Who is President Alexander Lukashenko?

Lukashenko is a Soviet army veteran, first elected president of Belarus in 1994, shortly following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He has since retained power via fraudulent elections and violent dissident suppression. Most recently, his landslide 2020 presidential election victory was deemed non-compliant with international democratic standards by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Lukashenko, for these reasons, has made himself a pariah in the West. It also draws him to the Soviet-sympathetic Vladimir Putin of Russia. They have thus become natural allies.

Both are constantly under Western scrutiny, and as a result, they provide each other with mutual political support. In an incident in 2021, Belarus used a hoax-bomb threat to divert a commercial air flight to Minsk in order to arrest prominent opposition journalist Roman Protasevich. Despite international condemnation, Russia affirmed the legitimacy of Belarus’s actions. In a similar act later that year, Belarus recognized the Crimean Peninsula as legally Russian.

Belarusian Russian Interdependency

Belarus and Russia have been partners for a long time. Since even before 2000, Russia has accounted for about half of Belarus’s trade. Now, Lukashenko’s economy relies even more heavily on preferred treatment from Russia, with revenues from exporting refined oil products encompassing over 20% of the Belarusian GDP. These oil products are only profitable because Russia sells crude oil to Belarus at preferential sub-market prices. 

The Soviet-style Belarusian economy lacks innovative growth potential to wean from those generous Russian oil subsidies and markets. Wide-scale privatization and foreign investment would ameliorate the economy’s stagnation and decrease dependence on Russia. However, Lukashenko’s unwillingness to cede economic and social power has ensured this would not happen. Given the current conflict in Ukraine, Russia seems unlikely to let Belarus westernize into a more capitalist economy.

Russia also benefits from this relationship. Putin backs Lukashenko because Belarus serves as a strategic buffer separating the Russian Federation from most of NATO. Additionally, Russia uses Belarus to monitor European military activities and conduct joint military drills. Putin has even suggested establishing permanent military bases in Belarus and merging countries to form a fully unified Belarusian-Russian state.

Belarus-Russia Tensions

Despite close ties and reliance, Lukashenko has shown willingness to exert his terms on Russia. In 2019 Belarus turned away from Russia to the West and ordered a U.S. oil shipment after Russia cut off crude oil supplies after the two countries disagreed on prices. 

Lukashenko’s most recent brush with Russia came shortly before the 2020 Belarusian presidential election when Lukashenko arrested 21 Russian citizens after accusing Russia of attempting to overthrow his government. However, soon after, the two made amends after Putin aided Lukashenko in suppressing the 2020 election protests that threatened to overthrow Lukashenko’s regime. Putin’s security forces, verbal threats against instability and volunteer aid were instrumental in keeping Lukashenko in power against hundreds of thousands of Belarusian protestors frustrated with yet another undemocratic presidential election.

Lukashenko has since paid his debts to Putin. In February, Belarus hosted joint military drills to set the stage for the invasion of Ukraine. Belarus is also the departing point for the Russian military contingent attacking Kyiv. Though Belarusian troops have yet to see action in Ukraine, Lukashenko edited the Belarusian Constitution (with another allegedly bogus election) to erase the country’s non-nuclear status. Now, Putin can deploy nuclear weapons at the NATO border as retaliatory measures for “Western interference.”

Belarus’s Future

Despite Lukashenko’s history of erratically spurring both Russia and the West, the future of Belarus is inextricably tied to Russia’s for two reasons.

The first reason is the permanent Russian military presence in Belarus. Ever since Russia massed military forces in Belarus in late 2021, Lukashenko has lost all bargaining power with Putin. He will have to comply with whatever measures Putin deems necessary for their collective security. Lukashenko and the West have to assume these measures are extreme, considering that Putin has gambled his entire legacy as Russia’s strongman president on the invasion of Ukraine. The lengths he will go to ensure his expansionist goals succeed are epitomized by his numerous accounts of saying, “Why do we need a world with no Russia in it?” 

Putin may even seek to fulfill the Union State Agreement with Belarus. Although Belarus never separated itself much from Russia’s economy, this 1999 agreement would completely integrate the two economies. Lukashenko has no leverage over Putin to prevent this, and the Russian tanks and troops already inside Belarusian borders don’t give Lukashenko any strategic favors if Russia decides it wants the Belarusian economy (or anything else for that matter).

The second force tying Belarus’s future to Russia’s comes from the West. Sanctions on Russia have expanded and will extend further to include Belarus because of their role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, the West will need to sanction Belarus so that they won’t route sanctioned goods to Russia—whatever punishments and deterrent measures the West decides to impose on Russia will also directly impact Belarus.

