The dam’s primary purpose is to generate electricity for the 70% of Ethiopia’s rural population who lack it. The dam is also meant to enrich the country through the sale of excess electricity. The giant infrastructure undertaking also serves as a rallying point for Ethiopians who see it as a way for their country to move out of poverty. 

On the other hand, Egypt and Sudan, as downstream countries, are worried that the GERD will permanently decrease the amount of water that reaches them. Egypt, which is dependent on the Nile for agriculture, hydropower and 94% of the country’s total water supply, is particularly threatened and has opposed the GERD since its conception in 2011. Ethiopia claims that the dam will help its people without harming Sudan or Egypt, while Egypt says that the GERD will short the country on the resources it needs. 

With both sides making such bold statements about the benefits and consequences  of the dam, it is difficult to determine which statements are true and what environmental impact the GERD will end up having.

This situation with the GERD is reminiscent of the controversy surrounding the Aswan High Dam, another dam on the Nile that was completed in 1970 and is located in Egypt. Similar to Ethiopia’s desire to use the electricity and profits generated by the GERD to advance as a country, the Aswan High Dam was a point of pride amongst the Egyptian people and a key factor in Egypt nationalizing the Suez Canal and taking back control of it and their country from European nations (the revenue from the canal was needed to fund the dam).

Before the construction of the Aswan High Dam, there were numerous concerns that it would end up doing more harm than good to the surrounding environment. Critics worried that the dam would lead to sedimentation in the reservoir, erosion of the coast and the land at the base of the dam, an increase in the spread of diseases and decreased soil fertility in the area.

The Aswan High Dam has been in use for over 50 years now, and according to several experts including Cecilia Tortajada, editor-in-chief of the International Journal of Water Resources Development and senior research fellow at the Institute of Water Policy, and Asit Biswas, member of the World Commission on Water and co-founder of the International Water Resources Association and the World Water Council, the benefits have thus far proven to outweigh its negative effects. The dam’s primary mission is to stabilize the flood-drought cycle of the Nile in Egypt, and from this point of view it has been an unequivocal success. Since the dam was completed, the Nile’s annual flood has not harmed human lives or agricultural land, and enough water has been stored to see Egypt through all subsequent drought years. Another positive side effect of the Aswan High Dam is that the regulation of the Nile’s flow has allowed for year-round irrigation, leading to two or three harvests per year instead of just one. Additionally, the electricity it generated was the main source of power for Egypt until recently, and a key propellant behind the country’s rapid industrialization.

The impact of the Aswan High Dam has not been entirely rosy though; it has led to an increase in the salinity of both the water and the nearby soil used for agriculture, a severe reduction in the silt that has traditionally fertilized the soil, the collapse of some river banks, and infestations of various aquatic weeds. However, the widely accepted consensus is that these side effects can be managed and are far eclipsed by the positives of the dam.

There is no way to be sure what effects the GERD will have, but estimates have been made based on the fallout from the High Aswan Dam and simulations of various scenarios, including failure of the dam and drought and flood seasons. According to Abdelkader Ahmed, a professor of environmental engineering at at Aswan University, the initial filling of the reservoir will flood existing plants in the area (which is heavily occupied by tropical shrubs), killing them off en masse and leading to a large release of carbon dioxide emissions (between one and eight million tons) as they decompose. It will also affect the spawning and migration of several fish species that may become disoriented by the changing temperatures and currents. However, since the GERD is located by Ethiopia’s border, it will likely not cause major changes to the country’s water supply or agricultural land.

Sudan is in a unique in-between position because the GERD stands to benefit the country but also puts it in harm’s way. The GERD will stabilize the flow of the Nile in Sudan and allow for agricultural production year-round (similar to the effect the High Aswan Dam had on Egypt). However, Sudan is also the country most at risk if the dam should fail. Models created by faculty at American University of Sharjah and United Arab Emirates University found that because the GERD is located in an area of Ethiopia prone to earthquakes and surrounded by steep mountains with high rates of erosion and landslides, geological activity is the most likely reason why it would fail. Regardless of the reason, if the GERD collapses, Sudan will face catastrophic damage including the flooding of almost 10,000 mi² of agricultural land and roads and the transformation of Khartoum, the country’s capital, into a lake.

