As the United States edges ever closer to another presidential election in 2016, foreign policy discussion on the campaign trail has turned ugly. A leading candidate for the Republican Party nomination openly stated that they would ban all Muslims from immigrating into the country, while another mused aloud on the feasibility of glow-in-the-dark sand in the deserts of the Middle East. Given these first few months, it appears a number of candidates feel that apocalyptic force is the only viable US foreign policy strategy.

The good news is that polls and pundits alike do not anticipate Donald Trump or Ted Cruz to occupy the Oval Office come January. Professional consensus on the 2016 election sees the Democratic frontrunner, Hillary Clinton, becoming President at the end of the year, partly as a result of her vast experience in the realm of foreign policy.

Despite the positive perception of her experience, her foreign policy ideas must be examined independently—and they prove to be outdated and dangerous. It is true that Clinton’s foreign policy platforms are neither apocalyptic nor isolationist, making them preferable to those of Cruz or Trump. But that is setting an incredibly low bar for presidential foreign policy. Based on two defining moments during her tenure as Secretary of State – her council on regime change in Libya and her response to the Arab Spring in Egypt – Hillary Clinton has shown herself to be a Cold War-era realist, much like Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon (perhaps even Margaret Thatcher). Clinton operates under the assumption that any international entity not pro-US must be anti-US and, as happened during the tenures of the aforementioned leaders, that view has often lead to involvement or escalation in unnecessary, unproductive conflicts.

The most visible example of Secretary Clinton’s realist ideology came when she advocated for aggressive regime change in Libya without a strategy in place for the aftermath. Muammar Gaddafi was certainly a tyrant who treated his people horribly and masterminded an attack on US soldiers in Berlin before the turn of the century. But the willingness on the part of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to destabilize Libya originated in a Cold War ideal. In explaining his choice to use force in the country, President Obama said that if Gaddafi were left in power, “The democratic values that we stand for would be overrun.” In the estimation of President Obama and Secretary Clinton, foreign leaders are either “with us or against us”, and those against us should be deposed. Interestingly, when the Muslim Brotherhood was voted into power in 2014, a CIA-trained, Libyan-born, US citizen named General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar assumed control of the Libyan government. General Haftar has since threatened to disband governmental institutions in an attempt to seize power—in effect, rule as Gaddafi did. Should Secretary Clinton become President, a willingness to open up power vacuums by toppling regimes considered anti-American could pose a number of problems.

The lack of a clear strategy for implementing traditional democracy in Libya, as evidenced by the early success of the Muslim Brotherhood and the subsequent chaos that rendered the country a hotbed for loose weapons and terrorists, calls into question Secretary Clinton’s ability to handle a similar situation. Bashar al-Assad has overstayed his welcome as leader of Syria, and more damning evidence of infringements on democratic values has been brought against him than Gaddafi. Given Secretary Clinton’s council to President Obama on how to handle Gaddafi, President Clinton would surely do her best to depose Assad. She has even alluded to wanting to depose Assad before tackling the problem of ISIS in Syria.

Her argument that rebels on the ground would be more invested in fighting ISIS if Assad was gone is incredibly naïve for a woman of her experience. Nature abhors a vacuum, so the most organized group will surely fill the power void left by a deposed Assad. Unless Clinton has a miracle plan for organizing the moderate forces in Syria, ousting Assad would clear a path for ISIS to seize even more control in the country. Hasty regime change in Libya led to the Muslim Brotherhood gaining power; why would that pattern not continue in Syria?

Secretary Clinton’s support of the pro-democracy Libyan intervention is made all the more curious when considering how she handled the Arab Spring. Following the Tahrir Square protests in 2011, Secretary Clinton warned President Obama and his foreign policy team that the protesters would not be able to govern themselves if Mubarak was overthrown. According to Dennis Ross, Clinton feared that if the US backed protesters it would be turning its back on a long-time friend in Mubarak. Even Ross, a man described as “a hard-headed realist”, felt Clinton was “putting too much stock in…old friends.” Surely Mubarak was opposed to democratic values, but he was pro-US. Therefore, Secretary Clinton fought to protect Mubarak until President Obama chose to support the protesters.

