In the 2012 Burmese elections, Aung San Suu Kyi – the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) – won a seat in parliament after spending years under house arrest. Her triumph represented a shift in the power wielded by the ruling military dictatorship. Though the transition to a true democracy is unfinished, Suu Kyi’s election placed Burma/Myanmar in a positive global spotlight.[1] Such a peaceful transition contrasts that of Egypt, which appears to be returning to military-dominated governance only three years after a popular coup ousted Hosni Mubarak and six decades of authoritarian regime. Despite the two countries’ vastly different histories, identities and economic and international interests, can Burma’s success story be a potential analog for Egypt?

Military dictatorships are not uncommon in today’s world, especially in developing countries. This is perhaps because civil society widely considers militaries to be the most capable institution to rule, or because the military is able to organize itself enough to claim power over a burgeoning democratic movement. The current prevalence of this form of government, in which the military institution controls the politics and governance of the nation-state, is thought to exist mainly as a leftover of the Cold War era bipolar order in which the United States and the Soviet Union “collected” allies to their cause. Training developing countries’ militaries to control public resistance within its borders – instead of existing solely to protect citizens from enemies coming from outside – was the cornerstone of a US Cold War foreign policy termed “national security doctrine.”[2] The US retained allies by providing military and financial aid, and teaching foreign governments to recognize and destroy communist cells. In return, these countries would remain loyal to the US cause, championing democracy and capitalism.

As a result of this Cold War doctrine, the highly trained military emerged as the dominant institution within developing countries. These institutions were easily able to take control of the government and, believing their own systems and bureaucracy to be most well-equipped to run the country, assumed political control. In many of these cases, global society did not object to these military governments, because the great powers were more focused on retaining allies than on the rights of the people living within the allied countries. The problem with favoring the power of the military over the rights of the people, though, is that eventually these policies will have consequences—the populace can only be repressed for so long before they will rebel against the government.

The key to working around the interests of these powerful militaries, whose interests lie more in retaining power than in providing quality lives for their people, is to co-opt the institution into having a stake in democracy. In Burma, the efforts and sacrifices of Suu Kyi and NLD were certainly effective in battling the dictatorship on both the global and domestic levels using her image as a human rights icon.

However, it could be argued that the key actor in affecting this ideological change in the military is actually the global economic system. Burma is rich in natural resources, and has struggled with China, which is attempting to turn Burma into a quasi-vassal state. Since Burma has demonstrated what could be the beginning of a successful transition towards democracy it has begun to establish economic and political relations with the US. The US, meanwhile, is interested in Burma’s success because it has interests in competing with and containing China, and being seen as a global supporter of democracy. In this way, Burma’s military elites have slowly been co-opted into ceding power to the democratic government: with increased levels of democracy come increased levels of investment in the country. In November 2015, it will be interesting to note how the military responds to the coming elections, and particularly whether it will allow Suu Kyi to run for the presidential seat she covets.

In Egypt, the opposite transition is taking place, and it remains to be seen whether cooptation of the military, as has occurred in Burma, could eventually save the potential for Egyptian democracy. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the former defense minister and army Field Marshal, was “elected” to the Egyptian presidency in June 2014. Amidst the excitement of “elections” in Egypt, it was clear that they were not exactly democratic; Sisi won the presidency with 96% of the vote, with only one opponent taking 4% and the rest of the political parties abstaining from the elections in protest against the military and its treatment of opposition groups.

The military, which has trained and educated every Egyptian president since Nasser’s Free Officers movement, has always retained some level of control on Egypt’s fate. In 2011, during the Arab uprisings, the military refused to side with authoritarian president Mubarak and allowed the popular uprising to succeed, before it took over interim control of the government as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). Even once elections were held in Egypt, the military retained tight control of politics, executing a coup to remove the democratically elected Mohamed Morsi from office and massacring hundreds of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.

It has become clear that the Egyptian military, with Sisi as president and a literal army of his military allies surrounding him in government, is in absolute control of state politics. Global society has not denounced this takeover. This could be because allied states have prioritized the military regime’s suppression of Islamist movements over the establishment of democracy. The US and its allies want a stable Egypt for many strategic reasons; forcing the military to hold true elections and effectively deposing Sisi and his military elite system would throw the country into greater chaos. Egypt’s military has enjoyed significant influence in the country’s politics since independence in 1952: what actor would fill the power vacuum if the military were to be entirely sidelined?

Egyptians have already cited countless human rights violations, including the massacres occurring against dissenters to Sisi’s regime. The media is also being curtailed: Bassem Youssef’s political satire television show was cancelled and al-Jazeera journalists have been jailed and sentenced to life in prison. The judicial system now allows the military to try civilians without logical justification. Human rights are slowly disappearing in Egypt, and, currently, no countries have the means or the interest to coerce the military into ceding power, especially when the state of the global economic system makes it beneficial to the US and its allies to keep Egypt stable.

As demonstrated by the evolving experience in Burma, the only way to regain at least a semblance of democracy in Egypt is to co-opt the military into a democratic agenda by providing it with interests in further structural reforms. The actors who can accomplish this, and how they will do so, remains to be seen. But it is through observing the potentially successful transitional steps occurring in countries like Burma that those working towards democratic reform in Egypt can convince the military to cede some of its power and truly adopt positive change in Egypt.

