While the world focused on the clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces in May 2025, it is important to remember that the Kashmir conflict has not only been shaped by the two states, but also by various armed non-state actors with conflicting goals, ideologies and allegiances. This article seeks to explore the various armed non-state actors that have shaped the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, focusing on their histories, ideologies and relations to the Indian and Pakistani states and intelligence services.

Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) – Pro-Independence

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front was founded in the late 1970s, with considerable support from the British-Pakistani diaspora, most of whom trace their origins to Mirpur in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. After carrying out attacks on Indian military personnel, diplomats and Kashmiri Hindus, JKLF shot to prominence with the execution of key leadership and the conclusion of the 1987 elections in Jammu and Kashmir, widely regarded as rigged in favor of a pro-India Kashmiri party. This prompted many Kashmiri youth to pick up arms to fight Indian rule, starting the armed Kashmir conflict. 

JKLF initially received support from the Pakistani intelligence agencies with the common goal of separating from Indian rule, but the group adopted a relatively secular, Kashmiri-nationalist ideology that sought to unite Indian-administered Kashmir and Pakistani-administered Kashmir as an independent country. 

In the mid-1990s, a diversion of funding from Pakistani intelligence services to pro-Pakistan militant groups combined with crackdowns from India and Pakistan saw JKLF renounce violent struggle in 1994. They continue to operate politically on both sides of the ceasefire line dividing the region, advocating for independence, but face restrictions from both countries. 

Currently, Pakistan restricts political activity by JKLF and other pro-independence groups in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, and India has banned JKLF since revoking Indian-administered Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status in 2019.

Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM) – Pro-Pakistan

Another non-state armed group, Hizbul-Mujahideen, emerged in 1989 after the 1987 elections. HM, like the JKLF, was predominantly composed of Kashmiri Muslims seeking to separate from Indian rule. However, unlike the JKLF, they sought to merge all of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, and justified their struggle as a jihad against India in contrast to secular nationalism. By the early 1990s, they overtook JKLF as the foremost separatist militant organization in the Indian-administered Kashmir with Pakistani support. 

The group has historically enjoyed close ties with Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir, an Islamist political party in Kashmir. HM has engaged in attacks against Indian armed forces, Jammu and Kashmir police officers, pro-Indian politicians in Jammu and Kashmir and Kashmiri Hindus, leading to the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits in 1989-1990. They are accused of committing the 1998 massacre of Hindus in Prankote. They are also held responsible for the Wandhama massacre of Kashmiri Hindus in 1998. Furthermore, a popular HM commander was killed by Indian security forces in 2016, prompting massive protests in Kashmir. Indian forces were widely criticized for the usage of pellet guns to quell the protests which caused severe injuries, including blindness, to hundreds of Kashmiris. 

HM is designated as a terrorist organization by India, the U.S., Canada and the European Union. It is a legally operating organization in Pakistan. It remains active, but severely weakened due to Indian crackdowns and infighting.

Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen – Pro-India

The Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen was formed around 1993-1994, backed by the Indian intelligence services. Pakistan’s intelligence services initially supported multiple armed groups in the JKLF umbrella, but later concentrated support on the pro-Pakistan HM. This led many other militant organizations to lose their weapons, training, funding and bases, pressuring members to defect to HM. Many militants became disillusioned, and instead sought revenge on HM and other pro-Pakistani organizations. Indian intelligence services and their collaborators organized these groups together to form the Ikhwan. They recruited Kashmiri Muslims with pro-India leanings, those seeking revenge against HM due to loss of resources or friends and family members to militant attacks and suspected, surrendered and imprisoned militants who sought freedom and protection from both India and HM. 

