Under the international treaty, South Korea and other member states are prohibited from creating nuclear weapons, in order to promote cooperation in nuclear energy and further the goal of total disarmament.

South Korea also signed another joint declaration with North Korea, a denuclearization and unification effort of the Korean Peninsula that agreed to not “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons” that went into effect in 1992. Further clauses mandate nuclear energy use solely for peaceful purposes, and regular inspections to ensure compliance with the declaration.

Unfortunately, North Korea has repeatedly violated this declaration by launching six separate nuclear tests since 2006, not including the over 70 ballistic and cruise missile tests the country launched in 2022 alone. The most recent concerning behavior from North Korea came at the end of last year, when five North Korean drones crossed into South Korea, one of which breached the presidential office’s no-fly zone. 

The election of South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol in May , whose conservative policies take a harsher stance on North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un’s regime than his deescalation-seeking predecessor, has contributed to this increase in tensions. 

In a meeting of Kim’s Workers’ Party at the end of last year, he cited Yoon’s government as a valid reason to center its nuclear policy on “a mass production of tactical nuclear weapons” and “an exponential increase of the country’s nuclear arsenal,” specifically as a defense mechanism against South Korea. 

All this comes in conjunction with Kim’s need to maintain his credibility after international sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic and recent floods that devastated the economy. Peace talks on the Korean Peninsula now look less than promising.

While the country’s current policy under Yoon is to defend itself from North Korea by strengthening its alliance with the United States, the president stated during a recent policy briefing that South Korea would consider building its own arsenal should the North continue its escalations. 

Washington’s official policy maintains its goal of entirely clearing the Korean Peninsula of nuclear weapons, fearful of triggering an arms race should South Korea decide to do so.

The threat of nuclear war has garnered support among South Korean citizens for their government to build an independent arsenal. A joint survey published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy found that 71% were in favor of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons, and 56 percent would support a deployment of U..S nuclear weapons into the country.

However, an independent arsenal is greatly preferred, as trust that the United States will defend South Korea against the North remains at only 61% despite repeated assurances from Washington and the 28,500 American troops still stationed in the country.

Opinions of analysts and policy makers are split. Some hold faith in the umbrella of protection that the United States provides, while others not so much. 

According to Sejong Institute senior analyst Cheong Seong-Chang, the United StatesU.S. would be safer if South Korea had nuclear independence. Washington would not have to sacrifice its own nuclear weapons to defend South Korea, and, as an added bonus, a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula might encourage China to crack down on Kim, he says.

However, deciding to build its own arsenal would require South Korea to withdraw from the NPT, in which case it would be the only country to do so after North Korea did in 2003.

Article X of the NPT does allow for a member state to withdraw, provided it gives the UN Security Council three months’ notice and sufficient reasons. The reasons cited for withdrawal must be in the case that “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this [t]reaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” The increasing threats of nuclear attacks from North Korea could be a potential justification for South Korea to withdraw. 

Leaving the NPT remains a last resort for now. In the meantime, Yoon and his Defense Ministry plan to hold tabletop exercises with their allies to strategize and determine how well-equipped they are in the event of an attack. 

South Korea’s Defense Ministry has other deterrence strategies, as well. In 2017, after North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, South Korea established a “decapitation unit” under the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation initiative, which would conduct cross-border helicopter and plane raids into North Korea under the cover of night. The unit’s imposing name aims to strike fear of assassination into Kim Jong-Un.

Other South Korean arms build-up programs include Kill Chain, which would detect incoming missile attacks and launch preemptive strikes, and the Korea Air and Missile Defense program, which aims to intercept incoming missiles. 

The debate on nuclear policy comes at a time when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised global concerns of nuclear war, and self-defense capabilities seem not only appealing but also necessary. 

South Korea must first confront several problems: How heavily can it rely on the United States for protection in the event of a Northern attack? Would an independent arsenal of nuclear weapons trigger an arms race? And, what is the best decision the government can make to ensure the prosperity and peace of its people? 

There may not be one right answer, but safety cannot be guaranteed while nuclear weapons are in the hands of any nation with malintent. 

The post The Future of Nuclear Weapons in South Korea appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

The United States and North Korea have had a long history of disagreements regarding nuclear weapon policy. While the nation began developing its nuclear program in the 1970s, U.S. intelligence began to view the program as a threat in the early 1990s. In 1992, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) first inspected the DPRK and found inconsistencies between how much plutonium the country reported and the amounts found in the IAEA investigation. Subsequently, in 1994, the United States and the DPRK compromised on an Agreed Framework that disassembled the DPRK nuclear program in exchange for energy resources and movement towards normalized relations. The DPRK failed to respect the agreement, and by 2002, the DPRK was pursuing uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. 

Eleven years after the DPRK’s first underground nuclear test, former President Donald Trump classified the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism to pressure the DPRK to begin discussions of denuclearization. Despite the relatively good relationship between former President Donald Trump and DPRK Supreme Leader Kim-Jon-Un, the two countries failed to reach an agreement as both countries had different visions of how denuclearization would play out. The DPRK’s demands to agree to denuclearization were unrealistic and would call for U.S. denuclearization. As a result, the deal fell through.

Most recently, the DPRK’s announced a new nuclear doctrine. With this new doctrine, the U.S. faces increased difficulty in ensuring safety and peace. The DPRK’s unprecedented pledge to their nuclear program and the program’s recent technological advancements threaten our security in the region and around the world. Supreme Leader Kim-Jon-Un has taken a firm stance declaring that any force that attempts to violate the interests of the state, he is willing to deploy nuclear weapons. The nuclear program is a fundamental part of the DPRK and, according to Kim-Jon-Un, is a “symbol of our national strength.”

The rise in missile testing and increased commitment to the DPRK’s nuclear program causes a security risk as the country is and will develop more advanced technologies. A successful missile test in April is reported to strengthen the country’s short-range missiles. The DPRK has also been testing submarine-launched ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles.

