Since the breakup of Yugoslavia and the ensuing war, governance over Kosovo has remained a contentious topic in global affairs, with international oversight providing much of its legal infrastructure alongside local power brokers. Many of these local leaders have direct ties to the nominally dissolved Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a group designated as a terrorist organization in multiple countries. Among these leaders is Kosovo’s first elected prime minister Hashim Thaçi, one of the founders of the KLA who is currently awaiting trial for war crimes in The Hague.

Cooperation between international actors and local leaders to orchestrate a peaceful transfer of power has required carefully redefining the relationship with the KLA “from ‘terrorists’ to ‘partners.’” As of now, the UN is gingerly withdrawing from Kosovo one agency at a time while balancing international and domestic issues. Establishing Kosovo’s legitimacy will require restructuring of economic and political institutions, international cooperation and long-term conflict mitigation plans. Through sustainable, mutually beneficial and calculated policy implementation that strengthens Kosovo internally, we will see an end to, in the words of international relations professor at the University of Southern California Dr. Douglas Becker, the “international presence [in Kosovo]no one wants.” 

The KLA is a nationalist Kosovar-Albanian militia founded in 1993 as a response to Serbian state-backed violence against students protesting for Kosovar independence. Starting as a small, disorganized group of around 150 men, the KLA quickly became “one of the most successful military organizations in history,” as well as one of the most brutal. As Kosovar nationalism rose, more and more people joined the KLA in taking up arms against Serbia. 

During the following years of conflict, the KLA were not only perpetrators of war crimes—including systemic torture, rape and forced expulsion—but also an organized crime ring. Much of the KLA’s funding came from human trafficking, organ trafficking, sex slavery, money laundering, illegal weapon smuggling, counterfeit currency, migrant smuggling, fraud and drug trade, with an estimated 80% of all heroin headed into Europe passing through the hands of the KLA in 1999. 

When the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia officially ended in June 1999, the KLA filled the subsequent power vacuum. However, they were quickly replaced after the 1999 Security Council resolution 1244 gave jurisdiction of Kosovo to the UN, creating the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and establishing United Nations Administered Kosovo, a time period in which the UN was essentially the Kosovar government. The UNMIK took charge of virtually all government functions in Kosovo, facilitating elections, issuing legal identification documents, adjudicating criminal cases, policing and overseeing immigration. 

By 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, developed a constitution and elected its first prime minister, Hashim Thaçi, ultimately ending UN Administered Kosovo and creating the Republic of Kosovo. As part of their agreement to recognize Kosovo’s independence, the U.S. and EU required oversight by international presences; thus, UNMIK remains a supportive actor in ensuring peace, normalcy and community-building in collaboration with 16 other UN agencies and partners. 

Locally, most political figures are former members of the disbanded KLA, including current prime minister Albin Kurti. Some claim to have abandoned their criminal past while others have faced charges of war crimes, such as Kosovar prime ministers Hashim Thaçi, Agim Çeku and Ramush Haradinaj. An investigation conducted by the Council of Europe found that even while acting as prime minister, Thaçi still controlled much of organized transnational crime, relying upon illegal activities for government expenditures. Although the KLA is officially dissolved, its members have reassembled in one of the main political parties, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). Prime Minister Kurti has openly declared that “the Kosovo Police is a continuation of the liberation army.” KLA dominance presents a massive issue for the prospect of complete UN withdrawal due to its unsustainable nature and criminal history. While decreasing, organized crime remains intertwined in Kosovar politics, with the U.S. Department of the Treasury blacklisting multiple Kosovar politicians and security officials linked to transnational organized crime as recently as 2021.

The UN, European Union and United States are desperate to withdraw: Kosovo presents a major liability for the international actors involved due to the criminal background of the local actors with whom they are collaborating. The United States views UNMIK as having fulfilled its purpose, and states that “a peacekeeping mission [is]no longer necessary.” International involvement is unfavorable for the people of Kosovo as well, inhibiting their desire for international recognition and sovereignty. Serbia also dislikes the international presence and does not recognize the majority of the agencies in Kosovo as legitimate, instead viewing them as an imposition upon their own sovereignty. Logistically, the oversight has simply drawn on much too long and cannot be maintained in the long term. 

