Ever since the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, US and NATO relations with Russia have been frozen, including the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), arguably the most valuable tool of NATO-Russian cooperation. Its function is essential to build trust and confidence through shared institutions. In March 2014, sanctions were imposed on Russian officials and NATO Foreign Ministers suspended the NRC, stalling “all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia.” As the US and Russia have a number of shared interests, the revival and enhancement of cooperation would benefit both countries tremendously. The US should take two steps to build a constructive and sustainable foreign policy towards Russia: resuming diplomatic relations in the NRC and cooperating in the field of information systems.

Even before the Ukraine crisis, lack of trust and suspicions between Moscow and Washington were a main reason for recurring crises and tensions in the region. Before the crisis, the NRC allowed open communication and cooperation on common interests such as counterterrorism, building trust and increasing efficacy in endeavors of common concern. The current suspension of the NRC undermines this consultation and cooperation between Russia and NATO. Fighting the imminent international threat of ISIS and solving the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine could be more effective if the NRC’s diplomatic and military tools were reinstated.

As a second pillar, next to the (resumed) NRC, further expansion of NATO-Russian cooperation is in America’s national interest. Distinguished military fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program, Vladimir Dvorkin, proposed that the US should seek rapprochement with Russia and pursue “computer-assisted joint missile defense exercise[s].” This increases the effectiveness of both countries’ intermediate-range ballistic missiles interception and embeds Russia into a greater Atlantic-European community—crucial for long-term stability. A Western-oriented Russia that shares operational systems with the NATO leader is less likely to carry out belligerent acts in the future. Also, Russian withdrawal from arms control treaties would become more unlikely, strengthening the international law regime and security in the region. However, a joint data center with shared administrative responsibilities does bear the risk of having information on US technology leaked to Russian-friendly terrorist organization or countries such as North Korea or Iran.

Another hurdle to overcome for a constructive relationship is the power structure of future NATO-Russian or US-Russian cooperation. Previous attempts to engage in data sharing failed due to mistrust on Russia’s side about the US domination of NATO-Russian relations and negotiations. Barack Obama initiated a “reset” of US-NATO relations to let both parties rethink their strategies. Although the US administration now further takes into account Russian concerns, the latter still does not perceive itself as an equal partner. Therefore, the US should further “rethink” its position in NRC negotiations and be more accommodative of Russian interests.

A number of issues on the security agenda of NATO, the US and Russia must be tackled in the near future, and are most effectively addressed through established diplomatic channels; moving beyond the current freeze is vital. Fundamental questions to be solved include arms reduction treaties and the ongoing Syrian civil war.

In June, Vladimir Putin announced the addition of 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs with 3,400 miles range) to Russia’s nuclear arsenal by the end of 2015. Both Russia and the US are bound by the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, INF, and the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, New START. According to some US sources, Russia’s use of its R-500 cruise missile exceeds the 300 miles range granted by the INF Treaty, constituting a breach of the agreement. Contrary to these sources, Russia claims that the R-500 is equivalent to US land-based SM-3 antiballistic missile. This “current nuclear hysteria” and fears of confrontation between the US, NATO and Russia appear to be ungrounded, partly because Russia would suffer significantly more if a new arms race were to happen.

More recently, incumbent US Defense Secretary Ash Carter distanced himself from Russia’s operation, claiming that Russia will pay for its airstrikes in Syria as resentment is growing in the rebel-supporter Saudi Arabia. Recent terrorist attacks by ISIS in Syria, the Sinai and Beirut, however, worsened the situation and currently pressure the US and Russia to overcome disagreements on alliances in the war and take immediate action.

Irrespective of whether targeting immediate threats such as ISIS or developing a long-term policy for the Atlantic-European region, US foreign policy towards Russia through NATO should be aimed at softening the fronts between the two camps to ensure and possibly enhance national security. At the same time, the US should reassure NATO members to improve confidence in the defense alliance, especially after NATO only provided limited military assistance in the Ukraine crisis. The dismissal of the INF Treaty or New START, however unlikely, could provoke a renewed arms race and increase instability. Therefore, norms of the international law regime on strategic and non-strategic nuclear arms reduction should be protected and strengthened.

Focusing on the benefits of cooperating with Russia and of a NATO-Russian rapprochement through the NRC allows greater Europe to go beyond the “post-Crimean” security discourse of frozen diplomacy and cooperation. For a political solution to the Ukraine Crisis, the NRC should operate as a facilitator of negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and NATO members. US openness to Russia’s concerns is instrumental for Russian commitment not to carry out irredentist interventions in the future and to give more consideration to international law. Embedding Russia in Europe’s security architecture as an equal partner through cooperation in information systems is a viable path towards stability and a post-Crimean chapter in European security.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The post A New Edge in US Foreign Policy: Improving NATO-Russia Relations appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

The Syrian Civil War has been going on for several years now and has become more complex and protracted than ever. Although the international community has been reluctant to take action in the conflict, the ongoing refugee situation in Europe and numerous terrorist attacks by ISIS have brought the issue of the Syrian Civil War back on the agendas of global leaders. The international community is at a pivotal moment in which resources can be jointly mobilized to solve both these pressing conflicts. As ISIS and the Syrian Civil War are ultimately interwoven, they must be approached comprehensively.

