BEIJING AND HONG KONG — On April 13, Japan announced that it would release around 1.25 million tons of nuclear wastewater into the Pacific Ocean within two years, a process that is expected to last for 40 years. Although the Japanese government claimed that the wastewater has been treated and will have minimal risk for human health, the plan has sparked outcry both at home and abroad. 

Japan has been dealing with the effects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident for the last decade. On March 11, 2011, an earthquake and the following tsunami hit the prefecture of Fukushima, located on the eastern coast of Japan. The disaster led to the meltdown of three of the six reactors at the largest nuclear power plant in the region, causing explosions and the leak of radioactive substances into the atmosphere and the ocean. 

Japan started decommissioning the nuclear plant after the disaster, and an average of 170 tons of water are pumped into the broken reactors daily to prevent the melted cores from overheating. During the process, the water has been contaminated by harmful radioactive substances from the core and then stored within the vessels near the power plant. Although more than 1,000 vessels are being used to contain the wastewater at this point, it is estimated that there will be no extra room for storage by 2022. 

Feeling the imminent challenge, the Japanese cabinet had started a discussion on releasing the wastewater into the ocean five years ago. Some of the proposed solutions include evaporating the wastewater and releasing them into the ocean. The government eventually adopted the latter solution as it is believed to be the more reliable option.

Responding to the decision, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, claimed that the government would “take every measure to absolutely guarantee the safety of the treated water and address misinformation.” 

The operator of the Fukushima nuclear power plant, Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc. (TEPCO), uses an advanced liquid processing system (ALPS) to treat the radioactive wastewater and minimize the radioactivity. TEPCO plans to dilute tritium, a harmful radioactive isotope in the wastewater, to fewer than 1,500 becquerels in every liter of water. The figure is well below the national standard of 60,000 becquerels of tritium per liter.

Yet, many in Japan have objected. A nationwide survey conducted by The Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese national newspaper, reported that 55% of respondents opposed the plan, compared to 32% that supported it. On April 13, protestors gathered around governmental buildings in Tokyo and Fukushima to show their disapproval of the government’s decision to release treated wastewater into the ocean. 

Several environmental groups also voiced their concerns about whether the discharged wastewater is safe enough. Friends of the Earth Japan pointed out that the government has not been candid with the details of how to treat radioactive elements other than tritium. Meanwhile, United Nations experts noted that the ALPS is not sufficient enough to remove all radioactive elements in most nuclear wastewater. The experts claimed that “[a]first application ALPS failed to clean the water below regulatory levels and there are no guarantees that a second treatment will succeed.”

The pushback is particularly strong in the fishing industry, where members are afraid that the release of treated, radioactive wastewater will still turn customers away from the Japanese seafood manufactured in the area. Their worries are not unsubstantiated, as 15 countries and regions have been restricting the import of Japanese fishery and agricultural products ever since the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011. 

In February, Japan held back on shipments of black rockfish from the Fukushima Prefecture because the amount of radioactive cesium detected was five times the national standard. Even though the release of nuclear wastewater equates to a certain amount of economic losses and environmental concerns, the impacts only pertain to certain areas and limited groups of people. 

Japan’s plan hasn’t gone unnoticed by its neighbors either. China has condemned Japan for being “highly irresponsible” by endangering public health, noting that “the oceans are mankind’s shared property.” South Korea called the plan “utterly intolerable” and “one-sided”, and threatened to file a case with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Russia, North Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines have expressed similar concerns.

On the contrary, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States have backed the plan and called it safe. 

“In this unique and challenging situation, Japan has weighed the options and effects, has been transparent about its decision, and appears to have adopted an approach in accordance with globally-accepted nuclear safety standards,” a statement from the U.S. Department of State read. 

The support came a few days before Suga was scheduled to meet with President Biden to strengthen the partnership between the two nations. However, the United States has not lifted its ban on Fukushima food imports, which has been in place since 2011. 

Still, the Japanese government insists that the plan is safe and scientifically sound. They also pointed out their neighbors’ hypocrisy: South Korea’s Wolseong Nuclear Power Plant and China’s Daya Nuclear Power Plant both have a history of releasing tritium into the ocean. Despite this, both China and South Korea — along with neighboring countries —  likely feel domestic pressure to take a strong stance against Japan’s plan, partly because the Fukushima disaster is so etched into regional memory.

Whether their worries are rational or not, many people in the region “are going to be very, very anxious about what would happen if this radioactive material came into our near seas and contaminated our resources,” Eunjung Lim, an associate professor of international relations at Kongju National University in South Korea, told The New York Times.

China and South Korea have been the most vocal against Japan’s plans. This is not surprising given the countries’ proximity to the island; but the distrust is underscored by historical and political conflicts. 

TEPCO’s history of scandals has long caused it to lose trust both domestically and abroad. South Korea and China further take issue with the Japanese government behind TEPCO, whether it’s due to ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, or historical grievances that date back to World War II. 

Lately, South Korea has dialed down their complaints and struck a more conciliatory tone, saying that they won’t oppose the plan if Japan abides by IAEA standards. This may be due to an unwillingness to sacrifice bilateral ties, as Japan is a valuable trading partner and market. Chinese officials, on the other hand, have kept up an aggressive stance, maintaining its years-long ban on certain imports from Fukushima and even daring Japanese officials to drink the treated wastewater. Unless they impose further economic sanctions, Japan is not likely to change its course.

Nevertheless, in the face of such intense domestic and regional pushback, Japan would not only have to navigate the scientific and technological challenges of releasing its nuclear wastewater, but ensure transparency, reestablish trust and manage good public relations regarding the plan both at home and abroad. 

