Ukraine

After the election, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky congratulated Trump, saying he looks forward to a strong U.S. approach to global affairs. Trump has pledged to end the war in Ukraine but has revealed little plans on how he would do so. The United States provides the most aid to Ukraine out of any other country, and Trump, alongside his Vice President JD Vance have cast doubt on whether they would continue military aid to Ukraine. This would be devastating for the hopes of beating Russia, which is steadily advancing into Ukraine’s Donbas region. President Putin has not congratulated Trump, and re-iterated U.S. hostility towards Russia making them hesitant to make any statements on the future of the two countries’ relationship. However, given Trump and Putin’s friendly-ish relationship (possible collusion between Russian officials and Trump campaign members in 2016 and Trump calling Putin a “genius” for invading Ukraine), it would not be surprising for the Trump administration to reduce aid to Ukraine. Last week, President Biden sent Ukraine official approval to use American long-range missiles to strike deep within Russian territory, a move seen as Biden hedging against Trump’s future plans.

Hungary

Moving westward, another relationship that should be watched is that between Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a right-wing autocrat. Hungary and Russia are close, despite Hungary’s membership in the European Union and NATO. Hungary relies on Russia for gas and is refusing to let aid pass through Hungary into Ukraine. Additionally, Orbán was the only EU leader to endorse Trump for the U.S. presidency and flouted their close relationship. Therefore, under the new administration, Hungary might gain an influx of foreign investment from American companies or enjoy a closer economic relationship. These circumstances suggest there will be good relations between the United States and Hungary over the next four years. 

Poland

Another conservative leader, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda, congratulated Trump on his win. Duda wants to strengthen Poland’s relationship with the United States, but Poland is against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, sending more than $3.5 billion to support Ukraine’s army. Duda’s main goal is to curry U.S. favor and keep the United States in NATO, so it’s no surprise that Duda has tried to become closer friends with Donald Trump. In April 2024, Duda and Trump met in New York City for dinner, and both shared positive sentiments, with Trump stating that he is “behind Poland all the way.” Thus, it would not be surprising to see Poland continue to schmooze up to the incoming president in the coming months. 

Czech Republic and Slovakia

The Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both populist conservatives, have welcomed Trump with open arms.

Petr Fiala, the Prime Minister of Slovakia, and President Biden have enjoyed positive relations, with the U.S. and Slovakia becoming closer over the past four years. The Czech Republic has continued sending military aid to Ukraine, but Fiala is growing weary as the war has surpassed its 1000th day. In September, he stated that Ukraine “will have to be realistic” about the growing possibility of ceding some territory to Russia, even if temporarily.

Fico has ended Slovakia’s military aid to Ukraine and opposes Ukraine’s bid to enter NATO. Slovakia is in the midst of a political crisis, with a sharp divide between Fico’s conservative government and the liberal opposition party. Fico has been consolidating power, undermining media independence, eliminating the office responsible for investigating political corruption and prohibiting protests. As such, expect to see Slovakia drifting towards an Orbán-style populist way of governing, to Trump’s delight.

The fate of Ukraine lies, in large part, in the hands of Trump and Vance. 

The post What a Second Trump Presidency Means for East-Central Europe appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

NEW YORK — The Biden administration has expressed an interest in reinvigorating U.S.-Canada relations following a virtual meeting between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau early February. The meeting, which was the first between the then newly-inaugurated president and a foreign head of state, focused on each country’s response to COVID-19, economic cooperation during the pandemic and moving forward, as well as other shared interests among the two close allies. As the White House begins forming its foreign policy objectives and global leadership, it is essential to consider the current state of U.S.-Canada relations and where the two countries may be headed moving forward.

“Generally in world politics, there are no permanent friends, but permanent interests. But, there is supposed to be a special exception for some countries,” said Brian Bow, director at the Center for the Study of Security and Development at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, in an exclusive interview with Glimpse from the Globe. “It is not unique to the U.S.-Canada relationship, but Canada has a special relationship with the U.S. and Canadians were happy with that in the first half of the Cold War.”

When former President Richard Nixon reformed the United States’ economic policy in 1971, which is often referred to as the “Nixon Shock,” along with leaving the Gold Standard, Nixon began putting tariffs on products leaving the United States.

“Most countries reacted with hostility, but no one was more surprised than the Canadians,” Bow said. “They assumed it was a mistake that they weren’t on the list of countries that wouldn’t need to pay these surcharges.”

Following the change invoked by Nixon in U.S. international economic foreign policy, Canada had to do some “soul-searching,” as Bow said. Canada began realizing that they needed to have other partners rather than just entirely relying on the United States. Canada tried to diversify its economic partners, but ultimately failed, as penetrating new markets, especially in Asia, can be pricey and full of uncertainty. As a result, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1989, signaling that economic relations would return to normal. This agreement; which eliminated all tariffs on trade, was a precursor to NAFTA, which was then enacted in 1994. 

“Even since then, there have been these recurring periods where Canada hasn’t liked the direction the U.S. has been going in,” Bow said. “The controversy with the Bush administration over the war in Iraq in 2003 was a big one, and the election of the Trump administration in 2016 was another one.”

Bow believes that the current administration in Ottawa is better aligned with President Biden than it was with Trump. That said, he believes there is a possibility of Trump-like rhetoric making its way into Canadian politics in the future. 

“When I was a teenager in Canada, stylish clothing would make its way about five years after it appeared in America,” Bow said. “The same thing can happen with policies and parties in Canada trying on Trump-style rhetoric.” 

The possibility of conservative politicians in Canada imitating the populist and often provocative language of Trump will certainly impact relations between the two neighbors. While this style of rhetoric is not prominent in Canada yet, Canadians, including Bow, are worried this could occur in the future. The next federal election in Canada could see a tight race between liberals and conservatives. Current polls show Prime Minister Trudeau with a narrow five-point lead, but Biden’s win may have an effect on Canadian elections. Many politically engaged Canadians are happy that the Biden administration will be holding office for the next four years; a recent poll showed that four in five Canadians hoped for a Biden win. 

Canadians are excited and hopeful about the Biden administration’s position on various issues, namely climate change. Undoubtedly, the Biden administration is taking the threat of climate change more seriously than the previous administration. Already, Biden has appointed former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry as the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, a new position within the cabinet. Additionally, the U.S., as of February 19, has rejoined the Paris Agreement with the international goal of keeping global warming below two degrees celsius, needed to avoid the most catastrophic impacts of climate change. Canada is also a signatory of this agreement and has fiercely advocated for its importance. Most recently, on February 25th, Biden and Treadau announced that they would be coming together to reach their goal of net zero emissions by 2050 with their “U.S.-Canada Partnership Roadmap.” 

The Partnership works to align the goals and climate policies of each country so that they can cooperate more efficiently. In addition to aligning policies, the plan hopes to create more policies and projects that will promote job growth, address inequality and combat the effects of climate change. Advocating for the creation of clean-energy infrastructure and ensuring that cross-border energy is renewable is at the core of this partnership. Biden and Trudeau also committed to having polluters take responsibility for their damages.

In addition to the announcement of the plan, Trudeau said that “U.S. leadership has been sorely missed over the past years… [it is]nice when the Americans are not pulling out all references to climate change and instead adding them.” 

While both countries must implement long-term goals for climate change to protect our planet, the issue of COVID-19 has taken precedent this past year as over 500,000 people have died of COVID-19 in the U.S. alone as of February 2021. 

During the initial meeting between Biden and Trudeau, COVID-19 was the primary focus. Both leaders agreed that cooperation in combating the virus was essential. Canada has struggled to vaccinate its population due to supplies being bought up by larger economies like the United States and United Kingdom. As part of his statement, Trudeau raised the idea of buying vaccines produced in the United States. Canada is currently receiving vaccines from Pfizer and Moderna plants in Europe and Biden’s team reportedly said that it was the administration’s priority to “ensure every American is vaccinated.” 

