In July 2016, in response to North Korea’s rising nuclear threat, the US and South Korea announced their decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), an antimissile battery built to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. China quickly objected to THAAD on the grounds that it would weaken its nuclear deterrence capabilities and decrease Chinese influence in the region. To coerce South Korea to disable and remove THAAD, China launched a year-long campaign of economic retaliation, targeting the consumer goods, entertainment and tourism industries. Though it faded quickly and quietly, the THAAD dispute reveals much about the current limitations of China’s power, as well as its potential.

China specifically raised concerns that THAAD’s X-band radar, which monitors THAAD’s surroundings, had too large a scope and could gain information about China’s military actions further inland. However, US defense officials have pointed out that an existing, similar instrument deployed in Japan has a comparable, marginally smaller scope. While China’s claims were technically weak, they were understandable symbolically. Many Chinese found it concerning for the US to deploy a military weapon on neighboring South Korea’s territory – a neighbor who had been recently improving relations with China.

After over a year of tensions, in late October 2017, South Korea and China suddenly announced that they would work towards improving bilateral relations. South Korean media content started re-appearing on Chinese platforms that had previously stopped showing it, the consumer goods and tourism industries began to pick up their lost momentum, and the short-lived protests against the South Korean conglomerate Lotte Group had mostly ended.

Looking closer, the limited impact of its economic blows reveals the boundaries of Chinese power. The first retaliatory action to make headlines was limiting Chinese viewers’ ability to access and consume South Korean entertainment. Popular South Korean celebrities also cancelled or suspended public appearances in China. Even within the gaming industry, Beijing tightened regulations to make South Korean games’ entry into the market more difficult. These industries have felt some impact from the ban and experienced a decrease in the trade surplus of media content in the first nine months of 2017. Nevertheless, the entertainment industries were not significantly hurt by China’s ban, as they expanded their presence in other markets.

China also targeted certain South Korean consumer products, including food products, cosmetics, and automobiles. South Korean carmakers Hyundai and Kia both experienced the effects of the THAAD dispute and saw significant drops in Chinese sales. Although many companies have felt a negative impact, the decrease in some sales were compounded by other factors like boycotts from Chinese citizens and not necessarily strictly by Chinese policy. The South Korean cosmetic giant AmorePacific cited both stagnation of the domestic economy and the decrease in tourism after March 2017 as reasons for slowing sales growth and decreased operating profit.

As China was and still is the number one provider of tourists for South Korea, tourism was the industry that experienced the largest setback during the THAAD controversy. Chinese policy was partially responsible, as regional travel companies suddenly stopped selling package tours to South Korea, but other factors like concerns for safety and political tensions, anger at Lotte Group, and increased negative perceptions of South Korea also contributed to decreased tourism, one study showed. Overall, the number of tourists fell by 3.29 million in the first nine months of 2017 as compared to 2016, leading to a total $6.8 billion loss for the tourism industry.

The hardest hit by this economic dispute was Lotte Group, the South Korean conglomerate that sold the South Korean government the land it used to deploy THAAD. Before the conflict, Lotte owned more than 100 department stores and supermarkets in China, but since February 2017, the Chinese government closed more than 70 of them, citing safety concerns. Lotte Group closed the remaining stores after large protests at numerous storefronts. Recently, Lotte Group announced that it would sell all of its stores in China, abandoning its previous effort to expand its presence in the Chinese market.

Despite all of these negative impacts, the South Korean economy as a whole did not suffer significantly from Chinese retaliation. In fact, total Chinese exports increased in 2017; in the first eight months of that year, South Korean exports to China rose by 12 percent. Despite China’s economic might, many Chinese businesses rely on South Korean companies as part of their supply chains, which helps explain why only three main industries were hit.

Though it came out largely unscathed by China’s economic attacks, it would be difficult to argue that South Korea – and the US – definitively won this dispute. Granted, THAAD is still fully operational today. However, during reconciliation talks, Seoul assured Beijing that it would not seek additional THAAD deployments nor join a trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan. China may not have achieved its full desired outcome, but it did succeed in placing some boundaries on its neighbor’s future behavior. Meanwhile, the popularity of domestic boycotts bolstered the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) power at home.

More than anything, this dispute demonstrated the scope of China’s global clout. Its failure to effect THAAD’s removal revealed that its international influence remains limited by its integration into the global economy. In other words, China can only tolerate cutting off its corporations from foreign markets up to a point. Moreover, China clearly still faces bigger security questions surrounding North Korea. However, as China’s economic might continues to grow, it could become a more viable tool for asserting Chinese power globally, as well as garnering domestic support for the CCP.