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In a notable departure from its longtime anti-war stance, the Japanese government is becoming increasingly assertive on the world stage. The Japanese have grown accustomed to their unique identity as one of the world’s few pacifist countries, and many resist the new militarism, fearful that it signals a return to a dark, imperialistic past. However, Japan’s new policy direction marks a necessary and inevitable response to rising regional tensions.

Since the end of World War II, a pacifist consitution, heiwa kenpou (平和憲法), has dictated Japan’s international and military policies. For the past seven decades, the country has closely adhered to these values and refrained from going to war to settle any disputes.

This war-averse policy represents the reversal of a starkly different legacy: a century of imperialism and military prowess of the Empire of Japan during the first half of the 20th century. The Imperial Japanese Army terrorized the people of neighboring Asian countries as it endeavoured to expand its territory and gain control over the Asian continent. This goal never came to pass as the Empire and its fellow Axis powers were defeated at the end of World War II.

In 1947, Japan enacted a new constitution, drafted mostly by the staff of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in occupied Japan. The constitution’s Article 9 states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” After decades of nonstop war, the Japanese embraced this new pacifist stance as a welcome opportunity to focus on rebuilding the economy and public morale.

Seven years of post-war American occupation gave birth to a US-Japanese alliance that remains strong to this day. With a powerful ally to call upon for protection–and American military bases operating throughout the country–Japan was free from worry of attack or war, especially in the last several decades of relative peace in Asia. The country so readily embraced its new pacifist identity that only the oldest generations now remember a warlike Japan.

However, the turn of the century brought changes at home and abroad. Japan is beginning to assert its military power through legislative decisions and budget priorities, likely as a response to the intensifying power struggle among East Asian countries.

Shinzō Abe, who served as Prime Minister in 2006-07 and was again elected in 2012 and 2014, is one of the most nationalistic and militaristic leaders to govern Japan since the end of World War II. One mark of his agenda is an increase in defense spending. The Japanese Ministry of Defense stated in August 2017 that it will request a record 5.25 trillion yen ($48 billion) for fiscal year 2018 as a security response to a series of North Korean ballistic missile tests and increasingly assertive Chinese naval movements in the East China Sea.

Beyond his fiscal policy, Abe revealed his militarism perhaps most clearly in his push to pass a bill to reinterpret war-renouncing Article 9. In 2014, the parliament approved a reinterpretation that allows military retaliation against countries that attack Japan’s allies, claiming this a form of “collective self defense.” This measure marks Japan’s philosophical drift towards what Abe calls “proactive pacifism.”

China has raised strong objections to Article 9’s reinterpretation. This alarm stems from a history of tension with Japan since its imperial rampage through the continent in the early 20th century. The two countries maintain a passive-aggressive rivalry – politically, economically, and now increasingly militarily with China’s aggression in territorial disputes in the water around Japan. China’s discomfort grows as Japan begins to reassert its military prowess and shifts closer in alliance with the US.

One other threat undeniably feeds Japan’s military expansion: its small impoverished neighbor, North Korea. The rogue state is becoming more vocal and aggressive towards Japan (and the rest of the world), emboldened by its development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. North Korea continues to test its missiles around and over Japan, the latest missile test in November plunging into the Sea of Japan.

With such hostile neighbors, it is clear why the Japanese government is eager to bolster its military might to maintain its regional power and international relevance. Yet the Japanese people remain divided on Abe’s new direction, some fearing that the country is embarking on a dangerous path reminiscent of its imperial days. The bill for Article 9’s reinterpretation passed with significant resistance, both from Abe’s opposing parties in parliament and from Japanese citizens. The streets were filled with protesters chanting “We’re against war” and “Don’t destroy Article 9,” brandishing banners like one with a picture of Abe that read “Heading to war – don’t let him.”

These opponents predict that Japan’s investment in the defense sector will almost inevitably result in war. While there is certainly now more potential to get involved in fighting, that does not necessarily mean that Japan will become involved in frequent wars. It certainly does not necessitate a reversion to the imperialistic empire.

Japan’s new militarism is necessary and inevitable.

Pacifism suited the country well in the latter half of the 20th century as it rebuilt from the ruins of the war. But now, 72 years after the end of World War II, absolute renouncement of any type of military action, even with the exception of self-defense, presents a glaring liability.
That’s not to argue that Japan must immediately develop an entire nuclear arsenal, or that the US should abandon its Japanese bases and leave its ally to fend for itself. In fact, its close American alliance removes the need for Japan to have its own nuclear weapons, lest it threaten or provoke China or North Korea and increase the likelihood of nuclear war.

This island country should not and will not become the next great military power. Yet in a tense regional and global political environment, it is more than appropriate for Japan to bulk up its military to deter conflict and be capable of protecting its people if necessary. It is critical for the future of Japanese security.

Japan’s heiwa kenpou (平和憲法) does not literally mean “pacifist constitution.” Kenpou (憲法) translates to constitution; heiwa (平和) means peace – not pacifism. The country has adhered to a peaceful constitution for more than half a century and it will continue to do so. Japan’s more assertive military policies will help secure and maintain the peace for its people among the growing tension and uncertainty with its neighbors.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Japan is an island country in many ways beyond just being surrounded by water. The country has been elusive and wary of foreigners for centuries, and although the country has increasingly globalized in the last few decades, it remains as stubbornly insular as ever. The country’s strict immigration policy allows significantly limited entry into its borders with the government accepting less than one percent of refugee applications last year and granting only 28 people refugee status out of the 8193 reviewed applications.

The Japanese government is not unique in its reluctance as a developed country to admit refugees from foreign countries in conflict. The current US administration shares this same platform, while the European and Middle Eastern countries that have admitted many now feel overburdened by the surge of refugees crossing their borders. Yet among this reluctant international response, Japan’s hesitance to proactively take part in the global refugee crisis is noteworthy in its numbers, or lack thereof, of refugee acceptances into the country. From 1982 to 2014, Japan has accepted only 633 refugees out of a total of 22,559 applications, which is less than three percent.

