Nonetheless, the opposition against the nuclear plant’s construction was vociferous. A principal concern for the opposition group was the fear of foreign interference, particularly from Russia. The Russian oil company, Rosatom, had expressed interest in funding the power plant, despite its legacy from the Chornobyl disaster in 1986. Worries arose that allowing such an intervention would increase Kazakhstan’s dependency on Russia, from whom it gained independence in 1990 at the precipice of the Soviet Union’s collapse.

In the days leading up to the referendum, reports emerged that the government attempted to suppress peaceful political protests by activists who opposed the approval of the power plant. Activists were denied entry to audience halls where the power plant was being debated, detained while leaving public hearings and an increased law enforcement presence was noticed around journalists.

The climax of the contention was in September 2024, a few weeks before the actual referendum election. In Almaty, the country’s largest city, groups of activists took to the streets to voice their opposition to the proposed power plant. The Kazakh government clamped down on the protests through arrests. Five men, one named Aidar Mubarakov, were detained in the city for protesting the nuclear proposal, accused of “organizing mass riots” according to Article 272 of the Criminal Code.  Article 272 states that the organization of violent riots is punishable by imprisonment for a period of four to ten years; however, the reported protests carried out by Aidar Mubarakov and his colleagues remained peaceful, with the men arguing that they had no intention of inciting violence and were exercising their inalienable constitutional liberties. Accordingly, many citizens viewed this case as a breach of the government’s legal framework, portraying ordinary citizens, who were pacifist in their actions, as criminals or security risks, engendering worries that Kazakhstan’s criminalization of peaceful activism was a step toward potential authoritarianism. 

One of the protesters, Aidar Mubarakov (56), had previously spoken out against the government’s actions only a few years prior. While Mubarakov is arguably not as famous as other Kazakh human rights defenders in the region, his civic anonymity renders his story compelling. In 2022, Mubarakov and his friend, Erkin Kaziev, were similarly criminally charged for an art performance in which they chained themselves to a large cage with wheels and held signs stating “Kazakhstan is a large prison” above their heads. Police used scissors to cut the chains and began launching tear gas canisters against the protesters. 

Accordingly, it can be concluded that Mubarakov is no longer simply a protester with a just cause, but something more. The government’s violation of Mubarakov’s protective freedoms during the nuclear plant protest under the guise of protecting the public from the “disruption of a state event” and “illegal assembly” designates Aidar Mubarakov a political prisoner.

What does that mean? According to the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, a person is considered a political prisoner if their detention was imposed in violation of a fundamental guarantee of their liberty, such as freedom of thought or assembly, the prisoner was detained for purely political reasons if the charges are clearly out of proportion with what the accused was doing and if the arrested was subject to an unfair and biased trial. Mubarakov was indeed detained during a peaceful protest, was simply an everyday worker who was arrested for expressing his concern about a government project and was unjustly sentenced to a 5-year arrest.

Initially, Mubarakov’s case received minimal international attention, and within Kazakhstan itself, the arrest went largely unnoticed. As momentum behind the referendum began to build, however, many organizations started to remark on the campaign against the nuclear power plant and the various opposition movements to its approval. For instance, Radio Free Europe, a private journalism organization that prides itself on promoting democracy and debate in countries where the free press is restricted, published an article highlighting Mubarakov’s arrest in early October. While this detailed publication garnered some attention, the case was brought up again a few months later by the Open Dialogue Foundation in its annual report on the 2024 human rights violations in Kazakhstan. Summarizing Kazakhstan’s numerous violations with the stark title “Tough Year for Human Rights,” the report outlined over 48 political prisoners subjected to captivity within the nation and the continued curtailment of human rights implemented by the government, demonstrated through anti-terrorism legislation.

The related anti-terrorism rhetoric and counter-terrorism legislation directly impinge on the security that peaceful protesters face daily. The government reportedly positions authorities outside their homes, jobs and places of recreation in an effort to brazenly intimidate activists into changing their minds. This highlights the bravery exhibited by the nuclear plant opponents, such as Aidar Mubarakov, who took to the streets in protest despite reports of intimidating threats by the government. 

The most prominent question that emerges from Mubarakov’s story and detention inquires into the current state of Kazakhstan’s politics. Is Kazakhstan sliding back into authoritarian rule, reviving the Soviet-style repression it once fought to escape and threatening the democratic future it has struggled to build? The answer is multifaceted. In recent years, Kazakhstan’s government has been critiqued internationally as repressive, particularly after it handled the Bloody January protests across the country in 2022. What began as peaceful protests against fuel prices erupted into violence when soldiers and armed vehicles shot at protesters, resulting in 238 casualties. The government attempted to mask the event through anti-terrorist rhetoric and the denial of lawyers to those who were arrested; however, internal and international human rights groups were quick to publicize the atrocities that occurred, leading to harsh criticism from international governments, with the U.S and EU criticizing the government’s actions. To this day, there remains little accountability for the 2022 events and the government administration’s failure to acknowledge its severe actions during and after the protests.

Despite the oppression, Kazakhstan’s current president advocates for increased citizen participation in local decision-making and has established the Constitutional Court to address public human rights appeals. Furthermore, while his government remains autocratic, the country is considered more open and free than its neighboring nations. 

The current state of Mubarakov’s liberty remains ambiguous, with sources remaining difficult to authenticate. In Nov. 2025, the Appellate Court of Almaty reduced Mubarakov’s prison term from four years to two years of restricted freedom. However, the government refused to acquit him of his charges and to rescind its accusations and banned him from participating in public activities. The verdict was handed down in accordance with the principle that the protesters were inciting mass violence and distributing brochures opposing the power plant’s construction. 

The most effective way to combat these kinds of human rights violations is to advocate alongside local organizations, through social media posts and reposts, online campaigns and contact with Kazakh groups and government organizations, such as Orda, Open Dialogue and Human Rights Watch. Additionally, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Kazakhstan (at gov.kz) offers an appeals page listing judicial leadership officials who can be contacted via email. Although these approaches may seem inefficient, they are steps toward the release of political prisoners in Kazakhstan. Ultimately, power belongs to the people, and in their hands they hold the key to change. 

The autumn breezes of that fateful day in October were ephemeral, passing without notice. However, the actions enacted by Mubarakov and his colleagues against the referendum are permanent, establishing a potent opposition to the nuclear base implementation and the potentially disastrous repercussions it could provoke. While the referendum may have succeeded, the movement created by Mubarakov and those who protested alongside him will continue. Mubarakov’s detention is more than an arrest, but rather an illustration of the intensifying crackdown on political protesters in Kazakhstan and of the deep internal tensions testing the resilience of its democratic institutions.