There are some geopolitical safeguards that make a DPRK nuclear attack unlikely. As the DPRK is struggling economically due to a budget that puts excessive funds into the nuclear program and the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the DPRK is heavily reliant on China to keep afloat. The DPRK is not looking to aggravate the Chinese government; therefore, the risk of a nuclear attack is unlikely. However, the United States should still be cautious as the DPRK has been able to make unexpected increased revenue through the selling of artillery and rockets to the Russians for the invasion of Ukraine. Despite the strong opposition that the United States and its allies hold towards the DPRK’s nuclear policy, there are areas of compromise and similar interests that should be at the forefront of our strategy in the Korean peninsula. It is in the interests of both countries not to provoke China via nuclear war. A decrease in international uncertainty and aggression will allow each country to focus on its domestic initiatives. 

Although the United States has significant influence in the region, ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol has taken a hard stance against North Korea and has encouraged ROK and U.S. forces to do routine military drills to deter DPRK missile threats. However, as of September 2022, this approach has only shown to increase DPRK aggression when met with these joint drills.

As a result, the United States should not increase the amount of joint military drills to pressure the DPRK to meet and discuss denuclearization in return for humanitarian and economic assistance. Even if these talks occurred, the DPRK is dishonest. In 1994, the DPRK agreed to dismantle its nuclear program. Yet, without warning, in 2002, the DPRK began developing its nuclear technology. While the DPRK was willing to meet with former President Donald Trump on multiple occasions, they never reached a deal as they had vastly different ideas of the meaning of denuclearization. Without massive reforms from the United States, the conversation will not proceed differently this time.

Changing the United States’ current approach to the DPRK by decreasing the practice of joint military drills with the ROK, limiting DPRK rhetoric, and advising the ROK to follow similar proceedings is the best way to approach this life-threatening and destabilizing dilemma. The DPRK will likely not launch a nuclear attack unless provoked; therefore, we should not give a reason for the DPRK to irrationally act if they feel threatened. To combat a lack of U.S. intelligence of the DPRK, we should re-divert the funds used for these military drills to cyber surveillance of the DPRK nuclear program. Although advising the ROK to act in accordance with our strategy may cause tension between our two countries, the ROK needs our military power to protect them if invaded. Therefore, they will likely follow our lead.

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“True Beauty” was hotly anticipated even before it hit screens. 2018’s “My ID is Gangnam Beauty” had a high level of viewership within South Korea and was labeled “the most memorable TV series of the summer” by The Korea Herald. 

What do all these shows have in common? They began as adaptations of South Korean webcomics, comics published online in digitally interactive modes. 

Webcomics are available all over the Internet and are produced by creators in many different countries. Yet it’s the South Korean version of webcomics, usually called webtoons (a mash-up of the words “webcomic” and “cartoon”), that have spearheaded the popularity of the art form and actively brought Korean culture to the world. 

Webtoons are the selling point of many digital platforms: WEBTOON, Tapas, Manta and Tappytoon, among others. Their growing presence in the online space hasn’t gone unnoticed. 

Established entertainment publications like Variety have labeled South Korea’s webtoons as “the next big thing in the global K-culture takeover.” The Hollywood Reporter has even commented on the marketability of webtoons for the global economy, calling them “hot properties” that have captured the attention of China’s expansive film industry and more than 18 million foreign users of Korean platform Naver’s webtoon services. 

Although many of these webtoons were originally written in Korean, English translations are available, usually through the assistance of hired translators and proofreaders. Translators should be credited with bringing webtoons beyond the domestic national market of South Korea and into English-speaking (and other) markets worldwide, a reach that has increased global awareness of Korean culture. 

Creators, both the original authors and the translators, deserve monetary compensation for their work, which means that reading webtoons online is often not free. However, these business models seem to be relatively effective thus far. According to 1-Stop Asia, the Korean webtoon market is worth around a hefty 368 million dollars. 

Manta, a webcomics app, operates on a subscription basis, where a subscriber can access all of the platform’s currently available webcomics by paying $3.99 per month. WEBTOON, on the other hand, requires consumers to purchase coins. These coins can then be used to purchase selections of episodes within each webcomic, rather than providing access to all of the webcomics at once. 

Upon entering these platforms, one will discover that there are a wide variety of genres that cater to audiences’ diverse tastes. From mystery to thriller to romance, each platform houses multiple types of webcomics. With the expansive selection of content, it’s no surprise that entertainment studios and companies have begun noticing the immense amount of intellectual property on these platforms, especially when the content often speaks to relevant social issues.

For example, “True Beauty” was originally a webtoon by Yaongyi. It centers on a high school student named Im Jugyeong who is initially bullied for her ugliness until she learns the art of makeup. Jugyeong finds that makeup can transform her into a whole new person, and she begins assuming the persona of a beautiful, flawless girl — until a popular male student named Suho finds out what Jugyeong looks like without makeup. In order for Suho to keep her secret, Jugyeong agrees to be his servant, setting off an entertaining sequence of high school drama. 

The webtoon was widely popular with millions around the world, and “True Beauty” was adapted into a Korean drama starring popular K-pop male idol Cha Eun-woo and actress Moon Ga-young. It was praised by audiences for its social messaging about South Korean society’s preoccupation with outer appearance. 

Although often marketed for teenagers, similar webcomics have tapped into pre-existing issues in South Korean society. “My ID is Gangnam Beauty,” another beauty-centered webcomic, focuses on Kang Mi-rae, a college student who is stigmatized for having plastic surgery. Plastic surgery has long been a contentious topic in South Korea, and, similar to “True Beauty,” the drama tapped into those concerns about conformity to strict beauty standards as a means of social status. 

Although a completely different genre than “True Beauty” and “My ID is Gangnam Beauty,” the Netflix survival-horror zombie show “All Of Us Are Dead” also provides social commentary. Adapted from the webtoon of the same name, the show follows a group of high schoolers struggling to survive when their high school succumbs to a zombie virus. 

It was noted for containing implicit statements about the police’s lack of intervention and disregard of the teenagers — a message thought to allude to South Korea’s 2014 Sewol Ferry tragedy, in which 250 Danwon High School students perished after the ferry’s captain and members of the crew abandoned the ship without evacuating the passengers. 

Webtoons and their stories are becoming the next face of South Korean entertainment. By representing different aspects of South Korean society, webtoons not only amplify conversations about social issues but also serve to positively reinforce the global nature of their audience. 

In the maneuvering of the digital space and the Internet to create content, South Korea has shone a spotlight on its culture as a key strength of its national identity. As a platform, webtoons are given the opportunity to critique the country’s domestic and internal issues as well. 