The forecasted impact for Egypt is not as favorable as the other two countries. A study conducted by researchers at Zagazig University in Egypt and the Technical University of Kosice in Slovakia found that the GERD will reduce the level of both groundwater and surface water in Egypt, which would be detrimental to the agricultural output since most crops grown in the country require large amounts of water. However, if farmers switch to growing crops that use less water, the lower groundwater levels combined with less watering of the plants will increase the salinity of the soil to a level that will damage soil productivity, putting Egyptian farmers in a no-win situation. The dam also inhibits the flow of nutrient-rich sediment that has traditionally replenished downstream agricultural land, further handicapping production capabilities. This could become a serious problem if agricultural output decreases as Egypt’s population growth continues to outpace the ability of the country’s resources to to support it.

The decreased groundwater and surface water levels are concerning on their own since Egypt is already facing increasing levels of water scarcity and has one of the lowest per capita shares of water in the world. According to the United Nations, Egypt is under the water poverty threshold, and will face an “absolute water crisis” by 2025. The country is also concerned about whether Ethiopia will permit the necessary amount of water to be released from the GERD’s reservoir during drought years. Though many talks have taken place between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the GERD, no agreements have been made about protocol during droughts. For Egypt, whose water supplies are already being stretched very thin, how Ethiopia chooses to react to the next drought could be an inflection point for the country.

It is clear that though the GERD will bring many benefits for Ethiopia and Sudan, Egypt will not share in the good fortune. Regardless, the dam has already been built and the reservoir is filled partway. At this junction it is crucial for the leaders of all three countries to come together to determine how to maximize the GERD’s utility for Ethiopia and Sudan within the constraints of maintaining Egypt’s access to necessary resources. 

The post The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Miracle Solution Or Wishful Thinking? appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Stateless people are those without a nationality — people who are not recognized by any country in the world, even the one they live in. They often lack access to basic rights including healthcare, employment, education and political participation in the country they live in. Without citizenship, stateless people are unable to attend public schools and gain equal access to education, take advantage of subsidized medical costs, or meet work permit requirements. Essentially, stateless individuals are locked into a cycle of poverty.  

A 2013 report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees formally identified 60 stateless people in Egypt, but acknowledged that it was unable to report accurate numbers, as they can only include those who come to the UNHCR office for aid. UNHCR found that there are actually hundreds of thousands of stateless people in the country. Many of these people are stateless because they are refugees (and so considered de facto stateless by the UN) or don’t qualify for citizenship under Egypt’s strict nationality laws. In Egypt, citizenship is passed down only through males; even children born in Egypt to Egyptian mothers and non-Egyptian fathers are not given citizenship. 

However, the majority of stateless people come from territory on the edges of Egypt’s borders, land that has been claimed or occupied by two or more countries. Most of them are tribespeople who have lived in the same area for generations, but are suffering from disputes between countries, particularly in the Hala’ib Triangle (claimed by both Egypt and Sudan) and Sinai (occupied by Israel until 1982). The Egyptian government assured them citizenship decades ago, but for most, this promise has remained unfulfilled.

In the last few years, the stateless tribes have started working closely with the Egyptian government to aid them in anti-terrorism operations. Given weapons, vehicles and tactical support, tribespeople are sent on campaigns to confront offshoots of the Islamic State, repaid with amnesty for their actions and citizenship when they return. Many tribespeople have agreed to work with the government, believing employment and citizenship are worth the danger of these missions. However, many tribespeople have died or been injured during these campaigns and, as a result of this new allegiance, terrorist groups are targeting tribal villages as well, dragging innocent people into the conflict. 

Apart from the damage caused by the involvement of the tribespeople in anti-terrorism missions, the Egyptian government has also made life difficult for tribes that have refused to work with it. One such tribe, the Azazma, have had their names excluded from government records and have not received official identity cards, which are required to receive any government services and have been given to other nearby tribes.

Besides using citizenship as a tool to recruit the tribespeople, the Egyptian government has also recently begun threatening citizenship revocation to deter human rights activists. On December 24, 2020, political activist Ghada Naguib had her citizenship stripped by the government. This decision was likely triggered by Naguib accusing a senior intelligence officer of being behind the disappearance of a different activist, Doaa Khalifa, who had previously accused the same officer of blackmail. This situation is the first use of the 2017 amendments to Egypt’s nationality law, which expanded the circumstances in which the government can revoke citizenship and worried human rights activists around the world.

