Ukraine

After the election, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky congratulated Trump, saying he looks forward to a strong U.S. approach to global affairs. Trump has pledged to end the war in Ukraine but has revealed little plans on how he would do so. The United States provides the most aid to Ukraine out of any other country, and Trump, alongside his Vice President JD Vance have cast doubt on whether they would continue military aid to Ukraine. This would be devastating for the hopes of beating Russia, which is steadily advancing into Ukraine’s Donbas region. President Putin has not congratulated Trump, and re-iterated U.S. hostility towards Russia making them hesitant to make any statements on the future of the two countries’ relationship. However, given Trump and Putin’s friendly-ish relationship (possible collusion between Russian officials and Trump campaign members in 2016 and Trump calling Putin a “genius” for invading Ukraine), it would not be surprising for the Trump administration to reduce aid to Ukraine. Last week, President Biden sent Ukraine official approval to use American long-range missiles to strike deep within Russian territory, a move seen as Biden hedging against Trump’s future plans.

Hungary

Moving westward, another relationship that should be watched is that between Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a right-wing autocrat. Hungary and Russia are close, despite Hungary’s membership in the European Union and NATO. Hungary relies on Russia for gas and is refusing to let aid pass through Hungary into Ukraine. Additionally, Orbán was the only EU leader to endorse Trump for the U.S. presidency and flouted their close relationship. Therefore, under the new administration, Hungary might gain an influx of foreign investment from American companies or enjoy a closer economic relationship. These circumstances suggest there will be good relations between the United States and Hungary over the next four years. 

Poland

Another conservative leader, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda, congratulated Trump on his win. Duda wants to strengthen Poland’s relationship with the United States, but Poland is against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, sending more than $3.5 billion to support Ukraine’s army. Duda’s main goal is to curry U.S. favor and keep the United States in NATO, so it’s no surprise that Duda has tried to become closer friends with Donald Trump. In April 2024, Duda and Trump met in New York City for dinner, and both shared positive sentiments, with Trump stating that he is “behind Poland all the way.” Thus, it would not be surprising to see Poland continue to schmooze up to the incoming president in the coming months. 

Czech Republic and Slovakia

The Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both populist conservatives, have welcomed Trump with open arms.

Petr Fiala, the Prime Minister of Slovakia, and President Biden have enjoyed positive relations, with the U.S. and Slovakia becoming closer over the past four years. The Czech Republic has continued sending military aid to Ukraine, but Fiala is growing weary as the war has surpassed its 1000th day. In September, he stated that Ukraine “will have to be realistic” about the growing possibility of ceding some territory to Russia, even if temporarily.

Fico has ended Slovakia’s military aid to Ukraine and opposes Ukraine’s bid to enter NATO. Slovakia is in the midst of a political crisis, with a sharp divide between Fico’s conservative government and the liberal opposition party. Fico has been consolidating power, undermining media independence, eliminating the office responsible for investigating political corruption and prohibiting protests. As such, expect to see Slovakia drifting towards an Orbán-style populist way of governing, to Trump’s delight.

The fate of Ukraine lies, in large part, in the hands of Trump and Vance. 

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The past decades have seen an expansion of EU membership. However, the principal function of the coalition focused on economic growth, not political unification. Brussels’ greatest bargaining chip with misbehaving member states usually reverted to imposing restrictions on  funding. Wealthier countries like Germany contributed almost 20 billion euros in 2020 and Poland received over 12 billion euros that same year. Despite its heavy reliance on billions of euros, Poland routinely violated EU law regarding judicial independence and claims that Polish courts superseded that of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 

Today, these dynamics are changing rapidly, with EU unification taking precedence over previous disputes and a complete turnaround of refugee policies. Poland and Hungary had some of the most hardline approaches toward refugees during the 2015 migrant crisis. Both nations refused to accept almost any applications under a 2015 deal that was intended to resettle 160,000 refugees, which would have taken some of the burden away from Italy and Greece. Now, Poland is receiving praise from EU officials such as Charles Michel, the European Council President, for an unprecedented open-arms policy toward fleeing Ukrainians. 

The Russian attack on Ukraine has sparked an unprecedented refugee crisis in Europe. Over two million Ukrainians have been welcomed into Poland, with an estimated 4 million total expected by the UNHCR over the next few months. Hungary has taken in over 300,000 refugees, the fourth largest recipient in Eastern Europe. The paradoxical nature of a warm welcome to refugees from these nations, which both displayed extreme prejudice against asylum seekers from the Middle East during the Syrian Revolution, has surprised the international community.

