The case of Chan Tong-Kai, a Hong Kong citizen who allegedly murdered his ex-girlfriend in Taiwan in 2018, was used as an example by Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s administration to support the controversial extradition bill that resulted in the ongoing demonstrations in Hong Kong. As ceaseless conflicts between the police force and protestors debilitated the financial hub of China, Lam announced on October 22nd, 2019 that Chan, having expressed regret over his “irreversible mistakes,” would fly to Taiwan to turn himself in. Lam claimed that Chan’s decision would “alleviate the tense atmosphere in Hong Kong” and “bring ease to society.”

Chan’s ultimate release, however, was viewed in a suspicious light by authorities in Taiwan. The government of Taiwan had previously made multiple judicial requests to have Chan handed over to Taiwan to stand trial, arguing that it holds jurisdiction over the murder case. The Hong Kong government, however, did not respond to Taiwan’s call to establish a cooperation mechanism between the two political entities; instead, it made amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance that would allow extraditions of foreign citizens to Mainland China where suspects will be tried. The amendments’ contentious nature prompted the term “extradition bill” or “surrender-to-China (送中).” The Hong Kong government’s sudden willingness to let Chan turn himself in consequently raised doubts among officials in Taiwan, who argued that Chan’s willingness to surrender in the first place was motivated by political factors. As the two sides dispute over the settlement of Chan, Chan’s conviction remains difficult to be achieved.

Taiwan’s Rationale and Hong Kong’s Dilemma 

The administration of President Tsai Ing-wen has prioritized working on the case with Hong Kong using the existing channels between the two governments. One solution proposed by Taiwan is allowing the Ministry of Justice and other government agencies in Taiwan to participate in a joint investigation along with the analogous agencies in Hong Kong. In other words, the government of Taiwan hopes to solidify its self-proclaimed sovereign status by reinforcing its jurisdictional independence. A statement released by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), an administrative agency in Taiwan that is responsible for the overall planning and handling of Mainland China affairs, indicated that Hong Kong has signed agreements on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters with 30 countries worldwide, including Australia, and asked “why will it not negotiate and sign such an agreement with Taiwan?” 

Such a move would severely challenge Beijing’s “One-China” stance and place the Hong Kong government in a political dilemma. By establishing an agreement or any legislation that constitutes cooperation between Taiwan and Hong Kong, the Special Administrative Region of China would tacitly recognize Taiwan as an entity separate from China, thus violating the PRC’s “One-China” policy.  

Hong Kong, the Key to a Residential Election

In the unofficial scheme, the situation in Hong Kong generated much sympathy among young adults in Taiwan, who have been at the forefront  of social movements and democratic mobilizations on the self-governed island. To the younger generation, Hong Kong’s descending autonomy mirrors, if not foreshadows, the status of Taiwan as a territory whose political legitimacy is often threatened by Mainland China’s policies. In September, more than 100,000 people marched in Taipei in solidarity with Hong Kong and “Today, Hong Kong; Tomorrow, Taiwan” has become a popular slogan at Taiwanese rallies held in support of Hong Kongers. Moreover, Taiwanese university students have engaged in disputes with exchange students from Mainland China over Lennon Walls — sites that feature messages and posters of encouragement for the Hong Kong protests which have been widely set up on public transportation and in colleges. There have also been cases where Chinese tourists who destroyed Lennon walls were arrested and deported.

Young Taiwanese voters thus lean towards President Tsai, who won re-election in 2020 and has voiced support for Hong Kong multiple times. Political analysts pointed out that her outspoken criticism of China’s role in the neighboring region’s calamities has shed a positive light on Tsai’s image and made up for her relatively weak performance in domestic policies. In fact, surveys conducted in August indicated that Tsai’s popularity rose to 38.2%, an 8% increase from that of the previous month, outperforming her strongest opponent, the populist mayor Han Kuo-yu. The National Policy Foundation, a Nationalist party-based think tank, accused the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led by Tsai of delaying justice by rejecting Chan’s surrender to create a favorable situation for Tsai’s run in the upcoming 2020 presidential election.