Egypt has grown increasingly authoritarian since President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi took power in 2013, with human rights abuses increasing while individual freedoms are increasingly restricted. According to Freedom House, the country’s Freedom Score, which takes into account civil liberties and political rights, was 21/100 in 2020, and has been steadily decreasing over the past few years. However, removing Naguib’s citizenship is a new level for the al-Sisi regime, with Human Rights Watch Deputy Middle East and North Africa Director Joe Stork calling it a “shocking and dangerous precedent,” and saying that “Egyptian authorities are stooping to a new low in punishing dissent.”

While numerous human rights organizations around the world are outraged and have called on the Egyptian government to restore citizenship to Naguib, the reaction from foreign governments has notably been silent. This kind of bystanderism is what has allowed Egypt’s government to turn into a dictatorship and get away with constant human rights violations. President Donald Trump had long given al-Sisi a pass on his actions, even going as far as to call him his “favorite dictator.” 

The only way to curb this kind of behavior from Egypt in the future is for other countries to step in and take action in a way that lets Egypt know its repressive actions will not be tolerated. Unfortunately, this does not look likely in the near future — at least from the United States. The Biden administration stated in late February that human rights will be at the core of future relations with Egypt, then followed through with a sale of almost $200 million in missiles to the country only a few days after dissidents and their families (including U.S. citizens) were jailed by the Egyptian government. 

Regardless of whether Egypt continues to recruit tribespeople to fight its wars or strips nationality from other activists, it is clear that citizenship is just one more tool in the Egyptian government’s repertoire, and one that it is very willing to use.

The post Citizenship: The Bargaining Chip of the Egyptian Government appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

On September 15, representatives from the United Arab Emirates, Israel and the United States signed the ‘Abraham Accords.’ The Abraham Accords — named after the common ancestor shared by the people of Christianity, Islam and Judaism, was brokered by Jared Kushner, senior advisor to the President of the United States,  between the United Arab Emirates and Israel. This peace agreement is historical because prior to the signing of this agreement, the only Arab nations who had peace deals with Israel were Jordan and Egypt.  

The chief reason for this conflict was the ratification of the Partition Resolution in the United Nations, passed on November 29, 1947, which divided the Palestinian mandate, under British rule at the time, into an Arab and Jewish state. However, the holy city of Jerusalem remained under United Nations control. The resolution sparked outrage amongst both parties but Palestinians felt particularly aggrieved as they thought Jews were favored in the deal. This resulted in numerous ongoing conflicts between Arab Palestinians and Jews which only increased following Israel’s independence from Britain.  

May 14, 1948, a day known as Nakba, meaning “catastrophe,” for the 700,000 Palestinians expelled from their homeland. This day is also known as Yom Ha’atzmaut, which translates to “Day of Independence,” for the Jewish people, who gained the newly created state of Israel. Also beginning on said day was the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, where the Arab nations of Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan banned together to help defend a Palestinian state. Due to inexperience and a shortage of efficient military equipment, the Arab nations were unsuccessful with their attempt to defend a Palestinian state.   

Solidarity towards Palestine amongst Muslim Arab nations was and still is very strong, which means that these countries are all allied against the Jewish State of Israel. Currently Israeli citizens are not allowed to travel to Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman or Saudi Arabia in an effort to boycott the country. Nor do these countries have diplomatic relations with Israel. In addition, every nation listed except Oman will not allow people with evidence of travel to Israel,such as an Israeli stamp or a stamp from the King Hussein Bridge, to enter their country. However, this animosity towards Israel could change with the Abraham Accords.

Prior to the Accords, the United Arab Emirates also did not allow Israeli citizens to enter their country. However, since its signing we have seen the first flight between the two countries in years. Not only has tourism opened, but trade and economic relations have become possible. 

Bahrain has also signed a peace agreement. Both deals have similar provisions to normalize working relations between the two countries. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain likely signed the deal for similar reasons, a desire to diversify their economies and access to Israel’s advanced technology. For these compelling reasons, we will likely see more Arab and North African nations signing peace deals with Israel. President Trump seems to have confirmed this, stating, “ we are down the road [in terms of deals]with about five different countries,” including Morocco, Oman, and Sudan. With Sudan taking the lead by signing an agreement to normalize relations with Israel on October 23, 2020. These potential shifts would change the political dynamics of the Middle East.  

There are 12 provisions included in the Abraham Accords. The two most notable are the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and Economic relations, meaning both countries will establish embassies and assign ambassadors. In addition, both nations have agreed to establish economic relations, which was likely the main reason the Gulf States agreed to sign. As a result, the United Arab Emirates and Israel will open trade routes between each other and allow travel which wasn’t previously allowed.  