While considered effective by India for counterinsurgency operations, they were widely criticized in Kashmir for egregious human rights violations, including torture, extortion and extrajudicial killings. Lack of popularity in Kashmir pressured Indian forces to disband and remove security from the organization, leading to the killing of many Ikhwanis by rivals. Others were absorbed into the Jammu and Kashmir police force (JKP) or Indian army. Many joined the Special Operations Group (SOG), a specialized counterinsurgent unit of the JKP. While the SOG is officially affiliated with the state, recruiting police officers from the various ethnic groups of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, it is also widely accused of serious human rights abuses, with particular concern that cash incentives from the Indian military for killing militants has encouraged SOG members to kill civilians and label them as militants for financial rewards.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) / The Resistance Front (TRF) – Pro-Pakistan

The LeT was established in 1990 in Afghanistan, as one of the various Mujahideen organizations, after the merger of two Islamist missionary organizations. After the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan, it shifted its focus in the mid-1990s on fighting India with the objective of merging Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan. Unlike Hizbul-Mujahideen, who were mostly made up of Kashmiris, most LeT fighters were Pakistani Punjabis. The group expanded from suicide bombings and shootings in Kashmir to attacks in major Indian cities, becoming notorious for both the 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, where 10 LeT fighters sieged the Taj Hotel and killed more than 160 people. The group is also accused of collaborating with Indian Muslim extremist groups in coordinating attacks, and enjoys ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It is designated as a terrorist organization by the UN, European Union, U.S., India and Pakistan.

 In spite of its official ban, Pakistan’s intelligence services are widely accused of continued support to the organization, particularly through allowing its charity front, Jamaat ud-Dawa (JuD), to continue its activities within Pakistan, as well as taking limited action against LeT leadership. While Pakistan has cracked down on LeT and JuD since 2018 to comply with FATF regulations, seizing assets and jailing leaders, criticism remains that the organization continues to receive covert support from military and intelligence circles. Top leadership have historically lived openly in Lahore, holding political rallies and appearing on television interviews, in spite of UN sanctions and American bounties.

The Resistance Front (TRF) has emerged in resistance to the 2019 revocation of Article 370 in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. The group has become known for its attacks on Indian military personnel, Jammu and Kashmir police, migrant laborers and minorities. The group shot to prominence with the April 2025 massacre of Indian tourists in Pahalgam, prompting the military standoff between India and Pakistan. The group appears to have deliberately targeted Hindus during the attack, sparing those who could recite Islamic verses. Both India and the U.S. allege the group is a local proxy of the LeT, with considerable overlap between its leadership. Unlike the LeT, it has framed its struggle against India in more secular terms in an attempt to distance itself from the LeT’s religious rhetoric, seen as a strategic shift to win more tolerance for their cause.

Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) – Pro-Pakistan

Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) is a newer group, founded in 2000 in Pakistan by militants released from an Indian prison in exchange for Indian hostages from a plane hijacking. The group, like LeT, seeks Jammu and Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan, and largely draws membership from Pakistani Punjabis who had experience in the Afghan Mujahideen. The group became notorious for its suicide attacks, including on both the Indian Parliament and the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly in 2001, Indian consulates in Afghanistan and the Pulwama attack on Indian paramilitary forces in 2019. They also launched attacks on Indian military personnel in 2016. It is designated as a terrorist organization by the UN, most western countries, India and Pakistan. However, Pakistan remains accused of allowing the organization to effectively function, with no serious legal action or arrests against the organization. Pakistani intelligence is suspected of supporting the group in attacks against India and shielding its leadership, as well as utilizing it as a counter to the Pakistani Taliban which wages war against the state. Both JeM and the Taliban share ideological links from the Deobandi school, leading to competition for cadre. The group remains active.

Village Defence Guards (VDG) – Pro-India

The Village Defence Guards, formerly known as Village Defence Committees, were organized in the mid-1990s as a civilian militia against militants in Jammu. Villagers were predominantly recruited from pro-India ethnic and religious groups in Jammu, such as the Hindu Dogras, Hindu and Muslim Paharis, Sikhs and Muslim Gujjar-Bakarwals. The VDG system has been criticized for arming civilians, enabling them to settle personal scores. With most VDG members being Hindu, the program has also been accused of enabling majoritarian violence against Muslim Gujjar villagers. While inactive for most of the 21st century, the VDGs were resurrected after the abrogation of Article 370, particularly as more militant attacks are shifting to Jammu from the Kashmir Valley. The VDGs are armed, trained and paid by the Indian army.