Future Challenges for Taiwan

 The pro-independence narrative that Tsai has promoted since assuming the presidency has triggered Beijing to intensify its pressure on Taiwan and the Tsai administration’s unequivocal support of Hong Kong has only further chilled Beijing-Taipei relations. The unofficial interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwanese people have provoked denouncement from Beijing, which has warned the Democratic Progressive Party to “not intervene in Hong Kong affairs” and “refrain from protecting violent radicals.” However, Taiwan faces challenges greater than heightened tensions with China. While Tsai has promised to offer humanitarian assistance to Hong Kong, Taiwan is ill-prepared to deal with the influx of Hong Kong protestors who would flee to the self-ruled island as political refugees. With a lack of refugee laws and an institution to systematically process political asylums, it is extremely difficult for Tsai to properly provide for Taiwan’s “friends from Hong Kong.” 

While the general public of Taiwan often views Hong Kong as a warning to the possible risks of unification with China, the government of Taiwan should think beyond the political realities and take measures that tackle the possible consequences of the months-long protests. Politicians in Taiwan should work on refining drafts of the refugee bill for the long term benefits of people in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Would legislation that opens doors to refugees increase the risk of foreign — often Chinese — espionage masked by political asylum? Would Taiwan be able to assist the refugees in assimilating? Most importantly, will acceptance of refugees from Hong Kong deteriorate Cross-Strait relations? Such are the questions that the Tsai administration must consider.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The Middle Kingdom Returns

A great deal of fuss has been made recently about China’s foreign policy activities. Its economic shifts, naval activity and foreign investments have all received extensive coverage worldwide. However, the real focus should be on China’s future moves and long-term intentions. Casual observers often have short-term memories and horizons, but to observe China casually would be a grave error for any strategist or policymaker. Beijing is pursuing two clear foreign policy objectives: first, China will seek reunification with Taiwan, which is the unstated end goal of its recent naval buildup and maritime expansion. Second, Beijing will move to acquire undisputed hegemony in Central Asia to secure access to vital natural resources and resolve several domestic concerns. China hopes to achieve both goals by mid-century.

Fortunately for its neighbors, China’s ambitions and strategies are rarely new. The Middle Kingdom often reaches back into its historic memory for guidance. Mao Zedong was facing a border dispute with India soon after consolidating control of his nation. Rather than relying solely on information about the present-day dispute and the capabilities of Chinese forces, Mao called together his advisors to tell them two stories of ancient Chinese dynasties that dealt with hostilities in the same region years before. The Chinese leadership chose to heed their ancestral lessons, and launched a restrained military operation with clearly limited aims. Their forces amassed along the front lines, dealt a fast, punishing strike against Indian forces and then promptly retreated back to their original positions. The Chinese didn’t take any land, but the Indian forces realized they would be unable to withstand any future assaults. India retreated from the disputed territory, just as Mao intended.

Strategic knowledge is not the only benefit of having maintained a literate civilization for over two millennia. Historic durability has also ingrained contemporary China with a sense of pride in their culture and accomplishments. Like the United States, China believes in its own exceptionalism. But unlike Americans, who proclaim their nation’s Manifest Destiny, the Chinese look back on thousands of years of history and see themselves as the rightful heirs of the empires that have dominated Asia. China will not face any challenge today or in the future that it has not seen before. All the answers lie in the history of a civilization that has outlasted nearly every known historical entity. Mao’s twentieth century forces used different weapons and technologies in their wars, but employed a strategic calculus developed by their ancestors. We can expect the same of China’s present and future leaders.