Lukashenko enjoyed acting as if Belarus was independent during his nearly 30-year reign. Though Belarus gained and retained sovereignty in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, it never escaped Russia’s shadow. More than ever, Russia is in control of the Belarusian economy, military and leadership. Just as Putin took down his citizens’ rights, his own economy and the lives of Ukrainian civilians in an attempt to achieve Eastern European hegemony, Putin will drag Lukashenko and Belarus down with Russia in the aftermath of his war of aggression.

The post Alexander Lukashenko’s Past, Purpose and Future appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

The police, adorned with riot gear, broke through the apartment door and detained the two women. On Nov. 20, the journalists were both charged under Part 1 of Article 342 of the Criminal Code, accused of disrupting public transport. Days later, police searched Andreyeva’s apartment and detained Andreyeva’s husband, Igor Ilyash. He was sentenced to 15 days in prison for allegedly participating in another protest, despite his claims that he was not there.

Leading up to the arrests, protests erupted in August 2020 in Minsk after the sixth presidential election in Belarus. President Alexander Lukashenko, who has been president since 1994, won the vote. His presidential style, which many call a brutal dictatorship, is infamous for its restriction of civil liberties and frequent human rights violations, including rampant police brutality. 

Prior to their arrest, Chultsova and Andreyeva reported the news regarding his presidency. Both journalists worked at the television channel Belsat TV, a Polish satellite television channel aimed at revealing the true nature of Belarus. Because Belarusian journalism is so highly restricted by Lukashenko’s regime, much of the reporting is done by outside human rights organizations and media. Those that are within the borders of Belarus are either not officially recognized by the administration or are highly regulated and often misrepresent the issues plaguing the country. 

The Trial

The trial opened on Feb. 9, with both Andreyeva and Chultsova pleading not guilty. On behalf of the Belarusian government, the prosecution argued that their reporting caused a spread of misinformation leading to the congregation of protestors and an increase in the magnitude of the rally. 

They concluded that this made it easier for protesters to resist arrest. Linguistic experts on behalf of the defense noted that the reporting of the journalists “only described what was happening and was neutral in nature.” Nevertheless, the judge found Andreyeva and Chultsova guilty and sentenced the journalists to two years in a general-security penitentiary. 

An appeal was prepared by Andreyeva’s former lawyer, Siarhei Zikratski, but was denied in April 2021. Zikratski was disbarred in March 2020 for lacking the proper qualifications but many have argued that it is because of his defense of Andreyeva. 

In a text exchange with Glimpse from the Globe Zikratski wrote: “All these actions [appeals]are possible protection mechanisms within the national legal system.”

“But we understand that there is no law in Belarus right now,” he wrote. “Therefore, these mechanisms are important: first, in order to prove to everyone and to ourselves that we [have]use[d]all possible legal mechanisms for protection; secondly, to start using international legal mechanisms.” 

When asked about potential international avenues for justice that could be pursued, he said that it remains difficult. 

“Unfortunately, Belarus doesn’t sign many international conventions, which could be used for the protection of Katerina Bakhvalova,” he wrote. “The most likely protection mechanism is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”  

On the day of sentencing, Andreyeva stated: “I want to devote my energy to the creation, building the new Belarus without political repressions. I demand an acquittal for myself, for my colleagues, and for hundreds of political prisoners.” 

Andreyeva’s statement reflects the prominent role of journalists in the continued fight for a fair, free and democratic Belarus. 

Political Prisoner Status

Seven months following the rejection of their appeal, several organizations, including the Viasna Human Rights Centre, the Belarusian Association of Journalists and the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, released statements categorizing them as political prisoners. Moreover, many governments, non-governmental organizations, and news outlets have released statements and called for their release, including both the U.S. Helsinki Commission and the U.S. State Department. The European Union also condemned the illegal imprisonment.

On Feb. 18, the U.S. State Department released a statement declaring: “We stand with the brave people of Belarus and support their right to free and fair elections.” 

The statement also called for the release of all journalists being held. By releasing this statement, the United States solidified their support for further independent research into election irregularities, reaffirmed that every Belarusian citizen is entitled to freedom of speech and assembly, and acknowledged the Lukashenko administration’s failure to uphold these rights.

Moreover, the State Department took action against the Lukashenko regime by enacting the Presidential Proclamation 8015 to impose visa restrictions on individuals responsible for undermining Belarusian democracy. However, these sanctions have not effectively discouraged further human rights violations by the government. 

In the months following this statement, the U.S. Helsinki Commission, a government agency promoting human rights and military security in the OSCE region, also expressed its support for the journalists, calling for the “U.S. administration to revoke access to the U.S. financial system for the nine largest state-owned companies in Belarus.” 