Hypocrisy aside, Secretary Clinton’s desire to stand behind “friends” at all cost could deprive the US of a great opportunity during her Presidency: a shift away from its alliance with Saudi Arabia. The political, social and economic timing could not be better. Saudi Arabia has grown increasingly violent, and rang in the New Year by executing 47 dissidents. Domestic shale oil production in the US continues to decrease petroleum imports, meaning less business with Gulf States. The nuclear deal with Iran has opened the door to a more friendly relationship. The times are changing, and such a strong alliance with Saudi Arabia may no longer be required. Under President Clinton, however, the policy of defending “friends” would allow for no such maneuvering, lest the US be seen as turning its back on an ally. It is therefore plausible that in order to placate her ally, President Clinton would keep Iran at arms length (putting strain on a still-tenuous relationship), ignore human rights violations and allow democratic ideals like free speech to be punished by beheadings and public crucifixions.

Supporters of Secretary Clinton might argue that these events took place years ago and don’t reflect her current thinking on today’s challenges. However, while she has not had to defend her position on the Arab Spring movement, Secretary Clinton has reaffirmed her position on the Libyan intervention multiple times during debates in October and December of 2015. Moreover, while new situations pose new challenges, the overarching premise remains the same—renegade leaders who do not heed American warnings (Gaddafi and Assad) and decades-old alliances made untenable by leaders who systematically oppress their people (Mubarak’s Egypt and Saudi Arabia).

In fact, if Clinton embraces a foreign policy as President similar to the one she exhibited as Secretary, the ramifications will be more severe. Russia is openly backing Assad, which could lead to increased hostility if the US directly attacks Syria in an attempted regime change. ISIS, rather than the comparatively benign Muslim Brotherhood, would likely fill the power vacuum left post-Assad. And the escalation of proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran could lead to potential US involvement on the Saudi side, calling into question the burgeoning diplomatic relationship with Iran.

Despite her vast experience in the field of foreign policy, Hillary Clinton is a Cold War-era realist. Her worldviews perpetuate conflict and utilize the same “us vs. them” mentality that saw the US become involved in countless aggressions from World War II until the 1990s. While Clinton may not be screaming incoherencies about the evils of Muslim people and is certainly not actively seeking apocalyptic nuclear conflict, her agenda isn’t that of peace and cooperation. I cannot say for certain why Secretary Clinton feels the need to exude toughness and operate based on the realist ideas of old, but I can say for certain that her ideas will not move the world in a positive direction. One can only hope that American voters concentrate on the reality of Secretary Clinton’s foreign policy rather than accept experience alone as a qualifying factor for the Presidency.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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On the surface, it would appear that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has begun the long-overdue process of eliminating corrupt, power-hoarding oligarchs from national prominence, despite his own status as one of the richest men in the country. In March of this year, Poroshenko removed Igor Kolomoisky, the former governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region and an oligarch with a personal fortune of $3 billion, from power. This came shortly after a volunteer battalion under the control of Kolomoisky captured offices of a state oil firm, followed by an embarrassing standoff between national troops and Kolomoisky’s men. National authorities then charged one of his banking assets, PrivatBank, with fraudulently diverting upwards of $1.8 billion out of the country in August.

With Kolomoisky under scrutiny, President Poroshenko has now shifted his focus to the richest man in Ukraine, Rinat Akhmetov. Akhmetov is hemorrhaging profits from his steel and energy empires as a result of ongoing violence and instability in Eastern Ukraine. He is also having difficulty repaying debts issued in foreign currencies with Ukraine’s devalued hryvnia. In that context, the government’s actions to annul the privatization of parts of Akhmetov’s firm DTEK – which produces the majority of the non-nuclear power in Ukraine – is a clear attack on a weakened target.

Attacking Kolomoisky and Akhmetov gives President Poroshenko the air of a morally superior leader willing to act against corruption and oligarchy in Ukraine. The following, however, are two arguments asserting that Poroshenko chose his targets so as to politically utilize ethnic and religious distrust and position himself as the protector of true Ukrainians. Neither is confirmed, but the chains of evidence exist.

To provide context, nationalism and ethnic distrust have been on the rise in Ukraine. The Western oriented Poroshenko government successfully adopted economic policies prescribed by the EU and the IMF; but with economic reform comes devalued currency, increased prices of necessary goods and increased inequality and hardships for the people. From those difficulties, far right, ultranationalist movements have emerged that support a more independent Ukraine free from either Russia or the West. This is the societal trend that Poroshenko is playing to in Ukraine.

