In an unprecedented move in early January, the Russian government resigned and President Vladimir Putin began proposing major constitutional reforms, including a revision that would reset his presidential term and allow him to stay in power past 2024. While Putin seemed poised to create a new, more conservative regime, his previously firm grasp over the Russian state is now coming loose as the result of a poor domestic COVID-19 response and internal conflicts among Russian elites. With increasing discontent among civilians and powerful authorities alike, the future of Putin’s Russia looks bleaker each day. 

When the coronavirus outbreak began expanding globally in early March, Putin was optimistic about Russia’s ability to limit the spread of the virus within its borders, claiming the situation was “under control” and all infections were “contained”. However, as cases rapidly increased, Putin faded into the shadows, leaving Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin to announce lockdown measures in the city and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to encourage similar efforts among regional authorities. In addition, voting on the new constitutional amendments was postponed to a later date, and plans to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in World War II were significantly scaled down. 

Following the implementation of stay-at-home orders, the state of the Russian economy has continuously deteriorated. With major oil output cuts as a result of a global price war and a several week “non-working period” in which nonessential businesses were required to close, the Russian economic output in April was $33 billion less than the previous year. In addition, Russian GDP for the month fell by 28 percent. Although the Russian government has announced some economic programs to reduce the negative impact of coronavirus on civilians, such as cheap loans to businesses and increased unemployment benefits, economists and business people alike have criticized authorities for failing to provide adequate support to Russians. Projections show that the coronavirus crisis will decrease Russians’ disposable income by 20 percent in the second quarter of 2020 compared to the previous year, and a significant decline in living standards is expected. Moreover, unemployment is predicted to hit 8 million before the end of the year. 

This is not the first instance of Russia’s economy retracting under Putin; in fact, real incomes in Russia have declined in five of the last six years. Moreover, official state statistics show that poverty has increased since the beginning of 2018,  rising to 14.3 percent. This stagnation is largely as a result of economic sanctions implemented by Western powers in response to Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. While the Russian government has announced a six-year, $400 billion National Projects effort to improve Russian education, health care, and infrastructure, consultants from Oxford Economics project that these programs will increase GDP growth by only 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points annually. Consequently, it is unlikely the economy will recover anytime in the near future.

Public support for Putin’s leadership is now at an all time low. When it comes to evaluation of the government, Russians tend to most highly value economic performance, domestic order, and international standing, all areas that Russia has been consistently lacking in. According to the Levada Center, in late April, Putin’s approval rating was at 59 percent, the lowest it has been since 1999. Furthermore, poll respondents believed that their regional authorities responded more effectively  to the outbreak than Putin; 50 percent of respondents said that their governors or mayors were “doing their best to deal with the outbreak”, however only 46 percent agreed that Putin and the federal government were doing the same. 

Not only is Putin losing public support, but there is also increasing division among the Russian elites who guide Putin’s policy choices. Some influential groups, such as state oligarchs, are more “liberal” and seek better relations with the West and reduced sanctions. Other longtime private sector associates of Putin, however, do not share these interests;  for them, Western sanctions present an opportunity to improve their relations with the Kremlin. Consequently, there is a growing split between the former, who  advocate for warmer relations with the West to improve their earnings from foreign markets, and the latter, who  seek to deter the development of normalized relations with the West through promotion of increasingly radicalized “Putinism”.

As support for his policies has waned, Putin has resorted to a tried-and-true tactic to coerce patriotism and national unity: shifting attention to international adversaries. In this case, the Putin regime has targeted the Czech Republic, which incited anger in the Kremlin in February after it renamed Pod Kaštany Náměstí Square, where the Russian embassy in Prague is located, in memory of the late Russian political opposition leader Boris Nemtsov. Several weeks later, Prague district mayor Ondrej Kolar removed a statue of Soviet general Ivan Konev, prompting further indignation. Putin took advantage of this opportunity to redirect attention from domestic weaknesses to his consistently nationalistic foreign policy, signing legislation which criminalizes vandalism of Soviet war memorials located abroad. Moreover, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu directly called for the prosecution of Kolar. However, not all actions have been so diplomatic; in April, Kolar was targeted by a Russian assassination plot and the Prague airport, along with multiple hospitals, have been attacked by suspected Russian hackers. These moves sent a clear message that anti-Russia policies in the Czech Republic will not be tolerated and sought to temporarily distract from an unsuccessful domestic response to the coronavirus outbreak. 

Despite his attempts to distract from shortcomings at home, it is clear that Putin’s regime is beginning to crumble and this reality cannot be avoided forever. The coronavirus outbreak has only exacerbated existing issues with Putin’s domestic policy choices and propelled ordinary Russians to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo. If discontent continues to spread among elites that feel their own interests are being threatened by Putin’s choices, there may be enough support to challenge Putin’s rule. 

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict in 2014, an estimated 13,000 people have been killed, and millions more have been displaced. Five years ago, the Ukrainian government decided not to sign an association agreement with the EU in favor of closer economic ties with Russia. As a result of the popular protests that followed, the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted, the 2004 constitution was restored, and the Russian annexation of Crimea soon followed. Although the Russia-Ukraine conflict has faded from many headlines, the war in Donbass between Pro-Russian forces and the Ukrainian nationalist opposition has continued, resulting in thousands of casualties. Even more worrying, the weak international response has allowed the Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue its aggressive tactics against Ukraine and the war to carry on with no end in sight.

Shared Origins: Kievan Rus

The Russia-Ukraine conflict stems from a complex shared history with roots tracing back to the 9th century with the first organized Eastern Slavic state of Kievan Rus. However, both sides have conflicting perspectives regarding the history of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. In the Russian nationalist narrative, although the center of the Kievan Rus state ultimately transitioned to Moscow, there is an overarching unity among the “Rus people”, or the citizens of Russia and Ukraine. Putin himself has proclaimed numerous times that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” who are essentially part of “a single nation in many ways.”

On the other hand, Ukrainian historian Mikhail Hrushevsky argues that there are three branches which descend from Kievan Rus: the Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Belorussians. This perspective leaves greater room for political interpretation and has been widely accepted by Ukrainian historians.

Because both nations originated from the Kievan Rus state, centered in present-day Ukraine, the assertion of Ukrainian independence in 1991 was a great misfortune in the eyes of many Russians as they lost many historical sites to Ukraine including the Kyiv Perchersk Lavra, a monastery in Kyiv associated with the birth of Russian Orthodox Christianity.

From Stalin to Putin: Fear of Ukrainian National Movement

Because many Russians believe that Ukraine’s sovereignty should be limited, Russia has long seen the Ukrainian national movement as a threat. When the last Russian Tsar was removed in 1917 and the Bolsheviks took power, Ukrainian combatants fought back for several years in the Ukrainian War of Independence. Although Ukraine was ultimately forced to become a part of the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks were deeply stunned by this resolve to claim total independence and noted it as a cruel lesson to be learned from.

The Ukrainian people resisted Russian rule once again in 1932 when Stalin decided to collectivize agriculture. When Ukrainian farmers fought back against the policy, Stalin responded by sending armed troops to confiscate land and livestock. Although the food harvest was successful in 1932, the Soviet government withheld the harvest from the Ukrainians, and those who attempted to steal food were executed. As a result, an estimated three million to eight million Ukrainians died from starvation between 1932 and 1933 in the Holodomor genocide.

Although Putin’s rule differs greatly from Stalin’s, there are many notable parallels. Once again, the Russian government today is taking action to dismantle Ukrainian national movement. Similarly, Putin has also pursued a greater Russian “sphere of influence” and policies of Russification, or the promotion of Russian language and culture, to increase state control. Additional similarities include a disdain for Ukrainian independence, enforcement of attacks against “enemies of the government,” and a willingness to kill Ukrainians to serve his goal of legitimizing Russia as a major power.