This request has not been met by the Biden administration. 

Additionally, Polish President Andrzej Duda called on the Belarusian authorities to grant increased press freedoms and civil rights while also calling for amnesty for both convicts. Despite the good intention of this statement, amnesty would require those in prison to admit guilt. Chultsova and Andreyeva have previously stated they do not want to admit guilt.

Chultsova and Andreyeva are still in prison awaiting release some time in 2022 or 2023, depending on when the court determines the start of their sentence. Zikratsk has encouraged readers to write letters to voice support and post on social media to raise awareness on the topic. 

When asked about the current condition of the journalists, Zikratsk said, “At the moment Katerina is in the colony.”

He went on to describe the conditions of the colony. 

“On the one hand, the conditions in the colony are better than in the detention center, as she has more opportunities for fresh air and better living conditions,” he wrote. “On the other hand, she is working now, so she doesn’t have time to answer the letters of her relatives, friends and all those who support her with letters.”  

He said that it is important that her story, and others, are not forgotten.

“All political prisoners (including Katerina) need moral support,” he said. “It is very important to write letters to political prisoners, they should understand that they did an important thing and that they are not forgotten.” 

Because the government can still censor what letters the prisoners receive, the notification of the letter being sent can be reported through a lawyer in which case both Chultsova and Andreyeva will know of their support and solidarity. 

Andreyeva’s legal team is making strides for her release through legal avenues. 

“We always used all legal ways to release Katerina Bakhvalova,” Zikratski said. “While I was still a lawyer, I managed to prepare and file an appeal against the court verdict. Then, another lawyer filed a supervisory complaint. At the moment, we are considering the option of filing another supervisory complaint.”

Looking Forward

In November 2021, President Lukashenko categorized Belsat TV as an extremist organization, meaning employees, and even viewers, could face up to seven years in prison. This is a continuation of the Lukashenko regime’s crackdown on journalism, with no end in sight.

The EU, the United States and several other international actors refuse to recognize Lukashenko as the legitimate leader of Belarus and have imposed sanctions as a response to voter tampering and the crackdown on civil liberties. Despite these blatant objections to the election results and the imposed sanctions, Belarus has shown no progress towards reforming its prejudiced judicial system and undemocratic institutions. 

In order to promote lasting change, many believe that neighboring democratic countries in Eastern Europe and the greater international community must speak out against the authoritarian dictatorship that has oppressed Belarusians for over two decades. Activists believe that placing pressure on the Belarusian government by imposing harsher sanctions and “naming and shaming” in order to force Lukashenko’s resignation or removal and ensure the integrity of future elections are important first steps.

Zikratski said that citizens must pressure international organizations and their leaders to pay attention to these issues and fight for democratic freedoms.

“We are sure that the way out of the current situation in Belarus lies in Belarus itself,” he said. “Only the citizens of Belarus can and must make their choice. However, foreign states, citizens, [and]international states can push the existing regime to negotiate with their own citizens.” 

Katsyaryna Andreyeva and Darya Chultsova believe that if major democracies claim to fight for human rights, they must do so unequivocally — not just in their cases, but for all Belerusian citizens.  

Readers interested in writing letters to the journalists can do so at the address below. 

246035, Republic of Belarus, Homiel, Antoshkin Street 3, Correctional Colony #4
Bakhvalava Katsyaryna Andreyeuna, Chultsova Darya Dzmitryieuna

Top Photo: Belsat TV journalists Katsiaryna Andreyeva (right) and Darya Chultsova (left) embrace each other in a defendant’s cage during their trial in Minsk on February 18. (CNN) 

Middle Photo: Belsat TV journalists Darya Chultsova (Left) and Katsiaryna Andreyeva (Right) in court. (VIASNA)

Bottom Photo: Darya Chultsova (Left) and Katsiaryna Andreyeva (Right) holding up peace signs (The Guardian)

THE JOURNALISTS

Darya Chultsova was born on February 20, 1997 in the Mogilev Region of Belarus. Armed with a degree in Journalism, she started her career in camera reporting before making a shift to camera operator. At the time of her imprisonment, she worked at the television channel Belsat TV. 

Katsyaryna Bakhvalava, who goes by the pseudonym Katsyaryna Andreyeva, was born in Minsk, Belarus in 1993 and graduated from gymnasium №23. She spent two years in Spain as an English teacher before returning to Belarus to work as a journalist for Belsat TV.