The post The Prisoner Who Represents the Curtailment of Democracy in Kazakhstan appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Trump’s position to swiftly end the war does not come as a surprise. He has said on multiple occasions during his campaign trail that it would be one of his top priorities if reelected. However, despite Trump’s ambiguity and unspecificity on how he would end the conflict, the international community has drawn on statements from the former President to infer how the war will end if his administration takes office: the United States will simply stop funding the Ukrainian War effort. 

Trump’s conservative view on foreign aid toward Ukraine has been expressed numerous times to both the general public and world leaders. In March of this year, when Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban visited Trump at his Mar-a-Lago club in Palm Beach, Florida, Orban sat down with ABC News and said that he was assured that Trump would not give Ukraine “a penny” if elected. 

Following the Russian invasion in 2022, Ukraine has become one of the top recipients of US foreign aid, something not seen in Europe since the Harry Truman administration created the Marshall Plan after World War II. Sitting at 41%, the United States is the second largest contributor to Ukraine’s foreign aid behind the European Union. Foreign aid has largely been allocated toward military operations, law enforcement, communication departments and humanitarian efforts. 

Yet, even under the Biden Administration, it has been increasingly difficult in recent months for the United States to get bi-partisan support for funding efforts towards Ukraine. Much of foreign security discourse has shifted to the Israel-Hamas war, and Ukraine is not getting the media coverage that it once relied on for international support. Additionally, domestic chaos has fostered turbulence in Congress, with bi-partisan negotiations taking months. In Dec 2023, Zelensky’s appeal to Congress for funding was unsuccessful, as many GOP members cited domestic security issues like illegal immigration as a bigger priority. The shift of the Republican Party becoming increasingly neo-isolationist has created additional struggles for the Biden administration in terms of foreign policy, as many senators have said that their support remains contingent on stricter immigration policies along the Mexican border. 

On Tuesday, Apr 23, the foreign aid package that took months of deliberation finally passed through Congress, allocating $60.8 billion for the Ukrainian War effort. The majority of House Republicans opposed the effort, but the speaker of the House, Mike Johnson, managed to structure the bill in ways that separated large groups of opposition, preventing a congressional gridlock. However, despite this win for Congress and the Biden Administration to uphold their support for the war effort, Ukraine said that the delay in US aid has already had a direct impact on the ground. Hal Brands, a US foreign policy expert and a professor of global affairs at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said recently in an interview with The Hub that “the cost of this delay can be measured in Ukrainian lives and territory lost”. He cites that these losses, including the loss of the influential fortress city, Avdiivka, are a direct result of the dire need for artillery ammunition, which US aid helps to supply. 

Recognizing the US’ fundamental contribution to the war effort, for months now US allies in Europe have been trying to “Trump-proof” the conflict’s security, fearing the implications of Trump’s potential return to office. The two nuclear powers of Europe, the UK and France, can hardly compare to the US military arsenal, as they are but a small fraction of the size and have failed in test launches. 

Reflecting on this threatening potential reality, Norbert Röttgen, a veteran German lawmaker and ex-chair of the Bundestag’s foreign affairs committee, commented it would mark a big change for Europe.  

“Europe would have to stand up for its own security in an unprecedented way,” Röttgen said. 

Similarly, Valérie Hayer, who leads the Renew Europe group, and is French President Emmanuel Macron’s top lawmaker in Brussels, claims now is the perfect opportunity for Europe to start becoming more independent. 

“Europe has relied on the U.S. to provide its security for too long,” Hayer said.  “It’s high time for Europe to improve its own deterrence capacities and take its security into its own hands.” 

Restructuring trans-Atlantic relations would include multiple components, but the overarching theme centers around diverting economic reliance. Europe must look to other regional and global partners to ensure stability. This effort has already been seen in the geopolitically chaotic, yet productive, move to wean off of Russian oil exports.

Trump has said on multiple occasions, both in interviews and on his Truth social network, that the 2021 Russian invasion of Ukraine would never have happened if he had been in office. He even claimed that he delayed the invasion for years, citing his close-knit relationship and ability to influence Putin. However, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, has claimed that it would not make a difference if Trump was in power, because the mutual trust between the United States and Russia was tarnished when President George W. Bush Jr. pulled the United States out of the anti-ballistic missile treaties, which many international relations scholars believe escalated a new arms race in the Post-Cold war era. Nevertheless, Trump has continued to double down on his claims on his ability to influence Russian foreign policy. 

Since the Marshall Plan, a bilateral transatlantic security relationship has been fostered between the U.S. and most of Western Europe, materialized in NATO. However, Trump has been a vocal critic of NATO for years, claiming that other states have been freeriding on the US economic and security contributions to the organization. In fact, foreign policy expert and widely-regarded author Anne Applebaum believes that there is a considerable chance that Trump would pull the U.S. out of NATO entirely. 

However, regardless of his win in the election in November, it is clear that an emerging fundamental shift in transatlantic security relations seems imminent. As the war continues on to its third year, US foreign aid is a rising contentious topic among Americans, and Europe will have to adjust accordingly.

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However, it is not an isolated event. Over the past twenty years, Russia has participated in what has become known as passportization platforms in Georgia and Ukraine, fast-tracking or issuing Russian passports to breakaway regions to increase presence and political pull in areas of interest. In fact, on April 24, 2019, just four years before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin signed a decree expediting Russian passport citizenship procedures for Ukrainians living in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

What Russia’s actions demonstrate on a broader scale is that passports have become powerful tools in international relations, thereby influencing not only the movement but also the benefits, identities and rights of individuals. Sometimes, passports have even demarcated who is allowed to leave active warzones, with early evacuation out of the Gaza Strip into Egypt segmented by citizenship, and only foreign or dual passport holders allowed to make the Rafah crossing. How society has gotten to this point, and the mechanisms in which passport and citizenship processes have been abused and complicated over the past decades, open conversation regarding the history and present status of these travel documents. 

A Brief History of the Passport

The creation of the contemporary passport system is often attributed to the aftermath of World War I, where after mass refugee displacements, an international effort by the League of Nations began implementing protocols for organized state recognition and travel.

Yet, there is evidence that nations have been trying to classify and control individuals’ movements for much longer. Reports have been discovered of ancient China as early as the 3rd century BCE employing a check-point system of wood-written documents called zhuan to determine who was allowed in or out of the country’s borders. Early attempts illustrate that the policy of inclusion and exclusion regarding citizenship and the state has proved pivotal to the creation of travel documents, in whichever form, to confirm ones belonging to a particular political entity. 

Golden Passport and Visa Programs

Since then, exactly who is allowed to receive documentation has become an extremely contentious topic. Over the past three years, Europe in particular has been cracking down on what are known as “golden passports” or “golden visas,” investment programs providing official documents to foreigners who invest a set amount into a country’s economy. These programs were created to ease national financial burdens and promote foreign contributions to housing, cultural or scientific exploits and financial funds. 

