However, from the beginning, it has always been known that storing and distributing vaccines would be a tall task. Everything from road conditions to human error can squander life-saving doses. Recently, just a single unplugged cord, knocked loose by a cleaning contractor, rendered 2,000 vaccines in a Boston hospital useless. These are the frustrating — yet inevitable — realities of needing to develop vaccines quickly and effectively, but not having time to consider convenience. 

Those lost doses are often a result of factors outside of human control. However, hundreds of thousands more lives are being put at risk by the most pervasive and permanent virus of all: greed. 

But there are currently global coalitions working to ensure that vaccine rollout is equitable. COVAX is a cooperative set up by the World Health Organization, Gavi (the Vaccine Alliance), and the European Commission in order to ensure the equitable distribution of vaccines. The coalition’s broad goals are motivated by the vision that no matter a country’s prosperity or wealth, they will have the right to protect their people and have equal access to vaccinations as they are developed. 

The COVAX facility maintains a diverse portfolio of vaccines and essentially gives lower income countries collective bargaining power to ensure that manufacturers deliver appropriately and in a timely manner. It is made up of both ‘self-funding’ countries and countries in need, and is primarily funded by member states of the WHO and funding from external sources. A separate COVAX Advance Market Commitment (AMC) acts as a vaccine fund, made up of a mixture of foreign aid and philanthropy from the private sector. Under the Trump Administration, the United States announced its withdrawal from the WHO, citing corruption and political favoring toward China. However, the Biden administration, in its first days in office, announced the United States’ recommitment to the organization, and as a result, the COVAX alliance.

Former President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, told The World radio that “this is an interdependent and interconnected world. [COVAX countries] have to see vaccines as a global good to be able to save humanity — and humanity is worldwide… they cannot treat it as apartheid [and]they cannot say because you’re poor, you will not be vaccinated, only the rich will be.” COVAX is supposed to be a multilateral effort demonstrating the public health impact of the world coming together, with wealthy nations extending a much-needed hand to the world’s poorer economies.

For example, Canada, a G7 nation with the tenth-largest economy in the world, invested $440 million in COVAX. While most wealthy countries are buying their vaccines directly, Canada instead intends to use half of their contributions to buy vaccines through COVAX for their own people. Trudeau is facing harsh criticism for Canada’s disjointed and ambiguous coronavirus protocols; after all, Canadian leadership initially called the virus a low risk to their nation, and delayed a comprehensive response for far too long. More recently, Canada has been widely criticized for their ineffective plan for how to distribute their doses to the masses. Perhaps Trudeau views COVAX as a way to bail him out of an unfavorable political dilemma — one that was entirely the fault of his administration — instead of as a way for Canada to contribute to global recovery. 

While it is the only G7 nation to benefit from COVAX thus far, other countries further along in their coronavirus response like New Zealand — who found success in combating COVID-19 as a result of proper planning from the government — are following suit. Canada already owns the highest number of doses per capita, even before COVAX doses start rolling out in February. In contrast, only one out of the 29 poorest nations have started vaccinations. But this first step forward is nowhere near where the world needs to be quite yet. For the west African nation of Guinea, the country had only a whopping 55 shots delivered to them. 

Outside of COVAX, it was clear from the outset that money could buy human security during the pandemic. Israel, for example, was extremely aggressive in prioritizing the safety of their people and securing vaccines early. According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the government paid double for earlier access to Pfizer’s jabs. The reverse side of that coin is a case like South Africa’s. South Africa has acted similarly to Canada in that its leadership failed to take quick and decisive action to invest in a recovery plan. The Serum Institute of India (SII), where the Astra-Zeneca vaccines are made, sells its doses in a tiered system based on wealth. South Africa qualifies as a middle-high income country, yet has nowhere near the economic capacity of Canada. Therefore, they have to pay $5.25 per dose. To put that in perspective, European countries pay around $2.17 to $3 for each of their doses. The SII justified this by stating that some countries were entitled to a discount due to their contributions to research and development.

