arming and financing the regime for years. In addition to arming the FSA, the international community must establish safe-zones and no fly zones across the country, and put additional pressure on Russia and Iran for them to abandon the demand that Assad remains in power.

GLIMPSE: What is Russia’s strategic interest in Syria and the Assad regime? Was Russia’s intervention in Syria counterproductive?

JOUEJATI: Since Russia invaded Syria several weeks ago, its military has bombed more than six hospitals and killed more than 400 civilians (97 of whom were children). By targeting civilians and rebels in the West, Russia allowed ISIS to advance onto Aleppo. Russia is largely refusing to attack ISIS, focusing its airstrikes on Assad’s opposition instead. Russia has three main goals in Syria. Firstly, preserving its seaport in Tartous, which is the Russian Navy’s only Mediterranean port. Secondly, keeping a friendly ally in the seat of Damascus who is willing to continue purchasing Russian weapons that will not be used against Israel. Thirdly, countering US influence in Syria and the region.

GLIMPSE: What is the interest and role of Iran in Syria and the region?

JOUEJATI: Even before the revolution started, Iran dominated Syria as well as the regime of Bashar al Assad. Iran is currently commanding military operations in Syria, managing underground torture chambers, manning checkpoints across the country and has extended billions of dollars in credit lines to the regime in order to pay the salaries of soldiers and other costs. Again, it is Iran, not Assad or the Syrian army, which is commanding military operations in the country.

Iran also has deep interests in Syria. Syria provides a link between Iran and its proxy militia in Lebanon, Hezbollah. Also, Syria is arguably Iran’s most important Arab ally. Finally, without Syria, Iranian influence would be limited to Iraq. Because Syria is part of Iran’s axis, Tehran’s influence extends from the Gulf to the Levant. So Syria is the important link that connects Iraq to Lebanon. Many Iranian policymakers and generals view Syria as one of Iran’s provinces. Iran also believes that by dominating Syria, they are able to contain the influence of Saudi Arabia, which is Iran’s biggest rival.

On Terrorism and the Backlash on Refugees

GLIMPSE: How do you expect the recent attacks in Paris, Beirut and other places carried out by ISIS to affect the situation of refugees in Europe and the European Union’s asylum policies?

JOUEJATI: We have seen the voices of the xenophobic right in Europe get louder and louder as a result of the Paris terrorist attacks. ISIS’ goal in these attacks was to cause an Islamophobic backlash. ISIS is trying to frame a ‘clash of civilizations’ between the West and Islam. So, by strengthening the xenophobic right in Europe, ISIS strengthens its own worldview as well, that there is in fact a clash between the West and Islam. The saddest part is that Islamophobic backlash is being directed at Syrian refugees who are likely to have been victims of and fleeing from ISIS in the first place. I expect the European Union to tighten security at its borders and limit the number of refugees who are granted asylum, playing directly into ISIS’ strategy.

The Take Away

The Syrian Civil War and the terrorist threat by ISIS are intimately connected and must be approached together. The strength of and support for the Syrian government and America’s focus on combatting ISIS rather than the Assad regime (the opposition’s much bigger threat) undermine a successful solution. Without international support of Syrian opposition, the strength and attraction of ISIS and the legitimacy of the Assad regime as the sole, viable alternative will only continue to grow. The most promising options to end the conflict are safe-zones and no fly zones across the country to secure populations, military support to the FSA and increased diplomatic pressure on Russia and Iran.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The post ISIS, International Powers and the Complexity of the Syrian Civil War: An Interview with Professor Faress Jouejati appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.