However, several programs were critiqued and shut down after claims of corruption and security concerns. For instance, Cyprus ended its golden passport program after an investigation accused several government officials of approving passports to ineligible applicants with prior criminal records. Furthermore, earlier this year in Jan 2024, Portugal also announced it would be revising the rules for its golden visas after pressure from the European Commission to shut down financial investment document programs altogether. 

The aim of many of these initiatives was to incentivize foreign direct investment in domestic economic sectors, and according to the London School of Economics, they have, in part, been successful, with the predominant market for the programs coming from China, the Middle East and Russia. Nevertheless, what makes these programs controversial is their inherent access inequality, allowing wealthy individuals greater possibilities and loopholes to earn citizenship benefits.

Freedom of movement has long dictated and been a prominent discussion regarding migration practices, and golden visas create a fast track for the wealthy to gain an ulterior advantage. Furthermore, without proper bureaucratic and accountability measures, abuse of golden passport and visa programs remains a prominent concern regardless of the economic benefit. 

Citizenship Requirements and “Birth-Tourism”

In addition to golden passport programs, arguments over how citizenship is granted in the first place returned to the domestic mainstream after presidential candidate Donald Trump recently re-proposed revising the United States’ birthright citizenship structure, which, under the Constitution, grants everyone born on U.S. soil automatic national citizenship. Trump’s suggestions came after a conservative push to deny children of immigrants entering the United States illegally American citizenship. 

The United States’ current birthright citizenship structure retains much of its history in the aftermath of the Civil War, where, to prevent the creation of citizenship classes following the abolition of slavery, the 14th Amendment ensured that anyone born on U.S. territory would be entitled to citizenship benefits. From that point on, challenges to this system have often been presented in relation to immigration practices. Yet, the 1898 Supreme Court Case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark protected and upheld that children of immigrants born on U.S. soil are entitled to American citizenship under the 14th Amendment. Wong Kim Ark was brought before the Supreme Court during the period when the Chinese Exclusion Act denied citizenship to Chinese immigrants to the United States, illustrating the ways the United States’ own naturalization platforms over citizenship have historically been racially motivated and restrictive.

Now, the United States is not alone in granting birthright citizenship. However, countries around the world differ in their primary citizenship requirements. For instance, many European countries operate under the “right of the blood,” with citizenship tied to that of the parent, regardless of where somebody is initially born. 

In December 2020, the Trump administration also passed new visa rules to target the practice of what has become referred to as “birth tourism,” or pregnant women giving birth abroad to provide their children additional citizenship. The new visa rules limit the granting of B-non-immigrant visas unless the applicant in question proves medical reasons for the visit and reports proof of payment, a policy that has remained under the Biden administration. 

Passport Fees and Economic Barriers

Globalization and increased mechanisms for transportation and travel have also led to what has been characterized as the “commodification” of passports. In the 2010s, during the Syrian refugee crisis, the underground economy for passports soared, and the Syrian government faced backlash for increasing passport prices to over $400 in 2014 with the aim of increasing government income. 

Syria’s policy illustrates how passports are used as money-making schemes, both through legal and illegal channels. In the modern era, passports are the cornerstone dictating movement between states, which has opened the door for individuals to take advantage of those in need of travel documentation to immigrate or leave their country of origin. Passport fees have become tools for governments to restrict emigration. For instance, in 2022, it was reported that a Lebanese passport valid for 10 years cost approximately 10,000,000 L.L., or $663. 

The nature of the passport system is inherently hierarchical, and provides citizens of developed nations clear mobility privileges, giving them access to most countries Visa-free. Despite being initially created as a standardized identification system, passports, and their subsequent citizenship promises, have become political and economic leverage tools for countries and groups around the globe. Policy debates over citizenship requirements, Russia’s passportization and golden visa programs highlight the need for caution when looking at passports’ evolution in domestic and international relations. 

Following 9/11, travel, visa and passport processes have become more stringent to prioritize national security. However, recent global developments evidence discussions of passport arrangements that must balance security concerns while keeping in mind the ways passports are equipped as dividers and captors of movement. 

The post The Passport Dilemma: How Citizenship and Travel Documents Have Re-Structured International Affairs appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

At the same time, the eastward expansion of NATO, which the West viewed as integral to safeguarding peace and establishing a buffer zone, is perceived by Russia as “an existential threat to national security.” Particularly, Russia is most concerned recently with NATO expansion as more and more countries are joining the organization. At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, both Georgia and Ukraine were promised to eventually join the Western defense alliance. Four months later, Georgia attacked Russia, killing at least ten Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, to which Russia responded with a full-scale offensive — marking the beginning of the Russo-Georgian war. Although the nature of this conflict is multifaceted, its predominant causes can still be analyzed. These causes can be broken down to the personal interests of Russian President Valdimir Putin, the desires of the Kremlin and NATO’s involvement. 

In the context of the Russo-Georgian war, an individual to analyze is Putin, who (despite not officially being president) still had full control over the country as Dmitry Medvedev, the leader at the time, was Putin’s protégé and aligned his policies through regular consultations with Putin. This effectively made him Putin’s proxy. For Putin, his interest was to ensure the survival of the Russian state and, within that, to maintain his own power. 

The color revolutions, particularly the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in the subsequent year, collapsed pro-Kremlin leaders in neighboring countries, which increased Western influence by Russia’s borders. Preservation of the Kremlin became Putin’s priority during that period, which might have been a contributing factor to the war. Indeed, Putin sought constitutional changes as a means to reclaim power and pursue a more aggressive role in the region which could explain the asymmetrical escalation in 2008 — launching a full scale invasion after just a few casualties. This revisionist sentiment remains even today, where Putin continues to abide by incrementalism in his foreign policy rather than drastic actions — resorting to cyberattacks to undermine NATO solidarity, exploiting international institutions (i.e. UNSC, IMF, APEC) to stifle liberal internationalism, and propagating misinformation to disrupt free elections. All of these efforts are to destabilize Western institutions and democratic systems around the world. 

For the short-term leading up to the invasion, Putin was faced with a triple-challenge: low oil prices from the Great Recession, a stalled constitutional process and socio-economic hardships. The war in Georgia was a diversionary tactic employed to distract from these domestic failures. By ‘rallying around the flag’ against NATO, which over 88% of Russians held unfavourable views towards, Putin increased his approval rating by eight percentage points directly after the intervention and re-consolidated his regime’s legitimacy. This parallels the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, where Putin’s approval rating jumped by 22 percentage points from a historic low post-invasion. 

