Katya Lopatko: A Win for Centrists

“On Sunday, the people of France annoyingly retained their traditional right to claim intellectual superiority over Americans.” The New Yorker’s celebrated political satirist Andy Borowitz summed up the dramatic and drawn-out French election with this quip, but French seeking to maintain cultural superiority are not the only ones breathing sighs of relief this morning. Moderates and centrists all around the world are cheering; neoliberalism lives on in an age of right-wing populism hysteria dominating political discourse.

Macron is untraditional in all ways but policy–the banker turned politician has championed policies that would not be out of place on any American Democratic platform. Though he represents a rupture for French politics, clearly breaking from the Socialists, the traditional Left, Macron’s outsider credentials come from his youth, his scandalous relationship, and his new En Marche! party. Appearances aside, he is not a populist candidate–but in an age when populism has such an ugly, xenophobic face, maybe that’s not such a bad thing.

Miles Malley: Macron’s Foreign Policy Inexperience 

When it comes to domestic economic issues, there is little doubt that Emmanuel Macron knows what he is talking about, whether you agree with him or not. He comes in with more knowledge of the financial sector than maybe any other French President has had at the time of their election. Unfortunately, this knowledge does not seem to translate to foreign-policy expertise. According to sources, Macron had to cancel two different major foreign-policy interviews with French newspapers out of fear that he wasn’t prepared enough.

In this vein, Macron comes into office with an essentially blank-slate foreign policy doctrine. As the US is witnessing with Trump (who, by comparison, makes Macron look like a foreign policy guru) this means that first impressions with other countries can potentially shape entire policies and politics. This makes for a fascinating, if not dangerous, relationship between Macron and Putin’s Russia, who Macron and his team have publicly blamed for the President-elect’s hacked emails, rumors of homosexuality, and a barrage of other tactics intended to swing the election. Whether this all has turned Macron into a reactionary Russian-hawk is now one of the biggest foreign policy questions in all of Europe.

Aziza Kasumov: Not as Popular as you Think

France, on Sunday, seemed peacefully unified after centrist and liberal candidate Emmanuel Macron won the presidential election with a two-third majority of the vote over Marine Le Pen, the candidate of the extreme right. As Macron vowed to respect his political opponents, protesters, for the most part, stayed off the streets, sending an image into the world of a country that seemed, at least for the moment, at ease with itself, pressing “pause” on its internal divisions.

But let’s take a closer look at the numbers: Yes, Macron won with 66 percent of the vote, leaving Le Pen with only 34 percent. Yet more than one out of three French eligible voters either abstained (25.4 percent) or cast a spoilt ballot paper (12 percent). This shrinks Macron’s votes to less than 50 percent (41.4 percent, to be precise) of the total number of in theory available ballots — a record low. Only in 1969, when two center-right candidates made it to the run-off in the second round, the rate of abstention was higher than last Sunday. This election’s number of spoilt ballot papers, on the other hand, proved to be at an all-time record for the French Republic. Macron’s win wasn’t one of true conviction — and that will be a fragile fundament for a presidency that builds on its popular-vote legitimacy unlike any other in the Western world.

Will Macron be able to increase his margin of popular support? It depends on the success of his proposed policies and whether he’ll be able to implement them through legislative and European support. One thing, however, is for sure: The protesters who spared him on Sunday instead marched the streets on Monday. And they surely won’t cease to criticize him throughout the next five years.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The post Glimpse Weighs In: French Election appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Concerned murmurs of “populism” hang over many political movements that emerged in 2016. The word littered headlines, describing political parties, politicians and popular movements in the US, UK, Spain, Italy and the Philippines, among others.

As far as “isms” go, populism made an indisputable comeback in the last year—but what exactly does this mean? For a term so easily recognized, it appears to carry limited insight if it applies to such a vast array of ideological agendas. Whether a warranted, misused or merely incendiary label, it suggests that there is a shared global sentiment unifying recent anti-establishment movements around the world—potentially stimulated by the same international factors.