Japan does not have a diverse population nor a history of welcoming immigrants. 98.5 percent of the population identifies as being of Japanese ethnic origin, and this comes with a national history of homogeneity and wariness of outsiders. In this country, you’re either Japanese or you’re not. This pattern of polarization between the Japanese and the outside world dates back for centuries with sakoku as an often-referred example. Sakoku (鎖国), which means “chained country,” was a period between the 17th and 19th century during which foreigners entering the country and trade with foreign countries were strictly regulated. Citizens who left the country and tried to return faced the death penalty. This edict was lifted over two centuries ago, yet the affinity for seclusion still lingers throughout the country.

The current leading party of Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party, is historically conservative, and the government declared Japan as not an “immigration country.” Voices against accepting more refugees claim that peace in the country is based on its homogeneity and increased migration would disrupt the culture. Added with the long history of wariness for outsiders and insular culture, these factors make the bureaucratic process especially difficult for refugees to gain recognition.

Today’s process of refugee recognition in Japan is extremely byzantine. Applicants must submit many documents and identification cards or, if unable to produce those documents, written explanations as to why they do not have them. They must prove to the Japanese government that they are personally being persecuted by their own government. The process will take sometimes months but more often over a year, and success is far from guaranteed. It is clearly difficult for refugees to be accepted into the country and it is even harder to assimilate to the culture.

However, Japan is changing – both demographically and culturally – and it is showing signs for a need of newcomers to help maintain the economy. Japan is slowly changing their perspective from insular to permissive and even welcoming of foreigners.

Today, the country has one of the most rapidly aging populations in the world with a plummeting fertility rate, and the population is expected to decrease by 34 percent by 2100. The population is clearly in decline, and Japan needs more people in the workforce to remain competitive in the global sphere. The country simply cannot rely on automation and robots to keep it going.

Foreign-born workers have already begun to fill in the low-paying, low-skilled job vacancies the native Japanese do not want. They are the convenience store workers, nursing home assistants and dishwashers. Yet with laws specifically restricting entry from immigrants seeking this type of work, industries are losing potential low-skilled laborers. Refugees, with adequate training, could fill in these holes. This would provide refugees with small but steady incomes, while they fulfill their original objective of escaping persecution in their home countries.

It is clear Japan’s demographics are changing and there is a noticeable shift in the country’s culture as well. Younger Japanese generations are more open to accepting foreign newcomers into the country. According to a 2017 Pew Research Center Study, “44 percent of Japaneses ages 18 to 29 say diversity makes for a better country, compared with 17% of those ages 50 and older.” Japan does not have to allow its history of isolationism and homogeneity to hinder it from welcoming the refugees and increased diversity in the population. Younger Japanese generations have grown up with significantly more influence from foreign events and foreigners through the proliferation of the internet and media. Thus, they are more familiar with and less wary of them compared to their elders.

Japan is also hardly ignorant or indifferent about the current refugee crisis – it is in fact the fourth largest donor to the UNHCR for refugee relief and resettlement programs. The empathy and capacity to help is there; the country now needs to express their efforts in more proactive ways by accepting more refugees and helping them resettle in the communities.

Japan is showing some, albeit slow, signs of progress in its contributions towards mitigating this global crisis at a more tangible level. In the past decade, the government has introduced several small resettlement and education programs for refugees entering the country. One such arrangement is a collaboration between UNHCR and select prestigious universities in Japan that offers free tuition for refugee students to pursue Japanese or English degree programs.

This country has the potential in spades to become one of the world’s great humanitarian leaders. It is already a leading donor to refugee relief programs and is one of the top powers in international circles. It has the means to welcome and accommodate those fleeing from persecution. In fact, it would be in its best interest to welcome the newcomers. An increase in population would boost the labor force to maintain the country’s position as one of the top global economies. It will also lead to a more diverse population that initially will likely elicit some rifts among the communities, but as 44% of the younger Japanese generation believes, “it will make for a better country.”      

Now is the time for Japan to take a more active role in the global refugee crisis for its own benefit. The country is capable of supporting people who cannot return to their own homes. Japan’s future looks to be progressing towards a more global outlook that welcomes diversity, thus refugee policy changes should begin accelerating now to reflect the more accepting perspectives of the younger generation who will soon lead the country and try to stay competitive on the global stage. Change will not come quickly, especially in a country so resistant to it and used to its own singular ways, but its demographics and culture is shifting so policies should as well. Japan cannot help that it is surrounded by water but it does have a say in whether it will make an elusive island of itself in response to this refugee crisis.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Correspondents Luke Phillips, Kenneth Lee, Jack Crash Anderson and Associate Editor Alexis Dale-Huang discuss the history of East Asia, from the fertile Chinese basin to the Mongol Steppes to the Korean peninsula. Listen to our heroes overcome polito-technical snafus (likely a foreign cyber intervention), and talk Chinese pre-modern hegemony, the “century of humiliation”, Japan’s Meiji restoration, today’s Chinese dream and the modern Asian order.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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In one sobering scene of George Orwell’s seminal work 1984, Winston Smith roams the working class, streets of “the Proles”. He watches astonished as the government launches rocket bombs into crowds and buildings to subdue the masses. Unfazed and unconcerned, the Proles continue discussing mundane and inconsequential trivialities amongst themselves. Through the brunt of violence, Big Brother batters the Proles’ senses, ultimately destroying their will to speak up or act out.