The Future of Ukraine

Since 2014, war has continued on between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces, particularly in the Donbass region. While many Western nations responded to Russia’s initial military intervention in Ukraine in 2014 with economic sanctions, there has been little international response to recent aggression in the Black and Azov Seas. The currently imposed economic sanctions have fallen short of changing Russia’s behavior, and greater intervention is needed.

A UN deployed peacekeeping mission in the Donbass region could provide a favorable situation for both parties. If peacekeeping forces maintained a ceasefire, this would save thousands of Ukrainian lives at stake and put to rest fears of further Russian aggression, which would be favorable to the international community as a whole. A peacekeeping operation would also create the foundation for the beginning of positive political and economic reform in Ukraine. Additionally, such an agreement would also help Russia save face domestically as the economic sanctions that have created financial struggles for many Russians would be lifted and its’ international reputation would be improved. Although both Ukraine and Russia have expressed interest in a peacekeeping mission in Eastern Ukraine, both have different visions for what such a mission should look like, with Russia preferring a smaller scale operation. As Russia has veto power in the UN Security Council, some concessions to Russia may need to occur in order for any form of a peacekeeping mission to be implemented. However, Ukraine and the West should stay open to discussing the positive aspects of Russia’s proposals as the alternative is the continuation of a devastating war. The priority for both nations should be negotiating an agreement in regards to the deployment of peacekeeping forces, as a neutral third party helping to facilitate negotiations could bring the deadlock in Donbass to an end.

The political future of Ukraine remains largely uncertain. Although no candidate holds an overwhelming advantage, elections will take place at the end of this month and the pace of domestic reform has slowed greatly in anticipation. While it is unclear who will next assume office and what approach they will take to address the current climate in Donbass, it is evident that de-escalation in the conflict with Russia needs to be prioritized above all else; only then can the region stabilize and begin to make positive progress.

Even with the news consumed by stories from the 2016 presidential race, President Obama continues to be upbraided by political analysts and commentators for each and every mandate, appointment and speech—especially when it comes to his foreign policy. However, with regard to Russia’s recent aggression in Crimea, casting blame upon the current administration may just be a hasty oversight of the nuanced interplay of interests in the Middle East and the intricacies of Putin’s political calculations. Many conservative politicians and pundits have attributed Putin’s audacious military exploits in Eastern Ukraine to Obama’s projection of weakness in the face of conflict in Syria, Iraq and Crimea. But it’s not at all clear whether more aggression from the US would have intimidated or aggravated Putin. In a post-Iraq world, Obama’s softer hand appears the more rational, strategic move compared to the hawkish alternative.

The Red Line on Syria
Politicians love to enumerate examples of Obama’s weakness—it has practically become a hobby on the Hill. The first thing they point to is the administration’s “red line” with Syria back in 2013. When asked if he would deploy US military forces in response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons, Obama stated, “We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is that we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.” Then, in a press conference with Swedish Prime Minister, when asked about using military action in Syria to maintain his credibility, Obama denied the use of military force and distanced himself from the military follow-through that many felt embedded in the “red line”, saying “I didn’t set a red line; the world set a red line. The world set a red line when governments representing 98 percent of the world’s population said the use of chemical weapons are abhorrent and passed a treaty forbidding their use even when countries are engaged in war.”

The President’s vague approach of non-military confrontation was reversed, however, when he sent Congress a request to authorize military strikes in Syria. An apparent political flip-flop, this policy change could have been a mere symptom of President Obama’s greatest flaw: his professorial nature. With past presidents, like George W. Bush, the country became accustomed to absolute, decisive action. When faced with an international conflict, the administration assumed a position, and pursued it vehemently—well-informed or not. Obama – on the other end of the spectrum – has consistently taken prolonged periods of time to reflect on issues, which has often been perceived as indecision and weak leadership.

Did Obama make a mistake in his Syria strategy? In the Syria Accountability Act, the treaty on chemical weapons, there is no clause that requires anything beyond sanctions in response to a country that develops chemical weapons. Military actions were never a part of the agreement. Obama’s later request for military support may have been a reaction to pressure from the public and the media. Regardless, the strategy ultimately brought Assad to the negotiating table. The resulting compromise between the US, Moscow and Syria managed to leverage much of the international community in destroying most of Assad’s chemical weapons—a tangible improvement that air strikes and collateral damage couldn’t have accomplished alone.

Though many cite the resulting plan as the epitome of Obama’s weak foreign policy, we should look at the consequences of a foreign policy decision that didn’t resort immediately to military force. As the administration’s national security agenda states, “We must recognize that a smart national security strategy does not rely solely on military power… The use of force is not the only tool at our disposal, and it is not the principal means of U.S. engagement abroad, nor always the most effective for the challenges we face.” With soft posturing and military restraint, one of the world’s most brutal dictators came to the negotiation table, and Russia offered a degree of compliance with international laws and norms. The latter was not an easy task. Though Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov came to Geneva to discuss the question of Syria’s chemical weapons, he continued to deny Assad’s actual use of weapons on the Syrian people and threatened to leave the talks before any deal was reached. It was only after UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon threatened to share the results of an investigation into Syria’s chemical weapon use with the Security Council that the Russians shifted their position. Though a permanent and often obstinate member of the UN Security Council, Russia feared becoming more of a pariah in the UN, which attests to the significant sway of the international community—something that usually finds its strength in a climate of military restraint.

The US’s military restraint accomplished several noteworthy feats: the US didn’t immediately resort to bombing Syria, nor assume the role of the world’s most unwanted policeman (again) and become accountable for the absolute mess that would have and now is ensuing in Syria. Preemptive missile strikes would have forced the US to become more involved and in turn responsible for any awry regime change. The Middle East is a foreign policy Rubik’s cube. Any and all military actions should come as a final attempt, as hastiness risks making the situation incredibly worse, and costs significant political capital.

The immediate military action and show of force that many call “American leadership and strength” wouldn’t have addressed the nuanced and complex forces at play nor attained the same results. Indeed, the end proved an imperfect reduction of conflict, not an end in itself; however, the US mitigated the levels of conflict in a way that a hawkish would have missed all together. Suggesting that Obama’s hesitancy sent Putin a signal of weakness is flawed when considering the cooperation of Russia in a campaign led by the US. Isn’t this reflective, adaptive reaction to complicated situations exactly what leadership entails?

Playing Whack-A-Mole in the Middle East
President Obama’s strategy with ISIS has also become a hallmark of the criticisms political pundits, politicians and the media use against the administration. First, it’s important to admit that the US isn’t “winning the War on Terror”, nor dealing effectively with the proliferation and spread of extremist groups throughout the Middle East. Too often however, this opinion becomes a political ploy under the guise of pseudo-analytical criticism, exploiting the public’s ignorance of the US’s capacity to incite positive change with minimal risk.

Countries like Syria actually provide a perfect example of the limitations to US policy. Fighting groups like ISIS or Al Qaeda either translates into strikes, ground support or the more ambiguous, “logistical support”. In Syria, however, this approach inevitably strengthens the Assad Regime, a brutal dictatorship killing the same innocent civilians targeted by extremists. Arming moderate rebels, however, poses issues as well. The US isn’t free to exude American strength wherever it finds contention.