Thus, the UN is working to strengthen local political, legal and economic institutions to wean Kosovo off international support. Additionally, efforts are underway to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia, including promoting Serbian and Albanian language learning, assisting families of missing persons and providing free legal aid and language interpretation to allow for a smoother transition of power and a peaceful future for the region. According to the UN, a facilitated, gradual withdrawal from Kosovo is the best approach to end this deeply undesired international presence. 

However, tensions have risen within the last few months, amounting to “the worst escalation of violence in years,” with Serbia deploying tanks and artillery to the Kosovar border, prompting the U.K. to send 200 troops to support the current NATO presence. This uptick is the result of a dispute over license plates, with Kosovo demanding Serbian license plates turned over in favor of Kosovar plates to demonstrate a sovereign, united Kosovar state. Ethnic Serb mayors in northern Kosovo resigned in protest of this demand, further contributing to unrest and lawlessness and reinvigorating Serbs’ desires to establish autonomous Serb-majority municipalities within Kosovo. This move and the reaction to it proves nationalism and ethnic identity disputes remain unresolved issues.   

Seeing as the status quo is undesired by all parties involved, any potential resolution would necessitate the complete withdrawal of international forces. However, given the recent developments in conflict, such a withdrawal must be orchestrated in a gradual and calculated manner. A sustainable, mutually beneficial plan should be executed through three main tenets: economic and institutional restructuring, international cooperation and long-term conflict management plans. 

A major hurdle to Kosovar legitimacy is government corruption. The UN must incentivize legal economic activities to dissuade organized criminal activity. Kosovo is well-endowed in natural resources including fertile farmland. The UN should provide agricultural training, subsidies and supplies to reinvigorate this sector and help establish multilateral trade agreements as well as a conducive market environment, which would allow Kosovar goods to be competitive on a global scale. Additionally, farming was a major part of Kosovo’s medieval identity and revitalizing this industry could appeal to Kosovar nationalists. Opportunities for professional development, such as job training, higher education and English lessons should also be installed. 

Politically, legal and lucrative economic opportunities should automatically lessen corruption. Through education, the general public should become more aware of their human rights and therefore more likely to elect transparent officials who better protect these rights. However, the UN should also lead crackdowns on political criminals and help restructure political institutions to eliminate opportunities for future corruption. 

International recognition could also be enhanced if Kosovo were to abandon transnational crime and join the global economy. Countries are more likely to support relationships from which they benefit economically, and if Kosovo can become an international bread basket, especially during a time when the agriculturally crucial country of Ukraine is under attack, they can establish themselves as a critical ally and trade partner. 

Additionally, the UN should advocate for Kosovar recognition within the general assembly. Although the chances of gaining Russian approval are extremely slim, other nations such as Argentina, India and Greece may be more likely to change their views. With increased recognition, Kosovo can operate as a strong de facto state or even an internationally recognized country—Taiwan, for instance, is unrecognized by UNSC member China, yet is still internationally recognized as a sovereign nation. 

A long-term conflict mitigation plan is crucial in preserving an auspicious future for Kosovo. In establishing political institutions, the UN should coordinate between Kosovar Serbs and Albanians to create a joint association to guarantee cooperation. If this matter is not addressed, Kosovo will remain vulnerable to issues like the license plate dispute, where something as seemingly mundane as license plates led to a violent conflict due to a lack of resolution regarding underlying disagreements regarding ethnic identity. The UN must work in conjunction with both ethnic communities to establish institutions and promote long-term collaboration. 

Rather than staying idle in the present, the UN must start actively pursuing a sustainable future by implementing mechanisms that will provide Kosovo strength for decades to come. By redirecting Kosovar interests towards lucrative economic pursuits, the Kosovar government can become more legitimate and capable, garner revenue to strengthen internal political institutions, secure trade partners to embed them into the global economy and establish international allies to validate their sovereignty. If the parties restructure economic and political institutions, pursue international recognition and set long-term conflict mitigation strategies in place, the international community can finally withdraw from Kosovo and put an end to an international presence no one wants.