Webtoons have become a resource for the South Korean government to elevate its presence in the global entertainment market. As more and more webtoons become adapted for the screen, it is clear that webtoons will continue to serve as one of South Korea’s greatest national — and global — cultural assets.

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South Korea has over 200,000 Asian migrant workers, mainly from Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and Nepal, who came to South Korea through the Employment Permit System (EPS). The program was launched in 2004 as a solution to labor shortages, but has been increasingly important given the recent labor shortages due to COVID-19-related restrictions on immigration.

However, activists are demanding a rehaul of EPS because of its contribution to the exploitation of migrant workers. Under EPS, migrant workers can stay up to three years in South Korea and if they are labeled “diligent workers” they can re-enter the country and work for another four years and ten months. One problem with EPS is that during their stay, migrants can change their workplace only up to three times with an employer’s consent, and those who end up leaving their jobs without consent could be reported to the police as illegal immigrants and face deportation. Migrants are also discouraged from speaking up about their mistreatment because if they are involved in a dispute and no longer labeled “diligent workers,” they then have lower chances of re-entering the country.

Migrant workers argue that this system violates their rights and is equivalent to forced labor because migrants are discouraged from leaving their employers even if they are exploited. Kim Dael-song, a pastor who runs the Pochean Migrant Workers Centre, says that “the hardest thing for workers is that there’s absolutely no freedom of movement and the workers are bound entirely to the owners. A complete master-servant relationship. This is the source of all the violations of human and labor rights.” Rights for farm workers are even worse than that of factory workers because the nation’s Labor Standards Act, which regulates working hours and break times, does not apply to workplaces with four or fewer employees, which is the typical number of laborers on farms. 

This means that oftentimes, migrant workers, especially those working on farms, are overworked and underpaid. Activists argue that in Pocheon, migrants working on farms are farming for 10-12 hours a day with only two Saturdays off per month with meager salaries that are below what their contracts promised them. A migrant worker from Nepal who works on a farm considers finding work in a factory, because he claims that on a farm “it’s just an extreme amount of work (each day). You don’t get bathroom breaks. You don’t even have time to drink water.”

In addition to the grueling working hours and poor pay, many migrant workers are also living in substandard living conditions. On South Korean farms, nearly 70% of migrant laborers live in shipping containers or other types of makeshift homes that are far below safety and sanitation standards. 

In response to these poor labor conditions, activists and migrant workers have fought to create reform. They have organized protests and even created a Migrant’s Trade Union in 2005 to improve their working conditions. After the death of Sokkheng, authorities stopped issuing employment permits to workplaces where they were housing migrant workers in greenhouses or other forms of substandard housing. Though there has been little government reform in improving working conditions, and the exploitation of migrants continues. 

One factor that makes it difficult to improve working conditions is South Korea’s negative perception of migrant workers. Steve Hamilton, chief of mission of the International Organization for Migration to Korea, has noted that the “negative perception towards foreigners has prevented officials from being more open to migrant workers.” Due to the local media’s poor portrayal of foreigners and their impact on the country, there is less incentive to improve their labor conditions. Hamilton added that “fear-based misconception of foreign labor displacing jobs and decreasing wage levels should be tackled… a step that must be taken while reforming Korea’s immigration policies at the same time.” In fact, a study on immigration in South Korea found that 42% of South Koreans favored maintaining the current level of immigration, 32% supported a decrease in levels, while just 19% supported an increase. 

To improve the working conditions of migrants, an overhaul of the EPS needs to be implemented to remove the dependency immigrants have on their employers. The negative perception surrounding migrants in South Korea also needs to change if improvements are to be made. In order to tackle this narrative, Hamilton suggests that migrant workers should be granted permanent residency in South Korea rather than having workplaces continue to replace them. He claims that “providing more room for migrants to settle and achieve success could also in return change the perception of migrants here.” 

As South Korea faces labor shortages caused by an aging labor force and declining birthrate, migrant workers continue to be a crucial part of South Korea’s workforce and should be treated as such. The importance of migrant workers has been highlighted, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, which exacerbated labor shortages as a result of halts on immigration. Looking forward, there needs to be a change in how migrants are perceived and a rehaul of the EPS system so migrant workers can have the basic human rights they deserve. 

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Turn off the main strip and enter one of many narrow streets sloping upwards with lively music spilling out from every direction. You would hardly know it without taking a closer look, but this steep alleyway is South Korea’s only gay neighborhood. Dubbed “Homo Hill” by locals and expats, the collection of gay bars and clubs is a unique refuge in a country where LGBTQ+ topics are considered taboo. The South Korean judicial system has rejected same-sex marriage and legal protections for discrimination based on LGBT status. In January 2022, a court in Seoul declined to allow a same-sex couple spousal insurance benefits, reaffirming the Republic of Korea’s strictly heteronormative culture. 

South Korean society largely maintains a position of ignorance regarding the rights and status of LGBTQ+ citizens. For the most part, it isn’t a household topic of conversation or a fiercely debated issue by politicians. Historical precedence of the Confucian family model and the spread of Christianity across the Korean Peninsula since the 17th century have manifested in the strictly traditional society seen today. This lack of acceptance has very real implications for LGBTQ+ youth in South Korea, with a survey finding that 45% of under-18s who identify as gay have attempted suicide. Despite such social and legislative apathy, the South still seems a tolerant environment compared to countless nations actively and violently persecuting their LGBTQ+ citizens. 

LGBTQ+ Rights Around the World 

In the United States, both public acceptance and legal protections for LGBTQ+ individuals have seemingly improved over the past 20 years. The landmark Obergefell v. Hodges civil rights case gave same-sex couples the right to marry in 2015 and marked a federal victory for gay citizens to enjoy more equal rights and benefits. However, the striking down of Roe v. Wade symbolizes how social progress in America is not moving in a single direction. Many in the LGBTQ+ community are bracing for a rollback after comments made in the concurring opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas suggested that established rights to both gay marriage and contraception should be reconsidered. The US is a unique case where tolerance and equality seem to shift constantly, often depending upon the state.  