More broadly, the Kremlin sought to revise the status quo and bring back Soviet glory. The disintegration of the USSR was seen as a humiliating defeat because Russia/USSR lost a third of its territory and half of its population and GDP. The Kremlin has long desired to rebuild the once-great Soviet Union (also known as revisionism) and feels it has the right to “take something back” such as reuniting the ethnic Russians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia with their motherland. Yet, revisionism also can only be a secondary component because it does not explain why Russia chose Georgia to go to war with instead of other ex-Soviet states, which all possess ethnic Russians in varying quantities. Specifically, Kazakhstan and Moldova both have comparatively larger populations of ethnic Russians compared to Georgia. This means that while revision can be a contributing factor to the war, it is not a leading factor because there is no justification for Georgia specifically compared to every other ex-Soviet state. The only difference is Western involvement in the country, which suggests that to be a decisive factor. 

NATO’s involvement in Georgia impacted both Russia’s and Georgia’s decision-making calculus when it promised that Georgia would one day join the alliance. Instead of disbanding after the collapse of the USSR, NATO extended membership to 15 additional countries in Eastern Europe as a means to ‘deter Russian aggression’ through the creation of a buffer zone. Russia on the other hand, has vehemently opposed NATO expansion, perceiving its only goal to be villainizing and containing Russia. 

Furthermore, “NATO expansion broke a promise that various American officials [including Bush and Clinton]had given to various Russian and Soviet officials [such as Gorbachev and Yeltsinthat]that NATO would not expand.” NATO’s hubristic expansion tipped the balance of power in Eastern Europe and was considered an existential threat by the Kremlin, which compelled it to retaliate to seek survival. In this case, Russia felt forced to destabilize the region in an effort to block NATO membership for Georgia, which was promised at the Bucharest summit. Indeed, the war effectively vetoed membership for Georgia because NATO would not accept new members with open territorial disputes. Overall, it’s arguable that Putin has been “protecting legitimate security interests” by destabilizing the region to veto NATO membership. 

By contrast, NATO involvement also emboldened Georgia to become overconfident through moral hazard  — the concept that Georgia engaged in risky behavior (behavior which they wouldn’t otherwise engage in) because they believed they had the full support of NATO. NATO’s open-door policy emboldened Georgia to act arrogantly after verbally pledging membership in 2008. Soon after, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili launched an offensive against pro-Russian separatists and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia as he believed the “West had his back, but he miscalculated and overreached,” confirming that the pledge made by NATO was misinterpreted by Georgia as a blank cheque. In Georgia, sporadic fighting against separatists has been ongoing for years, but it was not until after the Bucharest summit that President Saakashvili decided to strike. In this paradigmatic plight of moral hazard, NATO involvement encouraged Georgia to provoke Russia, confident that NATO would save them in the end. Critically, this was not the case with the invasion of Ukraine, as there were no indications that Ukraine would be part of NATO anytime soon. 

Today, Russo-Georgian relations are in shambles despite the war only lasting five days. After Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, Georgia completely severed all diplomatic relations with Russia. Russia eventually withdrew their troops from Georgia after a month. In its entirety, the war displaced nearly 200,000 people, many of whom were unable to return even today. 

Importantly, many of the issues and patterns in the Russo-Georgian war can still be seen today: the unresolved ethnic tensions in the Donbas and Luhansk regions, the revisionist sentiments of the Kremlin and the antagonistic stance of NATO. Moving forward, it is vital to consider pre-existing conditions within regions, the intention of each state and the impact of the involvement of international institutions.

The post The Russo-Georgian War: A Historical Investigation appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

At its core, this meeting was about searching for a mutually beneficial trade. North Korea reportedly went in the interest of obtaining satellite technology, economic aid and food supplies. In return, Russia is desperate to refuel its dwindling ammunition in order to sustain its war on Ukraine. 

North Korea likely seeks satellite technology for a number of reasons. One is truly for satellites — the country has already failed twice this year to put a spy satellite in orbit and says they will try again in October. They seek more advanced technology to aid this endeavor. 

The other, unspoken reasoning is for nuclear missiles. Both satellites and missiles rely on rocket technology, and the United States and its allies argue that North Korea uses its space programs as a cover for weapons tests. 

This deal could thus be doubly threatening to the West, as it would both aid Russia in its war against Ukraine and support North Korea’s nuclear and weapon proliferation.

Other than posing a threat to the United States and its allies, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation is a violation of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution, which was at the time supported by Russia. A decree also forbids any financial aid or education training that may help North Korea’s nuclear program. Moscow has in the past been hesitant to share such technology with North Korea, over its own concerns about the country’s nuclear arsenal. However, experts now believe that Russia’s priority for its war in Ukraine (and its desire to form strong relationships with enemies of the West) outweighs any previous inhibitions toward North Korea. 

What does Russia seek in return for this nuclear technology? Putin may be interested in the possible tens of millions of old Soviet artillery shells and rockets in North Korea’s possession. Russia has run through its own arsenal in its war on Ukraine faster than it perhaps expected to, and is now desperate for weapons and artillery. 

An obstacle to this deal, though, is another UNSC decree (which Russia also endorsed) that bans North Korea from exporting or importing any arms. It prohibits the transition of weapons in or out of the country. This resolution effectively bans Kim Jung-Un from making this trade and giving Russia their weapons. As such, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has stated that any military cooperation between North Korea and Russia is illegal as it breaks the United Nations Security Council resolutions and other international sanctions.

In this same vein, in August of last year, according to American Intelligence, North Korea volunteered 100,000 of its own troops to help Donbas and in September they sold Russia millions of artillery shells and rockets for use in Ukraine. However, both parties heavily deny this claim, though these denials could be truth or just cover for deals that break UNSC treaties. 

There is history to this kind of covert weapons aid between Russia and North Korea. After World War II, the Allies took Korea from under Japanese occupation and divided it between the Soviet Union and the United States. Then, on June 25, 1950, the Communist North, overseen by the Soviet Union, invaded the U.S. backed South. During the war that ensued, the Soviet Union secretly funneled North Korea pilots, aircrafts, machine guns, tanks, materials and medical services. They couldn’t get directly involved due to their tenuous relationship with the United States, who were actively involved on the South Korean side. Any sort of blow up between the two countries could result in a nuclear war. As a result, the pilots had to fly in other uniforms, speak other languages, and pretend to be tourists when on the ground. Armistice was reached in 1953, but since no peace treaty was ever signed, the two countries are still technically at war. 