In late May, Japan adopted a policy of its own aimed at subduing the crowd. To combat the prevalence of public xenophobia, the Diet enacted its first anti-hate speech law. Championed by the Liberal Democratic Party-Komeito ruling coalition, the law seeks to “eliminate hate speech” towards ethnic minorities by condemning “egregious insults” and “incendiary language” intended to exclude them. The measure comes in response to hate speech rallies fraught with nationalism and racism against Koreans living in Japan. The Ministry of Justice reported earlier this year that over 1,152 such rallies transpired in Japan between 2012 and 2015, a figure on par with past years. On the frontlines of these rallies is a group called Zaitokukai, whose full name translates to the Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of Korean Residents in Japan.

As it stands, the new law lacks both enforcement and punishment provisions. To further complicate its prosecution, Article 21 of Japan’s 1946 Constitution provides, “[f]reedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression.” In so many words, this guarantee mirrors the American Constitution’s First Amendment; however, Japan promises even more. The very next clause stipulates that “[n]o censorship shall be maintained.” Yet despite—and in spite of—these legal constraints, Japanese courts have arrogated to themselves the role of guarantor of good feelings.

In the first case since the law’s enactment, the Kawasaki branch of the Yokohama District Court called off a planned Zaitokukai protest on June 2, curiously enforcing a law that lacks any enforcement clause. The court held that the rallies constituted “illegal actions that infringe upon the personal rights for leading a peaceful life” and fall “outside the bounds of freedom of assembly and freedom of expression guaranteed under the Constitution.” Overcome with emotion at the news of the ruling, the Korean plaintiffs described the injunction as a groundbreaking ruling that would help to heal the psychological scars hate speech can leave on victims.

The plaintiffs are quite correct that the ruling is groundbreaking, but not so much for the relief to minorities as for its detriment to a free society. Pursuant to the ruling, police and local governments have, on their own volition, denied access to roads and other public places for protests they deem hateful. One mayor chose to altogether “disallow anti-Korean groups to protect citizens’ safety and dignity from any form of discrimination.” In Asia’s supposedly strongest democracy, citizens wishing to peacefully express a personal position, however unpopular, are suffering systematic censorship and suppression at the hands of their government. Contrary to the court’s ruling, no provision of the Japanese Constitution protects the utopian “right to lead a peaceful or dignified life”. Yet by capricious statute, the government and police impose strict measures to empower themselves and remove citizens’ enumerated rights. That system, by definition, is a flirtation with fascism.

In a world that seems unable eradicate racism, there remains the question of how to balance the freedom of speech and the dignity of minorities. The Japanese authorities and courts, however, constructed a false dichotomy for themselves. Far from being mutually exclusive, speech and dignity reinforce one another, and this lesson finds vindication right in Japan. Twenty Zaitokukai members held an anti-Korean rally in Kawasaki on June 5, but were soon surrounded and drowned out by six hundred counter protesters. Within one hour, Zaitokukai canceled its rally and left. The police, who were on site and ready to intervene, did not have to use the force of law to silence hatred. Instead, free people did that on their own. The solution to countering hate speech lies with more speech, not less.

The West generally favors robust protections for speech, however repugnant, thanks to the legal and cultural fortifications around first amendment rights. The Supreme Court has protected most forms of political speech and conduct, from vulgarity in the public square to burning crosses and flags to racist rallies. This is partly cultural. The western tradition is one of deep distrust of government power, prompting the need for the courts to intercede for the protection of rights.  Could it be that the eastern tradition is simply more trustful of government power?

Like the US Supreme Court, Japanese courts are among the few in the world that exercise judicial review, and are thereby empowered to invalidate unconstitutional laws. Abdicating this emphatic responsibility by elevating the invented right to dignity over the enumerated right to free assembly and speech invites oppression. On the cultural front, a glance at founding documents or the plethora of dystopian novels considered Western classics explains Americans’ distrust in ceding freedoms for fleeting comfort. The American Civil Liberties Union, a champion of minorities suffering the scorn of society, explains this Orwellian phenomenon succinctly: “The same laws or regulations used to silence bigots can be used to silence you.”

Using the force of law to impose maudlin constraints on speech based on its political substance—rather than the lawlessness it incites, as in American jurisprudence—is like hurling rockets at the rights of the people. Literature vividly warns of the dystopia that results from speech censorship laws like Japan’s. The Japanese, like the Proles, will come to realize that their rulers are doing violence to their liberties, bombarding and battering them until their free speech connotes nothing more than subdued compliance with whatever the government permits. “If liberty means anything at all,” Orwell cautions, “it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.”

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Sandy Hook, Connecticut
December 14, 2012. I remember the day so vividly. I was sitting in my 11th grade Spanish classroom when over the loudspeaker, we were told that my school was on lockdown. Naturally, my heart sank, like it did every time we were put into lockdown, drill or not. At first, some of my classmates around me were less concerned, remembering the last lockdown we had when a raccoon made its way onto school grounds, posing an apparent ‘threat.’ However, as time went on, more and more students began to fear, for no lockdown had ever been so long. It didn’t take long for students to find out bits and pieces of what was occurring less than five minutes down the road at one of the four elementary schools in town. News about what had happened was streaming on national media networks and despite the teachers’ mandate to remain calm and stay off of our phones, we needed answers. At first the number was four first graders found dead, then ten. The number kept increasing every time we checked the news. It eventually made its way up to a heart-wrenching 20 students and 6 educators murdered by a stranger who had lived less than a hundred yards from my house. We remained in lockdown until the shooter was found, to ensure that we would all be okay.

Although the shooter was found shortly thereafter, we were not okay. Students frantically called home to find out whether their baby brothers, sisters, neighbors and friends were safe, terrified of what they might learn.