There is arguably no continent with more widespread LGBTQ+ acceptance than Europe, especially Western EU member states. In an NBC ranking of the top 15 most gay-friendly countries, ten are located in Europe. The perspective in many EU nations on LGBTQ+ acceptance and equality is resolute, with countries like the Netherlands and Belgium being the first to legalize same-sex marriage in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Additionally, in 1985, the Netherlands passed some of the earliest legislation allowing transgender people to change their registered gender. The European Parliament has taken steps to solidify the Union’s position by declaring itself an “LGBTQ+ Freedom Zone” in response to Poland’s resolutions to create “LGBTQ+ Free Zones.” These resolutions were meant to publicize a rejection of “LGBT Ideology” in Poland and ban equality marches. While the declarations were primarily symbolic, they illustrate the Polish conservative government’s commitment to suppressing “LGBT propaganda” and denying same-sex couples the legal right to marriage. Even in the most progressive coalition of countries, basic equality for non-heterosexual people fails to be standard. 

Many regions fall into a middle ground where same-sex relations aren’t criminalized, but there remains heavy social pressure to stay in the closet. Most countries in Latin America and the Indian subcontinent would typically fall under this category. Then, there is a somewhat concentrated pattern of staunchly anti-LGBTQ+ nations in Africa and the Middle East. Many correlate Islamic governments with strict persecution of any non-heteronormative identity, but this is not a comprehensive reality. Countries like Iran punish homosexual acts between men with the death penalty. However, trans citizens can have their gender identity recognized by the law. Incredibly, the Iranian government goes beyond allowing gender reassignment surgery; it’s also subsidized. A mere five countries in the Middle East allow same-sex relations, with Israel being the only one to recognize homosexual civil unions. Africa follows a similar makeup, with Amnesty International noting an almost ubiquitous increase in homophobia. Homosexuality remains legal in just 19 out of 54 countries on the African continent. 

Asia probably has the greatest variety of LGBTQ+ tolerance from country to country. Places such as Thailand offer a more open environment to different sexualities and gender identities; consequently, neighboring Myanmar maintains a hostile policy. Most Asian societies prefer not to acknowledge the existence of LGBTQ+ citizens, as seen in the South Korean example. There have been strides, such as in May 2019, when Taiwan became the first Asian country to legalize same-sex marriage. Overall, tolerance in Asia is mostly stagnant with small advancements in western influenced nations. 

 The global picture remains grim for a vast majority of LGBTQ+ identifying individuals. Outside a handful of highly developed Western countries, equal rights don’t exist and legal protections are sorely lacking. If gay and trans people aren’t being actively persecuted by their governments, they likely have to contend with social ostracization and discrimination from their communities. Understanding the global reality of LGBTQ+ status is essential for finding how to best support change. In most intolerant countries, even peaceful advocacy for gay rights is met with dramatic and sometimes violent consequences. That is why supporting international entities is essential; Organizations like OutRight Action International, which fights for international LGBTQ+ rights and maintains a presence in the UN, and Rainbow Railroad, a small non-profit helping gay survivors relocate to friendly countries, are two examples. Pride Month is undeniably a time to celebrate identity if you live in a place where it’s possible. Such a celebration must go in hand with the acknowledgment that not everyone around the world is so lucky. 

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This conservative lead is deeply curious, given recent electoral history. For one, the last conservative president, Park Geun-hye, was impeached and removed from office on corruption charges. Additionally, the current liberal Democratic president Moon Jae-in is perceived to have had one of the most successful presidential campaigns, with an approval rating of 42%. From these trends, one might have expected continued liberal leadership to continue within South Korea.

Then, why is it that so many voters suddenly preferred to swing back to conservative leadership? 

One major answer lies in Korea’s burgeoning anti-feminist movement, driven predominantly by young South Korean men who see themselves as victims of feminism. These young men believe that feminism has granted women preferential treatment within Korea’s hypercompetitive employment market, creating female supremacy rather than gender equality. 

The competitive environment underlying their hostility has not always existed in Korea. In 1997, an unprecedented economic crisis restructured Korean job security. This made long-term, stable employment inaccessible to many Koreans. Consequently, young Korean men ignore the social dynamics of sexism and instead blame women for their economic hardships.

Anti-feminist male activists have taken root in a variety of spaces, from university lecture halls to business fronts, chanting their popular slogans of “out with man-haters” and “feminism is a mental illness.” Beyond the borders of South Korea, this misogynistic sentiment has manifested in the most unlikely corners of current affairs — notably, the Tokyo Olympics. 

An San, a South Korean archer who won two gold medals at the Olympics, was the target of misogynistic online abuse. Young male anti-feminists online accused An of being a feminist because of her short hairstyle. They then called for An’s gold medals to be revoked on account of her perceived feminist status. This incident is a clear example of how these activists are clearly proactive in their campaign against any semblance of feminism. 

These anti-feminists have been further enabled by conservative party leader Lee Jun-seok, whose Harvard-educated background gives his platform significant credibility in a society that highly values elite education. Lee’s popularity in the conservative People Power Party (PPP) is largely due to his outspokenness against the Democratic Party’s “fixation on a pro-woman agenda” and advocacy for male victimhood, which has resonated with certain groups — namely young Korean men. 

In South Korea’s hyper-competitive world of education and employment, Lee is a beacon for these young Korean men who believe they are losing opportunities due to affirmative action. Of course, this framing is far from the truth, as South Korea was ranked 102nd out of 156 countries by the World Economic Forum regarding the gender pay gap. However, this has not changed the fact that young men who believe themselves victims of feminism are increasingly twisting publicly available evidence for their own political agenda.

In electoral politics specifically, these misogynistic sentiments had extensive impacts on the outcome of the recent elections. Anti-feminist young men flocked to Yoon following his promise to eliminate the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. Yoon’s statements that the ministry “treated men as potential criminals” resonated with anti-feminist young men’s ideas of victimhood. 

The effect of this political promise was evident in the polls, as Yoon’s ratings jumped 6% after his statement. Lee Jae-myung, on the other hand, took a more neutral approach to gender issues. He ceded any promises to eliminate the ministry, yet still attempted to appease anti-feminists by acknowledging male discrimination and promising to remove the word “women” from the ministry’s official Korean-language title. Both candidates have failed to defend feminism, recognizing that the electoral force of the young misogynists is undeniable. 

In fact, Yoon had already realized this in December of 2021. In order to appeal to young women voters, Yoon vocalized support for prominent Korean feminists. However, he quickly lost his polling lead, falling behind Lee by 10%, as well as the support of Lee Jun-seok, who had been working on his campaign. 