 An Empty Qualifier

Attempts to standardize populism reveal conceptual inconsistencies. For example, its recent use in descriptions of US president Donald Trump and in discussions surrounding the UK Brexit movement highlight distinct anti-immigration stances rooted in nationalism. Meanwhile, the Spanish “populist party” Podemos advocates voting rights for immigrants. And as Bolivia’s populist president Evo Morales supports coca cultivation by indigenous farmers in spite of drug problems, Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte—also labeled a populist—conducts brutal drug crackdowns.

This inconsistency isn’t unique to current politicians. Past uses of the label refer to the US 19^th century People’s Party and the Free Silver movement (a rural movement), Peronism in Argentina (an urban working class movement), and even to the Soviet Union’s People’s Democracies of Eastern Europe (a communist movement). A better approach to a comprehensive definition may be to acknowledge that one of its only constants is this historical inconsistency. Despite the lack of a universal definition, another rare constant is its self-evidence: somehow everyone knows a populist when they see one. Beyond this, and beyond its paradox of consistent inconsistency, populism offers very little regularity.

But hurled as an insult, it has proved reliable throughout history in eliciting disdain. Uttered with revulsion, the word “populism” is usually flanked by qualifiers like “aggressive” and “violent.” Clearly, being labeled a populist is not a compliment. It is rarely embraced openly, nor used in favorable descriptions. Despite Trump and his supporters’ re-appropriation of the insult, in which they proudly turn their noses up at “fake” or “mainstream” news, populism carries a negative historical connotation.

Yet it may not be immediately clear why a word that refers to the will of constituents against elite machinations, would be so defiled in democratic societies. On its face, its derogatory use may seem contradictory. Perhaps use of the word reveals just as much about the labelers as those labeled.

Populism is largely rhetorical, and usually combined with other “isms.”

While an all-encompassing definition eludes academics, it’s clear populism can be linked with certain types of rhetoric. For example, many associate it with reactionary nationalism, sometimes in response to a perceived drop in national welfare.

Other populist movements are hinged on the charisma and political maneuvers of particular leaders. Also known as “strongmen,” these leaders make use of a rhetoric that pits a good, wholesome people against corrupt elites or oligarchs. Usually this is done in conjunction with an appeal to ethno-national identity.  Examples of such strongmen can be found in Latin American populism, including leaders like Juan Peron and Hugo Chavez who campaigned on platforms that eschewed existing power-holding institutions in the interest of “the People”—the true national representatives.

USC SIR professor Pablo Barbera is working on a project examining populist rhetoric and the communication strategies of populist politicians on different channels, including social media.

According to him, “Populism thinks that society is divided in two groups. There’s a very large group, which is the People, or the masses, who are morally superior. And then there’s a tiny minority—the elites, who are in power. They’re kind of like parasites, and they’re just trying to enrich themselves, and they are corrupt.”

Thus, one way to make sense of populism’s lack of ideological color is by establishing it as a purely rhetorical rather than ideological ism—a political strategy rather than a coherent platform. In fact, according to political scientist Cas Mudde, populism can be conceived as a “thin” ideology, usually combined with “thick” ideologies like communism or fascism. Because of its inconsistent application to these ideologies, populism looks different every time it is practiced (despite being self-evident), and frequently adopts a distinct national identity—hence its strong correlation with nationalist rhetoric.

Populism can rise in the wake of economic change

Regardless of the personality, rhetoric and ideology that can qualify a movement or a campaign as “populist,” economic and social changes—particularly the exposure of inequality—can trigger the success of populist movements. According to Barbera, two types of factors have led to recent success.

“One is underlying; and the other is a trigger. The underlying is that there are a lot of citizens in many countries that are suffering the consequences of globalization, and technology is making the skills of blue-collar workers in many countries obsolete,” he said.  “So that means there’s a lot of people unemployed. For them, objectively their economic situation is much worse now than it used to be. There’s also a trigger, and I think that’s the economic crisis.”

Though its inconsistency prevents populism from forming a “thick” ideology, certain conditions and features add dimensions to populism beyond pure rhetoric. Economic gaps appear to fuel populism. Historically, industrialization has been accompanied by the rise of populist movements.

