China’s known across the world for its unfortunate repression of the Tibetan and Uyghur peoples’ right to self-determination. Tibet and Xinjiang (home to China’s Uyghurs, an Islamic, Turkic ethnic group) are both restive regions that capture the world’s attention from time to time, leading observers to frame the conflict as one between the Han majority, consisting of 95% of the population, and an oppressed class of minority groups.  However, many people fail to realize that China is also home to 53 other ethnic minority groups that are generally satisfied and at peace with the regime. At the heart of Chinese policies toward minorities is Youhui zhengce (优惠政策), an affirmative action-like program meant to induce economic integration, protect the equality of minority languages and cultures, and respect territorial autonomy.

To examine the success of this policy requires comparing two fundamentally similar groups that differ in response to the Chinese regime: the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the Koreans in Jilin.  The Koreans and the Uyghurs share a similar geographic and historical context. Both are located in landlocked provinces outside of the core region of China’s economic miracle and were, in principle, equal recipients of preferential treatment by government affirmative action policies to foster integration and equality of opportunity since the 1980s. In addition, both provinces have seen substantial double-digit economic growth since the 1980s. However, while the Koreans have lived in peace with the Chinese, the Uyghurs have become increasingly violent and resistant to Beijing.

Comparing the Uyghur and Korean-Chinese experiences offers a rare opportunity to analyze Beijing’s strategy of using economic growth and integration to develop a legitimate mandate of rule over minority groups.

Uyghurs and Korean-Chinese share fundamental characteristics that make a comparative study possible. First, unlike other minorities like the Bai, Uyghurs and Korean-Chinese are culturally and historically distinct from the Han. Uyghur culture is closer to the Central Asian Turkic and Islamic civilizations, while Korean-Chinese culture is part of the long, independent Korean culture and civilization founded in the namesake peninsula.

Secondly, both groups are at the periphery of China. Xinjiang has historically been at the far periphery of any Chinese empire—if included at all. Even when controlled by a Chinese government, Xinjiang was often classified as an outpost rather than a full province. The Korean Chinese live at the southern tip of Manchuria. Jilin is a former Manchurian province, and only became a part of China during the Qing dynasty. Most Koreans that live there trace their roots to migrants that left the peninsula between 1850 and 1945.

Thirdly, both groups have a similar socio-economic background. They both reside in provinces that were outside the direct Chinese economic miracle that transformed areas along the East Coast. Both Xinjiang and Jilin are removed from the central Chinese basin and predominantly rural, with the Korean-Chinese and the Uyghurs engaged almost entirely in agriculture. And both provinces have seen substantial economic growth, ever since the start of Chinese investment in the 80s and 90s: Jilin had 13.4 % GDP growth in 2012 and Xinjiang has seen 8.8% growth in 2016.

With all of these fundamental similarities, why were the Chinese able to placate Korean ethnic nationalism while stirring up Uyghur frustration and resistance over the past two decades. That reason might be found in China’s method of producing economic growth. In Xinjiang, Beijing utilized migration while Jilin grew due to internal investment. The former caused substantially higher levels of income inequality that hurt Chinese attempts at integration.

When comparing growth strategies in the two provinces, we need to understand what drives GDP growth. Growth requires increases in investment, consumption, exports and/or government spending. Exports are dependent on investment and government spending. Investment relies on a large population base with substantial human capital to implement projects and achieve returns.  Consumption also requires a growing population (i.e. consumer base) with rising incomes.

In the case of Xinjiang, China had no means of fast growth other than through migration-induced development. Xinjiang, which had a population density of less than 10 people per sq km. in the 70s and 80s, was not built for rapid growth in investment, consumption or exports. A small, spread out population also means government spending growth has a low ceiling. So, rather than wait for the local population to increase and develop higher levels of educational attainment, the CCP simply encouraged—and in many ways forced—mass migration: an economically ingenious move insofar as it took the massive labor surplus of provinces such as Sichuan to the labor scarce Xinjiang. However, it effectively overwhelmed Uyghur culture and identity; the Uyghur, once a majority, is now the provincial minority. It also reduces the benefits of affirmative action policies for Uyghurs as the mass influx of Han migrants, educated and un-educated, reduces the demand for skilled Uyghurs.

