At present, Taiwan is the leader in semiconductor manufacturing. Taiwanese state-owned company Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the world’s leading manufacturer by a large margin. TSMC alone produces almost 70% of the world’s microchips and over 90% of the most advanced semiconductors. In America, Congress reports that only 12% of the global market share of semiconductors is manufactured domestically, a decline from 37% in 1990. This results in significant American dependence on Taiwan.

Due to the production of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry, China, which has threatened Taiwan with invasion for decades, has yet to fulfill its threats. This production of microchips has created an impenetrable utilitarian forcefield, making Taiwan untouchable to China, as China needs the advanced chips Taiwan produces. As China continues to make threats of invasion against Taiwan, the United States has stood by Taiwan, promising to protect it from China and pledging U.S. troops to be on Taiwanese soil in the event of an invasion. Through this, the diplomatic bond between Taiwan and the United States has grown significantly, with Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, visiting Taiwan in Aug 2022. 

It is important to note that despite the United States promising military protection to Taiwan, this is not the United States’ official foreign policy stance. Officially, the United States recognizes China’s One-China policy, agreeing that Taiwan is a part of mainland China and that China has sole legal control over Taiwan for geopolitical reasons. Officially, the United States and Taiwan do not have diplomatic relations. 

On May 15, 2022, TSMC announced that it would be building a fab, a semiconductor manufacturing center, in Arizona. This was a big win for the U.S. semiconductor industry. With a $40 billion investment and the expertise that TSMC will bring, U.S. production of semiconductors is expected to increase considerably. Furthermore, the Arizona TSMC fab is projected to produce three-nanometer semiconductors by 2026, the second most advanced type of semiconductor currently available. TSMC’s fabs in Arizona have several implications on a global scale that may only be realized after a period of time.  

The most obvious implication is that creating a fab in Arizona would naturally strengthen the relationship between Taiwan and the United States. With a decreased cost in transportation, increased opportunity for trade and improved connections between business leaders in the United States, TSMC and the United States would be expected to develop closer ties. Closer ties between TSMC and the United States could mean that the United States would be more likely to protect Taiwan from a potential Chinese invasion given the value of the semiconductors to the United States. However, it is doubtful that the United States would change its official foreign policy status.

Second, a less obvious implication of the creation of an Arizona fab would be the negative effect on the Taiwanese-American relationship. The fab in Arizona is expected to mostly influence the American semiconductor industry. With an estimated annual revenue of $10 billion, TSMC would make back its initial $40 billion investment in only about four to five years. Furthermore, the American semiconductor industry would gain invaluable expertise that might take years or decades without TSMC. 

While this sounds like a win-win situation for both TSMC and the United States, one aspect is easily forgotten. One of the main reasons why Taiwan has U.S. protection is due to Taiwan’s unparalleled semiconductor industry which produces a large majority of the semiconductors used around the world. If Taiwan’s semiconductor industry were to stop producing semiconductors, “no other company will be able to fill the gap in the short term” according to the Council on Foreign Relations.

If the U.S. semiconductor industry were to compete with Taiwan’s after the U.S. industry gained expertise and understanding of TSMC’s methods, then the Taiwanese industry would lose some value as consumers could simply buy from the United States instead of Taiwan. If Taiwan loses this global competitive advantage, it might also lose its bargaining power on the world stage. With a producer that could produce a semiconductor competitive with or better than TSMC’s, global consumers would quickly shift their consumption away from TSMC and towards the new producer. 

The potential unravelings of these trends could have negative implications for Taiwan. Without their utilitarian forcefield of the semiconductor industry, the United States may not find a reason to spend resources and risk U.S. lives protecting Taiwan. 

Militarily, Taiwan is severely outmatched against China. China’s military budget of $225 billion in 2023 dwarfs Taiwan’s budget of $19 billion. On water, China’s 86 naval ships and 59 submarines would dominate the Taiwan Strait against Taiwan’s 26 naval ships and four submarines. In the air, China operates almost 3,000 aircraft compared to Taiwan’s 500. On land, China operates over 4,000 tanks more than Taiwan and has two million active military personnel compared to Taiwan’s 200,000. Without the U.S. and allies’ protection, Taiwan would be defenseless to a Chinese invasion. 

Although it is known that China has wanted to forcefully annex Taiwan for decades, it has stopped short of doing so due to the threat of triggering U.S. protection and the destruction of Taiwan’s valuable semiconductor industry.

However, if the United States were to create a competitive semiconductor industry, it may lose some of its incentive to protect Taiwan. Meanwhile, if China were to believe that the United States would not defend Taiwan and that it could successfully invade Taiwan, China would be more likely to invade Taiwan. 

To this end, some experts expect an invasion as soon as 2025. However, Taiwan’s foreign minister predicts conflict in 2027 — marking the 100-year anniversary of the foundation of the People’s Liberation Army with an invasion of Taiwan.

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Though Taiwan only has a population of 23.5 million, its 2022 gross domestic product amounted to about $761.69 billion USD — ranking it #21 in the world — and is projected to reach $990.75 billion by 2028. Taiwan is crowned as one of the “Four Asian Tigers” alongside Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea — the Southeast Asian countries that experienced rapid industrialization and economic growth beginning in the 1960s and 1970s. Taiwan earned the title initially through its export-oriented economic strategies of exporting semiconductors, electronic components and computer hardware. 

Currently, Taiwan plays a vital role in the global supply chain, specifically in the technology sector. They are still a major producer and exporter of high-tech products. Taiwan’s tech companies dominate about “two-thirds of the semiconductor foundry market share with Taiwan Semiconductor Market Company (TSMC) controlling 84% of the production for the most advanced and efficient chips.” As a result, an increased number of “multinational corporations have invested in Taiwan in recent years, and demand for local talent with bilingual proficiency has also increased.” 

Further, the United States’ goal of trying to ‘decouple’ from China, meaning, trying to significantly decrease or sever economic dependence on Chinese supply chains, technology and trade in order to avoid national security risks and intellectual property theft has the potential to strengthen trading ties between Taiwan and the United States. From Taiwan’s perspective, this is another reason for their Bilingual 2030 pursuit — to increase its competitive advantages and international mobility to gain trading partners going forward, especially against competitor suppliers like Brazil, India and South Korea. 

Taiwan’s economic come up story and current success appear phenomenal at first glance. However, a closer look reveals that for both exports and imports, Taiwan’s “relative importance within global trade has fallen steadily since 2000.” In 2000, Taiwan ranked 14th in the world via exports, accounting for 2.3% of total world exports; in 2019, Taiwan ranked 17th in world exports, reducing its share of total exports to about 1.7%. Similarly, the bilateral trade relationship between the United States and Taiwan has greatly diminished. The United States has fallen to the fourth — from the first — largest trading partner for Taiwan since 2000. 