Correction: The previous version of this article mistakenly identified the National Democratic Party, or NDP, as a major political party in Burma. No such party exists. The article has been corrected and identifies the National League for Democracy, or NLD, as the opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Other Works Cited

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Syria, Iraq and Ukraine have been reduced to shambles. You’ve seen it all over the news: terrorist turned caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and his Islamic State watch as their influence and power spreads like wildfire across the Levant, while pro-Russian opposition groups wreck havoc throughout the Ukraine, shaking the establishment of the Iraqi and Ukrainian governments at their cores. Millions of refugees and internally displaced persons across the regions suffer from inadequate resources and fear they may never return home again amidst oppositional invasions and airstrikes in cities like Mosul and Snizhne. Thousands of miles away from the comfort of our living rooms we wonder how these states descended into chaos so rapidly in the past few years and why attempts at reigning in their power prove ineffectual at best.

Yet, the leadership in two of these regions has emerged from the entropy unscathed, and, by some accounts, more powerful than ever despite the chaos unfolding within their borders. Bashar al-Assad began his third presidential term last week despite condemnation of Syria’s elections by the European Union, the United States and UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon as unfair and illegitimate. According to a recent Gallup poll, Vladimir Putin has enjoyed an 29% increase in his national approval rating this past year, no doubt in response to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and destabilizing role in Eastern Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Syrian political groups remain mired in intense intra-group conflict over how to handle their current domestic situation. With the current split system between Bashar’s Damascus and the opposition-led Aleppo government, little hope remains for any semblance of legitimate rule.

In Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been blacklisted and blamed by leaders in the Gulf States and Iraq’s own general public for failing to quash the rebel fighters edging their way towards Baghdad. Mired in gridlock as Parliament members attempt to form a new government, the hope for order and stability in Iraq seems fleeting for the near future.

How do Putin and Assad continue to reign with such unchecked power given the fierce opposition by their own citizens –as seen in the Pussy Riot protests and by free speech advocates being arrested for “violating public order”–and, by and large, the Western world? Without question, Russia’s star has risen astronomically in the global political arena over the past year. Damascus, thanks to the generosity of Putin’s government, has greatly increased its military power with Russian-made jets used to hunt down oppositional militias. Al-Baghdadi and his troops have captured the Al-Omar gas field in central Syria, increasing their economic power and threatening the very core of the Iraqi energy sector. Though by no means exclusively, ‘iron fist’politics, tangible gains in national interest and popularly supported cronyism are the three driving factors in the success of Bashar, al-Baghdadi and Putin.

Dominant leadership has proved crucial to the success of Putin’s Russia. Since 2000, his charismatic authoritarianism has pushed the country to the forefront of the political arena. By setting a precedent of swift, no-holds-barred action against opposition groups during the Second Chechen War, Putin enjoys popular support as a leader who demonstrates potency and has a clear vision for the future. Bashar too continues to hold absolute rule despite the scattered battlefields across the country, authoritatively quashing rebel groups with brutal barrel bombs and leaving millions displaced or in flight from their homeland. Al-Baghdadi’s Islamic State has also risen as an effectual political and military model that wins citizens’support thanks to welfare services and public works projects, despite grave ideological differences within the group’s vision of a caliphate and fundamentalist fueled sharia law.

All three leaders also boast a clear grand strategy for what they perceive as the public’s interest. Putin’s vision of Russian exceptionalism, reiterated in his speeches to the people, now inspire a new wave of popular support throughout the country, and his actions in Crimea and the rest of Ukraine reflect a prototypically powerful Russia rising from the ashes of the USSR’s breakup in 1992. Pro-Russian rebel forces now control the majority of Eastern Ukraine –including the area where Malaysian Airlines MH-17 was allegedly shot down by opposition forces with Russian-supplied surface-to-air missiles–further illustrating their influence. In Bashar’s inaugural speech last week, he called for a greater focus on caring for the people of Syria, decrying attempts from the West to uproot existing order in the country and promising to protect the Syrian people against further bloodshed. While his declarations of victory of terrorism don’t ring true for Syrians in Aleppo still recovering from last week’s airstrike, his military and political capabilities will undoubtedly keep Syria safe from international threats and slowly but surely defeat the Free Syrian Army from within its borders. Al-Baghdadi’s comprehensive public works campaigns and acquisitions of oil and gas fields in both Syria and Iraq have won the support of citizens and business leaders alike who hope to cash in on the loot.

Yet, the widespread, intricate cronyism that ties the three together is the most damning evidence of all. Reports recently surfaced that the Islamic State may be selling Syria oil and gas through secret back channels, even though the Syrian government vowed to “eliminate” the extremist Sunni terrorist organization, which it considers a threat to Bashar’s presidency. Russia too has joined in on the action, providing the Syrian regime with weapons and jets to combat their civil war, seeing value in defending a vital economic and political ally in the Middle East.

Sustained growth by these three powers gravely threatens American political and economic interests; yet, the US has proposed ineffectual sanctions that, while crippling to Syria and Russia’s economy, have done little to nothing to ease tensions and render solutions. Putin hasn’t batted an eyelid: the creation of the $100 billion BRICS Development Bank poses a serious threat to both the US dollar and the influence of Western-based lending institutions like the World Bank and IMF. While a three-front war in the regions would be strategically challenging and politically impossible, more direct action must be taken in Iraq, Syria and Russia. While America’s presence in Iraq is growing, its purely advisory role lacks the necessary punch to rid Iraq of ISIS.

While war hawks and some leaders in the US want to sustain the country’s role as the international police force for conflict and corruption around the world, it is clear that a majority of Americans want to focus on domestic economic and political rehabilitation. Ultimately, the country may no longer be able to foot the bill, either economically or politically.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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