The first suggestion that the attacks are politically motivated is relatively simple: both oligarchs under scrutiny have Eastern Ukrainian power centers. Kolomoisky’s political seat of power was in the Eastern city of Dnipropetrovsk, along with most of his business interests. Akhmetov’s factories are mostly in Eastern Ukraine as well, and he was a great supporter and beneficiary of deposed President Victor Yanukovych’s Eastern-leaning regime. Therefore, it is plausible that Poroshenko is attempting to gain favor in the more Western-leaning areas of Ukraine by invoking existing tensions through the prosecution of prominent Eastern businessmen. Simultaneously, he could be playing to the ultranationalist movements by attacking people with perceived Russian connections.

The second argument may seem more circumstantial, but when taken with the first could prove poignant. Both Kolomoisky and Akhmetov are not purely ethnically Ukrainian: Kolomoisky is Jewish  (outspokenly so) and Akhmetov is a Tatar (Muslim). Most ethnic Ukrainians, however, are Eastern Orthodox. Their last names also indicate that they are not ethnically Ukrainian – neither end in “enko” as most ethnically Ukrainian names do. Both the religious differences and the variance in name structure suggest a cultural and religious divide between the two oligarchs and ethnic Ukrainians, which Poroshenko may be exploiting.

The previous assertions would perhaps hold little meaning if not for the fact that Poroshenko is losing his power base. 97% of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the rate of change under his administration and questions remain about his commitment to combatting oligarchy, despite the examples of Kolomoisky and Akhmetov. In fact, they are the first oligarchs against which Poroshenko has acted. As a result, his popularity numbers are down and he is losing the people’s trust.

Now, Poroshenko and his government are under pressure due to a looming election. Former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, whom Poroshenko beat in the most recent presidential election, is gaining ground in the polls and challenging Poroshenko from the Euro-centric side of the political spectrum. She, too, is using nationalist rhetoric and symbolism—including a famous picture of her holding wheat, a commodity Ukraine is known for producing, with her hair in a traditional braid. Because Poroshenko has failed to convince the public that EU-prescribed economic reforms are attacking the oligarchs or improving the lives of the citizenry, nationalist rhetoric is growing across the political spectrum. In order to regain support, Poroshenko must appear to be protecting Ukrainians from those who would take advantage of them. It makes sense, then, that he would target people who are already disliked for their social status and distrusted for their identity.

The combination of his low approval rating and a general rise of nationalist fervor makes it politically practical for Poroshenko to attack two of the East’s major oligarchs, both of whom are ethnic “outsiders” in Ukraine. But political expediency is not without its potential complications. Ethnic conflict has already impacted Ukraine, with the ethnically Russian majority wanting to disassociate with Kiev. If Poroshenko continues to only prosecute oligarchs that are Eastern-oriented, there may be increased distrust between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Ukraine has had a massive spike in black market weapons sales and a minority that has violently sought increased autonomy just over a year ago – add tension along the same ethnic divisions and conflict could soon follow.

Further escalation in Ukraine might be catastrophic. Any emerging ethnic strife could see the Kremlin use the guise of protection for Russian minorities to exert further influence—perhaps even take tangible military action, which would put the US, the EU and NATO in a tricky situation. If Poroshenko continues to foster ethnic distrust, and if nationalism wins out in Western Ukraine, further conflict escalation will not be far behind. In an attempt to curry political favor, Poroshenko could be leading his country into further struggle and misery.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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John Oliver, burning tires and flowers. Why do these three seemingly disparate entities belong in the same list? They each indicate just how dangerous Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa is and could become.

Correa’s eight-year reign, now in its third term, has brought significant benefits to the people of Ecuador, including an impressive drop in the poverty rate from 37% in 2007 to 22% in 2014 and stability to a nation that in the prior decade saw seven presidents removed from office before completing their terms. But an alarming combination of hypersensitivity to criticism, obsession with power at any cost and a faltering economy could push Correa to civil war with his people—or worse, trap them in an oppressive, smothering dictatorship.

The President’s hypersensitivity manifests itself in Ecuador’s poor record on freedoms of expression and the press. Freedom House has labeled Ecuador “Not Free” in its Freedom of the Press category for 2015, citing strict censorship laws passed by the Correa regime, specifically a 2013 law, The Organic Law on Communications, that allows more government regulation of the media by dictating the types of information that can and cannot be presented and expanding governmental monitoring capabilities.

Moreover, Human Rights Watch has noted several cases that used the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, a US law that requires websites to remove content on the grounds of copyright infringement without ever going through the judiciary. President Correa, according to Human Rights Watch, has used this precedent to compel global social media sites to remove content that is critical of his administration. The cases were all brought by a Spanish firm representing media entities linked to the regime, including the public TV station, the political party and even a government ministry.