I seized the opportunity of my semester abroad at the George Washington University in Washington, DC to interview Faress Jouejati, a highly involved young academic and professional. Mr. Jouejati is an American-Syrian Adjunct Professor of International Political Economy at the George Washington University. He has established and worked with a network of citizen journalists and organizations to disseminate information about the Syrian revolution and to coordinate humanitarian efforts for the Syrian people.

Background

GLIMPSE: What do you consider the root causes of the Syrian Civil War?

JOUEJATI: A fairly large, and unprecedented, demonstration was held in central Damascus on February 17, 2011, after police beat a shopkeeper in the famous al-Hamidiya market. Although an isolated event, this was the start of the Syrian revolution. Then on March 6, more than 15 children were arrested for spraying anti-government graffiti on school walls. During their internment, the citizens of Daraa held unprecedented protests against the regime. These kids were returned to their families days later, bruised and tortured, which led massive protests in Daraa and across the country. While those are the root causes of the Syrian revolution, it is important to look at the political consequences of Bashar al Assad’s neoliberal economic policies (state-business actors, free trade agreements, outsourcing the provision of shelter to private development companies), as well as the handling of the 2009 drought.

From when Bashar took office in 2000 until 2010, state-business actors, such as Rami Makhlouf, were obtaining ever-increasing rents from the country – partly because Bashar was unable to muster enough force to prevent this scale of corruption. The gap between rich and poor increased significantly in those years. This, combined with the torture of the Daraa school children and Arab Spring protests across the region, created the ripe situation in which Syrians began to protest against the regime.

GLIMPSE: What are the main obstacles to resolving the conflict?

JOUEJATI: There are a number of reasons as to why the Syrian conflict is so difficult to solve. On the international level, there are a lot of competing interests (US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, France, Turkey, Egypt, etc.). Because of these competing interests, the international community has been unable – or unwilling – to devise a comprehensive strategy to restoring peace in the country in a way that serves the interests of each of these states. On the domestic level, we are dealing with a half-century-old dictatorship. If you look at the regime’s military strategies and rhetoric, it is quite clear they are not interested in a political solution. Rather, the regime has relied on the “security solution” to defeat all opposition—moderate or otherwise. Their stance is reinforced by what Shabiha gangs have frequently scribbled on the walls of buildings across the country: “al assad ow mna7req al balaad” (the Assad regime or we will torch the country).

On the Syrian Opposition

GLIMPSE: What kind of vision do the representatives of Assad’s opposition (National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces) have for post-war Syria?

JOUEJATI: The Syrian opposition represents all segments of Syrian society and has representation on the ground in Syria. They envision a democratic Syria where all people are equal under the rule of law regardless of race, religion, ethnicity and gender.

GLIMPSE: How representative of the Syrian people is the opposition force?

JOUEJATI: The opposition is very representative of the Syrian people and is composed of all segments of Syrian society including Sunni, Shiite, Alawite, Christian, Kurds, Druze and Assyrians.

GLIMPSE: How unified is it?

JOUEJATI: This is a difficult question to answer. In short, with each passing day and in the absence of any kind of meaningful intervention, the opposition – both armed and unarmed, inside and outside the country – becomes more and more fragmented, and this obviously has big implications for [the]uprising. For example, one of the main purposes of the expatriate opposition is to represent popular resistance on the ground in Syria, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and to lobby on their behalf. Since the expatriate opposition has been unable to win any meaningful support from the international community (in the form of weapons or money to the FSA), the FSA and other popular resistance groups have increasingly separated themselves from the expatriate opposition.

As a result of failing to obtain weapons for the FSA, FSA members find themselves in a huge dilemma: either stay true to the goals of the revolution by remaining in the FSA (which is the most popular resistance group among Syrians) or alternatively, switch allegiance to better-funded, better-armed militias, which tend to be more Islamist. From the perspective of FSA, you either stay in this isolated but popular army, which will likely result in your death, or you join other groups that have better weapons and more money. So, in the absence of any meaningful support, the opposition becomes increasingly divided.

The international community could reverse this situation with ease, though. Arming the FSA would not only cause defections from the Syrian army, but it would decrease the incentive for Syrians to join other extremist militias, and it would give incentive for the FSA to reiterate its allegiance to the expatriate opposition—the only party which represents all segments of the Syrian society.

GLIMPSE: How do the Assad regime and other international actors strengthen or weaken the opposition?

JOUEJATI: Beyond the supply of canned food, blankets, walkie-talkies and some light weaponry, the international community has not given much support to the opposition. This is partly because one of President Barack Obama’s conditions to arming the FSA is that they fight ISIS, and ISIS only. Most Syria experts agree that this condition is unrealistic because it is the Assad regime that is responsible for the overwhelming majority of murder in the country. As a result, some of the most armed resistance groups have rejected US assistance. On the other hand, the regime has deliberately targeted the leadership of all opposition forces – armed and unarmed – in an effort to leave the opposition leaderless. By targeting teachers, merchants, doctors, engineers, lawyers and popular commanders, the regime hopes to further fragment and divide the opposition. If the regime succeeds at doing so, the world would see the Syrian conflict in terms of only two options, Bashar al Assad on the one hand and ISIS on the other.