Conclusion

Armed non-state actors have played a significant role in Kashmir for decades, complicating the conflict beyond the formal militaries of India and Pakistan. For the Kashmir conflict to reach a resolution, and for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences, the complications arising from these various organizations are an important factor to account for and keep in mind.

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It has now been over a year since the shutdown has been imposed in the region making it the longest-ever internet shutdown in a democracy.

The internet kill switch was a mechanism that was originally created to serve as a safety net against large-scale cyber warfare. Today, it is often used as a form of repression. Internet shutdowns and slowdowns are considered features of authoritarian regimes and the irony of such a practice taking place in the largest democracy in the world is not lost on the Indian people. 

India is, in fact, commonly referred to as the internet shutdown capital of the world — no other government has exercised this power with as much frequency. Shutting down the internet has become a regular feature of law enforcement in India. This tool has pushed the entire 8 million population of Kashmir into a blackhole where the world is unable to know what is happening inside this cage — and vice versa. 

The most frequently used justification provided by the government for such behavior is “public safety.” A study conducted by a research scholar Jan Rydzak at the Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator, shows that if public safety really is the government’s priority, shutting down the internet is unlikely to make much difference. The results of his study demonstrate that shutdowns do not discourage or prevent violent protests from taking place. He describes this action of the government as a “digital siege” and says that, “public safety is almost always a convenient excuse because in the vast majority of the cases it is written into the law of a given country that in situations of public emergency, the government has special powers to, for example, cut off communication.”

Ryzdak also explains the far reaching consequences this political decision has for India’s international reputation. As an ascendant power, the frequency with which India is shutting down the internet sets a bad example for other countries. 

The impact of the internet shutdown has been catastrophic. It has affected every aspect of the Kashmiri people’s lives. Kashmiri students have not been able to access resources for studying, bringing their education to a grinding halt. A prominent newspaper, The Hindu, reports that students have ferried data by air, driven over 300 kilometers to download syllabi, and teachers, in the middle of the pandemic, have only been able to reach them sporadically. 

COVID-19 has also caused Kashmir to slip from one lockdown to another. The impact of this double whammy was felt immensely when the rest of the country, like the rest of the world, moves to online classes. Despite the complete shutdown being lifted in January and limited internet access being restored, this internet is delivered in the form of obsolete and sluggish 2G services that cannot keep up with the demands of the Kashmiri people. 

Students in schools in Kashmir are still struggling to find the means to set up remote classes due to the limitations of slow-speed internet access. Even when they try to make do with 2G services, blackouts still take place at regular intervals — sometimes lasting a few days. Additionally, whenever a gunfight breaks out between militants and government forces, the authorities move to snap internet access completely in that district or area. From January to June 2020, there have been 55 instances when mobile internet services were completely shut,  according to a report released by two Kashmir based Rights groups, JKCCS and APDP

Despite internet shutdowns not being new to Kashmir, this particular and most recent ban was much harsher in terms of economic impact than any of the previous ones. The economy of the region recorded a loss of nearly 4000 crore rupees (53 million USD) between 2012 and 2017 due to 34 instances of internet shutdowns, as per a report by the New Delhi-based think tank International Council for Research on International Economic Relations. This figure, albeit large, is nothing compared to the economic loss experienced by the region in the past year. 

As far as businesses are concerned, a report released by the Forum for Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir in July 2020 stated that economic losses to the tune of a staggering 40,000 crore rupees (5.3 billion USD) have been registered in the region since August 2019. In this year alone, from January to July 2020, Kashmiri businesses suffered a loss of 17,900 crore rupees (2.9 billion USD) amid the coronavirus pandemic. This data is based on estimates from the Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industries (KCCI). 

At this moment, the state of Jammu and Kashmir is grappling with two major crises occurring simultaneously. The realities of an internet shutdown are only more pronounced within the context of the global pandemic. The abrogation of Article 370 and the subsequent digital silencing in the region represents the authoritarian nature of the current government in the world’s largest democracy. 

If the government is truly concerned about public well being, it would do well to lift this draconian policy from the region and work with the local government and the people to serve their communities through this pandemic. 

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