Following the war, the relationship between the Soviet Union (Russia) and North Korea has fluctuated, but they now find themselves in a very similar, if reversed, position to 70 years ago. Putin even brought up this piece of history during their meeting. He said it was “our” country who first recognized the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a state and “our” country who supported their “war of independence” in the 1950s. Similarly, North Korea was the third country to recognize the independence of breakaway states of Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics in Eastern Ukraine, in reaction to which Ukraine terminated diplomatic ties with North Korea. Perhaps by bringing to mind the times “his” country supplied weapons to their invasion, Putin hopes to endear Kim Jung-Un to contributing to his own invasion. 

It still remains to be seen what the products of this meeting will be, on Russia’s war on Ukraine, on North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, and on our current political landscape. Regardless, this was a meeting ripe with historical and modern implications that will have heavy influence on both the outcome of this particular meeting and on international politics in the years to come.

The post The Korean War to Today: The Russia-North Korea Collaboration appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

As the only country producing nuclear energy in the Caucasus region, Armenia has relied heavily on nuclear power since 1976. The Metsamor nuclear power plant, located about 35 kilometers from the capital city of Yerevan, generates roughly 40% of the country’s electricity. From its inception as a Soviet-era plant to its current-day operation, the history of the Metsamor power plant is riddled with Russian presence — a presence that tiptoes the fine line of colonization in every chapter it is found.

Today, Russia seems to have taken the long-uncertain future of Armenia’s power plant into its own hands. Currently commissioned until 2026, the life of the Metsamor plant will be extended for another ten years through Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation. 

Moreover, in 2021, Russia expressed interest in deepening its energy investments in Armenia’s nuclear power sector and undertaking larger projects, such as the building of a new power unit at Metsamor. Months later, Russia’s interests would materialize into a signed agreement between Rosatom and Armenia’s nuclear power plant.

Notably, although nuclear power is a large component of Armenia’s energy profile, natural gas remains Armenia’s primary energy import, comprising over 80% of total imports. Russia imports roughly 85% of this natural gas to Armenia while Iran imports the rest, the latter partly in exchange for Armenian electricity exports. 

With Russia deeply entangled in every nook and cranny of Armenia’s energy sector, an emerging pattern of Russian energy colonization in Armenia — a remnant of a lingering post-Soviet legacy three decades after dissolution — seems to rear its ugly head. The Metsamor nuclear power plant is merely one case study highlighting the root causes of Armenia’s crippling energy dependence on Moscow. 

Such a relationship, of course, bears geopolitical implications, as well.

Under the corrupt and criminal leadership of Armenian administrations whose interests aligned more closely with Russia’s than their country’s, Armenia gradually sold its most critical energy infrastructures to Russia. In exchange for securing cheap Russian gas in the short term, the leadership in Yerevan forsook the west’s push for energy diversification. 

Fortunately for Yerevan, after the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Armenia is no longer governed by the corrupt oligarchs who sold their country’s energy sector — and therefore a crucial piece of its independence — to Russia; however, the legacy of their corrupt dealings with Gazprom and Moscow at large will remain for several decades to come.

Furthermore, Russia’s investment in Armenia’s nuclear sector comes amid a broader pattern of energy colonization in the region. Similar offers-turned-deals to invest in Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Belarussian nuclear power have been undertaken by Moscow in recent months and years. 

Meanwhile, the same recklessness Russian President Vladimir Putin employs in his foreign policy seems to be ever-present in Moscow’s nuclear endeavors, which subject the recipient state — or colony, in the Kremlin’s eyes — to significant safety concerns and associated risks.

In securing Yerevan’s long-term dependence for nuclear energy, Russia significantly also gains another degree of leverage over a former Soviet republic whose geopolitical predicament is a national security risk in its own right. Sandwiched between hostile neighbors Turkey and Azerbaijan, not even the Metsamor power plant has been immune to the dangers this entails.

For its own part, Turkey has repeatedly wielded rhetoric about the dangers of Armenia’s power plant, located roughly 15 kilometers from its border, for political gain. Its concerns, cited far too frequently to be genuine, are also largely hypocritical when considering Ankara’s own partnership with Russia for development of its nuclear sector. Moreover, the Turkish- and Azerbaijani-imposed economic blockade of Armenia, which has financially devastated the country, is a main driver for the necessity of Armenia’s nuclear production.

On the other hand, Baku’s aggressive foreign policy, incessant warmongering and expressed ethnic cleansing agenda against the Armenians located both within its internationally recognized borders and outside pose a unique threat in the context of Armenia’s nuclear power plant.

In July 2021, as tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan were boiling over leading up to Baku’s preemptive war against Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan threatened to employ a missile attack against the Metsamor power plant. Self-evidently, the implications of such an attack would be catastrophic, despicable and constitute a direct terrorist threat to Armenia and its neighboring countries.

Ultimately, Armenia’s Metsamor power plant is not only a symbol of Russia’s energy colonization but a testament to the infinitely complex geopolitical disposition Armenia finds itself in. Like every sector of its host country, competing regional interests and Russian hegemony have overtaken Armenia’s nuclear power plant, as well. 

Whether or not the Metsamor plant will weather the storm relies entirely on Yerevan’s long-term planning and the conduct of regional actors. 

The current trajectory, however, seems to be Moscow-bound.

The post The Russian Nuclear Threat, Recontextualized: Energy Colonization and Armenia’s Nuclear Power Plant appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

This threat of nuclear escalation is neither new nor surprising. Putin has made similar statements in the past, namely stating that “the world is nothing without Russia,” and therefore, using nuclear resources to defend Russia is necessary. However, with the massive costs of this conflict and increasing Russia-West tensions, such threats are beginning to bear more impact than ever.

Moreover, Russia recently took over a Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant following strenuous attacks. Zaporizhzhia, currently Europe’s largest power plant, now sits under Russian control. 

As Russian attacks move further into Ukrainian territory, the shelling and the sensitivity of the nuclear force in the plant may pose a threat. Many in the West and around the world are watching intently as Russia inches closer and closer to risking the lives of millions with its continuous pressure on the plant. 

With many of Putin’s threats materializing into consistent attacks on this region, nuclear threats like these become more worrisome. With such a large nuclear arsenal at its disposal and Russia’s repeatedly-expressed interest in using them to win the war it started at any cost, many Western powers are looking intently at the course of action by Putin’s government.

U.S. President Joe Biden has not stayed unresponsive to Putin’s attempts at nuclear provocation. Biden is warning Russia that there might be a “wider danger” in the threats by the Russians, and something that the West should not turn a blind eye to. In an interview with CNN, Biden stated, “It would be irresponsible for me to talk about what we would or wouldn’t do” if Russia follows through with any nuclear threat.

If Russia was to actually exert its force on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and continue to move forward with a “strike first” mentality, it would risk challenging the United States and its allies to a nuclear match-off. Approximately 90 percent of all nuclear warheads are owned by Russia and the United States, and their excessive — yet accessible — supply has kept them at a stalemate for the past 80 years. 

