The earliest form of the Taliban was born in the 1990s in the aftermath of the Afghan Civil War. The group was primarily composed of students who had been educated and radicalized with extremist religious ideas. After the rapid spread of Taliban ideals, by the late 1990s, the Taliban had controlled the majority of Afghanistan. However, the Taliban’s power and control over the nation had mostly dissolved after the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan following the September 11th, 2001 attacks. 

The United States remained in Afghanistan to try and build a democracy and the country’s infrastructure, attempting to create schools, roads and utilities in both urban and rural areas. However, many of these projects never took shape for two reasons: first, the United States diverted most of its money to its subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003, and second, while the United States attempted to rebuild Afghanistan, it was waging a war against Afghans who were possibly in the Taliban or in the Mujahedin (allied Muslim anti-Western terrorist forces) who were mostly from rural areas.

Consequently, the United States fostered increasing resentment among Afghans, who created the second wave of Afghan fighters in the Taliban, this time primarily comprised mainly of everyday rural Afghans who were wrongfully accused of terrorism, cruelty and jihadism and subject to cruel and unusual punishment. This new Taliban gained power in secret, taking over the rural expanses of the country and slowly ambushing United States forces. Eventually, the Taliban waged an insurrection against the United States to become the interim government of Afghanistan in September 2021, with the new Taliban government leadership retaining many members from the Taliban of the 1990s.

Ever since this government takeover, Afghanistan has become an isolated country, deprived of international economic collaboration. Before the Taliban takeover, foreign assistance “funded 75%” of the government budget. However, the majority of the world currently refuses to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The Taliban is financially starved, and the government is crumbling without allies to assist the country’s needs. The United States alone has suspended aid granted through USAID, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It has also frozen the Afghan government’s reserves held in bank accounts in the United States. Therefore, Afghanistan has catapulted into an economic recession and Afghans need significant economic and humanitarian assistance.

The situation progressively worsens with the onset of natural disasters that plague the region. Earthquakes are a very prevalent part of the country of Afghanistan and its surrounding area because of the prevalence of mountains and fault lines alongside the region. On June 22, in the Northeast Khost Province, over 1,000 Afghans died in a 5.9-magnitude earthquake, and thousands more were injured. This is the largest humanitarian disaster the Taliban has dealt with since becoming the government of Afghanistan.

The Taliban urges the international community to “provide immediate… aid” to help the affected Afghans and the government in this most recent crisis. Some nations, like China, have provided millions of dollars of humanitarian relief, but many nations, including the United States, remain hesitant to help. Since many nations refuse to recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government, resources and aid are circumvented around the government and provided directly to Afghans. Still, only “5% of Afghan families have enough food” to sustain themselves nutritionally according to the World Health Organization as of late 2021, even with the onset of numerous forms of international assistance, and this number seems to become progressively worse as time continues.

In September of last year, the United Nations passed general licenses that allowed aid groups to continue assisting Afghan citizens by providing them with “basic human needs,” even while the United States maintained its sanctions on the Taliban. There is no limit on civilians receiving humanitarian assistance, but freezing governmental assets severely affects the people of Afghanistan, weakening everything their ability to access cash. Although the Biden administration has seized half of these frozen Afghan assets to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghans, this decision might actually hinder Afghanistan’s economic growth in the long run since monetary assets themselves are still frozen. Instead of Afghans providing for themselves with their own money, the Biden administration expects that humanitarian assistance can provide for the basic needs of Afghans. This cash shortage also affects humanitarian aid organizations, like the International Rescue Committee and Doctors Without Borders, organizations that have struggled to even pay their own staff in the country.

Additionally, humanitarian aid organizations are only temporary relief in otherwise flawed governmental provisions; eventually, there would have to be a long-term solution. There is added difficulty when nations are hesitant to provide aid to the Taliban, a government that is financially struggling. Finally, the United States and other nations must debate helping a government that could utilize this financial support and socioeconomic isolation to become a partially or entirely isolated regional threat, much like Russia or North Korea. Ultimately, there are few options for nations to assist Afghans.

To ensure protection for Afghans, the United States and other countries must continue to indirectly or openly support humanitarian aid, while diplomatically and strategically working to lessen Taliban extremism that could force the government into financial reliance on the international world. At the end of the day, there are millions of Afghan people who lack basic necessities and humanitarian assistance. The United States, a country significantly responsible for the current situation in the country, must contribute to actively better the situation, although the decision might always remain uneasy. After all, the international community’s inaction to help hurts not only millions of Afghans but all of humanity.