China and ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members such as Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Maynamar have had a competitive advantage over Taiwan through cheap labor and large domestic markets — attracting more foreign investment and trading partners — a key explanation for Taiwan’s diminishing trading relationships. 

In addition, Taiwan’s domestic workforce is predicted to steadily decline over the next decade. 2022 was a year with a historically low number of births and the most deaths ever, indicative of Taiwan going into a negative growth by 2031. Consequently, Taiwan’s economic structure is no longer “labor-intensive, it is technology-intensive,” and now needs to fill shifting industry and talent shortage demands in “biomedicine, green energy, defense, modern agricultural and the circular economy.”

To counter the low fertility rates and push to create a ‘Silicon Valley for Taiwan,’ Taiwan also seeks to gain 400,000 white-collar foreign workers by 2030 with at least 20,000 being Silicon Valley-adjacent innovators and 200,000 overseas students. Despite this goal, Taiwan suffered a 5% decline in total foreigners from 2020-2021 — with some critics arguing Taiwan can make itself more expat-friendly, such as boosting English-speaking rates. 

Coupled together — a decrease in global trade, diminishing trading relationships, negative population growth, shifting industry demands amidst talent shortages and a decline in needed expats explain why Taiwan is desperate to recruit foreign technical workers and boost its labor force. More so, it explains why Taiwan sees becoming a bilingual English-Mandarin nation as a key facilitator to these goals and overall productivity growth. Taiwan can’t supply a cheap, domestic labor force like China and ASEAN members did to increase exports and certain trading relationships. But, Taiwan can boost its English proficiency as a means of reducing barriers to foreign investment and facilitating itself as a a hub for multinational firms looking to enter the Asian market.” Likewise, Taiwan can hope to outcompete Hong Kong. Singapore, India and the Philippines where English is widely used in business, governmental and professional sectors. 

The Bilingual 2030 policy realizes Taiwan’s shifting demands and meets them with a twofold policy. Its first aim is to “help Taiwan’s workforce connect with the world,” and secondly, to “attract international enterprises to Taiwan and enable Taiwanese industries to connect to global markets and create high-quality jobs.” For these aims to be achieved, Taiwan’s workers must not only align their professional expertise with international standards, but also collaborate with counterparts from other countries and work in global markets targeted by Taiwan’s industries. 

Bilingual 2030 will stress college and senior high school education, supplemented by integrating English proficiency at all stages of education. In 2021, 21% of grade 12 and 6.5% of grade 9 students reached the B2 level (high-intermediate level) or higher on the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) for Languages, statistics that make 2030 bilingualism achievable. However, their high performance in receptive skills, reading and listening, were incongruent with their mediocre performance in writing and speaking — which is precisely what Taiwan wants to improve. The Ministry of Education has formulated six goals to bridge writing and speaking gaps and achieve bilingual proficiency. 

First, accelerate the development of bilingual higher education. The Ministry of Education plans to select universities that are able to speed up the implementation of bilingual teaching and make them a beacon for other Taiwanese universities. The ministry will collaborate with the British Council to provide consulting to universities in hopes of achieving the 50-50-50 target by 2030 — at least 50% of all university sophomores should have achieved B2 in listening, speaking, reading and writing, at least 50% of all sophomore and master students should have done at least 50% of their credits in full English for that academic year. 

Second, balance and optimize bilingual conditions for schools at the senior high school level and below. At a glance, this means enhancing students’ ability to use English in daily life, having STEM schools integrate more English, and adopting all-English teaching in English classes. Further, Taiwan seeks to form partnerships with the U.S., U.K. and Australia and have Taiwanese schools establish sister-school partnerships with these target countries — specifically to conduct online bilingual classes. By 2030, Taiwan hopes to have “one in every six schools nationwide to establish a partnership with a foreign sister school.”

Third, develop digital learning. The Ministry of Education aims to distribute technology to remote areas to bridge proficiency gaps between urban and rural areas. Likewise, Taiwanese university students with higher proficiency will online-tutor remote and disadvantaged students. 

Fourth, expand the provision of affordable English proficiency tests to gauge the progress of Bilingual 2030. With the support of the Ministry of Education, Taiwan developed their own English proficiency test — about a half to one-third the price of foreign English tests — to increase access for more rural, economically-disadvantaged demographics. 

Fifth, raise civil servants’ English proficiency. Bilingual 2030 will initially focus on the civil service whose work is integrated with international affairs and where English is pertinent to their job. In the future, English will be taught to all civil servants and the portion of English testing on civil service exams will be increased. 

Sixth, establish an administrative body dedicated to policy promotion and implementation. Bilingual 2030 is still a novel and nebulous long-term initiative and requires various stakeholders to collaborate and reach a consensus. The Bilingual Policy Development Center will “assist with the horizontal integration of measures relating to education, examinations, and training across 31 related government agencies. It will provide these agencies with vertical specialized services ranging from policy research to policy execution and consolidate international cooperation efforts under the policy.” 

In addition to the six initiatives, Taiwan has plans for multiple other ancillary initiatives. For example, there are plans to have “government regulations, policies, and websites in legally binding English” eliminating translation barriers to foreign businesses. The government will also “promote the establishment of an exclusively English-language television station, and both TV and radio broadcasters will be encouraged to produce English-language programming.” While Bilingual 2030 is still ongoing trial and error with each municipality and school having to acclimate the policies to its students, it’s a significant step for the island’s future.  

Taiwan faces various economic challenges which will only be exacerbated in the face of rapid globalization, the rise of AI, its volatile relationship with China and competition from neighboring countries. However, Taiwan can control its future by endowing its workers and future generations with bilingualism, global perspectives and international mobility. 

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Leaders know this, and while the future of the current conflict remains unknown, some elements are easier to predict. For example, last week, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted on whether or not to adopt a resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

Thanks to Russia’s P5 seat at the table, and consequent veto power, the resolution was doomed to fail. Indeed Russia vetoed, 11 countries voted in favor, while China, India and the United Arab Emirates abstained. Despite claiming other reasons, these nations are wrapped up in their own territorial disputes — India in Jammu and Kashmir, the UAE in the Persian Gulf and China in Taiwan, the South China Sea, etc. A vote to call for the end of the Ukrainian dispute could come back to bite a nation such as China if it were ever to engage in Taiwan or elsewhere. 

The UN General Assembly swiftly passed its own resolution on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, though U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, voiced her opinion on the UNSC vote: “Let me make one thing clear. Russia, you can veto this resolution, but you cannot veto our voices, you cannot veto the truth, you cannot veto our principles, you cannot veto the Ukrainian people,” America’s position is at odds with itself – willing to help but not where it counts. Many are criticizing the current inaction of the United States.  NATO has refused to deploy troops in or declare a no-fly zone over Ukraine due to the fact that it would require policing, and any direct combat would draw the West into the conflict once and for all. 