It is unlikely, however, that the United States would sell vaccines produced domestically to Canada until late summer at the earliest. As of February 20th, 2021, only 2.43% of Canadians had received at least one dose of the vaccine compared to about 14% of the U.S. population. 

Despite the challenges associated with vaccine distribution, the United States and Canada have committed to keeping trade as open as possible. The Prime Minister’s office emphasized “the importance of avoiding measures that may constrain the critical trade and supply-chain security between our countries” in a public statement. Economically, it is in the best interest of both nations to keep borders open and encourage trade to avoid unemployment and increase GDP.   

Although Canadian and U.S. interests are more aligned than in previous years, on his first day in office, Biden signed an executive order to end the expansion of the Keystone XL pipeline, a project supported by the Government of Alberta, a provincial government of Canada. The Keystone XL pipeline, which began planning and construction in 2008, travels from Canada through Texas. The pipeline, which began operating in 2010, was scheduled for an expansion to be able to carry even more oil. Despite the pipeline providing economic benefits to both countries, Biden canceled the project in order to protect the environment and indigenous communities. A January statement from the White House said that “the President acknowledged Prime Minister Trudeau’s disappointment regarding the decision to rescind the permit for the Keystone XL pipeline.” 

Bow said that the pipeline will hurt domestic relations between the local governments and the federal government in Canada, rather than hurting diplomatic relations between Ottawa and Washington. Given that Trudeau is substantially worried about political support in his country, this may be why he showed disdain for the cancellation of the project. 

“The prairie provinces who are the major oil exporters in Canada are the ones who really desperately wanted Keystone to go through, and people in other parts of Canada don’t really care that much about it,” Bow said. “There are real differences between Canadians on those issues.” 

While the Trudeau administration did not express as much distress about the cancellation of the project, in a statement released by the Government of Alberta, Premier Jason Kenney expressed his disturbance with Biden’s actions to cancel the Presidential permit for the Keystone XL pipeline. He highlighted the 2,000 jobs that would be lost due to the cancellation of the project. The statement also said, “That’s not how you treat a friend and ally.”

Even though some of the provincial governments may not support President Biden, there is no reason to believe that the Trudeau administration, which will be in office for at least the majority of Biden’s stay in the White House, will become hostile with the U.S. over this issue, especially as, since the cancellation of the project, Trudeau and Biden have already begun working on several projects together. 

The future of U.S.-Canada relations looks hopeful as the two countries are already working together to tackle global issues such as climate change and COVID-19. However, the  relationship between the two countries can change depending on the issues at hand and the administration holding office. 

With the popularity of Trumpism in the United States and growing support of populism in Canada, both countries could experience major political shifts once the two leaders are up for re-election. However, until then, the neighbors will most likely continue to work cooperatively together and advance the two countries’ unique historical, cultural and geographical relationship.

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LOS ANGELES — The Cuban Missile Crisis. The Bay of Pigs. Guantanamo Bay. All of these infamous events seem to encapsulate a common sentiment around the topic of U.S.- Cuba relations over the years, one marked by tense relations and cautious diplomacy. 

In 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama overcame decades of tension and became the first president to visit Cuba since Calvin Coolidge in 1928. In Obama’s second term, he made it a priority to change the contentious relationship between the two countries. While Obama understood the human rights differences, he believed that the best way to deal with the dispute and promote freedom was through dialogue and positive actions. 

He then set out a plan to develop trade, humanitarian and scientific opportunities. The Obama administration promoted joint medical research, the selling of Cuban medicine in the U.S. and banking for Americans in Cuba. They also wanted to create scholarships for research and build more infrastructure in Cuba. 

The administration hoped that easing restrictions and creating new programs would help facilitate a better economic and diplomatic relationship. Though Obama’s actions were not widely applauded by Cuban Americans like Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ), his arrival in Havana marked a historic beginning to a detente period and the first step to normalizing relations between the two countries. 

That, too, however, quickly deteriorated. The past four years under Trump saw rollbacks in Obama’s policy. Former British Ambassador to Cuba Paul Hare told Glimpse from the Globe in an exclusive interview that, “Trump for largely electoral reasons, thought it would be advantageous, so he could win Florida, to say he would reverse Obama’s policies, which he did pretty quickly, despite the main one of keeping full diplomatic relations.” 

Notably, Trump also re-designated Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” continuing to choke Cuba’s economy with economic sanctions. Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reported the new classifcation of Cuba, and justified the decision by saying that Cuba continually, “[provided]support for the acts of international terrorism in granting state harbor to terrorists.” When this decision was made, the United States only had listed Syria, Iran and North Korea under this categorization. Being classfied as a “state sponsor of terrorism” allows the United States to apply more sanctions, deny foreign aid and restrict the exports of defense materials to the country. 

In a tweet, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez condemned the act, and said that “the political opportunism of this action is recognized by anyone with an honest regard for the scourage of terrorism and its victims.” Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy expressed his frustrations with the decision and recognized in a statement that this action will make the relationship between the United States and Cuba even more strained for the Biden administration. As Biden now takes office, there has been talk of continuing Obama’s legacy to normalize relations between the two countries. 

U.S. President Joe Biden, who served as Obama’s vice president, heavily endorsed previous efforts to seek improved relations with Cuba. Biden’s presidential campaign vowed to reverse Trump’s policy that has “inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights.” Already, eighty Democrats in the U.S. House of Representative have encouraged Biden to roll back sanctions on Cuba and allow travel between the two countries to create “a constructive, productive and civil approach toward Cuba and its people,” according to Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive.  

Calls for lifting U.S. sanctions on Cuba mainly stem from concern for the Cuban economy. Many describe Cuba as a country lost in time, with its infrastructure and economy unmoving from decades ago. The struggling economy saw its first awakening in 2014 after U.S.-Cuba relations were restored and travel restarted to enliven the tourism market. However, these changes were quickly undermined by rollbacks of the Trump presidency and the COVID-19 pandemic. 

In 2020, Cuba’s economy shrank by 11%, setting a three-decade record of decline. Broadly speaking, the Cuban economy last peaked in 1984 and plummeted in the 1990s, erasing almost a third of its entire economy. After that, there were meager economic improvements in 2000 when Venezuela supplied oil at discounted prices, but since the 2008 financial crisis, Cuba never truly recovered. 

Now, the dire state of its economy is taking a toll on the entire demographic, with its population of 11.2 million shrinking and quickly aging. With Biden’s arrival, many are optimistic about Cuba’s recovery with U.S. aid — but it may still be too early for that. At this stage, Cubans are looking towards strides in opening up travel.

“They will be hoping now that Biden does open travel, which will bring a lot of money into Cuba,” said Paul Hare, former ambassador to Cuba. “It will bring tourism, but also Cuban American travel, which is being reduced from the new restrictions.”

As seen by Cuba’s recent governmental action, better relations seem to be desired by Cuba. Cuba’s inner workings have seen significant changes over the years. After decades of isolationist authoritarian policy under Fidel Castro, in 2009, Fidel’s successor, Raul Castro completely reformed his cabinet. He removed several of Cuba’s highest-ranking officials from their posts and dismounted many loyalists of his brother. The political significance of the removal signaled a notable pivoting point for Cuba, signifying an internal political power and Cuba’s divergence from a long period of isolationist policy. 

For the first time in decades, Raul expressed openness to improving relations with the United States. Cuba’s reform has not only been limited to its government but has also been making economic changes to accommodate for the pandemic. The spread of the Coronavirus in Cuba has caused over 65,000 infections and resulted in 387 deaths. While the country was able to keep the mortality rate considerably low, it struggled to keep its economy going and protect its citizens. And the already dwindling economy became even more damaged by a food crisis. 

Since 2010, Cubans have only been allowed to work in businesses in 127 private sector categories specified by the government, mostly encapsulating service jobs in the restaurant or transportation industry. In February, the former policy was abolished, legalizing all private sector businesses except for a list of 124 specifically prohibited jobs. 