What does this mean for Israel-Palestine relations?

Palestinians have protested the signing of the Abraham Accords, specifically voicing  their dissatisfaction with Arab countries making peace with Israel before peace between Israel and Palestine has been achieved. In response, the United Arab Emirates’ Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Abdullab bin Zayed Al Nahyan, reaffirmed the country’s support for a Palestianian state and thanked President Benjamin Netanyahu for halting his annexation plan of the West Bank. 

Prior to the Abraham Accords, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was planning to annex thirty percent of the West Bank, an area home to approximately 3 million Palestinians and 500,000 Israeli settlers. As of now, annexation has been halted, due in part to the Abraham Accords and COVID-19. Although the plan is currently suspended, Netanyahu has indicated that this hold is only temporary, implying annexation will take place at some point. 

Right now, West Bank Palestinians are faced with eviction to make room for more settlements, insufficient water and electrical resources due to the Israeli regulation, and a lack of access to roads and infrastructure. Unfortunately, these conditions could worsen with Isreali annexation. 

Netanyahu’s aim in the West Bank is to expand Israeli sovereignty. This is alarming for Palestinians and neighboring countries for a number of reasons. An increase in Israeli settlements would result in more Palestinian evictions in the West Bank, further  displacing Arab Palestinians. According to the United Nations Relief and Works agency for Palestine refugees, one-third of Palestinian refugees reside in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in addition to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Syria is currently dealing with a civil war, Lebanon is recovering from a tragic explosion and Jordan is handling a water shortage, a substantial increase in refugees could put serious strain on these countries. 

Annexing land along the Jordan River would provide Israel with a military strategic advantage over the West Bank which could be crippling to the already weakened Palestinian resistance.  The Jordan river also provides water and other vital resources for Palestinians and Israelis but if Israel gains sole control of the river Palestine could lose a critical water source for agriculture and energy. 

Although the signing of the Abraham Accords is historic in nature and represents the Middle East effort for peace, Palestinians still do not have an independent state. Since the conflict is largely based on obtaining sovereign land it is hard to imagine peace in the Middle East without an independent Palestianian state. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain’s signing of the accords has proven to motivate other nations to sign similar deals, Sudan for example, for economic or diplomatic reasons, while Israel contiunes to spread their borders, effectively losing sight of any Palestinian state. 

However, the hope is the Abraham Accords will set the stage for a peaceful Middle East, thus ending the Arab-Israali conflict and any subsequent aggression from Arab nations to Israel.      

The post The Abraham Accords: Palestinians Lose Out appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

INTRODUCTION

Nearly ten years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement officially ended the bloody Sudanese Civil War, South Sudan is again on the brink of disaster. Months of negotiation following a tenuous peace deal between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar collapsed in July, when forces clashed on the streets of the capital city Juba for several days. In the months since, a brewing humanitarian disaster has reached catastrophic levels of food insecurity and created millions of refugees while the government cracks down on platforms for news and political dissent. On November 11^th, the popular radio station Eye Radio was shuttered by security officials with no official reasoning, and in September, authorities similarly closed the Nation Mirror newspaper without providing a reason. Adama Dieng, United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, visited South Sudan and reported: “I saw all the signs that ethnic hatred and targeting of civilians could evolve into genocide if something is not done now to stop it.”

Today’s struggle is a vicious zero sum game – a battle for power between the political and military elites who exploit the long-running history of conflict in the region, depriving citizens of basic necessities such that ordinary people believe that their survival depends on pledging loyalty or support. With no end in sight, South Sudan’s current situation reflects its legacy of violence and highly fragmented internal state, as well as its origins born out of a bloody war with northern Sudan.

A LEGACY OF VIOLENCE

Civil war raged between the North and South for almost 40 years (1955-1972 and 1983-2005). After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and referendum for independence in 2011, South Sudan became the world’s newest country – as well as one of its least developed. After decades of conflict, South Sudan faced the formidable task of developing basic infrastructure, human capital and formal civilian institutions.