Recognizing that young men are a key voter base, Yoon quickly reversed his decision, re-welcoming Lee onto his campaign and opting for a strict approach against feminism. This sudden pivot makes one thing clear: Yoon knew anti-feminists would be key in the South Korean presidential elections. Indeed, they were. According to an exit poll, 59% of men in their 20s and 53% of men in their 30s voted for Yoon.

What does this mean for the future of women in Korea? 

These misogynistic views have serious, real-life consequences. Sexual harassment and violent crimes against women are rife in the workplace and beyond. Korean police accounts reveal that 98% of victims in sexual violence cases and over half of all homicide victims are women. Such numbers most likely do not account for the women who do not come forward with allegations due to a fear of workplace or social consequences. These harsh realities motivated the explosive start of the #MeToo campaign in Korea in 2018, which subsequently marked the anti-feminism movement’s expansion. 

If Yoon does follow through on his promise to eliminate the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, Korea’s already alarming gender pay gap will continue to widen. In addition, the ministry’s prevention programs for violence against women will be eliminated and worsen the gender issue in South Korea. 

These prevention programs, which provide legal, medical, investigative and counseling support for victims of sexual violence, will be replaced by enhanced punishments for false accusations of sexual violence by women. The ministry also supports mentoring and networking programs that encourage women’s career development. These, too, may no longer be a reality under Yoon’s presidency.

Most significantly, Yoon’s victory will accelerate the ideological rise of anti-feminism, creating a mainstream political space where misogyny continues to be actively perpetuated. Yoon believes that gender discrimination only exists in Korea as a personal matter rather than a structural one. Not only would the policies promising to safeguard women’s rights begin to crumble, but Korean society as a whole will also question the grievances of women. The proliferation of anti-feminist rhetoric in Korea signals to the global community that the battle against gender discrimination is not a fight worth having, let alone one that exists in the first place.

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The past four years resulted in weak and volatile U.S.-North Korea relations; but, Biden’s outward-oriented posture starkly contrasts with that of Trump. As North Korea proliferated their nuclear weapons program, Trump responded to every nuclear threat staunchly, signaling a potential war if need be. 

With a new administration in the White House, the United States now has a chance to ease tensions with North Korea and encourage dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. 

Under President Obama’s administration, the approach towards Pyongyang focused on incremental change. In 2008 and 2009, Obama emphasized the need to interact and engage with North Korea “without preconditions.” He affirmed that while difficult, working with communist governments, like those in Cuba and North Korea, would be beneficial for the entire international community. Obama’s willingness to meet with strongman Kim Jong-Un was met with harsh criticism, particularly from conservatives and human rights groups. Some viewed his efforts as weak. Conservatives expressed that meeting with enemies would “lower the prestige of the office of the president.” After Obama, Trump reversed course and deeply strained the progress Obama had made with Kim Jong-Un, resulting in several instances of nuclear threats toward the United States. 

In contrast, conservatives applauded Trump as he met with Kim Jong-un during his presidency, praising his efforts to aggressively denuclearize North Korea. Unlike Obama’s “strategic patience,” Trump demanded a top-down approach to North Korea’s complete denuclearization, offering the incremental removal of financial sanctions. To Trump’s dismay, the Hanoi Summit in 2019 ended in Kim’s refusal to accept any form of denuclearization. Still, Trump garnered conservative support as the false potential for North Korean disarmament led to the expression: “If North Korea disarms, President Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize would be well deserved.” 

Even Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) said a full-fledged war would be “worth it in terms of long-term stability and national security.” Many argue that Trump’s business mindset might have aided in dismantling Kim’s nuclear weapons program. However, soft power and traditionally diplomatic skills from the Biden administration will likely prove to advance U.S.-North Korea relations. 

Biden’s plans to reverse many of Trump’s foreign policies suggest that relations with North Korea will progress. The Obama administration did not have a weak approach toward Kim, despite partisan criticism, and emphasized that military involvement may be necessary if North Korea does not cooperate. Obama’s plan of North Korean denuclearization before easing restrictions should be followed through during Biden’s presidency, but with a bottom-up approach. Before any high-level summit is held, Washington must establish high-level methods of private communication with Pyongyang. 

Already, however, a challenge is clear. In early January 2021,North Korea labeled the United States as its primary enemy. The Biden administration should not plan to host a large summit in an official manner, but in private discussions. In the past, the United States has made deals with North Korea which were misconstrued as simply improving America’s reputation. 

In addition to dealing with North Korean denuclearization, the United States must repair relations with South Korea. Coordination with South Korea will further pressure Kim to accept incremental disarmament. Pursuing peace on the Korean peninsula can incentivize North Korea to change its alignment towards cooperation in exchange for sanction removal, economic advancement and an enhanced reputation. As detailed in the 2018 Singapore Declaration, the United States should work towards normalizing relations on the Korean peninsula. To do so, Biden must eradicate the hostile atmosphere that Trump exacerbated during his presidency. Building military preparedness along the Demilitarized Zone, dividing the north and south, is vital to protecting their citizens. Peace on the peninsula will never be achieved with an aggressive attitude. 

Amid Biden’s new presidency, North Korea plans to hone its military power in an effort to hinder American power. Kim’s attempts to modernize its weapons system include a 15,000 km range missile. North Korea’s military development can serve as bait to convince the United States to slowly lift sanctions in exchange for minuscule denuclearization. To avoid military aggression, the Biden administration must arrange working-level negotiations to effectively mitigate tensions and the destruction of an entire population. Trump’s staunch approach towards denuclearization can be implemented, but with cautious language and private negotiations. Trump’s style of riling up allies to attack the enemy is not the approach Biden can continue. By amassing the collective hatred of many allies, North Korea has even more reason to pursue nuclear aggression and refuse any negotiation. 

Incremental denuclearization in exchange for sanction relief is the most effective route for the Biden administration. Conducting these negotiations in a private setting will allow both parties to not put on a “show” and instead discuss what they truly need in order to repair relations. 

Biden must not accept Pyongyang as a nuclear power, but grant concessions and offer greater market access to North Korea. However, these concessions may only be offered if Kim feels inclined to denuclearize in any capacity. 

Ultimately, Biden’s presidency will likely improve U.S.-North Korean relations exponentially — but it will take some time. Regardless, there is hope for a more peaceful international community. 