This is true for the US in the 19^th century, but perhaps even more for Latin American industrialization at the beginning of the 20^th century. In the wake of these changes, the political system in place no longer accurately represents the resulting new and/or displaced groups. These groups—whether the rural poor or a new working industrial class—whom the political system failed to represent become, in a sense, “up for grabs.” Thus, perhaps most simply, populism is the manipulative mechanism employed by politicians on either side of the political spectrum to win the vote of these disenfranchised groups.

Arguably, the changes and uncertainty of the 21^st century mimic the gaps left by industrialization in previous eras of growth. The downturns and transitions of the 2008 recession and the advent of the Internet which has been described as “the greatest technological surge since the industrial era,” combined with huge demographic shifts and the rise of global terrorism all contribute to a very different-looking world in the new century.

The economic and security ramifications of this “newness” and uncertainty can render certain populations ripe for political manipulation. The feeling of disadvantage is inherently economic. Political freedom, explains The Atlantic, is inextricable from economic freedom. Economic freedom here is understood as an equal ability to compete in the marketplace. In left-leaning populist platforms, this makes redistributive policies and land reform particularly appealing. On the right, it means standing up to a corrupt elite that betrays the national interest.

The reactions these platforms have elicited in the US are not only seen through the Trump and Sanders campaigns in 2016, but in the increasing failure of the US bipartisan “duopoly” to represent Americans. More evidence is the growing percentage of self-identified independent voters. A recent Glimpse article by Senior Correspondent Luke Phillips illustrates how both candidates utilized the American working class frustration with globalization and growing inequality.

Populist politicians capitalize on this antiestablishment sentiment through the “us vs. them” rhetorical framework mentioned above. An “us vs. them” rhetoric is not exclusive to populism, but it is a necessary condition. This framework can be split into two camps, as described by political scientist Werner Muller. An exclusive populism seeks to shut out stigmatized groups. In Europe, these are refugees. In the US, immigrants. In Latin America, inclusive populism is more common, in which increased representation is demanded for stigmatized groups such as the poor and the indigenous.

However, “us vs. them” in the populist dimension rarely addresses class conflict. Rather, it relies on a narrative of ordinary, honest people exploited by corrupt elites. Populists build coalitions within specific demographics and cast them into these roles. For example, Donald Trump received support from both the poor and the wealthy: his coalition brought together blue collar workers, wealthy white women, and even prominent names in the finance industry—proving that his rhetoric was not class-oriented.

In both, there is a strong grassroots component. Regardless of whether it panders to an agrarian movement demanding land reform, or a reactionary working class, populism is presented to the public as a bottom-up solution. This goes back to its etymological roots—populism is for the plain folk, for the masses, for the opposite of the elites. It serves those who feel somehow disadvantaged or usurped of what is owed them. Because of this, populism often champions democracy.

“Populists are usually, at least at first, ultra-democratic. For example they’re huge fans of direct democracy like referenda, popular initiatives. The whole Brexit referendum that happened in the UK is something that the populist party in the UK had been demanding for a long time,” Barbera said.

What populists ignore, however, are systems of checks and balances. Unlike direct democracies, parliamentary democracies can aggregate the interests of the population and represent them equally, taking into account minority groups.

What Barbera sees as most harmful are the inconsistencies contained within the rhetoric.

“On paper, giving power to the masses and getting rid of the corrupt elite sounds great, but there’s all these logical fallacies. The first thing is that the democratic system already gives the power to the masses. Second, most politicians are not corrupt. They’re kind of like picking out the black sheep and saying the whole thing is polluted,” he said.

On the other hand, use of the word could also be trigger-happy response of the opposition.

Populism is often wielded by the opposition to classify anti-establishment movements as radical or extreme.

Conceptual inconsistencies have not stopped populism from being hurled as an insult. For populists themselves, the label is an elite response. From this perspective, the label itself serves as a rhetorical tool to shut down uprisings that threaten current power-holders. The underlying implication is that “the people” are incapable of voting in their interests, or at least manipulated into voting against their interests.