But, then again, grotesque media censorship is not all that surprising coming from a man who angrily tweeted John Oliver for condemning his underwhelming record with regard to freedom of the press.

Troublingly, Correa’s penchant for stifling free and fair journalism by any means necessary – including calling one female journalist a “fatty” in order to discredit her – is not his worst leadership quality. In addition to his distaste for media criticism, he often responds to protests against his policies with state-sanctioned cruelty.

During August 2015, a national strike was called to protest controversial inheritance tax policies, the expansion of oil drilling and mining, changes to labor laws and pensions, repression of the freedoms of speech and the press, and constitutional amendments (discussed later). In response to the demonstrations, reports state that the Ecuadorian police used tear gas and clubs on protestors, arrested and searched citizens arbitrarily, declared a warrantless “State of Exception,” and even targeted female protestors’ “intimate regions” during attacks—all while Correa publically praised the police.

Police violence and excessive use of power are not new to the Correa regime. In 2010, after a demonstration during which members of the air force and police department blockaded major thoroughfares with burning tires to protest cuts in benefits, the President responded by publically declaring that “no pardon or forgiveness” would be given to those involved. Correa even stated that he would attack members of the opposition political party, who he accused of attempting to stage a coup.

His sensitivity and violent streak depict a man with a need to hoard power, an image only enhanced when examining the aforementioned constitutional reforms. If adopted, Correa’s proposed amendments to the Ecuadorian constitution would eliminate term limits for public officials. These amendments would, in theory, allow him legislative freedom to rule for life should he continue to win elections, and are being advertised by the ruling party despite a 14-point drop in the President’s approval rating, an overall disapproval rating of 55% and 50% of Ecuadorians saying they no longer trust him.

The most immediate threat to Correa’s coveted power might not come from the people of Ecuador, but rather its economy. As oil prices have fallen and the dollar – Ecuador’s currency since 2000 – has strengthened, Ecuador’s economic activity has stalled; public coffers are beginning to dry up and Correa has lost a valuable leverage over his people. As a commodity exporting country – its two major exports being oil and bananas – volatile commodity markets affect Ecuador disproportionally.

Concurrently, the sanctions placed on Russia in response to President Putin’s aggression against Ukraine have also gravely affected Ecuadorian cut flower exports. The flower industry in Ecuador employed over 100,000 people and generated $873 million in business in 2013, with Russia as one of its principal buyers. As such, imposed sanctions have hurt the Ecuadorian flower industry. Ecuadorian industry is losing competitiveness across the board and it is unable to devalue its currency in order to spur export competitiveness.

Correa also poses an economic threat to foreign markets. He came to power in 2008 by defying the international monetary community and defaulting on his country’s debt. His economic legacy is volatile at best, and, with access to total power, he could initiate a crackdown on foreign investment in the form of creeping expropriation—investment that totaled over $725 million in 2013 and reached an eight-year high with over a billion dollars invested in 2008. The US State Department has labeled Ecuador fairly open to FDI in the past, indicating any attempt by Correa to close off foreign economic involvement could affect the significant international presence in the national economy. Moreover, because Ecuador has adopted the dollar, the American Federal Reserve Bank has control of Ecuador’s currency; the American government should have vested interest in the stability of democracy and free trade there.

The Twitter war with John Oliver proves that Rafael Correa will do anything in his power to discredit and silence his critics. How he handled the burning tire protest and others since then prove that he will publically call for and subsequently condone the use of force in response to demonstrations against his policies, stifling dissent. Most importantly, the issues with commodity exports demonstrate the fragility of Ecuador’s economy, the performance of which was Correa’s one legitimate claim to the popularity and adulation he so clearly covets. His disapproval and distrust numbers keep climbing while simultaneously he and his party are increasing attempts to codify in Constitutional law his indefinite right to the Presidency. If he continues losing popularity, the situation will worsen.

For the sake of the people of Ecuador and foreign investment in the country, vigilance is necessary, lest Correa forcefully construct an oppressive, leftist state. He may be “one of Latin America’s most popular leaders” today, but Rafael Correa is a ticking time bomb set to go off in the near future with clear potential for disaster.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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In order to try these complex cases, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was formed in 1998 out of the Rome Statute, an international treaty separate from other multinational entities, such as the United Nations. Located in The Hague, Netherlands, charges under the purview of the court include genocide and war crimes, as well as crimes against humanity.