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Qatar demonstrated its willingness to work with the extremist group when it announced “[it is]important to continue dialogue with the Taliban,” stated Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim, at the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly. “Boycotting them would only lead to polarisation and reactions, whereas dialogue could be fruitful.” This new goodwill toward the Taliban has raised questions within the international community regarding the future of global relations, specifically within the Middle East. 

Glimpse from the Globe sat down with James Seevers, a professor for the Georgetown Foreign School of Service, to discuss what this possible allyship entails and what the future holds for Qatar and its foreign diplomacy.

When asked about his opinions on Qatar’s remarks from the UNGA Conference and its future implications, Seevers replied, “Qatar has engaged with the Taliban for some time, allowing them to open an office in Doha in 2013 and hosting talks between the Taliban and the United States in recent years. Qatar’s relationship with the Taliban gives it significant influence in Afghanistan, and Qatari officials have said that they seek to encourage the Taliban to be inclusive as it forms a new government.” 

Not only is Qatar maintaining strong relationships with countries such as the United States, but it is also making strong efforts to nurture relationships with the Taliban in order to have increased influence in both regions of the world. By maintaining close ties with the opposing governments, Qatar ensures security from both nations by acting as their only source of communication.

In 2013, Qatar and the U.S. helped the Taliban open an office in Doha with the intention of creating a neutral space for negotiations with the extremist group. By allowing the Taliban to set up its own international communications headquarters in their capital, Qatar provided the extremist group with a way to establish relations with nation-states throughout the world. 

With the establishment of this office and the most recent remarks at the UNGA Conference, many experts and government officials have wondered whether an allyship between Qatar and the Taliban will likely happen in the near future. 

Seevers responds to this by stating that, “Qatar will likely move carefully in its relations with the Taliban, and any decision about diplomatic recognition, given the Taliban’s history of brutal rule when they were in power pre-2001.” 

Since 1995, when Crown Prince Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani deposed his father, Qatar has been a symbol of democracy and equal rights for the Middle East. Supporting any group or nation that violates those ideals would go against many beliefs Qatar stands for, causing even more confusion behind the true intentions of this new alliance. 

With no allyship in the cards for the near future, many question Qatar’s true intentions when it supported the Taliban’s need for open communication with the world. Seevers believes it was a tactful move because it will “give Qatar a significant role in global politics, increase its influence and smart power, and, in a broad sense, enhance its own security.”

Qatar acts as a mediator by controlling all communication between the Taliban and any international state, hence making it a strong nation to have as an ally. Now with many countries debating whether it is the right choice to work with the Taliban, and using Qatar to do so, Qatar is aware that it is too indispensable for global security for any other nations to threaten its power and sovereignty.

After the U.S.’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States moved its Afghan embassy from Kabul, Afghanistan to Doha, Qatar. This move helped strengthen Qatar’s influence, and according to Seevers, it also “help[ed]the U.S. government during a challenging period and further strengthened bilateral relations.” 

By already having a strong presence within Qatar, including the establishment of the U.S.’ Al Udeid Air Base, the UnitedStates has found a way to secure its footing within the Middle East and retain some control over affairs occuring in the region. 

The United States has continued this hunt for more influence and security within the Middle East in recent days, and has done so through the “recent visit to Qatar by both Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin,” mentioned Seevers. He continued, “it demonstrated U.S. appreciation for the invaluable assistance Qatar provided in the evacuation of Afghans, Americans and others from Afghanistan when Kabul fell.” 

As the United States continues to find ways to establish more control during the Taliban’s rise in power, Qatar will be a key leader in continuing these efforts and communications.

“Qatar will likely continue to serve as an important go-between as events unfold on the ground and the world grapples with how to deal with an Afghanistan led by the Taliban,” Seevers said.

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Yet, their actions over the past few weeks contradict this message. The Taliban has not allowed women to go back to work, claiming that they needed to teach their fighters to respect “women” before this can occur. Inclusivity was especially poorly reflected in the Taliban’s all-male political cabinet. Meanwhile, journalists were attacked and detained simply for covering protests and demonstrations happening across the country. 

This article, however, will primarily focus on two primary concerns in the region, both of which are causing geopolitical instability. 