This is a fundamental, historic change that we’ve been asking for for a long time,” said Oniel Diaz Castellnos, an owner of a business Cuban consultancy agency. “There are a lot of businesses that were illegal and now can be legalized, and there’s going to be a lot of innovative ideas that will be unleashed. It’s an economic opportunity not just for entrepreneurs but for the country.”

Biden’s entry into office has increased optimism on the U.S.-Cuba relationship. He has openly voiced intentions to roll back President Trump’s harsh foreign policy and continue engagement with Cuba. “Yes, I would. In large part, I would go back,” Biden said. “I’d still insist they keep the commitments they said they would make when we, in fact, set the policy in place.” The Biden administration’s first priority in Cuba would be to support democracy and human rights in the country. White House Spokeswoman Jen Psaki said at a press briefing “[we are committed]to making human rights a core pillar of our U.S. policy,” and “to carefully [review]policy decisions made in the prior administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.”

However, this is not necessarily a guarantee of close diplomacy. Biden’s arrival may mean improved relations between the United States and Cuba, but as the United States battles with COVID-19, diplomacy with Cuba may not be of the utmost importance. The Biden administration is not in a rush to change Cuba policy, which is currently under review, the White House said. 

“The Biden administration clearly has to decide what it’s for and what its policy priorities are,” Hare said. “They’ve got many more pressing issues, and perhaps Venezuela, which is linked with Cuba, is more pressing than actually reformulating a new policy towards Cuba.”

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This is old news. The report merely revealed information that was leaked and well-known years beforehand: the brutal murder of Khashoggi would not have been possible without the approval of the crown prince. The declassification of the report was largely a symbolic move, much like the general nature of American response to Saudi Arabia and other allies who consistently violate human rights. 

Saudi Arabia has long been a country marred by questionable actions, most notably the decade-long war in Yemen. The Yemen Civil War began after the Shiite Houthi rebels overtook the Sunni government’s capital in late 2014. Fearing Houthi links to Iran, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition with other Sunni Gulf states with hopes of restoring power to Yemen’s incumbent government. As the Saudi-led coalition intervened with airstrikes and economic isolation, a full-blown humanitarian crisis emerged. Yemeni civilians faced famine and an endless downpour of strikes, leading to tens of thousands of casualties, thousands of deaths (including those of children), and millions of people displaced. Despite the global concern, during the first five years of the Yemen War, Saudi Arabia was the largest arms importer in the world — and 73% came from the United States. By supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia and other states in the coalition, the United States ultimately fueled a devastating human rights catastrophe. 

During his campaign, Biden promised to end support for the Saudi-backed war. So far, his administration has temporarily suspended arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states and has revoked Trump’s designation of the Houthi rebels as a foreign terrorist organization. It’s worth noting that these actions do exceed those of previous administrations. However – especially if the arms sales ban is not made permanent – these are mainly emblematic in nature. They signify a reluctance to take hard action and a desire to subdue calls for accountability. 

Shortly after these actions were announced, the backtracking ensued. Biden clarified that the crown prince himself would not be penalized, claiming that the diplomatic cost would be too high. Instead, Biden’s aides described a series of travel restrictions on lower-level Saudi officials among other actions, denying giving Saudi Arabia a pass. According to White House officials, instead of reaching out to the crown prince directly, Biden opted for a call to his father, King Salman. During the brief phone call, Biden reportedly raised the idea of recalibrating the U.S.-Saudi relationship. However, approaching the aging king, rather than the prince who appears to be calling the shots, is likely another mechanism to avoid direct accountability.

The United States is not likely to take harsh action against Saudi Arabia, especially against the crown prince himself. Albeit, Biden was correct in highlighting the diplomatic cost of doing so, as Saudi is a critical ally in ensuring Middle East stability and in confronting Iran. Biden faces the unfortunately difficult task of balancing security interests and basic human values. However, it does illuminate America’s double standards when it comes to human rights. 

Directly punishing world leaders is not unheard of for the United States. It has imposed sanctions on a handful of world leaders: President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Kim Jong-un of North Korea, President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and Robert Mugabe, the former prime minister of Zimbabwe. Many of these punishments came after various human rights violations among other sources of conflict. However, none of these nations were American allies. In fact, they were the opposite. The unwillingness of the United States to punish M.B.S after a brutal and clear violation of human rights — against a U.S.-based journalist nonetheless — reflects its stance on human rights violators: pursue when convenient. 

It’s not as if Saudi violations have not been up to par with other perpetrators. Migrant workers, religious minorities, women, and other vulnerable groups have all faced questionable treatment in Saudi Arabia. Families affected by 9/11 have taken to the courts, seeking accountability from the Saudi kingdom for providing material support to Al-Qaeda after some Saudi officials had been linked to the horrific attacks. Thus, the Khashoggi murder report could not have been the final straw for the U.S. government to finally reconsider relations with Saudi Arabia. It was an opportunistic maneuver to appease human rights activists and fulfill a back-burner campaign promise, which likely would not have even occurred if the United States was still heavily dependent on the Gulf for oil. 

The United States has consistently shown that it is a champion of human rights — when convenient. If an American ally commits a crime, whether that be Saudi Arabia or even Israel, the United States usually will not pursue accountability. This is not the era of American isolationism; the United States is not shy in actively involving itself in conflicts around the world. 

However, the conflicts it chooses to insert itself in reveal a clear double standard where adversaries are punished and allies go unchecked, even if they have thousands of deaths on their hands. 

The post U.S.-Saudi Relations Under Biden: American Moral Hypocrisy in Full Force appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

In exchange, nuclear-related sanctions would be lifted once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified that Iran had taken the steps to roll back their nuclear program. The controversial agreement was designed to repair the relationship between the United States and Iran after numerous tumultuous decades. 

For moderate Iranians, the JCPOA ignited a sense of unprecedented optimism for a new beginning — one that could integrate Iran into the international community, allowing for economic prosperity and policy reform within the nation. These sentiments were echoed by the Obama administration, as their top Deputy National Advisor Ben Rhodes said that the agreement would produce an “evolution in Iranian behavior,” while simultaneously implying a reduction in the systemic human rights abuses within the nation.

While the JCPOA was primarily viewed as a nuclear and economic agreement, there was hope that the deal would inspire a shift in the sociopolitical governing of the Iranian regime. Prior to the deal, Iran had a long-lasting history of alleged American hostage-taking, including the mysterious disappearance of Bob Levinson, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent, and Siamak Namazi, an Iranian-American businessman. In the days preceding the JCPOA’s implementation, former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif worked to release ten U.S. Navy personnel who were taken into Iranian custody after straying into the nation’s territorial waters. 

On January 16, 2016, the day the JCPOA went into effect, Iran agreed to release all remaining jailed dual nationals, implying renewed diplomatic intentions. However, the same year, Iran further imprisoned several other dual nationals, making it abundantly clear that Iran’s true motives in regard to diplomatic and human rights relations had not reformed. Instead, Iran’s support for Houthi rebels in Yemen, a U.S. declared foreign terrorist organization, increased, initiating a concatenation of consequent violations. 

The largest human rights violations following the JCPOA’s implementation were the inhumane conditions within Iranian penitentiaries faced by free speech proponents which were carried out without basic due process. Prisoners continued to be executed, their deaths symbolizing the consequences of rebellion. Human rights activists and citizen journalists have carried the majority of the burden, as they uphold the reputation of being the regime’s most formidable threat. A majority of political activists’ executions are justified by the Iranian government through false convictions that require barbarous punishments or the clandestine selection of a scapegoat to pin government officials’ crimes on. 

According to an informed source, Hossein Jozi, a protest organizer during the 2019 riots, was kidnapped and murdered by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC). Farhad Vosoughi, a 27-year old husband and father, was accused of killing Jozi and unlawfully subjected to solitary confinement — without ever having received legal assistance. During his sentence, his brother cited the fierce torture Farhad Vosoughi’s endured that led to his eventual death. Following his demise, prison judiciary officials further threatened Vosoughi’s family to equivocate the truth to the press.