When I was finally able to get home to my family, I found my parents in front of the kitchen television, holding each other, crying. It was so strange to see Newtown on the news – our small, quintessential town no longer unknown. I knew that Newtown would become a name that would not be forgotten, a recognition of the first mass shooting of elementary school children in America. I hated that. I wished that Newtown could go back to the unknown town it was the previous day: a town seldom struck with violence or crime. It was all so raw to me, and my sense of safety was shattered.

For the next few weeks, the entire nation mourned the loss of our 26 precious angels. Together, the members of my community tried to wrap our heads around how something like this could have happened in our small, suburban town, and we were pained to know that this could likely happen again, to another town. Hope truly felt lost.

Shortly after the shooting, my family attended a grassroots organization meeting to figure out what could be done to prevent another tragedy. In that meeting, I realized that I could recover only if I attempted to make this world safer for others. I begged my mom to take me with her to Washington, D.C. where I was able to meet with Senators, attend the Brady Campaign’s press conference and meet with family members of victims from the Aurora theater shooting. Since then, I have traveled to Washington, D.C. three more times: delivering letters to Congress to encourage them to support common sense gun laws, traveling with family members of victims of the shooting and attending the National Vigil for Gun Violence Victims at the National Cathedral. My mother is now the chairwoman of a grassroots organization called the Newtown Action Alliance and has devoted the past three years volunteering to transform the town tragedy into something meaningful. Her tireless efforts to make our country safer for not only my siblings and me, but for people all across America, continues to inspire me.

During the three and a half years since the Sandy Hook shooting, I have spent a lot of time following gun violence. I have now learned that America could be doing so much more to prevent tragedies like this from affecting so many. On the same day as the Sandy Hook shooting, 22 school children were stabbed in China, the difference being that none of the Chinese students died. While the attack was horrific, China’s ban on private gun ownership may have saved the lives of the students. If America had in place a simple gun law to restrict the access to the semi-automatic handguns and rifle used by the shooter at Sandy Hook, could the attack have been prevented?

This question pressed me to examine America’s gun laws and compare them to those of other developed nations in hopes of seeing how America might end the gun epidemic that claims 89 lives each day.

America
The Sandy Hook tragedy was a turning point in the national gun debate. Gun violence prevention supporters truly believed that after such a horrific event, progress would finally be made for common sense gun laws like rigorous background checks.

And in some states progress was made. Since the Sandy Hook tragedy, Colorado, New York, Delaware, Washington, Oregon and Connecticut passed laws expanding background checks to include all gun sales. And in April 2013, Gov. Dannel P. Malloy of Connecticut signed the nation’s second strongest gun violence prevention law, which included an assault weapons ban prohibiting the use of military-style weapons like the one used in the Sandy Hook shooting. After the bill was enacted, there was a 32% decrease in the state’s gun deaths from 2011 to 2013.

However, on a national level the government continues to struggle to find common ground. In 2013 a bipartisan background check bill was brought to the Senate by two NRA “A-rated” senators, Joe Manchin (D-WVA) and Pat Toomey (R-PA).  This bill would have expanded background checks to cover all unlicensed dealers at gun shows and online sales, and reduced the 40% of total gun sales that currently go without a background check in America. But despite 90% of Americans (including 75% of NRA members) agreeing with the proposal, the Senate declined the bill.

Since Sandy Hook, there have been 892 mass shootings in America, each one leaving a town like mine shattered. After the Charleston church shooting in June 2015, President Barack Obama said that our country must understand this type of mass violence is not an issue in other developed nations. America’s gun-related murder rate is nearly 20 times greater than that of the other 22 nations that make up the world’s 23 wealthiest countries. In light of the San Bernardino attack, the Editorial Board of the New York Times described the gun issue as an epidemic, one that is non-existent in many other developed nations but continues to exist in America because elected leaders “reject the most basic restrictions on weapons of mass killing” and “place a higher premium on the money and political power of an industry dedicated to profiting from the unfettered spread of ever more powerful firearms.” It is about time that America solves this epidemic by examining how other developed nations have succeeded in reducing gun violence in response to mass shootings.

UK
In 1996, a shooter killed 16 five and six-year-olds as well as their teacher in a British primary school with a handgun. Unlike the aftermath of Sandy Hook, national anger drove immediate change. Largely supported by the British public, the Firearms Act of 1997 was passed, which called for a total ban on privately owned handguns. Violators found with unauthorized guns may be penalized with up to five years of jail time. Besides the handgun ban, the UK requires a background check and licensing process that only allows individuals to purchase guns if they have “good reason” to do so. This can include job requirements and sport but does not include protection. The UK gun legislation is one of the strictest in the world and since the Dunblane incident, there has only been one mass shooting.

Australia
Australia is a model country for gun reform. In Australia, there were just 30 homicides in all of 2010, a miniscule figure when compared to the average 32 people killed everyday in homicides from gun violence in the United States. In 1996, Australia witnessed a mass shooting at Port Arthur that killed 35 Australians. This was the twelfth mass shooting in Australia that decade. Less than two weeks after Port Arthur, the Australian government created laws that enforced background checks for all gun consumers as well as a 28-day waiting period after the gun is purchased. There has not been a single mass shooting in Australia since the gun laws were enacted. Australia also instituted a buyback program through which people are paid for turning in weapons to the government, and they are then destroyed. A total of 650,000 weapons have now been collected.

Japan
Japan is known for its zero tolerance of gun violence. In 2008, there were only 11 homicides in Japan. The only legal guns in Japan are shotguns and hunting rifles, which are only obtained once the citizen goes through an extensive background check and licensing process. In order to get a license, someone must take part in a full-day lesson about guns, pass a written and practical exam based on the lesson, take a mental health test and submit a document to prove their drug-free status. In addition, the gun owner must retake the test every few years. This in-depth background check ensures that guns are given only to people least likely to use them as weapons for harm.