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At the same time, the eastward expansion of NATO, which the West viewed as integral to safeguarding peace and establishing a buffer zone, is perceived by Russia as “an existential threat to national security.” Particularly, Russia is most concerned recently with NATO expansion as more and more countries are joining the organization. At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, both Georgia and Ukraine were promised to eventually join the Western defense alliance. Four months later, Georgia attacked Russia, killing at least ten Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, to which Russia responded with a full-scale offensive — marking the beginning of the Russo-Georgian war. Although the nature of this conflict is multifaceted, its predominant causes can still be analyzed. These causes can be broken down to the personal interests of Russian President Valdimir Putin, the desires of the Kremlin and NATO’s involvement. 

In the context of the Russo-Georgian war, an individual to analyze is Putin, who (despite not officially being president) still had full control over the country as Dmitry Medvedev, the leader at the time, was Putin’s protégé and aligned his policies through regular consultations with Putin. This effectively made him Putin’s proxy. For Putin, his interest was to ensure the survival of the Russian state and, within that, to maintain his own power. 

The color revolutions, particularly the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in the subsequent year, collapsed pro-Kremlin leaders in neighboring countries, which increased Western influence by Russia’s borders. Preservation of the Kremlin became Putin’s priority during that period, which might have been a contributing factor to the war. Indeed, Putin sought constitutional changes as a means to reclaim power and pursue a more aggressive role in the region which could explain the asymmetrical escalation in 2008 — launching a full scale invasion after just a few casualties. This revisionist sentiment remains even today, where Putin continues to abide by incrementalism in his foreign policy rather than drastic actions — resorting to cyberattacks to undermine NATO solidarity, exploiting international institutions (i.e. UNSC, IMF, APEC) to stifle liberal internationalism, and propagating misinformation to disrupt free elections. All of these efforts are to destabilize Western institutions and democratic systems around the world. 

For the short-term leading up to the invasion, Putin was faced with a triple-challenge: low oil prices from the Great Recession, a stalled constitutional process and socio-economic hardships. The war in Georgia was a diversionary tactic employed to distract from these domestic failures. By ‘rallying around the flag’ against NATO, which over 88% of Russians held unfavourable views towards, Putin increased his approval rating by eight percentage points directly after the intervention and re-consolidated his regime’s legitimacy. This parallels the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, where Putin’s approval rating jumped by 22 percentage points from a historic low post-invasion. 

More broadly, the Kremlin sought to revise the status quo and bring back Soviet glory. The disintegration of the USSR was seen as a humiliating defeat because Russia/USSR lost a third of its territory and half of its population and GDP. The Kremlin has long desired to rebuild the once-great Soviet Union (also known as revisionism) and feels it has the right to “take something back” such as reuniting the ethnic Russians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia with their motherland. Yet, revisionism also can only be a secondary component because it does not explain why Russia chose Georgia to go to war with instead of other ex-Soviet states, which all possess ethnic Russians in varying quantities. Specifically, Kazakhstan and Moldova both have comparatively larger populations of ethnic Russians compared to Georgia. This means that while revision can be a contributing factor to the war, it is not a leading factor because there is no justification for Georgia specifically compared to every other ex-Soviet state. The only difference is Western involvement in the country, which suggests that to be a decisive factor. 

NATO’s involvement in Georgia impacted both Russia’s and Georgia’s decision-making calculus when it promised that Georgia would one day join the alliance. Instead of disbanding after the collapse of the USSR, NATO extended membership to 15 additional countries in Eastern Europe as a means to ‘deter Russian aggression’ through the creation of a buffer zone. Russia on the other hand, has vehemently opposed NATO expansion, perceiving its only goal to be villainizing and containing Russia. 

Furthermore, “NATO expansion broke a promise that various American officials [including Bush and Clinton]had given to various Russian and Soviet officials [such as Gorbachev and Yeltsinthat]that NATO would not expand.” NATO’s hubristic expansion tipped the balance of power in Eastern Europe and was considered an existential threat by the Kremlin, which compelled it to retaliate to seek survival. In this case, Russia felt forced to destabilize the region in an effort to block NATO membership for Georgia, which was promised at the Bucharest summit. Indeed, the war effectively vetoed membership for Georgia because NATO would not accept new members with open territorial disputes. Overall, it’s arguable that Putin has been “protecting legitimate security interests” by destabilizing the region to veto NATO membership. 