China’s present day circumstances are not new. Its economy is stagnating because the foreign trade that fueled its rise is now tapering off, so it needs to boost domestic consumption and internal economic activity. The nation has been struggling to construct larger hydroelectric dams and import more coal, oil and natural gas to stave off energy shortages. The country is still reeling from a population explosion, and the one child policy has led to an overabundance of young male citizens. The country also faces a food deficit of drastic proportions, having one of the world’s highest ratios of citizen dependence on each acre of domestic farmland. It simply cannot produce enough food for its billion-plus population, and must import from abroad despite its massive irrigation projects and centrally planned agricultural system. The Communist party also has political incentives to boost domestic consumption. Its political roots lie among rural Chinese citizens, and it cannot ignore its original base of support. With over a billion people to feed, the government must take food security into its own hands.

China’s Plan for Taiwan

Chinese strategic thought has often been traced back to wei qi, a board game now known as Go. The game rewards strategies of encirclement. Each player places his or her stones on the board, and can remove an opponent’s stone by surrounding it in each direction. In more recent times, Chinese strategy has employed measures designed to build up a psychological advantage in global affairs. By acting unpredictably, China can draw objectively stronger nations into diplomatic activity on Chinese terms, and prevent hostile nations from executing clearly defined policies to counter Chinese moves. It has already achieved psychological superiority among its neighbors in the South China Sea. Only Indonesian and Japanese maritime forces have faced down Chinese expansionism, despite the United States’ public backing of the maritime claims of Vietnam, the Philippines and other nations in their disputes with China.

Given the position of new Chinese military outposts in the South China Sea, one can easily see that it aims to encircle Taiwan while keeping foreign powers focused elsewhere as it develops the capacity to blockade Taiwanese waters. The encirclement can be achieved by consolidating control of the Pratas Islands, located southwest of Taiwan, and the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands to the northeast. Although Beijing claims both of these territories, Taiwan presently controls the Pratas Islands and Japan has maintained its claims of the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands. Despite the importance of these archipelagos, most of the international focus has been on the South China Sea’s distant islands and shoals claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and other nations. The Philippines is Taiwan’s southern neighbor, and the only American ally proximate to Taiwan. By distracting the Philippine navy in the South China Sea and drawing American focus to islands that are hundreds of nautical miles from Taiwan, China can keep Filipino and US naval resources out of the reach of Taiwanese waters.

Additionally, there has been greater focus recently on North Korea, which is aggressively expanding its rocket, ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities. China will certainly attempt to capitalize on a moment when regional powers are distracted by North Korean military activities like their recent nuclear test. East Asian nations should expect a move against Taiwan to occur once China has solidified adequate control over its desired possessions in the East China Sea, when regional navies are concentrating their attention on the South China Sea, and in the immediate aftermath of a major event in North Korea. Taiwan, despite possessing a formidable military and alliance with the United States, will likely be forced to the negotiating table under the strain of a Chinese blockade. The United States and other nations that are friendly with Taiwan have few geo-strategic imperatives to defend its sovereignty. If successful, China will have achieved a milestone sought for generations.

The Long Term Target: Central Asia

Despite its recent naval buildup, the Chinese military’s strength still lies in the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. China has 1.6 million men on active duty but only a handful engaged in active missions. As the Chinese government grows more comfortable with its maritime claims, it will turn its attention to Central Asia, a region which may hold the solutions for many of the challenges facing the Communist party. The real subject of debate is how China will exercise its power in Central Asia. Beijing will have to decide whether to use its economic heft or military power as the cornerstone of its future hegemony.

Wars can be useful for a country. They invigorate economies by demanding domestic production of military hardware and supplies, and China has the factory infrastructure to support a military campaign. It also has a young male population, and as the Gulf Arab nations learned recently, a large population of unemployed young men is a recipe for political uprising. The Communist leadership is aware of this, and will not risk political legitimacy by letting young Chinese go unemployed. Although China is not at any sort of breaking point right now, its domestic pressures will continue to grow in the coming decades, and may determine whether or not China opts to engage Central Asia peacefully.