In a talk hosted by the Polish NGO Forum for Dialogue, an organization facilitating Polish-Jewish relations, Natalia Kertyczak, an expert on Ukraine-Polish relations, shared her input on the situation. Kertyczak said, “Polish local governments are now forced to cooperate with organizations they didn’t want to work with just a few months prior on the Belarusian border.” Her statement illustrates how quickly sentiments towards refugees have changed in Poland since the outset of the war. 

Kertyczak insists that the societal connection between Ukraine and Poland has strengthened in the past several years. In Mar. 2021, the European Commission reported that over 250,000 Ukrainians held temporary residence permits in Poland. Motivations for the resounding support of Ukrainian refugees in Poland have been described as a mix of Ukrainians’ established presence in Poland, Polish sympathy towards victims of Russia’s aggression and their allegedly racist preferences for white Christian Europeans as opposed to Middle Eastern refugees. 

Questions remain on whether the EU will put aside its legal battles with Poland over a rule of law disagreement. The commission has signaled a willingness to release funding if Poland scraps its Supreme Court Disciplinary Chamber. The tribunal was feared to give Poland’s Law and Justice, a right-wing populist party, the ability to fire and punish judges whose ruling reflected more liberal political ideologies. Polish President Andrzej Duda offered a measure to dissolve the disciplinary tribunal, but there is doubt that he would have enough support to pass the measure. 

Regardless, the European focus has almost entirely shifted to Poland’s ability to take in refugees and arm Ukrainian forces by sending weapons across the border. It wouldn’t be shocking if the withheld funds were granted without substantive improvements to the judicial system. 

Hungary is facing a more complicated reaction to the war in Ukraine. Hungarian President Viktor Orban faces an election next month and has avoided placing harsh sanctions against Russia due to Hungary’s heavy reliance on Russian energy. President Orban’s inaction led to harsh criticism from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who asked if Hungary would support Ukraine or Russia in a recent speech to EU leaders.  

At this time, it appears that the EU is putting previous disputes on the back burner and focusing on a united support structure for Ukraine. These developments suggest that issues between the EU government and its eastern members may be buried to present a solidified front against Russian aggression. Poland could capitalize on this in the short term and receive 36 billion euros of pandemic recovery funds previously withheld for violations of EU law. 

As the war in Ukraine wages on, attention will likely turn away from praise for accepting Ukrainian refugees. European outrage cannot continue at this heightened level endlessly, especially if the conflict turns into a stalemate. The focus will inevitably return to the important divisions that threaten the stability of the EU. 

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Emerging from a shared socialist past, the coalition served to align these nations toward European Union integration, gaining accession to the organization in 2004. The four nations enjoy the free flow of capital, goods, services, and people throughout the EU. Yet, the EU also prides itself on shared democratic norms, expecting its members to uphold these values in return for membership and common economic and political cooperation. In recent years, the Visegràd group has acted in discordance with the EU, reminiscing repressive ideals from the former Soviet bloc and deviating strongly from Brussels’ action plan. 

Accession to the EU promised the V4 inclusion to the world’s largest common market. The labor market situation has improved in all four countries since the start of their EU membership. Poland for example, has received $154 billion from the EU since its accession, more than any other member country. This economic boost helped Poland make massive leaps in infrastructure. The aid, in combination with a higher standard of living, also enabled Poland to retain more of its working population within the country, counterbalancing the outflow caused by joining the EU.

The EU’s eastern members are also subject to paramount foreign direct investment (FDI) from the economic bloc. The inward FDI stock, a value of foreign investors’ equity and net loans to enterprises, accounts for over 40% of the GDP for each of the four Visegràd countries. Proportions of this order exhibit how strongly the V4’s economies rely on the close partnership with the EU and its western affiliates. 

The V4 are also the main topic of interest of the EU’s cohesion policy, an aim by the institution to reduce disparities, improve employment, and support convergence of incomes across its member states. During EU budget distribution from 2007 to 2013, the V4 received half of the total cohesion funding. Such funds unlock large scale infrastructure investments, bringing about economic growth and prosperity. In compliance with this, the Visegràd states were, collectively, Germany’s most important trading partner in 2017 due to their inclusion into European supply chains.

EU membership clearly brings economic development as well as social inclusion to the states left fragile by the demise of the former Soviet Union. Yet, all four countries continuously prove that their belonging to the European common market does not guarantee compliance with any problem-solving or political alignment. Analyzing these acts of non-compliance shows the former socialist identity is still very much embedded in the region, as the V4 are very attached to their nationalistic and authoritarian beliefs.