Canada and South Africa are two countries with poor leadership and poor initial action against the virus; the former and far wealthier was able to exploit a system designed to redistribute resources regardless of wealth by having enough wealth to do so, while the latter and far poorer continues to lag behind and pay a premium they cannot afford. 

It’s clear that there is cognitive dissonance between the stated goals of COVAX, the pharmaceutical companies, and participating nations. In order for any form of equitable distribution to happen, countries who can afford it must reap more than they can sow, yet there is no willingness to do so on a country-by-country basis. The WHO warned of the dangers of “vaccine nationalism,” greed and price-gouging, and the effects of these concerns are already materializing. 

COVAX has played into the wealth-based inequality which it originally postured itself against. While thousands continue to die worldwide because their countries can’t afford for them to survive, Moderna charges upwards of $32 per dose, making a healthy margin on saving lives; the vaccination effort has created billionaires and will bring in tens of billions in profit for leading companies while our global economy at large is threatened and strained.

How do we let money take precedence over life itself? Does the DNA of a virus alter because of the presence of money? Do resources disappear when money disappears? Does scientific research become unlearned because of a lack of funds? These complex problems reflect a complex issue with complex answers. The fine line between economic interest and economic necessity is blurred.

The world has to develop antibodies for greed. Combatting COVID-19 is a global effort, because unless vaccinations are administered in every country and to all people, the virus will continue to adapt, mutate and infect. This public health crisis has demonstrated that current approaches with self-interested goals will not work. And while coalitions like COVAX are a good first step in eliminating that greed, individual leadership within each country must step up to act now.

Corruption and impunity have been growing in Mozambique for many years. As early as 2013, Mozambican officials hid loans from the public and foreign investors, leading to a scandal that still taints the government’s legitimacy at the highest levels. The loans were used to pay off “questionable debt” for secret maritime projects like an $850 million fishing fleet; according to an indictment filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, the conspirators used these projects “as fronts to raise money to enrich themselves.” The party responsible for the scandal is still in power, and multinational firms continued to conduct business with Mozambique, which made accountability and combating corruption even more difficult. 

Corruption has also given rise to international criminal networks, which have taken advantage of the national political culture that allows elites to evade the law. According to the Organised Crime Index calculated by ENACT Africa, Mozambique ranks 38th in Africa, indicating that criminal networks have captured parts of the government and that there is a very low level of resilience to organized crime. From the heroin trade to ruby smuggling, crime has pervaded throughout the state and created a breeding ground for violent extremists. 

Although the attacks in Cabo Delgado began as early as 2017, terrorism has reached an unprecedented level in 2020. In only the first four months of 2020, violence in this region, led by a group known as Ansar al-Sunna, increased 300% compared to the same period last year. Although the group declared ties with ISIS in 2019, they rarely issue propaganda, have no publicly stated aims, and primarily attack state institutions, all of which suggest Ansar al-Sunna has a local focus. However, the organization has launched increasingly complex operations that have raised concerns within Mozambique and its neighboring countries. 

The state initially dismissed Ansar al-Sunna as merely a group of “bandits.” Yet, as the violence grew, President Filipe Nyusi admitted there was a problem, but experts believe that his government cannot effectively tackle it. Within Nyusi’s party, Frelimo, there is increasing infighting over the economic burdens of the violence. The country’s best soldiers are guarding natural gas facilities. The remaining soldiers, who are undertrained and underpaid, are the only ones left to combat the insurgents. 

Moreover, Mozambican security forces have been accused of committing human rights violations against those suspected of criminal activity. Video and photo footage has come out showing the attempted beheading and torture of prisoners, the dismemberment of alleged armed group fighters, possible extrajudicial executions, and the transport and discarding of a large number of corpses into mass graves. 