On The International Community

GLIMPSE: In your opinion, should and will the war be resolved domestically or internationally?

JOUEJATI: Despite unequal capacities due to Assad’s weapons support from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, and the supremacy of the government in terms of money and fighters, the conflict is currently in a stalemate. Of course, it is preferable for the war to be resolved domestically. But again, the regime has taken the ‘security solution’ to solving this conflict—resorting to force to quell protests rather than engaging in negotiations to address the protesters’ needs. So, the international community must balance the playing field in order for this war to be resolved. Only when the opposition is closer to being a strong opponent, the regime will be forced into a position to negotiate in good faith. The reason why all previous negotiations failed (in Moscow, DC, Montreux, Geneva, Luasanne, etc.) is precisely because the playing field is not leveled.

GLIMPSE: What role do you think the “international community” should play in efforts to resolve the war?

JOUEJATI: The international community should balance the playing field in Syria by arming the Free Syrian Army, which would force the Assad regime into serious negotiations. Let us not forget that there already is foreign intervention in Syria: Russia, Iran and Hezbollah have all been arming and financing the regime for years. In addition to arming the FSA, the international community must establish safe-zones and no fly zones across the country, and put additional pressure on Russia and Iran for them to abandon the demand that Assad remains in power.

GLIMPSE: What is Russia’s strategic interest in Syria and the Assad regime? Was Russia’s intervention in Syria counterproductive?

JOUEJATI: Since Russia invaded Syria several weeks ago, its military has bombed more than six hospitals and killed more than 400 civilians (97 of whom were children). By targeting civilians and rebels in the West, Russia allowed ISIS to advance onto Aleppo. Russia is largely refusing to attack ISIS, focusing its airstrikes on Assad’s opposition instead. Russia has three main goals in Syria. Firstly, preserving its seaport in Tartous, which is the Russian Navy’s only Mediterranean port. Secondly, keeping a friendly ally in the seat of Damascus who is willing to continue purchasing Russian weapons that will not be used against Israel. Thirdly, countering US influence in Syria and the region.

GLIMPSE: What is the interest and role of Iran in Syria and the region?

JOUEJATI: Even before the revolution started, Iran dominated Syria as well as the regime of Bashar al Assad. Iran is currently commanding military operations in Syria, managing underground torture chambers, manning checkpoints across the country and has extended billions of dollars in credit lines to the regime in order to pay the salaries of soldiers and other costs. Again, it is Iran, not Assad or the Syrian army, which is commanding military operations in the country.

Iran also has deep interests in Syria. Syria provides a link between Iran and its proxy militia in Lebanon, Hezbollah. Also, Syria is arguably Iran’s most important Arab ally. Finally, without Syria, Iranian influence would be limited to Iraq. Because Syria is part of Iran’s axis, Tehran’s influence extends from the Gulf to the Levant. So Syria is the important link that connects Iraq to Lebanon. Many Iranian policymakers and generals view Syria as one of Iran’s provinces. Iran also believes that by dominating Syria, they are able to contain the influence of Saudi Arabia, which is Iran’s biggest rival.

On Terrorism and the Backlash on Refugees

GLIMPSE: How do you expect the recent attacks in Paris, Beirut and other places carried out by ISIS to affect the situation of refugees in Europe and the European Union’s asylum policies?

JOUEJATI: We have seen the voices of the xenophobic right in Europe get louder and louder as a result of the Paris terrorist attacks. ISIS’ goal in these attacks was to cause an Islamophobic backlash. ISIS is trying to frame a ‘clash of civilizations’ between the West and Islam. So, by strengthening the xenophobic right in Europe, ISIS strengthens its own worldview as well, that there is in fact a clash between the West and Islam. The saddest part is that Islamophobic backlash is being directed at Syrian refugees who are likely to have been victims of and fleeing from ISIS in the first place. I expect the European Union to tighten security at its borders and limit the number of refugees who are granted asylum, playing directly into ISIS’ strategy.

The Take Away

The Syrian Civil War and the terrorist threat by ISIS are intimately connected and must be approached together. The strength of and support for the Syrian government and America’s focus on combatting ISIS rather than the Assad regime (the opposition’s much bigger threat) undermine a successful solution. Without international support of Syrian opposition, the strength and attraction of ISIS and the legitimacy of the Assad regime as the sole, viable alternative will only continue to grow. The most promising options to end the conflict are safe-zones and no fly zones across the country to secure populations, military support to the FSA and increased diplomatic pressure on Russia and Iran.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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The European Union has recently taken crucial steps towards a more humane response to the ongoing refugee crisis, which, despite being a positive development, seem to endanger existing EU asylum law and border systems. It is time for EU policymakers to face political and societal differences of member states and to shape the discourse of the crisis along the lines of the EU’s basic humanitarian and human rights principles. If this defining moment passes without the formulation of a common vision, sentiments of nationalism, right-extremism, Islamophobia and xenophobia will grow and European integration will regress.

