Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Russian and Iranian partners continue to mercilessly strike and bombard Idlib province — forcing thousands of civilians to flee toward Europe and killing thousands of others. This disastrous conflict has destabilized northwestern Syria and the resulting refugee crisis has disastrous impacts for countries that take in these migrant flows — voluntary or otherwise.

Turkey, a NATO ally, has been drawn into the conflict and provoked by the disaster unfolding along its border. Late last year, Turkey led an incursion into Syria that was met with harsh international condemnation — including bipartisan criticism from Congress. In late February, at least 33 Turkish soldiers were killed by the Syrian government in an airstrike. Ankara was placed in a precarious position: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan felt domestic pressure to respond but had to consider the risk of escalated confrontation with Damascus, and by extension, Moscow and Tehran.

Ultimately, Erdogan decided to respond. As part of the offensive, known as Operation Spring Shield, Turkey has killed over 2,000 Syrian troops and has destroyed hundreds of Syrian weapons systems, including tanks and launchers. But escalating the conflict in Syria also had consequential humanitarian implications. Amid the fighting, an estimated 1 million people have been displaced, according to the United Nations.

The numbers of those who have been displaced are telling. However, the alarming and unnerving uncertainty comes from the numbers of those who have yet to be displaced, but soon will be. Nearly 3 million people, mainly women and children, live in Idlib province. According to Vox, nearly half of those living in Idlib came from other parts of Syria after fleeing the violence of the civil war.

Now, with Turkish fighters to the North and encroaching Syrian forces to the South, civilians are forced into a shrinking area along the northwest border. These civilians face freezing temperatures, sporadic airstrikes and are living in makeshift homes made from tents and tarps. In late February, the New York Times reported children freezing to death due to dropping temperatures and a lack of proper medical assistance. And yet, the world has turned a blind eye to these harrowing realities.

The ongoing crisis also extends beyond borders: in eight months, nearly 800,000 Syrians have fled to Turkey and Europe. This massive exodus is unparalleled in recent history. Syrian families have upended their lives and moved up to two, three, four, or even five times in the past few years, fleeing violence and finding refuge in every temporary city they settle. Idlib was once an accessible safe haven for these migrants — but now, there is nowhere left to go.

Erdogan is at a crossroads and faces intense domestic pressure to prevent increased inflows of Syrian refugees through Turkey, which already hosts nearly 4 million migrants. A few months ago, Ankara sealed the border and warned that those who tried to cross risked being shot. However, Erdogan recently altered this policy; in an attempt to pressure the European Union and NATO to provide Turkey with assistance, Syrian migrants are now allowed to cross through Turkey to freely enter the EU. Erdogan hopes that by ceasing control over the EU-Turkey border, the pressure of migrant inflows will force allies to act.

This plan is failing.

Despite flows of refugees into Greece and Bulgaria, EU and NATO allies, including the United States, have failed to take concrete action to alleviate one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent human history. While this move may have helped Erdogan’s negotiating strength, migrants are still faced with uncertainty, inhumane conditions and blockades in their attempt to seek refuge elsewhere. Refugees are being used as pawns in a violent game of chess between regional powers.

Erdogan has been rightly criticized for using refugees as tools for negotiating military assistance for Turkey — and should continue to be criticized. But all things considered, the EU and the U.S. need to act now. More than ever, there is an urgently compelling strategic and moral obligation to do so. The recent ceasefire between Erdogan and Assad is likely meaningless — and fails to change the dire situation of migrants on the ground.

But to chip away at American inaction, we must first acknowledge the blatant callousness of the American president. President Donald Trump recently said he sees Syria only as a place of “sand and death.” But it is in the U.S.’ best interest to provide better humanitarian assistance to Syria and to work with our EU counterparts in an effort to effectively manage migrant flows. The Trump administration has a moral imperative to ensure that Assad will not slaughter thousands of innocent civilians who are caught up in a conflict at the hands of greater forces. If Assad continues to rule in Syria unchecked, with the military and political backing of Moscow, the potential for destructive regional spillover into neighboring countries will have damning effects on geopolitical stability.

Trump’s decision to pull U.S. forces out of the Idlib region late last year is just an extension of failed American policies in Syria. The decision to abandon our Kurdish allies and greenlight Turkey’s incursion into Syria escalated the conflict. But the cat’s been long out of the bag. The White House might not be able to undo the effects of its poor decision, but it can offer temporary humanitarian solutions to the problem.

Erdogan has made irreversible mistakes, but the U.S. has a moral obligation to relieve the suffering of Syrian refugees, while ensuring security and stability in the conflict between Assad and Erdogan. The U.S. ought to do so by increasing humanitarian aid, not only through the U.N. — where it often goes toward regime-held areas as it did last month — but through grassroots NGOs. The U.S. also needs to use existing diplomatic channels to force Turkey and Europe to sit down together and create a new immigration arrangement — one that builds upon the now seemingly outdated 2016 EU-Turkey Migration deal.

At this moment, every major player in Syria has their fair share of blame in contributing to the catastrophe unravelling each day. But if the West continues to let innocent civilians pay the price for the greater conflict escalation that plagues the region, it becomes more striking that an American act of omission is just as morally reprehensible as an American act of commission.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

On April 6th, Donald Trump ordered an attack on Syrian regime assets, “retaliating” against its most recent use of nerve agents against his civilians. The attack came in the form of 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles strikes, which, according to the Pentagon, targeted “aircraft, hardened aircraft shelters, petroleum and logistical storage, ammunition supply bunkers, air defense systems, and radars.”

Though the US media has thus far generally restrained from calling this attack an “act of war”, referring to it simply as a “warning”, there can be no question what it actually was. Would the US government or, for that matter, its media, not consider itself under attack and embroiled in war if its own government property was targeted by 59 airstrikes? Of course it would. Sovereign governments have an (understandable) tendency to consider unwanted military strikes on their soil, against their assets, as acts of war, regardless of what heinous acts they might previously have committed.

Still, war comes in all shapes and sizes, and it remains unclear what type of war Trump just initiated. The question remains whether the Tomahawk strikes were meant as “merely” a deterrent to Assad and his regime against the future use of chemical weapons, or if it suggests the beginning of another round of US-led regime change in the Middle East.

As his actions this past week have demonstrated, Trump’s impulsiveness and inconsistency makes this virtually impossible to tell. Tellingly, 2013 Trump’s tweet “What will we get for bombing Syria besides more debt and a possible long term conflict? Obama needs congressional approval,” may as well be directed at 2017 Trump.

This evidently isn’t the first time a President’s actions in office have departed from his campaign rhetoric.  Yet what is uniquely troubling about Trump is that his actions in office also have markedly departed from his earlier rhetoric while in office. Indeed, it was only a mere couple days before the airstrikes that Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary, suggested that there was a “political reality” of Assad in power that the US had accepted.

It has thus become increasingly clear that Trump’s foreign-policy doctrine is that he has none.  In some cases, his unpredictability may benefit US interests; here, however, it only serves to raise the stakes of conflict, intentional or not, with all the moving parts in Syria, and, most notably, Russia and ISIS.

Russia

The most pressing concern is how these strikes affect what had appeared to be thawing US-Russia relations. Of all the outside actors, including the US, Russia has by far the most at stake in Syria. Putin made the fateful decision several years ago that he would use the Syrian conflict as his means of returning Russia to the global, and specifically Middle Eastern, decision-making stage. If Trump and his administration thought that this missile strike would deter Russia from continuing their support for Assad, the Kremlin’s response over the last couple of days should have made it abundantly clear that this is most definitely not the case, and that, in fact, the strike may have unwittingly ratcheted up Russia’s presence in Syria.

Already, Moscow has indicated that it will increase military support for the Syrian regime, as evidenced by its moving “its most advanced ship in the Kremlin’s Black Sea fleet to tartus, the Russian navy’s port in Syria, ” positioning it near the “two American ships that carried out Thursday’s strikes.” Furthermore, Russia has announced its new commitment to strengthen and improve “the effectiveness of the Syrian air defense system.” And, perhaps most strikingly, the US government has confirmed that the Russian military suspended a communications hotline meant to mitigate for the risk of US and Russian air force collisions over Syria’s crowded airspace.

Thus, when Russia warns the US that they also have their “red lines” in Syria, mimicking Trump’s language, and that they will “respond” with force if these lines are crossed, or when Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev claims that the US and Russia are now “on the verge of a military clash,” this should not be interpreted as hollow rhetoric. While it remains highly unlikely that Russia will react military against the US for the strikes, tension between the two nuclear powers has undeniably increased, and with it, the potential for a damaging miscommunication.

Whatever one’s thoughts on the strike and its merits, it should be abundantly clear that it has not helped Russian-US relations. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is scheduled to travel to Moscow later this week, and, suffice to say, the tone and topic of the conversation has now changed dramatically. Any talk of cooperation against ISIS and radical terrorism, or non-proliferation, has officially taken a backseat to US aggression in Syria and Assad’s role going forward. One can only hope the events hasn’t derailed the possibility of immediate cooperation on global issues.

ISIS

Though many have claimed that removing Assad is a key element in defeating ISIS, or at least in diluting its potency, in the short-term fighting on two fronts (Syrian regime and ISIS) is clearly less efficient than focusing solely on the terrorist organization. In fact, this is something that Trump himself seemed to realize during the campaign trail, frequently engaging the audience by asking “Wouldn’t it be nice if we got together with Russia and knocked the hell out of ISIS?”