By contrast, NATO involvement also emboldened Georgia to become overconfident through moral hazard  — the concept that Georgia engaged in risky behavior (behavior which they wouldn’t otherwise engage in) because they believed they had the full support of NATO. NATO’s open-door policy emboldened Georgia to act arrogantly after verbally pledging membership in 2008. Soon after, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili launched an offensive against pro-Russian separatists and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia as he believed the “West had his back, but he miscalculated and overreached,” confirming that the pledge made by NATO was misinterpreted by Georgia as a blank cheque. In Georgia, sporadic fighting against separatists has been ongoing for years, but it was not until after the Bucharest summit that President Saakashvili decided to strike. In this paradigmatic plight of moral hazard, NATO involvement encouraged Georgia to provoke Russia, confident that NATO would save them in the end. Critically, this was not the case with the invasion of Ukraine, as there were no indications that Ukraine would be part of NATO anytime soon. 

Today, Russo-Georgian relations are in shambles despite the war only lasting five days. After Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, Georgia completely severed all diplomatic relations with Russia. Russia eventually withdrew their troops from Georgia after a month. In its entirety, the war displaced nearly 200,000 people, many of whom were unable to return even today. 

Importantly, many of the issues and patterns in the Russo-Georgian war can still be seen today: the unresolved ethnic tensions in the Donbas and Luhansk regions, the revisionist sentiments of the Kremlin and the antagonistic stance of NATO. Moving forward, it is vital to consider pre-existing conditions within regions, the intention of each state and the impact of the involvement of international institutions.

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In 2020, Eastern Europe’s response to the pandemic was a loosening of monetary policies to support citizens and protect against short-term economic loss, which ultimately led to higher inflation and an increased cost of living. Out of the whole continent, Eastern Europe has been impacted the most; while it used to be known for countries with lower living costs compared to the rest of Europe, the cost of living in Eastern Europe is now almost comparable to Western European countries. 

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Eastern Europe saw a sharp decrease in retail sales, skyrocketing food and energy prices and higher rent, all of which have cut significantly into families’ incomes. Hungary, a small, landlocked country bordering Ukraine and the EU country with the highest rate of inflation, saw the most severe inflation rates it has seen in decades following the invasion, rising more than 20% year after year from January 2021 to December 2022. 

How is this crisis impacting the average Eastern European citizen?

Low-income families are paying around double for groceries, electricity and gas compared to upper-middle and wealthy families in Eastern Europe. This results in worse economic gaps between low and high-earning families. Food prices have also risen faster in Hungary than any other country in the EU, rising over 45% from 2022 to 2023, with Slovakia in second place at 29%. 

Meat products, once considered a staple in the Eastern European diet, are now a luxury for many. Bottled water, milk, eggs and bread now cost 72-80% more than they did in 2021– a staggering difference when compared to the average monthly income of Hungarians, which is 554,540 forints (about $1,631 USD). A dozen eggs can now cost as much as 858 forints (about $2.34 USD); this is not currently a sustainable price point for the average Hungarian. In Hungary, many families like to vacation in Lake Balaton, a world-famous vacation destination that European citizens flock to every summer for its warm temperatures and beautiful landscapes. 

When I visited Hungary this July, I was shocked by the cost of food. Cheese was somehow more expensive in Hungary than in the United States and what I would have considered affordable in Hungary the last time I was there was no longer affordable. According to my Hungarian family members, as well as other Hungarians I met during my time there, fewer and fewer people are able to travel for vacation to other countries or even within Hungary.

The risks of inflation rates remaining this high are many, including consumers buying fewer things, having to find a second or third job, finding alternatives to using gas and having less disposable income, which in turn negatively impacts Eastern Europe’s economies. According to the European Commission, Hungary’s GDP growth fell from 4.6% in 2022 to a mere 0.5% in 2023, and unemployment rose from 3.6% in 2022 to 4.2% in 2023. Experts predict that Hungary will be able to recover in 2024 with forecasted disinflation and a tightening of monetary policy. Hungarians should expect a decrease in inflation to 7-8% by December of this year, according to Hungary’s Finance Minister Vargás. The IMF predicts a low 0.3% GDP growth in Poland for 2023, 2.4% in Romania and -0.3% in Lithuania. 