If Putin chose to make good on his threats, he would have to recognize that the United States is well-equipped to retaliate at any second. However threatening Putin’s words might be, they seem insufficient to realistically push him to take nuclear action. 

To better understand Putin’s ideas and the threat’s validity, one must also look at his long-term history of empty promises and unfulfilled threats of nuclear usage. 

Even with the strain of the ongoing conflict, Putin is considered by many to be acting erratically and irrationally. However, the threat of retaliation when it comes to nuclear force is something even Putin cannot pretend to show defiance to. 

But this issue is not simply a matter of rationality for Putin or Russia. While the use of nuclear weaponry to further this particular war is not likely, the wielding of such a threat would have dire consequences if it materialized, and should not be taken lightly. 

It would be in the best interests of both Russia and Putin to back away from nuclear use. But, that simply may not be enough to hold him back. 

With the world’s gaze on him and increased doubt on whether Russia can actually win this fight and maintain its position of power, Putin might be willing to take any measures necessary to win back control.

The post How Real is Russia’s Nuclear Threat? appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

The narrative choice of such a family, however, is clear once audiences are made aware that this “family” is merely the cover-up for a pair of Russian KGB spies living in the United States during the Cold War. 

This is the premise for the FX television show “The Americans,” by Joseph Weisberg, which tells the story of two double agents, Elizabeth Jennings (Keri Russell) and Philip Jennings (Matthew Rhys). The identities of these two characters as spies become particularly salient during simmering political, nuclear-related tensions between the United States and Russia.

In the very first episode of “The Americans,” audiences are introduced to the couple, who have replacedtheir real Russian names, Mikhail (for Matthew) and Nadezha (for Elizabeth), with American ones. According to Matt Brennan writing for Paste Magazine, the hidden nature of these names is significant because of the inherent division they imply: that one cannot be both Russian and American at the same time, but instead must outwardly perform a notion of loyalty. 

All of this fictional conflict is directly related to the realities of the Cold War, the period of time from roughly the late 1940s to 1991 during which the United States and Russia were at a political standoff due to a race to develop nuclear weapons. This race, and each country’s associated nuclear testing, naturally contributed to a global sense of dread that resonates throughout “The Americans.” The threat of nuclear warfare is omnipresent in the story’s background assumptions that Russian and American forces are oppositional.

Although it is not an explicitly antagonistic force until much later in the series, the nuclear threat is ideologically represented in the Russian identities of Philip and Elizabeth. The aspect of Philip and Elizabeth’s loyalty to Russia is constantly positioned as dangerous to the safety and security of the two’s American identities. 

Russia, by virtue of its nuclear power, is a threat to the United States. By association, so are Elizabeth and Philip’s Russian identities, a transnationalism that they are forced to hide in order to become completely American on the outside. 

Even as the show represents the struggles these double agents face, there is the implicit idea that for Elizabeth and Philip to renounce their Russian identities entirely, there would need to be a compromise between the two. Philip, for example, seems to desire being more American and is more willing to give up his Russian side, while Elizabeth is comparatively steadfast in her Russian identity. 

In essence, the real-life nuclear conflict becomes thematically symbolic to the story’s core, which centers on the many dimensions of warfare — both globally and between individual lives. “The Americans” is a fictional show, which means that Elizabeth and Philip should only be taken as metaphorical ideas rather than representations of history. Still, there are moments when history is incorporated into the fiction of the show.

One of those examples is in “The Day After,” episode 409 of “The Americans.” Philip, Elizabeth, and their family watch the 1983 TV movie “The Day After,” about the devastation left by nuclear war. In that scene, the Jennings mirror the millions of American viewers who watched the film when it first aired.

Writing for the Washington Post, Hank Stuever discusses the parallels in how both he and the fictional Jennings reacted to 1983’s “The Day After.” Both in Stuever’s own life and in the TV show, the emotional response to the movie was one of shock.

In “The Americans,” the experience leaves the family in fear about the implications of a nuclear war, as well as their roles as spies in the middle of the conflict. Stuever analyzes the release of the movie as a defining moment on both domestic U.S. and international fronts. 

The fictional Elizabeth, Steuver writes, is motivated by this movie to solidify her stance against the United States. After all, for her, watching the destruction brings up memories of the United States’s direct use of nuclear force in the past. 

In terms of international relations in real life, the film is said to have contributed to Ronald Reagan’s drive for political efforts towards nuclear prevention. The influence of media on policy is clearly illustrated here. It also shows the capabilities of focused storytelling in educating audiences about greater political concerns.

Moreover, Peter Suderman writes about how “The Americans” demonstrates the ideal that the personal was political, and vice versa. 

“‘The Americans’ was a spy thriller about the mundane difficulties of marriage, yes — but it was also a show about geopolitics and the ways in which powerful international rivals interact, conflict, and, maybe, forgive each other, by insisting on treating people as individuals rather than as political and ideological adversaries.”

Put simply, “The Americans” can illuminate the politics of the nuclear threat through a narrative lens. As a form of media, the show portrays real-life concerns about nuclear power and its consequences. The emphasis “The Americans” places on the war of identities and ideologies — Russian and American — regarding the potential of nuclear war are significant. 

For audiences, the show bears important lessons about the history of international relations, and most importantly, for the future.

The post How the TV Show “The Americans” Represents the Russian Nuclear Threat appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

This idea of a raceless society mainly comes from the fact that Russia never participated in slavery. In 1842, well before the U.S. Civil War, Emperor Nicholas I banned the human trade of Africans and stated that slaves that arrived in Russia would be declared free. Those who broke this law would be, “put on trial and punished”.

Russia Beyond writer Georgy Manaev explains that the time period affected how Black individuals were perceived: “[Africans] were seen as an object of wonder, a curiosity and something exotic from overseas.” They were not necessarily seen as an opportunity for free labor. 

This historical perception raises the question:  what does it mean to be Black in Russia now? This article will analyze how, despite the lack of slavery, innate rights are not equally afforded to Black Russians as they are to white Russians.

During the United States’ fight against communism, the United States’ main competitor was the USSR. The USSR was Communist but continued to expand and colonize bordering republics. As a result, their economy grew despite not being capitalist. This development was particularly troubling for the United States.

The USSR was able to find the United States’ weakness — racism — and exploit it by encouraging black people to immigrate to the USSR while criticizing the United States. Starting in the 1930s, an abundance of African-Americans immigrated to the USSR for the chance of a better life financially, with the Great Depression looming, and personally, perceiving a place with “no racism or white supremacy” – an ironic juxtaposition to the heavily promoted American Dream said St. Julian-Varnon in an interview with Glimpse from the Globe.