Though the US and the Syrian/Russian/Iranian coalition have not seen eye to eye on the fight against terrorism in Syria (and that’s probably an understatement), the Syrian regime and its allies have still allowed the US to bomb terrorist havens and fly over Syrian territory with practical impunity. Whether this implicit understanding still remains in force is now seriously in question.

Syria could either purposefully retaliate against the US by activating their air-defense system against US aircraft or, just as likely, misinterpret US aircraft as threatening the regime and react accordingly.

Either way, the fight against ISIS has gotten significantly more complicated.

What Next

More importantly than Russian and ISIS’ actions, or Iran’s and Syria’s for that matter, is what the US does next; most pressingly, whether this the strikes were only in response to the chemical weapon attack that left 86 Syrian civilians dead, or if it indeed it signals a stunning reversal of Trump’s foreign policy.

If it is the former, then, while it is still an act of war, still complicates relations with Russia and other actors, and is still of dubious legality (how flexible is the Authorization to Use Military Force against al Qaeda exactly?) one can at least breathe more easily knowing we aren’t yet engaging in a broader offensive against the regime.

If it is the latter, however, which recent history (think Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya) suggests it might be or could inexorably lead to, then many more question arise. For one, what exactly is the eventual strategy for replacement? Before endorsing any sort of attack on a foreign country, one should wonder what the political strategy for ending the war — which extends far beyond chemical weapon use — truly is. As bad as Assad is, and he is a murderous dictator, there is no proof yet that the increasingly factionalized and radicalized rebels will be any better. Groups like ISIS have so far shown an ability to thrive when left in a power vacuum.

In the same vein, is the question of how exactly a full-fledged intervention in Syria would differ from the failed nation-building experiments in the Middle East that we have seen in recent years?

The Trump administration must answer these questions, and deal with the complicated reality of having targeted Assad’s regime, and having upset the Kremlin and perhaps handicapped the fight against ISIS in the act, before any full objective judgement on the strikes can be made. But with Trump’s penchant for impulsive and gut-based foreign policy, I’m not holding my breath.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

As Europe’s migrant crisis has escalated, many have become familiar with the plight of the Syrian and North African refugees flooding the continent. Given the attention of the international press, it is easy to think migrants to Europe comprise the world’s main refugee population. However, another major group of refugees has been hiding in plain sight for decades, housed in a country already mired in controversy. And as conditions for these refugees deteriorate, they are having to reckon with a crisis of their own: returning home.

The UN commission on Human Rights estimates that over two and a half million Afghan citizens currently reside as refugees in Pakistan, making it one of the largest refugee havens in the world, second only to Turkey. And unlike Syrian migrants who are dispersed throughout the Middle East and Europe, all of these refugees are housed in one country. The movement was catalyzed by the political unrest of 1977-1980 brought on by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, when over a million people decided to escape to Pakistan. Many of these refugees were ethnic Pashtun’s fleeing oppression after the coup of 1978 and subsequent war. Others settled in Pakistan to escape the violence of the Taliban in the early 1990’s.

Originally the government valued the new arrivals because they earned Pakistan moral and political capital over a closed-border West. The country handled the logistics of the refugee glut well. By the late 2000’s, most refugees had been assimilated in large urban areas, enjoying a sense of stability and security impossible in Afghanistan. And after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, some 1.5 million Afghani’s decided to return home.  The current numbers of the refugee crisis look something like this: 3 million total Afghani refugees in Pakistan, of which approximately 2.2 million are accounted for within the official Proof of Registration (PoR) process. The PoR program, started in 2006, mandates every migrant obtain a PoR card marking them as an “Afghan citizen temporarily living in Pakistan.” These cards were to be renewed every three years until the Pakistani government felt that the refugees were able to return home safely. The Pakistani government recently extended the rights of PoR holders so they would be able to stay as temporary residents in Pakistan up until the end of 2016. This means that starting in 2017, all of these refugees will become technically illegal.  

Unlike refugee crises in Europe or East Africa, the Afghani refugee population is not living in large, temporary camps. They are not “sexy” refugees; having been displaced for so long, most are assimilated into the fabric of Pakistani society. But this is where the danger lies, as complacency over the welfare of these refugees has led to international ignorance of recent flares of violence. Pre-2015, the situation was relatively stable; however, a mass shooting orchestrated by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) —an anti-government organization separate from the Afghan Taliban—on the Army Public school in Peshawar in December 2014, killing 145 people, completely destabilized the refugees’ situation. Many Pakistani’s blamed the Afghan refugees for this tragedy, even though there was no evidence that the Afghani Taliban was involved in the attacks. The shooting has been called, “Pakistani 9/11.”

In the first six weeks afterward, police abuse and intimidation of the Afghan population increased significantly. Pakistani police forces unlawfully arrested Afghan citizens, seized property and physically assaulted refugees. With the uncertainty of PoR status for Afghans, state police felt as if they had a free license to harass and coerce them. The intent was to intimidate migrants and make them feel so unsafe that they would decide to go back to Afghanistan on their own. On September 30, 2015, Pakistani security forces raided an Afghani market in Peshawar and destroyed a majority of the shops. They demanded bribes from the shop owners so they could avoid arrest for selling produce on what was claimed to be government property. The PoR cards meant to legitimize refugees hold little water in Pakistani law, and migrants still don’t have many official rights in Pakistan. Though the Pakistani Ministry of States and Frontier Regions claims its committed to protecting the rights of refugees, they have been hampered by regional and district governments out for blood.

The scare tactics worked. In January of 2015 more than nine times as many refugees went back to Afghanistan as in December of 2014. Most of these “spontaneous returns” were not officially deported, but were instead families fleeing out of concern for their safety.  This “self-deportation” has led to a situation where Pashtuns are now refugees within their own homeland. Many fled the stable jobs and families they had in Pakistan to return to a country with few prospects or support systems. Though they have returned “home”, refugees are actually worse off than they were in their adopted country.

The problem in Pakistan is that of a latent disease. Refugee crises elsewhere in the world move with such speed and scale that it is easy to forget about other, more drawn out crises like this one. The dramatic fixation by western news sources on refugees bound for European countries makes it even easier for policymakers to ignore those refugees stuck in the Global South. There are no pictures of Afghani children on the 24/7 news cycle. But it is imperative to recognize their plight. If actions aren’t taken to reduce police brutality towards Afghans in Pakistan, the world may be facing a refugee crisis on par with the human rights disaster unfolding in Europe now. And, ironically, one set in the country refugees were running from in the first place.

The views expressed by this author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

[1] Many of the refugees decided to partake in this system in order to gain legitimacy as official refugees, but others did not, fearing that the PoR process was a scheme designed to deport them back to Afghanistan.

The EU deadlock on refugee policy is not so much an immigration crisis as it is one of European solidarity. Plans of redistribution quotas between member states have failed repeatedly. Of the 160,000 refugees to be distributed as a result of a hard-won agreement in September 2015, just 481 refugees have been resettled. What seemed like initial stubbornness has developed into a hardened front of isolationism and self-interest in the majority of EU member states; the final version of the Turkey-EU refugee deal enforced on March 20 reveals just how far its members are willing to go in sacrificing EU standards and values—so long as they can avoid responsibility.

The deal promises a total of 6 billion euros in aid to Turkey until 2018. In exchange, Turkey promises to secure its borders and improve living conditions (including education and health services) for the 2.7 million Syrians already residing in the country. What the deal adds to previous negotiations is the direct exchange of “irregular” refugees for “regular” refugees between Turkish and Greek territories. (“Irregular” migrants are those who enter EU territory “illegally” — without an entry visa — while “regular” migrants enter legally through a visa system that the EU is launching for an extremely limited number of refugees.)

Each “irregular” migrant that enters Greece will be deported back to Turkey, and in exchange, the EU will resettle a Syrian refugee from Turkey legally into Schengen up to a predetermined limit. This regulation applies exclusively to “irregular” refugees arriving from Turkey onto Greek territory, and Greece is responsible for registering, processing and assessing the claims of the refugees prior to deportation. A migrant is only safe from deportation if they can prove that they face danger from prosecution within Turkey itself.

Turkey is expected to uphold its end of the deal by receiving and registering the deported refugees from Greece, who will then be placed at “the end of the line” in standard visa applications to the EU. In return for Turkey’s agreement to be a destination of deportation, the EU will open two chapters of negotiations for accession into the EU with Turkey, one of them being the visa-free entry of the Schengen area for Turkish nationals.

The problems of this deal are three-fold. Firstly, the new arrangement of “exchanging refugees” allows for severe humanitarian problems on the Greek islands and is unlikely to curb the trafficking network until the legal immigration mechanism is realistically enforced. Secondly, it poses severe legal problems by violating conventions to protect refugees through detention and forced return to the Turkish mainland, creating what the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is referring to as “mass deportations”. Lastly, in brokering this deal the EU knowingly contributes to the legitimization of a new and dangerous status quo in Turkey.

Humanitarian Problems

Greece is simply not prepared to implement what has been decided on paper: while up until March 20 the partial suspension of the Dublin accords allowed refugees to move to other countries and register there, Greece is now obliged to organize the registration, processing and the return of every single “irregular” migrant to Turkey. The Greek government and international agencies are already struggling to provide for the basic needs of those arriving and simply does not have the resources to implement the demands of the pact, which require it to set up tribunals with appeal procedures and mechanisms for deportation.