The media recently inveighed against the President after he equated sending in ground troops to combat ISIS as playing whack-a-mole. The President’s current strategy is comprised of five parts, outlined in his address given on the 13th anniversary of the September 11 attacks:

1. Conducting “a systematic campaign of airstrike”
2. Increasing “support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground” with approximately 475 servicemen
3. Supporting “Iraqi and Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and equipment, ramp[ing]up military assistance to the Syrian opposition”
4. Isolating ISIS politically and economically, and expanding humanitarian support by collaborating with partners

In simple terms, the US launches airstrikes that are coupled by “support” for fighters on the ground, like the Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi forces. Any more aggressive of a strategy would entail a full-fledged war in the Middle East, and indirect conflict with allies like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Aside from a disruption of the broader, regional interests of the US, that war would find very little support from a war-fatigued public after Afghanistan and Iraq. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that Putin sees the President’s restraint as a sign of weakness. If anything, a lack of aggression by Obama might have clued Putin into just how tied Obama’s hands are in foreign military intervention. As conditions continue to evolve rapidly in the Middle East, however, it would prove unwise for Putin to take egregious actions presuming the President’s low level of the political flexibility.

Appeasement in Crimea
This leads to the latest display of “Obama’s weakness” abroad: Crimea. The day Putin officially declared Crimea a Russian commonwealth, major world powers displayed perhaps the most anticlimactic eruption of consternation. German Chancellor Angela Merkel called it an “unjustifiable and inexcusable” act that challenges “the European peace order and international laws.” David Cameron compared it to the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s. French President Francois Holland immediately denounced the illegal action of Putin and called for a “strong coordinated response.” The EU, most heavily impacted by a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty, failed to execute any sort of meaningful action until pro-separatists shot down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, killing 298 people. Its reluctant intervention was met with parallel support by the US, which also announced new sanctions and a freezing of assets for Russian oligarchs.

The criticisms that call for more American strength offer few plausible solutions. Even Senator John McCain, who attributed the crisis to “a feckless foreign policy where nobody believes in America’s strength any more,” had to concede the fact that there was “no viable military action that [could have been]taken.” Other suggestions, like harsher sanctions, are ineffective without European support. While the US only trades about $40 billion a year with Russia, Europe relies on a lucrative trade relationship with its aggressive neighbor to the East, leaving them hesitant to aggravate Putin with more sanctions. With a third of Germany’s gas and oil coming from Russia, a disruption in the supply line would be devastating. What’s more, Russia provides an integral market for $48 billion worth of German products.

Other suggestions also defy European interests. Welcoming Ukraine into NATO is complicated; it’s uncertain whether any Western nations would be willing to come to Ukraine’s aid in the case of a Russian attack. Others, like Ted Cruz, have suggested stripping Putin of authority in international regimes like the Security Council and G8, which would only further antagonize Putin and exacerbate his unwillingness to compromise. Even propositions like those of Lindsey Graham to arm Ukrainian forces would mean unilateralism that upsets our key allies. Merkel responded directly to such suggestion at the Munich Security Conference, saying, “This [crisis]cannot be won militarily. That is the bitter truth. The international community must think of something else.”

Ultimately, in line with the international community, the US must trust diplomacy and collective international pressure. Moreover, the critics of Obama’s response to Ukraine shouldn’t immediately dismiss non-military options as weak. Though the US’s sanctions aren’t crippling Russia’s economy into military restraint in Eastern Ukraine, it is acting multilaterally and allowing the European community to deal with a regional issue. While this more careful approach may not exude military prowess, it does display a more impressive awareness of global complexities—one that will likely lead to more intelligent strategic initiatives than impulsive fits of defensive aggression.

Rhetoric that blames Putin’s aggression on Obama’s feckless strategy remains just that—rhetoric. Though Obama’s overall strategy might not be as effective as many would like, it’s not an expression of weakness, but rather a calculated response in a climate of limited options. The criticisms overlook the nuanced geo-political issues of these regions and the limitations of the international system. Moreover, they don’t consider Putin’s extremely hawkish foreign policy and Russia’s political culture. He’s leading a country fueled by a heightened sense of nationalism and nostalgia for a Soviet-era prominence. Just as in Georgia, the greater the lash-back of the West, the more strongly Putin seems to defy it. The Russian people demand assertive leadership to compensate for years of what many would call condescending international relations by the West. In this way, Putin and his extremely nationalistic cabinet of advisors have come to embody the frustration of their people. Given Putin’s well-known aggressive nature and willingness to take unpopular positions, often siding with other brutal dictators like Assad, it’s wrong to presume that any actions by the US would have restrained his aggressions at the Eastern Ukrainian border. This supposition also relies on the notion that Putin’s political calculations rely exclusively on the US’s foreign policy, which is arrogant at best. It seems most his decisions have been reactions to the New World Order, in which the US’s rules dominate the system and marginalize ideas that challenge the current paradigm. The US acts hypocritically by calling Russia’s intervention in Ukraine’s civil war a breach of sovereignty when it constantly injects itself into the affairs of strategically important countries. Within the complex web of wars, religious and ethnic conflicts, and alliances, any military move by the US may begin a domino effect that transcends even the problems of Russia’s aggression. Therefore, the US flexing its muscle on the international stage becomes almost counter-intuitive.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

It has been a year since Ukraine’s February Revolution, or Euromaidan, began in Kiev’s Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti), which resulted in over 100 deaths and the ousting of Russian-backed President Viktor Yanukovych. Whatever moments of celebration enjoyed by Ukraine were short lived. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and sponsoring of the pro-Russian separatist movement in the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk followed shortly thereafter. The war in eastern Ukraine, which has already claimed over 5,000 lives, has overshadowed the positive events of the Maidan.

Paris based French-Swiss photographer Loïc Fontanel, 21, happened to be in Kiev during the 2014 Orthodox Christian Celebrations. His photos, taken from the nights of January 1-7, 2014, provide an uncommon perspective on the revolution: the popular occupation of the Maidan square prior to the outbreak of violence. His photos, which were shown at the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Paris last week, will be displayed on February 28 in Paris alongside those of Oskar Dumitrashchuk, a photographer and friend of Loïc’s from Ukraine. I recently interviewed Loïc about his series of photographs, Kyiv. Below is an edited translation of that interview from French:

GLIMPSE: Why were you in Ukraine during the revolution?

Loïc Fontanel (LF): I was in Kiev to meet the family of the love of my life and so I found myself at the heart of this revolution.

GLIMPSE: What was your general experience taking these pictures?

LF: I was struck by the mood and calm atmosphere of the [Maidan] square. The Ukrainians were so welcoming and happy to see a photographer taking pictures during their revolution. There were few other photographers or journalists present at that time and very little information was being relayed to the outside world.

GLIMPSE: Are there any shots in particular that you want to talk about?

LF: There are several in which I found myself facing a grandmother with her grandson and she was taking a photo of him in front of a barricade and I couldn’t help but think about this youngster who will find that photo in the future.

GLIMPSE: Did you have a specific goal in mind while capturing these images?

LF: My thought was to take pictures that will remain timeless without any pretense—photos that will go down in history, of course. While taking these pictures, I felt, for the first time practicing photography, the importance of the photograph in history and in memory.

GLIMPSE: Your photos straddle the domains of photojournalism and art-photography, no? That being said, what role do you feel they play both as art and testimony?

LF: Yes, these are indeed photos that will be testimony for the future of what happened and for that I am particularly proud of this series. One must absolutely not forget the current situation in [Ukraine], and that the revolution led to the current war.

GLIMPSE: Why the choice of black and white?

LF: I now work in nothing but black and white. I prefer the composition, the subject and the shapes [in black and white]in respect to color.

GLIMPSE: How would you describe the subject of your photos? I am curious about the partially hidden figures we see in a few of them.