While there is no easy solution, ambiguity is dangerous. The lack of clarity on Ukrainian NATO membership (a promise with no due date) helps no one. A legacy of overpromising and under-delivering weakens U.S. credibility, all while Zelensky begs for honesty, insisting “an open door is good, but we need open answers.” Nothing prepared Ukraine to fight this war alone, and whatever decision the world lands on, clarity is needed.

When looking deeper into the situation in Ukraine, this is evidently not a new issue; the geopolitical situation has been tense for the last decade. In 2014, pro-Russian leader Viktor Yanukovych was ousted in favor of a pro-Western government, and Russia annexed Crimea, the southernmost part of Ukraine, shortly thereafter. Due to the fact that Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region is sympathetic to the Russian cause — as evidenced by a political divide and significant ethnically Russian population — separatist groups aided in the recent Russian invasion. 

This phenomenon is not limited to Ukraine, as many de facto states throughout Eastern Europe remain at odds with their de jure nations. As the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dissolved and former satellite states gained independence and their pre-Soviet territory, unrest began to emerge in certain regions. These areas claimed their own independence and territories but have failed to achieve international recognition of statehood. Known as de facto states, these governments consistently clash with their de jure leaders, as they must rely on the larger country to facilitate international diplomacy and trade. 

South Ossetia, for example, has been Russian-occupied since the 2008 Georgian War and claims independence from Georgia. Located on the Russian border, in and around the Caucasus Mountains, this de facto state could become a gateway to Georgia, should Russia pursue further expansion. Additionally, de facto states exist throughout Eastern Europe, and are not limited to the Russian border. While each warrants a case-by-case consideration, de facto states cannot be overlooked when observing Russian sympathy in the region. The issue of territorial sovereignty is not only limited to the hegemonic tendencies of the Russian Federation but of hegemons worldwide.

Beyond Russia and Ukraine, China has its eyes set on Taiwan and is closely watching to see how Russia is treated following the nation’s disregard for Ukrainian sovereignty. If limited sanctions and UN condemnations are all that the world is willing to do, China could see the current global response as a green light to pursue control of Taiwan or the South China Sea. Sanctions would not hurt the Chinese as much as Russia, and while China owns U.S. debt, any financial consequence is a risky move.

Territorial tensions are high, and consequences now will inform actions later; as the world looks to Ukraine, we must look to the world.

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In what many see as a response to the Hong Kong protests of 2019, China passed the Hong Kong National Security Law in June 2020, which criminalizes offences of “secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces to endanger national security”. Johannes Chan, former Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong, criticized the law as ambiguously worded and questioned how peaceful protests act such as chanting slogans and flying banners could be seen as violations of the law.

These policies prompted opposing statements from foreign countries. British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab asserted that it was “a flagrant assault on freedom of speech and freedom of peaceful protest,” while then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the “draconian law” destroys the territory’s autonomy.

Since then, countries have been taking action; most notably, a few governments have  enacted new immigration measures for Hong Kong’s citizens. In July 2020, the United Kingdom announced a policy proposal immediately after the law went into effect, opening an immigration tunnel for Hong Kong citizens who hold the British National Overseas passport (BNO). The BNO is a passport issued by the UK government for Hong Kong citizens born before July 1, 1997, the day of handover of the city. Citizens born after that day are eligible for the HKSAR passport issued by China instead.

The UK’s immigration policy stated that BNO holders and their dependants can apply for the BNO visa, which grants them the right to live and work in the UK.  Applicants will be able to apply for a permanent resident status after living within the country for five years.

Liu Xiaoming, China’s ambassador to the UK, claimed that Britain’s action has infringed on China’s sovereignty and undermined international norms. On January 29, 2021, the Hong Kong government announced that they would no longer recognise the BNO, meaning that BNO holders would not be able to enter or leave the Hong Kong border or demonstrate identity with the passport.

This means that for Hongkongers to depart, they would need an HKSAR passport. However, the British government has found a way around China’s response to their policies. The UK stated that BNO citizens do not need a valid BNO passport to demonstrate their BNO citizenship, thus they would not need a BNO passport to enter the UK. 

Other countries have also moved to enact similar immigration policies. Canada launched its Hong Kong Pathway immigration scheme, which allows all Hong Kong residents to apply for open work permits. Australia also loosened its VISA policies by allowing Hong Kong students to stay within the country for up to five years upon graduation from an Australian university. 

The threat to freedom of expression posed by the National Security Law has already made emigration a popular topic among Hong Kong citizens, and new immigration schemes by different countries have prompted debate. Jacky Yau, a student from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, said that the uncertainty of Hong Kong’s future is one of the key reasons why he thought about leaving the city.

“We don’t know how much time Hong Kong has before it becomes exactly the same as China,” Yau said. “We might lose all the freedoms that we once enjoyed, and that’s not something that many of us want to see.” 

When asked about what country he would want to move to, Yau suggested Taiwan as a preferable destination.

“Lots of people have raised concerns about the problem of discrimination in Western countries, and Taiwan is just both culturally and linguistically closer to Hong Kong,” Yau said.

Clarence Ip, a Hong Kong citizen currently studying at the University of California San Diego, wants to stay in North America after graduation. He considers Canada as a viable option because of its new immigration scheme.

“I’ve looked into countries like the UK, Canada, the [United States], and I’ve looked into both the BNO program and the Canada youth program,” Ip said. “I feel like the Canada youth program is more beneficial towards the younger people of Hong Kong, but I have not seen anything from the [United States] yet.”

In September 2020, Congress proposed the The Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act of 2020, which would provide temporary protected status for Hong Kong residents who have “well-founded fear of persecution if the individual asserts such fear.” After the bill was passed in the U.S. House of Representatives and moved to the Senate, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) blocked the bill, asserting that the bill was Democrats’ effort to advance their immigration agenda and would be used by China to send more Chinese spies into the United States.

With China further tightening its grip on Hong Kong, emigration is increasingly being seen as the best option for HongKongers to preserve their freedom. Fortunately, foreign countries are offering to take the city’s residents. But moving away from home and immigrating into a new country could prove to be another round of tough challenges for the Hong Kong people.

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Boba, the soft and chewy tapioca pearls that make up the “bubble” in “bubble tea,” was invented in Taiwan in the late 1980s. While boba’s origins are technically unclear, as many shops have claimed ownership of its invention, the drink’s positive global reception closely parallels Taiwan’s reputation on the international stage. 

In late 2020, Taiwan’s New Power Party announced new passport designs as part of the political initiative to reinvent Taiwan’s identity. One passport design that garnered the most attention for its striking combination was of a blue bird with a cup of bubble tea perched atop its head. The novelty of the design gained widespread attention, with international media outlets from Quartz to CNN Travel covering and commenting on its unique creativity. 