Sina Ghanbari, another political activist, was incarcerated and rumored to have committed suicide in May of 2018. However, when Ghanbari was lowered into his grave, family members unveiled his head and found signs of a broken skull and smashed left eye. 

Aside from mysterious homicides, there were also direct accounts of inhumane treatment through the refusal of medical services within penitentiaries. Behnam Mahjoubi, a prisoner of conscience, was arrested for his involvement in anti-government protests in February of 2018. Despite requiring daily medication for a diagnosed panic disorder, Mahjoubi was intentionally denied proper medical care. According to Mahjoubi’s wife, the correctional physician substituted his prescribed medication with 14 to 17 sleeping pills, a night, which led to his paralysis and untimely death. Their deaths and cruel treatment represent a minuscule fraction of the overwhelming number of political prisoners who bear the burden of seeking free speech. 

It has become increasingly difficult to hear the muffled screams of Iranian citizens, as human rights abuses continue to be meticulously buried via government censorship. As there has been little information revealed on the subject, the situation on the ground is best understood through local activists. Shiela, an Iranian local advocate who has extensively studied the sociopolitical climate of the region, spoke to Glimpse from the Globe on the status of human rights post-JCPOA implementation.

“There has been an extensive amount of misinformation spread regarding the satisfaction of Iranian citizens, especially after the signing of the JCPOA,” said Sheila, who requested that her identity be kept anonymous. “Rouhani repeatedly expressed that Iranian citizens were overjoyed at the lifting of sanctions, when the reality is that Iranian families have received no economic assistance and are victims to inhumane living conditions… the painted narrative put forward omits the realities of our hardships. It becomes increasingly frustrating when there is no way to illustrate how human rights abuses have worsened.”

Government mandated censorship does not end at journalist inoculation; the concealment of human rights violations is equally crucial for the Iranian government. During the November 2019 protests, over 300 protesters died and over 7,000 were arrested. An Amnesty International report revealed accounts of relentless torture throughout their prison sentences, including beatings, electrocution, amputation, waterboarding and sexual violence. On the deadliest day of the protests, Iranian authorities purposely blocked all internet access within the nation to conceal the true extent of police misconduct. Till this day, there have been no official criminal investigations or accountability measures taken against the government for the blanket internet shutdown. During the shutdown, many American-Iranians residing in the U.S. turned to non-partisan organizations to shed light on the severity of the protests. While various organizations within Iran claim to be for the people, Sheila said this is not always the case.

“Non-partisan organizations such as the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) claim that they amplify the voices of the Iranian-American community, yet they continuously formulate false testimonies about our experiences and have been repeatedly linked to the Iranian government,” she said.

While the international community may not understand the depth of human rights violations, they have witnessed the multitude of protests that overtook the streets of Tehran in the past decade. Since January 2018, over 5,000 individuals have been imprisoned for engaging in protests surrounding inflation, unemployment and inequality. In May 2018, former President Trump declared that he was withdrawing from the nuclear deal and imposing severe economic sanctions and penalties on Iran. Consequently, Iran has been unable to access its tens of billions of dollars in assets held in foreign entities, mostly in the form of oil and gas exports. 

Despite these sanctions causing an increased cost of living, many Iranian citizens had hoped that the increased pressure on the regime could promote accountability, decrease human rights violations and even lead to an eventual government collapse. However, the imposed sanctions produced no change in governmental accountability, causing an eruption of mass dissent. The protests were multifaceted in their aim; while a portion of citizens were protesting the worsening human rights violations, others were opposing the rise of fuel prices and their crippling socioeconomic conditions.

Thus, citizens face a Catch-22 with no axiomatic resolution. During the JCPOA era, the Iranian government was able to access over 50 billion dollars in usable liquid assets to further strengthen their regime and perpetrate severe human rights offenses. However, even during the post-JCPOA era, increased economic sanctions led to civil uprisings, further provoking the government’s police forces to escalate state-sanctioned imprisonment and death rates amongst Iranian citizens. 

The entrance of the Biden administration onto the world stage could mark a new era in Middle Eastern affairs. However, reentering a revised deal will not be accomplished as easily as the United States may hope. Since the Trump administration previously withdrew from the deal, Iran has enriched their uranium from 102 kilograms to approximately 2,440 kilograms — more than 12 times the limit set by the JCPOA. They have also halted international inspections of nuclear sites, allowing for the accelerated development of atomic weapons. 

Iran has become more powerful, granting them greater leverage at the negotiating table. Although Iran’s economy is in shambles, Iranian hardliners are hesitant to negotiate a new deal following the killing of Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian general who commanded a wing of Iranian military forces. With the upcoming 2021 Iranian Presidential election, a tough fight between hardliners and moderates will indicate the future of U.S.-Iran relations, and more importantly, the future of human rights within the country. 

The most feasible and immediate solution for Biden’s administration may be an interim agreement to halt nuclear buildup in exchange for sanction relief and access to oil revenues, allowing an economic boost. Following a potential period of economic relief, popular support for a more moderate presidential candidate could allow the revisiting of a new deal that can further develop diplomatic ties between Iran and the international community. 

While economic benefits may be the key to reentering negotiations, the global community cannot continue to turn a blind eye to the number of Iranian lives at stake following the introduction of a new deal. In September of 2020, then-presidential candidate Biden promised to “call out the [Iranian] regime for its ongoing violation of human rights”, citing the execution of Iranian wrestler Navid Afkari as a “travesty” in a September 12th tweet. 

Iranians now, more than ever, are urging Biden to impose stringent economic sanctions until Iran is willing to accept accountability for their human rights violations. Only then can the global community and Iran negotiate a feasible nuclear and economic deal that sets human rights at the forefront.

The post Renegotiating the JCPOA: Human Rights Should Take Center Stage appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

In 2018, Mexico elected President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a left-wing populist member of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). Although he had long been a divisive figure in Mexican politics, López Obrador entered office with an astounding 53% of the popular vote and a promise to prioritize Mexico’s sovereignty. After multiple failed presidential elections, AMLO (the popular abbreviation for López Obrador) finally achieved the highest office in Mexico on the rising tide of Mexican nationalism, which had dominated Mexican politics for a majority of its relations with the U.S. and had only subsided in the late 80s.

Americans observed Mexico’s return to nationalist tendencies with anxiety, heralding AMLO as “Mexico’s answer to Donald Trump” and anticipating exacerbated tension between the United States and its southern neighbor. However, AMLO and Donald Trump maintained a surprisingly functional, occasionally even congenial, working relationship.

In many ways, Trump and López Obrador were diametrically opposed, but one crucial shared opinion allowed the two leaders to collaborate. Trump was uniquely uninterested in intervening in Mexico’s domestic politics, and AMLO appreciated the absence of American oversight and intervention.

Donald Trump’s platform toward Mexico focused almost exclusively on issues of migration and renegotiating regional trade agreements. Trump’s approach to foreign policy, toward Mexico and many others, was unprecedentedly one-dimensional, relying on his personal business dealings rather than a multifaceted, coordinated agenda. Trump’s narrow focus allowed AMLO to pursue his own domestic agenda with less American influence.

In a recent call with newly elected President Joe Biden, AMLO said “I must mention that we do have a very good relationship with the now president of your country… Regardless of all other considerations, he respects [Mexico’s] sovereignty.”

Joe Biden’s approach to relations with Mexico is a far cry from his predecessor’s. Where Trump relied on his own personal relationships, Biden will rely on a fully appointed cabinet to manage a wide range of issues. One of the many ways in which Trump’s presidency marked a divergence from the status quo was his resistance to assemble a cabinet that could navigate the complexities of a relationship between two countries whose economies, cultures and politics are so inextricably interconnected. Biden intends to reconstruct this infrastructure of diplomacy that will allow him to tackle multiple campaign promises.