LF: It is true that there are not that many people in my pictures as I was focused on the barricades and other impressive structures. I wanted to capture the atmosphere of waiting and calm. While on the square, one could feel a sort of sensation like being transfixed. This is what I am showing in my exposition. The photo with the AK-47 is definitely ambiguous, but it is not real. You can see this on the photo where the focus is pulled on the background—it is just a target-shooting game that was set up at the square and it is my girlfriend that is holding the fake weapon. It is a very symbolic picture when one knows what happened on the square a few weeks later.

GLIMPSE: I notice that many of your photos put a striking emphasis on the barricades of the Maidan square. What effect do you feel they had? What was important about them in your experience?

LF: As I mentioned, I really wanted to concentrate on the transfixed atmosphere of this square at this very precise moment. It must also be known that there are many symbols like the watch advertisement, the big statue of the angel that protects the city, the flags and also the written Ukrainian phrases. These are not just barricades; they are above all a very powerful symbol of the revolution.

GLIMPSE: Thank you for your time, Loïc. Is there anything else you would like to add?

LF: To conclude, I hope that it is clear that things are not over in Ukraine…

To see more of Loïc’s work click here.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

For all intents and purposes, Vladimir Putin killed the South Stream natural gas pipeline project on December 1st during a joint press conference with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The news made global headlines and rocked the natural gas industry. Putin blamed the European Commission’s legal restraints for making the current plans untenable. Russian state gas monopoly Gazprom would have owned both the primary gas fields and the South Stream pipeline itself, but European regulations prohibit the same corporation from owning and operating such a large amount of the supply chain. Without Gazprom’s involvement, South Stream is now as dead as the once-glorified Nabucco project. Instead, Putin described vague plans to build a new gas hub in Turkey and a new pipeline across the Black Sea. This would allow Russia to control its exports of gas to Turkey but not any further.

South Stream was Russia’s 63 billion cubic meter per year (bcm/year) competitor to the Western-backed Nabucco. The Nabucco pipeline began in 2002 as an ambitious project to bring Caspian and Central Asian natural gas across Turkey and the Balkans to Central Europe, bypassing Russia and diversifying Europe’s gas suppliers. But many potential suppliers were noncommittal, leaving Azerbaijan as the only remaining supplier. Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II gas field is projected to have enormous gas reserves, but they would not have been enough to fill Nabucco’s planned capacity. After months of deliberations and revisions to the Nabucco project, Baku shifted its support to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) in 2013. It had also completed planning for the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) project independently with Turkey in 2012, which will carry 16 bcm/year of gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II field to the Turkish border with Greece. There it will transfer gas to the TAP, which will reach the southeast shore of Italy.

The entire European energy policy discourse is rooted in Ukraine; most transport infrastructure and pipelines taking Russian gas to Europe pass through Ukrainian territory. Moscow needs a cooperative government in Kiev for strategic reasons and cannot possibly tolerate NATO or EU institutions existing on its doorstep.[1] One of Russia’s preferred methods of keeping Ukraine close is turning off its gas supplies, as it did in 2009, but that means turning off supplies to other European customers as well. Hence the South Stream and other projects have been developed to bypass Ukraine. For example, the Nord Stream and Yamal pipelines bring Russian gas to Germany. However, they are not enough to replace Ukrainian routes.

I first arrived in Azerbaijan as a language student around the time TAP was finalized. I remember meeting executives from SOCAR (State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic) and noting their excitement about finalizing the gas agreements and their eagerness to get the supplies running. Azerbaijan was always going to develop and profit from its gas reserves one way or another, preferably without sending fuel through Russia, as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan do. As long as gas made it to Europe somehow, SOCAR would be able to charge non-discounted prices and Baku would profit.

Last week, the Caspian Center for Energy and Environment (CCEE) hosted two events where the planned topics quickly shifted towards discussions about the South Stream’s cancellation. Businessmen, academics, and government representatives from Azerbaijan, Turkey, Greece, Norway, the United States and elsewhere gathered at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (ADA) for the small but high-level events. The first event’s focus was a presentation on the economics of oil and gas price movements (both products have price elasticity of demand estimates close to zero, making prices highly sensitive to changes in supply) and the second was an in-depth review of Russian political and economic thinking regarding natural gas export strategies.

The notable aspect of the ongoing analysis in Baku is that the Russians are absent from the conversation. Russian diplomats, academics and businessmen frequently visit ADA for various programs, and several Russian students study there. Russians are sometimes present at other international energy-related events here, but no one is asking for Moscow’s opinion right now. Energy policy independence is a priority in Azerbaijan. The end of the South Stream may be bad news for Moscow, but there can be no doubt that the energy industry in Baku now has a sense of reserved excitement. Scrapping South Stream means that European consumers – whose energy demands are increasing – need to look elsewhere. For instance, Hungary is already publicly looking towards Baku as an alternative gas supplier.

At CCEE’s second event, Norwegian analyst Arild Moe brought up the issue of smaller “non-Gazprom producers” or NGPs in Russia that make up a small portion of the gas market. These gas companies have grown substantially, and even did well during the recession. Since Gazprom is a state monopoly, it is responsible for providing cheap gas within Russia. This is an enormous task, and as an inefficient monopolist, Gazprom is happy to hand off some of its domestic supply duties to smaller, efficient operations and focus on its profitable export markets. But according to Moe, these smaller gas producers have grown to the point where they are beginning to explore opportunities for exports as well. He showed graphs comparing the NGPs’ projections of their combined market share with Gazprom’s projections of the total market share held by NGPs. The difference was substantial; Gazprom anticipates NGPs controlling about 15-20% of Russian gas production by 2020, while the NGPs believe they will produce about 35% of Russia’s gas. Some of these NGPs are backed by serious investors including large oil companies like Rosneft, and have large amounts of capital available for investment in new fields and infrastructure. I asked Moe if these NGPs would consider pursuing a smaller pipeline project by themselves to export gas to Europe, such as a link running through the Caucasus or Eastern Black Sea towards TANAP in Turkey. “A few years ago, that would have been unthinkable,” he said, “but now that might not be so far-fetched.”[2] If this were to happen, it would be a sure sign that Gazprom’s monopoly on Russian gas is weakening substantially.

Although the South Stream’s cancellation may come as tentatively good news, Putin also gave some tantalizing details about future plans with Turkey: “…we are ready to not only expand the Blue Stream pipeline, as I just said, but also build another pipeline system in order to cover the growing needs of the Turkish economy.” Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said in a statement on the same day that Gazprom plans to build a new pipeline directly to Turkey. This will expand gas exports to Turkey by 63 bcm/year, with some 14 bcm/year intended for Turkey and the rest to be transported to the border of Greece. But the consensus in Baku is that a 63 bcm/year pipeline to Turkey is highly unlikely.

During Dr. Ed Hirs’ presentation on oil and gas price fluctuations, the question of such an ambitious project to bring 63 bcm/year to Turkey was brought up. Hirs, an economist who chairs an annual energy conference at Yale, agreed with others that such a project would be commercially and economically unviable for Gazprom since it would be immensely costly.[3] The Turkish economy is strong, but Hirs and others agreed that it would not grow enough to require an additional 14 bcm/year anytime soon. A BP spokesperson said that any new Russian-Turkish pipeline would not affect the TANAP, in which BP holds a large stake. Azerbaijani participants dismissed the Russian claims, projecting that a smaller project with a capacity for 30-35 bcm/year would be more likely. Participants in the event with Dr. Moe also reached this conclusion.

More importantly, there is a business opportunity here for those operating in Baku. Russian gas still needs to go somewhere. It may come from Gazprom or from NGPs in Russia. The Azerbaijani participants in the CCEE conferences often commented that TANAP and TAP could be readily expanded to accommodate 32 bcm/year or more. SOCAR is a major stakeholder in both these projects. If Russian gas companies, seeking profits from Western customers who pay full prices, decide to avoid major capital-intensive projects like South Stream while still avoiding Ukrainian routes, then TANAP and TAP could become the routes of choice.