Recently, the rise of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and its connection with the Haqqani Network have been cause for concern — and the implications of this group’s rise on human rights and political freedoms is particularly worrisome. Additionally, this article will explore the role of the Hawala system, the primary funding source of organizations like ISIS-K, in propping up the terror group.

While the Taliban is the most successful of the region’s extremist groups, it is far from the most brutal. Scattered across Afghanistan, many seperatist organizations represent serious threats to stability. The most recently successful is ISIS-K, or the Islamic State Khorosan, which is an affiliate organization of the Islamic State. It was founded in 2014 with fighters who defected from other terrorist organizations like the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 

The main issue these defectors took with their previous organization was the blurry or overly broad mission the organizations pursued. While the Taliban solely focuses on controlling Afghanistan, ISIS-K, like its parent organization, wants to impose their beliefs on a much grander scale beyond the country.

While ISIS-K has always been small compared to other groups, it grew to 4,000 fighters by 2019. But, the United States, coupled with Afghan security forces, was able to put a serious dent in the organization, reducing ISIS-K to about half its original size. Yet, ISIS-K has been able to survive due to its willingness to bargain and work strategically with other terrorist groups, many of whom also rely on large regional populations willing to fight for their cause. 

In the last two years, the group successfully carried out 77 attacks in four months and has pulled off several major attacks, including a bombing of a high school that killed 90 schoolgirls. And most recently, the bombing of Kabul Airport killed 13 Americans and almost 200 Afghan citizens.

ISIS-K, like other separatist groups in the region, funds itself through control of drug trafficking routes, as well as extortion of the local population. Interestingly, there are significant ties between ISIS-K and the Haqqani Network, which is connected to the Taliban. The Haqqani Network not only provides security for the Taliban, but is also headed by Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is the current Afghan Minister of the Interior and one of two deputies to the Taliban’s supreme commander, Mawlawi Hibatullah. ISIS-K and the Haqqani Network collaborate in the lucrative drug trade along the Pakistan borders. 

The cooperation occurs as such: ISIS-K recruits the fighters, they then receive training in Pakistan from various local extremist groups and go over targets they’d like to attack, the Haqqani Network provides coordination and logistical planning to make sure the attacks actually happen, and then once that’s all sorted, ISIS-K carries out the plan and takes responsibility. 

This strategy has been carried out numerous times in recent years, including an attack on a maternity ward in 2020 and the aforementioned bombing on the all-girls school. It is also important to note that ISIS-K and the Taliban are more similar than they are different. Both of these attacks were targeting the Hazara people, an ethnic minority within Afghanistan. The Taliban have a similar history of targeting these people, showcasing a mutual hatred of select ethnoreligious groups within the country.

But how do organizations like ISIS-K and the Taliban fund themselves? The answer lies in the same strategy that the Taliban have used for decades — one that forms much of Afghanistan’s economy: the Hawala system. 

Ahmad Shah Mobariz, a PhD candidate at the University of Arkansas who has done extensive research and work in understanding the challenges of the Afghan economy, spoke with Glimpse from the Globe about the Hawala economy. Mobariz spoke about the Hawala System, an informal money transfer system that has increasingly come under the spotlight due to bank closures and frozen assets. 

The Hawala system works through a complex network formed by a sender, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. According to Mehrabi, informal channels are established that involve three countries: “the sender, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.” The sender first gives money to the transfer agent in the sender’s country, who then sends it to Pakistan. The partner in Pakistan then places an order to a partner in Afghanistan, to convert the dollar into the local currency for the receiver in Afghanistan.

But what if someone within Afghanistan were to want to make an international transaction? According to Mobariz the answer, once again, is Pakistan. Afghani currency has no value outside country lines, so there has to be a substitute. 

“Informal money brokers ship Pakistani rupees to Afghanistan, which gradually replaces the Afghani in most transactions,” Mobariz said. 

The Pakistani medium replaces both the dollar as well as the Afghani, demonstrating Afghanistan’s reliance on Pakistan. 

The Hawala system is a crucial mechanism for fundraising various terrorist organizations. After the United States and Afghan joint forces forced them out of previously controlled mountainous regions, ISIS-K lost access to the talcum mines, which were a major revenue stream source for them. Now, they largely receive funds from four main sources: ISIS, local donations, taxation and extortion. 