The post Rights Around the World: Belarus’ Crackdown on the Power of the Pen appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

In the new agreement, Serbia and Kosovo agree on the establishment of a single market, guarantee a free flow of people, services and capital, and create railway and highway links. Although Serbia and Kosovo have previously had many negotiations towards the betterment of bilateral relationships, the improvements were minimal. Tensions between Serbia and Kosovo actually increased in 2018 when Kosovo imposed a 100% tariff on goods imported from Serbia. Considering that Kosovo used to be a Serbian province and its 2008 independence was never recognized by Serbia, the sudden achievement of a deal in 2020 was unexpected.

What was even more surprising was a Facebook post by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Maria Zakharova. She posted a photo of President Vucic and Trump at the Oval Office and another photo featuring Sharon Stone’s rather provocative leg-crossing scene from the American thriller “Basic Instinct.” Commenting on the two photos, Zakharova implied that instead of sitting as if he was being interrogated by Trump, Vucic should present himself more confidently. 

Zakharova’s reckless remark immediately sparked wide-spread vexation, and Vucic himself commented on the situation, saying that “the primitivism and vulgarity she showed speaks about herself, but also about those who have given her the job.” Although Russian President Vladimir Putin and Zakharova herself later apologized for this misconduct, The White House meeting reveals an underlying shift in Serbia and Russia’s historically close relationship. Considering the European Union has always tried to normalize the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, the agreement will undoubtedly improve Serbia’s relationship with the EU. What is more, the Serbia-Kosovo agreement contains political items that may indicate Serbia’s effort to distance itself from Russia. This leaves the future of the Serbian-Russian alliance uncertain and makes clear Serbia’s intention to strengthen its relationship with the EU. 

Serbia and Russia are both Slavic and Orthodox countries that have traditionally always been allies with each other. Ties between the two countries strengthened in 2008 when Kosovo, an autonomous Serbian province with an ethnic Albanian majority, declared its intent to leave Yugoslavia (which includes the current-day Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia). To fight against Western pressure to internationally recognize Kosovo as an independent country, Serbia sought help from its Slavic brother, Russia. Since then, Russia has supported Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity regarding Kosovo, refusing to recognize Kosovo’s independence. The two countries have also formed close economic partnerships and collaborated militarily. Russia’s investment in the Serbian economy totaled up to $4 billion in 2019, and it is expected to invest another $500 million over the next two years, while also supplying the country with natural gas.

Serbia is also the only Western Balkan country that purchases Russian weaponry. In 2016, Serbia signed an agreement on the purchase of the Buk air defense complex for its military. When Aleksandar Vucic assumed the Presidency in 2017, news media in both countries eulogized the friendship between Serbia and Russia. Putin is the most popular foreign leader in Serbia due to his understanding of Serbia’s national culture and interests.

Nevertheless, the two countries do not always have the same goals, and Serbia cannot completely side with Russia due to geographical and economic reasons. Serbia’s geographical location illustrates it’s strategic position: caught in between two rival powers in Europe, with the European Union in the West and Russia in the East. Russia is able to support Serbia’s stance on Kosovo and provide military assistance, while the EU brings more economic benefits to Serbia. A report from the EU delegation to Serbia mentions that the EU has long been a major trading partner with Serbia, receiving, on average, 67% of Serbia’s total exports. Meanwhile, around 60% of Serbia’s total imports of goods come from the EU member countries every year, showing deep economic ties between Serbia and the EU. 

Besides this, almost all of Serbia’s neighboring countries (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Croatia) are EU members, leaving Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as the only two countries that support Russia in the Western Balkans. As Vucic stated during an interview this March, Serbia is always on a path towards greater collaboration with the EU. Serbia has demonstrated this commitment by backing the EU denouncement of the Presidential election in Belarus — a Russian ally — and suspending the 2020 “Slavic brotherhood” military drills with Belarus and Russia due to “great and undeserved pressure from the European Union.” The previously mentioned Serbia-Kosovo agreement also indicates that Serbia will diversify its energy sector, where Russia has an entrenched role. Interpreting the meaning of this economic diversification, the U.S. envoy to Belgrade said it “means [Serbia’s] distance from Russia.” 

Though Serbia has displayed an interest in joining the EU, it is less likely that a formal offer will take place any time soon due to the presence of unresolved problems. The first and most crucial barrier towards EU entry lies in the recognition of Kosovo as an independent country. Although Serbia and Kosovo were able to normalize economic relations, Vucic has made it clear that Serbia will reject EU membership if it means recognizing Kosovo’s independence and letting it become a member of the UN. Speaking on this issue in a press conference, Vucic said: “It is clear what our answer will be. If you want a direct answer, it is no.” Moreover, Vucic claimed that most Serbians prefer to keep the Serbian-Kosovo relationship as it is. This is mainly a result of Western policies in Serbia in the 1990s, such as NATO’s illegitimate bombings of Yugoslavia in 1999 during the Kosovo War, which resulted in the death of around 1500 people. This unhealed wound makes it even harder for Serbia and Kosovo to reach a final compromise.