On September 5, Germany opened its borders to all “illegal” Syrian refugees, temporarily suspending the national rule of the Dublin Regulation. Hungary is often the country of first entry (due to external borders) and is therefore responsible for processing many of the asylum requests; in waiving the rules of the Dublin Regulation, Germany urged Hungary to apply “higher standards” to respective refugees and to let them pass through the country. This move was vehemently criticized, especially by Hungary’s right-wing, Eurosceptical and anti-migration Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who criticized Germany for failing to deter refugees and to eventually preserve Europe’s Christian identity.

Germany has set a precedent of acting on humanitarian principles by unilaterally welcoming Syrian refugees and creating legal ways to enter the country. One could argue that this helped the European Commission (EC) gain legitimacy in formulating the innovative EU Quota Plan for redistributing 120,000 refugees across the union from the severely overburdened countries of Italy and Greece. The EU Quota Plan is based on the model of the Königsteiner Schlüssel (meaning key), a quota system used to distribute asylum seekers across the Länder (states) in Germany since 2012. The EU interior ministers adopted it on September 22 by a qualified majority vote (with vetoes from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, and the abstention of Finland). On September 23, Slovakia initiated a legal challenge against the plan, which is seen by Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico as a “dictate of the majority.” Hungary also opposed the concept of redistribution and pushed for an alternative plan based on the creation of an EU-wide fund to financially support highly burdened states.

EU leaders should evaluate whether imposing the plan on Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic(although the latter voiced concerns not to let Europe “fall apart”) is politically and ethically feasible. Coercing the quota plan on states is likely to fuel resentment against decision-makers in Brussels and strengthen nationalists concerned about state sovereignty. Nationalist Eastern European leaders, for example, base their radical stance on the overall atmosphere in their societies, characterized by fear of the “Islamization” of Europe or the loss of Europe’s Christian identity. These xenophobic sentiments have grown from the societies’ memories of World War II, when Jewish refugees were seen as “harbingers of a dangerous ideology.”

Eurosceptics have argued that the disunity among member states as well as the reinstatement of national borders may lead to the end of the Schengen Agreement (border-free area in Europe) and possibly the end of the Dublin Regulation. A hardline Eurosceptic Member of European Parliament said in an interview that “Schengen is dead.” On the other hand, supporters of the EU’s current policy direction speak positively about the future of Schengen and consider the current reintroduction of border checks as temporary. This discourse emphasizes the EU’s potential to successfully manage the crisis.

However, it is highly unlikely and very undesirable for Schengen to cease in the long run, for the following reasons.

Firstly, Bavaria’s Seehofer announced that Schengen is only temporarily suspended (in accordance with EU law) due to the existing “emergency” of an overflow, and that German borders will be taken down again after the situation in the south of Germany is more under control. Trains are already taking refugees from Munich further north, in order to unburden the south and dissolve the immediate emergency. After the resettling under the quota, borders will be taken down again.

Secondly, research suggests that borders do not prevent refugees from crossing several countries before settling at their intended destination. There are many ways to circumvent controls and illegally enter a country, through for instance the Balkans, Turkey and Greece. It is naïve to assume that borders are effective deterrents. The creation of Schengen did not function as an “invite” to refugees—they leave their home countries in times of severe crises or civil war such as during the Balkan Wars.

Thirdly, the area of free movement of goods is beneficial to all member states in terms of trade, labor, education and tourism. The abandoning of borders was also a major step for European Integration and shaping a European identity, due to economic, political, cultural and societal interaction among all member states. The reinstatement of borders would reverse this process to a detrimental extent.

However, the second cornerstone of EU asylum law, the Dublin Regulation, should be critically rethought in order to create a more equal system. The Quota Plan is a positive development in terms of burden-sharing and a unified solution. A next step should be a quota that distributes refugees “upon arrival,” according to the capacities of member states (as used for the Quota Plan), family members that are already in an EU country and other member states or individual needs. For this, the Königsteiner Schlüssel could again be applied to the whole of the EU.

Additional steps should include financial and logistical support of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan in order to improve refugees’ situation there, and the push-factors for refugees not to stay in countries like Hungary should be addressed. Currently, refugees are most likely to end up in detention camps or to be sent to “safe” third countries before proper consideration of applications.

EU leaders bear great responsibility in pushing the humanitarian discourse of the crisis and to be more persuasive than their Eastern European counterparts. Moral and legal responsibilities should be publicly emphasized. Public awareness should be raised about why the Schengen zone will and should survive. Finally, the value of refugees as potential labor force to counterweigh the EU’s ageing population should be emphasized. The EC’s announcement to indict breaches of responsibilities under EU asylum law, and Merkel’s assertion that “if we now have to start apologizing for showing a friendly face in response to an emergency situation, then that’s not my country” are signs that joint action and strong leadership are on the horizon.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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When former Glimpse from the Globe correspondent Sean McGuire explained the origins of the Greek debt crisis and its devastating humanitarian consequences in October, 2012, he reported that Greece’s suicide rate had almost doubled between 2009 and 2010. Today, the pressure of unemployment – now close to 30% – is even greater and presents new humanitarian challenges. In addition to increased depression and suicide, this crisis is accompanied by the rise of children in poverty: from 23% in 2008 to 40.5% in 2014, topping Spain (36%), the US (32%) and Chile (22.8%).