The idea of Russian gas transiting non-Russian pipelines probably does not sound appealing to the Kremlin right now. But according to some experts such as Dr. Moe, Gazprom’s major gas fields are Soviet legacy fields, which are becoming less productive over time. They will need to make massive investments in developing new fields sooner or later, and with the decreasing prices of energy, the Russian budget is being squeezed. There is also a major capital flight out of Russia due to the Ukrainian crisis. Perhaps building a small link through the Caucasus and paying transit fees to use TANAP and TAP will be more appealing in Moscow than pursuing major pipeline projects, in order to save up for the inevitable exploration and development of new fields. Since TANAP and TAP will be coming online in a few years, SOCAR has time to think and play its cards.

There is also a strategic opportunity here for the West. If Russian gas was reached Europe via an expanded TANAP and TAP, then the life of Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II field could be extended significantly; the pipeline could be filled without Shah Deniz II being consistently operated at 100% of its output capacity. If Russia ever found itself in a scenario desiring to shut off exports via TANAP, gas supplies from Azerbaijan could be increased to satisfy some of that demand. A variety of gas suppliers using TANAP and TAP routes would increase European energy security while adding substantially to fees collected by Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Expanding TAP and TANAP could be a windfall: more energy security for Europe, more cash coming into Baku, and another non-Ukrainian route for getting gas from Russian producers to their best European customers. Russia would not have direct control of this pipeline, but that would allow it to focus its investments elsewhere.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Other Works Cited

[1] “Ukraine and the Little Cold War” by George Friedman, published on Stratfor March 4th, 2014, is composed of excerpts of two chapters on Eurasia from Friedman’s 2009 book The Next 100 Years, published by Anchor Books.

[2] Personal interview with Dr. Arild Moe during CCEE’s event “Round-Table Discussion on Russian Gas: New Internal and External Challenges with Dr. Arild Moe.” December 3rd 2014.

[3] Discussions during Dr. Ed Hirs’ presentation “Oil and Gas Prices: Analysis of Current Situations and Trends” sponsored by CCEE. December 2, 2014.

Biz Peabody

Nationalism: long thought to be one of the strongest forces in the world. The exact definition of nationalism is the amalgamation of feelings, principles and efforts in the name of patriotic pride for one’s nation or country. The psychological concept of nationalism has always been present in humans, because we’re “programmed” to identify with our groups – our “herds” – who we work with to ensure our survival as individuals and as a species.

What we’re witnessing as these two crises in Gaza and Ukraine unfold is a phenomenon that is becoming clearer as the world globalizes: the clash of nationalism and technology. In the past, the only way for a nation to defend itself was through large-scale war against other nations, but technology is allowing smaller entities to assert themselves on the global stage. In the tragedy of 9/11, it became clear that large-scale war was no longer the paradigm. A group – Al-Qaeda – was able to wage war on the hegemon – the US – and the hegemon was forced to wage its “War on Terror” on an ideology.

In a similar group-against-nation dynamic, the war between Hamas and Israel is driven by nationalist sentiments, and so is the war fought between Ukraine against its pro-Russian rebels. Aside from the tragedies these two conflicts have created – most recently pro-Russian rebels shooting down commercial flight MH-17, and the 500+ deaths in Gaza and Israel – the conflicts reveal that it is becoming easier for smaller and smaller groups to assert their own brand of nationalism on bigger and bigger entities. Diplomatic efforts to end these conflicts, therefore, must begin focusing more on the global, collective good and less on emphasizing “peace talks” between warring nations. Continuing to simply call for peace between nationalistic entities only underlines differences between groups, which in turn strengthens nationalistic mentalities and further separates peoples.

Jason Tse

Two major crises could not come at a more inopportune time. Now the United States faces trouble on three fronts: the ISIS crisis in Iraq, the MH-17 disaster, and the war in Gaza.

I wrote in a recent piece for Glimpse about how rapprochement with Iran was expedient for our interests in the Middle East. In the US-Iran engagement, Russia had always positioned itself as a close partner with Iran, able to sway Iran to a favorable agreement similar to China’s promises on North Korea.

But, the MH-17 disaster complicates things. Facts are still surfacing, but with the US Intelligence Community confirming that the weapon systems used to shoot down MH-17 were moved quietly back to Russia and Putin’s public attempts to shift blame onto Kiev, it is almost certain that Russian-backed and armed rebels shot down the plane.

This leads the US to a new dilemma: choosing which foe represents the larger threat: Russia or Iran. While it is clear that Russia must be held accountable, the US should take care not to completely back the bear into a corner. At the same time, greater action against Russia, which seems likely considering the global outrage, would signal that a rapprochement with Iran is no longer merely expedient to fighting the ISIS crisis, but necessary now that Iran’s partnership (or at least being out of Russia’s orbit) is required to address both ISIS and Russia. This unfortunately gives the Iranian hand a significant boost as the Americans and Iranians return to the table for extended negotiations.

Luke Phillips

I don’t have too many thoughts on either crisis boiling up this week, not the one in Gaza or the one in Ukraine. I do have thoughts, however, on what the American and overall Western reaction will be to each.

If the timeline of the Ukraine crisis up to this point is any guide, then I think it can safely be said that there won’t be very much in the way of policy innovation in the wake of the tragedy of MH-17. Sure, a few more impassioned speeches will be made in Brussels and Washington about heavier sanctions on Moscow, and much energy will be expended in the time-tested act of finger-waving. But no one in the European Union or US has the political will to make truly meaningful actions against Putin’s Russia, and I don’t necessarily think they should. MH-17, for the tragedy it is, is not particularly important. But, if Russia’s actions began to directly threaten the Baltic States or Poland, then we might see some shuffling of feet in the West.

As for Gaza, that’s even easier. The fight will go on for a few weeks or months, Palestinian and Israeli apologists will absolve themselves and accuse the other side, and one happy autumn day the flag of truce will go up. Give it three years, maybe less, and there will be peace talks in America again. Another few years and they’ll be back at war. However, shifting geopolitical dynamics in the broader Middle East might alter the equation somewhat. In particular, if Iranian-American relations normalize, and the US distances itself from Israel, the Jewish State may be compelled to engage in more vigorous diplomacy. Conversely, if the massive war underway in neighboring Syria and Iraq spreads into Jordan, a more security-paranoid Israel could take aggressive measures in Gaza and even the West Bank to forestall the violence from penetrating its borders.

Time will tell. Prudence is all we can ask of our leaders, restraint all we can ask of those abroad.

Abigail Becker

Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in November 2013, the fighting in Crimea has unfortunately involved many civilians. Because of the nature of the fighting, the death of more innocent people is not surprising. What distinguishes the attack on MH-17 from previous conflicts is the international nature of the event. The crisis in Ukraine has, of course, been an international headline from the start, but for most people beyond the Ukraine/Russia border, it has remained a distant threat. The crash of MH-17 shatters that feeling of safe separation. Almost every continent was represented on the flight, and a number of countries issued statements of sadness and anger. The Netherlands, which lost 193 citizens, has been particularly vocal, and rightfully so.

To make matters worse, the rebels handled the aftermath of the crash with an unbelievable lack of tact and decency. The bodies of the victims were hidden for days after the crash in train cars and the crash site was kept on strict lockdown. Unsurprisingly, there has been no apology from the rebels, Putin or the Ukrainian government. All parties have instead chosen to play the blame game – though most everyone agrees the Russians and rebels are responsible. The botched handling of the victims’ bodies has only increased tensions and polarized the opposing sides. This is no longer a crisis between a state and rebels—it is a conflict between the rebels and Putin, and angered people around the world.