The Future of Guns in America
Leaders of other nations—and many Americans themselves—have a difficult time understanding why America still has yet to take extreme measures to end its gun violence epidemic. How many more mass shootings will it take for Congress to make the right decision for common sense gun laws, beginning with passing a universal background check that the majority of Americans already support? The American government must look to other developed nations and adopt their strategies. If the government continues to fail in agreeing on gun violence prevention measures, innocent Americans will continue to suffer.

Every time I go back to Sandy Hook, CT, I am greeted with nonstop reminders of the tragic event that took place on December 14, 2012. I am reminded of my grade school days at Sandy Hook Elementary. It is where I learned how to write in cursive, to memorize multiplication tables and above all to love and treat others with respect.

After the tragedy, my town showed its resilience. We came together, mourning over the losses and leaning on one another when forced to find our “new normal.” Sandy Hook Elementary has a motto: “Think you can. Work hard. Get smart. Be Kind.” This motto has lived with me since I learned it at five years old.  Now, as I spend time in Sandy Hook for my summer vacation, I see just how much that motto has become a symbolic part of this small town. Magnets on car bumpers and necklaces on school students with the words “Be Kind.” I guess it is the people of Sandy Hook’s way of saying that despite the sadness embedded in our past, we are stronger than the shooting. We are something more and with love, we are capable of overcoming the violence that will forever be associated with our home, Sandy Hook, Connecticut.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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In the final days of 2015, the governments of South Korea and Japan surprised the world with a deal addressing the issue of Korean “comfort women”. This term describes the thousands of women and girls from Japan’s Pacific-Asian colonies during World War II who served as sexual slaves to Japanese soldiers stationed in the front lines. Foreign Minister Kishida of Japan conveyed Prime Minister Abe’s apology for the women’s treatment and announced that Japan would provide official government funds totaling ¥1 billion ($8.3 million) for a victim’s foundation. Foreign Minister Yun of South Korea announced that both sides would refrain from accusing and criticizing each other internationally regarding an issue that “is resolved finally and irreversibly.” With 2015 being the 50th anniversary of the normalization of Japanese and Korean relations, this was a major breakthrough that analysts predict would change the geopolitics of East Asia by strengthening the anemic Korean-Japanese alliance at the expense of China’s attempts to isolate Japan and increase influence in Korea. However, this decades-old issue is unlikely to be solved heading into 2016.

The issue of comfort women represents the lack of closure regarding Japanese war crimes and grievances during World War II. More than 200,000 teenage Korean girls were taken from their homes and served at front line military bases, where they became victims of institutionalized rape. Each girl had to serve dozens of men per day and according to one testimony, a girl that resisted was “[t]aken to the courtyard and in front of all of us, her head was cut off with a sword and her body was cut into small pieces.” While Korea was the main country where the military recruited girls, women from China, the Pacific islands and South East Asia were also victims.

The crime committed against comfort women is horrific, and the attention surrounding the issue only amplifies the lack of justice regarding Japan’s conquests. Unlike the German war crime tribunals, there was little participation of victim countries in the Japanese ones, as these tribunals largely focused on grievances against the West. Many neighboring countries believe that Japan has not properly accepted and acknowledged its wartime guilt. This is only strengthened by some Japanese politicians arguing that comfort women were necessary (in order to maintain troop morale and discipline during the war) and continuing to visit the Shinto Yakesuni shrine, which many see as a symbol of Japanese militarism. With Japan led by nationalist Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is intent on strengthening Japan’s military and endorsing textbooks that reduce the extent of Japanese war crimes, tensions between Korea and Japan have increased in the past few years—and comfort women have become the crucial point of tension.

The recent deal between both sides is the most progress made in recent history. The last time the Japanese government made an apology was in the 1993 Kono Statement, which was issued by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono. However, Japanese conservatives rejected the statement, making the move seem insincere. Since then, conservatives have made further affronts regarding the issue; for example, Shinzo Abe has long attempted to reduce the significance of the victims’ claims and even to pass a resolution in 2007 suggesting that there was no proof of coercion (playing into the far-right narrative that comfort women were prostitutes). However, after both sides made the recent deal public, Prime Minister Abe called President Park and offered Japan’s “sincere apologies and remorse from the bottom of his heart.” (It is important to note that Japan only apologized to Korea despite the fact that the women originated from all across Asia.) Both sides clearly want to improve economic and security relations, especially concerning North Korea and the rise of China.

While the governments have settled this issue, it does not mean that it is buried in the dustbin of history. In order to be resolved, the people of both countries must also agree to the compromise. Unfortunately, that does not seem to be the case; a day after the announcement of the deal, protests began in front of the Japanese embassy. Some of the surviving Korean victims are voicing fierce objections to the deal, which they say is insincere (since the Japanese government has not admitted legal responsibility) and invalid (because they were not aware of the negotiation proceedings). Furthermore, the opposition party leader Moon Jae-in stated “the deal amounts to a treaty in which the people’s rights are surrendered.”

Complicating the issue further, the Japanese government conditioned their funding on the removal of a bronze statue of a comfort woman sitting in front of their embassy in Seoul. With 7 in 10 Koreans against the removal of the statue and a civic group pledging to erect additional statues, this condition is becoming a major point of contention. President Park came on national television to ask for the country to understand the need for compromise, but it seems that the issue has only been inflamed.