Pre-occupied with state-building failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. and larger international community lavished $1.4 billion dollars of aid onto the apparent poster-child for Western conflict resolution. However, the carrots came without a stick. With little oversight or aid conditions, the money rarely found its way into infrastructure projects or public services. The advice of hundreds of international consultants sent to South Sudan was ignored. At the time of independence, South Sudan had an estimated 11.6 million people, including the Dinka (35.8 percent), Nuer (15.6 percent), and in descending size, the Shilluk, Azande, Kakwa, Kuku, Murle, Mandari and Didinga minorities. While ethnic tensions were relegated to the background during battles with the North, they returned soon after independence, and the West failed to pressure and bring together these estranged communities. The government was inefficient, incompetent and unable to enforce bureaucratic order in the country.  Institutional gaps, a failure to meet citizens’ expectations, and a collapse of mechanisms made it clear that the government was incapable of fulfilling its promises. The corruption-security nexus was exacerbated by the fragile public institutions which were too weak to manage resources, enforce government transparency or maintain checks on abuses of power.

Public expenditure in South Sudan was 8 to 9 times higher than Ethiopia’s and 5 times higher than Uganda’s. Yet there was little to show by way of improvements in education, public health or infrastructure. The only thing that grew was the gap between the newly rich and powerful corrupt officials and the impoverished citizens who had nothing; “Instead of creating institutions that deliver services and ensure the rule of law, and ignoring systemic checks and balances, leading members of the factions united momentarily to create a parasitic system in which mass corruption and the brutal maintenance of power became the raison d’etre of governance.”

In December 2013, accusations of a coup plot against the state, months of mounting political tension between President Kiir and Vice President Machar, inefficient financial institutions and widespread perceptions of corruption culminated into a bloody civil war. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), long seen as the symbol of national unity and sovereignty, was subsequently divided primarily along ethnic lines either in support of President Kiir (the Dinka) or Vice President Machar (the Nuer). Although the Dinka are the largest ethnic group in South Sudan, they do not make up the majority of the population. The Dinka have long dominated politics and have been accused of monopolizing top posts. That sentiment was exploited by Machar as he declared a rebellion with the support of several senior Nuer military commanders, effectively invoking an ethnic conflict.

Awash in arms from decades of armed conflict, South Sudan’s rural citizens formed militias along ethnic lines. With no apparent national civic identity or strong basis for a stable state, political identity in South Sudan has defaulted to ethnic identity; the militias are essentially ethnically based armed units, mobilized by ethnic narratives of fear and legacies of violence, which were exploited by Kiir and Machar.

CONTINUED STRUGGLES

Since 2013, continued fighting has displaced more than 2.7 million people, including 200,000 sheltered at U.N. bases throughout the country.  Various negotiations under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) finally led to an international peace agreement in August 2015. Kiir signed the deal a week after Machar, expressing his concerns and calling the agreement divisive and an attack on South Sudan’s sovereignty. Although the agreement was signed in August 2015, the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) was not formed until April 2016. Former Vice President and opposition leader Riek Machar returned to Juba for the first time since the outbreak in 2013, and was sworn in as the First Vice President of the new power-sharing government under President Kiir. By June, however, the agreement had seemingly collapsed and hundreds were killed before ceasefires were declared on July 11^th. Both sides of the civil war have been accused of mass rape, massacre, and the use of child soldiers. Both sides have been exploiting South Sudan’s natural resources. President Kiir’s wife and children own stakes in the oil and mining sectors, while Machar has been selling oil futures for weapons.

South Sudan is now classified by the United Nations as a “level 3” humanitarian disaster – one of only four in the world, alongside Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. A crippling hunger crisis affecting an estimated 4.8 million people is reportedly so dire that some refugees living in swamps are surviving on water lilies and goat bones. Food costs have skyrocketed since fighting began in July, and in the capital of Juba, vegetable traders now cut tomatoes in half to sell because some customers cannot afford a whole tomato. The World Food Program’s main warehouse in Juba was reportedly looted by government soldiers in July, losing 4,500 metric tons of food which would have fed 220,000 people for a month. As of October 2016, an estimated 2,500 refugees – mostly women and children – were crossing from South Sudan into Uganda every day. Most live in settlement camps, where resources are limited and families have been living on partial food rations. An estimated 200,000 South Sudanese refugees have fled to Uganda since July, and according to the UNHCR, there are now 54,000 registered South Sudanese refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Out of the UNHCR’s pledged $251 million South Sudan refugee plan, only $48.5 million has been received.