Jilin, unlike Xinjiang, is relatively well-populated and dense, with 27 million people and 149 people per square kilometer. In addition, the capital of Jilin, Changchun, was the former capital of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. Thus while the province is still very agricultural and rural, its urban areas are far more developed thanks in part to Japanese imperialism. Given this history, Jilin has a strong base of human capital, an aged but functional industrial base and a population density that can induce further urbanization. While Koreans, like the Uyghurs, are predominately agricultural and rural, they are densely concentrated in one part of Jilin: Yanbian Prefecture at the south tip of the peninsula. Thus, there was no need to force surplus Han labor from other provinces to induce growth. In Jilin, capital investment and endogenous strategies were able to kick-start the economy. Koreans who benefited from affirmative action policies were also able to climb up the ladder of prosperity without having to compete with a mass of Han migrants like the Uyghurs.

The CCP has created a generally successful strategy of using economic growth to develop a legitimate mandate of rule and bring peace to a country with 55 minority groups. We see this exemplified in Jilin, where Koreans have generally been peacefully integrated through endogenous development. However, in the case of Xinjiang growth was induced through massive migration of Han people, which brought development but reduced the efficacy of economic growth based ethnic integration. Conflict in Xinjiang is racial, and despite economic growth and an objective betterment of Xinjiang Uyghur livelihoods in the past three decades, nothing can replace the loss of identity that accompanied it.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

In the spring of 763 CE, eight years of rebellion came to an unceremonious end. The An Lushan Rebellion, started by its namesake, a Chinese general of Turkic descent, sought to carve a new dynasty centered in the Chinese capital of Luoyang to replace the corrupt and decadent Tang Dynasty. Although An Lushan was motivated by personal ambition and not by what we would now classify as ethno-nationalism, the immediate consequences of the rebellion were clear: the Tang turned their backs on the Silk Road-based cosmopolitanism that once defined their glorious empire in favor of homogeneity. The days of rich Persian merchants parading the streets of Guangzhou, of Turkic generals patrolling the northern deserts and of Chinese citizens exploring new cultures in art and expression were long gone. In its place was a new era of mistrust, where Uyghurs (the exact relationship between Tang Dynasty’s Uyghurs and today’s Uyghurs is disputed) were forbidden from wearing their ethnic dress and anti-miscegenation laws were promulgated. The weakened dynasty never regained its glory, leading to a long decline as corruption and rebellions weakened its ranks before ultimately falling in 907.

Recent attacks in Xinjiang, China’s western-most province and home to a prominent Uyghur community, and elsewhere threaten to force a similar pivot to intolerance in contemporary China. The knife attack in Kunming that left 33 dead and the recent market bombing in Urumqi have been met with predictably harsh government reactions. In a spectacular display of political theatrics, the Chinese convicted 55 people of terrorism charges in a mass trial, sentencing three to death and the others to incarceration in front of an audience of 7000.

Though many in the West may label the trial as a typically oppressive action by an authoritarian government, these measures are understandable. The Han majority’s faith in the central government’s ability to protect its own turf from domestic terrorism is waning. The Kunming attack is especially disconcerting, as it took place in a multicultural province where Islam is not the majority religion. To the average Han, the subsequent bombing in volatile Han-majority Urumqi would leave little doubt in the eyes of many Han Chinese that a new era of separatist action was upon them: a new War on Terror must be waged to protect China.

But the mass trial is already a serious blunder on the part of the government. The Uyghurs see the trials as nothing more than the latest in a string of alienating and marginalizing policies. A Han Party Secretary, who takes precedence over a largely symbolic Uyghur governor, rules in the supposedly autonomous Uyghur Province. In everyday life, Uyghurs experience economic marginalization, denial of opportunity and the destruction of homes and old districts in the name of economic progress. And now, the Uyghur community is being blamed for attacks that many had nothing to do with, harassed by security and facing the ire of their neighbors.