Luodanni Chen

Let’s talk facts. The 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine began on February 23, 2014. During the past five months, two Ukrainian military planes have been shot down in the region: one in June and one just three days before the attack on MH-17. The plane crash in June has been identified as the work of pro-Russian separatists. The large Ukrainian military transport jet was shot down using a shoulder-fired missile when the jet was trying to land at an airport in Luhansk. One month later, another military plane was shot down when it was flying at 6,500 meters. This distance is well beyond the range of shoulder-fired missiles. Ukrainian officials speculated that a more powerful missile had brought down the plane, and the missile was perhaps fired from territories within the Russian Federation. A powerful anti-aircraft weapon that is capable of doing such damage is called the Buk surface-to-air missile. The Buk missile system was developed by the Soviet Union and was in service since 1979. Buk is “capable of detecting air targets at ranges of up to 160 km and hitting them at full altitude range at a distance of over 30 km,” according to the Russian Defense Ministry information. Obama has already confirmed the use of surface-to-air missile in the MH-17 disaster on July 18^th. By connecting these dots, Putin has his fingerprints all over this. What is his next play and how will the international community respond?

Kshitij Kumar

Both the Gaza crisis and the Malaysian Airlines tragedy have resulted in unfortunate, devastating civilian deaths. These were 800+ individuals (400 noncombatants and counting in Gaza, 298 on MH-17) that had no say, no involvement in either conflict. They were casualties of crossfire, and whether their deaths are labeled accidents or unfortunate necessities resulting from the use of civilians as human shields, the loss of innocent life is unjust and disturbing. While the technology of war has evolved to allow high precision targeting and supposedly minimize collateral damage, clearly, this is not what is happening. To add insult to injury, the deaths are being politicized! Headlines earlier suggest that the remains of the dead of the Malaysian aircraft are pieces in an international political ‘game’; a Wall Street Journal article suggested that the very election of Hamas in Gaza forfeited civilians’ rights to be safe from war. The sanctity of life no longer seems to have any value; those who have lost loved ones are apparently not even allowed to mourn.

Yes, there is a bigger picture to look at—there is a greater good (everyone has a different opinion as to what that constitutes) to consider. But in these physical and verbal battles between nations, groups, passions and beliefs, it is imperative that we remember the humanity of those lost—as well as our own.

Update: Kshitij Kumar’s portion received minor corrections 

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

If you’ve stayed up to date with our leading popular calumnies, you’ve probably heard of the so-called twilight of the American space program. As the narrative has it, the end of the Space Shuttle program and budgetary constraints has forced the nation that once reached the moon to hitch rides on Russian Soyuz rockets, relegating the US to a position of near subservience to our former Cold War rival. To make matters worse, that rival’s been slapping us with counter-sanctions and limitations, paralyzing our already crippled space program. As Neil Cavuto of Fox News put it: “What a fall from grace.”

Well that’s how the narrative goes anyway, a narrative that’s entirely the result of misinformation and media hype. The reality is, Russia’s counter-sanctions will be little more than a nuisance to the American space program, a program that has been, and will continue to be, successful.

In 1973, the Saturn V rocket, the launch vehicle of the Apollo program that took 12 Americans to the moon, was decommissioned, effectively leaving the United States without manned space mission capabilities for eight years. This period of dormancy, similar to the current one, was simply a transitioning phase between two generations of space launch technology: Saturn rockets and the Space Shuttle program. Subsequently, the Space Shuttle program was instrumental in the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS), the Hubble Space Telescope, the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite and countless other projects and experiments.

The program officially ended in 2011, as was intended by NASA and Congress, after nearly 30 years of operation and 135 launches. Its termination however, should not be considered representative of some fictitious demise of the US space program. It is merely, as the termination of the Saturn program before it, a signal that NASA is transitioning to a new generation of space technology. And, though the US may temporarily need rides to the ISS via Russian Soyuz rockets until that technology is achieved, Russia has been using the same rockets since the 1960s. These rockets, which were incapable of transporting humans beyond low Earth orbit at the height of the Space Race, pale in comparison to the Space Shuttles.

So, what is the new generation of space technology? Well in addition to innovations by the private sector, which should allow for independent manned launches by 2017, NASA is gearing up for the Space Launch System (SLS). This program, set to replace the canceled Constellation project, will not only once again provide the US with manned space launch capabilities, but will also return astronauts to the moon and eventually land the first humans on Mars.

Aspects of the SLS project will be developed in conjunction with the European Space Agency to create the first truly reusable launch system. The system will consist of five configurations (called “Blocks”), each designed for different purposes and payloads. Moreover, at least one of these rockets will have the ability to carry the Orion (a manned spacecraft analogous to the Apollo module), into deep space to perform manned operations on asteroids, the moon and Mars. A rough timeline for the program is as follows: In December of this year, the Orion craft will be launched unmanned via a Delta IV rocket for operational testing. In 2017, Orion will use a fully operational SLS rocket for a second unmanned mission, this time to the moon’s orbit. In 2021, Orion, with a manned crew, will land atop a robotically captured asteroid. And though no official date has yet been scheduled, SLS will implement manned missions to the moon sometime in the 2020s and a manned mission to Mars as early as 2033.

So that should clear up any major misconceptions regarding America’s space impotence, but the world of cable and click-hungry news agencies have a few other fables to purport. The two main fallacies pertain to either Russia kicking NASA astronauts out of the ISS or Russia’s halting of the shipment of RD-180s to the United States.

In response to US sanctions placed on Russia earlier in the year, Putin’s government in May issued a statement that Russia’s space agency, Roscomos, would not support the continuation of the ISS program until 2024. Until January of 2014, when Congress voted to extend the project, the ISS was scheduled to end in 2020. However, recent reports forecast that components of the ISS will last beyond previous estimates, which have obliged the project’s continuation. Russia’s announcement in May was merely a statement that in the midst of the current political climate, it would not support the ISS beyond 2020. The announcement however has no real immediate bearing on the current status of the ISS. Headlines and popular discourse represented the news as America’s banishment, but Russia never indicated that it would cease providing Soyuz lift offs for astronauts anytime soon. And, given that Roscosmos is presently incapable of operating the ISS without Americans on the American wing of the station, it’s unlikely Russia ever will take action so long as it’s involved in the project. In the meantime, NASA, in conjunction with private companies including Boeing and SpaceX, will continue to develop its ability to launch crews and will likely be ready to take over the station with or without Russian cooperation by 2020.

The second major issue is that of the RD-180 engine. On the same announcement on May 13, 2014, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin vowed to fight back against US sanctions through the suspension of RD-180 engine sales to the United States for military purposes. These engines are used by the otherwise US manufactured Atlas V rockets, mostly for transporting commercial and military satellites to orbit. But suspension isn’t quite the detriment to national security it’s made out to be. The suspension has yet to be made concrete by Russian officials while the USAF maintains a two year stockpile in the case of supply breaks. Spokesmen from the United Launch Alliance, the Atlas V’s manufacturer, contend this period offers enough time to make a transition to the domestically produced Delta IV rocket family. (For information on the separate but relevant SpaceX court injunction please read: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2512/1)

So although recent political scuffles with Putin could have numerous negative consequences for the United States, the dissolution of the American space program isn’t one of them. The program’s inadequacies, expressed through popular media and conversations around the country, are mostly overblown and needlessly pessimistic. But, as the past as shown, it’s usually advantageous for the despondent public to become overly concerned about matters pertaining to space. The cynicism might be something to welcome.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

This piece will be the first of a special “Weigh In” series that is going to be started on Glimpse, which will focus on momentous current events.