The post Can Biden Repair Relations with North Korea? appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Once citing fewer than 10 COVID-19 cases a day, cases have risen to triple digits since August 14. With new clusters being attributed to gatherings of fundamentalist right-wing Christian churches and anti-government protests, these groups have come under fire for contributing to COVID-19’s spread. Underneath the cloak of health disputes, the health crisis in South Korea is incredibly telling of the expanding divide within the East Asian country’s political climate. 

Previously, South Korea was widely applauded for their handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, even coining their recovery strategy as “K-Quarantine”, projecting it as a successful world model. Though other countries such as New Zealand and Australia have also been able to tame the virus, South Korea is arguably the largest democracy to “reduce new daily cases by more than 90 percent from peak”. Their success is largely due to the three pillars of fast testing, thorough tracing, and mandatory isolation, all of which is communicated to citizens daily through official government messaging systems.

Now, amid the virus’s resurgence, churches have come under fire as being virus spreaders. In particular, the fundamentalist Christian church “Sarang Jeil,” meaning “love comes first” in Korean, has faced significant criticism. 

More than 1,100 cases of infection have been linked to the Sarang Jeil Church, second only to that of Shincheonji Church’s 5,200 cases in February. Its pastor, Jun Kwang-hun, has been known for his criticism of President Moon Jae-in, accusing him of being a North Korean sympathizer, as well as perpetuating and capitalizing on election fraud. Having tested positive for COVID-19, he has also battled criminal charges for spreading libel and obstructing epidemiological tracing by reportedly turning in false lists of church-goers used for contact tracing. Despite this, his devout following has not wavered, with members of the conservative right-wing blatantly disregarding social distancing measures and partaking in anti-government rallies. 

On August 15th, thousands gathered to protest President Moon Jae-in’s policies, carrying pro-South Korea banners, American flags, and cut-outs of President Trump. The conservative protesters advocated for President Moon to step down, claiming that he was “handing South Korea over to North Korea”. 

Though exacerbated by the rise of COVID-19 and subsequent economic hardships, the association of Christian fundamentalism and the conservative right in South Korea is not new. Rooted in Protestant American missionaries, Christian fundamentalists have historically aligned themselves with the South Korean conservative right’s’ fervently anti-communist stance and their strong opposition to the efforts to open diplomatic engagement with the North.

In the early 2000s, participation in the Christian fundamentalist movement skyrocketed as other churches started catering towards more “affluent urban professions,” alienating the lower class. As a result, the fundamentalist church bases grew. Sarang Jeil, for example, has a base largely made up of older, lower-income South Koreans, who “took the ostracization they experienced amid the changes South Korean Protestantism went through in the late 90s and turned it into a political holy movement,“ says Kim Jin-ho, a pastor and researcher at the Christian Institute for the 3rd Era.

The rise of COVID-19 cases has only deepened the existing divide in South Korea. Pastor Jun and the church have accused the government of intentionally infecting church members and publishing false COVID-19 test results to cast the brunt of the blame on churches. Many churchgoers have also criticized the government for their mishandling of the situation, with church-going patients citing that they “treated me like a ball of germs, not a citizen of the country.” Meanwhile, the government has also publicly criticized churches for being inconsiderate and senseless. 

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, tensions have been exacerbated by an ongoing recession, with the South Korean economy suffering a shrinkage of 3.3% in GDP between April and June. The recession has impacted the lower class disproportionately, brewing strong dissent from the right. Many churches also rely on donations from church attendance, furthering their opposition against government attempts to restrict public attendance. 

Politically, the government’s clash with right-wing churches has only put President Moon’s administration under further scrutiny. As of August 14, his Gallup Poll approval rating dropped to 39% amidst allegations of corruption and sexual harassment allegations within the Democratic party. In addition, he began receiving heavy criticism from the right after his unsuccessful efforts to rebuild South Korea’s relationship with North Korea. Being born to North Korean refugees himself, President Moon’s original campaign policies were centered around North Korea rapprochement to establish more cordial relationships between the two countries. Since groundbreaking reconciliatory actions between the North and South in 2018 when President Moon became the first South Korean leader to be ceremonially received, relations between the two countries have deteriorated after South Korea failed to mediate nuclear agreements between the United States and North Korea. South Korea has continuously made efforts to make peace with their Northern counterpart, but their unsuccessful attempts have divided the citizens, with the conservative right accusing President Moon of being a “communist sympathizer” and advocating for his removal. Left to choose between reconciliation with North Korea and maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States, President Moon remains stuck between “a rock and a hard place” as the resulting political divide continues to deepen. 

Going forward, South Korea is faced with difficult decisions between balancing virus prevention regulations, economic recovery, and managing domestic dissatisfaction with the government. Though the number of infections is now lowering, domestic political tensions still persist, and South Korea must tread carefully to avoid complete political upheaval. 

The post What COVID-19 Has Uncovered: South Korea’s Deep Political Divide appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

The influencer takes one bite of the lamb and reaches for a baby back rib. As time passes, she takes her time slurping her noodles. When the camera pans out, viewers see that — to their surprise — there is so much more food than was originally shown, including several whole roast porks. As the influencer smiles, a mouth full of meat, she widely and happily proclaims that in this video, she will be eating all of it. 

While this is only a fictional scenario of a Chinese mukbang, it’s not far from the truth. This debaucherous gormandizing is typical of a mukbang, during which people film or livestream themselves eating excessive quantities of food in one sitting, glorifying unhealthy eating habits. The trend first began in South Korea, but has become popular in many other East Asian countries, and even in the United States. It’s not uncommon for these mukbang personalities to eat anything and in huge quantities. In fact, these streamers, who often financially profit from their content, have built their entire followings on the shock value of excessive consumption. 

At first glance, these videos may seem extreme but entertaining and don’t appear to be political in any way. They have garnered millions of views on Youtube and across other streaming platforms, and have resulted in the creation of thousands of popular Youtube channels and personalities.

So why has China banned them?

According to the Chinese government, mukbangs are not only promoting unhealthy eating habits, but they have contributed to the country’s food waste issue. A previous report from the World Wildlife Fund China stated that in China, 17 to 18 million tons of food were wasted in 2015 — enough food to feed 30 to 50 million individuals annually.