The most prominent example of disobedience is the migrant crisis of 2015. The European Court of Justice found that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had breached EU law by taking little to no migrants during the crisis. The EU policy called upon member states to properly manage migration flows, sharing the burden and imposing redistribution quotas. 

The three nations disagreed with key EU policy, stating that supporting migration brings more problems to the EU. This lack of burden sharing was met with heavy criticism by other European leaders, leaving countries such as Germany to take in over one million asylum seekers between 2015 and 2016 alone. The anti-immigrant stance also falls in line with the V4’s nationalistic belief in homogeneity, wanting to keep the majority of their population of the same religion, ethnicity, and race.

The Center for European Studies links this lack of burden sharing to the fact that the V4 states had little authority over their borders during the Soviet Union. The stream from East to West left these countries very fragile in the past. A reminiscence of internal and physical division is a harrowing narrative for these countries. However, the group cannot support open EU borders when it benefits from the inflow of remittances and FDI, to then decline the flow of movement when a problem arises.

If the V4 felt that the EU was solely bringing economic development to their countries, would they still nitpick what part of the membership they agree with? Hard to believe. This is why the V4’s viewpoint needs to be considered. In fact, the aforementioned emigration to Western Europe meant that many high-skilled labor forces left their countries. Moreover, the levels of FDI in the Central European countries have bought out the local market. The Visegràd nations cannot establish their own economic landscape as they are now dependent on Western capital.

By not developing their own economic sovereignty, the V4 know that they will never be considered heavyweights within the EU spectrum. As outlined by a lecturer at the Institute of European Studies, the V4 feel inferior to other member countries, essentially being handed out a second-class membership. If not valued as an economic partner, the Visegrad states are in no rush to adapt their political landscape to the rest of Europe. Instead of a successful EU integration narrative, their new narrative is that they are an underappreciated bunch. 

Despite being tied to the West, the V4 don’t want to be bullied into an adaptation of policies such as migrant intake strictly because someone much further West in Brussels says so, a view shared by a Visegrad minister. Instead, many parts of the four countries are driving forward political sovereignty from the EU, pushing further right. And while this viewpoint is not widespread throughout all four countries, it helps to explain their rebellious behavior in terms of foreign policy. 

The V4 has also observed how Brexit has left the EU fragile. Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister and perhaps the strongest euroskeptic of the V4, attacks the EU’s weaknesses by stating it “is unable to protect its own citizens, to protect its external borders and to keep the community together, as Britain has just left.” Following the strongest anti-EU sentiments in the region suggests the V4 has identified the instability of the EU. Thus, if it is to stay in the EU, it will not tolerate being treated as a young member within the organization.

The Visegràd group uses that knowledge to its advantage. If these countries do not feel valued as an EU partner, they will not limit the spreading of far right and repressive politics in their countries. In fact, due to the notion of lost sovereignty across their states, they are holding onto their discriminative and nationalistic beliefs even more. These beliefs never truly disappeared with the fall of the Soviet era. If anything, the migrant crisis as well as the perceived disrespect from Brussels has poured fuel on the V4’s non-political alignment with the West.

A more recent example perfectly illustrates the level the repression has reached. Poland and Hungary rejected COVID-19 stimulus funds created by the EU in 2020, explaining that the countries don’t see eye to eye with the rest of the EU on topics such as migration and gender. Allowing the stimulus funds would enable EU countries to force their interpretation on these topics on Poland and Hungary. Instead of easing the effects of the pandemic on its citizens, the two nations would rather block much needed recovery funds, due to the possible implications this could have on migration and gender rights in their nations. 

The mayors of capital cities Warsaw and Budapest were in disbelief by this action. In a joint statement, they sharply criticized their own governments, accusing them of spreading non-liberal ideologies and corrupt interests. Clearly, we can observe a strong divide between the countries’ leaders’, and their capital cities, which are exposed to a richer cultural blend. This divide in itself portrays the stubborn nature of the governments, unable to adapt to changing norms in its own country, and stuck in denial toward cultural diversity and liberalism.

While this is the strongest case of the V4 disregarding EU morals, the far right and repressive ideologies are strong and growing across all four Visegràd states. The fingers are often pointed at Poland and Hungary, and with good reason, but Slovakia and Czech Republic exhibit those same ideologies.