The economy is in shambles. South Sudan is the size of France yet has only 200 kilometers (125 miles) of paved roads. This is a serious inhibitor to not only delivering aid, but also to developing any sort of self-sustaining industry. Inflation is at 835.7 percent – the highest in the world. South Sudan is an oil income-dependent country, and until independence, South Sudanese oil fields produced 75% of Sudanese oil and sold it through Sudanese oil transport infrastructure. Now that infrastructure is monopolized by Sudan. In 2014, total oil revenue was reportedly $3.38 billion, of which the government only received $1.71 billion after $884 million in transit fees to Sudan and $781 million in loan payments. A 2016 IMF visit determined that South Sudan would receive no oil revenue if it were to meet its obligations to Sudan; negotiations are currently ongoing to reschedule delivery dates. The low global price of oil, combined with rampant inflation, drastically rising food costs, and the extreme shortage of hard currency have put severe strains on the economy.

Furthermore, the United Nations has catastrophically failed to fulfill its responsibilities. It has failed to protect both civilians and humanitarian workers; South Sudan had more attacks on aid workers than any other country last year, and at least 57 aid workers have been killed since 2013. Despite a large presence of around 12,000 U.N. Peacekeeping forces, a horrific gang rape of aid workers by government troops in a hotel less than a mile from a U.N. compound went unanswered, even as the victims frantically called for help. In late October, a U.N. inquiry accused the UNMISS of failing to respond to the attack; in response, Kenya began pulling its Peacekeeping troops out of South Sudan. Almost 200,000 South Sudanese reside in U.N. Protection of Civilian (POC) sites – refugee camps for the displaced that are secured by peacekeepers at or near their bases. The camps were never intended for large, long-term settlements, and are overcrowded with terrible living conditions. In 2015, a UN human rights commission found that the situation in South Sudan demonstrated “new brutality and intensity,” with “a scope and level of cruelty” that “suggests a depth of antipathy that exceeds political differences.”

THE PATH FORWARD

The complexity of the situation proves there will be no easy solution anytime soon. Although the conflict began with a political dispute, it will not be resolved simply by reconciling rival political factions. South Sudan’s history of ethnic manipulation for elites’ own political and economic benefit continues to challenge the feasibility of social cohesion in the country, and there is little evidence that President Kiir’s government is willing to share power with the opposition. Increasingly antagonistic rhetoric against the UN and international groups pose threats not only to peacekeepers, aid workers and expatriates, but also to the viability of continued operations within South Sudan. Furthermore, aid donors are hesitant to take policy stances that could threaten the ability of aid agencies to deliver relief in the midst of humanitarian crisis. The efficacy of piecemeal technocratic solutions is dubious without an accountable, functional government in place. There are, however, a few critical first steps that must be taken for any long-term solution to materialize.

1. Stop the meddling of regional actors. The interference of neighboring countries and their national interests has played a destabilizing effect, from Sudan to Uganda to Kenya to Ethiopia. Sudan has failed to demonstrate commitment to the terms of the CPA, as evidenced when they prevented the residents of Abyei (which continues to be a hotly contested region) from participating in the referendum. In 2012, the South Sudan government, angered by border disputes and negotiations over oil transit and export to the Port Sudan terminal in the North, suspended oil production for over a year, and oil production continues to be a critical area of contention. With so much at stake in resource-rich South Sudan, the continued meddling of outside actors obstructs not only internal stability, but also forces the rival factions to compete with one another for foreign funding and support. The U.S., U.N., and other international allies must show that the overarching goal of bringing peace and stability to the region should be regional actors’ foremost priority and is beneficial for all. Once this is done, South Sudan needs to negotiate resource-sharing or access agreements with all its neighbors.
2. The aid agencies must leave. Not only have the aid agencies failed to protect citizens and their own workers, most significantly, they have been severely hindered by forces on both sides. It can be argued that aid agencies, especially food agencies, are keeping a larger humanitarian crisis at bay. Yet, as Dambisa Moyo argues in “Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa,” halting aid delivery will force actors to be accountable for the plight of their supporters once it is clear that outside aid is what is keeping the country afloat. It will also force actors to promise and provide conditions stable enough for aid agencies to carry out their missions.
3. President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar both must step down. International questions about the status of the peace agreement and legitimacy of the TGNU have persisted following President Kiir’s replacement of Machar and other opposition representatives in late July. The faith of the population in the current government is dubious at best, and much like the debate over President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, a fundamental disagreement over the governance needed to unify a fragile state divided down ethnic lines is one that can only continue with new leaders in both parties. The U.N. Security Council has already blacklisted six generals – three from each side of the conflict – under a targeted sanctions regime, and on November 18^th, the U.S. proposed for Machar, South Sudan army chief Paul Malong and South Sudan Information Minister Michael Makuei to be added to the list.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The post The Vicious Game: Understanding Endemic Conflict in South Sudan appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.