Thomas D. Armstrong

Recent op-eds have labeled Putin as a mastermind or a megalomaniac fool. I am of the opinion that Putin is a megalomaniac mastermind exploiting a disempowered US. However, debating Putin’s psychological profile is less constructive than analyzing the economic foundation of his regime. Putin and his Russia survive on energy revenues, and war is only making him richer. Unlike 2008, when Putin invaded Georgia, oil prices have held steady. In fact, the threat of sanctions on Russia have only driven oil prices marginally higher, up $2 dollars to $110.8/bbl as of writing. Putin is financing expansionist dreams (and his own savings account) thanks to his near-monopoly on Russia’s energy industry. Therefore, the best way to rein him in is to drive global energy prices down. The US can accomplish this quite easily with a reformed national energy policy. Currently, the US is sitting on an unused 727-million-barrel underground cache of crude oil, and is producing more and more natural gas by the day. If the US were to supplant Russia as Europe’s primary natural gas provider, and flood the global market with American oil exports, energy prices would plummet. A decrease from $110/bbl to $80/bbl would cost the Russian oil industry alone an estimated $120 billion, plus billions more in foreign exchange earnings. Putin is a deft leader, but even he could not survive such a sustained economic collapse.

Nick Kosturos

Russia’s move to deploy soldiers in Ukraine is indicative of feelings of insecurity rather than confidence. Putin knows that such a large loss of influence in Ukraine, a critically important country in economic, cultural, and geopolitical terms, would be devastating to Russia’s ultimate goal of increasing its regional sphere of influence and international prestige. Putin’s domestic considerations and tensions can also shed light on these aggressive actions. If a small country like Ukraine can successfully stand up to the Kremlin by ousting its man from Kiev, what will Russians think of a leadership unable to control their “Small Russia?” Russia is acting out of desperation, not strength. Putin’s clownish justifications for Russia’s military actions do not hold up to scrutiny and are made under a façade by what I recently labeled an “imitation democracy.”

While the West has multilaterally condemned this act of aggression, which is a positive first step, it should now increase pressure on Russia to relent. In order to force Russia to withdraw and accept Ukraine’s sovereignty and a chance at a peaceful political transition, the West must maintain a multilateral and wide-ranging coalition of rejection, isolating Putin via sanctions on both his allies and competing oligarchs (including their overseas funds and visas), and by supporting Ukraine’s new government through assistance and advisement. At this point, conventional military power projection against Russia is not a viable option – no matter how tempting – as it could spark an unintended military provocation leading to conflict. The current situation is very difficult to manage, although the international community should know that the West ultimately has the upper hand. Russia’s desperate authoritarian strategy based on oppression is doomed to fail in the long-run.

Luke Phillips

The situation in Crimea is nothing more than the Russians managing their own geopolitical periphery, and so far as it has to do anything at all with expansion, it is only due to the fact that Russian power is presently contracted to levels far below what Moscow would like. America would do and has done the same thing in the event of revolutionary unrest in our neighbor states, as is evidenced by our interventions in Mexico a century ago and in Cuba a half-century ago.

The question here, I think, is what the United States is going to do about it. Part of our grand strategy since the end of the Cold War has been to keep the Russians from establishing formal or informal dominion over the former U.S.S.R. Another part has been supporting the thin veil of liberal international order that girds the power politics flowing subtly underneath in an effort to at least grant a semblance of order and harmony in international affairs. These imperatives have come under increasing pressure in recent years, but in 2013 and 2014 more than ever before. I don’t know what the proper policy response should be, but I hope it isn’t more of the lectures, gestures, and silences with which President Obama responded to the Russians in the Snowden and Syria affairs.

Jacob W. Roberts

America is in no position to intervene nor should it.  To the western world, Putin’s actions appear nefarious, but from the perspective of many Russians he is acting well within the parameters of international law.  Professor Tatiana Akishina of USC argues that, since the prime minister of Ukraine’s semi-autonomous Crimea region has called upon Putin for military support, his intervention is in accordance with international law.  Moreover, America has intervened with greater frequency and intensity over the past century, thus it is highly hypocritical of US authorities to castigate Russia for meddling within its region.  That being said, it is somewhat disturbing to witness Russia fail to respect the sovereign rights of an independent nation.  One can only hope that Putin’s intervention into the region will be short lived.

Alessandro M. Sassoon

There is a risk of ethnic cleansing. It starts with classification. Weeks before this conflict made the front pages of the New York Times, reports emerged that Russian-Ukrainians in Crimea were being given Russian Passports. Russians have lived in Crimea for some 200 years, and Ukraine has held the territory for half a century. Then there are the Tatars, the people for whom Crimea is an ancestral home dating back to the Mongol Khan Empire. The Tatar population, which accounts for 13% of Crimea’s inhabitants, is predominantly Sunni Muslim. Under Stalin’s Russia, the Tatars were accused of collaborating with Nazi Germany and deported en masse to other parts of Russia (read: Siberia). It should come as no surprise then that they are more keen on being governed by Ukraine than by Russia. As things stand, there are three populations with strong ethno-nationalist tendencies who inhabit a geographic area they all feel they have a historical, political, or legal claim to. Of the eight stages of Genocide, we’ve passed #5: polarization. That means preparation, extermination, and denial are next.

Sabrina Mateen

Before this conflict, my knowledge of Ukraine consisted solely of “ex-USSR”. I assumed the region consisted of Russian natives, and that they were considered to be allies with their ex-country. However, with the news of an outbreak of civil war, it has become apparent that there are opposing nationalities, languages, and mindsets that are all helping to tear Ukraine into pieces. The conflict seems to be reaching increasingly dangerous heights as Russia begins to put pressure on Ukraine in the form of planned military drills and in one case, an unspecified military presence that looked to be Russians supporting Crimeans. Although the conflict is being called a civil war, it is beginning to seem like one of the many moves Putin has been making to restore Russia to its USSR-era square footage. It is important to see what the United States plans to do, as the Obama Administration is already under scrutiny after the ill-advised response to the crisis in Syria.  Any move from the newly war-shy United States will be seen as an escalation in a conflict that has all the makings of a new Cold War.

Kerry Collins

Recent developments in the volatile Ukraine situation show the autonomous Crimea region voting to join the Russian Federation. Crimea has a Russian ethnic majority and is predominantly Russian speaking, so it might not come as a surprise that the region is in support of the secession. If it is what the people want, then perhaps the region should have never been a part of Ukraine to begin with. These recent moves that Crimea has made are violations of international law, which puts the United States in a tough response position. The President has been making frantic calls to Putin urging a diplomatic end to this crisis, but to no avail. Meanwhile, Putin doesn’t seem particularly concerned with US warnings. What the EU and the US bring to the table are economic sanctions, and it will be interesting to see if those “sticks” are enough to make Putin falter.

This past week, Ukraine experienced the worst period of violence in its post-Soviet history and a stunning political development as President Yanukovych was forced out of power by the Ukrainian parliament. The cost of this political victory for the opposition has been great; aggressive clashes between government security forces and protesters resulted in at least 77 deaths and 577 injuries. Although a potential breakthrough peace deal emerged Friday calling for early elections this December, a lessening of the powers of President Yanukovych, and the establishment of a “national unity government,” the Ukrainian parliament voted Saturday to remove President Yanukovych from office and to hold elections on May 25th in a stunning rebuke of his regime. This political whirlwind places Ukraine in a vulnerable position. Although the opposition movement achieved a great victory in eliminating Yanukovych from power, its efforts may prove futile if a fair political transition is not undertaken in the coming months, especially if Russia continues to bully Ukraine into submission. If Ukraine is to move towards a freer and more just society, then the West must work with Ukraine to ensure fair and free elections while offering strong guidance and support during the upcoming political transition.