Slovakia has had the most successful rise of a radical far-right in politics. The opposition party to the government has gotten daunting levels of support. The People’s Party Our Slovakia (LSNS) presents itself as a respectable party, yet its extremist affiliations can be discerned very easily. From celebrating anniversaries of fascist war heroes, to putting up billboards condemning LGBT and migrant communities, repressive and undemocratic politics have clearly resurfaced in Slovakia.

An even stronger trend is noted in the Czech Republic, as it isn’t the opposition party but the governing party exhibiting undemocratic politics. Czechian Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has distributed EU funds in an incorrect and corrupt way, giving the money to his own conglomerate instead of the small to medium sized enterprises the funds were meant for. This resulted in convictions by the European Commission. If that wasn’t enough, Czech President Milos Zeman is openly racist, xenophobic, and frequently showcases much stronger alignment with Russian Ideals than European ones.

Real communist power is on the rise once again across the V4. This is not to say that the trend hasn’t occurred across other EU members, but the Visegràd states are specifically placing nationalistic anti-immigrant culture above all else. The EU does not seem to be wholly respected and previous ties with the Kremlin’s ideologies are entertained. As a result, the EU does not give the V4 as much decision making power in Brussels. 

The Visegràd coalition thrived to be part of an economically prosperous and forward-looking Europe, yet strongly disrespects the European identity. At times it seems the countries themselves don’t know what they want to belong to. The identity crisis needs to be resolved, as Europe has worked toward peace for too long to revert back.

How do you solve an identity crisis? By forming an identity. The V4 have relied heavily on EU funds and remittances to promote their economic agenda, but they haven’t identified their own niches in production since joining the EU. The EU needs to encourage this and let industries flourish without intervention. Otherwise, the European market will never truly value the V4, they will continue to treat them as second-class members and in return the V4 will act nefariously toward the organization, creating a vicious loop.

On the EU side, it should offer incentives to the V4. If they adapt their political agenda more to that of the West, they can carry more voice in Brussels. As of now the V4 do not see a reason why they shouldn’t enforce their oppressive beliefs in homogeneity, they need to see a benefit in altering the way their politics is run.

A softer solution in the meantime could be resolutions that resemble the “pact of free cities.” Particularly, the culturally diverse metropoles of the Visegràd states strongly disagree with the oppressive actions of their own governments. If corruption and repression from their own governments prevents them from aligning themselves with the rest of the EU, they should not be punished. A separate relationship should be built between the EU and the cities.

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Since conservative President Andrzej Duda narrowly won reelection in July 2020, LGBT rights in Poland have been placed in even greater jeopardy. In a speech, Duda stated that, “the Polish constitution should include an entry saying that it is forbidden to adopt a child by a person who lives in a single-sex relationship.” In his past term as President Duda stated LGBTQ ideology was “worse than communism.” His rhetoric has empowered hate speech and conflict leaving the future of all LGBT rights in Poland in peril.

Prior to Duda’s reelection, anti-LGBT sentiment erupted into violence last summer when a pride parade in the city of Bialystok led to clashes between paraders and protesters. Anti-LGBT protesters threw bricks, stones and fireworks leading to dozens of injuries; the conflict only subsided after police authorities deployed tear gas to disperse the crowd. 

The European Parliament condemned LGBT discrimination in Poland and called on local Polish governments to revoke their declarations- to no avail. In July, the European Union announced it would not provide funding for an EU program that connects communities across Europe through the “twinning of towns in different countries” to six Polish towns. The town’s that had their funding withheld displayed anti-LGBT sentiment and made bigoted statements. The funding ranged from $6,000 to $29,000 dollars. 

The EU has failed to take any meaningful and punitive action against the Polish government to stop it from oppressing its LGBT citizens. Furthermore, if the EU hopes to prevent growing nationalist and far-right sentiment in Poland, it must send a clear message to the Polish people, urging them to elect more tolerant leaders.

EU Response and Limitations Thus Far

In her first state of the union speech on September 20, EU Commision President Ursula Von Der Leyen said that, “being yourself is not your ideology.” 

“It’s your identity. And no one can ever take it away. So I want to be crystal clear – LGBTQI-free zones are humanity free zones,” Von Der Leyen said. “And they have no place in our Union.” While the Commission president publicly condemned Poland’s anti-LGBT actions, she was unable to offer specific steps the Commision would take to stop the Polish government from employing further discriminating legislation. Von Der Leyen promised to personally “push for mutual recognition of family relations in the EU [for LGBT couples],” which is undoubtedly a positive step for all EU citizens. However, LGBT Poles would still be subject to legislation from their local and national governments making this push practically futile.