Branding a political movement as “populist” cites a Freudian notion in which individual inhibitions dissolve as people are “stirred up,” evoking dormant “cruel, brutal and destructive instincts.” In short, groups or “masses” are designated a mind of their own, which is subsequently associated with primitive instincts. But this generalization is colored by ideology. After all, not all constructions of “the people” are created equal, so ideology renders the labelers alternately defenders and condemners of popular movements.

If populism fills the gaps created by economic changes of the time, and is used by elites to decry movements deemed “too extreme,” any definition of the term must consider the era’s conception of the political center. During the Cold War, for example, because the Soviet Union made frequent appeals to “the people,” the populist label became even more loathsome. Because the subsequent use by any politician of “the people” was wont to generate US suspicion, populist rhetoric changed. Now, in the 21^st century, hardly any politician makes direct reference to the political group.

Populism and “the People”

Communication between populists and constituents is unconventional, and as a consequence these politicians share a curious relationship with the media. According to Barbera, there are two frameworks for analyzing communication between politicians and their constituents generally. The first is top-down, in which the mass media broadcasts messages to the population, which doesn’t have an input. The second framework, on which Barbera believes populists rely heavily, is bottom-up. In this approach, the population sets topics and concerns, which the politician picks up on and addresses.

A couple factors make this second framework the ideal communication strategy for today’s populists. First, populists generally don’t have a good rapport with traditional media, who dissect and criticize populist talking points. These criticisms threaten to disrupt the narratives created by populists related to corrupt elites and playing to popular dissatisfaction. While Hungary’s Victor Orbán quelled the opposition press through more traditional measures in response (shutting it down), other tactics involve absorbing or reframing criticisms. Trump supporters have done both—absorbed the “deplorables” label, and spun negative press into “fake news.” This is not unlike their European counterparts. One European study found that when criticizing mainstream media, populists employ five recurring themes: erroneous reporting, criticism of ownership, naming and shaming, discursive contestations, alternative phraseology and the promotion of other media outlets.

The other reason bottom-up communication works so well with populism is precisely because of the abundance of alternative media outlets thanks to the Internet.

“Now with social media it’s so easy to put out a message and it goes viral—it doesn’t matter if you’re a farmer in the middle of Iowa or a journalist. Everybody has the same power. So, I think populist parties, or parties that have a populist strategy, take advantage of that as a way of giving voice to the ordinary people in our country,” Barbera said.

At its core, populism implies a fear of the “tyranny of the masses.”

Populism can also be conceived as an answer to the question, “are there limits to democracy?” The answer depends on the existence of a belief that a body of constituents can be as tyrannical as a dictator. In other words, democracy can be abused for something that is not, overall, good for society. Because the populist label describes a lack of faith in the democratic mass to vote in their interest, its use implies that what would otherwise be a system of direct democracy must be checked. The manifestation of this implication in the US, for example, is the electoral college.

Regardless of ideological orientation, populism can be a good thing in a democracy. It pushes to the forefront underlying or unresolved issues that have not been addressed by institutional channels. That way, even in quelling a populist movement, the political center is still broadening the scope of the conversation.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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“Their world is crumbling. Ours is being built.”  The vice-president of France’s far-right, populist Front National (FN) party tweeted this message on November 9, as Donald Trump’s victory became evident. The FN’s prominence in the upcoming French presidential election poses yet another threat to the globalized, liberal world order which has recently endured two successive blows: Brexit and the election of President Trump. If the FN’s candidate, Marine Le Pen, becomes the next French president, that will be a third strike with immediate consequences for the European Union, and far-reaching effects for the world.

The French presidential race is heating up; all major political parties have selected their final candidates. Les Républicains (the conservative, center-right party) have chosen François Fillon. The FN’s unopposed candidate is Marine Le Pen. Current President Hollande’s ailing Socialistes swung left in primaries with the victory of candidate Benoît Hamon. Emmanuel Macron, former economy minister in President Hollande’s government, has launched an independent campaign promoting center-left principles. Finally, Jean-Luc Mélenchon will run as the candidate for the Communist party.