[su_quote]The Uyghurs see the trials as nothing more than the latest in a string of alienating and marginalizing policies.[/su_quote]

Americans of Middle Eastern descent faced similar experiences in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Faced with paranoia and a blind hate towards all things Islamic, many Americans faced levels of discrimination from stares at airports to having their fundamental rights blatantly violated. The collapse of trust between citizens took years to recover. However, mistrust and intolerance continue to this day, exacerbated by America’s interventions throughout the Muslim world.

If intolerance spurred by acts of terrorism caused American progress to stumble, then it is sure to threaten geopolitical stability for China, a country with relatively little experience in maintaining a society that is just to citizens of all ethnicities. Ethnic tensions boiled over in 2009 with the Urumqi Riots and relations now between the Han and the Uyghurs can only sour after these attacks and show trials. In the interest of maintaining stability and of ultimately expanding the role Xinjiang can play in China’s domestic and international politics, the Chinese government must resist giving in to short-term interests and sentiments and adopt a longer-term vision for Xinjiang.

Traditionally, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has relied on top-down control to preserve stability. During the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the CCP re-emphasized the fact that national reforms must proceed at the hands and whims of the government. The autonomous ethnic provinces of Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi are, contradictory to their name, tightly controlled by the Central state.

However, this approach is no longer viable in Xinjiang. As the world decentralizes and new forces are unleashed on the stage of global politics, non-state movements and actors become better organized and more powerful. East Turkestan is once again in the spotlight because many Turkic minorities do not feel “Chinese,” thanks to cultural, political and economic isolation. “Ethnic harmony,” as promoted by the top-down government, hardly soothes a people without a home.

The government must be prepared to accept that unless some bottom-up policies are allowed to flourish, minorities’ animosity towards the CCP will grow. This mistrust is the basis of the violence and independence movements that fuel those seeking East Turkestan today. The government must take extra care that in curbing terrorism they do not foster the next generation of anti-Han minorities.

In order to achieve a truly stable Xinjiang, China must allow the local population to represent their own localities. Although people’s elections for their own mayors are largely symbolic, since real power resides with the Party Secretary of a region, the Party can still exercise more sensitivity by cultivating talented Uyghurs and allowing them political leeway. Too often, the frontier is seen as a stepping-stone for power-hungry Han officials eager for promotion to the capital. They quickly set to work bulldozing buildings, displacing people and building apartments that no local person can afford, calling it economic progress.

In a broader perspective, as China seeks to reconstruct the Silk Road and once again extend its influence over the steppes, it cannot fully strengthen continental relations without a strong Xinjiang. A strong Xinjiang requires a strong citizenry of Uyghurs, Han, Kazakhs and other ethnicities free to express themselves and honor their heritages while also feeling included in the Chinese state and its destiny. A strong Uyghur citizenry will be eager to serve and represent the country and, since four out of the five Central Asian countries share Turkic cultural and linguistic backgrounds, can find themselves uniquely positioned to build strong ties between their home country and Central Asia. It only makes sense that the Chinese government should actively cultivate and develop the region and its people, to truly make Urumqi into a gateway to Central Asia rather than a slogan claiming it as such.

To truly bring Xinjiang into China’s fold and give the Uyghurs a home in a Chinese nation, “ethnic harmony” is not enough. Acceptance of heterogeneity is the ultimate solution. As radical an idea as it might sound considering the tense environment of contemporary China, it is an idea present even in the annals of Chinese history. Taizong (ruled 626 – 649 CE), the second Tang emperor, is still considered one of the greatest emperors in Chinese history. Taizong himself was not fully Chinese, having been born a quarter Turkic and his wife, the Empress Zhangsun, fully Turkic. He understood the importance of a diverse China, and actively encouraged foreign trade and interaction, even going so far as to promote any man of talent, regardless of whether he was ethnically Chinese or not, thus ushering in an era in which Chinese ships and porcelain could be found as far west as the Horn of Africa and where the influence of the realm could be felt all across the vast steppes into Central Asia and the golden city of Samarkand.

Both the Uyghurs and Han yearn for a stable Xinjiang. For China to truly achieve a prosperous and flourishing society, Xinjiang and the Uyghur community must also be empowered. Reactions to terrorism mustn’t repeat the same mistake of the Tang after the An Lushan Rebellion. Diversity and openness, as in the Taizong years, must be favored over intolerance and marginalization.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff and editorial board.