Despite it being a potentially more civilized option for prosecuting war criminals than vengeful post-war tribunals, the court has struggled for legitimacy and access. As an international body, the court cannot violate the sovereignty of any nation. Consequently, it relies on supporting countries or parties to the Rome Statute to extradite those in question, or on the individual in question to cross international borders. Although it can issue warrants, the court cannot enter countries to bring the accused to justice.

Moreover, the ICC cannot press charges unilaterally. In order to issue an arrest warrant, the court must receive referrals from the UN Security Council or State Parties to the Rome Statute. The model for the ICC obviously has flaws—despite over a billion dollars spent building the court, it currently only boasts two convictions from a single conflict in the Congo.  

The court could, however, be on the verge of a third, more important conviction. The trial of Bosco Ntaganda began Wednesday, September 3, two years after he voluntarily surrendered himself to the US Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda.

Nicknamed “The Terminator” because of his ruthless murders, Ntaganda is facing 18 charges, including recruiting child soldiers, raping women soldiers and holding them as sex slaves, and commanding troops that murdered and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. All of this is compounded by the ethnically driven murder of 800 civilians in 2002.

The beginning of the Ntaganda trial, in addition to the heads of state of the Ivory Coast and Kenya appearing before the court, suggests a more powerful, more influential ICC. Bringing Uhuru Kenyatta, President of Kenya, to the court was a major triumph – he was the first sitting head of state to appear before the ICC for any purpose.

Despite the court’s successes on the continent, the African Union (AU) has taken exception to what it perceives as a bias against African states in the cases the court tries. It is true that all nine situations currently being processed by the court are against Africans; however that continental focus could be beneficial if the AU accepted it.

The fact that Africa has recently experienced nine circumstances classified by the ICC as crimes against humanity suggests a trend of instability and violence exists that would benefit from any kind of deterrent. While all regions of the world exhibit violent tendencies from time to time, no region’s violence gets less international attention than Africa. A 2014 report in the Columbia Journalism Review on the lack of Western media coverage of the brutal, quasi-genocidal civil war in the Central African Republic highlights this gap in coverage. The report notes the war – which killed 5,000 and displaced hundreds of thousands more – received less coverage in September 2014 than celebrity stories, including the Oscar Pistorious trial in South Africa. Moreover, the report cites two wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo that have killed more people than any war since World War II, yet never had a single journalist consistently stationed on the front line.

Were the ICC involved in identifying, finding and prosecuting African war criminals, the coverage problem would dissipate as a result of the western actors involved—a wide array of media would profile and report on the conflicts. That coverage in turn leads to attention, attention leads to scrutiny, scrutiny leads to pressure and the right pressure leads to changed behavior.

If this occurred, the ICC would need the authority to violate state sovereignty to bring those accused to The Hague. Currently, those accused of crimes against humanity understand that they have the protection of sovereignty, and as long as sovereignty is a safetynet, they will continue to commit unspeakable atrocities.

Additionally, if the ICC partnered with Interpol, the necessary enforcement would be possible without expanding international bureaucracy. Interpol is the world’s largest international police entity, with 190 member countries cooperating with the organization. As a body working under international law, Interpol has faced similar issues. The two would partner well: the ICC needs a police force to exercise its warrants and Interpol needs a judiciary body to report to.  

Of course, the fear of a world court and police force threatening the sovereignty of individual countries is warranted. And the first criticisms of those world bodies would come from the United States, a country that, out of fear of prosecution, has yet to ratify the ICC charter. The limited scope of the ICC regarding the types of cases it is permitted to try, however, would remain a significant check to its power, preventing it from involving itself in situations better tried in national courts. Most importantly, though, international laws should have the accompanying legal bodies to identify violators and bring them to justice. That is how laws are enforced, and without enforcement laws hold no weight.

No justice system, national or international, represents an active crime deterrent; all courts respond to crimes retroactively. Those who say the ICC is ineffective because it cannot actively deter crime fail to take into account the structure of any traditional justice system. Moreover, those opposed to the ICC fail to appreciate that the fear of prosecution and increased international scrutiny – without sovereignty as a protection – has the potential to make people think twice about their actions while in power. Many of those who commit crimes against humanity are immensely powerful, and therefore answer to no one and fear little reprisal. A more powerful ICC could change that.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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