Similarities have emerged between the U.S. election cycle and the French campaigns. Marine Le Pen is the clear analogue to Donald Trump. Le Pen’s FN is a party of “France-first” isolationists and populists who feed on fears about immigration and the “islamization” of France. Though the Républicain François Fillon has many important differences from Hillary Clinton, both can be portrayed as the politically experienced “insider” candidate as well as reasonably centrist picks. Rather like Clinton, Fillon may be brought down by a scandal his campaign cannot shake – an allegation that Fillon’s wife Penelope did no real work while drawing an official salary as Fillon’s parliamentary assistant. The “Penelopegate” scandal threatens to ruin Fillon’s chances, damaging his anti-corruption reputation and challenging his small-government platform.

If Fillon’s scandal brings down his campaign, it will be up to either a candidate from the left or the independent Macron to counter Le Pen. Le Pen is widely expected to make it through the first round of elections in April, so the real challenge will occur during the runoff. The French presidential election occurs in two rounds, with the second round functioning as a runoff between the two candidates with the highest percentages of the vote from the first round.

The run-off mechanism is a useful structure. It allows voters to make their voice heard in the first round, but then cast a vote “against” one candidate rather than “for” the other in the second round to block a candidate viewed as unsuitable. The time between the two elections allows political leaders to rally their electorates to do just that. For example in 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine Le Pen’s father and former head of the FN, captured enough votes to make it to the second round of voting against conservative Jacques Chirac. Massive popular protests followed, and socialists and conservatives rallied together to defeat Le Pen in a historic landslide. Chirac was elected with over 82% of the vote.

The best initial hope was that something similar would occur this year; that whether Fillon, Macron, Hamon, or Mélenchon was left standing to counter Le Pen, all the candidates’ former supporters would rally together to elect anyone but Le Pen. However, Emmanuel Macron’s unprecedented success as an independent candidate has redefined the story of this election cycle. Macron has combined economic reformism, social liberalism, and–perhaps most importantly–personal dynamism while on the campaign trail.

In an election cycle where electing someone, anyone other than Le Pen was thought to be the best case scenario, Macron has introduced an “outsider” political movement that is not based on fear and exclusion. Practically, Macron as President could invigorate the French economy, promote tolerance for immigrants in France, and strengthen the European Union. Symbolically, Macron suggests something even more important: that a centrist political movement might inspire the public and win. If Macron succeeds, he will have proven that the popular movement is not only a tool of the far right.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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“The decision of the American people must be interpreted as the victory of freedom, the freedom of a sovereign people”, Marine Le Pen tweeted just hours after president-elect Donald Trump locked down the 270 electoral votes that set him on his way to the Oval Office. Although Le Pen on average receives only around 300 retweets compared to Trump’s 3,000, her active presence on social media communicates her wish to follow in the footsteps of the business mogul. In the aftermath of the 2016 US presidential election that sent shockwaves around the world, many populist leaders in Europe voiced their support for the President-elect. Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s National Front party and a popular spokeswoman of the far-right movement in Europe, took it one step further by not only praising Trump’s words and actions, but also mimicking them. If Le Pen proceeds to sweep the French presidential election this year, the US-French alliance will be stronger than ever, as Trump and Le Pen take their vows and metaphorically sign off on a four-year contract of mutual understanding and compatibility.

Modern Populism in Europe

The global financial crisis of 2008 was the trigger that set populist politics in Europe into motion. Right-wing parties had always existed in Europe, but never gained much momentum. Some regarded them as “taboo” and associated with “neo-Nazism”. However, as unemployment rates skyrocketed and countries faced severe economic slowdowns and piling national debts, many in Europe lost faith in left-wing politics. The increase in globalization created antipathies among the people who felt they were being cheated at their own game. Suddenly, Austria’s Freedom Party and France’s National Front party became serious candidates on the election ballot. The final spark that lit the fuse of populism in Europe was the refugee crisis that caused over a million migrants to pour into countries still recovering from their own crises. Newspaper headlines and twitter feeds were flooded with charged, nationalist rhetoric, stirring up anger and resentment in the public.