China’s campaign to crack down on food waste is largely motivated by rising food prices and a fear of food insecurity, as well as concerns over the continuing reliability of the global food supply chain during the coronavirus pandemic. This was realized in President Xi Jinping’s “Clean Plate” 2.0 campaign, which was launched amid the pandemic to monitor the amount of food that was being wasted in the country. To do this, President Xi asked all citizens to carefully consider how much food they order on a daily basis and to adhere to health guidelines by not overfilling plates and taking home food they cannot finish. 

Food waste, in this regard, has become a moral issue in Chinese society. It has taken shape as an obstacle to China’s fulfillment of national values, which emphasizes both health and prosperity. In order to combat mukbang’s emphasis on unhealthy and “immoral” consumption, the Chinese government has turned to censoring internet celebrities. Government officials believe that mukbang personalities, many of whom have gained large followings online, play a role in actively promoting lifestyles that do not align with the Chinese vision of “cherishing” food. 

Video platforms have heeded the call. Sina Weibo, China’s version of Twitter, has already stated that they would be restricting and banning content related to excessive consumption. Other platforms like Douyin and Kuaishou have echoed similar sentiments, even stating that internet users who search key terms like “competitive eater” and “eating show” will be redirected to healthier food content. Accounts who do not promote such values will be removed. 

While it’s easy to dismiss this crackdown on food waste and mukbangs as only another example of China’s surveillance and censorship tactics, the issue is far more complex. It’s necessary to acknowledge that censorship serves as a mechanism for the CCP to strategically excise what does not conform to the government’s political views, and that the consumption of food has now become a central aspect of what is regulated. Mukbangs are an accessible target due to their visibility on Chinese social media. 

However, what’s more clear is that warning against the dangers of mukbangs has become associated with upholding a version of China’s national identity, one that relies upon a projection of health and morality. Chief Washington correspondent Chen Weihua of the China Daily argues that food waste is a “shameful chronic disease,” thus linking food waste to a larger issue for the nation’s prosperity.

It isn’t just mukbangs that are facing the implications of China’s health-conscious political initiative. A Chinese beef restaurant in Changsha sparked controversy in its attempt to closely follow the ideal of “healthy” living. Chuiyan Fried Beef asked diners to weigh themselves before entering the restaurant. Upon weighing themselves and scanning their data into an app, these potential restaurant diners were then recommended a set of food options that would establish a healthy caloric value. News of this initiative quickly spread online, and the restaurant was forced to apologize for its faulty interpretation of inhibiting food waste.

Food in China has become politicized, and despite the economic context that backs up the “Clean Plate” campaign, the crackdown on food waste symbolizes a larger reckoning with and for Chinese nationhood. According to a 2013 article by writer Ning Hui in the Atlantic, the many initiatives against food waste have historically served as more than just a debate over food resources but rather, an allusion to Chinese history and power.

Hui cites a Chinese article from Phoenix Net, which states that conversations over food waste are informed by the idea that the issue of food waste hearkens back to the idea that there is something politically flawed with the current era. The article states that because food waste is often perceived as symbolic, or a “loss of ancient goodness,” some may believe that it is essentially necessary to return China to Mao Zedong’s time. 

Within this debate, there are also connotations of whether or not food culture is tied to the morality of national identity. Members of the public have chosen to label food waste as an issue of the current government’s corruption. Evidence shows that many leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have been partaking in large, extravagant banquets with excessive amounts of food going to waste. This linking of food waste and certain CCP officials also appears to be a reason why President Xi has advocated strongly for the “Clean Plate” 2.0 campaign. The elimination of food waste as an institutional measure can be said to indirectly promote a positive, moral image of the government, one integral to maintaining the strength of the CCP’s rule over China.

Food and consumption are heavily related, and acknowledging China’s crackdown on mukbangs as simply another symptom of authoritarian rule is a flawed and one-dimensional understanding of the “Clean Plate” campaign. Yet at the same time, other countries in which mukbangs are also popular, like South Korea and Japan, have not witnessed such a phenomenon as censorship of mukbangs. The most simplistic explanation for this is that they are democratic countries, but their food waste circumstances are also widely different from China’s. 

South Korea has also been largely praised for its successful efforts to combat food waste through recycling. Japan, too, has been clever in its food waste issue by implementing accessible digital technologies that tell consumers what foods need to be “saved” in their local grocery stories. China’s rapid economic development, in comparison to these other countries, is unprecedented enough for food waste to warrant a substantial and still unresolved issue, especially with the size of China’s population. 

It is potentially more effective to compare China’s food waste issue to that of the United States, which has also become politicized amid deteriorating U.S.-China relations. The United States is one of the global leaders in food waste, with 60 million tons of produce being wasted annually according to a 2016 report. 

Yet, Western reporting on China seems to conveniently overlook and not fully elaborate on the United States’ issue with food waste in their coverage of China’s “Clean Plate” 2.0 Campaign, choosing to label China as exerting political force over the whole country’s eating habits in the process of mismanaging their food supply. 

While much of Western media’s attempts to characterize China’s food waste can be considered comprehensive, they also contain flawed implicit assumptions about the motivation behind such endeavors. By analyzing the situation as a problem of China not possessing effective food management strategies, such articles have received harsh vitriol for further misrepresenting China’s reasoning behind the Clean Plate 2.0 Campaign, as well as the nation as a whole. The Chinese newspaper Global Times even issued a statement condemning Western depictions of China’s crackdown on food waste, calling their characterization “biased” and rife with “arrogance” about Chinese politics. 

For Chinese mukbang personalities who are now doubling down on their former content to adapt to the new standards, public response has also been varied. According to an article published in Sixth Tone, many viewers applaud the attempts to curb unhealthy eating habits, and yet, feel conflicted about the censorship of the content, which many enjoy watching regardless of whether or not they are inclined to follow suit in the steps of their favorite influencers. 

It’s worth considering that although some may disagree with the efforts, the campaign to stop food waste is an admirable and worthy cause — as is the concept of an ideal nation working to reduce its impact on the environment. China’s crackdown on food waste is motivated by both of these factors. Most importantly, its campaign aims to distinguish China as the vision of a nation that is both morally and politically sound, starting with its consumption of food and public perception in the media. Whether or not this vision will truly be realized remains to be seen. 