As part of the Turkey-EU agreement, newly arriving refugees are now being separated and involuntarily detained from those who arrived before the deal’s closure. This has led to backlash from the UNHCR and aid agencies such as Doctors Without Borders, who have begun to cease their services in protest. Those who arrive after an arduous journey by boat are now awaited by a hastened trial, which lays the burden of proof on the refugee; unless they can prove that they are not safe in Turkey, the verdict guarantees forced return.

As long as these changes remain unknown to the majority of refugees in Turkey and beyond, the deal is unlikely to deter traffickers who capitalize on the asymmetry of information.[1] In an official statement, the UNHCR explains that “uncertainty is making the new arrivals nervous. Many still hope that the border will open. Many have run out of money. There is also an urgent need for information.” Since the deal is explicitly restricted to transfer between Turkish and Greek territories, it still allows plenty of leeway for traffickers to exploit other routes, for example via Libya, Morocco and Bulgaria. If the “new option” of legal immigration directly from Turkey is to diminish the traffickers’ network in any way, the main sources of information for refugees need to be more accessible and targeted, and the quotas for “regular” migrants dramatically increased.

Unquestionably, the EU needs to put an end to the dangerous trafficking practices by sea. But this cannot happen at the cost of creating mass detention centers with dire humanitarian standards, and most importantly, it will not happen by allowing only a mere 72,000[2] refugees to enter the EU legally. European Member States cannot evade the inevitable solution of inner-EU distribution.

Legal Problems

While providing for individual case assessments and immediate appeal mechanisms is a good thing, a policy that leaves the burden of proof on refugees within a constrained time window is only a marginal improvement to the original plan of mass deportations, which are clearly prohibited by the European Convention on Human Rights.

The EU-Turkey deal relies on the principle that a refugee can “legally” be deported or returned to a third “transit country” on the grounds that they had or will have adequate protection there. This reasoning is only sound if Turkey is considered a safe third country, meaning a refugee is able to claim refugee status and is protected by the Geneva Convention. But Turkey only partly ratified Geneva by restricting it to Europeans, and currently only grants partial refugee status to Syrians. Its fulfillment of the “safe country” requirements is thus more than questionable: recent Human Rights Watch reports name instances of refusals of entry to Syrians fleeing from Aleppo in the midst of the Russian-backed offensive. Those who reach Greece report either detainment in dire conditions or lack of basic sustenance; only 10% of 2.5 million live in refugee camps. Additionally, even after the issuance of work permits for Syrian refugees, those who do find work are severely underpaid and disillusioned. Promises on the side of the EU that Turkey will fulfill adequate standards of refugee protection by the time deportations begin are clear signs of desperate and deliberate self-deception.

Political Problems

In spite of critics claiming the Turkish government should not be the recipient of aid in the realm of 6 billion euros, it is not the monetary side of the deal that is problematic. In fact, the EU’s promise of addressing the conditions in transit countries is long overdue considering that Turkey currently hosts the largest refugee population and has played a significant relief role, spending close to 8 billion euros from its own pockets.[3]

However, extending this safe country quality stamp to Turkey is now followed by resumed negotiations for accession into the EU: an all-too predictable bargaining chip. Having applied for EU membership first in 1987, the revival of the lengthy accession process comes at a time when Turkey has hit a new low concerning political human rights, freedom of expression and juridical independence—developments that clearly do not align with the standards demanded of an aspiring EU member.

Not only has Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared war on the left-wing Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), but he is also clamping down on Turkey’s southeastern, predominantly Kurdish regions; REUTERS and the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey have called attention to the mobilization of troops and bans on media in the area. Simultaneously, some of the country’s most renowned journalists are being tried for disclosure of state secrets in the larger context of a severely deteriorating freedom of journalistic expression over the past year. Erdogan’s strategy of power consolidation has even led his government to attack German journalists’ conduct and inflamed public debate abroad.

Consequently, the EU is well aware that it has placed its humanitarian responsibility in the hands of a government that is testing its power domestically and is not afraid to make use of its newly won leverage against the Union. It has struck a deal that is unquestionably condemnable and that will be unable to confront the same problems it faced originally: pressure from other channels of immigration and an unwillingness to distribute the limited number of refugees who can now arrive legally.

[1] Refers to the economic concept of an imbalance of information between buyer and seller; in this case it refers to the exploitation of a refugee’s lack of knowledge about regulations and migration routes.

[2] The number of 72,000 is already the envisioned maximum. Short-term limits are set at 18,000, which are then to be expanded by a further 54,000 if necessary. Looking back at the failed redistribution of refugees already residing within the EU, it is questionable whether the intended distribution scheme for these legal immigrants will be more successful. To compare: 2.5 million refugees are currently residing in Turkey, 700,000 migrants have been registered in Germany since the beginning of 2015 and the original EU redistribution plan envisioned 120,000 refugees to be allocated amongst Member States.

[3] While Germany will have spent 50 billion euros by 2017, the majority of EU Member states will each have spent less than 1 billion euros.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The Syrian Civil War has been going on for several years now and has become more complex and protracted than ever. Although the international community has been reluctant to take action in the conflict, the ongoing refugee situation in Europe and numerous terrorist attacks by ISIS have brought the issue of the Syrian Civil War back on the agendas of global leaders. The international community is at a pivotal moment in which resources can be jointly mobilized to solve both these pressing conflicts. As ISIS and the Syrian Civil War are ultimately interwoven, they must be approached comprehensively.

I seized the opportunity of my semester abroad at the George Washington University in Washington, DC to interview Faress Jouejati, a highly involved young academic and professional. Mr. Jouejati is an American-Syrian Adjunct Professor of International Political Economy at the George Washington University. He has established and worked with a network of citizen journalists and organizations to disseminate information about the Syrian revolution and to coordinate humanitarian efforts for the Syrian people.

Background

GLIMPSE: What do you consider the root causes of the Syrian Civil War?

JOUEJATI: A fairly large, and unprecedented, demonstration was held in central Damascus on February 17, 2011, after police beat a shopkeeper in the famous al-Hamidiya market. Although an isolated event, this was the start of the Syrian revolution. Then on March 6, more than 15 children were arrested for spraying anti-government graffiti on school walls. During their internment, the citizens of Daraa held unprecedented protests against the regime. These kids were returned to their families days later, bruised and tortured, which led massive protests in Daraa and across the country. While those are the root causes of the Syrian revolution, it is important to look at the political consequences of Bashar al Assad’s neoliberal economic policies (state-business actors, free trade agreements, outsourcing the provision of shelter to private development companies), as well as the handling of the 2009 drought.

From when Bashar took office in 2000 until 2010, state-business actors, such as Rami Makhlouf, were obtaining ever-increasing rents from the country – partly because Bashar was unable to muster enough force to prevent this scale of corruption. The gap between rich and poor increased significantly in those years. This, combined with the torture of the Daraa school children and Arab Spring protests across the region, created the ripe situation in which Syrians began to protest against the regime.

GLIMPSE: What are the main obstacles to resolving the conflict?

JOUEJATI: There are a number of reasons as to why the Syrian conflict is so difficult to solve. On the international level, there are a lot of competing interests (US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, France, Turkey, Egypt, etc.). Because of these competing interests, the international community has been unable – or unwilling – to devise a comprehensive strategy to restoring peace in the country in a way that serves the interests of each of these states. On the domestic level, we are dealing with a half-century-old dictatorship. If you look at the regime’s military strategies and rhetoric, it is quite clear they are not interested in a political solution. Rather, the regime has relied on the “security solution” to defeat all opposition—moderate or otherwise. Their stance is reinforced by what Shabiha gangs have frequently scribbled on the walls of buildings across the country: “al assad ow mna7req al balaad” (the Assad regime or we will torch the country).

On the Syrian Opposition

GLIMPSE: What kind of vision do the representatives of Assad’s opposition (National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces) have for post-war Syria?

JOUEJATI: The Syrian opposition represents all segments of Syrian society and has representation on the ground in Syria. They envision a democratic Syria where all people are equal under the rule of law regardless of race, religion, ethnicity and gender.

GLIMPSE: How representative of the Syrian people is the opposition force?

JOUEJATI: The opposition is very representative of the Syrian people and is composed of all segments of Syrian society including Sunni, Shiite, Alawite, Christian, Kurds, Druze and Assyrians.

GLIMPSE: How unified is it?

JOUEJATI: This is a difficult question to answer. In short, with each passing day and in the absence of any kind of meaningful intervention, the opposition – both armed and unarmed, inside and outside the country – becomes more and more fragmented, and this obviously has big implications for [the]uprising. For example, one of the main purposes of the expatriate opposition is to represent popular resistance on the ground in Syria, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and to lobby on their behalf. Since the expatriate opposition has been unable to win any meaningful support from the international community (in the form of weapons or money to the FSA), the FSA and other popular resistance groups have increasingly separated themselves from the expatriate opposition.

As a result of failing to obtain weapons for the FSA, FSA members find themselves in a huge dilemma: either stay true to the goals of the revolution by remaining in the FSA (which is the most popular resistance group among Syrians) or alternatively, switch allegiance to better-funded, better-armed militias, which tend to be more Islamist. From the perspective of FSA, you either stay in this isolated but popular army, which will likely result in your death, or you join other groups that have better weapons and more money. So, in the absence of any meaningful support, the opposition becomes increasingly divided.