In explaining the sentiment of many Black Americans, St. Julian-Varnon says “America’s not great. What could Russia offer us? It couldn’t be any worse.”

In the court of Black public opinion, Russia didn’t have to be extraordinary. It just had to be better than the United States. The USSR could use propaganda to dissuade people from accepting American ideals by enforcing the theory of “if they can’t treat their own people right, why would they treat you any better?” (St. Julian-Varnon). This sentiment was often conveyed to newly independent African states who were considering aligning ideologically with the United States.

The USSR was able to further damage the United States’s reputation by using American news clips and posters to boost their own labor market and country of equality. This further persuaded Americans to immigrate and therefore discrediting American prestige. 

It is important to note that, for the USSR, establishing positive race relations was paramount to national identity. In an op-ed for the New York Times, Jennifer Wilson writes that “racial equality was not merely incidental but a state project [for the USSR].” Then Premier of the USSR, Vladimir Lenin, saw that the greatest potential for revolution in the United States was “in the development of a Black proletarian consciousness.” In a sense, the acceptance of Black Americans was merely a side effect of the overall goal of degrading the United States.

This has been the experience of Black Americans in Russia, but what about Afro-Russians? According to St. Julian-Varnon, Afro-Russians are people of African descent that have migrated to and settled in Russia, usually multi-generational. Africans and Central Asians often traveled to the USSR for their studies. This was encouraged by the government at the time, specifically during the 1950s, expresses St. Julian Varnon. When  “Khrushchev invited African students to study in the USSR as part of the nation’s push to influence the decolonization movement on the African continent.” 

A side effect of this push was an increase in Afro-Russians, meaning those with one Russian parent and one African parent. After the African parent left, these children were “left alone to face increasing racial discrimination.”

Racism against Afro-Russians was exacerbated after the fall of the Soviet Union. The USSR was a multinational empire that, because of the collapse, was degraded to a regional power. The collapse essentially left an ideological hole that manifested in resentment and racism. St. Julian-Varnon notes, “If you lose your own power elsewhere, where do you reclaim it?” 

The USSR prided itself on being anti-racist. Still,  many, including St. Julien Varnon, have argued: how can one be anti-racist when one doesn’t measure race? Having a raceless society causes the erasure of the entire racial identity of Afro-Russians, who have experiences specific to their background. Oftentimes, an Afro-Russian is the only Black person in their entire town, including their own family. 

This upbringing causes many Afro-Russians to be indifferent to their race despite systemic racism that still ravages the system. Yelena Khanga, an Afro-Russian journalist and former television presenter, shared her opinion on race in Russia and how it is non-existent. The interviewer asked her about how Khanga’s then-white Russian boyfriend used to call her “monkey” and Khanga responded saying, “I couldn’t explain to him that it was racist because I knew he was not racist…That’s just what he called me.”

Khanga’s view of racism is unique because of her homogenous upbringing. St. Julian-Varnon writes, “For [Khanga], racism could only be a product not of malice, but of ignorance.” The racism Khanga encountered was, from Khanga’s point of view, purely based on ignorance and not the individual’s actual consciousness. 

Maxim Nikolsky, a journalist from Russia, described his experience with racism saying, “It’s the casual racism that’s a problem in Russia, and it comes from ignorance. I don’t think we have the institutionalized racism of the West.” This belief is not unpopular for many Afro-Russians. 

Although the experience of some Afro-Russians is that there is only casual racism, the data says otherwise. Russian law states that “Incitement of Hatred or Enmity, is classified as Actions aimed at the incitement of hatred or enmity…” Unfortunately, this law has been partially decriminalized and often produces lesser convictions for those who have violated it.

According to the SOVA Center, an Information and Analysis nonprofit organization based in Moscow, Russia, there is some progress: “The number of those convicted of “extremist statements” has increased slightly in the past year [2019].” With Afro-Russians making up such a small percentage of Russians, these numbers are often overlooked.  Their lived experiences of racism do not go away. 

An example would be Isabel Kastilio, a marketing manager from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia. She shares her experience in adolescence when her family was looking for a home and many of the renting signs said, “Slavs only”. 

She recounted, “When landlords heard my name on the phone, even though I had a permit to live in Moscow, they didn’t believe I could pay the rent. I had to arrange to meet them in person, so they could see I was a normal person with a normal job and wouldn’t turn their apartment into a drug den.” Kastilio’s experience can be compared to that of the United States’s redlining that continues to affect marginalized communities today.

Kastilio’s experience is shared with many other Afro–Russians as well as first-generation African immigrants. An example of this would be Roy Ibonga, a 21-year-old Congolese man studying economics at Bryansk State University. He posted on social media a time in which he was racially profiled while in a taxi. In the video, “the driver can be heard saying ‘If I don’t like a person, I won’t give them a ride. It’s my car.’ When Ibonga asks him bluntly “Are you a racist?” the driver replies, “Yes, of course.” 

Kastilio and Ibonga’s experience is quite contradictory to Khanga and Nikolsky, but together they embody a range of perspectives on racism in Russia. 

Simply said, there is racism in Russia, but it is often overlooked by Afro-Russians because it is perceived as just another occurrence in their lived experience. This human rights issue often gets very little attention for many reasons: Black people in Russia are a small population, there is a  lack of research about the issue, and finally, international actors simply don’t care. 

The overt and systemic racism in Russia like that experienced by Isabel Kastilio and Roy Ibonga is not so different from the black American experience despite the USSR’s and Russia’s claim of being a nonracist country. This will continue to affect this minority without pressure from international state actors. Black Russians are not afforded the same rights as white Russians, as demonstrated by a brief look into the history and lived experiences of Black Russians from the USSR to today. Looking ahead to the future, there is much more research that needs to be done, starting with more accurate census reporting on Black Russians. 

The post What Does It Mean To Be Black in Russia? appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

In the 2016 competition held in Stockholm, Ukrainian singer Jamala won the contest with her song “1944.” The song was written and performed in the Crimean Tatar language, a tongue spoken by Crimean Tatars — a Muslim and Turkic ethnicity indigenous to the Crimean Peninsula. 

Since Crimea entered center stage following its annexation by Russia in 2014, Crimean Tatars now face a new struggle for survival under the thumb of oppression once more. Russia’s growing encroachment upon Ukraine brought detrimental effects on the Crimean Tatar people, where Russia aims to wipe out the Crimean Tatar culture and put the Tatar people under threat of conflict.

The history of the Crimean Tatar people extends back to the 13th century, when the descendants of Genghis Khan entered the Eastern European plains and into the Crimean Peninsula. Crimean Tatars ruled the peninsula for centuries under the Crimean Khanate until the Russian Empire conquered Crimea. Although once the masters of Crimea, Tatars were relegated to second-class citizens under Tsarist rule, resulting in several waves of mass migration into Turkey. 