The significance of this deal goes beyond the South Korea-Japan bilateral relationship. It sets a precedent for other countries such as the Philippines and China to levy similar requests. It may also signal a serious attempt by the Abe government to finally resolve war grievances at the inter-governmental level. Geopolitically, it demonstrates Japan’s attempt to repair its image in East Asia amidst plans of militarization and a more assertive foreign policy. For South Korea, it is an attempt to mend a crucial relationship and deflect concerns in Tokyo and Washington, DC that Seoul is drifting into the arms of China. Seoul’s interests lie with developing a closer relationship with Beijing; China is their largest trading partner and wields the most influence in North Korea, the South’s greatest security challenge. Yet through the US alliance system, South Korea’s security partner in the local region is Japan, and DC is most likely pressuring both governments to cooperate in light of China’s rise.

The next few months will be a crucial test to determine if Seoul and Tokyo can use this deal as a vehicle to repair a strained relationship. The number of living victims is decreasing rapidly, and intensifying protests and a tug-of-war relationship between China, South Korea and Japan make 2016 a crucial year to see if compromise will be sustained.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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[soundcloud url=”https://api.soundcloud.com/tracks/232844702″ params=”auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=true&show_user=true&show_reposts=false&visual=true” width=”100%” height=”450″ iframe=”true” /]IMAGE: The USS Teddy Roosevelt operating in the South China Sea (U.S. Pacific Command/Flickr Creative Commons).

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Japan has the only constitution in the world that denounces the use of or threat of force in all cases but self-defense in its own territory. The provision that outlines this, Article 9, has caused controversy since the American occupational government included it in the postwar constitution. On July 1, 2014, current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decided to break from the traditionally strict interpretation of this provision and declare that Article 9 did allow for collective self-defense. This marks a shift in the Japanese constitutional narrative that has spurred endless controversy amongst neighbors and global onlookers alike.

Although many have interpreted this move as militarism, this shift is a far cry from the nationalist resurgence of expansionist Japan. Abe is not a sudden war hawk rising up to match a growing China; nor is he a pawn of the United States. Rather, Abe is the heir of a post-war ruling elite who used Article 9 for their own convenience in maneuvering Japan’s stance in international politics. Article 9 is no longer convenient – and so Abe changed it.

Article 9’s Roots in the Cold War

Article 9 can only be understood in the context of the era that conceived it. The United States’ occupational government under General McCarthy wrote Article 9 to strip its former enemy of military capability in 1947 in order to prevent any future belligerence in the region. After fierce domestic debate, the Japanese government accepted. Then, in 1950, the Korean War started.

Fearing the domino effect would spread communism throughout the region and expand the Soviet sphere, the US sent Ambassador John Foster Dulles to Japan in 1950 to ask the Japanese government to amend their constitution to eliminate Article 9. Yoshida Shigeru, the prime minister at the time and a former member of the Imperial foreign ministry, refused. He knew that remilitarizing would cripple the still devastated Japanese economy. Favoring development over militarism, he used Japan’s supposed new pacifist identity to dissuade American pressures to remilitarize. Dulles went back to Washington empty handed while Japan reaped the benefits of procurement orders from the war in Korea. Using the Japanese people as a shield, Article 9 was thereafter a convenient bargaining chip to resist pressure to join the United States’ wars in the Pacific.

 A New International Context

The original rationale to maintain Article 9 was its convenience in preventing costly remilitarization and helping Japan to a path of economic development. In 2014, those conveniences no longer applied: Japan had been economically stagnant for over two decades, and the costs of militarizing would not cripple its economy. On the contrary, a strict interpretation of Article 9 under the current state of affairs in East Asia posed a threat to the US-Japanese alliance.

Under strict interpretation, if a US vessel was attacked in Japanese waters, the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) would have to stand by and watch their ally sink. This would create an extremely complicated situation for Japan, at best resulting in damaged US-Japan relations and at worst, the termination of the security alliance. Some segments of the US political elite already resent what they see as a one-sided alliance. An incident of this nature would be disastrous for Japan. The likelihood of an accidental clash has been rising in recent years with the numerous territorial disputes in the region and the increased presence of Chinese marine vessels in the waters around Japan. In the eyes of Abe, Article 9 is becoming less convenient and more of a risk to Japan’s national interests.

At the same time, the new interpretation is in no way a return to militarist Japan. Its roots are less “national” and more “practical”. The actual wording of the new interpretation and the laws implementing it are too limited to even pretend to be expansionist. The phrasing allows for Japan to act in collective self-defense only in places of strategic importance to Japan’s national interest. It also must be acting on behalf of a country with whom Japan as a long-standing close relationship. Currently the only country that qualifies is the United States. This strict wording is again a matter of convenience. Japan can use it to refuse to participate in wars in the Middle East or even to refuse to come to the rescue of countries in the Pacific. While there are segments of the Japanese conservatives that would prefer a more active role in global military operations, they face strong opposition by most of the population and government. Members of the opposition party in the Diet are fighting hard to enact legislation that severely limits the SDF’s ability to be deployed abroad.

Because the discussion of reinterpretation was framed around risks posed by North Korea and China, many outside of Japan see the interpretation as a sign of the rise of nationalism. Abe’s government is painted as wanting to return to the glories of a militarily strong Japan, fueling nationalism to achieve their goals. While there is a correlation between this shift in security policy and the increased tensions in the region, framing the reinterpretation of Article 9 as purely a nationalist move ignores its long history. The reinterpretation is lauded by nationalists and brought about by a conservative government. But nationalism is not a cause of the reinterpretation; it is not the primary reason Abe’s government pursued a new policy. Moreover, were it the primary reason, opposition in the government and the populace would have been much stronger and defeated it altogether.