AMLO anticipates the increase in American oversight that will come with Biden’s more holistic foreign policy platform. He has already begun sending signals to the incoming American president that he will not tolerate the same amount of American influence as his predecessors. Not only was López Obrador among the last global leaders to congratulate Biden on his victory, but he has also exonerated a former Mexican defense secretary from prosecution for drug trafficking in America and granted asylum to Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks who has been evading U.S. extradition since releasing thousands of Hillary Clinton’s emails in 2016. Many Americans received these actions as slights to the incoming administration, but the sum of these minor affronts is a broader message: Mexico’s president intends to continue pursuing his robust domestic agenda with minimal American interference.

AMLO has championed the charge for Mexican energy independence, a goal which he has ardently pursued since he took office in 2018. An outspoken critic of his predecessor’s energy sector redesign that opened the industry to extensive privatization, López Obrador has repeatedly vowed to restore the dominance of Mexico’s state-owned electricity company.

Recent storms across Texas, a major source of Mexico’s natural gas, resulted in widespread blackouts across the northern half of Mexico. Pointing to these blackouts as evidence, AMLO argued for fortifying Mexico’s own domestic energy supply and in late February put forth a bill that would strengthen the state-owned energy program and limit the involvement of private companies in the energy industry. Ultimately, López Obrador aims to buttress Mexico’s economy from America’s political and economic influence through the centralization and nationalization of the energy industry.

AMLO’s fear that Biden’s election will spell out more roadblocks to his dream of energy independence is not unfounded. Hordes of legislators, environmental advocates and industry experts have criticized his proposed bill for violating carbon emission regulations and trade agreements. These infractions will likely attract opposition not just from his domestic opponents but also from the Biden administration.

Lourdes Melgar, a top energy official under former President Enrique Peña Nieto, said AMLO “has a nationalistic view of how to utilize resources.” Melgar and many other energy experts argue that this policy sacrifices environmental sustainability for an ideological power play. Although the bill is expected to become law within the coming days, Mexico will continue grappling to find a balance between nationalistic impulses, international cooperation, and environmental sustainability.

Unlike his predecessor, President Biden will not look the other way when it comes to violations of environmental agreements. Throughout his campaign and into the first month of his presidency, Biden has remained adamant about the need to uphold environmental protection agreements and expressed a willingness to reassert America’s role as a leader of international environmental cooperation.

According to Pamela Starr, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network at the University of Southern California, Biden should expect to ruffle some feathers when addressing Mexico’s disregard for carbon emission limits and other sustainability regulations. The new president may not necessarily care that Mexico is striving for energy independence, only considering the repercussions of the tactics employed to achieve self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, increased oversight could set off alarm bells for AMLO and others who remain skeptical of American involvement.

Starr points to Jeffrey Davidow’s metaphor for the complex relationship between the United States and Mexico, “the bear and the porcupine,” which captured the difficulties of navigating a relationship between two closely connected countries when one was overtly interventionist and the other hypersensitive to perceived intervention. This dance between American brashness and Mexican defensiveness defined their relationship until the election of Ernesto Cedillo in 1988.

AMLO has openly asserted his disapproval for his predecessors’ approach to dealing with the United States, accusing Mexico of kowtowing to American interests over the past few decades. His approach to diplomacy marks a return to the era of the porcupine, defined by Mexican nationalism and apprehension of U.S. involvement. In order to avoid returning to the role of “the bear,” the United States must carefully navigate the rising sentiment of Mexican nationalism, an endeavor further complicated by rising nationalism within its own borders. Competing threads of nationalism could cause friction not just within the realm of environmental policy, but also within negotiations of labor, trade, corruption and migration.

According to Starr, Biden’s policy toward Latin America rests on three pillars: corruption, climate change and democracy. Although the ongoing migration crisis will likely monopolize much of Biden’s first year in office, the early months of his presidency could define the timber of their relationship and define the trajectory of negotiations of the other items on his agenda in the subsequent years of his presidency.

Despite AMLO’s initial posturing, he has recently demonstrated his commitment to maintaining a productive relationship with the United States. The two leaders convened virtually to discuss issues of immigration, the pandemic and climate change, and both seemed intent on redirecting the nature of their nations’ exchange away from the blatant antagonism that defined the Trump administration. López Obrador, like many Mexicans, is relieved to work with an American president who does not openly degrade their country.

However, this relief at a return to amiability will not dissuade AMLO from fiercely protecting his plan for energy independence. The past four years have exacerbated a relationship that had been fraught with mistrust for decades. This history of unwelcome intervention and competing nationalist sentiments will guide the next four years of U.S.-Mexico relations.

Biden has already begun to dismantle Trump’s hardline anti-immigration policies, ending the “Remain in Mexico” program and working with Mexican officials to reinstate mechanisms for granting asylum to the thousands of migrants waiting at the US-Mexico border. Biden has already encountered numerous roadblocks: an SUV crash in California left 13 migrants dead and a bottleneck of migrants in encampments at the border. Recent reports predict thousands more migrants from Central America are marching toward this chokepoint, hopeful that the new administration will open more doors for their arrival.

Tensions of migration at the border continue to reverberate throughout the region. With the support of Mexican police and leadership, Guatemalan police confronted a caravan of Honduran migrants in late January in an effort to stem the flow of northbound Central Americans. As the entire region reels from the effects of widespread migration and the ongoing public health crisis, Biden will need to rely on coordination with Mexico to stabilize their shared border and eventually the region.

Constructing a productive relationship after four years of Trump’s nationalism and centuries of prior American interventionism will be no small feat, especially with a Mexican president with his own political agenda that runs counterproductive to American interests in certain sectors.

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The past four years resulted in weak and volatile U.S.-North Korea relations; but, Biden’s outward-oriented posture starkly contrasts with that of Trump. As North Korea proliferated their nuclear weapons program, Trump responded to every nuclear threat staunchly, signaling a potential war if need be. 

With a new administration in the White House, the United States now has a chance to ease tensions with North Korea and encourage dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. 

Under President Obama’s administration, the approach towards Pyongyang focused on incremental change. In 2008 and 2009, Obama emphasized the need to interact and engage with North Korea “without preconditions.” He affirmed that while difficult, working with communist governments, like those in Cuba and North Korea, would be beneficial for the entire international community. Obama’s willingness to meet with strongman Kim Jong-Un was met with harsh criticism, particularly from conservatives and human rights groups. Some viewed his efforts as weak. Conservatives expressed that meeting with enemies would “lower the prestige of the office of the president.” After Obama, Trump reversed course and deeply strained the progress Obama had made with Kim Jong-Un, resulting in several instances of nuclear threats toward the United States. 

In contrast, conservatives applauded Trump as he met with Kim Jong-un during his presidency, praising his efforts to aggressively denuclearize North Korea. Unlike Obama’s “strategic patience,” Trump demanded a top-down approach to North Korea’s complete denuclearization, offering the incremental removal of financial sanctions. To Trump’s dismay, the Hanoi Summit in 2019 ended in Kim’s refusal to accept any form of denuclearization. Still, Trump garnered conservative support as the false potential for North Korean disarmament led to the expression: “If North Korea disarms, President Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize would be well deserved.” 

Even Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) said a full-fledged war would be “worth it in terms of long-term stability and national security.” Many argue that Trump’s business mindset might have aided in dismantling Kim’s nuclear weapons program. However, soft power and traditionally diplomatic skills from the Biden administration will likely prove to advance U.S.-North Korea relations. 

Biden’s plans to reverse many of Trump’s foreign policies suggest that relations with North Korea will progress. The Obama administration did not have a weak approach toward Kim, despite partisan criticism, and emphasized that military involvement may be necessary if North Korea does not cooperate. Obama’s plan of North Korean denuclearization before easing restrictions should be followed through during Biden’s presidency, but with a bottom-up approach. Before any high-level summit is held, Washington must establish high-level methods of private communication with Pyongyang. 

Already, however, a challenge is clear. In early January 2021,North Korea labeled the United States as its primary enemy. The Biden administration should not plan to host a large summit in an official manner, but in private discussions. In the past, the United States has made deals with North Korea which were misconstrued as simply improving America’s reputation. 