The post Mukbangs and Morality: China’s Crackdown on Food Waste appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

This poor turnout was largely attributed to the organizing efforts of K-Pop fans in the digital space, who had registered for dozens of tickets without any intention of showing up. The call to action began with a video on the online streaming platform TikTok encouraging protest against Trump, followed by mass-tweeting and the online spread of information about this initiative throughout the fandom. This online campaign became a shining example of the power of K-Pop fans and garnered the recognition of leaders such as Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who lauded K-Pop fans for harnessing the power of digital organizing to contribute to “the fight for justice”. 

This relationship between the K-Pop fandom and activism demonstrates a unique underlying theme of social justice in the popular music genre. In K-Pop, the genre’s idols are often obligated to set a positive image for their fans. That includes contributing to notable and necessary causes. For example, the seven-member South Korean boy band BTS is well-known for promoting positive messages of self-empowerment, anti-racism, and inclusivity. And when it comes to demographics, the majority of K-Pop fans tend to be politically liberal and people of color. Given these facts, it is no surprise that this fandom has wielded its digital power against Trump.

According to CNN, K-Pop fan activism works as a comprehensive ecosystem. Activism within the community is a highly strategic process, as K-Pop fans bring the same energy they use for promoting their idols online to organizing around social issues. Fans use algorithms on Twitter and other social media platforms to wash out hateful messages, raise awareness of important issues, and translate online efforts into real-life action — as seen with Trump’s Tulsa rally. This recent effort has led to greater awareness in American media of K-Pop’s impact on American culture and politics.

Yet, K-Pop is not only relevant as a politicized genre in the United States, but on an international scale as well. In recent years, K-Pop has made global headlines for its rapid rise as a cultural phenomenon — both in Korea and around the world. With K-Pop stars performing at the Olympics and its fans becoming increasingly involved in U.S. politics, the genre has adopted global political significance. While many media outlets have acknowledged K-Pop and the genre’s fans for their unique contributions to political activism, it is important to note that K-Pop is a product of globalization, and is, therefore, no stranger to global politics. 

This includes being a source of political dispute on the international stage. One of the most well-known K-Pop controversies — starring Taiwanese member Chou Tzuyu of South Korean K-Pop girl group TWICE — highlighted the “One China” conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, which stipulates that Taiwan is a part of China. In 2016, then-16-year-old Chou waved the flag of Taiwan on a South Korean variety show. In response, a pro-China Taiwanese singer named Huang An posted the image on the Chinese social media site Weibo, where he accused Chou of promoting “Taiwanese independence.” 

Reports quickly surfaced about the suspension of TWICE’s activities in mainland China. Chou later apologized for the situation in a video that featured the young popstar looking contrite and reading a scripted apology from a slip of paper. She read: “There is only one China. The two sides of the Strait are one. I have always been proud to be Chinese.” 

The incident was met with backlash from both mainland Chinese and Taiwanese citizens. Some citizens of mainland China echoed that, given its political connotations, Chou should not have waved the flag of Taiwan. In contrast, the Taipei Times reported that many Taiwanese were angered by the perceived slight against the nation, saying that the teenager did not need to apologize for simply waving a flag. 

Josh Horwitz of Quartz wrote that, for the Taiwanese people, Chou had become a “symbol of the island’s civic pride.” Cindy Sui of BBC analyzed the impact of Chou’s apology on Taiwanese politics, stating that in Taiwan, many viewed the situation as only another example of mainland China attempting to intimidate the small nation. In this case, K-Pop may have influenced the political outcome of the island, as Chou’s video was publicly released only one day before the Taiwanese election that year. While scholars acknowledged that the pro-independence Tsai Ing-wen would most likely have won the race for president without Chou’s controversy, the K-Pop star’s apology only fueled desires for Taiwanese independence further. 

But this instance was not the first, or the last time, that K-Pop would emerge as a political and cultural force. Other members faced similar controversies in later years. One Japanese member of TWICE, Mina, fueled conversations about the role of entertainment in politics after she was spotted wearing a fan-given hat featuring Japan’s Rising Sun flag, a symbol of Imperial Japan that serves as a painful reminder of Japan’s history before and during World War II. Another member, Sana, was called out for expressing national pride for Japan’s Emperor Akihito, upsetting some South Koreans, many of whom perceived the gesture as insensitive due to South Korea’s colonial past under Japan. 

While TWICE members may have witnessed more of these conflicts due to their status as one of South Korea’s top girl groups, these political disputes are not limited to one group. Korean American Tiffany Young, well-known for being a member of the popular group Girls’ Generation, faced a similarly tricky political situation when she was removed from a South Korean variety show after posting a Japanese Rising Sun flag on social media. Furthermore, popular “Gangnam Style” singer PSY publicly apologized after performing anti-American rap lyrics that critiqued American troops serving in Iraq.  

As a globalized genre with many idols coming from outside of South Korea, as well as an inherently strategic tool of South Korea’s “soft power,” K-Pop, like other mediums of entertainment, has never been isolated from politics. While there have been many cases of K-Pop stars being criticized for their inadvertent political actions, that is only one manifestation of K-Pop’s power as a political tool. Despite all the political controversies that have been associated with the genre’s stars, K-Pop has also emerged as a force for global diplomacy and conflict resolution. 

In 2018, South Korean girl group Red Velvet performed in Pyongyang, North Korea, a relatively unprecedented televised endeavor that acted as a notable cultural exchange between the two nations. In 2017, South Korean president Moon Jae-in gifted a signed album of South Korean boy band EXO to the Indonesian president’s daughter as a form of goodwill for the K-Pop fan. In another global diplomatic encounter, President Trump’s daughter Ivanka posed for a photo next to EXO members at the 2018 Winter Olympics, a key symbol of K-Pop’s potential for facilitating positive diplomatic relations.

These case studies of K-Pop being utilized in a strategic sense highlight the fact that K-Pop, both through its stars and its fans, has become fundamentally intertwined with politics. Public diplomacy scholars and practitioners increasingly recognize how music and art serve as important tools of foreign policy, historically and currently.

K-Pop, by its very origins and nature, has always been political, and its fans have influenced the outcomes of international politics in unprecedented ways. The intersection of a musical genre with political activism has, in turn, given rise to conversations about the controversial role of fandoms, which has transitioned from a focus on common interests to a forum for common action. Yet beyond being a site of political debate for the international community, K-Pop has the potential to be a positive force for social, cultural and diplomatic change.

The post Fandoms and Foreign Policy: The Impact of K-Pop on Global Politics appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.