Aside from the aforementioned grudges against Kosovo, Serbia’s increasing connections with Russia, China, and the United States also worry the EU. The Serbia 2020 Report drafted by the European Commission mentioned that “Serbia continued to develop intense relations and strategic partnerships with a number of countries worldwide, including Russia, China, and the U.S. Serbia… needs to progressively align its foreign and security policy with that of the European Union in the period up to accession.” These relationships include having frequent high-level meetings and military cooperation with Russia, increasing cooperation with China, and supporting the United States by moving the Serbian Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. By pointing out these issues, the EU implies that it hopes Serbia will keep its distance from Russia, China, and even the United States as it seeks EU membership. However, the EU cannot expect this effort to happen anytime soon, because Vucic openly claims that Serbia is not planning to sacrifice its current relationship with these countries. In his address at the 74th Session of the General Assembly of the UN this September, Vucic said: “…Serbia chooses the independent foreign policy, [and]independent decision-making as its path towards the future. And that is why we don’t hide [it]anywhere, and not even in this hall, but we praise good and friendly relations we have with the People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation, and wish [for]better and better relations with the USA. because our job is to take care of our people, we do not care what someone else in the world might tell us.” The statement is sufficient to manifest Vucic’s refusal to prioritize the EU’s demands by weakening ties with Russia, China, and the United States.

Another obstacle to Serbia’s EU accession is that Serbia doubts the EU’s ability to support European countries in times of crisis. This was especially evident after the EU’s decision to ban the export of essential medical equipment to countries that are not EU members during the coronavirus pandemic. Criticizing European solidarity as nothing but “a fairy tale on paper,” Vucic turned to Russia and China and was able to receive immediate medical and economic aid. In response, the EU — fearing Russia and China’s increasing influence in Europe — provided 93 million euro in economic aid a few days later.

Vucic claims that Serbia intends to maintain an independent foreign policy and is not trying to please either the EU or Russia. This is demonstrated by the fact that Serbia does not always side with Russia, often opposing its Slavic brother on a series of issues, as well as the fact that Serbia has not expressed much enthusiasm about joining the European Union, especially after the EU’s initial reluctance to help Serbia during the pandemic. For now, it seems Serbia is committed to maintaining a neutral stance and gaining support from both the EU and Russia while seeking to strengthen other potential partnerships outside Europe, namely with China and the United States. 

Yet, Serbia will remain a prospective candidate for EU membership, despite Vucic’s recent criticism of the alliance and the EU’s hesitation to expand its ranks. Given that the EU’s previous expansion brought in Eastern European countries with issues of corruption and economic troubles, Serbia will need to demonstrate greater political and economic stability in order to earn an invitation. Furthermore, France, one of the EU’s key leaders, is especially uncertain about welcoming new members, believing the alliance should focus on achieving greater consensus between the existing members. Nevertheless, it is clear that, despite Vucic’s claims of an independent foreign policy, Serbia seems to be leaning towards the EU and shifting away from Russia. Though Serbia will likely continue to play both sides for now, it seems its end goal lies with the EU.  

The post Between the EU and Russia, Serbia Makes Its Choice appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Since the disputed August 9 election, a massive public movement erupted and thousands of citizens across the Eastern European country cried out for the end of Lukashenko’s 26-year-long presidency. The world has watched as Belarus’ citizens, notably led by women, have protested in the streets and faced state-sanctioned violence from militarized special police, known as the OMON. 

Country-wide demonstrations have been held in support of opposition candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, who ran symbolically in the place of her husband, popular blogger and Youtuber Sergei Tikhanovskaya, who was prevented from registering as a candidate and arrested for causing public unrest. Svetlana was forced to flee the country after the election, but has become a rallying call this election as the person to end Lukeshenko’s presidency.

The LGBTQ community in Belarus is protesting, facing police brutality in the hopes of ending the current dictatorship and making progress against deep-rooted anti-queer sentiments. On the frontlines, community members are being beaten and detained everyday, a critical, and overlooked, component of the demonstrations.

A History of Homophobia

Belarus has notoriously persecuted its queer population. Same-sex relations have been legal since 1994, when a Nazi-era law used to criminalize and kill gay men was repealed. However, there has been a distinct lack of legal protections or rights, leaving hate crimes rampant, with courts rarely recognizing homophobia and a hostile government that only fuels the violence. In 2012, Lukeshenko notoriously responded to the claim by a German minister that he was “Europe’s last dictator” that it was “better to be a dictator than gay.”