In the end, the bubble tea design did not take first place and consequently, was not selected as the final passport. Yet according to Quartz, the design competition itself is representative of larger conversations about Taiwan and its place in debates about mainland China. This is because the competition, which originally began as an initiative to remove the term “Republic of China” from the Taiwan passport, involves Taiwan’s desire to rebrand themselves as quirky and creative — and separate from mainland China. 

Since the onset of the pandemic, the Taiwanese people have aimed to promote a positive image of their home, viewing the negative rhetoric about mainland China as an opportunity to define themselves as a separate entity altogether. For many residents of Taiwan, this has meant affirming a distinctly Taiwanese identity and sharing this distinct identity and unique values with the outside world. Representing that identity involves a concerted publicity campaign, strategic nation branding and public diplomacy efforts to market the island to the world. To start, Taiwan has sought to market boba as a popular global consumer good, representative of the island’s most prized cultural icons.

Bubble tea, in that regard, is an effective choice to best represent Taiwan. As a form of gastrodiplomacy, the drink has come to symbolize Taiwan’s innovation in not only food, but also culture. In addition to the bubble tea shops found on almost every block, bubble tea has taken on a new life of its own abroad. 

The real agents of Taiwan’s soft power, however, are the Taiwanese people who are bringing boba out of Taiwan and into an increasingly globalized world. Wanpo, for example, is a famous milk tea chain in Taiwan that recently opened its first U.S. location in Palo Alto, California, near Stanford University. Other famous Taiwanese milk tea chains like Tiger Sugar — best known for its brown sugar drinks — have taken the lead in opening shops all over the world, from Europe to Oceania. 

Yet, bubble tea is more than a purely commercial venture. Al Jazeera reports that bubble tea has become a prominent driving force for Asian American communities, particularly in the San Gabriel Valley near Los Angeles, where nearly 525,000 Asian Americans reside. For Asian American youth, in particular, consuming the drink serves as a bonding experience and a means of establishing unity through cultural affiliation. 

Boba’s popularity within Asian American enclaves is largely attributed to the Taiwanese immigrant communities that first brought it to the United States. Since the early 1990s, it was Taiwanese immigrants who opened the first shops dedicated to bubble tea. According to Clarissa Wei in LA Weekly, decades-old Taiwanese-run bubble tea shops like Tapioca Express, Quickly and Ten Ren can be credited with originating the bubble tea culture. 

TPumps, which has shops located all throughout the Bay Area, has created their own spin on traditional bubble tea by adding a unique range of flavors to the mix, including peppermint, gingerbread and guava. Boba Guys, too, is no stranger to innovation. The milk tea chain boasts relatively never-before-seen creations such as espresso milk tea and black sugar hojicha. 

Both of these chains, originally inspired by the traditional drinks of Taiwanese shops, are created and run by Asians in the United States. In the United States especially, bubble tea has evolved beyond merely a “Taiwanese” drink to its own type of international cuisine, one that incorporates a variety of flavors. It’s a testament to the global reach and widespread acceptance of Taiwan’s gastrodiplomacy.

The evolution and proliferation of bubble tea in other countries demonstrates its status as a drink with its own individualized international appeal. In that way, bubble tea indirectly symbolizes what Taiwan aspires to represent to the international community: innovation, adaptability to global interests and accessibility. Through economic and cultural means, bubble tea has achieved an international reach and fanbase. 

Even as its popularity has become an international phenomenon, bubble tea is fundamentally Taiwanese. This is evidenced by its origins and the perpetuation of its iconography in the Taiwanese political and cultural collective consciousness. From Taiwanese diplomats posing for photos with bubble tea to the creation of a “milk tea alliance” in promotion of Taiwanese democracy, bubble tea has become a political force to be reckoned with and a source of pride. 

Bubble tea’s cultural popularity has come to represent what Taiwan’s government desires for the nation as a whole. Conceptually, bubble tea represents a Taiwanese identity, primarily because only Taiwan can claim ownership of its creation. 

For that reason, Taiwan has launched bubble tea-related advertising campaigns and has stressed its association with the world-famous drink through Taiwan tourism guides. These endeavors in branding have contributed to the positive association between Taiwan and bubble tea culture.

Bubble tea has become part of a fundamental soft power campaign, and its role in Taiwanese gastrodiplomacy is based on the assumption that bubble tea wasn’t just created in Taiwan, but that at its core, it is Taiwan. In terms of future international endeavors, it’s unlikely that bubble tea on its own can lead to any concrete political upheaval. However, it’s worth paying attention to as a form of Taiwanese marketing. 

Taiwan’s positive image abroad as a democracy is correlated with the popularity of its gastrodiplomacy, as seen in the aforementioned “Milk Tea Alliance,” a digital solidarity movement with participants from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Myanmar and Thailand. The movement derives its name from the idea that despite the differences in how the drink is made from region to region, the regions all share the same core democratic values. Since its founding, participants have rallied supporters online to retaliate against Chinese nationalist bots asserting Chinese authoritarianism. 

According to the Atlantic, with the work of the Milk Tea Alliance, milk tea has become an “anti-China” symbol. Moreover, it has become an advocacy platform for democracy worldwide. It’s an example of how bubble tea is more than just a cultural tool, but has become emblematic of a larger geopolitical movement. 

The closest bubble tea shop doesn’t just sell bubble tea. For Taiwan, it sells a national image. 

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Despite negative environmental implications, many Southeast Asian countries have built their entire economies on the textile industry, catering mostly to fast fashion. Valued at $2.4 trillion and employing over 75 million people, Southeast Asia’s textile industry must adapt in order to weather the pandemic and reduce its impact on climate change. Implementing innovative and sustainable methods of production is critical to the future of Southeast Asian economies and the planet.  

To evade the costs of fair wages and high taxes, companies relocate production to countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam, where environmental and labor regulations are more relaxed. Companies that constantly seek cheap labor and lax regulations have disastrous consequences for the environment, but have also laid the economic foundations for developing countries in Southeast Asia. Textiles make up 80% of Bangladesh’s total exports. Textile production hubs in Taiwan have also developed into higher value sectors, as these countries open up to foreign trade and adopt new technologies. The industry in Indonesia employs as many as 4 million workers. 

While fast fashion has industrialized many Southeast Asian countries, it has also promoted exploitation of a vulnerable workforce and the degradation of the environment. The 2013 collapse of the Rana Plaza factory in Bangladesh and the pollution of freshwater sources are only two out of a myriad reasons for why the industry must change. The Rana Plaza factory was constructed using substandard materials and disregard for building codes, which eventually killed over 1,000 garment workers. The bleaching and dyeing processes in textile production contaminate water with toxic chemicals, endangering aquatic life and poisoning sources of drinking water. 

Fast fashion’s model of production revolves around the notion of “stack-them-high, sell-them-cheap,” pumping out more garments as trends quickly die out. Clothing companies like Zara take only two weeks to transform sketches into garments. The disposable nature of fashion allows approximately 350,000 tons of clothing to crowd landfills in the UK alone, costing the economy over $1 billion. Research by environmental scientists has revealed that one garbage truck worth of clothing is incinerated or sent to landfills every second. The growing global middle class and GDP per capita has doubled fast fashion consumption within the last 15 years. Yet, garments are only worn for half as long. 