The unprecedented violence in Ukraine was appalling and indicative of a deteriorating security situation on the ground, suggesting significant gains in the opposition movement and feelings of insecurity on part of the Yanukovych regime. To combat demonstrators, Ukrainian security forces were issued combat-grade weapons and fired upon protesters . Opposition members attacked security forces with Molotov cocktails and possibly firearms . Although both sides have committed acts of violence, there should be no doubt that the preponderance of force came from government-sponsored security forces; reports indicate that government-sponsored snipers killed at least 20 protesters this past week. This suppression is unacceptable and revealed the true authoritarian nature of the Yanukovych government. Although the main perpetrator of the violence has been effectively removed from power, the West must continue to isolate those responsible and should take an active role in shaping the next phase of the political transition.

Even though the U.S. and EU are becoming more active in Ukraine’s political crisis, the most influential external actor in Ukraine is undoubtedly Russia. President Putin and his allies are taking bold steps to keep their Ukrainian puppets in power thereby preserving the status quo. Indeed, Russia’s provocative moves instigated the political unrest when it bullied Ukraine into rejecting a trade deal with the EU in favor of $15 billion dollars in aid and a tantalizing 33 percent discount on Russian natural gas. Naturally, Russia has many reasons to prevent Ukraine from developing relations with the EU. In his quest to restore the idea of a “Great Russia” and a sphere of influence similar to the former Soviet Bloc, Putin knows that Ukraine is the most important country in pursuit of this goal.

Historically, Ukraine has been known as “Small Russia.” The concept of a “Modern Russia” is said to have started in Ukraine, and Ukraine is seen as the birthplace of the region’s Orthodox Christianity. Linguistically, the two countries are also very similar as many Ukrainians speak both Ukrainian and Russian. The economic ties between Ukraine and Russia are also vital in gauging Russia’s interest. If Ukraine does not join Russia’s Eurasian customs union (which recently recruited Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), then the whole concept could disintegrate. Russian companies have a large investment presence in Ukraine accounting for about 7 percent of Ukraine’s total foreign investment in 2013. In addition, many Ukrainians have migrated to Russia providing a substantial labor force for Russian companies. Ukraine also has geostrategic importance for Russia hosting Russia’s Black Sea Fleet naval headquarters. If the naval base’s lease were threatened by a more independent Ukraine, Russia would suffer a significant loss in a critical region. Clearly, Russia has a substantial interest in keeping a pro-Kremlin government in Kiev. Although Russia has indicated perhaps a softer stance by sending in a more reasonable diplomat to conduct negotiations during this tipping point, this gesture should not be considered a serious change of intention or attitude. Russia knows that losing Ukraine to the West will be a momentous blow to its aspirations of restoring the idea of a “Great Russia.”

When evaluating the West’s efforts to support the Ukrainian opposition and influence the Ukrainian regime, it is important to understand that the U.S. and its Western allies are at an inherent disadvantage. Unlike the Russian state which has few reservations in actively supporting authoritarian regimes that suppress their own people, such as the Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria, the West generally does not support corrupt autocrats in such a brash manner. It also is difficult to provide assistance to an opposition that is not well defined. Nevertheless, the EU’s decision to place individual sanctions on Ukrainian officials , and the U.S.’s move to revoke 20 Ukrainian visas were positive efforts to punish President Yanukovych’s regime. These individuals must be held responsible for their actions, especially if they continue to receive guidance from Russia urging the state to resist tectonic reforms in the coming months. However, more must be done beyond sanctions to ensure a meaningful political transition and reform process.

More often than not, the West views elections as the end game of democratic reform, even when the elections in question are severely flawed. The West must actively monitor and offer guidance to the Ukrainian political transition team via diplomatic channels and civil society groups to ensure free and fair elections. Yanukovych and/or his allies may attempt to retain power in the upcoming months resulting in a Russian-backed political machine winning the elections. According to international observers, Ukraine’s 2012 election cycle was plagued with fraud, so it is likely that history could repeat itself if the election process is not regulated and monitored. Western countries should also keep an eye on rising leaders within the opposition movement that could be potential puppets for President Putin. Wealthy oligarchs such as Henadiy Boholyubov and Ihor Kolomoyskyy, who both have billion dollar plus holdings in the financial, media, and energy industries, have recently switched allegiances to the opposition movement even though they have traditionally supported the Yanukovych regime. These powerful actors could potentially hijack the opposition movement and resist any meaningful change that threatens their interests, which could include greater independence from Russia. Ukraine’s proposed political transition and reform could easily become a sham if the U.S. and the EU lose focus and decrease pressure.

Russia is bold to accuse the West of “puppeteering” in Ukraine via diplomatic support since the Kremlin has actively supported a bloody regime that has massacred civilians. While the current situation is not a proxy war, it is hard to ignore the emerging political divide and international political implications of Ukraine’s transformation. Western Ukraine supports further integration with the EU, and Eastern Ukraine is supportive of a strong Russian presence. Moving forward, it will be very difficult to reconcile these two viewpoints in a political transition that seeks a “national unity government.” However, the West and EU can continue to punish Ukrainian officials guilty of oppression and help support and shape meaningful political reform that keeps President Yanukovych and his cronies out of power. The ouster of Yanukovych by parliament, while a positive development, should be watched closely. The inevitable scramble and disorganization that follows such a momentous event could lead to the rise of another corrupt regime that seeks to ally itself to the highest bidder. Regardless of this possibility, those Ukrainians who desire a freer and more just society have won a substantial victory. Let us hope this victory is the first of many to come culminating in a Ukraine that aspires to be more than just a “Small Russia.”

The communist-style grey suit is so 1950s. Kim Jong-un: please take note. While those drab American leaders all dress similarly and wear the same American flag pins, which are of course made in China, you should focus on dressing to impress. We recommend obtaining a military uniform and cramming as many shiny badges on your outfit as possible. People want a strong leader, and old-school military power projection will impress your subjects while making them more accepting of your militaristic police state over time. Muammar Gaddafi mastered the dressing game, switching between flashy traditional garb and his ornate military uniform to trumpet both his cultural and military credentials. A consistent, yet unique style will leave the newly minted members of your personality cult craving for more. 2. Plaster Your Face on Everything

If an individual or a group tries to rain on your cult parades, you must remove them from the scene. The last thing a true leader wants is a competing figure or group stealing your thunder. You and you alone are the star – channel your inner Hollywood diva. Remove all opponents swiftly and by any and all means necessary through any force necessary, and most importantly, be sure to erase them from the annals of history. A few photo touch-ups should do the trick for well-known figures. Job prerequisite: a least two years experience with Adobe Creative Suite© and, preferably, previous experience in product marketing and re-branding. 5. Micro-managing is a Must

You must maintain an active presence in the direct management of your cult or else it could be hijacked by the opposition, or worse, a not-so-loyal lieutenant. Stalin was a master of this management style and developed a habit of personally monitoring and directly approving or disapproving cult products that were to be distributed to the masses. So next time one your lieutenants offers to “take care” of management, politely refuse. Reply that you will “take care” of him and send him to Siberia to break rocks. 6. Conceal any and all Physical Faults

We know you’re perfect, but on the off chance that you have a physical or mental ailment, it must be concealed. You need to portray yourself as god-like, and to do this requires careful image manipulation. Kim Jong-il had a major speech impediment that prevented him from giving speeches or distributing recordings, but he was able to hide this impediment and keep his people in the dark. Rather, Kim was known to have Herculean sporting abilities where he would bowl and golf perfect games, and he was incapable of passing gas. Focus on your strengths and do not be afraid to highlight only your finest qualities, such as your ability to show off that priceless grin. 7. Bad Press is BAD Press