In 2013, Belarus had its most recent LBGT-related legal battle, as gay activists pushed for the registration of a public LGBTQ association that was denied by Belarus’ Department of Justice and Supreme Court. Mikhail Pischevsky, the leading architect of the proposed association was attacked the next year in Minsk outside of a gay nightclub and called a pidor, Belarusian for “faggot,” by his assailant. Doctors remove 20% of his brain in attempt to  save his life, but he died 17 months later. Belarus’ courts decided that the attack had no homophobic motive. 

In August of 2019, gay filmmaker Nikolai Kuprich and his two friends were assailed in Minsk as the attacker used homophbic slurs. Courts ruled that there was no homophobic motive, until Minsk recognized the crime has hate-motivated in December.

The post-Soviet state is marred by legal, social, and institutional homophobia. In 2016, Lukeshenko signed a law into effect banning information that “encourages habits contradicting the development of a healthy lifestyle” or “that discredits the institution of the family and marriage.” 

This modeled neighboring Russia’s infamous 2013 gay propaganda law, and provides for the targeting and infringement of human rights for queer people in Belarus. The Russian law threatens affirming education and support services and essentially bans resourceful and positive LGBTQ information for minors. Human Rights Watch called the law “a classic example of political homophobia.”

Meanwhile, the government has called same-sex relations “fake” and stated that “the overwhelming majority of Belarusians adhere to traditional family values,” in response to the British embassy flying the Pride flag in 2018.

“Pidor”

In Belarus there is no meaning to the word “queer” like in Western Europe or the United States. There is only pidor, a word that has been derogatorily charged against gay people as well as against Lukashenko in recent protests.

Belarus’ “pidor family” have joined the protests against Lukeshenko, and in doing so, risked their own personal lives and safety. Police abuse detainees, and activists say that for members of the LGBTQ community, this violence is routine. Officers call them “pidors” and say that “people like [them]need to be killed.” Activists who are arrested and released then have the threat of their personal information being published or leaked, which can destroy lives.

When recalling the scene at a riot, queer activist Andrei Zavalei told Politico: “When I think of this very moment, recalling the fear, shock and terror I faced, it doesn’t feel like an exceptional experience for me. I’ve had the same feeling of insecurity and oppression many times before.”

As first hand reports of police violence and abuse against protesters and detainees are being published, it is clear that the Belarus security forces employed tactics to terrorize citizens. One man told Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty his account of being raped with a truncheon by police while detained in August. 

There is an undercurrent of violent homophobia entrenched in Belarus’ culture and history that these divides have manifested in the volatile situation between the government and protesters. Recently, a popular Belarusian rock band reversed the special forces “OMON” to read “HOMO.” In the streets, police attack demonstrators, shouting, “on your knees, pidor,” while protestors have painted “go away, pidor,” calling for Lukeshenko to resign. Mocking one’s sexual identity has become a tool of verbal violence for both sides.

While visibility is a strength, it comes at a price. Some protestors openly bearing the rainbow Pride flag face retaliation from within the anti-Lukashenko movement, who do not welcome them. Meanwhile, bearing Pride flags gives potential fuel for the government to denounce the protests as Western-backed, delegitimizing the movement.

“We needed to document the participation of LGBTQ people in the revolution,” said Anna Bredova, an activist and organizer in Belarus. “We wanted to show that we also support the revolution and we’re also taking part in the protests.” 

Yet, even Svetlana appears not to be the saving grace for the community, stating on gay marriage: “I’m totally fine with same-sex relations and think any love is wonderful, but perhaps our country isn’t ready for a decision on this just yet.” 

Visible or not, the pidor family has been on the front lines, facing tear gas, stun grenades, and rubber bullets from police. They did not start their fight in August, and the fight will not end after the result of this election. Still, the possibility of a new president brings hope for a better future. 

“In a country with such depressing and frustrating conditions for LGBTQ people, we are determined to be patient and creative,” Zavalei said.

The post Belarus Protests: Fighting for LGBTQ Rights in Eastern Europe appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Now, as the European Union imposes sanctions on Belarusian officials in response to the government’s election fraud and abuse of protestors, President Lukashenko is turning to Moscow for support. And, Putin has already confirmed that he has organized a reserve of law enforcement officers and is ready to intervene in Belarus  “if necessary.” The two countries have even launched joint military drills. With the President’s regime weakened by the protests and the European Union’s condemnation, Lukashenko has had no choice but to authorize Russian military intervention, a move that could potentially lead to Belarus’ annexation, though this remains a distant prospect. In any case, it seems like the clock is ticking for Europe’s last dictator. 