However, the debate amongst the policymakers in the EU and the Eurogroup continues to dwell on numbers and figures of austerity rather than the living conditions of the Greek affected. How is it that the humanitarian discourse is marginalized by the political or economic one? Arguably, offering a broad coverage of Greek suffering would mobilize critical voices from civil society, inspire empathy in the broader European public and challenge the legitimacy of current policies. Instead, the current discourse considers the victims of the crisis not as humans but as part of an abstract financial problem that threatens other European economies. In the context of a dehumanized debate, it is no surprise that many label the current crisis one of European solidarity.

Although the initial Idea of Europe in 1950 was not much more than a strategy of maintaining peace and national political interests through economic cooperation and liberalization, the “idea” has since expanded. Today, while neoliberalism remains at the core of the project, equality of EU citizens and solidarity among EU states is now another keystone of the union, enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (legally established in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty). This was an “affirmation that the EU countries should demonstrate solidarity when facing crises [e.g. terrorism and natural catastrophes], but not crises created by the countries themselves”, as Yves Bertoncini, an administrator at the European Commission, put it in his speech at The Institute of European and International Affairs in 2012.

This supposed “European solidarity” does not come without “national responsibility”, according to Bertoncini. In practice, this generally means austerity measures. But conflating solidarity with austerity measures in this crisis is misleading at best, and dangerous in most cases, considering its devastating socio-economic consequences for Greece. Furthermore, austerity measures only are unsustainable—the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) document on predictions for 2030 urged for a “substantial debt relief for lasting economic recovery”, since Greece would otherwise reach “unsustainable” levels of debt.

Simultaneously, the approved bailouts, presented as acts of generosity at the time of Bertoncini’s speech, did not help strengthen the Greek economy. Instead, they simply postponed the point at which a Grexit (Greece’s exit of the eurozone and reestablishment of its own currency) would become a valid option.

Today, a Grexit is no longer unthinkable. In fact, it is even considered advantageous in the eyes of some, most prominently Germany’s Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schaeuble. It is unclear what would happen to the eurozone and to Greece itself in the case of a Grexit. Presumably, in the short run, the financial situation of Greece would deteriorate to far worse conditions. The long run benefits are disputed. Neil Jones, head of European hedge fund sales at Mizuho Bank Ltd., told Bloomberg he is convinced that a Grexit would be “very complicated, very severe, take a long time and [would be]a very bumpy rocky ride.” By then, the resurrection of Greece’s economy would be at the cost of one generation or more characterized by poverty, unemployment, malnutrition and chronic depression.

Meanwhile, Greece continues to suffer, largely due to factors outside of its control. By accepting the euro as national currency, the 19 member states of the eurozone formed a monetary union while staying largely independent and sovereign fiscally. This means that, for instance, the printing of money is overseen by the European Central Bank (ECB), while how much money is spent and on what remains in the hands of each member state.

This points towards the first of Greece’s dilemmas: the inability to devaluate its currency and exchange rate independently, and thereby adjust to its particular economic needs. Greece is left with no way to make its products competitive except through wage reductions, which is politically unfeasible. In the current climate, a weaker currency in Greece could bring the economy back on the path towards growth through increased exports and foreign investment.

But of course, a devaluation of the Euro would be damaging for strong economies such as Germany and France—decreasing purchasing power and scaring away investment. This clash of interests is inherent to the historically inhomogeneous composition of the union’s member states. While Germany and France were able to easily adapt to the Euro currency because of their internal wage and price flexibility, Greece and others were unable to keep up or compete.[1] The result was that large, surplus countries benefitted from the eurozone while those with account deficits found themselves borrowing progressively more to stay afloat. When investors lost confidence in Greece’s ability to pay back massive sovereign debt, interest rates on loans skyrocketed and the country found itself trapped in a hole dug by the eurozone’s unbalanced structure.

This conflict between strong and weak states leads to chaotic decision-making when trying to manage the financial crisis. When the IMF proposed forming a fiscal union to cut Greek debt, the leaders of the Eurogroup – the informal decision-making body of eurozone finance ministers – rejected the idea in favor of fiscal independence. It’s worth noting that, while legally established by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the processes of agenda-setting and decision-making in the Eurogroup are unclear, non-transparent and lack legal accountability. Often, the interests of larger states like Germany take precedence over the needs of smaller members.

The actions that were taken by the Eurogroup during the crisis were unsustainable, tackling immediate problems rather than structural ones. Instead of bailouts, what Europe needs is a eurozone-wide adjustment mechanism.

Such a mechanism would have to involve regulating labor costs and prices to mitigate imbalances. This would in turn lower the prices of goods, giving member states equal footing in coping with the competitive environment. Developing and implementing a joint adjustment mechanism should be considered a common responsibility by the eurozone governments, in order to both show solidarity and to prevent further crises from erupting.