In the coming weeks, the remnants of this heated dispute will fade as the region turns its attention to the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics. With North and South Korea planning to march under a united flag and create a joint women’s ice hockey team, there are modest signs of peace and hope. But even as the world comes together for 17 days of symbolic unity, the underlying distrust in the region caused by this conflict cannot be swept aside with colorful flags and cheerful processions. While nations applaud each others’ athletic accomplishments, the THAAD battery lies a mere 125 miles away, casting an uneasy shadow over the celebrations.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

In describing the history of Korea’s foreign relations, there is an appropriate phrase: “Between a fight of whales, the shrimp is crushed.” While the Korean peninsula’s relative geographic isolation has protected its peoples’ ancient, independent streak, every few centuries the region gets tossed into the tumult of great power politics, leading to conflict and devastation. In the 16^th century, Japan’s quest to topple Ming China as a regional hegemon led to the Imjin War, which was fought entirely on the peninsula. The 17^th century saw the Manchus rise to challenge the Ming leading to a war involving Korea, a Ming ally. The 19^th century saw the Sino-Japanese war, which saw Qing and Japanese forces clash in Seoul and Pyongyang. In the early 20^th century, the Russo-Japanese war was a battle over who will have a sphere of influence in Korea (the Japanese won). After the end of World War II and liberation of Korea, Cold War politics between the Soviet Union and the US led to the division of Korea and the subsequent Korean War, leaving many scars still remembered on both sides of the 38^th parallel.

In the 21^st century, South Korea is now caught between a rising China and its longtime ally, the United States. In the 1950s, the Chinese and the US fought to a standstill in the Korean War leading to decades of frosty relations between China and the South Korean-American alliance. But since normalizing relations with China in 1992, South Korea has developed closer relations with the Middle Country, so much so that China is now South Korea’s largest trading partner. Millions of tourists travel between the two East Asian countries annually, which helps foster a relationship already deepened by strong cultural and historical ties.

And South Korea and America’s relationship has evolved as well, moving beyond military affairs towards a strong economic relationship. The United States has based troops in the country since the establishment of the state. It provided the military and economic aid that helped South Korea become the 9^th largest economy in the world. The United States is South Korea’s second largest trading partner, with two-way trade value reaching $60 billion. However, with growing tensions between a rising China and the United States, there are risks that South Korea can be caught in the cross fire once again. Such concerns began to manifest in the summer of 2015 as South Korea debated joining the Asian Infrastructure Bank, a Chinese creation, thoroughly opposed by the US (the ROK eventually did join). This summer, the China-or-the-US dilemma escalated because of the decision to place the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea, further challenging South Korea to balance its relations with both countries.

THAAD is an anti-ballistic missile system that has the capability to shoot down short to intermediate range missiles. It is not an offensive system, as the missiles have no warhead and rely on the kinetic energy of the projectile to destroy the oncoming missile. Consisting of six truck-mounted launchers, 49 interceptors, a fire control and communications unit, and an AN/TPY-2 radar, this system is designed to deter any potential missile attack from the North. South Korea already has the US patriot missile system that can intercept artillery missiles, meaning that the addition of THAAD should be able to stop the entire array of potential aerial projectiles, excluding conventional artillery and mortar shells. This is strategically critical given the fact that the North Koreans are rapidly developing stronger nuclear weapons as well as the requisite missile delivery systems that can hit the ROK, Japan and even parts of the US’s West Coast.

South Korea has debated deploying THAAD since 2014, and China has asserted its strong opposition to the system from the very beginning. This is not too surprising and easily mirrors the Russian response toward US anti-ballistic missile systems being placed in Eastern Europe. Any time new weapons systems are placed on the front line, there is room for misunderstanding and suspicion. To the Chinese, South Korea is part of the US’s “first island chain,” stretching from the peninsula to Taiwan and the Philippines, an arrangement they see as an effort to contain China. But beyond superficial suspicion, the Chinese also have a genuine concern that THADD will reduce their nuclear missile deterrence. THAAD cannot directly destroy long distance missiles originating from China, but its radar component offers an extension of the US’s surveillance capability well into the Asian continent. THAAD’s surveillance system has been known to also be able to coordinate with the floating anti-missile and surveillance systems on the Aegis Cruisers, some of which are based in the seas around the Korean peninsula. THAAD can offer a unique early-tracking system of missiles originating from the continent, allowing for early warning for the land-based interceptors that defend the 50 states. In addition, China cannot count out the possibility of a future upgrade or expansion of the THAAD system, which could degrade its nuclear deterrent.