The international community could reverse this situation with ease, though. Arming the FSA would not only cause defections from the Syrian army, but it would decrease the incentive for Syrians to join other extremist militias, and it would give incentive for the FSA to reiterate its allegiance to the expatriate opposition—the only party which represents all segments of the Syrian society.

GLIMPSE: How do the Assad regime and other international actors strengthen or weaken the opposition?

JOUEJATI: Beyond the supply of canned food, blankets, walkie-talkies and some light weaponry, the international community has not given much support to the opposition. This is partly because one of President Barack Obama’s conditions to arming the FSA is that they fight ISIS, and ISIS only. Most Syria experts agree that this condition is unrealistic because it is the Assad regime that is responsible for the overwhelming majority of murder in the country. As a result, some of the most armed resistance groups have rejected US assistance. On the other hand, the regime has deliberately targeted the leadership of all opposition forces – armed and unarmed – in an effort to leave the opposition leaderless. By targeting teachers, merchants, doctors, engineers, lawyers and popular commanders, the regime hopes to further fragment and divide the opposition. If the regime succeeds at doing so, the world would see the Syrian conflict in terms of only two options, Bashar al Assad on the one hand and ISIS on the other.

On The International Community

GLIMPSE: In your opinion, should and will the war be resolved domestically or internationally?

JOUEJATI: Despite unequal capacities due to Assad’s weapons support from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, and the supremacy of the government in terms of money and fighters, the conflict is currently in a stalemate. Of course, it is preferable for the war to be resolved domestically. But again, the regime has taken the ‘security solution’ to solving this conflict—resorting to force to quell protests rather than engaging in negotiations to address the protesters’ needs. So, the international community must balance the playing field in order for this war to be resolved. Only when the opposition is closer to being a strong opponent, the regime will be forced into a position to negotiate in good faith. The reason why all previous negotiations failed (in Moscow, DC, Montreux, Geneva, Luasanne, etc.) is precisely because the playing field is not leveled.

GLIMPSE: What role do you think the “international community” should play in efforts to resolve the war?

JOUEJATI: The international community should balance the playing field in Syria by arming the Free Syrian Army, which would force the Assad regime into serious negotiations. Let us not forget that there already is foreign intervention in Syria: Russia, Iran and Hezbollah have all been arming and financing the regime for years. In addition to arming the FSA, the international community must establish safe-zones and no fly zones across the country, and put additional pressure on Russia and Iran for them to abandon the demand that Assad remains in power.

GLIMPSE: What is Russia’s strategic interest in Syria and the Assad regime? Was Russia’s intervention in Syria counterproductive?

JOUEJATI: Since Russia invaded Syria several weeks ago, its military has bombed more than six hospitals and killed more than 400 civilians (97 of whom were children). By targeting civilians and rebels in the West, Russia allowed ISIS to advance onto Aleppo. Russia is largely refusing to attack ISIS, focusing its airstrikes on Assad’s opposition instead. Russia has three main goals in Syria. Firstly, preserving its seaport in Tartous, which is the Russian Navy’s only Mediterranean port. Secondly, keeping a friendly ally in the seat of Damascus who is willing to continue purchasing Russian weapons that will not be used against Israel. Thirdly, countering US influence in Syria and the region.

GLIMPSE: What is the interest and role of Iran in Syria and the region?

JOUEJATI: Even before the revolution started, Iran dominated Syria as well as the regime of Bashar al Assad. Iran is currently commanding military operations in Syria, managing underground torture chambers, manning checkpoints across the country and has extended billions of dollars in credit lines to the regime in order to pay the salaries of soldiers and other costs. Again, it is Iran, not Assad or the Syrian army, which is commanding military operations in the country.

Iran also has deep interests in Syria. Syria provides a link between Iran and its proxy militia in Lebanon, Hezbollah. Also, Syria is arguably Iran’s most important Arab ally. Finally, without Syria, Iranian influence would be limited to Iraq. Because Syria is part of Iran’s axis, Tehran’s influence extends from the Gulf to the Levant. So Syria is the important link that connects Iraq to Lebanon. Many Iranian policymakers and generals view Syria as one of Iran’s provinces. Iran also believes that by dominating Syria, they are able to contain the influence of Saudi Arabia, which is Iran’s biggest rival.

On Terrorism and the Backlash on Refugees

GLIMPSE: How do you expect the recent attacks in Paris, Beirut and other places carried out by ISIS to affect the situation of refugees in Europe and the European Union’s asylum policies?

JOUEJATI: We have seen the voices of the xenophobic right in Europe get louder and louder as a result of the Paris terrorist attacks. ISIS’ goal in these attacks was to cause an Islamophobic backlash. ISIS is trying to frame a ‘clash of civilizations’ between the West and Islam. So, by strengthening the xenophobic right in Europe, ISIS strengthens its own worldview as well, that there is in fact a clash between the West and Islam. The saddest part is that Islamophobic backlash is being directed at Syrian refugees who are likely to have been victims of and fleeing from ISIS in the first place. I expect the European Union to tighten security at its borders and limit the number of refugees who are granted asylum, playing directly into ISIS’ strategy.

The Take Away

The Syrian Civil War and the terrorist threat by ISIS are intimately connected and must be approached together. The strength of and support for the Syrian government and America’s focus on combatting ISIS rather than the Assad regime (the opposition’s much bigger threat) undermine a successful solution. Without international support of Syrian opposition, the strength and attraction of ISIS and the legitimacy of the Assad regime as the sole, viable alternative will only continue to grow. The most promising options to end the conflict are safe-zones and no fly zones across the country to secure populations, military support to the FSA and increased diplomatic pressure on Russia and Iran.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Russian President Vladimir Putin once remarked, “Sometimes it is necessary to be lonely in order to prove that you are right.” Putin has not shied away from unilateral action and is proving to be a calculating realist leader who is readily attempting to increase Russia’s power. The most notable example was his successful annexation of Crimea and destabilization of an anti-Russian, pro-West Ukrainian government to the benefit of his domestic popularity and Russian strategic posture. Russia did lose global popularity, but the incident confirms Putin’s preference for realist considerations of relative power over neo-liberal concerns of interconnectedness and positive foreign relations, which he unabashedly sacrifices. He is at it again by intervening in Syria, currently in its fourth year of a bloody civil war.

After Russia’s parliament unanimously approved of further military action in Syria, Moscow has dramatically increased its military presence in the Mediterranean base of Tartus, which they lease from Syria, and began airstrikes against ISIS as well as US-friendly rebel groups. Russia is laying the groundwork for a major Russian intervention despite the vehement opposition of the US and Europe. Their strategic move in the area maintains Moscow’s regional relevance and tilts the Middle East back in their favor geopolitically. Putin recognizes that winning the Syrian Civil War means winning the region.

Firstly, in order to establish Russia’s interest in the region, we need to look at the historic and long valued Russian-Syrian strategic relationship going back to the 1950s. Syria was ruled by a socialist (and nationalist) Ba’ath party that required assistance in governing a state in a volatile region. The Soviet Union was more than willing to step in, and the strategic relationship has been a match made in heaven since then, eventually including cultural exchanges and international marriages. When it comes to direct national security interests, Russia’s only base in the Mediterranean is in Syria, making it the lynchpin of Russia’s regional military and economic power projection, and of achieving Putin’s ambitions to increase Russia’s global clout. Additionally, amidst the political instability and many powerful non-state actors in the Middle East, the Assad regime provides critical regional intelligence to Moscow. This partnership has historically been the counterweight to the US and Israeli Mossad’s relationship.

Secondly, Russia’s involvement in the region is an extension of their national security interests; namely, ISIS and similar extremist organizations (e.g. Al-Nusra Front) are seen as a major threat to Russian stability. More than 2000 Russians have joined ISIS thus far and on October 31, a Russian airliner flying from the Sinai Peninsula was brought down by an ISIS bomb. Unlike the US, which is insulated by distance and two oceans, Russia’s southern border is relatively close to the region and the risk of an ISIS attack on their territory is higher. ISIS has exemplified their ability to launch terrorist attacks in the recent Paris attacks, there are videos threatening more impending attacks in Russia and there is a homegrown Islamic separatist movement in Chechnya, where many terrorist plots trace their roots. With these strategic interests in mind, Russia has wielded its veto power in the United Nations Security Council to prevent any UN-sponsored intervention or condemnation of the Assad regime—a crucial ally and partner in the fight against Islamic extremism. They have also continued their decades-long practice of supplying weapons to Damascus in order to equip Assad’s Army to effectively fight extremists and rebels, despite criticism that the arms are also being used to commit human rights violations. Now with the situation on the ground becoming more perilous and tense, direct military involvement is a natural escalation of Russia’s involvement in the region.