While the Belarusian public condemns their authoritarian government, public support for authoritarian leaders remains strong in Poland and Hungary. Poland’s Law and Justice Party and Hungary’s Fidesz Party have maintained power since 2015 and 2010, respectively. And, despite their track-records of antidemocratic reforms, national parliament voting intention polls for Poland and Hungary show that both right-wing parties still hold over 45% of voters’ support.

Will Poland and Hungary find themselves in a similar situation as Belarus if they continue down the path of authoritarianism? The two countries’ quasi-authoritarian politics have already resulted in a significant erosion of democratic institutions, but it is unclear whether it will escalate into a full-blown dictatorship as it did in Belarus. 

Though the future of democracy in Hungary and Poland remains uncertain, by analyzing the nature of these two countries’ budding authoritarianism, and comparing it to Belarus’ longstanding dictatorship, we can gain some insight into whether these two countries will follow in Belarus’ footsteps. 

Unlike Poland and Hungary, Belarus was never really a true democracy. Alexander Lukashenko was elected as the first President of Belarus in 1994, immediately after the country gained its independence from the Soviet Union, and has maintained power ever since by manipulating elections, repressing political dissension, and undermining the rule of law. In contrast, Poland and Hungary, transitioned to Western-style liberal democracies after their break from the USSR in 1991 and 1989, respectively. Both countries also joined liberal democratic international institutions, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, it is clear that Poland and Hungary’s histories differ significantly from that of Belarus. 

Yet, Poland and Hungary’s recent political maneuvers mirror Lukashenko’s early authoritarian tactics. Though Lukashenko is now subject to popular disapproval, he was once favored by his people and elected on an incendiary populist platform in 1994. He harnessed this populist support in 1996 when he persuaded voters to approve a new constitution through a referendum. This new constitution gave Lukashenko the right to lengthen his presidential term, rule by decree, and select one third of the upper house parliament representatives. And, in 2004, he completely eliminated term limits through another allegedly rigged referendum. Since then, his administration has consolidated power over all governmental institutions. 

Similarly, Poland’s Law and Justice Party and Hungary’s Fidesz Party rose to power through inflammatory right-wing, ethno-nationalist, populist politics. And, though the two parties have relied on democratic elections to maintain power, they also tend to have a general dislike for democratic institutions. Accordingly, Hungary and Poland’s leaders have struck a balance between preserving and dismantling democratic institutions to maintain political power while gradually advancing authoritarianism. 

Since 2015, the Law and Justice Party in Poland has used its control over the legislative and executive branches of government to take over the judiciary, effectively dismantling the democratic rule of law. In 2018, the Law and Justice Party founded an “extraordinary appeal” chamber made up of appointed officials that has the power to reverse any civil, criminal, or military court decision made since 1997.  This government body also has the final say when it comes to elections, making the prospect of unfair elections all the more likely. And, in February 2020, incumbent President Andrzej Duda adopted legislation that gives politicians the power to fire judges for perceived unfavorable decisions and forbids judges from criticizing the president’s judicial appointments.

Hungary is following a similar path, as the Fidesz Party, headed by Prime Minister Victor Orbán, has continued to attack judicial independence since its return to power in 2010. In fact, just like Belarus’ Lukaneshko, the Fidesz Party adopted a new constitution in 2010 that weakened judicial checks on its power. Similarly to Poland, Hungary created a parallel court system in 2018 controlled by the executive government with the purpose of overseeing elections. Additionally, Orbán has modified electoral laws to ensure he remains in power by redrawing the electoral map and giving ethnic Hungarians outside of the country voting power. 

Through judicial and legislative reform, both Hungary and Poland have eroded the democratic rule of law and democratic elections. As in Belarus, by undermining the power of the judiciary, they have eliminated the right to a fair trial and transformed the justice system into a weapon for political harassment and persecution. And, without an independent court system to check the validity of elections, they have also paved the way for electoral fraud. 

COVID-19 has only exacerbated the rise of authoritarianism in these two countries, as the Polish and Hungarian governments have used emergency legislation to squash political dissent and give themselves sweeping powers. In Poland, President Andrzej Duda exploited the pandemic crisis to cripple his opponents and secure his re-election in July. While campaigning for re-election, Duda imposed social distancing restrictions for everyone with the exception of himself, giving him an advantage over his opponents who could not effectively campaign. The Law and Justice Party is also taking advantage of social distancing restrictions to advance controversial conservative legislation, such as increased constraints on abortion. In the past, similar legislation has succumbed to the pressure of large-scale public protests. However, under coronavirus restrictions, protesting is no longer an option. 

In Hungary, authoritarianism is accelerating even further, as Prime Minister Victor Orbán has virtually declared himself dictator through emergency coronavirus legislation that gives him the power to rule by decree indefinitely. Technically, parliament can still revoke these emergency powers. However, with the legislative branch dominated by Fidesz Party loyalists, this outcome seems highly unlikely. Additionally, the legislation allows the Hungarian government to jail anyone for up to five years if they publish false or agitating information, allowing for greater censorship of political opponents. 