ISIS-K can also glean and store money in different Hawala networks. According to the Treasury Department, ISIS-K forms relationships with specific Haduwalars who store thousands of dollars for them in and around Kabul and Jalalabad. Through this, ISIS-K can pay their fighters and provide basic necessities, all to maintain power and influence. 

While secretive and underground, much of ISIS-K’s wealth lies in the hands of few individuals. If the Taliban were to even remotely supervise and attempt to regulate Hawalas, ISIS-K would have no place to store or exchange their money. Furthermore, the Taliban may even be incentivized to do this, as sharing financial intelligence with international organizations could buy them goodwill in the community and reduce the chance of intervention. 

So why does the Taliban choose to not crackdown on the ISIS-K Hawadulars and cement firm control of Afghanistan? 

First, regulating the Hawalas and reporting financial information to international organizations could be detrimental to the Taliban’s own revenue streams, particularly in rural strongholds. Regulation would likely require the Taliban to build a legitimate economy, which given the Taliban’s history and their current administration is unlikely. 

ISIS-K’s existence within Afghanistan could potentially benefit Taliban aims. Top individuals in the United States defense sector have already expressed willingness to work with the Taliban in combating ISIS-K. Taliban leverage would continually increase as ISIS-K grows in strength and begins to pick targets outside of Western Nations. Furthemore, as long as ISIS-K remains a threat, pressure on the Taliban will likely remain diminished, which may allow them to operate under less strain and lower the chances of international intervention. 

Moreover, according to Mobariz, there are already existing factions within the Taliban between the old regime and the new-age Haqqani Network. Continued attacks from either side could split the Taliban and its security network, leading to a civil war that would be bloody regardless of the prevailing party.

Will ISIS-K be allowed to co-exist with the Taliban in Afghanistan? The answer is tough to discern and will depend on a multitude of factors, but only time will tell. 

But while the international community watches the Taliban and ISIS-K slug it out for control from afar, Afghan citizens are caught in the crossfire. 

“They will be fine, but it’s the people that will suffer,” said Dr. Shah, a professor at Montgomery College and a member of the supreme council of the Central Bank of Afghanistan.

For decades, Afghan citizens have suffered at the hands of the Taliban, at the hands of incompetent “democratic” administrations and lived at the mercy of the U.S. government. While the United States managed to evacuate its own citizens, the people of Afghanistan are forced to manage the hardship and conflict in their country.

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The Trump administration initiated intra-Afghan negotiations after signing an agreement with the Taliban in February. Peace talks offer the country a rare opportunity to build a framework for lasting coexistence after nineteen years of bloodshed. Afghans are in dire need of a permanent ceasefire, especially now that the coronavirus is pushing millions into poverty and devastating the economy, with 90% of the population living below the poverty line of $2 a day.

While getting the Taliban and Afghan government to the table is an accomplishment in and of itself, negotiations will be long and difficult, and both parties will need to reconcile fundamental differences over the country’s system of government to reach a successful deal. This article outlines the developments that have led to peace talks, challenges facing intra-Afghan negotiations, and future policy considerations.

Intra-Afghan Peace Talks

After more than eighteen months of negotiations, the United States reached an agreement with the Taliban in February, signaling the possibility of ending the U.S.’ nearly two-decade-long involvement in the war. The agreement commits the United States to a gradual withdrawal of military forces in exchange for the Taliban’s commitment to preventing Afghan soil from being used as a safe harbor for terrorists ever again. The agreement also obligates the Taliban to commence peace negotiations with the Afghan government and was preceded by a ‘Reduction in Violence’ deal to test the Taliban’s commitment to achieving peace and controlling its forces.

On the same day the U.S.-Taliban agreement was finalized in Doha, the United States signed an agreement with the Afghan government in Kabul. A joint declaration between the U.S. and Afghan government outlined goals for achieving peace and regional stability in Afghanistan, including a permanent ceasefire, withdrawal of U.S. troops, and counterrorism operations.

Talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban were supposed to begin on March 10, 2020, as per the U.S.-Taliban agreement, following an initial prison exchange of Taliban prisoners and Afghan security forces prisoners. However, the Afghan government had not been consulted on the exchange, resulting in contention and a delay of peace talks. After more negotiating, the Afghan government eventually agreed to release 1,500 prisoners and created a negotiation team for the talks composed of “politicians, former officials, and representatives of civil society,” five of whom were women.