The Israel-Palestine war will affect not only the Middle East’s economy but Eastern Europe’s as well; the cost of oil has already risen but will expect to recover unless Iran is sanctioned by the West for its support of Hamas. With no end in sight for the Russia-Ukraine war, rippling global conflict, lower consumption and economic activity and climate disasters such as wildfires and heat waves, the next couple of years will be difficult for Eastern Europeans. 

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Since the disputed August 9 election, a massive public movement erupted and thousands of citizens across the Eastern European country cried out for the end of Lukashenko’s 26-year-long presidency. The world has watched as Belarus’ citizens, notably led by women, have protested in the streets and faced state-sanctioned violence from militarized special police, known as the OMON. 

Country-wide demonstrations have been held in support of opposition candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, who ran symbolically in the place of her husband, popular blogger and Youtuber Sergei Tikhanovskaya, who was prevented from registering as a candidate and arrested for causing public unrest. Svetlana was forced to flee the country after the election, but has become a rallying call this election as the person to end Lukeshenko’s presidency.

The LGBTQ community in Belarus is protesting, facing police brutality in the hopes of ending the current dictatorship and making progress against deep-rooted anti-queer sentiments. On the frontlines, community members are being beaten and detained everyday, a critical, and overlooked, component of the demonstrations.

A History of Homophobia

Belarus has notoriously persecuted its queer population. Same-sex relations have been legal since 1994, when a Nazi-era law used to criminalize and kill gay men was repealed. However, there has been a distinct lack of legal protections or rights, leaving hate crimes rampant, with courts rarely recognizing homophobia and a hostile government that only fuels the violence. In 2012, Lukeshenko notoriously responded to the claim by a German minister that he was “Europe’s last dictator” that it was “better to be a dictator than gay.”

In 2013, Belarus had its most recent LBGT-related legal battle, as gay activists pushed for the registration of a public LGBTQ association that was denied by Belarus’ Department of Justice and Supreme Court. Mikhail Pischevsky, the leading architect of the proposed association was attacked the next year in Minsk outside of a gay nightclub and called a pidor, Belarusian for “faggot,” by his assailant. Doctors remove 20% of his brain in attempt to  save his life, but he died 17 months later. Belarus’ courts decided that the attack had no homophobic motive. 

In August of 2019, gay filmmaker Nikolai Kuprich and his two friends were assailed in Minsk as the attacker used homophbic slurs. Courts ruled that there was no homophobic motive, until Minsk recognized the crime has hate-motivated in December.

The post-Soviet state is marred by legal, social, and institutional homophobia. In 2016, Lukeshenko signed a law into effect banning information that “encourages habits contradicting the development of a healthy lifestyle” or “that discredits the institution of the family and marriage.” 

This modeled neighboring Russia’s infamous 2013 gay propaganda law, and provides for the targeting and infringement of human rights for queer people in Belarus. The Russian law threatens affirming education and support services and essentially bans resourceful and positive LGBTQ information for minors. Human Rights Watch called the law “a classic example of political homophobia.”

Meanwhile, the government has called same-sex relations “fake” and stated that “the overwhelming majority of Belarusians adhere to traditional family values,” in response to the British embassy flying the Pride flag in 2018.

“Pidor”

In Belarus there is no meaning to the word “queer” like in Western Europe or the United States. There is only pidor, a word that has been derogatorily charged against gay people as well as against Lukashenko in recent protests.

Belarus’ “pidor family” have joined the protests against Lukeshenko, and in doing so, risked their own personal lives and safety. Police abuse detainees, and activists say that for members of the LGBTQ community, this violence is routine. Officers call them “pidors” and say that “people like [them]need to be killed.” Activists who are arrested and released then have the threat of their personal information being published or leaked, which can destroy lives.