The most recent election cycle in the United States has directly mirrored Europe’s era of populism. Back in 2010, anti-Islamic sentiments were running high throughout the continent. Some women werefined for wearing a niqab, while a Danish newspaper ridiculed the Prophet Muhammad through a series of hateful cartoons. President Trump channeled the same hatred towards the Muslim community when on January 27^th  he signed an executive order banning refugees and “nationals of seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States for at least the next 90 days by executive order.” Additionally, one of the running slogans of Austria’s Freedom Party was the simple phrase “Austria First”. This certainly echoes Trump’s tweet on July 19^th, 2016 when he wrote “Such a great honor to be the Republican Nominee for President of the United States. I will work hard and never let you down! AMERICA FIRST.” These and other similarities demonstrate America and Europe’s hand-in-hand progression into the dangerous territory of self-absorbed, hateful politics. France has taken the vitriolic allegiance one step further.

France and America: Conjoined Twins    

Apart from incessant tweets, many aspects of Marine Le Pen’s political platform directly epitomize those of Trump’s. Just as Trump has called for automotive factories (specifically Ford) to be moved to the US from Mexico, Le Pen announced an identical plan “to repatriate production of French motor vehicles and other industrial goods”. This high-level protectionism has been a hallmark of populist politics in the past years. Political leaders like Le Pen believe that homemade production of national goods is a form of “economic patriotism” which will ultimately create new jobs and lessen international competition. Although protecting jobs in one’s own country is advantageous, it should not come at the expense of turning away foreign immigrants while placing high tariffs on imported goods. Because international markets are so entangled with each other in today’s global economy, many fail to perceive how severely another country’s market collapse could affect the American economy. If Trump severs important economic ties with either Mexico or China, the US will suffer the consequences. As reporter James Poulos from The Week states, “If you think immigration, wage stagnation, and drug crime are problems in the U.S. now, consider the consequences if China’s tanking economy takes down Mexico’s, too”. To this, the populists would respond with calls to secure their country’s borders.

Although building walls and strengthening border security does not fix the root cause of illegal immigration, right-wing leaders like Le Pen and Trump continue to live in their own delusion.  Le Pen and Trump have uttered almost identical messages on this issue. Both politicians have engaged in slanderous name-calling of the immigrants crossing over their countries’ borders, and both have accepted strong borders as the solution to fight illegal immigration. Shortly after Trump called for building a wall along America’s southern border, Le Pen echoed his words in a statement: “it is essential that France gets back control of its national borders once and for all. Without borders, neither defense nor security is possible”.

Trump and Le Pen’s hatred does not only extend to refugees, but also to the elitist establishment. During his campaign, Trump constantly reiterated the fact that he is an outsider, a man who can change the political climate in Washington D.C., and a man who can give the power back to the people. Much of this establishment happens to be Jewish, suddenly shifting Trump’s rhetoric from being anti-establishment to vaguely anti-Semitic. Although Trump may not be explicitly anti-Semitic considering he has a (recently converted) Jewish daughter, son-in-law, and grandchildren, many of his right-wing supporters certainly are. Le Pen and the National Front party have adopted virtually the same stance toward the “Jewish establishment” as Trump. Capitalizing on Francois Hollande’s low approval ratings, terrorist incidents, and a weak euro, Le Pen has fueled a wide hatred towards the establishment in France and the European Union. Catherine Heron, a Paris-based corporate communications manager shared that “people feel that the government and politicians in general are not up to their task anymore.” It is perfectly justified to be dissatisfied with one’s own government if one’s nation remains economically stagnant, is plagued by terrorist attacks, and is overcome with a general sense of insecurity. However, the National Front party’s roots traditionally lie in anti-Semitic and xenophobic rhetoric. Jean-Marie Le Pen, the father of Marine Le Pen and former head of the National Front Party, was recently accused of “inciting hatred for anti-Semitic statements”.