In June, the Taliban and Afghan government agreed to open intra-Afghan peace talks in Qatar to negotiate a ceasefire and long-awaited political settlement to nineteen years of conflict. However, tensions increased when the Taliban rejected said ceasefire, which the government called for during the holy month of Ramadan so authorities could focus on curbing the spread of coronavirus. The Afghan National Security Council reported that attacks by the Taliban over the previous three months rose by nearly 40 percent compared to the same time last year. The Taliban promised not to target American bases, but refused a ceasefire with Afghan forces, leaving that to direct negotiations between both sides. In response, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani warned that Taliban-sponsored violence could pose a serious threat to negotiations during the peace process in September.

Key Challenges

Intra-Afghan talks are a historic chance for peace but there is still a long road ahead, with many challenges threatening the viability of a sustainable peace agreement. First, the Taliban and Afghan government will have to reconcile fundamental differences in ideology and governance systems. The majority of citizens support the current “Islamic Republic” which follows a democratic constitution, separation of powers, and equal rights for men and women to participate in politics. The Taliban, however, seek to establish an “Islamic system” which has yet to be defined, but would likely be similar to the restrictive regime established in the late 1990s which included: banning entertainment, forcing men to grow beards, and shutting down girls’ schools. The Taliban have been steadfast in their opposition to democratic elections and the country’s constitution. For an agreement to be successful, the Taliban must be flexible and willing to make concessions with regard to issues such as the role of Islam and women’s rights in the legal system.

The second challenge facing intra-Afghan talks is internal division on both sides. After the disputed and controversial outcome of the September 2019 presidential election — which resulted in Ghani’s presidency by a razor-thin majority of 50.64 percent of votes — the Afghan government is extremely fragile. While a power-sharing agreement was reached by Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, Chief Executive Officer of Afghanistan, tensions between the two politicians remain high, and the Afghan government is plagued with other forms of high-level corruption that threaten its cohesion and credibility. Internal divisions within the Taliban will also make negotiating difficult, as factions hold different stances on the peace agreement. Some Taliban members refuse to acknowledge the agreement, while others are working to strengthen ties with the Haqqani Network and the Islamic State in Khorasan.

Finally, it is unclear whether the Taliban are truly acting in good faith. The group has already objected to numerous compromises such as prisoner exchanges and a temporary ceasefire, making Afghan and U.S. officials cast doubts on whether they are serious about reaching a peace deal. The Taliban’s increased attacks on Afghan forces following the February agreement also raise concerns about the viability of a long-lasting ceasefire. Skeptics argue that the fundamentalist group is only negotiating to drive U.S. troops out of the region so Taliban forces can overthrow the Afghan government and establish an interim one.

Future Policy Considerations

The stakes in Afghanistan are as high as ever and the United States should view intra-Afghan peace negotiations a foreign policy priority. After nineteen years of involvement in the conflict, a final peace agreement would allow the United States to withdraw forces and reduce its security and development commitments, focusing instead on recovering from the pandemic and addressing tensions with China and Iran.

Despite bipartisan support for a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops, abandoning Afghanistan before a peace agreement is settled would be a foreign policy disaster. Not only is Afghanistan on the brink of a humanitarian crisis, but the country is also still at risk of becoming a hub for terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), especially if the Taliban were to overthrow the Afghan government. A withdrawal of troops would also send a bad signal to allies about U.S. credibility in the region. Thus, the United States should continue providing economic, military, and humanitarian assistance to the Afghan government and remain heavily involved in the peace process to prevent stalled negotiations and ensure a peace settlement is reached.

The harsh reality is that one or both sides may refuse to proceed with negotiations, resulting in a stalemate. Given the Taliban’s lack of commitment to democracy, it is extremely likely that the group will refuse to make concessions on civil liberties, the role of Islam in governance, or political power-sharing. The U.S. must be prepared to maintain the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan if the Taliban chooses to renege on its commitment and develop credible threats to ensure that recent progress is not reversed.

While reaching a political settlement should remain a U.S. priority, it must be done without sacrificing the societal gains that have been achieved in the past two decades. The Afghan government should not make concessions on civil liberties, women’s rights, and democratic principles of governance when negotiating with the Taliban. Afghan women’s hard-won rights cannot be sacrificed for political gain. Instead, leaders should continue to involve Afghan women in the negotiation process to ensure their voices are heard and promoted in the formation of a peace agreement.

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