Central Asia is the most viable area for Chinese expansion simply because the region poses the least risk to Beijing while offering tangible rewards. Chinese strategists would not want to upset the Korean Peninsula, where Chinese soldiers fought South Korea and a UN coalition (made of almost entirely American military forces) in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. Although China can extract concessions out of foreign nations by tightening or loosening its grip on the North Korean regime, it has no long-term interest in changing the status quo there. Southeast Asia, which is home to large quantities of natural resources, could provide some of what China will need in the future. It would be possible for a conflict to sprout in Vietnam, for example, if today’s maritime scuffles turn into tomorrow’s conquests. But the cost of attempting to conquer densely populated Southeast Asian nations would almost certainly outweigh the benefits of imperialism. China has little to gain by crossing the Himalayas into India’s traditional sphere of influence or by advancing north to the Mongolian and Russian steppes.

Central Asia has been a Russian domain for most of the past two centuries, but that is changing. The American incursion into Afghanistan was accompanied by new Western interest in Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which housed NATO bases for many years. Additionally, the resource-rich republics of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have sought to diversify their clientele of natural gas and oil buyers. They have both formed economic relationships with European and East Asian nations, including China, which now purchases vast quantities of hydrocarbons once controlled by Moscow. China knows that it can secure future energy supplies by making more lucrative offers to Central Asian suppliers and by building pipeline infrastructure. In 2012, over half of China’s gas imports came from Turkmenistan alone, and its dependence on Central Asian energy is continuing to rise.

In addition to offering energy security options, Central Asia has the potential to satisfy China’s demand for food resources and electricity supplies. The Fergana Valley, jointly controlled by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, is one of the most agriculturally productive locations in the world. Uzbekistan controls the most productive fields, which it has traditionally leveraged to grow cotton for export. Kyrgyzstan controls the water supplies, and Tajikistan controls a mountain pass providing easy access to the valley. Central Asia’s two largest rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya, are two of the largest in the world and can be harnessed for even more hydroelectric power than they already produce.

With Russia increasingly focused on Eastern Europe and the Middle East, China will find future opportunities to develop influence in Central Asia. To access the Fergana Valley and the rivers powering its agricultural system, it will need to get through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, two of the most rugged and underdeveloped nations in the world. China will have no problem pumping aid money, infrastructure projects, and other strategic investments into both countries. Meanwhile, Russia will struggle to keep its own economy afloat and lose sight of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, since they have very little to offer Russia in terms of real economic or political benefit.

Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and Tajikistan is a prospective member. The Russian-designed EEU imposes high tariffs on trade with non-EEU members, hampering both states’ abilities to trade with China. This will become burdensome for Kyrgyzstan and unattractive for Tajikistan as China becomes a larger trading partner. China’s Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) program, initiated by current Chinese President Xi Jinping, will invest at least $40 billion into these and other countries to support infrastructure projects in Eurasia that will later underpin Chinese overland trade. The prospects of Chinese integration are so high that there is already speculation that Kyrgyzstan will leave the EEU relatively soon.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are both members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CSTO is a defensive pact similar to NATO, and also includes Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia. Recently Russia has refocused its security priorities in Europe and the Middle East, notably by annexing Crimea and engaging in limited wars in Ukraine and Syria. It is entirely possible that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, sensing Russia’s preoccupation with other regions, will seek a new security alignment with China. Beijing could use facilities in each nation as bases for security operations in northern Pakistan and Afghanistan. China committed $329 million worth of aid to Afghanistan in 2014, and is investing billions in Pakistan. Beijing will not allow the Taliban or other insurgent actors to undermine its economic activism, and this reality will drive China to seek closer security relationships with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well.

Once Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are within China’s orbit, Beijing will leverage its access to the Fergana Valley. Chinese demand for crops could encourage the Uzbek regime (currently undergoing an unprecedented power shift in the wake of President Islam Karimov’s death) to restructure its economy and better manage water resources. If China can establish a security presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Uzbeks would be dependent on Chinese controlled water resources. Uzbekistan may someday find itself paying tribute to Beijing with cash crops, not unlike how “barbarian” leaders once obliged dynastic Chinese emperors. Alternatively, the Uzbeks could find themselves facing a legitimate military threat from the PLA.