When recalling the scene at a riot, queer activist Andrei Zavalei told Politico: “When I think of this very moment, recalling the fear, shock and terror I faced, it doesn’t feel like an exceptional experience for me. I’ve had the same feeling of insecurity and oppression many times before.”

As first hand reports of police violence and abuse against protesters and detainees are being published, it is clear that the Belarus security forces employed tactics to terrorize citizens. One man told Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty his account of being raped with a truncheon by police while detained in August. 

There is an undercurrent of violent homophobia entrenched in Belarus’ culture and history that these divides have manifested in the volatile situation between the government and protesters. Recently, a popular Belarusian rock band reversed the special forces “OMON” to read “HOMO.” In the streets, police attack demonstrators, shouting, “on your knees, pidor,” while protestors have painted “go away, pidor,” calling for Lukeshenko to resign. Mocking one’s sexual identity has become a tool of verbal violence for both sides.

While visibility is a strength, it comes at a price. Some protestors openly bearing the rainbow Pride flag face retaliation from within the anti-Lukashenko movement, who do not welcome them. Meanwhile, bearing Pride flags gives potential fuel for the government to denounce the protests as Western-backed, delegitimizing the movement.

“We needed to document the participation of LGBTQ people in the revolution,” said Anna Bredova, an activist and organizer in Belarus. “We wanted to show that we also support the revolution and we’re also taking part in the protests.” 

Yet, even Svetlana appears not to be the saving grace for the community, stating on gay marriage: “I’m totally fine with same-sex relations and think any love is wonderful, but perhaps our country isn’t ready for a decision on this just yet.” 

Visible or not, the pidor family has been on the front lines, facing tear gas, stun grenades, and rubber bullets from police. They did not start their fight in August, and the fight will not end after the result of this election. Still, the possibility of a new president brings hope for a better future. 

“In a country with such depressing and frustrating conditions for LGBTQ people, we are determined to be patient and creative,” Zavalei said.

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Now, as the European Union imposes sanctions on Belarusian officials in response to the government’s election fraud and abuse of protestors, President Lukashenko is turning to Moscow for support. And, Putin has already confirmed that he has organized a reserve of law enforcement officers and is ready to intervene in Belarus  “if necessary.” The two countries have even launched joint military drills. With the President’s regime weakened by the protests and the European Union’s condemnation, Lukashenko has had no choice but to authorize Russian military intervention, a move that could potentially lead to Belarus’ annexation, though this remains a distant prospect. In any case, it seems like the clock is ticking for Europe’s last dictator. 

While the Belarusian public condemns their authoritarian government, public support for authoritarian leaders remains strong in Poland and Hungary. Poland’s Law and Justice Party and Hungary’s Fidesz Party have maintained power since 2015 and 2010, respectively. And, despite their track-records of antidemocratic reforms, national parliament voting intention polls for Poland and Hungary show that both right-wing parties still hold over 45% of voters’ support.

Will Poland and Hungary find themselves in a similar situation as Belarus if they continue down the path of authoritarianism? The two countries’ quasi-authoritarian politics have already resulted in a significant erosion of democratic institutions, but it is unclear whether it will escalate into a full-blown dictatorship as it did in Belarus. 

Though the future of democracy in Hungary and Poland remains uncertain, by analyzing the nature of these two countries’ budding authoritarianism, and comparing it to Belarus’ longstanding dictatorship, we can gain some insight into whether these two countries will follow in Belarus’ footsteps. 

Unlike Poland and Hungary, Belarus was never really a true democracy. Alexander Lukashenko was elected as the first President of Belarus in 1994, immediately after the country gained its independence from the Soviet Union, and has maintained power ever since by manipulating elections, repressing political dissension, and undermining the rule of law. In contrast, Poland and Hungary, transitioned to Western-style liberal democracies after their break from the USSR in 1991 and 1989, respectively. Both countries also joined liberal democratic international institutions, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, it is clear that Poland and Hungary’s histories differ significantly from that of Belarus. 