In addition to consumer waste, the textile industry’s manufacturing bases are remarkably destructive. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change estimates that the industry is responsible for 10% of global greenhouse gas emissions, which they expect to increase to 25% in 2050. The production of one cotton shirt requires 2,700 litres of water, exceeding an individual’s water consumption over a two year span. The pesticides used to treat cotton fields pose a serious health threat to farmers, degrade soil quality and contaminate water. 150 million trees were demolished in 2018 to farm cellulose- and protein-based fibers used in textile production. Viscose fiber, in particular, is the major source of Indonesia’s deforestation. Fast fashion giants like H&M rely on this cheap and durable fiber, with its sourcing contributing to severe untreated water waste and excess levels of toxic carbon disulfide. The combination of polluted air and water and deforestation is lethal as the climate rapidly warms. 

Storefront closures and dwindling consumer confidence have plummeted fast fashion sales. In the wake of COVID-19, H&M reported a 46% sales decline in March. Bangladesh’s textile industry estimates a $10 billion loss in 2020 as Western retailers continue to cancel mass orders. Overall, ongoing textile manufacturing and a steep drop in consumer demand has led to extraordinary levels of textile waste. Experts worry that, as the economy gradually emerges from the pandemic, excess consumption will ensue, with consumers likely prioritizing affordability over sustainability. Attracting investments back into the Southeast Asian manufacturing bases will likely suspend crucial labor and environmental regulations. 

Pursuing sustainability requires raising consumer awareness and reshaping models of production. Although many name-and-shame campaigns have exposed brands like Nike for exploitative child labor, most consumers tend to neglect this issue due to lack of proximity. Heightened consumer awareness can pressure fast fashion brands to adopt sustainable practices. The slow fashion movement, coined by Kate Fletcher of the Centre for Sustainable Fashion, sets an excellent standard for modern consumerism by focusing on the craftsmanship of clothes, opting for more sustainably made garments. 

Shifting the mindsets of consumers is a challenge, but brands marketing new and sustainable practices can attract more demand. Perhaps the latest ‘trend’ can be sustainably made clothing. Normalizing second-hand clothing is necessary to reduce garment waste, as well as dispelling the misconception that purchasing second-hand is unhygienic or tacky. Brands like Rent the Runway have capitalized on the concept of leasing clothing instead of buying and trashing. 

The recent rampage of natural disasters in 2020 has hopefully enlightened consumers to the dangers of large coroporation’s greenhouse gas emissions. Unfortunately, costliness hinders measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions. To combat this, governments can offer brands certain tax incentives that push brands to provide fairer wages and adopt sustainable methods. Governments can also penalize companies who exceed carbon emission limits. The Asia Pacific Rayon (APR) factory in Indonesia is a great example of sustainably sourcing viscose fibers. Recognizing that viscous sourcing contributes to deforestation, APR has committed to sourcing this wood fiber from sustainably-run plantations. 

Moreover, technological innovation in the textile industry can reduce the quantity of garments produced. Computer processes can now calculate the demand of items, significantly shrinking overproduction. Companies must also adopt the circular economy’s four pillared business model: phasing out toxic chemicals and microfibre release, increasing clothing usage, revamping recycling, and effectively using resources and renewable input. Once companies implement these practices, they should market their sustainability commitments, drawing consumers to more ethical labels.  

Millions of lives depend on the fashion fashion industry’s economic base, yet billions of lives depend on the earth’s survival. Legislation coupled with consumer responsibility will transform the textile industry for the better. If the textile industry wishes to stay in business, the next big trend ought to be sustainably-made clothing. 

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China’s ties to the continent trace back to the post-colonial era in which it forged relationships with newly independent African nations. Chinese officials used diplomatic recognition of China over Taiwan as a bargaining tool, rewarding states that sided with Beijing instead of Taipei. Since the mid-1990s, China has focused its relations with Africa to be primarily economic. Today, China is the continent’s largest trading partner and has invested more in the continent than any other country. 

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a notable example of China’s role in African economic development. Launched in 2013, the BRI enabled Chinese-funded infrastructure development to strengthen relations with participating countries and expand trade to circumvent routes controlled by the West. This initiative was especially popular in Africa, which faced shortages of resources and capital to build infrastructure. The BRI filled these infrastructure gaps and facilitated economic growth for these countries. Notable projects financed by China include a hydropower program in Nigeria; $3 billion in telecom equipment to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Ghana; and major railroad projects in Nigeria, Gabon, and Mauritania. These initiatives have considerably contributed to the development strategies of these countries. According to the World Bank, economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has averaged roughly 5% per year over the past decade, with the BRI improving living standards and bolstering human development indicators across the continent. 

Opponents to the BRI, primarily Western countries, claim that China is engaging in “debt-trap diplomacy”, loaning excessively to developing countries and trapping them in debt to have strategic influence over them. Some Western politicians say China’s motives in Africa are not purely economic and are an effort to gain political support, similar to its tactics during the post-colonial period. Former US National Security Advisor, John Bolton, once criticized China for “…us[ing]bribes, opaque agreements, and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and demands.” He claims that such “predatory actions” are a part of larger strategic initiatives, like the Belt and Road project. 

Experts from Aid Data, a research lab at the College of William & Mary, found a positive correlation between Chinese economic assistance and the alignment of recipient countries with Beijing’s UN voting and its One China principle. Yet, some still believe China’s diplomatic ventures in Africa have received much more criticism than is deserved. During a congressional hearing on China’s presence and investment in Africa, Judd Devermont, the director of the Africa Program, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, stated that, “it is essential to draw a clear distinction between Chinese activities that threaten U.S. interest and those that are neutral or complimentary.” In the same vein, Yun Sun from the Brookings Institution argued that “[c]onsidering the low priority of Africa in China’s overall foreign strategic mapping, a disproportionate level of international attention, publicity, and scrutiny is paid to China’s Africa engagement.”

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the true nature of Africa’s relationship with China‒ a relationship characterized by massive debt and economic dependence. Amid the pandemic, African countries faced both a health and economic crisis: they needed to protect their citizens’ health while minimizing economic shocks. While addressing these concerns, many African countries, particularly Zambia and Djibouti, realized the size of their debt to China, which is widely regarded as Africa’s largest bilateral creditor. The Chinese government, banks, and state-owned enterprises are estimated to hold 17-24% of Africa’s external debt. Paying back this debt leaves African nations with minimal funds to address their health and economic problems. 