The abuse is intensified by the Mozambican authorities’ refusal to allow local and international journalists and researchers to document the situation without repercussions. Deprose Muchena, Amnesty International’s Director for East and Southern Africa, weighed in on the human rights abuses as “… flout[ing]fundamental principles of humanity. The abuses attributed to [Ansar al-Sunna] can never justify further violations by the security forces of Mozambique.” 

The international response to these events has been mixed. After a virtual meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on August 17th, the bloc released a statement saying that it would “support Mozambique in addressing the terrorism and violent attacks.” However, Mozambique is reluctant to allow neighboring countries to interfere given the fragility of the conflict, and the states themselves worry about the possible blowback of getting involved. Beyond Africa, the United States and many other Western nations initially offered to help with military training but soon withdrew from the commitment. 

The government has also turned to foreign defense contractors for help. At the beginning of the conflict, they enlisted Erik Prince, who founded Blackwater, a controversial American security firm. In 2019, the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary network, came to the aid of Mozambique but ultimately proved unsuccessful. They were replaced by Dyck Advisory Group, a South African organization led by Lionel Dyck, who was involved in past conflicts in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. 

These abrupt administrative changes have made it even more challenging to contain the violence. Perhaps the most significant consequence of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado is the worsening humanitarian crisis. Attacks on towns and villages have forced people to flee their homes and abandon their farms. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, over 300,000 people are internally displaced, and more than 350,000 people face severe food insecurity. A recent UN World Food Programme report presented findings from famine early warning system FEWSNET that indicate that communities “will continue to face ‘crisis’ levels of food insecurity… into early 2021.” This is a worrying projection in Cabo Delgado, which has the second-highest rate of chronic malnutrition in the country. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has only worsened this crisis. In the UN Policy Brief titled COVID-19 and People on the Move, the UN Secretary-General notes that “COVID-19 hits the most vulnerable people the hardest, including refugees, migrants, and internally displaced persons (IDPs).” The attacks in Cabo Delgado have forced people into living in crowded and unsafe host communities or camps with limited resources to protect themselves. Thousands have also fled to an International Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) treatment facility in Pemba, the provincial capital of Cabo Delgado, despite the city being one of the largest pandemic epicenters in the country. Raoul Bittel, the head of ICRC’s operations in Pemba, describes how “[p]eople fleeing armed conflict in Mozambique are trading this life-threatening danger for the risk of COVID.” 

Even with the country’s abundance of natural resources, investment prospects are dwindling as the situation in Cabo Delgado worsens. To experts, Mozambique should serve as a warning to other countries that prioritize their business interests over their people. In the words of Michelle Gavin of the Council on Foreign Relations, “Perhaps, if a decade ago, the international community had expended more energy supporting the civil society actors who have been calling action to these deep-rooted problems –and pressed harder to support solutions– Mozambique today might demonstrate more resilience, and the outlook would be less bleak.” 

The violent insurgency and resulting humanitarian crisis in Mozambique have exposed a profound weakness in a state that once showed tremendous promise. In promoting international trade and elitism over equitable socio-economic development, the government has fostered a culture of corruption and continues to do so despite the worsening conflict. 

Ituri is a northeastern province in the DRC that has seen extensive ethnic conflict occur since 1972. Violence peaked between 1999 and 2003, with an estimated 50,000 deaths. The main root of the altercations is that the Hema community, who are historically herders, were treated much more favorably during the Belgian colonization of the DRC (ending in 1960), placing them higher up on the social hierarchy. Meanwhile, the Lendu community, which is traditionally agricultural, is often the aggressor due to feeling unjustly stripped of land, natural resources and local political power. 

The conflict diminished after 2003 due to European Union peacekeeping missions, but has been reignited since 2017. Part of the reason for this is the continuous nature of the issues, with the disputes never fully ending and with groups holding onto their weapons from previous altercations. More importantly, the reason a complete cessation is so challenging is due to it being far more than a bilateral ethnic conflict. A deeper analysis of the crisis reveals that other military and ethnic groups are involved, including heavy political meddling from exterior actors due to the province’s wealth in resources — especially oil.