China has historically targeted long-term gains in its foreign policy, so long as its domestic politics have been stable enough to allow a continuum of its grand strategy. Unlike Western powers that tend to base foreign policy initiatives on values and principles that are revised with each election cycle, Chinese policies are rooted in well-defined goals and objectives with clear benefits for the country. Foreign policymakers need to acknowledge Chinese interests in Taiwan and Central Asia and plan for dealing with China’s power projections to ensure their own foreign policies are not derailed by Beijing’s future moves.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Ever since the nationalist government of China fled to the island of Taiwan in 1949, the Republic of China’s (Taiwan) relationship status with the People’s of Republic of China (China or PRC) has been clouded with ambiguity. The 1992 consensus, accepted by both China’s Communist Party (CPC) and Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT), stated that there is “one China” that encompasses China and Taiwan; however, disagreement persists as to which government maintains legitimate authority over the region and what exactly “one China” means. The last 60 years have witnessed increasing contention over diplomatic recognition and territorial claims by the governments of China and Taiwan.

While China’s CPC and Taiwan’s KMT insist that each has legitimate authority over both Taiwan and China, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the more liberally minded opposition party to the KMT, adamantly rejects the 1992 consensus and any notion of unification with China, viewing it as a disparate nation. Following Taiwanese President (and KMT leader) Ma Ying-jeou’s attempts to cultivate stronger economic ties with the China, in March 2014 hundreds of outraged college students stormed Taiwan’s parliament, occupying it for several weeks, with thousands more protesting in the streets. Eight months later, the DPP enjoyed widespread victories throughout Taiwanese localities.

This electoral victory is largely a reflection of general dissatisfaction with the failed leadership of President Ma, and only slightly tied to DPP’s anti-unification policies. Still, recent moves by the PRC to undermine Hong Kong’s political autonomy have galvanized Taiwanese political movements aimed at countering increased economic and political ties between Taiwan and China. Many Taiwanese are progressively wary of any moves towards reconciliation or economic integration with their estranged neighbor to the north. After all, the “one country, two systems” agreement that supposedly guaranteed Hong Kong’s political independence in exchange for unification was an idea first conceived by Taiwan. That Hong Kong’s political sovereignty has been so flagrantly disregarded by China’s politicians is not a positive signal to those Taiwanese leaning towards conditional unification in the future.

Because the DPP is seen as the strongest hardliner on independence, Taiwan’s anti-unification trend will only serve to strengthen DPP’s political influence in the coming years, as well as increase the odds of a DPP candidate ascending to the presidency in 2016. Such a shift in Taiwan’s leadership would aggravate the CPC, since a Taiwanese president from the DPP party would likely ratify legislation aimed at diminishing economic ties with China and further distance Taiwan from pressures to reunite.

Legislation of this variety is seen as unacceptable by the CPC and could inevitably lead to heightened aggression by China towards Taiwan. As was made abundantly clear in China’s 2005 Taiwanese Anti-Secession Law, a mere declaration of independence by Taiwan would result in aggressive military action by China.

In sum, China has shot itself in the foot. Its attempts at curtailing freedom in Hong Kong have not only been met by widespread protests, but also served to embolden formal independence movements in Taiwan. These increasing calls for independence in Taiwan will precipitate aggression by China, which will then trigger more calls for independence in Taiwan. And here begins the vicious cycle that will plague cross-strait relations for the foreseeable future.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Its nine streams touching the gateways of the city,

This river runs beyond heaven and earth,

Where the color of the mountains both is and is not.

The dwellings of men seem to float

On ripples of distant sky –

These beautiful days here in the city

Make drunken my old mountain heart!

