In May 2023, Turkey began a large-scale humanitarian project in the Idlib and Aleppo governorates of Syria pledging the construction of about a quarter million housing units, commercial facilities, industrial areas, farming plots, schools and hospitals, spearheaded by President Recep Erdoğan and supported by the Qatar Fund for Development. The housing project pushed refugees displaced into Turkey to begin relocating back to their motherland, specifically to the 30km swathe of land along the northern Syrian–Turkish border created by Turkey to function as a demilitarized area known as the “safe zone.” The target amount of 240,000 permanent housing units is set to be finished by 2025, with 1 million refugees expected to be repatriated into Syria. In addition to this new program, Turkey has already built 75,000 25-square-meter briquette homes in Idlib and 107,000 in Aleppo within the past two years, housing over 6 million Syrians.

The new project is operating under the slogan “safe, voluntary and [honorable]returns,” and is most likely a result of the “temporary protected” status for Syrians which grants refuge that is temporary and thus volatile. According to Turkish Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu, “there is a serious demand for a voluntary and dignified return to this safe area.”

While Soylu has labeled this repatriation scheme “the most honorable project the human history will talk about” and “an exemplary step for the whole world, showing how humanitarian aid transforms into development in a region,” many have been skeptical of Turkey’s true intentions. 

The validity of this “serious demand” expressed by Soylu has been contested by a myriad of international sources including the UNHCR, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW). The UNHCR reported in 2023 that although over half of Syrian refugees hope to return one day, a mere 1.1% planned to do so within the next year. 

In 2019, the Turkish government began forcibly deporting refugees back to Idlib, an area marred with violence. Police scoured public areas and raided apartments, searching for Syrians with and without temporary protection cards. While Turkey insisted its actions were legal, Turkish and international law — under the principle of non-refoulement — prohibit forced deportation to active war zones under any circumstances “irrespective of migration status.” 

While in custody, Turkish officials coerced detained Syrian refugees to sign statements expressing their desire to repatriate, under the threat of imprisonment. If able to re-enter Turkey, deported refugees who did have Turkish identification documents found their validity had been canceled. Whether or not the zone is actually safe is also a matter of contention, with major international organizations including HRW condemning the Turkish safe zone as “anything but,” describing it as “woefully misguided,” “dangerous” and “bound to fail.”

Many are concerned that the safe zone simply is not safe, as it is rife with violence. With 12,000 ISIS fighters imprisoned in the safe zone’s easternmost governorate of Al-Hasakah, the area is a prime target for rebel groups and armed uprisings — such as the 2022 ISIS prison break, the “most significant” assault since its inception. 

Additionally, safe zones as a concept have been notoriously counterintuitive. According to HRW, militants are known to take advantage of safe zones, intermingling with civilians to attempt to avoid retaliation, turning the area into a “valid military target.” Additionally, safe zones are lucrative sources of humanitarian aid, which combatants can easily steal. They also serve as ripe recruiting grounds for extremist organizations.  

President Erdoğan is managing a two-level political game, juggling both domestic and international concerns. Regardless of these criticisms, free housing and resources are not entirely negative endeavors. Erdoğan is incentivizing Syrians to act in a way beneficial to their long-term development — taking advantage of resources that will ultimately lead to a sense of stability and safety —– and furthering his domestic and international agendas. 

Regarding Turkish domestic politics, Erdoğan established this plan in the midst of the country’s 2023 presidential elections. His opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu campaigned on a platform of sending “all the refugees home,” reflecting popular anti-refugee sentiment, so a similar message was necessary on Erdoğan’s behalf if he wanted to compete with Kilicdaroglu. Instead of publicly forcing refugees to return home, he attempted to bolster both his domestic image as a stern advocate for Turkish nationalism and international image as a humanitarian by proposing the free housing solution instead. 

In addition to improving his international reputation, his building schemes solidified the establishment of the “safe zone,” as Turkish building projects bolster Turkish influence in the region. This move also supports Turkish imperial interests and the rise in pan-Turkism, a growing nationalist ideology that “emphasizes the common ethnic, cultural, and linguistic roots of Turkic peoples living across Eurasia,” regardless of Turkish nationality. 