Misunderstanding the context of Article 9 and its place in Japanese political history, many commentators have read Abe’s rhetoric and decried it as a nationalist resurgence in reaction to China. This is an ahistorical understanding that only drives the fearful reactions of Japan’s regional neighbors. Article 9’s reinterpretation must be understood in context. Abe is doing as Shigeru did: using Article 9 for Japan’s convenience in the midst of a shifting international order.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

AUTHOR BIO:

Kayla Foster is a current senior at USC pursuing a double major in International Relations and East Asian Languages and Cultures. Her focus of study is American foreign policy, politics of the Pacific Rim, and Japanese security policy. Kayla spent one year studying abroad at Sophia University in Tokyo where she took classes on Japanese society and Northeast Asian security. She has working proficiency in Japanese as well as conversational ability in Spanish and Korean. In the past she has spent six weeks in Washington, D.C. researching how policy makers address the issue of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which culminated in a team policy brief on North Korea’s nuclear IBM capabilities. She also spent a month at Ewha Womans University in Seoul studying the transitions in South Korean society.

The post The Inconvenient Constitution: Japan is Not on a Path Toward Nationalism appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Andre Gray
The Japanese restrictions on collective defense and power projection outlined in the famed Article 9 have produced in Japan’s culture a deep pacifist sentiment, which plays an essential part in the country’s postwar identity. The new legislation will not change or challenge that pacifist core, but instead clear out what, in my view, are anachronisms that prevent Japan from being a fully normalized state that can participate like any other in security alliances, maritime defense networks and UN-sanctioned peacekeeping missions. And let’s not forget that Japan has already outgrown the limits of its US-imposed constitution—Japan has in the past sent missions of support to both Iraq and Afghanistan. President Abe understands that Japan can’t afford to pose as some exceptional post-conflict state when faced with a security sphere that includes an unpredictable North Korea and an aggressive, military-investing China.

To those who say this move will strain relations with China, keep in mind that Japan’s current price deflation troubles make any attempt at an East Asian arms race or serious ramp-up of defense capabilities unfeasible. For Abe it seems to be more about flexibility and legitimacy, and less about actual expansion. That being said, I think the opposition makes a good point that the government hasn’t done a good job of defining the parameters of the new rules. If Abe doesn’t want to alienate his people, he needs to be very clear about what Japan will consider as grounds for supporting allies, otherwise future governments will be able to interpret “existential threat” as they please.

Kara Junttila
Japan’s new defense legislation is really just a next step along an evolutionary process for the country rather than a dramatic practical change. Among other aspects of security policy, Japan’s military spending and Arms Export Ban have been changed over the past few years, in line with an overall trend towards normalizing Japan’s military and loosening the most restrictive pacifism-based requirements. Additionally, SDF forces have already operated overseas, for example aiding post-war reconstruction in Iraq and anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. This new legislation in some ways just formalizes changes that Japan’s military posture has already undergone. It is a smart idea for Japan, and useful for Japan’s allies, to reevaluate and codify its policies for use of the SDF.

However, the response of Japan’s population and constitutional law experts with large-scale protests and planned legal challenges has been quite dramatic—which should be a concern for both Prime Minister Abe and Japan’s allies. Opponents of the new legislation in Japan are from across the political spectrum and have varied concerns including that the law is unconstitutional, will draw Japan into US wars abroad and will renew Japanese militarism. The Japanese government has outraged many of its citizens in passing this law, and the United States in particular should be concerned if Japanese public opinion is not behind increased military cooperation as visualized by Abe. The domestic divisiveness of this law will need to be resolved before Japan can move forward as a “proactive pacifist” (as Abe puts it) in any meaningful way.

Dan Morgan-Russell
There is finally a security dilemma in the South China Sea. Without that massive Chinese military buildup around Japan and the Senkaku Islands, Japan would not have needed to pass a law allowing for military deployment overseas.

This tension could escalate further, with China increasing its deployment and the US and Japan responding with similar military increases, ensnaring all three powers in a serious security dilemma. Each side will become more worried of the buildup of the other, respond with their own buildup and repeat the cycle.

However, even if Japan, China and the US continue deploying hard power into the South China Sea, this will not turn into a serious, direct conflict. Both the US and China have serious nuclear arsenals, and the Japanese civilian nuclear infrastructure is so robust that Japan has rapid breakout capability. These nations will not go to war with each other.

In the unlikely event that there is some sort of direct conflict, it will be limited in scope. Japan and China might fight over the Senkakus, but the conflict would start and end there.

Kenneth Lee
When looked at closely, the new Japanese law is hardly a major threat; it simply allows Japan to send troops abroad to fight with or on behalf of a distressed ally. With support from the United States, Japan’s major ally, it seems that this collective self-defense law would be uncontroversial. But domestically, the law passed through political (and physical) conflict. Now, the well-renowned Japanese constitutional legal scholar, Setsu Kobayashi, is planning to muster 1000 lawyers to challenge the legislation in the Tokyo district courts. Internationally, China and even South Korea (Japan’s ally by way of the US) have expressed vehement opposition. The law does not make Japan a military belligerent, but it is a key symbol representing a more conservative Japanese government that is pushing to increase the country’s power.

When combined with Japan’s historical revisionism, increased military investments and Abe’s regular visits to Yakesuni shrine, this law seems to herald Japan’s relentless march toward military normalization. While Japan, the world’s third largest economy, has every right to be more involved on the global stage, they need to be wary of how their neighbors interpret their actions.

Japan has no current motive for war, but due to the sensitive history, South Koreans and Chinese have reason to worry about their ascendant neighbor. In the long run, this law will inevitably increase tensions with China (who already feels contained by the actions of the US and its allies) and potentially weaken the South Korean-Japanese friendship, which is a crucial relationship in America’s alliance system. In the world of international politics, the interpretation of an action by other parties is a crucial factor in whether there is stability or tension. It is likely that Japan’s actions will inevitably lead to the latter. 

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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