Following the establishment of the USSR, Crimean Tatars found themselves subject to a new, more oppressive hegemon. Through collectivization and subsequent famines under Stalinist rule, the Crimean Tatar population took a significant hit, with about 50% leaving their ancestral home. The worst, however, was yet to come, as the USSR entered World War II in 1941. 

Crimean Tatars were suddenly subject to suspicion by the Soviet government as collaborationists and Nazi sympathisers, along with other ethnicities like Chechens and Volga Germans. As the USSR had planned to take over the Dardanelles and, in turn, territories in Turkey, Crimean Tatars were seen as a threat as they shared a cultural bond with the Turks.

May 18, 1944, was a harrowing day in the collective memory of the Crimean Tatar people. Joseph Stalin ordered the exile of the entire Crimean Tatar population to Central Asia. 240,000 Tatars were rushed onto trains that would take them to unfamiliar lands, with tens of thousands dying along the way. This painful event was named Sürgünlik in the Crimean Tatar language, as the Tatar people were disenfranchised and victimized by imperialist tyranny.

The popular Crimean folk song “Ey Güzel Kırım” features the lyrics, “men bu yerde yaşalmadım, yaşlığıma toyalmadım” (meaning “I could not live in this land, I could not enjoy my youth”), describing the pain of being in exile and losing one’s homeland.  

As the once-mighty Soviet Empire began collapsing in 1989, Crimean Tatars were eventually allowed to repatriate to their homeland in Crimea. Thousands of Crimean Tatars managed to return to Crimea, but their land was entirely different. Although originally under Ukrainian jurisdiction, Russians had since taken up the vast majority of Crimea, as historically Tatar settlements were wholly populated by Russians. 

Yet, the Crimean Tatars persisted in reclaiming their homes and re-establishing their cultural presence on the peninsula. The Mejlis, a political body representing the Crimean Tatar people, was founded in 1991 to protect Crimean Tatar culture and rights. Since the Ukrainian government had been most sympathetic to the Crimean Tatar struggle, the Mejlis was allowed to operate within the scope of Ukrainian and Crimean politics.

However, things took a sharp turn for the worse when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in February 2014. Crimean Tatars once again found themselves under a familiar overlord as the Tatar community overwhelmingly stood against the Russian annexation. Subsequently, Crimean Tatar voices were silenced following a peninsula-wide ban on Tatar news publications and radio stations. Tatar journalist Reshat Amatov was abducted and later murdered by pro-Russian groups, while Russian authorities made no effort to bring justice to Amatov’s case. 

In April 2016, the Mejlis was banned by Russia for promoting separatism and extremism. The head of the Mejlis, Mustafa Dzhemilev, was barred from entering Crimea two years before the ban on the organization. Tatars linked to the Mejlis were also arrested on charges of collaborating with terrorist groups.

Following the annexation of Crimea, Russia continues its attempts to wipe out the Crimean Tatar culture. For example, many mosques and religious institutions were shut down by Russian authorities. Russia also banned Tatar-language classes as Russian became the only teaching language in Crimean schools. In 2016, human rights activist Teimur Abdullaev was arrested and sent to an isolation ward in Simferopol because he had written a letter in Crimean Tatar.

The brutal nature of Moscow’s governance over the Crimean Tatars is due to its own political structure and culture. Despite Russia being a multiethnic federation on paper, Russia is very much dominated by its largest ethnic group. The various titular nationalities of Russian republics, like Volga Tatars, Ossetians and Yakuts, have little to no power over how their respective polities are run (with Chechnya being an exception). 

As a result, ethnic minorities in Russia are expected to live a fully Russified lifestyle, where their identities are blurred out and replaced with an overarching Russian identity. For an authoritarian state like Russia, keeping the homogeneity of the country’s culture is vital for the regime’s survival to maintain control over non-Russians and prevent secession. 

For Crimean Tatars, their disobedience towards Russian rule and the presence of a unique and lasting culture pose an active threat to the Russian Federation. For Russia to create stable control over Crimea, the presence of a non-Russian and indigenous culture is enough for Russia to engage in suppressive policies. 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has undoubtedly brought renewed tensions amongst Crimean Tatar communities, as they are being dragged into a war against their will. Many Crimean Tatars chose to fight against Russia as they joined the Ukrainian Army or served in independent battalions. 

One of the most prominent Tatar battalions is led by Isa Akayev, whose troops mainly comprise Crimean Tatars but also from other ethnic groups like Chechens and Circassians. Bonded by Islam and a common goal of liberation, nationalities from the North Caucasus often fight alongside Crimean Tatars to repel Russian encroachment. North Caucasians like Chechens, Ingush and Avars also share a similar past as victims of forced deportations during the USSR. 

The recent wave of mobilization in Russia gravely impacted Crimean Tatar communities, as the order also extended into occupied Crimea. Crimean Tatars are reportedly being disproportionately targeted in military drafts in Crimea, where the vast majority of the draft is being carried out in Crimean Tatar villages. 

During an evening address, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that “this is a deliberate attempt by Russia to destroy the Crimean Tatar people, this is a deliberate attempt by the aggressor state to take the lives of as many residents of the territory the Russian troops invaded as possible.”

As a result of the mobilization, Tatar families had already started to leave their homes en masse since the start of the war, paving the way to further disenfranchisement of the Crimean Tatar people and an even more significant exodus. 

Surely, one can interpret Moscow’s draft policies in Crimea as a deliberate attempt to completely rid Crimea of its indigenous inhabitants. By disproportionately drafting Crimean Tatars and forcing families to abandon their homeland, Russia can thereby replace them with Russian settlers, ensuring loyalty from Crimea to Moscow and completely Russifying the peninsula. 

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine does not simply present a binary selection, as many groups, like the Crimean Tatar, are caught in the middle. The resistance against Russian imperialism is not a struggle defined by the West. Instead, it is the various traumatic experiences and acts of defiance towards tyranny. It is the struggles of peoples like the Crimean Tatars, the Chechens, the Circassians and many more that complete the story.

In reality, Crimean Tatars do not wish to be puppets under Russia or Ukraine. They deserve a homeland with no masters above them. Yet, the hard truth is that Crimean Tatars have fought and suffered too much, where at least Ukraine has allowed them to rebuild themselves. 

The Crimean Tatar experience is one scarred by blood and oppression, but it’s also one empowered by an undying will to fight and survive. As the Crimean Tatar people once again face the possibility of further disenfranchisement, one could certainly expect them to resist their oppressors and protect their beloved homeland.

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