Although the two politicians feel they are moving their countries forward by securing jobs for their people and rekindling patriotism, their resistance to globalization and modernization will ultimately redact advancements made by their countries in the past few decades. In October  2015, Marine Le Pen said in a statement “Only the [National Front party] plans to give back to France those essential weapons [such as control of its national budget and borders]to help it fight in a globalized world and achieve innovation and re-industrialization.” Despite the fact that all nations require secure borders to ensure their sovereignty, demonizing and forcing the expulsion of immigrants is completely contrary to building up a strong economy and ensuring job security. Some opponents of immigration claim that it negatively impacts the economy as an increase in the “labor supply reduces wages as workers compete in an increasingly crowded economy”. This logic has been consistently rejected by economists who point to the fact that native-born citizens and immigrants compete for different jobs requiring different skill-sets. If these two groups compete for the same job, businesses usually respond by expanding their enterprise, thereby creating more job opportunities rather than less. A study by the National Bureau for Economic Research actually shows that immigration “reduces the share of offshored jobs”, thereby encouraging job creation in the United States. It is because of immigrants that jobs are being created on native soil in the first place.

Implications of a Flawed Logic

Trump’s election to the presidency came as a shock to the nation, but the executive orders signed within his first week in office were no less shocking. It has become incredibly concerning that more and more populist leaders in Europe like Marine Le Pen have become Trump policy parrots. Trump has set off a fuse among his own people that has been sparked by his upsetting and discriminatory policies. Major American cities are already experiencing the birth of a citizen-led revolution through their protests.

Le Pen as President would not only normalize discriminatory policies within France, but could send the nation back to a pre-Napoleon era of popular uprisings and violent insurrections. In light of presidential competitor François Fillon’s fraud and corruption scandal, Le Pen has a much better chance of securing the presidential office. This scenario strongly echoes the Hillary Clinton’s email scandal that may have cost her the election, allowing Donald Trump to secure crucial votes in swing states. If Le Pen really does win this election, the world should expect a stronger, more radical alliance between the US and France.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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The recent terrorist attacks in Paris have shocked and outraged the French, Europeans and people all over the world. Undoubtedly, the tragedy will have a heavy impact on Western countries’ foreign policy in the Middle East. But perhaps less obvious is the profound effects it might have on the domestic political scene in France and across Europe. Terrorism inherently evokes a country’s preoccupation with securing its borders; but taken to too far, extreme nationalistic attitudes can spill into xenophobia. France has already seen a rise in the popularity of extreme right nationalistic parties, a phenomenon correlated to escalating ethnic and religious tensions, controversy over immigration and an overall concern with the effects of cultural mixing. As radical Islamism inspires fear in the population with horrific acts of terrorism, a more nationalistic, reactionary France may emerge.

Founded in 1972 as the French manifestation of the European neofascist movement, the Front National (FN) party has always supported nationalism and controls on immigration, stances that often earned it criticism for “fostering xenophobia and anti-Semitism.” Though the party’s popularity rose and fell throughout the last decades of the century, FN has been firmly held as a fringe group; “it placed itself in opposition to virtually the entirety of the political mainstream,” which in France already encompassed the ideologically extreme French Communist Party. FN’s polemic image was largely maintained by the controversial nature of its longtime leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Some of his public comments downplaying the Holocaust have stirred widespread criticism, not to mention a three-month suspended sentence and a Euro 10,000 fine imposed by French courts in 2005 for violation of France’s Holocaust denial statue.

But since Le Pen’s daughter Marine Le Pen took over party leadership in 2011, the National Front has undergone a reinvention. Distancing herself from her father’s radical image, Le Pen has striven to “recast the FN as a credible alternative to France’s major mainstream parties” with considerable success. FN’s performance improved steadily between the 2011 cantonal elections, the 2012 presidential elections – in the first round Le Pen finished third behind Sarkozy and socialist Hollande – and the 2014 local elections. Just last year, FN had a record performance in the May 2015 elections for European Parliament representatives; the party captured around a quarter of the popular vote, finishing first overall.