To aid Africa with its pandemic response, the Chinese government has contributed to the International Monetary Fund’s Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust to support debt service relief. It has also supported the eight-month debt moratorium or payment suspension offered to developing countries by the G-20. China’s unprecedented participation in these multilateral initiatives is a positive sign, but these solutions only provide short-term relief. The Chinese Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it is “keeping in contact” with developing countries on the debt issue, but there has not been much progress on that front. 

Despite drawing criticism for silencing the early signs of the pandemic, Chinese support in handling the health crisis is appealing to African leaders, given China’s “demonstrated experience” in containing the virus. China has sent personal protection equipment to support 18 African countries, including Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. The Ghanian Minister of Foreign Affairs cited the gesture as “a testament of the enduring and exemplary relations between China and Africa.” However, others like the Nigerian Medical Association, who pushed back on the deployment of a Chinese medical team, are skeptical of China’s intentions, stating that Chinese assistance in Africa is a geopolitical move amid growing U.S.-China tensions.

China’s central role in aiding Africa throughout the pandemic contrasts with the mistreatment of African migrants in the Chinese city of Guangzhou. Social media footage showed African migrants, who were perceived to have coronavirus, being forcibly evicted from hotels, and forced to sleep on the streets. One clip even showed a restaurant that allegedly barred African migrants from entering. The Chinese government responded to the incidents by stating that it had “zero tolerance for discrimination” and that it was collaborating with local authorities to “improve their working method,” an explanation African leaders seemed to accept. The South African government, for example, cited that the incidents were “inconsistent with the excellent relations that exist between China and Africa.” The general public in Africa was not so quick to forget, with many taking to social media to express their anger over these discriminatory acts. 

Africans also view these events to be representative of African leaders’ submissive attitude towards China. African governments have shied away from speaking out against Chinese injustice even when it affects their citizens, in order to protect their business pursuits. Former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, like many other African leaders, believes that “[China] has a much greater sense of the personal urgency of development in Africa than many western nations.” However, in the eyes of the public, the suppression of these events has proven that neither China nor African governments have the African people’s best interests at heart. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has unearthed the fundamental economic and political inequality of the Africa-China relationship. China’s massive lending to Africa may no longer be sustainable, given Africa’s difficulty paying back debt despite moratoriums and relief through multilateral agencies. Although China has been aiding Africa with both their economic and health crises, their relief is not long-term and it has only fueled the idea that China’s motives in Africa are more self-interested than benevolent. 

China has always claimed that relations with African states are “win-win,” but the financial debt and the events in Guangzhou have revealed to the African people that they are not “winners,” especially if their governments remain silent to protect business interests. Experts, like Deprose Muchena of Amnesty International, say that “Beijing needs to back up its professed commitment to zero-tolerance of discrimination by changing the way it engages with Africans, both at home and abroad.” 

Unless China finds a way to win over the support of the average African citizen, the future of a continued China-Africa relationship looks bleak. 

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As Glimpse From the Globe continues its special coverage of the 2020 U.S. presidential election, it’s important to highlight the differences in key areas of the candidates’ foreign policy agendas. In this piece, we will look at how the incumbent, President Donald Trump, and his opponent, former Vice President Joe Biden, will tackle the United States’ most topical international issues, including the superpower’s role in the Middle East, the global climate crisis, foreign aid, immigration policy, China and trade. 

An overwhelming trend in this analysis is that Trump’s foreign policy agenda is centered around unilateralism and protectionism, while Biden’s is focused on strengthening the United States’ relationships with its allies and promoting multilateral cooperation.

Middle East

The Middle East represents a key pillar of U.S. foreign policy, given its geopolitical significance for the United States’ economic interests, as well as the country’s counterterrorism, military and humanitarian efforts in the region. Whether it’s Iran’s relentless pursuit to acquire nuclear weapons after the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear deal, the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen or the unresolved Israel-Palestine dispute, the upcoming presidential election will determine U.S. action, or inaction, in the region.

Trump: After moving the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and brokering the landmark Israel-UAE peace agreement, Trump can be expected to continue strongly supporting Israel. In January 2020, he released the New Middle East Plan in collaboration with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Trump vehemently opposes Iran and has undertaken many actions against the state including withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, imposing severe economic sanctions in an effort to curb its nuclear program and authorizing the air strike in early 2020 that killed Major General Qasim Soleimani. Trump has also withdrawn U.S. troops from Syria, but has ordered they remain in Iraq. Over the past few years under Trump, the United States has also improved its relations with Saudi Arabia, especially after Trump expressed his support for Prince Mohammed bin Salman even after Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder at the Saudi embassy in Istanbul in 2018. 

Biden: Joe Biden is a long-time supporter of Israel and a self-proclaimed Zionist. Perhaps the only area of confluence we see in Trump and Biden’s foreign policy is vis-a-vis their support for Israel. However, their stances are not totally aligned — Biden opposes Israel’s annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and is a strong advocate for the two-state solution. When it comes to Iran, Biden, like Trump, is strongly opposed to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. However, he believes that Trump’s decision to strike Soleimani without Congress’ approval was an “enormous escalation” of tension and pledges to rejoin the Iran Nuclear Deal. Additionally, it is important to note that Biden has had a long involvement with Iraq policy in his past roles of senator and Vice President, which will likely shape his foreign policy agenda. Unlike Trump, Biden is not warm to the idea of close relations with Saudi Arabia and seeks to stop arms sales with the country.

Climate

In recent years, the scientific community has called on countries to speed up their process of reducing carbon, methane and other greenhouse gas emissions. Climate organizations have alluded to the dire consequences of shifting climate patterns such as food shortages, the spread of diseases and mass migration of animals and humans, making climate change the fastest growing threat to global security.

Trump: Trump is doubtful of how much human activity contributes to climate change and is a strong advocate for expanded fossil fuel production and use. He withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement, which set higher standards on vehicular emissions and imposed new and stricter regulations on power plants, and rescinded Obama’s Clean Power Plan. Over the past few years, Trump has also slashed funding to the Environmental Protection Agency and has repealed dozens of other environmental regulations. In August 2020, he finalized a plan that allows drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, part of his efforts to open almost all U.S. waters and protected lands to oil and gas drilling. Apart from this, he also hopes to expand new oil pipelines throughout the United States and reduce automobile fuel efficiency standards.

Biden: Biden has released his version of the “Green New Deal,” a climate plan that aims to ensure that the U.S. economy has net-zero emissions by 2050. He is vehemently opposed to new drilling and fracking on public federal lands and pledges to rejoin the Paris Agreement. He aims to reduce the United States’ carbon footprint in transportation, agriculture, and housing sectors and halt the flow of foreign aid to coal-fired power plants overseas. To encourage countries to implement green policies, he also wants to offer debt relief and expand G20 climate efforts. Though Biden is criticized by some environmental activists and organizations for not being more aggressive on climate change, his policies toward climate change demonstrate a stark contrast to Trump’s approach.