–Wang Wei

It’s difficult to do justice to Hong Kong. It is one of the densest places in the world with seven million calling a city of 1100 square kilometers home (6550 people per square kilometer). This teeming island city is the quintessential urban jungle, a vast forest of concrete and neon lights, juxtaposed by expansive ocean and forested peaks. Visitors are taken aback by “the world’s most beautiful skyline” and delight in navigating the Constantinople of our times.

But one particular aspect of Hong Kong is especially fascinating. While Hong Kong, like any other city, is a place you could easily get lost in, it is also a city where you can easily lose a sense of space. As much as you move left and right, you are also moving rapidly up and down.

This is a phenomenon unique to Hong Kong. Urbanists seeking answers have described Hong Kong as lacking the traditional concept of ‘ground’. In the majority of cities around the world, one primarily moves laterally. If one goes up and down, it is usually in an isolated skyscraper or down to a subway station. Connectivity, and thereby movement of people, relies on channels situated on a planar ‘ground’, usually roads, pedestrian walkways and street-level public spaces.

In Hong Kong however, civic life thrives not just on the street level, but also in spaces suspended in the sky and in corridors three stories underground. Subway stations become extensive shopping centers, providing convenience stores for busy office workers scurrying home. Central, Hong Kong’s central business district, is punctuated by sky walkways, allowing citizens easy access between skyscrapers and the ability to cross highways and roads. In Soho, one finds moving sidewalks snaking up the side of Victoria Peak. The Hopewell Center, embracing the Peak, has two entryways and lobbies, one 17 floors above the other, allowing visitors convenient access to two different parts of the Wan Chai District.

Any walking trip from Point A to Point B in Hong Kong may require much vertical movement. More than any other urban center on Earth, Hong Kong is a three-dimensional city.

In creating this unique urban configuration, Hong Kong is mostly an ‘accidental pioneer’. A tiny colony on a rock that was trapped between a Communist giant and the Pacific, quick adaptation was the key to survival. All forces, natural and human, conspired to spell Hong Kong’s failure.

It is a city faced with a difficult situation of high population density on limited space. Numerous mountains and uneven hills rivet what little land the city has, which further constrains development potential. Typhoons are common in the summer, and poor infrastructure at the time meant frequent flooding and mudslides.

Compounding geographic difficulties, social chaos and highly strained resources characterized the post-Japanese Occupation era of Colonial Hong Kong. Refugees from World War II swelled with refugees fleeing a newly Communist China. A transformed China also stripped Hong Kong of its purpose. It had served as the West’s entrepôt to China much like Shanghai in colonial times. With a China then closed off to the capitalist West, Hong Kong once again became an unproductive rock in the ocean.

Despite all these difficulties, Hong Kong eventually developed into one of the successful newly industrialized countries called the Four Asian Tigers (the others being Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore), specializing in light industry. Economists in the West heralded the Four Asian Tigers as model economies, correctly pursuing export-oriented development by finding a niche in the global economy and then practicing free trade to quickly gain prosperity. When China re-opened in the late 20^th century, Hong Kong once again found its niche as an entrepôt to the Mainland, and Hong Kong boomed as the financial center of Asia. Hong Kong was and is still upheld as an example of a successful laissez-faire system, with high business competitiveness, low taxes, loose customs and a thriving financial sector.

Like the other Asian Tigers, however, the truth is more nuanced. While most trumpet the success of laissez-faire economics in shaping the city of Hong Kong, in truth, Hong Kong can thank a large part of its own prosperity on sound governmental decision-making.

On Christmas Night 1953, a fire broke out in the district of Shek Kip Mei, leveling a slum and leaving 58,000 people homeless. The government immediately set to work temporarily resettling the destitute while isolating the root of the problem. Poor sanitation and infrastructure, combined with the many refugees living in abject conditions as squatters, convinced the colonial government to pursue the development of public housing.

It was with subsidized public housing that Hong Kong’s prosperity and urban form took shape. Using government and resettlement programs, the Hong Kong Housing Authority was able to offer most of the poor population homes.