Yet, Poland and Hungary’s recent political maneuvers mirror Lukashenko’s early authoritarian tactics. Though Lukashenko is now subject to popular disapproval, he was once favored by his people and elected on an incendiary populist platform in 1994. He harnessed this populist support in 1996 when he persuaded voters to approve a new constitution through a referendum. This new constitution gave Lukashenko the right to lengthen his presidential term, rule by decree, and select one third of the upper house parliament representatives. And, in 2004, he completely eliminated term limits through another allegedly rigged referendum. Since then, his administration has consolidated power over all governmental institutions. 

Similarly, Poland’s Law and Justice Party and Hungary’s Fidesz Party rose to power through inflammatory right-wing, ethno-nationalist, populist politics. And, though the two parties have relied on democratic elections to maintain power, they also tend to have a general dislike for democratic institutions. Accordingly, Hungary and Poland’s leaders have struck a balance between preserving and dismantling democratic institutions to maintain political power while gradually advancing authoritarianism. 

Since 2015, the Law and Justice Party in Poland has used its control over the legislative and executive branches of government to take over the judiciary, effectively dismantling the democratic rule of law. In 2018, the Law and Justice Party founded an “extraordinary appeal” chamber made up of appointed officials that has the power to reverse any civil, criminal, or military court decision made since 1997.  This government body also has the final say when it comes to elections, making the prospect of unfair elections all the more likely. And, in February 2020, incumbent President Andrzej Duda adopted legislation that gives politicians the power to fire judges for perceived unfavorable decisions and forbids judges from criticizing the president’s judicial appointments.

Hungary is following a similar path, as the Fidesz Party, headed by Prime Minister Victor Orbán, has continued to attack judicial independence since its return to power in 2010. In fact, just like Belarus’ Lukaneshko, the Fidesz Party adopted a new constitution in 2010 that weakened judicial checks on its power. Similarly to Poland, Hungary created a parallel court system in 2018 controlled by the executive government with the purpose of overseeing elections. Additionally, Orbán has modified electoral laws to ensure he remains in power by redrawing the electoral map and giving ethnic Hungarians outside of the country voting power. 

Through judicial and legislative reform, both Hungary and Poland have eroded the democratic rule of law and democratic elections. As in Belarus, by undermining the power of the judiciary, they have eliminated the right to a fair trial and transformed the justice system into a weapon for political harassment and persecution. And, without an independent court system to check the validity of elections, they have also paved the way for electoral fraud. 

COVID-19 has only exacerbated the rise of authoritarianism in these two countries, as the Polish and Hungarian governments have used emergency legislation to squash political dissent and give themselves sweeping powers. In Poland, President Andrzej Duda exploited the pandemic crisis to cripple his opponents and secure his re-election in July. While campaigning for re-election, Duda imposed social distancing restrictions for everyone with the exception of himself, giving him an advantage over his opponents who could not effectively campaign. The Law and Justice Party is also taking advantage of social distancing restrictions to advance controversial conservative legislation, such as increased constraints on abortion. In the past, similar legislation has succumbed to the pressure of large-scale public protests. However, under coronavirus restrictions, protesting is no longer an option. 

In Hungary, authoritarianism is accelerating even further, as Prime Minister Victor Orbán has virtually declared himself dictator through emergency coronavirus legislation that gives him the power to rule by decree indefinitely. Technically, parliament can still revoke these emergency powers. However, with the legislative branch dominated by Fidesz Party loyalists, this outcome seems highly unlikely. Additionally, the legislation allows the Hungarian government to jail anyone for up to five years if they publish false or agitating information, allowing for greater censorship of political opponents. 

Poland and Hungary’s political moves seem to be straight out of Lukashenko’s authoritarian playbook. The two governments have undermined the democratic rule of law, suppressed political dissent, and meddled with fair elections. And, it has not gone unnoticed. Poland and Hungary’s democratic backsliding has already received criticism from the European Union. And, in the case of Hungary, its budding authoritarianism has strengthened its relationship with Russia, representing a potential security risk for NATO. 

If indeed this path leads Poland and Hungary down the same road as Belarus, perhaps they should consider sticking to democracy. These two countries’ leaders should view Belarus’ crisis as a cautionary tale about the consequences of authoritarianism, and shift their course now before they find themselves in Lukashenko’s position‒ on Russia’s doorstep. 

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