Since reigniting in 2017, 360,000 people have been displaced to neighboring provinces and countries, with over 1,000 casualties. Unlike the war from 1999 to 2003, there has not been a structured ethnic militia engaging in the conflict. The violence is mostly carried out by Lendu youths, not necessarily backed by their entire ethnic community, with some Hema youths carrying out reprisals. It is clear that there is no overarching command as assailants claim to be part of different groups, making intervention all the more challenging. 

The DRC’s military, FARDC, is perceived to be a very unstable force due to the levels of corruption and underfunding. FARDC frequently attempts to strike back at Lendu communities to limit their exertion of aggression, but this has just dispersed the youth groups. The dispersion enables them to spread terror in internally displaced camps, and take back some of their lost areas. Lendu youths do not fear the DRC’s armed forces, as they see the army as the natural ally of the Hema’s. Attacking army positions both helps them get rid of their enemy and enables them to take their firearm weapons. 

Aside from the military, other actors involved reveal why attaining peace in the region is such a challenge. These include other ethnic and rebel groups involved on the ground, as well as opposing political entities meddling to reach favorable outcomes. Due to past altercations in Ituri and in the Eastern DRC in general, the bordering countries of Rwanda and Uganda have historical ties to armed groups and rebellions in the region. A Congolese government official claims that migrants from the Hutu community from Rwanda fuel the violence. He asserts that they are involved both as military trainers for the Lendu’s, and as protectors of the Hema’s herds. 

Representatives of Congolese security also outline that the M23 movement, a rebel group responsible for violence just south of Ituri in 2012, is attempting to profit from the altercations from the Ugandan side. Former members of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-K), a political party and former rebel group, also own territory in the region, it is historically supported by Rwanda and is currently supported by the Ugandan government. One of the main issues of this crisis has been the continual involvement of foreign ‘invisible hands’ that help organize attacks and provide equipment, a complaint shared by several archbishops in the region. 

Due to the fragile relationship between the two ethnicities, external actors are pitting them against each other in order to rid the areas of inhabitants and exploit the benefits of the land, chiefly natural resources such as gold and oil. The greed for the district’s resources explains the heavy involvement by Uganda and Rwanda. Illegal resource exploitation has long been a pillar of the continuation in violence. The United Nations mission in the DRC explained in 2004 that inter-militia conflict will not cease in the region until the government takes care of extracting the natural resources in a credible fashion. 

However, while natural resources have always played a key aspect of violence in Ituri, oil is a particular resource that was not as prominent in the 1999 to 2003 conflict as now. Ituri is incredibly rich in oil, Lake Albert makes up much of its eastern border and is the main oil source of the region. There has been a substantial increase in oil discovery over the past decade. Therefore, despite the aforementioned history and regional factions of the area contributing to the crisis, oil is now an undoubtable key driver. Lake Albert’s oil exploration is divided into five blocks, with two being on the Congolese side of the lake, and three being on the Ugandan side. The majority of the lake and its basin are located on the Ugandan side, the country has therefore been able to control a favorable majority of the oil. 

The oil deposits at Lake Albert have often taken the center stage of the relationship between the DRC and Uganda. During the previous Ituri conflict, the Ugandan government altered its alliances with local armed groups frequently to attain its highest possible influence. Its main priorities in choosing alliances were to keep Uganda’s influence in the region high while limiting the DRC’s influence, and most importantly securing the extraction operations of their oil partners, Heritage and Tullow Oil, two foreign companies attempting to maximise profits in the region. Considering the uptake in oil discoveries on the Congolese blocks since the last Ituri conflict, it isn’t hard to imagine why Uganda might still support rebel militias on the Congolese side.

A closer look at these big oil corporations shows how rapidly the link to conflict can be made. 