In addition to dealing with North Korean denuclearization, the United States must repair relations with South Korea. Coordination with South Korea will further pressure Kim to accept incremental disarmament. Pursuing peace on the Korean peninsula can incentivize North Korea to change its alignment towards cooperation in exchange for sanction removal, economic advancement and an enhanced reputation. As detailed in the 2018 Singapore Declaration, the United States should work towards normalizing relations on the Korean peninsula. To do so, Biden must eradicate the hostile atmosphere that Trump exacerbated during his presidency. Building military preparedness along the Demilitarized Zone, dividing the north and south, is vital to protecting their citizens. Peace on the peninsula will never be achieved with an aggressive attitude. 

Amid Biden’s new presidency, North Korea plans to hone its military power in an effort to hinder American power. Kim’s attempts to modernize its weapons system include a 15,000 km range missile. North Korea’s military development can serve as bait to convince the United States to slowly lift sanctions in exchange for minuscule denuclearization. To avoid military aggression, the Biden administration must arrange working-level negotiations to effectively mitigate tensions and the destruction of an entire population. Trump’s staunch approach towards denuclearization can be implemented, but with cautious language and private negotiations. Trump’s style of riling up allies to attack the enemy is not the approach Biden can continue. By amassing the collective hatred of many allies, North Korea has even more reason to pursue nuclear aggression and refuse any negotiation. 

Incremental denuclearization in exchange for sanction relief is the most effective route for the Biden administration. Conducting these negotiations in a private setting will allow both parties to not put on a “show” and instead discuss what they truly need in order to repair relations. 

Biden must not accept Pyongyang as a nuclear power, but grant concessions and offer greater market access to North Korea. However, these concessions may only be offered if Kim feels inclined to denuclearize in any capacity. 

Ultimately, Biden’s presidency will likely improve U.S.-North Korean relations exponentially — but it will take some time. Regardless, there is hope for a more peaceful international community. 

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Since his inauguration in January 2019, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has been a close emulator of former U.S. President Donald Trump through both his divisive rhetoric and staunchly conservative politics. In return, the Trump administration consistently praised Bolsonaro, despite his harmful environmental policies in the Amazon and overall anti-democratic attitudes. Under the new administration of President Joe Biden, this is all likely to change. 

Bolsonaro may prove to be a difficult nut to crack for Biden and his cabinet. With the 2022 Brazilian presidential election looming, Bolsonaro wants to appear strong to voters, actively fighting against what he feels is foreign interference in domestic policies. A concern of interference emerged in 2019, when, after two decades of on-and-off negotiations, Brazil and other members of South America’s Mercosur trade bloc reached a free trade agreement with the European Union. While the Amazon was engulfed in flames, French President Emmanuel Macron demanded more robust conservation policies from Brazil as a condition for ratifying the deal. To the despair of South American and European exporters, Bolsonaro doubled down on his climate denial rhetoric, and the deal has yet to be ratified.

Biden’s inauguration comes as the United States faces a multitude of foreign policy challenges, such as repairing their relationship with NATO and competing with China. Nonetheless, dealing with Bolsonaro, diplomatically or otherwise, will be crucial as Biden seeks to return the United States to the forefront of the fight against climate change, one of his signature campaign promises. Early on the campaign trail, Biden took aim at the Brazilian leader. In the September 2020 presidential debate, Biden said: “The rainforests of Brazil are being torn down, are being ripped down. More carbon is absorbed in that rainforest than every bit of carbon that’s emitted in the United States. Instead of doing something about that, I would be gathering up and making sure we had the countries of the world coming up with 20 billion dollars… stop tearing down the forest, and if you don’t, then you’re going to have significant economic consequences.” This jab at the Brazilian president drew outrage from Bolsonaro, who labeled Biden’s comments as “regrettable,” as well as “disastrous and gratuitous.”

Biden will have two distinct routes in maneuvering an already rocky relationship with Brazil: take the path of direct repudiation of Bolsonaro or work to establish pragmatic collaborative ties with his government. 

Significant steps have already been taken towards repudiation. Most foreign policy aides in the administration regard Bolsonaro as a dangerous figure — a “Trump of the Tropics” with no regard for democratic norms, human rights or environmental protection. Their desire is to put forward policies that push back against Bolsonaro’s populist agenda, not just because it goes against what they believe in, but also because it will be more popular among many liberal American voters. It will also satisfy the wishes of activists within the Democratic Party, some of whom have called Bolsonaro a “pseudo dictator” and agreements between the Brazilian leader and Trump Administration trade representatives a “slap in the face of Congress.” Thus, the Biden Administration sees naming and shaming Brazil as a “climate outlaw” or denouncing it for democratic backsliding as good politics. 

In the first weeks of his presidency, Biden and top aides received a long dossier that requested a freeze of all agreements and negotiations with Brazil while Bolsonaro remains in office. The dossier, which was prompted by the U.S. Network for Democracy in Brazil, has the support of many American and Brazilian organizations, including Friends of the Earth and Articulação dos Povos Indígenas do Brasil (APIB) in Brazil, an organization that advocates for indigenous rights.

It condemns the improved relations between the countries during the Trump Administration, under the rationale that the alliance has tarnished America’s role as the fighter for the expansion of democracy. The document recommends that the Biden administration restrict lumber, soy and meat imports from Brazil, unless confirmation is given that these products are not linked to deforestation or human rights abuses, and that the U.S. government reverts the Technology Safeguards Agreement signed under the Trump administration in 2019. 

Despite Bolsonaro’s wishes expressed in a recent letter to the American president, the dossier emphasizes that the Biden-Harris government should not seek a free-trade agreement with Brazil in any form. This conscious effort to distance the United States from Bolsonaro was echoed by Juan Gonzales, a Special Assistant to the President and National Security Council Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere. “Anybody, in Brazil or elsewhere, who thinks they can advance an ambitious relationship with the United States while ignoring important issues like climate change, democracy, and human rights clearly hasn’t been listening to Joe Biden on the campaign trail,” Gonzales said. 

The dossier adamantly warns Biden against engaging in any negotiations with Bolsonaro, as financing joint conservation projects with the Brazilian government could mean throwing money at the problem rather than addressing the root of the issue, which would delay concrete action. The remedy, according to the document, is to attach any financial investment to the demands made by the representatives of Brazilian civil society, indigenous tribes, and other marginalized groups within the country. 

But essentially cutting all ties with a traditional ally and strong trading partner could allow Bolsonaro to further isolate himself from the international community, possibly opening the door for him to continue pushing his undemocratic agenda and reckless environmental policies unchecked. Thus, in order to most effectively fight for democratic values and a progressive environmental policy in Brazil, should Biden work with the Brazilian government or repudiate it?   

To get to the heart of this question, it’s important to analyze U.S. involvement in the region generally. American involvement with Latin America is much more complex than the relationship between these two leaders when viewed through a global lens. Given U.S. concerns regarding Chinese influence in the region, the Biden-Bolsonaro relationship could prove to be pragmatic, instead of one based on repudiation and finger pointing.

After trading criticism for the last months, working with Brazil’s far-right president may not even be possible for Biden. The strategic approach could be to work with the many actors within the country who have a genuine interest in improving the two nations’ relationship. Within Brazilian society, the Biden administration will find out that it not only has willing allies among activists, legislators, academics and civil society groups who have been opposing Bolsonaro’s policies for the last two years, but also among those who seek a middle ground. The Biden administration could listen and learn from these actors, as the dossier instructs, as well as empower local opposition groups to connect with international pro-democracy and environmental movements. If the fight for responsible environmental policies and a stronger democracy in Brazil is to succeed, it will be led by local players.

As it has become clear, Bolsonaro does not take kindly to international criticism over his environmental policies. Thus, Biden must find other means through which to advance his policy ideas for conservation in the Amazon, like his plan to raise $20 billion from the international community to curb the deforestation and devastating forest fires in the region. One possible course of action is working with the Brazilian ambassador to the United States, Nestor Forster. In an October interview with BBC News Brasil, Forster said that any international initiative that brings resources for the sustainable development of the Amazon and helps to finance those who preserve the forest is welcome, as long as Brazil maintains leadership on discussions. 