Having shed its former image as a stigmatized fringe group, the FN has now solidified its position as a legitimate, mainstream party in French politics. The facility of this transformation stems from Le Pen’s masterful leadership, manifested in her ability to capitalize on growing trends in the French populace and rebrand her party to cater to the anxieties of the French. For instance, FN appeals to a growing sector of the French population who see the European Union as an economic hindrance rather than a mutually beneficial institution, especially in light of recent economic stagnation and widespread unemployment. In her support of economic protectionism, Le Pen “has been masterful in channeling French fears of being swallowed by a hostile world.”

In addition to utilizing growing opposition to the free-market, liberal economics associated with the current political regime and seen as damaging to France’s working class, Le Pen has proven adept at harnessing growing concern about immigration and terrorism. Having “detoxified” the FN’s former image as a “dubious protest party of xenophobes, anti-Semites and die-hard fascists,” she is able to present nationalistic rhetoric and policy as legitimate and even necessary to protect France in light of recent terrorist attacks. By cleansing the FN of its former anti-Semitism, Le Pen has shifted the party’s focus to speaking out against the preferred scapegoat of the day: Muslim immigrants.  

In a news conference following the Paris attacks, Le Pen came out with a strong public statement: “We are living the horror… yesterday evening the centre of France was struck by exceptional barbarity. It was an escalation of Islamist terrorism and the sixth time this year that Islamists have attacked our country.” Such a statement is hard to dispute in light of the facts: indeed, France has seen an unprecedented number of terrorist attacks in 2015 attributed to extreme Islamic fundamentalists.

But the last attack differs from previous ones like Charlie Hebdo and the shooting at a kosher supermarket, not only in scale but also in the intended target. Prior attacks were aimed at particular people: journalists seen as deriding Islam, or specifically French Jews. But the November 13 attacks were indiscriminate in their violence against French citizens, rendering it a symbolic attack against all of France. As such, it is not difficult to imagine that more and more French citizens will tune into Le Pen’s rhetoric when she deems it “essential that France recover the control of its national borders, once and for all.” Such assertions resonate all the more loudly considering that the suspected mastermind of the attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, was an IS militant who spent time living in Syria and Belgium and entered the EU posing as a refugee.

Le Pen is more primed than ever for a 2017 presidential bid. According to a recent poll conducted by the Institu français d’opinion publique (IFOP), she holds the lead in three different scenarios. Asking participants which candidate they would be most likely to vote for if the presidential election were tomorrow, the poll found that Le Pen would come in first with 28% of the popular vote if competing against centrist Francois Bayrou and centre-right Nicolas Sarkozy. Though such polls can often be misleading and should not be taken too literally, these results nonetheless reveal Le Pen’s current popularity with the French electorate.

These findings also force one to imaging what a France led by Le Pen would look like. Certainly the FN would be placed in a better position than ever to influence domestic policy on immigration; just last week, she proclaimed that “France must ban Islamist organizations, close radical mosques, and kick out foreigners who are preaching hatred on our soil, as well as illegal immigrants who have nothing to do here.” One can safely assume that entering France as a Muslim immigrant – or a refugee – would become much more difficult, and that even immigrants already living in France would face increasing discrimination.

In terms of foreign policy, Le Pen has been less outspoken, but one can speculate about the effect that a FN-dominated France might have on Europe and the world at large. Given the Eurosceptic identity of the FN, France could distance itself from the EU, which would seriously undercut the institution’s potential for coordinated action and its overall economic and military efficacy. As one of its largest members, France is a top contributor of money and resources to EU causes and holds a disproportionate sway in European decision-making. Le Pen’s protectionism has the potential to undermine EU economic integration—the single, defining characteristic of today’s Europe. Her emphasis on border protection would also contradict one of the EU’s flagship policies: the freedom of movement. In short, a France governed by the FN has the potential to reshape the character of Europe. Le Pen’s newfound popularity threatens a reversal of the region’s decade-long progression toward an identity as a liberal and open zone of free-flowing money, people and ideas, designed for the benefit of all its members.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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