They are heavily involved in the political climate of the region, oftentimes even directing it, implementing everything but a laissez-faire attitude to their surroundings. In Angola, one of the DRC’s neighboring countries, Heritage Oil hired Executive Outcomes, a private military company from South Africa, in order to drive UNITA (Angola’s second largest political party) rebels away from Heritage’s oil extraction sites. The Executive Outcomes attacked areas under UNITA’s control in accordance with Heritage and the Angolan military. As conflict near an extraction zone tampers an oil company’s ability to do business, it is highly probable that oil firms are taking sides in the Ituri conflicts, in order to ensure continuous profits. 

This assertion is strengthened when considering that Heritage Oil cooperated with Ugandan groups in the 1999 to 2003 Ituri crisis, as well as admitting to the DRC government that it had been striking deals with the leaders of rebel groups occupying Ituri. Heritage is not alone though, the Congolese government accused both Heritage and Tullow Oil of working with the Ugandan army to illegally cross the DRC border for oil exploration purposes, resulting in Congolese fatalities. Seeing as the Congolese government is the one supporting the Hema’s in the Ituri conflict and the two companies along with the Ugandan government seek to act nefariously toward the Congolese government, the aforementioned ‘invisible hands’ supporting Lendu attacks might not be as invisible as they seem. 

Both companies, Heritage and Tullow, still controlled the majority of Lake Albert’s projects until this year, despite there being a handful of smaller shareholders involved. A third company, Total SE, has recently acquired all of Tullow Oil’s stakes on the Ugandan Lake Albert projects, as well as the rights to build an East African pipeline whose source is at Lake Albert. Tullow’s motivation to sell to Total concerned itself with improving its financial situation, although fleeing the conflict-ridden area might well be a secondary factor.

Total has also been one of two major firms involved in exploring the Eastern DRC for more oil deposits. The French company outlined the risks associated with oil exploration in Ituri in a 2013 report, which specifically says that inter-community tensions and conflict dynamics may be affected by the search for oil. It had already identified at this point that certain communities will feel excluded by the benefits that oil brings, creating greater tension. Land ownership has always been a root of violence in Ituri due to competition over resources such as gold, therefore any hope of benefiting from further oil deposits only amplifies the violent meddling by corporations, bordering countries, and the DRC government itself.

The Hemu communities, many of which are now in internally displaced camps, are convinced that the attacks are fueled by the greater political interest toward oil exploration, rather than continued hatred between them and the Lendu community. An Ituri politician and businessman explains that their areas are full of oil deposits, and that chasing out communities with violence is considerably easier than incurring the costs for relocating them to use the areas for oil exploration. It is obviously challenging to uncover which government and oil companies are supporting rebel groups, as they are trying to keep their activities secret. However, the past suggests much greater forces are at war in Ituri than two ethnicities.

The communities of Ituri seem to be much more concerned with agricultural land ownership, the Hema’s want to retain their land and Lendu’s want to expand their influence. However, external actors are blinded by Ituri’s gold studs and particularly the oil deposits surrounding Lake Albert, using previous conflict in the region as an excuse to have no regard for humanitarian decency, pouring fuel on a flame that was slowly fizzling out.

The most infuriating part of the current Ituri conflicts is that much like the rest of the DRC, the region is incredibly rich in natural resources, but this wealth actually inhibits its development rather than benefiting it. Total SE outlined in their 2013 report how oil exploitation could lift up entire communities and the DRC’s economy in general, sadly this assessment strays far from reality. Military and rebel groups are clearly being strengthened by nefarious actors, the economy is being distorted as the agriculturally-intensive sector is getting eclipsed by the greed for oil, and border tensions and internal corruption is bound to worsen.

The international community can attempt to halt conflict with peace delegations as it did in 2003, but this does not solve for the invisible hands manipulating it. Local humanitarian groups offer significant help in relieving the ample health problems in internally displaced camps. However, until there is greater credibility and transparency from the governments of the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda, as well as by the oil corporations, local aid is all that can be done for the moment.