Poland and Hungary’s political moves seem to be straight out of Lukashenko’s authoritarian playbook. The two governments have undermined the democratic rule of law, suppressed political dissent, and meddled with fair elections. And, it has not gone unnoticed. Poland and Hungary’s democratic backsliding has already received criticism from the European Union. And, in the case of Hungary, its budding authoritarianism has strengthened its relationship with Russia, representing a potential security risk for NATO. 

If indeed this path leads Poland and Hungary down the same road as Belarus, perhaps they should consider sticking to democracy. These two countries’ leaders should view Belarus’ crisis as a cautionary tale about the consequences of authoritarianism, and shift their course now before they find themselves in Lukashenko’s position‒ on Russia’s doorstep. 

The post Authoritarianism on the Rise in Eastern Europe: Are Hungary and Poland following in Belarus’ footsteps? appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Lukashenko managed to keep firm control over his country through a variety of methods, several of which involve intimidating the people of Belarus into acquiescence. Due to presidential decrees from 1999 that modify Belarusian labor law, the vast majority of workers in the country now work under short-term contracts, rather than the long-term or permanent job contracts that were common prior to the decrees. 

Since then, those vocal about their unhappiness with the state of Belarusian politics run the risk of losing their contract renewals and therefore their jobs. Besides attacks on job security, Lukashenko’s brutal treatment of protestors also serves to dissuade the people of Belarus from challenging him. The OMON, Belarus’ special forces police units, have long been used to break up protests and are notorious for their harsh tactics and inhumane treatment, often beating protestors and packing them into jail cells filled past capacity.

However, despite attempts to cow the people of Belarus into submission, the results of the 2020 presidential election, where Lukashenko was said to have garnered 80% of the vote and soundly defeated challenger Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, have led to countrywide protests that don’t appear to be slowing down. Even state factory workers, who have historically supported Lukashenko , have taken to the streets in objection to the election results. Tikhanovskaya decided to run for president as a symbolic action after her husband Sergei Tikhanovskaya, a popular blogger and Youtuber who discusses political issues in Belarus, was not allowed to register as a presidential candidate and was subsequently jailed for causing public unrest. 

Despite being forced to leave the country after the election, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya has promised to continue standing in opposition to Lukashenko, and has encouraged protestors to step up their actions, even as pressure from the government and authorities increases.

In the past, President Lukashenko has been able to overcome tumultuous periods with the backing of Russia, but this time may be different. He has always made it clear that he is a strong advocate for a close relationship between the two countries, and the larger country has always supported him, preferring the benefits of a current pro-Russia leader to the risk that Lukashenko’s successor might cut ties. However, for the past few years Lukashenko has been putting off any concrete actions towards realizing the Union State integration, much to Russia’s increasing annoyance. 20 years ago, both countries agreed to be part of a unique relationship, where each maintained jurisdiction over its own territory but had united social, economic, and foreign policies, as well as a single parliament and shared currency. Lukashenko seems to have changed his mind and no longer wants to go through with it, calling it an overstep of Belarusian sovereignty. 

In early August, prior to the election, Lukashenko arrested 33 Russian mercenaries, whom he believed were sent to overthrow his regime, and threatened to send them to Ukraine instead of returning them to Russia. Furthermore, current protests in Belarus have not shown any anti-Russian sentiment, solely anger at Lukashenko, but Kremlin support for the Belarusian president could quickly change that. After a call between Lukashenko and Putin, Russia pledged to assist Belarus if there was an external security threat, but said nothing about getting involved in the internal affairs of the smaller country. Lukashenko’s inconsistent actions and feelings towards Russia, paired with Tikhanovskaya’s vocal willingness to maintain relationships with Russia may have Putin reconsidering his support of the current Belarusian president.

The protests are also drawing widespread international attention, with many countries around the world not recognizing Lukashenko as the winner and calling for a fair reelection. The Nordic-Baltic Eight  — Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden — and the Visegrad Group — the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia — have both condemned the state-sanctioned use of violence against protestors. Other individual countries, such as Ukraine, Germany, Canada and Britain, among others,  have expressed similar sentiments alongside the European Union, which plans to bring sanctions against those involved in the election fraud and the suppression of protests. 

Lukashenko has seen his fair share of tumult and protest during his 26-year-long reign, but the world’s eyes are on Belarus now, and it seems as though Lukashenko will not be able to get away with his old tricks once more.

The post The Reign of “Europe’s Last Dictator” May Be Ending appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.