In addition to simply maintaining historical interests and security, Putin likely sees intervention in Syria as an open door to extend Russia’s reach and influence. There is a hegemonic vacuum in Syria: no major power is doing anything particularly meaningful to change the situation on the ground. The US is engaging in airstrikes, dropping ammunition relatively haphazardly (amid reports of not properly vetting the recipient organizations) and training rebels with very limited results. On the other hand, Russia’s air strikes, missile launches and artillery barrages are coordinated with a ground offensive composed of the actions of the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF), Hezbollah and Iran, which has reportedly led to initial success. There is no doubt that ISIS and the various rebel groups are powerful, but it is hard to imagine them winning a direct confrontation against a Russian-backed, three-pronged attack by the SAF, Hamas and Iran. What makes Russian operations easier is that they have a clear strategic goal: defend Assad and defeat both rebel groups and the Islamic State. On the other hand, the United States is in the strategic quandary of balancing opposition to Assad and opposition to ISIS. Since defeating one necessarily strengthens the position of the other, a substantial US intervention is unlikely.

Given the lack of meaningful opposition to Russian-backed forces in Syria (excluding rebel groups and ISIS), it is critical to consider the scenario of a pro-Assad victory and what it means for the region. Islamic State administers the area east of Damascus all the way to central Iraq as an internationally unrecognized country.

This gives the Russian-backed forces the ability to operate freely in the northern Middle East without the headaches of breaking international law regarding the infringement of state sovereignty. To add, Russia has token legitimacy—they even have the approval of the Iraqi government to intervene in what used to be their northern territories. A victorious Assad and Hamas backed by Russia would only have Kurdish and Iraqi forces as competitors in the area. While the Kurds are formidable, they do not have a recognized state, no regional allies and only the distant US to provide them with inconsistent aid. The Iraqi military has proven impotent and their government, headed by Prime Minister al-Abadi, has drifted away from US influence and is increasingly prone to co-option by Iran.

An Assad victory and the defeat of ISIS in conjunction with stronger Iranian influence in Baghdad would mean a potential Shia corridor in the central Middle East region. Russia would benefit at the very least by seeing the region swing further away from the US, which historically sides with Sunnis. Given a more generous victory, the Russian Federation has the potential and the ability to extensively shape the region in any post-war settlement through proxies – similar to their influence in central Asia and Eastern European states like Belarus – and in turn benefit from the northern corridor of Middle Eastern oil. Russian conglomerates like Gazprom and Lukoil already have operations in Iraq and Iran. With their alliance with Iran and Syria, along with a teetering and vulnerable Iraq, Russia can create a strong connected bloc of friendly nations. This is assuming, of course, that they win the Syrian Civil war and that the United States continues to maintain a relatively aloof strategic posture.

Russian involvement in the Syrian war marks the first overt Russian military campaign outside of the former USSR in 36 years. It is not a haphazard move, but rather a bold and calculated gamble with potentially large, long-term rewards. Putin is not simply interested in maintaining the status quo; he wants to expand Russian influence and strength by capitalizing on the relative apathy of the US and NATO. If successful, Putin may prove to the world that strong and calculated unilateral moves can serve an effective foreign policy strategy, even if they make Russia lonely.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

On Monday, September 28, Russian President Putin spoke before the UN General Assembly in New York for the first time in a decade. Putin outlined Russia’s plan for reintegration into the global community. In one word: Syria. By taking a much more interventionist role in the Middle East, Putin hopes to usurp the United States as the key world power in the region, prove Russia’s might and foreign policy prowess, and stage a rapprochement with the Western powers that have isolated the country in response to the conflict in Crimea. But Putin’s speech is best understood when compared to his previous statements on the international stage—particularly his famously bellicose speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007. Putin’s worldview, as expressed in these two speeches, is one in which power is a zero-sum game between the US and Russia. Additionally, Putin demonstrates a self-contradicting respect for international rule of law principles. Finally, Putin has long expressed and is now prepared to act on plans to redefine Russia as an effective and involved power on the world stage. The rest of the world will need to respond to this interventionist Russia, and understanding Putin’s worldview is the first step to formulating effective policy and engaging in sensible dialogue with Russia.

At the Munich security conference, Putin openly criticized the United States and its superpower status, saying, “What is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it…is (a) world in which there is one master, one sovereign.” Putin continued, directly calling out the US, “One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way.” Putin’s recent speech at the UN contained similar, though slightly more veiled lines, such as, “After the end of the Cold War…a single center of domination emerged in the world…those who found themselves at the top of the pyramid were tempted to think that if they were strong and exceptional, they knew better.” Both speeches end with Putin offering up Russia as a partner to the international community and an alternative to US hegemony.

These lines clearly reveal a mentality of conflict between Russia and the US, but they also show that Putin considers world power as a zero-sum game between the US and everyone else. In Putin’s world, the US must give up its domineering exceptionalism and others – particularly Russia – must take back their influence. Other countries cannot grow in a unipolar world; the United States must step back for others to move forward. Putin presents this as a path to a better, more just world order.

One of the most surprising elements in Putin’s speeches is his self-contradicting respect for the United Nation’s rule of law, particularly his regard for the concept of state sovereignty. Putin sees the UN as a rules-based forum that upholds the rights of nation-states and stabilizes the international system. In 2007, Putin lamented that, “We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law,” and emphasized, “The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN.” He specifically defined state sovereignty in 2015 as, “freedom and the right to choose freely one’s own future for every person, nation and state.” He has continuously condemned the US’s invasion of Iraq as an illegal circumvention of the UN, an unjustifiable violation of state sovereignty and an affront to international law and order. Putin also contends that breaching state sovereignty in the Middle East, from Iraq to Syria to Libya, has created a power vacuum in which terrorism has grown unchecked; he therefore supports the Assad regime as the only legal partner in combating the Islamic State in Syria.

However, Putin’s discussion of the importance of legitimate states stands in stark contrast to Russia’s incursion into Ukraine. Putin gets around this hypocrisy by claiming that the overthrow of the Yanukovych government was sponsored by the US, and that the current Ukrainian government is not “legitimate.” This argument, if Putin truly believes it, may explain how he hails sovereignty while (in Western eyes) outright violating it in eastern Ukraine. It is clear is that the US and NATO definition of sovereignty may not match Putin’s concept of legitimate states. In Ukraine, Putin favors the right to self-determination, while the US supports the central state regime. In Syria, the roles are flipped. These disparities will not be easily bridged, which is why Putin has taken on a new project in the Middle East.

Putin’s recent speech focused on Syria and the threat of Middle Eastern terrorism, positioning Russia as an interventionist global player. This is a complete departure from Munich, where most of his lecture focused on nuclear disarmament. Putin called for a “genuinely broad international coalition against terrorism,” and offered Russia as an alternative leader for a better Middle East. He has matched his words with controversial action—commissioning air strikes in Syria and selling a missile defense system to Iran. Russia is finally wading into the quagmire that Putin claims has been created by poor US policy and unilateral military action.

By taking on Syria, Putin has seized upon an issue that will garner attention and reverse Russia’s increasing isolation from the West. He has cunningly referenced the refugee crisis that has hit Western Europe hard, contending that with peace and security in the Middle East, “there would be no need for new refugee camps.” Russian involvement in the Middle East both counters US influence in the region and gets Russia global attention—perhaps even cooperation from Western European leaders that have iced the country out. However, Putin is taking a grave risk; as the US has learned, extracting your county from the Middle East is easier said than done. Russia should also not overlook Assad’s atrocities against his own people and must be reminded of the realities of the regime that they support.

Putin’s speeches at Munich and in New York reaffirmed that he has a distinct vision of the international system as unjustly unipolar, in addition to a complex but genuine respect for the rule of law and state sovereignty. Putin frequently offers Russia as an alternative global leader to the US, and his speech in New York outlined his plan to exercise Russian influence in the Middle East. Putin hopes to gain international approval for Russia’s plans for Syria, and at the very least, prove that Russia is undeniably relevant and cannot be isolated or ignored. Whether Putin’s plans will self-destruct in Syria remains to be seen, but the US and their Western European allies need to consider how they will respond to Russian power in the Middle East—while maintaining a firm stance on Ukraine.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

As the United States teeters on the edge of its third invasion of Iraq in three decades, most recently sending 450 advisors to aid the Baghdad government, the situation in-country isn’t pretty. ISIS stalks the borderlands of the Levant and Mesopotamia, while its primary opponents, the Iraqi Shiites, are bankrolled and advised by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.  This already puts the United States between a rock and a hard place. But further factors – from the raging war in neighboring Syria to the broad regional competition between the Sunni monarchies and Iran to the currently-underway Iranian nuclear deal – make for a more complicated situation in the Middle East than any in recent memory. The American position amidst all this – strapped as it is on all sides, constrained by contradictory commitments and limits – is even more mind-boggling.

The American public doesn’t know quite what to make of this mess. Think tanks, academics and policymakers don’t seem to have any constructive ideas on a way forward, so discussion of “what’s going on” usually devolves into a game of finger-pointing.

Partisan Republicans blame the ongoing chaos on President Obama and his relative dovishness, restraint and inaction. To them, Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech was hopeless pandering to the Muslim world at best, and shameful apologizing at worst. They see the President’s single-minded focus on a (weak) nuclear deal with Iran as appeasement. Worse, they believe the President to have sold out on crucial allies, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. The President’s gradual withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan they consider a resignation to defeat, surrendering a noble cause.

Partisan Democrats place their blame further back, on President Bush and his reckless militarism, trigger-happy attitude and crusading zeal for democracy promotion. To many, the War in Afghanistan was potentially justified, had it ended after the defeat of the Taliban. But the War in Iraq was either foolish adventurism or evil incarnate—the first stage of an aggressive American empire, or otherwise a greedy machination to secure oil supplies. More importantly, President Bush’s insistence on democracy promotion in Iraq and Afghanistan by the sword, and in other Middle Eastern countries by political pressure, was seen as an affront to the rights of those societies. Democrats tend to think President Bush started something he didn’t need to start, for all the wrong reasons.