In turn, these residential blocks, conceived of as single-use, became vibrant communities. Ground level floors became areas to shop and set up markets. Roofs became ideal spots for cottage industry, schools and playgrounds. The economy of space, a sense among the people that given limited space and resources public and private life should be organized as efficiently as possible, became the very basis of Hong Kong urbanism.

Hand-in-hand with the economy of space came the question of connectivity. There was a need to link the old central districts of Central and Kowloon Peninsula with other expanding communities on the fringes of the city. Again, the government took many initiatives, constructing tunnels connecting Hong Kong Island to Kowloon and other highways that traverse difficult mountainous terrain.

Most importantly perhaps, the government set the groundwork for the Mass Transit Rail (MTR) system. A luxury at first, the MTR system has grown to become a staple system for the lives of Hong Kong’s citizens. Fast service and clean stations well connected with different landmarks in their respective districts are characteristic of the MTR, and given the difficulties of parking, most citizens came to rely on the MTR and buses. 90% of Hong Kong’s vehicular transportation is, in fact, public. Side benefits of such connectivity are public spaces becoming thriving pockets of social interaction.

Forests and oceans are never far from Pokfulam District. Buildings here adapt to the hills and mountains, using extensive elevator, escalator, walkways and promenade systems to create convenient paths while always keeping a sense of nature. August 2011. (Author’s own)

Despite these urban triumphs, Hong Kong has also managed to practice harmony with the environment. 40% of Hong Kong’s limited land is protected by the government as state parks. In 2010, Hong Kong emitted about 5.2 metric tons of CO₂ emissions per capita, significantly lower than the American average of 17.6 metric tons per capita. This is in no doubt attributable to Hong Kong’s reliance on public transportation and the preservation of green spaces.

Hong Kong has also developed many creative architectural solutions to accommodate the environment. One example is the Soho escalators aforementioned. Another well-known example is buildings with holes in the middle. Designed with Feng Shui principles in mind, the buildings also help solve the “wind wall” problem Hong Kong Island has experienced. Due to the high number of high-rises, natural wind was not reaching the mountain vegetation behind the skyscrapers, causing them to wither and the local ecosystem to suffer. While not a perfect solution, buildings constructed with the ‘Feng Shui hole’ help mitigate this since wind can pass freely through the center.

It is clear that in current times, as more people move to urban environments and resources become more limited, Hong Kong offers powerful ideas for the future of cities. Urbanists in America are just now starting to realize the harmful side effects of urban sprawl. Environmental degradation, wasteful use of space and inefficient public transportation are only some of the problems facing many American cities.

This does not mean that solutions that worked in Hong Kong can work in any other city in the world, but if there are two lessons the city of Hong Kong can teach to the world it is these:

1) Some of the best long-term innovative solutions to problems today can be achieved through careful interplay between socially-conscious governmental actions (a reactive, establishing force: the construction of public housing and of the MTR metro system) and bottom-up entrepreneurial behavior (a proactive, expanding force: the conversion of single-purpose housing to efficient and productive communities, the transformation of MTR stations from merely transportation centers to commercial ones and the formation of creative architectural designs in harmony with traditional Chinese culture and Hong Kong’s environment and topography).

2) There is value in the ideas of the economy of space, increased connectivity and harmony with the environment. Hong Kong’s urbanism is an experience that forces a rethinking of current urban modes. In Hong Kong, efficient public transportation led to not only some alleviation of traffic and environmental pressures, but also strong, healthy civic places full of life and social activity in central districts. Hong Kong’s solutions cannot apply everywhere because not every city is a dense rock in the ocean. However, these three ideas are important components in sustainable development, and can help reverse the decline of inner cities and downtowns across the United States.

For those interested in reading more on Hong Kong urbanism, I suggest a visual guidebook called Cities Without Ground, which shows three-dimensional maps of Hong Kong, and The Making of Hong Kong: From Vertical to Volumetric, which provides a succinct planning history of the city, including architectural illustrations.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.