The EU Commission’s inability to impose effective punitive action against member states who defy democratic values and violate human rights reveals a larger issue surrounding the legitimacy of the Commision as a whole. A unanimous vote is required to suspend a nation state’s voting rights in the EU, but Hungary and Poland have vowed to veto any sanctions aimed at each other. This effectively makes the two states that have, in recent years, experienced a rise in corruption, authoritarianism and anti-LGBT sentiment immune from accountability. 

What’s worse, since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, Poland and Hungary have received the most EU funding — €7.4 billion and €5.6 billion respectively. In comparison, Italy was hit hardest by the pandemic and received only €2.3 billion in EU funding, according to the European Stability Initiative. Despite their disregard for EU laws on human rights, Poland and Hungary were effectively rewarded through COVID-19 relief funding. The rationale for this inflated funding revolved around Poland and Hungary being newer additions to the EU and having less developed economies compared with other member states. 

The EU had an opportunity to negotiate with Andrzej Duda’s government by attaching conditions to relief funds but failed to effectively do so. 

What can the EU Do Moving Forward? 

While a vote to fully suspend the voting rights of Poland must be unanimous, which would unquestionably be vetoed by Hungary, Article 7 of the Treaty of the EU states that only a four-fifths majority is required to impose sanctions on a member state. The EU should move forward in exercising the powers granted through Article 7 to demonstrate that issues surrounding discrimination, intolerance, and hate will not be given up on. While it is unlikely that the current conservative Polish government will roll back on its  anti-LGBT policies and sentiment, the Polish people could be swayed into voting for more tolerant leadership to stop sanctions from the EU. 

Beyond sanctions, funding could be one of the EU’s most useful tools. The EU has already demonstrated a willingness to revoke funding from regional governments, and it must continue to do so on a larger scale. Giving more funding to Poland than any other EU nation during the COVID-19 crisis is an upsetting case of positive reinforcement when it could have been used as a tool for mediation. While there are significant steps that the EU can take to pressure the Polish government, true change will only arrive if public perception of the LGBT community in Poland is ameliorated. President Andrzej Duda narrowly won the vote by 51.2%, illustrating the feasibility of a shift in Poland’s conservative majority. 

The EU should do everything in its power to push for not only an end to discrimination, but also meaningful improvement for the LGBT community that will occur if the majority of Polish people decide to move towards a more progressive and tolerant future. 

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Now, as the European Union imposes sanctions on Belarusian officials in response to the government’s election fraud and abuse of protestors, President Lukashenko is turning to Moscow for support. And, Putin has already confirmed that he has organized a reserve of law enforcement officers and is ready to intervene in Belarus  “if necessary.” The two countries have even launched joint military drills. With the President’s regime weakened by the protests and the European Union’s condemnation, Lukashenko has had no choice but to authorize Russian military intervention, a move that could potentially lead to Belarus’ annexation, though this remains a distant prospect. In any case, it seems like the clock is ticking for Europe’s last dictator. 

While the Belarusian public condemns their authoritarian government, public support for authoritarian leaders remains strong in Poland and Hungary. Poland’s Law and Justice Party and Hungary’s Fidesz Party have maintained power since 2015 and 2010, respectively. And, despite their track-records of antidemocratic reforms, national parliament voting intention polls for Poland and Hungary show that both right-wing parties still hold over 45% of voters’ support.

Will Poland and Hungary find themselves in a similar situation as Belarus if they continue down the path of authoritarianism? The two countries’ quasi-authoritarian politics have already resulted in a significant erosion of democratic institutions, but it is unclear whether it will escalate into a full-blown dictatorship as it did in Belarus. 

Though the future of democracy in Hungary and Poland remains uncertain, by analyzing the nature of these two countries’ budding authoritarianism, and comparing it to Belarus’ longstanding dictatorship, we can gain some insight into whether these two countries will follow in Belarus’ footsteps. 

Unlike Poland and Hungary, Belarus was never really a true democracy. Alexander Lukashenko was elected as the first President of Belarus in 1994, immediately after the country gained its independence from the Soviet Union, and has maintained power ever since by manipulating elections, repressing political dissension, and undermining the rule of law. In contrast, Poland and Hungary, transitioned to Western-style liberal democracies after their break from the USSR in 1991 and 1989, respectively. Both countries also joined liberal democratic international institutions, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, it is clear that Poland and Hungary’s histories differ significantly from that of Belarus. 