As is the case with most political debates and indeed most historical ones, both perspectives contain elements of truth. Bush’s reckless bravado did in fact lead us into an unwinnable war, because the goals we set were impossible to attain. Obama’s reluctance to demonstrate American military power did indeed allow rival powers like ISIS and Iran to hack out domains for themselves in which they could operate with impunity, unmolested by American strength. But neither narrative tells a fully convincing story.

So here’s my take on it.

Ever since the First Gulf War in 1991, we were bound to wind up invading Iraq again sooner or later. Saddam Hussein was simply too unstable—we would never be able to trust him to act predictably. The US airstrikes on Iraq ordered by President Clinton throughout the 1990s were made in response to Saddam’s barbarism against the northern Kurds and his willingness to bend the regional balance of power.

Come the early 2000s and the War on Terror, Saddam was not, in fact, supplying weapons to terrorists, or anything of the kind. In fact, his Ba’ath Party was a wholly secular institution—the Wahhabis in al-Qaeda were his rivals. Nonetheless, an Iraqi WMD would be unacceptable for the US, not because the regime might give it to terrorists but because it would immensely change the geopolitical dynamic in the Middle East. The Saudis, Turks, Egyptians and Iranians would soon pursue nukes of their own—and the Saudis and Iranians were known to have close working relations with different groups of jihadist terrorists.

Because we perceived that Saddam would soon become more powerful, we invaded. (Much of the credit goes to the then-powerful neoconservatives in the President’s circle, too; but even had Al Gore then been President, the impetus to attack Saddam would have been strong, for strategic reasons).

I think invading Iraq and deposing Saddam Hussein was a sensible policy, justifiable on strategic grounds. Saddam had proven himself to be irrational and aggressive, an unacceptable combination in a region through which a significant portion of the world’s energy supplies flowed. We needed him out.

That said, the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom was an embarrassment to strategic studies and political theory, not to mention to the US Military. When we went in with something like a third of the troops top generals recommended, we went in unprepared. When we declared that our mission was to turn Iraq into something we would recognize as a functioning liberal democracy, we bit off more than we could chew. And when we assumed that we could attain that transformation by the sword, we set off a rabid insurgency and civil war that killed 4,000 American soldiers and countless more Iraqis. The conduct of the war was a disaster in almost every sense.

It seems that Bush realized his blunders, though, as his Presidency waned. Gone were the annunciations of impending democratic transition, and in were the enterprising generals who practiced revised counterinsurgency strategies. By the aftermath of the Surge of 2007-2008, the civil war had died down and order, the prerequisite of political institutions, was beginning to become a norm. Sunni and Shiite militias both joined us in the fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq and radical militias. The Iraqi people were becoming a nation. We weren’t winning, but we were creating a strategic reality more amenable to our interests.

As the occupation drew on, President Bush left and President Obama entered the Oval Office and, sticking true to his campaign pledges, began reducing the US military presence in Iraq. By 2010 the formal US military presence had been removed from the country, although thousands of advisors remained.

Over the years, the sectarian violence returned and Iraq’s new governing institutions decayed into insignificance. The US-backed Iraqi military did what it could, but it was largely inept in the face of newly radicalizing militant groups. Everything we had fought to build and protect in the Second Gulf War was destroyed; because we left, and because chaos and insurgency returned, we lost the second round of warfare in Iraq.

The third round is brewing; its initial stages began right after we lost the second. Islamist fighters from the war in Syria spilled over the border, and one group in particular – the Islamic State in Iraq – built up its power until it grew strong enough to challenge the Iraqi government head on. Shortly after it declared a caliphate, it began its psychological warfare campaign of social media-publicized beheadings and dramatic, sweeping assaults on government forces, and the Western media began referring to it as “ISIS”. The US responded incrementally, much as it did in Vietnam—a few airstrikes here, some advisors there, now a Special Forces raid and national public statements whenever the public recoiled aghast at some magnificent slaughter or execution.

President Obama has been reluctant to intervene more decisively against ISIS in Iraq, knowing that the US public has no appetite for a third war in the cradle of civilization. He has hoped that the neighboring states whose interests are more directly threatened – Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Iran – would rise to the problem themselves. And they are doing so to a degree. But it remains doubtful whether the final end result of their action will be acceptable to American interests, especially if the Iranians carve out a greater sphere of influence in Iraq and the Sunni states bolster funding to radical Sunni militias to curtail Iranian power. President Obama’s inaction, hesitancy to project US power, and lack of a coherent vision for American policy in the Middle East has allowed regional players to roam about freely and create a scenario roundly hostile to US interests.

At the moment, though, President Obama does seem to be stepping up his game and taking (slightly) more assertive action against ISIS in Iraq. It is not enough yet; but perhaps once the deal with Iran has been reached, he will dedicate more effort to finding a strategic solution for Iraq. It seems clear that deeper US involvement – and far more importantly, wiser US strategic thinking – will be necessary to carve an acceptable endgame in Iraq in particular and the Middle East in general. With luck, Obama or his successor can make the intervention swift and effective, with long-lasting results.

I don’t have a clue what the winning strategy for Iraq might be, and I hope some strategic thinker comes out with one soon. It would most likely involve a splitting-up of Iraq into smaller units, including an independent Kurdistan, and a complete extermination of ISIS’s military forces. The coming deal with Iran will entrench the mullahs’ strategic position, so we would be wise to balance against that by removing Bashar as-Assad in Syria and replacing him with a moderate Sunni regime in Damascus. We would also be wise to continue building up our relations with the Sunni kingdoms, especially our strained relationship with Saudi Arabia—with no large buffer between the Sunni states and Iran, it may be time to beef them up in ways previously unthinkable, perhaps including a permanent forward military presence in Iraq not unlike those we maintain in Europe and Japan.

So who is to “blame” for Iraq?

Both President Bush and President Obama are to blame for the loss of the Second Iraq War. Bush doomed the mission from the start by setting the bar too high and acting recklessly; Obama abjectly surrendered the cause to fate (and American public opinion) in the complete withdrawal of US troops. While Obama’s was more direct and Bush’s more egregious, both errors equally contributed to our defeat.

However, both Bush and Obama learned from their mistakes. Bush began to pursue a more prudent strategy in his second term, while Obama has been less averse to using military force in his later second term. Perhaps there would have been a better outcome if Bush had learned to be a fox earlier, and if Obama learns to be a lion soon. Ultimately it was too late for either to correct their mistakes before time ran out; we can only hope that President Obama’s successor pursues a prudent and firm strategy from the very beginning.

We won Iraq I resoundingly, and we surrendered Iraq II. Iraq III has already begun, as American airstrikes, Special Forces activity and the lily-pad bases now dotting the country demonstrate. There has been no full-fledged invasion, but Americans again go to war in the land between the rivers. It’s increasingly starting to look like Lyndon Johnson’s slow, quiet and public opinion-minded escalation of American involvement in Vietnam.

This will not do—we have a quagmire waiting to happen, a whirlpool waiting to suck in the lives of thousands more American troops. Deeper American involvement in Iraq is unavoidable, contrary to General Dempsey’s claims, but we should make it as effective and decisive as possible so as to save the most blood and treasure while winning the best strategic reality. That means that the next President of the United States has to look clear-eyed at the world, and the Middle East in particular, and determine what strategic reality he wants to leave for his successor. Then he or she must do everything in their power to make that situation a reality—and with luck, that situation will be a stable Middle East with a healthy balance of power maintained by prudent American statecraft. Victory in Iraq is an integral component of a more secure Middle Eastern peace, but victory will be unattainable until we define our objectives for the Middle East moving forward. Just beating ISIS doesn’t cut it.

Were it not for the Middle East’s geostrategic position between Europe and Asia and its vast oil supplies to those continents, perhaps we could ignore it with the leisure with which we ignore Sub-Saharan Africa. But we can’t. As protectors of the liberal international order, we have vital interests in the Middle East that aren’t about to go away. Our duty as a superpower will continue to draw us into the Persian Gulf until Europe and Asia no longer run on oil, or else until we can establish a relatively stable regional order like that which existed from 1945 to 1979. Until then, periodic regional war will be the norm. We must win Iraq III decisively, and create a successful new strategic reality in the Middle East, if we are to preclude an Iraq IV.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

In a move that shook the world for more than a few diplomats, Reuters recently published an exclusive investigative report claiming that on at least two occasions in 2013 and 2014, Turkey supplied lethal aid to Syrian rebels, including Islamist groups, and that at least some of that aid later ended up in the hands of the Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist units operating over the border in Syria. The May 21 report cited a Turkish prosecutor and court testimony from Turkish gendarmerie officers who searched trucks escorted by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (called Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, or MIT). The Reuters investigation appears to have taken several months, if not over a year. The local police and gendarmerie alleged that the MIT was caught covertly supplying weaponry to areas of Syria controlled by Islamist rebels on two occasions, in November 2013 and January 2014. Since then, the prosecutors and over 30 officers who searched the MIT trucks have been charged by the Turkish federal government with crimes ranging from carrying out an illegal search to revealing state secrets, military espionage and attempting to overthrow the government of Turkey.