Yet, would increased U.S. pressure cause Bolsonaro to cave in? Brazilian congressman Alessandro Molon sure thinks so. “I have no doubt that the change in administration in the U.S. will have an impact on Brazil’s environmental policy,” says Molon, who leads the opposition Brazilian Socialist Party in the lower house. “Until now, Donald Trump served as a support for the Brazilian president to act irresponsibly. Now with the U.S. adding to Europe’s pressure, Brazil is more isolated and the government will find it harder to stay on this foolish path.” 

In case pressure alone is unsuccessful at swaying the Brazilian leader, Biden could use America’s economic leverage to force Bolsonaro’s hand. Biden’s climate plan promises to “impose carbon adjustment fees or quotas on carbon-intensive goods from countries that are failing to meet their climate and environmental obligations.” While it’s unknown if the administration will actually apply those kinds of deterrents to Brazil, there are a scope of trade levers the U.S. could pull, says Lisa Viscidi, director of the Energy, Climate Change and Extractive Industries Program at the Inter-American Dialogue, a think tank focused on relations between Washington and Latin America. 

Although it seems like a ready-to-use solution, American trade pressure may also fail to have a significant impact on the industries that drive deforestation as trade between the two countries has steadily decreased over the last few years. Between January and September of 2020, accumulated trade between the U.S and Brazil totaled $33.4 billion, a 25% drop from the same period in 2019. Regardless, the United States remains Brazil’s second-largest trading partner, accounting for 9.7% of Brazilian exports and 12.3% of revenue. Only China retains a larger slice, buying more than one-third of Brazil’s exports. The United States is not a major buyer of Brazilian beef and soy, the primary goods associated with deforestation, which are exported primarily to China. As a result, André Nassar, president of oilseeds industry group Aboive, which represents the soy industry, says he does not expect the U.S. to try imposing pressure on Brazil through trade as directly as Europe has. “What I do think will change [with the Biden administration]is that there will be a push within Brazil to get control of illegal deforestation,” he says ‒ differentiating between deforestation for agricultural purposes, which is sometimes allowed under Brazilian law, and irregular land grabbing. “If Biden’s rhetoric says, ‘Brazil, you need to get control of illegal deforestation’, we as the private sector would back that.” 

As Brazilian business goes, so goes Bolsonaro. In 2018, then President-elect Bolsonaro expressed his desire to follow Trump and pull Brazil out of the Paris Climate Agreement. Brazilian agribusiness loudly voiced their concerns in Brazilian media about what that could do to Brazil’s image in global commerce, and the country stayed in. “When it becomes clear that there’s a threat to investment, or Brazilian products, the government is going to listen to businesses,” Nassar says.

Beyond direct economic pressure, Biden does have further options on the table in order to achieve his goals with Brazil, if necessary. In January 2020, the Trump Administration announced it was recommitting to supporting Brazil’s bid for OECD membership. In a reversal of his predecessor’s policy, Biden could withdraw U.S. support for the bid if Bolsonaro does not take concrete action in the Amazon. If the Biden administration uses its weight in the OECD to make Brazilian accession contingent on Amazon protections, that would sharply increase pressure from the country’s business community on Bolsonaro, according to Marcio Astrini, executive director of the Sao Paulo-based Climate Observatory.

Although Biden and Bolsonaro have a multitude of clashing policies, they also share some common interests, especially dealing with the situation in Venezuela. The Venezuelan humanitarian crisis and mass migration into bordering Latin American countries, including Brazil, has become a destabilizing force in the region and Brazil has aligned itself with the current U.S. pressure campaign to oust Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. During the Trump administration, the U.S. opposed Maduro through a “maximum pressure” campaign largely rested on progressively tighter sanctions against the regime, with the goal of forcing him out in favor of opposition leader Juan Guaido, the former head of the National Assembly whom the U.S. and more than 50 other countries recognized as the country’s valid interim president.

This hardline policy toward Venezuela was a rare show of support for democracy by the Trump administration. Yet, it was deeply undermined by Trump’s own autocratic tendencies. Under Biden, the U.S. can renew its full commitment to supporting democracy and bring in Brazil as a potential regional partner to deal with the crisis and improve relations simultaneously. 

The future of U.S.-Brazil relations, while rocky, will likely be productive over the next two years as the U.S. reverts to more traditional diplomatic channels. Under Trump, “Twitter diplomacy” reigned, largely overshadowing the usual process. The traditional approach to diplomacy, where issues are negotiated beforehand by mid-level diplomats, will make a comeback and may ultimately be positive for both Biden and Bolsonaro.

The importance of careful but fruitful diplomacy with Latin America’s largest country is especially important currently for the United States. The U.S. is clearly aware that the neglect of Latin America has provided an opening for Chinese influence in the region. The Biden administration will have to be mindful of not pushing Brazil away and straight into China’s outstretched arms. 

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The past four years of an “America First” agenda have hurt the United States’ credibility and capacity to accomplish overseas policy goals. An American grand strategy focused on nationalism — as opposed to multilateralism — has severely hampered U.S. engagement on humanitarian issues. Namely, federal foreign policy and foreign aid bureaus such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have been severely impacted. 

On January 13, then President-elect Joe Biden nominated Samantha Power, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to the role of Administrator of the USAID. Though her nomination is currently awaiting Senate confirmation, it’s important to know what type of organization she is inheriting in the post-Trump era, and the deep problems that need to be addressed.

In contrast with other federal agencies under Trump political appointees, USAID remained somewhat unscathed until mid-2020. For the first three years of the Trump presidency, USAID was directed by former Republican Congressman Mark Green. His leadership was met with respect from both sides of the aisle and was one of the very few Trump political appointees with broad bipartisan support. However, when Green left USAID in April 2020, things started to go downhill. 

Bonnie Glick, Green’s deputy, was expected to take the helm after his departure. Glick was a Republican appointee who received Senate confirmation for her role in USAID in 2019. She had experience in the organization and her fellow USAID employees were confident in her ability to lead. Her progression to the head of the agency seemed like a natural choice. But President Trump had other ideas. In came John Barsa, a political appointee that served at USAID’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean for only nine months prior to his promotion to Acting Administrator. And before that, he served on Trump’s 2016 campaign team. This was the start to what an anonymous senior-level USAID official branded a “dumpster fire” of Trump’s legacy at USAID.  

Barsa wasted no time making his mark on the organization and sent a letter, without proper clearances or vetting, to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres claiming that “the U.N.’s global humanitarian response for the COVID-19 pandemic was being used to advance a pro-abortion agenda around the world.” 

In June 2020, in wake of the Black Lives Matter movement, he refused to acknowledge requests from 2,400 employees to address racial equality and discrimination in the organization. He also greenlighted appointees with prejudice against the LGBTQ community, women, and Muslims and defended their discriminatory comments. Additionally, since Barsa was an interim director, he could only serve for 210 days unless confirmed by the Senate — which he wasn’t. Instead, Bonnie Glick was forced out. This created another vacancy and restarted Barsa’s 210-day clock. Multiple anonymous USAID officials told newspapers that Barsa’s agenda and coziness with the White House was an attempt for him to get a better position at the Department of Homeland Security during President Trump’s second term. Which proved to be a political gamble. But with a new administration now in office, a new chapter for USAID has begun. 

Samantha Power, a former war correspondent in Yugoslavia, Pulitzer Prize-winning author and former U.S. Ambassador to the UN was nominated by President-elect Biden to salvage the reputation of USAID. Biden acknowledged the shortcomings of the previous administration in his speech to nominate Power. He said: “I know firsthand the unparalleled knowledge and tireless commitment to principled American engagement [Samantha Power] brings to the table, and her expertise and perspective will be essential as our country reasserts its role as a leader on the world stage.” 