Foreign Aid and Multilateral Cooperation

Multilateral diplomacy and foreign aid are key aspects of the liberal international order and are often propagated through international institutions. International institutions serve as both a framework and a platform for international engagement, debate, and cooperation. The United States has been the chief architect of alliance building through international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), World Bank and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

Trump: Trump has withdrawn from several international alliances and organizations such as the Paris Agreement, Iran Nuclear Deal, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the UN Global Compact for Migration. Most recently, amid the global coronavirus pandemic, Trump withdrew the United States from the World Health Organization (WHO), the international organization responsible for coordinating the world’s pandemic response. Regarding U.S. allies, Trump has often questioned the relevance of NATO in the post-Cold War era and has been critical of organizations such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Even relationships with long-term allies of the United States, such as the European Union (EU) have not been stable under his presidency. And, with regard to foreign spending and assistance, budget proposals under his administration have cut foreign aid spending by almost a third.

Biden: In contrast, Biden’s “Summit for Democracy” plans to convene all democratic countries in a single forum to discuss three major global issue areas — fighting corruption, addressing the rise of authoritarianism and combating the proliferation of human rights violations. If elected, Biden not only pledges to rebuild the U.S. Department of State but has also stated that he would re-enter alliances and agreements that the United States has left under the Trump administration. Biden has pledged to reenter the Paris Agreement, for example. Biden has also continuously warned against the current rise of populism as seen in waves throughout the world and calls for increased international investment in collective security and prosperity. In a Biden administration, one could expect the United States to reenter the liberal international order and place a heavy emphasis on multilateralism and global leadership.

Immigration

Immigration has long been an important issue in the American political scene and despite the countless number of American families that can trace their family history to migrants, many voters approve of isolationist and nationalist immigration policies. The debate over immigration in the United States has reared its ugly head in the form of rising xenophobia and bigotry, a critical aspect of Trump’s rhetoric throughout the 2016 presidential election.

Trump: Immigration is a huge issue for Trump, who has championed a zero-tolerance immigration policy since his candidacy in 2016. In 2019, he attempted to complete his vow of building a wall on the Mexican border by shutting down the federal government, and declared a national emergency on the southern border, allowing him to allocate federal funds to this project. Additionally, the president threatened tariffs against Mexico if the country didn’t improve their own border enforcement. The administration has also imposed a zero-tolerance border crossing policy, which has led to the separation of families at the border and mass incarceration of migrants. In efforts to keep migrants from reaching or staying in the United States, he launched the Remain in Mexico program, which requires asylum-seekers to stay in Mexico as they await their immigration proceedings. Additionally, Trump has brokered “safe third country” agreements with Guatemala and Panama, allowing for migrants who travel through those counties to be deported back if they do not apply for asylum there before they arrive at the U.S.-Mexico border.

In 2017, Trump instituted a ban on incoming travel from several majority Muslim countries. While the original executive order was rejected by courts, a revised version banning travel from Iran, Syria, Libya, Somalia and Yemen was passed. There have been a number of legal changes that Trump has promoted to attempt to reduce immigration overall. He has reduced the cap on the number of refugees accepted into the United States every year to less than 18,000, down from around 80,000; shifted the definition of asylum to no longer include survivors of domestic and gang violence; ended temporary protected status for citizens from Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti and El Salvador; and sought to end the Obama-era Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which has prevented the deportation of 700,000 individuals who were brought to the United States as children. 

Inside our borders, Trump has expanded interior enforcement raids, although his deportation numbers do not meet the peaks seen under the Obama administration; attempted to withhold federal funds from sanctuary cities; and, in July of 2020, attempted to revoke the visas of international students studying online, only to reverse the order after MIT, Harvard, USC and 17 states filed lawsuits against the policy.

Biden: Biden and Trump’s immigration policies stand on polar opposite sides of the spectrum. The former vice president has condemned the current administration’s policies as “racist” and “morally bankrupt.” However, Biden grapples with a past painted by restrictionist policies under the Obama administration. 

Biden wants to overturn policies that separate families at the border, establish public-private networks that address humanitarian needs, and make DACA permanent. He opposes the president’s ban on several Muslim majority countries and would eliminate the ban if elected. Additionally, he wants to extend temporary protected status to citizens of El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sudan and Venezuela, as well as use aid packages to stabilize the countries that migrants originate from. He also backs a 2013 immigration reform plan developed under the Obama administration, that focuses on strengthening border security, cracking down on employers of undocumented workers, creating a path toward earned citizenship, and streamlining the legal immigration system. 

But, Biden’s pro-immigrant stance conflicts with his senatorial record, which includes voting for a law that increased penalties for illegal immigration and expanded the government’s deportation authority in 1996; supporting the Secure Fence Act in 2006, authorizing 700 miles of fencing along the southern border; and, in 2008, proposing to jail employers of undocumented workers, crack down on sanctuary cities, and build more fencing to prevent the entry of drug dealers at the U.S.-Mexico border. 

China

Since former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping began to revamp the Chinese economic and trade strategy in the 1980s, China has been transforming itself into an economic juggernaut. As we enter the 2020s, China will seek to shed its image as a developing country with an unmatched economy and grow into a true global leader. This has not gone unnoticed by U.S. leadership. Former President Barack Obama’s “strategic pivot” towards Asia in an attempt to counter CCP influence in the region, as seen with the creation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While both candidates have similar platforms regarding grievances held against the CCP for human rights abuses, territorial disputes in Taiwan and the South China Sea, intellectual property theft and unfair trade practices, each candidate proposes a different strategy for interacting with the rising superpower.

Trump: President Trump has often criticized international institutions like the WTO and multilateral trade deals like the TPP — from which Trump used an executive order to withdraw the United States — for creating advantages for countries other than the United States. Thus, his game plan against China has often revolved around unilateral actions aimed at weakening the Chinese economy and strengthening U.S. producers. Most outstanding in this plan was a series of tariffs on over $350 billion worth of Chinese goods into the United States. Using national security concerns to justify the trade war, Trump has imposed tariffs on goods such as solar panels, washing machines and other household appliances, as well as agricultural products. This led to the US-China Phase 1 Trade Deal which called for the United States to reduce tariffs in exchange for Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products. 

Trump has also taken aim at the Chinese technology sector, which many intelligence agencies have argued is guilty of stealing technology from the United States as well as other countries. In 2018, Trump helped push reforms that allowed for the U.S. government to investigate and intervene in foreign investment into domestic companies, particularly taking aim at Chinese venture capital in U.S. technology firms. Additionally, he has imposed restrictions on Chinese tech operations and products in the United States, such as Huawei, Wechat, and TikTok. 

Other instances of Trump challenging China include being the first president since 1979 to speak to Taiwan’s President and proposing arms sales to the island, ending Hong Kong’s preferential trade status following China’s national security law restricting free speech in the region, and imposing sanctions on companies involved in human rights abuses of the Uighur Muslim minority in China. 