Before the inception of the new project, the Syrian government issued a statement in 2022 “[rejecting]these plans” and labeling them as “criminal projects.” Although the Syrian government is viewed as highly corrupt and not necessarily concerned with the best interests of the Syrian people, it is worth noting their stern opposition to the plan. Echoing concerns from the international community, Syria declared, in relation to the housing project, that “the main objective is colonialism.” Considering that Turkey has maintained a violent occupation of northern Syria since 2016, fears of continued land-grabs are not unfounded.  

Whether or not Syrians would repatriate into Syria without the force of the Turkish government or the incentive of free housing is unclear, but it is safe to say that the temporary safe place provides respite for the refugees, especially since the Syrian war persists, with rebel group strongholds as prevalent as ever. Thus, while the housing project is a potential positive step in Syrian repatriation, it is not unreasonable to scrutinize Turkey’s questionable underlying motives and reexamine the actual benefits of safe zones. 

The post Turkey’s Humanitarian Project in Syria Raises Questions of Ulterior Imperialistic Motives appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

With important domestic and foreign policies in Turkey’s horizon, the May 14 elections are of critical importance to Turkey, Europe, the Middle East and global policy at large.

Fethi Can Yaşar is the representative of the U.S. youth branch of Turkey’s Republican People’s Party, the main opposition party led by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the forerunner against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Glimpse From the Globe sits down with Yaşar to discuss the upcoming Turkish election and its global implications.

The post Prospects of a Post-Erdogan Future: An Interview With Turkish Opposition’s Youth Representative appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

This dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan began almost a century ago in 1921, when Joseph Stalin gave the region of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, a Muslim-majority nation. However, almost 90% of the population identified as Armenian and Christian, and this action isolated the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, known as the Artsakh to Armenians, within a country they did not consider their own. 

Despite the circumstances, the situation remained relatively stable until the deterioration of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh announced that it wanted to join Armenia despite its location within Azerbaijan. Three years later, when the Soviet Union fell and Armenia and Azerbaijan became sovereign states, the two countries went to war to determine who would have authority over Nagorno-Karabakh.

The war was incredibly violent, lasting three years and causing the deaths of over 30,000 people. Many of the casualties were attributed to the ethnic cleansing carried out by forces on both sides, which also displaced tens of thousands of refugees. By the time a ceasefire was negotiated, Armenia had taken over Nagorno-Karabakh and much of the surrounding area. While the ceasefire, brokered by Russia, ended the war, the strained relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan persist. Since then, Nagorno-Karabakh continues to be a part of Azerbaijan but is primarily governed by a separatist republic run by ethnic Armenians and supported by the Armenian government. The Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact, the border separating the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, remains one of the most militarized in the world.

The new resurgence of conflict hinted at the threat of an all-out war between the two countries, one that would likely involve the larger powers of Turkey and Russia. These two countries, who had previously worked together to manage the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, have also seen a deterioration of relations this year. In February, Russian airstrikes targeted and killed Turkish soldiers in Syria, and in May, Turkey sent military advisors, drones and Syrian fighters to Libya to oppose a Russian-backed political faction. Turkey and Russia are fighting each other through proxy wars in both Syria and Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh could very well have been the third.

During the war in the 1990s, Turkey fully supported Azerbaijan (with whom it shares an ethnic and cultural heritage), even closing its border with Armenia in solidarity. Turkey and Armenia have long been at odds, with the latter pushing for recognition of the Armenian genocide in 1915 and the former refusing to acknowledge it. Russia has economic ties to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, but has a closer relationship with Armenia. Currently, Armenia hosts a Russian military base and is part of several Russian-led regional alliances that include the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. 

Armenia had already claimed that Turkey is involved in this newest bout of fighting, and accused  a Turkish fighter jet of shooting down an Armenian jet in May. These claims were initially denied by Turkey, but satellite images of Azerbaijan showed parked Turkish planes. Later, Azerbaijan’s president admitted that the planes were there, but said they had not been used in combat. The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has openly declared support for Azerbaijan, and other governments monitoring the situation, including France and Russia, say that Azerbaijan has been attacking Nagorno-Karabakh with Turkish drones. These nations also allege that foreign fighters from Syria are being brought into the conflict by Turkey on behalf of Azerbaijan.