While a final agreement between Greece and the Eurogroup seems close, the crisis is being carried over to other fields. A vote of confidence for the Greek Prime Minister or a restructuring of the current government is likely as Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras loses the support of his party. At the same time, Germany (mostly represented by Schaeuble) is portrayed as the imperial hegemon of Europe. The hashtag #ThisIsACoup is going viral on social media, claiming that the Eurogroup and Germany blackmailed the Greek government to give up its revisionist dreams and to return to quietly following the interests of the more powerful European states. Jürgen Habermas, a well-known German philosopher, described it as the political bankruptcy of the European Council.

The inhomogeneity within the eurozone, the challenged legitimacy of the Eurogroup and the growing criticism of Germany’s leadership point towards the potential erosion of the EU as a union with a sense of community and common identity, which is so urgently needed in times of increasing Euro-skepticism, nationalism and xenophobia.

[1] Wihlborg, Clas, Thomas D. Willett, and Nan Zhang. “The Euro Crisis: It Isn’t Just Fiscal and it Doesn’t Just Involve Greece.” Claremont McKenna College Robert Day School of Economics and Finance Research Paper 2011-03 (2010).

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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The ongoing refugee crisis in the Mediterranean Sea is increasingly leading non-governmental organizations (NGOs), politicians, academics and civil society to vehemently criticize the EU’s approach to the crisis and the lack of a humanitarian operation in coherence with principles of human rights and migrant rights. Against the backdrop of European Integration, Eastern enlargement and the creation of an internal border-free zone, the issue of migration and asylum has transformed from a political-economic matter to one discussed in security terms. This shift can be seen in the increasing use of security threat language in policies on migration and asylum, legitimizing both increased employment of emergency policy-making and a military approach to solve issues. At the same time, EU legislation is giving Member States (MS) that are located at the EU’s external borders more responsibility than non-border MS in regards to processing asylum applications of both legal and illegal migrants. This takes place under the Dublin Regulation (1997), referring responsibility to process asylum applications to the country of first entry. These two factors, securitization of migration and unequal MS responsibilities, are the main reasons why the EU does not engage in humanitarian actions on either Union or MS level, but rather takes Union-wide militarized actions and enforces inhospitable policies on the MS level.

The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) – made part of the EU’s third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) under the Maastricht Treaty (1992) – gave the EU legislative competence on the issues of migration and asylum. This created the concept of one internal European space and led the way to a common security identity. The facilitation of free movement of persons, within the AFSJ, was made an issue of European Union policy by the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) and previously signed agreements. This unprecedented move to dismiss border security was embraced by the leaders at the time, as it was expected to increase tourism, trade and mobility of workers—thereby partly fostering the sense of a common European identity. The European Integration process and the subsequent dismissal of internal borders in order to allow the free movement of persons and goods within the parties of the Schengen Agreement (1995) (constituting the Schengen Area, now 26 EU countries) necessitated increased border controls and policing outside of the border-free zone. The shift of borders to the EU level also transformed notions of identities and threats: while reflecting the development towards a common EU-wide identity, this shift also produced legal, political and institutional frames that institutionalized a euro-identity. Concurrently, the notion of threats transformed from the internal level to the external level, emphasizing international crime and terrorism as dangers to the newly established identity within the EU/Schengen Area. Both the Schengen Agreement (1995) and the Dublin Regulation (1997) (regulating MS responsibility handling asylum seekers and migrants) emphasized this external threat as the major challenge the euro-identity.

The institutionalization process increasingly led to the securitization of migration and was followed by the creation of a number of agencies and networks that administrate the movement of people (read migrants) inside and outside of the EU. The Schengen Information System (SIS), EURODAC and FRONTEXT are the most prominent agencies, registering fingerprints of migrants, sharing information on people’s movement and policing the EU borders. These practices contribute to the labeling of migrants in levels of potential threat and undermine an approach that would focus on migrants’ needs for protection and human rights.

Whereas these security-related mechanisms are organized EU-wide and through joint efforts, the administration and facilitation of migration takes place on a national level. The Dublin Regulation established that the first EU MS entered by a migrant is responsible for administrating the asylum process and hosting the applicant meanwhile. Here, the MS are obliged to operate unilaterally. As border states receive a much higher number of asylum requests than MS further in the north, they are disproportionately affected by migration. Due to the lack of a common burden-sharing system, there is no distribution of asylum seekers across MS. As a result, border states’ infrastructures and capacities to administer and host asylum seekers are often overburdened, leaving numerous individuals in inhumane circumstances once in MS’ asylum camps. Many central MS even send back migrants that moved inside the EU to the MS that they originally entered, enforcing the Dublin Regulation. Against the concerns and motivation of the refugees themselves, some are also sent back to their home country if it is deemed “stable” by the MS in charge, on the basis of readmission agreements often incorporated in the European Neighborhood Policy.

Although these practices are clearly contradictory to the EU’s advocated and “exported” norms such as human rights and the rule of law, the Union seems determined not to take any change in course and develop better alternatives but rather further securitize the issue. In a public statement before EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Secretary of State John Kerry met in Washington, Mogherini emphasized that Europe is “one of the most complicated and dangerous places in the world today” wherefore future policies must try harder to fight international crime and terrorism considered linked to migration. This suggests that the alleged security threats to the EU will most likely be considered more worth investing political and financial resources in than adequately managing the hundreds of humans on their way to safer places. The lack of solidarity with incoming migrants is incomprehensible, considering the values the EU claims to promote abroad as well as the immense economic benefit many MS had and still have from the numerous migrant workers contributing to their labor force.