Biden: While Biden agrees with the President that the CCP must be held accountable for breaking internationally accepted trade rules. committing human rights abuses and challenging the U.S. energy, infrastructure and technology sectors, he ultimately believes that unilateral tariffs do more harm than good — citing damages to U.S. manufacturing and agriculture industries. He also thinks that the Phase One Trade Deal focuses too much on agricultural purchases rather than changes to Chinese business practices. As opposed to the United States acting alone against China, Biden believes that the United States must rebuild frayed relations with the world’s democracies — including EU member states and U.S. neighbors, Mexico and Canada — and then approach China through multilateral pressure. Biden believes that this is the best way to force the CCP to subscribe to internationally accepted trade and human rights standards. Biden also supported the Obama-era TPP trade pact and the admission of China into the WTO in 2001, showing a strong belief in the use of international institutions to engage with the growing economic powerhouse.

Trade

The backbone of American influence abroad in the post-Cold War era was the Washington Consensus and its focus on an open and liberal international trade and financial system. Rising inequality has led to skepticism toward international institutions on both sides of the aisle. But once again, though both candidates acknowledge these issues, their tactics differ on proposed courses of action. 

Trump: Donald Trump has been vocal about his ‘America First’ agenda since the first weeks of his candidacy in the 2016 election. In his opinion, the United States must combat an international system that is rigged against it and is to be blamed for a large trade deficit, reductions in U.S. manufacturing and the offshoring of American jobs. To combat this, Trump has focused his trade policy on removing the country from allegedly unfair trade deals and renegotiating bilateral agreements to the country’s advantage. President Trump has called the WTO a disaster and has crippled the organization by refusing to nominate judges to its appeals court. In the Asia-Pacific, the President pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, renegotiated bilateral trade conditions with Japan and other member countries and launched a trade war with China that cost the U.S. hundreds of billions of dollars. 

Across the Pacific Ocean, the president oversaw the rewriting of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and signed the updated U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which was passed by the U.S. Congress following amendments including strong labor and environmental considerations. Across the Atlantic, Trump has been taking shots at the EU’s trade relationship with the United States, which he calls “worse than China.” In 2019, he placed tariffs on $7.5 billion of EU goods in retaliation to the EU’s subsidization of aircraft manufacturer, Airbus. 

Biden: The former Vice President’s grievances against international trade stems from a lack of consideration for environmental and labor protections. Biden believes that the United States should take charge of the creation of “the rules of the road for the world” to make climate change and human rights centerpieces of the international order. Biden was a part of the negotiating team during the construction of the TPP, joining Obama in the belief that the best counter to China’s influence in the Pacific Rim would be to build a trade deal in the region focused around the United States. Additionally, he voted to pass NAFTA and approved of the revised USMCA, supporting the additional labor and environmental protections. He believes that “aggressive” retaliation is necessary for countries that break international trade rules and that the rules need to be more thoroughly enforced. Ultimately, Biden wants to use free trade as a tool to strengthen ties with African states, thereby opening up new markets to U.S. businesses.

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Though this is not a complete list of Trump and Biden’s stances on these critical global issues, it is important for the American populace to gain a basic understanding of how each candidate has impacted global affairs and how they are projected to impact international issues in the future. Additionally, an introductory awareness of how each candidate seeks to position the United States within the international system is of extreme importance, especially as the world continues to grapple with the ongoing economic, political and social impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The post Trump vs. Biden: A Side-by-Side on Key Foreign Policy Issues appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

In recent months, Taiwan has been hailed positively for its approach to the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only did Taiwan immediately commence efforts to identify and contain the virus shortly after news broke of a new respiratory illness, but it has since implemented firm quarantine protocols and initiated endeavors to prevent the further spread of COVID-19. 

Formally a part of China according to the “One China” policy, the island has attempted to subvert this narrative by challenging Beijing’s efforts to exclude it from international dialogue. Its medical diplomacy, meant to promote a positive image of the nation, has been widely praised by countries including the European Union, the United States and Japan. So far, Taiwan has not only provided the United States with 500,000 surgical masks, but has also donated masks and other personal protective equipment to countries throughout the world. This has, in turn, boosted Taiwan’s soft power and global influence on the world stage, increasing its recognition — which appears to be exactly what Taiwan’s leaders want. 

With U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar’s recent trip to Taiwan, the island’s ploy for international recognition looks to have been effective. For the most part, this trip can be considered significant in its positive implications for Taiwan’s symbolic importance. Acknowledging and praising Taiwan for its successful response in containing COVID-19 is a critical power move for the United States relative to its relations with China — especially since Azar is the most senior official to visit Taiwan since the United States broke ties with the island in 1979 in accordance with the “One China” policy. 

Yet the politics surrounding the issue are less self-explanatory. On the surface, the White House claims that this trip is meant to first and foremost celebrate Taiwan’s approach to the coronavirus. However, this visit cannot be isolated from its political significance. 

Taiwan’s democratic status has aided the United States in a successful containment of the virus — an important factor underlying the country’s visit. Azar said that his trip underscores the fact that “free and democratic societies are the best model for protecting and promoting health.” 

With this statement, the United States has shown that it is not just public health governing Azar’s trip, but politics as well. The public emphasis on Taiwan’s democracy affirms diplomatic relations between the Washington D.C. and Taipei, thus increasing tensions between Taiwan and the authoritarian government of the mainland. The latter has already publicly condemned this trip, along with recent attempts by the Trump administration to denounce China amid deteriorating diplomatic and political relations. 

In light of the political sensitivity associated with Taiwan’s success, it is necessary to acknowledge that positive recognition of Taiwan’s national image may not provide Taiwan with the complete sovereignty it desires. Taiwan recently refused entry to the World Health Organization under the condition that it is recognized as the “Republic of China,” which appears to be the only condition that will enable its participation. It’s clear that the WHO will not accept Taiwan as the independent country that members of its government claim it as — for the international health body, the risk of offending mainland China is far too high. 

Unless Taiwan can credit its successful COVID-19 containment measures to the “One China” policy that looms over much of its efforts, it appears that the island will continue to be excluded from participation in public health discussions on the global stage. Recent tensions in Cross-Strait relations are only an example of how, even amid a worldwide pandemic, political controversies still contextualize the debate surrounding public health. Thus, politics informs the very measures that aim to address the issues on each side of the strait. 

With its “mask diplomacy,” along with its proclamations of a successful public health campaign, Taiwan has attempted to demonstrate that it ought to be included in world politics — as an entity wholly separate from China. It has sought the “support” of the United States as critical to this endeavor. Yet, it seems that despite the island’s successful soft power campaign, the charismatic “hard power” of Taiwan — one limited by its geopolitical status — fails to support efforts for sovereignty. 

Given the circumstances, Taiwan appears to remain a political tool within U.S.-China relations. Instead of asking how China will respond to this diplomatic development, the more worthwhile question is whether Taiwan can shoulder the cost. 

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