Russia, on the other hand, had called for restraint from the two countries and refrained from getting directly involved. Had Azerbaijan attacked civilian areas deeper in Armenia, a defense treaty between Russia and Armenia would have been triggered, forcing Russia to intervene militarily and counter Azerbaijan. Possibly in recognition of this, Azerbaijan mostly limited its attacks to territory claimed by the Armenian-led separatist government in Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Reactions from the rest of the international community were rather limited. The United States, France and Russia, the leaders of the OSCE Minsk Group that has been working to end the conflict since 1992, issued a joint statement condemning the escalation of violence, as did the European Union. However, no countries in either of these coalitions announced plans to get further involved in the situation. Seeing the reluctance of foreign governments, the Armenian diaspora took to the streets in protests around the world to try and generate media coverage and action. Hundreds of Armenians from all over Europe protested in front of the European Parliament building in Brussels in August. Similar action was taken by Armenians in the United States, particularly in southern California, which has the largest population of Armenians in the country. Despite their efforts, the intervention by foreign governments never came.

Two weeks after the fighting in September began, Russia negotiated a temporary ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to allow  for the return of prisoners and bodies of the deceased. This quickly fell apart following attacks in both Armenia and Azerbaijan the day after the ceasefire took effect, leading to accusations from both countries of violating the truce. This set off another week of fighting until a second ceasefire was established. Once again, it did not even last a full day.

On November 10th, a third attempt at peace was arranged by Russia, under which Armenia will return to Azerbaijan land that it had taken in during the war that followed the fall of the Soviet Union. The agreement, which is also supported by Turkey, deployed Russian peacekeepers along the Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact and required the Armenian forces to withdraw. The Russian peacekeepers are currently scheduled to remain there for five years, and will also be joined by Turkish forces. The ceasefire has held so far, hinting at a possible end to this round of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

Since the news broke, Azerbaijanis have been celebrating the news, reveling in a victorious end to a long, drawn-out conflict. However, public sentiment in Armenia has been anything but relieved. After news of the ceasefire broke, protestors in the Armenian capital of Yerevan ransacked government buildings and attacked one of the Parliament speakers. Many Armenians feel betrayed by Russia, who they considered one of their closest allies. Only time will tell if the ceasefire will last, but whether it holds or not the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan will remain for a very long time.

The post The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Draws Turkey and Russia Toward New Proxy War appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Water scarcity is a direct result of climate change. As temperatures rise, and extreme weather, such as droughts, become increasingly prevalent, water insecurity will begin causing mass deprivation and catastrophe across the Middle East and, in particular, Iraq. Rapidly increasing temperatures in Iraq are making water even more difficult to find, causing mass desertification across an already arid region. 

This past July, in the capital of Baghdad, temperatures hit 125.2 degrees Fahrenheit, a life-threatening level of heat. Additionally, as water scarcity becomes reality, poor sanitation and a lack of clean drinking water are expected to increase the prevalence of disease. Moreover, Iraq’s population is growing, as seen by the annual population growth rate of 3.9% in 2013 and 2.3% in 2018. As the population continues to grow, the Iraqi government struggles to adequately provide food and water for its citizens. 

The international community has acknowledged how water scarcity threatens the livelihoods of both humans and wildlife in the sixth United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG), which targets access to clean water and sanitation, especially in desolate areas. While actionable steps can be taken to prevent the issue from worsening, these steps have not been implemented due to the chaos, corruption, low funding and lack of centralized control in Iraq.

Compared to its regional neighbors, Iraq has been the most impacted by water insecurity. As the entire Middle East is currently struggling with this issue, and many of these countries share the same water sources, there is a race to harvest water within a country’s borders. Iran, on Iraq’s eastern border, has built the Sardasht Dam and the Daryan Dam to harvest water from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, limiting water which would have otherwise flowed into Iraq. Moreover, since 1970, Turkey has worked to increase its control over the region’s shared water source by building approximately 20 dams on the Euphrates and some more on the Tigris. Syria has also built its own dams to harvest water. 