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Despite sanctions imposed by the West and the falling value of the ruble, President Vladimir Putin had every reason to celebrate the beginning of the new year since the treaty of the long-awaited Eurasian Economic Union (also known as the EEU or the Eurasian Union) entered into force on January 1, 2015. Also, the leaders of the three member-states, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, joined the celebrations by calling the “birth” of the Union a historic moment and the beginning of a new “epoch”. The president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, expressed his great expectations towards the Union as the “foundation for the future of political, military, and humanitarian unity”. Only Ukraine did not join the celebrations, since its prospective EEU membership was negated by the government’s regime change. But how promising is the EEU really? How bright is the future of the Union given the ongoing Ukraine Crisis and EU sanctions on Russia and Ukrainian officials?

When looking at more Western-oriented analyses, a clear divergence in the assessment of the EEU’s potential success becomes apparent. In contrast to the idealized portrayal of the Union in the East, the West seems rather negative about the EEU. In order to take a critical stance towards the current discourse and gain a deeper understanding of the situation, it is important to look at both sides, EU and Russia, as well as the region that is between the two players – in this case, the current (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia) and to-be member-states (Armenia and Kyrgyzstan). An analysis of the diversity of their expressed commitments to the EEU is highly valuable in comprehending the EEU’s potential.

A Brief History of the EEU’s Creation

After several failed initiatives to create political and economic ties among each other, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia finally were successful in creating the Custom Union in 2010.[1] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established in 1991 to bind the then independent states with economic and political ties.[2] This organization, however, quickly turned into a ‘pick and mix’ system allowing CIS- critical member-states to limit their commitment. This was undesired but tolerated by Moscow, since it was dependent on the member-states to stay with the CIS and Russia in the face of the EU’s formation and increased NATO and US involvement in the region.[3] While the CIS’s institutional framework stayed relatively ineffective, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (later also Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) created a customs union in 1995 to foster multilateral economic integration. Customs Unions are free trade areas, usually with a common export tariffs, serving to increase economic efficiency and solidify ties. The Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) came into existence in 2010; meanwhile, further strategies for deeper economic and political integration were made. After Putin became president in 2000, he initiated the establishment of the EEU, most similar to the EU, with a strong institutional setup and more mutual obligations between member-states.[4]

From Putin’s speeches on foreign policy, it becomes apparent that he attempts to increase his influence in other countries through incentivizing partnerships and creating shared interests as opposed to the zero-sum thinking during the Yeltsin era.[5] Putin’s pragmatic politics have proven successful to the extent that Russia’s leverage in countries such as Ukraine, under Yanukovych prior to the Ukraine Crisis, had grown and the EEU has finally come into existence in 2015.[6] However, the countries that are part of the CIS and the ECU (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan) partly overlap with the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) and European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The term ‘shared neighborhood’ captures the still dominant notion of competition for influence and alliances.[7] Another phrase used by scholars in this discourse, ‘normative rivalry’ between the EU and Russia, suggests that there is a struggle for spheres of influence between the two parties.[8]

The political discourse within the EU is normative and liberal, whereas the discourse within Russia is rather pragmatic and non-ideological. At the same time, it is up to the ‘shared neighborhood’ itself to decide upon which paradigm to operate and with which partnerships to engage.

The Current Member-States of the EEU

Nazarbayev expressed strong reservations regarding Kazakhstan’s commitment to political integration through the EEU, considering the potential of a loss of national sovereignty to Russia. Therefore, he insisted on limiting the EEU to a solely economic union and is openly criticizing Moscow for ‘politicizing’ it. Kazakhstan’s foreign minister Erlan Idrissov stated in an interview with Foreign Policy that his country will not take any side – Russian, Chinese, European, or American – but rather be pragmatic and instrumental about its future agreements with both the EU and Russia. These statements suggest that Kazakhstan opposes a future reintegration in the ‘Soviet space’. At the same time, it rejects the idea of politically committing and being bound to any party. Therefore, according to official statements, economic benefit would outweigh political pressure.

The current member-states will have to ask themselves three questions: Which of the parties (EU or EEU) is most economically promising? How likely is integration with the EU or EEU to be limited to economic and not political ties? And, would moving from one union to the other for economic interests be feasible for Kazakhstan (and Belarus), considering Russia’s pressure to build a united EEU?

While politicians and analysts deal with finding answers to those broad questions, let us look at the recent economic development in Kazakhstan and Belarus regarding integration with both Russia and the EU.