Yet, Poland and Hungary’s recent political maneuvers mirror Lukashenko’s early authoritarian tactics. Though Lukashenko is now subject to popular disapproval, he was once favored by his people and elected on an incendiary populist platform in 1994. He harnessed this populist support in 1996 when he persuaded voters to approve a new constitution through a referendum. This new constitution gave Lukashenko the right to lengthen his presidential term, rule by decree, and select one third of the upper house parliament representatives. And, in 2004, he completely eliminated term limits through another allegedly rigged referendum. Since then, his administration has consolidated power over all governmental institutions. 

Similarly, Poland’s Law and Justice Party and Hungary’s Fidesz Party rose to power through inflammatory right-wing, ethno-nationalist, populist politics. And, though the two parties have relied on democratic elections to maintain power, they also tend to have a general dislike for democratic institutions. Accordingly, Hungary and Poland’s leaders have struck a balance between preserving and dismantling democratic institutions to maintain political power while gradually advancing authoritarianism. 

Since 2015, the Law and Justice Party in Poland has used its control over the legislative and executive branches of government to take over the judiciary, effectively dismantling the democratic rule of law. In 2018, the Law and Justice Party founded an “extraordinary appeal” chamber made up of appointed officials that has the power to reverse any civil, criminal, or military court decision made since 1997.  This government body also has the final say when it comes to elections, making the prospect of unfair elections all the more likely. And, in February 2020, incumbent President Andrzej Duda adopted legislation that gives politicians the power to fire judges for perceived unfavorable decisions and forbids judges from criticizing the president’s judicial appointments.

Hungary is following a similar path, as the Fidesz Party, headed by Prime Minister Victor Orbán, has continued to attack judicial independence since its return to power in 2010. In fact, just like Belarus’ Lukaneshko, the Fidesz Party adopted a new constitution in 2010 that weakened judicial checks on its power. Similarly to Poland, Hungary created a parallel court system in 2018 controlled by the executive government with the purpose of overseeing elections. Additionally, Orbán has modified electoral laws to ensure he remains in power by redrawing the electoral map and giving ethnic Hungarians outside of the country voting power. 

Through judicial and legislative reform, both Hungary and Poland have eroded the democratic rule of law and democratic elections. As in Belarus, by undermining the power of the judiciary, they have eliminated the right to a fair trial and transformed the justice system into a weapon for political harassment and persecution. And, without an independent court system to check the validity of elections, they have also paved the way for electoral fraud. 

COVID-19 has only exacerbated the rise of authoritarianism in these two countries, as the Polish and Hungarian governments have used emergency legislation to squash political dissent and give themselves sweeping powers. In Poland, President Andrzej Duda exploited the pandemic crisis to cripple his opponents and secure his re-election in July. While campaigning for re-election, Duda imposed social distancing restrictions for everyone with the exception of himself, giving him an advantage over his opponents who could not effectively campaign. The Law and Justice Party is also taking advantage of social distancing restrictions to advance controversial conservative legislation, such as increased constraints on abortion. In the past, similar legislation has succumbed to the pressure of large-scale public protests. However, under coronavirus restrictions, protesting is no longer an option. 

In Hungary, authoritarianism is accelerating even further, as Prime Minister Victor Orbán has virtually declared himself dictator through emergency coronavirus legislation that gives him the power to rule by decree indefinitely. Technically, parliament can still revoke these emergency powers. However, with the legislative branch dominated by Fidesz Party loyalists, this outcome seems highly unlikely. Additionally, the legislation allows the Hungarian government to jail anyone for up to five years if they publish false or agitating information, allowing for greater censorship of political opponents. 

Poland and Hungary’s political moves seem to be straight out of Lukashenko’s authoritarian playbook. The two governments have undermined the democratic rule of law, suppressed political dissent, and meddled with fair elections. And, it has not gone unnoticed. Poland and Hungary’s democratic backsliding has already received criticism from the European Union. And, in the case of Hungary, its budding authoritarianism has strengthened its relationship with Russia, representing a potential security risk for NATO. 

If indeed this path leads Poland and Hungary down the same road as Belarus, perhaps they should consider sticking to democracy. These two countries’ leaders should view Belarus’ crisis as a cautionary tale about the consequences of authoritarianism, and shift their course now before they find themselves in Lukashenko’s position‒ on Russia’s doorstep. 

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