Exactly whose hands these weapons ended up in remains uncertain. At the time, the Syrian territory closest to where the shipments were discovered was under the control of Ahrar al-Sham. This hardline Salafist group was then led by Abu Omair al-Ahamy, who was a known associate of al Qaeda leaders including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Shamy was killed in Aleppo in February 2014.

Ibrahim Kalin, the official spokesperson for Turkish President Erdogan, recited to Reuters the oft-repeated official statement that “Turkey has never sent weapons to any group in Syria.” But as the Reuters report suggests, there is ample evidence to the contrary. Additionally, the MIT has the support of President Erdogan. When questioned on the incident last August during a television interview, he commented that “You can’t search an MIT truck, you have no authority.” He further claimed the trucks were carrying humanitarian aid to Turkmen communities.

But according to Reuters, Turkey was supplying lethal aid to rebels in Syria, which begs the question: Whose side is Turkey on?

Regardless of what the trucks in question were carrying or where they were sending their supplies, there can be no doubts that President Erdogan is juggling conflicting foreign policy interests while preparing for the upcoming general election on June 7. Turkey straddles the Bosporus Strait, and is geographically part of both Europe and the Middle East. Many of NATO’s European members are heavily focused on the Ukrainian crisis, their energy security and the financial state of the EU. All of these things are problematic for Turkey, NATO’s southeastern anchor. But lately, Turkey’s focus has been largely on the Syrian civil war that continually ravages Syrian and Iraqi lands south of Turkey’s long Anatolian border. The primary objective for the Turks in this conflict so far has been to maintain their own territorial sovereignty. Given the strength of the Turkish military and stability of the government in Ankara, this has not been much of an issue. The core of Turkey lies in the northwest, in the area surrounding Istanbul and Ankara. The rugged Anatolian landscape serves as a significant buffer between Turkey’s population centers and the chaos swirling in the Arab lands to the south.

The only recent threat to Turkish sovereignty involved the tomb of Suleyman Shah, grandfather of Ottoman Empire founder Osman I, which was located on the bank of the Euphrates River in Syria, about 30 kilometers south of the Turkish border. Shah’s tomb has long been guarded by a platoon-sized element of Turkish soldiers, and Shah’s burial site is considered Turkish sovereign soil. As IS approached the area in February, the decision was made to exhume the remains of Suleyman Shah and move them to a new location in order to avoid a large-scale confrontation between IS fighters and the Turkish guards. On February 22, the Turkish military conducted the operation, bringing home the contingent of guards in a rapidly executed rescue mission. Suleyman Shah now resides in a new, temporary tomb. It is still in Syria, but now less than 200 meters from the Turkish border. The Assad regime naturally condemned the operation as a violation of Syria’s territorial sovereignty.  But the Assad regime has no interest in fighting Turkey over such a relatively trivial matter, and Turkey is not willing to join the melee just to take down Assad. What’s more important is that the Suleyman Shah incident highlights a continuation of the Turkish government’s non-confrontational policy towards the Islamic State.

Back in October of last year, the city of Kobani came under siege from IS forces. The city lies on the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border and is (or was) inhabited predominantly by Kurds, who also populate a large swath of eastern Turkey. Much to the chagrin of Kurds in the area, the Turkish government stationed tanks on the border in a firm stance against any violent spillover, but did nothing to assist the besieged Kurds militarily. Given the uneasy and often violent history between Ankara and the Kurdish people, this was not much of a surprise. While Erdogan could have scored major points with the Kurdish minority in Turkey by intervening, he was unwilling to make Turks the target of the Islamic State’s brutality or Assad’s barrel bombs. As a result, Turkey stood back and watched while keeping Anatolia secure.

For its part, the Islamic State has not conducted any major operations in Turkey. IS has been expanding in two ways. First, it has been expanding its influence by supporting small cells located throughout the Middle East. Second, it has been gaining the loyalties of more distant, well-known terrorist groups in Asia and Africa, most notably Nigeria’s Boko Haram, which pledged allegiance to IS in March. But IS activity in Turkey has been largely limited to recruiting, since many jihadists enter the Syrian battlefields from across the lengthy Turkish border. An uneasy truce between the Islamic State and Turkey can be observed; both want the Assad regime to fall. Since IS has no air force, a Turkish no-fly zone is no threat to them—they would actually gain mobility from the absence of Syrian aerial attacks.

Meanwhile, the Turks have not actively participated in anti-IS coalition airstrikes led by the US and its Western and Gulf allies, launched in September 2014. Turkey is, however, home to a US air base. When the airstrikes began, Erdogan voiced support for the operations, which targeted the al-Qaeda aligned Khorasan group and IS targets in both Syria and Iraq. He stated that Turkey could provide “military or logistical” support for the operation, leaving the door open to future involvement.

Turkey doesn’t have a favorite in the Syrian conflict so much as it has a least favorite  – the Assad regime – whose actions are responsible for the countless Syrian refugees who have fled to Turkey. For Ankara, anyone who wants to depose Assad is welcome to do so. The Islamic State is the most powerful actor besides the regime in Syria, so Turkey won’t impede any IS activities. But Ankara also knows from the Islamic State’s rhetoric and operations throughout the Middle East that its ultimate goal is to create an all-encompassing caliphate. That too would be unacceptable for Turkey, but the prospect of a pan-Islamic caliphate is a long way off. So far, IS has only posed a significant threat to the sovereignty of weak and failing states, and doesn’t have the operational prowess to make territorial gains in more stable countries like Turkey or Saudi Arabia.

Besides the Islamic State, every other rebel faction is out to get rid of Assad as well. These groups range in ideology, practices and strength from the secular, US-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) to jihadist groups to ethnic Kurdish militias. Many of these groups find themselves in conflict over incompatible ideologies and long-standing feuds. These smaller groups also tend to find themselves pinched between regime forces in the east and IS strongholds in the west of Syria. The medley of smaller militant groups are Turkey’s best options to use as proxy forces in Syria, and many are in dire need of military assistance.

In deciding whom to support, Turkey must turn west and juggle the concerns of its European and American partners, whose attention is divided between the Middle East, Ukraine and tensions in the South China Sea. While Turkey may see the Islamic State as a lesser evil than the Assad regime, its NATO partners disagree. The US, its Gulf partners and Israel do not want to see the Islamic State supplant Assad and rule all of Syria. For the US, it is better to have a Syria divided among evildoers and to focus instead on keeping the Baghdad regime intact. There are no good options right now in Syria for the US or its European partners. The West’s preferred politically moderate, secular rebel forces have been holding a weak hand for a long time now in Syria, and providing them with lethal aid means undertaking the risk that those supplies could fall into terrorist hands. Publicly taking sides with the Assad regime to oppose terrorism is still morally and politically untenable among NATO members. Letting the civil war continue unabated is actually the best of all these bad strategic options.

Western powers find themselves doing four things under US leadership: 1) giving parcels of aid to refugee camps in Jordan, Syria and elsewhere, 2) bombing the least desirable jihadist elements in an effort to maintain the current balance of chaos in Syria, 3) preventing terrorist attacks outside the region, and 4) attempting to preserve a semblance of a government in Iraq by reluctantly accepting Iranian help in the region. Turkey has only been an active partner in the humanitarian aid mission and contributing to counterterrorism efforts outside the conflict zone. It is unlikely to join the airstrike coalition or to assist the government in Baghdad. But Turkey’s opinion about the utility of assisting certain groups does not align with the thinking of its NATO partners, as evidenced by the smuggling activities uncovered by Reuters.

So whose side is Ankara on? For now it stands alone. Technically, Turkey is a NATO treaty ally, but given its reluctance to participate in NATO operations in Iraq, anyone can see that the NATO-Turkey relationship has been fraying slowly over time. NATO offers Turkey a hedge against aggression from Assad, but Turkey remains reluctant to take part in US-led NATO missions. Additionally, Turkey depends on the United States to keep Iraq from imploding. Like the Arabs, Turkey is uncomfortable with expanding Iranian influence in the region. But Turkey is unlikely to openly challenge Iranian power, unlike the Saudis, who have been actively fighting Iranian supported Houthi militants in Yemen. Turkey also has the unique problem of dealing with a quite large Kurdish population with territorial ambitions. Keeping the Kurds in check is a national security priority for Ankara, and the Turkish government would undoubtedly diverge from its allies’ policies to keep Kurdish militants under control if necessary. Turkey also does not want to arm Kurdish forces fighting in Syria or Iraq for fear that those weapons could be used against Turkey in the future.

Like the US, Turkey is unlikely to fight outside of a supportive coalition. But its interests no longer align with those of its NATO allies, and so it finds itself isolated in many areas. Perhaps the upcoming elections will result in a change for Turkish policies, but for now its foreign agenda will remain intact. Turkey will have to come up with solutions for its foreign policy challenges on its own, lest they be resolved in favor of its foes. Maybe letting the Islamic State achieve its short-term goals in Syria wouldn’t be so bad for Turkey, if Ankara could figure out a foolproof and bloodless way to prevent IS from achieving its larger ambitions in the future.