Moscow is providing large financial support to Belarus and has agreed to a future common oil market by 2025 as the main incentives for EEU membership. For Minsk, a stable oil import as well as the availability of loans from Moscow is central to its membership in the EEU. Until the common oil market is established in 2025, Russia will send an additional $1.5 billion (2% of Belarus’ GDP) to Belarus. In 2014, Putin pushed for the launching of the EEU, partly due to the Ukraine Crisis and falling international standing. Therefore, Minsk could negotiate highly favorable conditions in respect of duties. However, the conditions of the duties are renegotiated yearly and are estimated to soon become less advantageous for Russia’s partners, now that the EEU is launched. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations, Minsk’s hopes of the EEU being more effective than previous initiatives are soon to be dashed. Russia prohibited export to Russia for 23 companies and custom checks were reestablished at their borders. Further embargoes were imposed on agricultural goods from Belarus to Russia after accusations against Minsk to re-export goods originating from the EU to Russia. While Russia’s political resentment towards EU goods is obvious, Lukashenko claimed Russia’s embargo legally ‘groundless’.

For Kazakhstan, the economic perspectives in the context of its EEU membership look brighter, though not flawless. The opening of the Russian and Belarusian market for Kazakh businesses, transport routes connecting Europe and Asia, and free flow of workers, services and finances are promising factors in its EEU membership. Nevertheless, in late 2013, already during the existence of the EEU, Kazakhstan’s exports fell by $7 billion while imports from the ECU rose by $17 billion.[9] Furthermore, Nazarbayev complained about the inaccessibility of Russia’s electricity market as well as limitations to meat exports and electricity transit.[10] The negative economic impact of the ECU for Kazakhstan is a sign of its future with the EEU, suggesting that its membership may turn out rather disadvantageous than beneficial for its own economy.

Further integration in the EEU can’t be expected to change much in Russia’s rigid policies and limitations to trade. Putin is very likely to tighten regulations within the EEU to EU-exclusive policies. This is most likely to not be in the other member-states’ interests. A limitation to Moscow’s domination within the EEU framework is the decision-making process within it. In the Eurasian Commission today, decisions must be made with unanimity.[11] However, the power distribution within the EEU remains uncertain. What is clear is the current member-states’ (especially Kazakhstan’s) resolve not to tolerate Russia’s political leverage in the territory and not to silently accept policies disadvantageous to their economies.

Troubling Times for the Russian Ruble and Alternatives to EU and EEU

The currently sinking value of the Russian ruble and Russia’s decreasing reputation in the West should be seen as warnings to countries that engage in exclusive partnerships with Russia. Closer economic integration and trade in the ruble bears greater risks to be mutually effected by economic recession or crises. Two factors have contributed to the falling value of the ruble: declining oil prices and the ongoing Ukraine Crisis including sanctions from the EU. The failed OPEC negotiations to reduce the production level of oil are the main cause for the oil slump toward the end of 2014 and early 2015. Due to the low prices of $50 instead of $100 per barrel for more than only a few months, Anton Siluanov, Russia’s finance minister, announced a loss of $45 billion (20% of the planned revenues). Russia’s GDP is expected to shrink by 3% to 5% in 2015.

Already early in January 2015, Lukashenko voiced concerns about his country’s high dependency on exports to Russia and its currency’s attachment to the Russian ruble. The Belarusian president distanced himself from further commitment to trade with Russia considering the potential risks for Belarus through high dependence on Russia. The economic recession may affect the EEU member-states even more in case of deeper integration, therefore they should refrain from neglecting potentially fruitful partnerships with other states.

The EU and China are current trading partners with great interest in the region, especially in Kazakhstan. Playing a crucial rule in the implementation of Hillary Clinton’s idea of the “New Silk Road” to connect Europe and Asia, Kazakhstan will see many large projects in order to build the necessary train and road infrastructure. The land-locked country would greatly benefit from closer cooperation with China and Europe and must keep good diplomatic relations with those partners.

Despite the EEU-critical remarks from Astana and Minsk regarding the politicization of the EEU and dependence on Russia, both parties have positive attitudes towards the economic impact of the EEU in their states. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this will remain the case after a change in leadership within the Belarusian and Kazakh governments. As authoritarian states, the preferences of the ruling personalities are crucial in the countries’ policy course. Putin relies upon Belarus and Kazakhstan’s commitment to the integration in the EEU under Lukashenko and Nazarbayev. Nevertheless, even if today’s leaders succeed in binding their countries to the EEU, a regime change may legally bring about the withdrawal from the EEU and its negotiations, as was the case in the Ukraine Crisis.

Kyrgyzstan will become member on May 1 and Armenia’s limited representation in the EEU will turn into full membership by the end of this year. The economic development of the current member-states will determine other countries’ willingness to enter the EEU. Its success will depend on the geopolitics of the region, finding solutions to avoid embargoes and export limitations, diversification of trade, and cooperation with other states. The future of Eurasia is not set in stone. Putin will need to pay close attention to its partners’ interests in order to avoid losing them to the EU.

The views expressed by this author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Other Works Cited

[1] Nicu Popescu, Eurasian Union: The Real, the Imaginary and the Likely. (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers, 2014).
[2] Rilka Dragneva, Kataryna Wolczuk, Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry? (Russia and Eurasia Programme. Chatham House, 2012).
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy. (London: Chatham House Papers. The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Blackwell Publishing, 2003).
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Popescu, Eurasian Union: The Real, the Imaginary and the Likely.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.

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