The race to secure water in the Middle East has left 81% of Iraq’s primary water sources under the control of other countries, some of which are regional and political rivals. Consequently, Iraq has little control over the amount of water that is coming into its borders, thereby making the nation more susceptible to the consequences of water insecurity. A combination of short-sighted solutions, an increase in the effects of climate change, previous conflict and tragic terrorist attacks threaten the future of Iraq and the entire Middle East — not just from a political perspective, but from a sustainability and resource-based perspective as well.

Since 2018, Iraq has been unable to provide all of its citizens with clean drinking water. In addition to being unable to provide clean water, Iraq also struggles to provide enough water to fulfill the basic needs of its citizens. Sanitary water is unable to reach Iraqi citizens due to the country’s poor water infrastructure. As a direct result of recent conflict in Iraq during the past few decades, the country’s water infrastructure has been virtually destroyed. The Gulf War, the U.S. Invasion of Iraq, and the post-war period, in particular, were characterized by significant blows to the country’s infrastructure. During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the United States bombed four hydro-electric dams, which made it impossible for water treatment facilities to clean the country’s water. Moreover, a sewage plant in Baghdad was destroyed, subsequently causing sewage to spill into the Tigris. 

The UN recognized that the Gulf War put Iraq in the “pre-industrial age” and started a resource “catastrophe.” Following the war, Iraq was unable to import water purification materials and construction supplies, as the country’s bank accounts were frozen and there were strict bans in place on what the country could import. After the U.S. invasion in 2003, the country’s water situation became even more desperate. 40% of Iraqis could not access safe drinking water and 70% of the country’s sewage plants needed repairs. The U.S. and Iraqi governments tried to bring more drinking water to people across Iraq; however, their plan to rebuild infrastructure was not as successful as they had hoped. At first, the two governments intended to bring water to 23 million Iraqis, but the coalition was only able to bring water to 7.6 million Iraqis. During the insurgency, which began in 2011, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) made the water issue worse by gaining control of strategic cities and towns that were located along the country’s two major rivers. ISIL would control the dams along the river and stop water that flowed downstream to towns that supported the government. Disastrously, ISIL would also poison the water supply.

While today, ISIL and its splinter groups do not have as much control in the country, the damage they have caused is overwhelming. Iraq’s rivers became so poisonous in the summer of 2018 that approximately 100,000 people were hospitalized. This sparked riots in the city of Barsa, an economically-significant city responsible for 80% of the country’s GDP. 

While water scarcity threatens Iraq’s ability to be a successful and secure nation-state, it also has led to a rise in terrorism. A lack of water and basic necessities has led to an increase in unemployment and economic unrest. Additionally, communities have turned to terrorist organizations for food, water and protection. Youth unemployment in these regions has aided terrorist groups, as young people are attractive recruits and are often more vulnerable to manipulation and persuasion. In the past, terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and ISIL have targeted areas coping with water insecurity in an effort to expand their base. This demonstrates that water insecurity is a security issue and an even more significant threat to the international system. 

The UN, various NGOs and several foreign governments all agree that countries in the Middle East must collaborate on a regional solution that works to divide the water sensibly. This solution includes water-sharing agreements, improved water governance and sustainable water management. Additionally, there must be a focus on access to potable water, water infrastructure and, importantly, sanitation. Regional leaders have yet to fully cooperate; thus, it is imperative that the international community promote fair, cooperative solutions to water insecurity in the Middle East. Otherwise, hope is dwindling for Iraq. 

There is no exact playbook for overcoming the obstacle of water scarcity in Iraq and the Middle East. However, as climate change worsens, it is becoming increasingly harder to provide water for all people. Countries cannot afford to make mistakes and allow policy errors and politics to get in the way of clean drinking water for every person. 

The post How Water Scarcity is Aiding the Rise in Terrorism appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.