Good luck with that, Erdogan.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Guest Contributor: Amanda Schmitt

“There’s no negotiating with ISIL [and]nothing to negotiate,” asserted Secretary of State John Kerry in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on US strategy against the Islamic State (IS), also commonly known as ISIS or ISIL. “ISIL must be defeated. Period.” IS has killed 5,500 civilians and created 1.8 million internally displaced persons in their quest to construct an Islamic caliphate under sharia law. As is common in cases of humanitarian intervention, the ethical and legal natures of the circumstances are at odds. The over 50-state US-led international coalition demonstrates the need for a response to IS; yet, the UN Security Council has not, and will not, authorize military action within Syria’s borders due to laws of sovereignty. This prevents legality of the action under international rules of force, necessitating a UN Security Council resolution, government consent or a self-defense claim.¹ Iraq requested the collective self-defense claim within its borders, but the US asserts that the Assad regime relinquished its right to consent foreign action within state territory given a practical lack of physical and political control of the area in question. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon accepted the legitimacy of this argumentation, further authenticating it as an exception to rules and norms in international law. While the technical legality of such action under international law and the future application of US dispersed weapons are controversial, it is ethically appropriate for the US to arm Syrian rebel forces deemed moderate by the intelligence community. Given the severity of the human security crisis, the nature of warfare with non-state actors and the purpose of sovereignty, the rationale for the action outweighs the potential negative aspects of infringements on international law.

With globally disseminated videos of public beheadings, systematic killing and raping of women, rejection of women’s right to education and acts of mass killing against any opposing group, IS is not an actor that abides by the rules of the international system and therefore cannot be dealt with as such. States have global legal frameworks and structural governance mechanisms to mitigate anarchy, but the context changes completely when dealing with non-state actors. When there is no option for diplomacy, the only viable alternative is military action to counter the violence. If the military response were confined solely to aerial bombardment, then IS’s resources and infrastructural support could be debilitated; however, the individual participants of IS would not likely be contained on a large-enough scale to cause a permanent power shift against them. The nature of such terrorist organizations prompts revitalized defiance and fundamentalism in response to attack. One cannot bomb an ideology.

IS’s power has grown militarily, territorially and ideationally, since their rhetoric has struck a chord with other Islamist jihadist groups. This momentum has created a daunting opposition on numerous levels that requires a multifaceted combative initiative, including the necessity of a ground counter-force to IS’s constant push for expansion. The Iraqi military has not proven itself as a strong enough containing force within Iraqi territory. Furthermore, the Turkish military became only recently involved in October 2014 to protect its borders. Within Syria, however, IS has gained significant territorial control, and the Assad regime’s military has proven ineffective. Within the US-led coalition, government positions vary in support of action within Syrian borders—all members agree with action in Iraq given the government request of collective security, yet they differ on both air strikes and arming rebels within Syria without government consent. Without other international military support, the Syrian rebels are therefore the most viable ground counter-force within Syria. As Secretary Kerry elucidated, arming the moderate Syrian rebels as a counter-force to IS precludes the potential need for US ground forces. While there are some American critics of a weapons assistance program, there is little to no support for any contribution of US troops to containing IS, restricting military options to training and weapons programs.

An unavoidable risk of engaging in a conflict of such an uncontrollable nature is the potential for future misuse of US weapons post-conflict, another area of American concern. In the September 2014 Senate debate for arming Syrian rebels against IS, Senator Rand Paul referred to past interventions, expressing his concern that intervention would create a “chaotic vacuum” of power that could result in radical groups contributing to further violence with the provided weaponry. While the future application of the weapons and training are always of concern, the extent of unease is lessened since the CIA already armed vetted Syrian rebel groups against the Assad regime in 2013. Any remaining weapons will likely be applied toward this same effort given the multifaceted conflict environment. This application of resources is likewise problematic under international law without a Security Council resolution for arming rebels against the Assad regime; nonetheless, this context limits the probability of weapon use beyond a US-backed initiative, given Syrian rebel priorities of combating IS and the Assad regime. This weapons allocation could actually act as an unstated strategy to bolster Syrian rebel groups for both US initiatives of combating IS and the Assad regime. This approach addresses US interests on both fronts and likewise prevents the need for American ‘boots on the ground’.

From an international legal perspective, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has reacted negatively to the option of arming actors as a means of intervention, reasserting its illegality. In the 1986 Nicaragua case in the ICJ regarding the US arming of rebel groups, the ICJ declared, “the protection of human rights, a strictly humanitarian objective, cannot be compatible… with the training, arming and equipping of the contras.” ²However, when there is such immense international outcry for the need to relieve a humanitarian crisis, as there was in the Rwandan Genocide and Syrian Civil War and currently with IS, international organizations refrain from serious reprimands despite breaking international legal procedure. This dynamic creates a de facto exception to rules of international law, with the ethical concerns of intervention taking precedence over the legal complexities.

At the core of the debate of ethics versus international law is the issue of sovereignty for determining the acceptability of intervention. Laws of sovereignty prohibit a misuse of an intervention claim for individual or state control over another’s territory, like Russia’s recent claim of the protection of ethnic Russians in Ukraine to effectively annex Crimea. It is a legitimate concern that numerous “exceptions” to international legal procedure for such state interference could enable governments to either intervene for largely self-interested reasons or to manipulate shifts in power in a state-building process. However, the current gridlock around intervention within the UN Security Council given China and Russia’s vetoes limits the international legality of intervention for cases of legitimate humanitarian crises; China and Russia aim to preclude any precedence that could enable foreign interference in their domestic spheres. These circumstances put global leaders like the US in a catch-22 position. If they do nothing militarily given the legality issue, they receive condemnation for failing to prevent continued loss of life. They are ridiculed for allowing the promulgation of terrorism as a global leader in the international system. By acting, they violate and undermine the international laws that create structure for the system.

The Assad regime has used the strict legal argument of sovereign control to its advantage despite that US assistance to combat IS is actually in its interest, as well. If asked for consent, the Assad regime would undoubtedly oblige, as IS is a serious threat to their control both territorially and politically. However, the Assad regime would conversely be staunchly opposed to any bolstering of opposition rebel groups for this purpose, as that would likewise strengthen the groups vying to unseat them. Since the US government does not recognize the Assad regime’s authority due to its human rights abuses, the US will not legitimate the regime by requesting its consent to act within its borders for aerial attacks. The US government’s insistence to work against a stringent interpretation of laws of sovereignty demonstrates the prioritization of ethics, including rejection of the authority of the Assad regime and utilization of the most promising campaign strategy.

To look deeper at intentionality behind the concept of sovereignty, scholar Stephen Krasner explains that sovereignty within a Westphalian state system is legitimized through “political authority based on territory and autonomy.”³ He suggests utilizing the Westphalian model as a guideline rather than concrete rules.⁴ With the current state of global governance mechanisms and international institutions, Krasner asserts that “compromising Westphalia is not only inevitable, it can also be good,” allowing for a “normative discourse more consistent with empirical reality.” ⁵ By neglecting to provide the necessary components for a state’s viability – rule of law, security, and markets – the territory becomes a failed state unable to employ sovereignty rights. Scholars Michael Fowler and Julie Bunk additionally support criteria for sovereign nationhood through “de facto internal supremacy… and external independence,” as well as de jure independence recognized by other states. ⁶  The Assad regime does not have supreme political control within Syria or international recognition of authority, delegitimizing its sovereign power. Ethically, if a government does not uphold its responsibility to maintain the security of its territory and political autonomy over governance, the government forfeits its right to sovereignty. The purpose of international law is to mitigate anarchy in the international system by ensuring the global protection of human rights and establishing standard operating procedures to facilitate diplomacy. It therefore cannot permit a context in which both are being violated or abused by the party in power. International law should not become a delaying mechanism that inadvertently helps the violent opposition cause further harm.

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan empathized with this legalistic versus ethical dilemma, stating, “sovereignty implies responsibility not just power.” In a context in which the de jure sovereign body is not able to exercise its state responsibilities or maintain authority over its territory, it forfeits its claim to sovereignty. Given this circumstance with the Assad regime, the US is ethically justified in its intervention through arming Syrian rebels. IS is not a threat that will diminish without forced containment, necessitating a significant international response and thorough actions toward a viable end to a successful campaign. The strategy must be robust enough to have a high probability of success to prevent an ongoing waste of resources and diminishing political will. The strong and global coalition coordinating various types of resources to aid in this campaign demonstrates the global sense of urgency in combating this threat. Therein, the military aspects of these contributions currently take prevalence as having the largest impact. The US is the only state with the resources, will and political power to lead the military effort against IS, therefore implicating its responsibility to act. Without US action to arm the Syrian rebels, there is limited ground support – only strongly on the Turkish border by the Turkish military and relatively ineffectively in Iraq by the Iraqi military – to ensure the finality of the air strikes’ intentions to contain IS. This leaves a high probability that IS will continue to expand its control militarily and its support from those they radicalize into their ranks. A further empowered IS would necessitate an elongated and increasingly expensive campaign, one that the US government aims to avoid. While there is never a definitive assurance of the success of any campaign, the absence of an armed opposition on the Syrian front significantly decreases the probability of success. It would not be feasible for any foreign military to contribute ground troops within Syria given the additional context. Moreover, there is no domestic political or social will to contribute American ground troops elsewhere in the region. The Syrian rebel groups become the final front to a holistic and hopefully conclusive IS containment strategy. Thus, beyond the paramount ethical argument of protecting collective human security, the US initiative to arm Syrian rebels is also practical from collective security, financial, strategic and sovereignty standpoints.

Amanda Schmitt is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in International Relations.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.