Along with his nomination of Power, Biden has elevated the standing of Director of USAID to be a Cabinet-level position. Samantha Power has been a reputable force in the past and she is expected to be no different with her role in USAID. She defined her time as UN Ambassador by championing genocide prevention and the expansion of human rights for women and LGBTQ-identifying people. She also had the unique challenge of building an international coalition to fight the Ebola outbreak in 2013 and 2014, which makes her extremely well-suited for overseeing foreign aid during the coronavirus pandemic. 

But Power is not without her faults. She was involved in orchestrating the American intervention in Libya in 2011 — a decision that former President Obama views as the worst of his presidency. The UN Security Council supported the intervention in order to “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” and our European Allies were for it as well. 

But the main issues and controversies are what came after the invasion. When NATO and the Western coalition came rushing into Libya, they toppled Muammar Qaddafi’s regime and promptly left. The decision to leave without creating democratic reform or any semblance of help for the post-Qaddafi era left Libya unstable and vulnerable to ISIS.  

Regardless, Power’s new role within the organization creates a new opportunity for a fresh start following the Trump era. There is no doubt that the first few months of her role as USAID director will be focused on helping disadvantaged countries with vaccine distribution and pandemic management. Power has said that pandemic management is her “top-line concern.” 

One challenge Power will face in her new role is returning USAID to its international commitments. Many policies and programs of the previous administration cut funding to women’s health — specifically reproductive health. Every Republican president since Ronald Reagan has instituted what is known as the Mexico City Policy. This policy cuts off funding to any NGO that funds abortions or advocates for the practice. Under the Trump Administration, it was expanded even further to limit funding for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), maternal and child health, malaria, nutrition, and other programs. These cuts rendered $7.3 billion in funding gone just in FY 2020. Because of the stoppage of U.S. funds to these programs, USAID expects that four years without funding for family planning and women’s health measures will have created a domino effect for other family and health issues. 

Not only will Power need to make sure these programs start back up and are funded, but she will also have to be prepared for the incredible influx of problems that have arisen as a result of these programs not having been functioning in recent years. 

Power has a daunting future ahead of her. Taking over an organization with a credibility problem during a pandemic and with dozens of policies to reverse is an incredible task, but she seems up for the challenge. 

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Following its withdrawal from the United Nations Human Rights Council and the decision to quit the Paris Climate Accords, the United States’ decision to pull out of the World Health Organization (WHO) came as no surprise to international spectators familiar with former President Donald Trump’s foreign policy doctrine of selective engagement, American nationalism and international withdrawal. However, the decision to pull the United States out of the global organization whose primary purpose is to coordinate international public health responses to crisis — during one of the worst pandemics of the last 100 years — did leave many questions unanswered.

This decision left the United States in an ill-equipped position to fight COVID-19 and left a major void between the United States and the rest of the world. As the pandemic ravaged across the world and left devastation in its wake, the WHO suddenly was in jeopardy of losing its funding, international clout and efficacy as a result of the announcement. 

However, within his first 24 hours in office, President Joseph R. Biden announced plans to re-enter the World Health Organization. As a result of this reversal, the United States is now in a dramatically better position to coordinate international diplomacy efforts and help fight COVID-19, on the domestic and international fronts. 

During his time in office and amid the first few weeks of COVID-19’s appearance in the United States, Trump repeatedly criticized the WHO for its COVID-19 response and claimed it was under the influence of China, who Trump — along with other world leaders — adamantly condemned for the country’s alleged cover-up of the virus’ transmission and proliferation early on. But the WHO has also been criticized in the past for being slow to react to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the 2013 Ebola outbreak, a concern of efficacy often resulting from the organization’s unstable funding sources. 

At the start of the coronavirus pandemic, Trump primarily accused the agency of helping spread the virus due to its alleged lack of transparency and ‘soft’ approach to China. At the time, more than 150 governments around the world backed a proposal to audit the agency. Then, following Trump’s claims to publicly discredit the WHO, the U.S. State Department sent a notice to the United Nations in July 2020, formally announcing the end of its 72-year membership with the WHO.

The notice of intent formally occurred in July; however, based on the terms of the treaty, the United States could not officially withdraw until a year later, in 2021. As a result, on the campaign trail in 2020 during the lead-up to the U.S. presidential election, public health response and international organization involvement was a big talking point for both candidates. The result of the election would ultimately decide if the U.S. were to stay or complete its withdrawal.

Withdrawal from the WHO would have enormous ramifications for the United States, with — arguably — the most significant being lack of access to shared data. The United States could no longer access data and vaccine research during a pandemic, could no longer advise the agency and would forfeit its ability to influence global health standards. This would reverse the goals of international health collaboration, as communication across countries would be intensely hindered. Essentially, the United States would forfeit its seat at the table during the moment it mattered most.

But now that Washington has undergone a transition and the United States’ public health efforts are led by a different team, with different goals and a different mission, Biden vowed to rescind the withdrawal and join a multilateral effort to distribute vaccines worldwide, reversing two major Trump administration decisions in one blow.

However, U.S. reengagement with the WHO will be complicated and the process to reconciliation will not be easy. 

The Trump administration’s move to withdraw from the WHO threatened the agency’s funding. Prior to the pandemic, the United States was the largest donor to the WHO, giving approximately $450 million a year. Today, the United States’ contributions are rivaled by Germany, who has since taken the lead, and by the private Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. An official exit by the United States would have significantly decreased the World Health Organization’s budget, leaving it reliant on other countries and private donors. This move had the potential to shift global health funding towards the will of wealthy private donors, with other governments reluctant to fill the void of funding the United States left. But, China pledged an additional $30 million on top of its annual contribution of $43 million to the WHO, demonstrating that Trump’s criticism of the WHO currying favor with China would not be solved by leaving space for China to become the organization’s major contributor.

Reversing the Trump administration’s stance towards the WHO, the Biden administration is expected to take further steps in rejoining world health initiatives. Recently, the United States committed itself to joining COVAX. This WHO co-led initiative aims to support the development and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine worldwide, specifically aiming for equitable distribution to lower-income countries. Until February 2021, Russia and the United States were the only two major countries to not join, unlike many of the United States’ partners, such as the United Kingdom, which pledged major financial support to the program. The program has already raised $2 billion but is looking to raise an additional $5 billion in 2021. It is one of the largest multilateral efforts since the Paris Climate Agreement and likely will set the stage for further international health alliances. 

The impact of the United States’ newly announced commitment has yet to be seen, but signals a positive shift toward multilateral cooperation and solutions. Joining this global program sends a powerful message to U.S. allies and adversaries: the United States is re-extending an olive branch to nations around the world and attempting to rebuild relationships tarnished in the last four years. However, the United States cannot entirely wipe the past four years off of its history and will likely face hesitation from the international community on the path to re-establishing diplomatic relations until the Biden administration proves its commitment to the global stage once again. 

The United States cannot assume the world will revert back to the pre-Trump era, especially since other countries, such as China, have stepped in to fill the United States’ role in certain issue areas. But, recommitment to the WHO is a clear message that the United States is once more prioritizing U.S.-led diplomacy — assuming the world is ready for it. 

But ultimately, the United States’ re-engagement with the World Health Organization will help with the global struggle against COVID-19. Antony Blinken, the new U.S. Secretary of State, stated that the Biden administration “believe[s]strongly that we can ensure that every American gets the vaccine, but also help make sure that others around the world who want it have access to it.” In joining COVAX, the United States can help to distribute vaccines worldwide. 

In the White House’s National Strategy for the COVID-19 Response and Pandemic Preparedness briefing, the Biden-Harris administration declared that the United States would restore U.S. leadership on a global scale, laying out an active strategy for fighting the pandemic. The United States will support the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator and seek to strengthen existing multilateral initiatives. Some of these include the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Additionally, the United States hopes to strengthen global pandemic supply chains and work in partnership with the UN Security Council to aid humanitarian cooperation on the COVID-19 response to prevent future biological threats. 

It takes time to effectively communicate collaboration to fight a global threat. With the United States rejoining global alliances and advancing its goal of engaging with the World Health Organization, hopefully, the world is prepared to embrace the new administration’s multilateral agenda. 

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