China did not sit idly while South Korea made its decision to deploy THAAD. It has enacted policy to hurt South Korea’s burgeoning entertainment exports to China. South Korean pop-exports is a $5.4 billion industry and China is the main export target. To illustrate the importance of the Chinese market, this past year a single Korean drama got 2.4 billion views in China, generating millions of dollars in revenue. But ever since the deployment of THAAD, Chinese TV stations have blurred or cut out broadcasts of Korean stars like Psy and limited broadcasts of K-pop concerts. As China continues to strengthen, its leverage over the Chinese-South Korean trade relationship will only increase. And much to South Korea’s dismay, the Chinese have clearly indicated that they are willing to use South Korean dependence on the Chinese market in order to advance their political objectives. It is not out of the question that more lucrative South Korean electronics, cars and ships may also be fair game in the future.

The diplomatic and cultural battle over THAAD is a glimpse into the volatile and potentially dangerous fault line that South Korea straddles between China and the US. The decision to deploy THAAD took nearly two years, with Chinese pressure only amplified by significant protests in South Korea over its deployment. It offers a preview into what the next century may hold in store for the South Koreans. The Chinese and the US have opposing interests that will undoubtedly lead to more frequent clashes. Whether South Korea can avoid being crushed will depend on brain over brawn: in order to protect all that it has gained thus far, the prawn needs to outmaneuver the whales and slip through their clash unscathed.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Rooted in emotion and ideology, opposition to charter cities is reactionary and misplaced. People living in the world’s poorest, most politically dysfunctional countries have far less to lose from an unsuccessful implementation of this avant-garde development strategy than they could gain from its success: economic growth that translates into rising living standards and expanded opportunities. And yet, successful charter city projects must take into account potential pitfalls and criticisms to ensure that opponents’ fears aren’t realized.  Economists and government officials who hope to establish charter cities within their borders must brand and implement them in a way that reassures hesitant policymakers and citizens that they mean to promote development and fight poverty, not undermine democracy or invite exploitation.

Renowned economist Paul Romer first developed the idea of a charter city as a way to promote good governance and development to finally eradicate poverty around the world. He christened his vision the “Startup City,” a “city-scale reform zone where a startup city could emerge.” In practice it meant selecting a piece of open land, creating completely new laws and institutions, then allowing citizens to move there at will. Romer’s vision also had foreign, developed governments or even multinational corporations providing funding, expertise and governance. In this way, the charter city hopes to solve entrenched issues with the political institutions of the host country in one sweep, without having to institute painstakingly slow and cumbersome reform that vested interests or corrupt officials will go out of their way to block.

A key element of Romer’s proposal is the stipulation that citizens of the country ceding the territory are free to opt in or out of living in the city, which justifies the establishment of new laws without going through traditional democratic channels. No coercion is involved, so “you can propose something new without having to go through a long process of consultation and agreement amongst the people that might be affected by a change.” This crucial detail then allows poor governments to circumvent a huge barrier to reform: in a broken system, all of the parts need fixing at once, making it difficult to decide where to begin.

As it is, many governments find themselves in a tangle of chicken-and-egg dilemmas – situations in which one structural inadequacy must be addressed to solve another, so none are ever resolved. For instance, imagine a country that wants to fix its poor education system, but can’t because its teachers are constantly striking. The government lacks the capacity to collect taxes efficiently, so it cannot adequately pay its teachers, nor its police. Without a legitimate police force, crime is rampant and the tax code can’t be enforced. A poorly educated populace and high crime rate deter foreign investment and economic development; the country remains in poverty. Romer argues that by establishing an independently governed charter city within its borders, this country could resolve all of these issues as once. It’s easier to build new institutions than to fix old broken ones. If all goes well, the new laws and institutions of the charter city will then spill over into the rest of the society, uplifting the entire country.

The spillover effect, one of the main mechanisms through which charter cities are predicted to boost economic growth, is already a well-documented phenomenon in global business. In the charter context the term refers to the way the new city will stimulate economic activity in surrounding areas by demanding labor, food and raw materials and offering an open, business-friendly environment in close geographical proximity.

And yet, this great advantage of the charter city also implies its main criticism: if not the national government, who’s in charge? Activist groups and citizens alike question the legitimacy of a project that arbitrarily sets up new, sometimes unconstitutional laws within a nation’s borders. The issue of sovereignty becomes especially problematic in light of Romer’s suggestion that poor countries invite wealthy, developed nations like the US or EU members to provide the governance structures and law enforcement in charter cities. At this point, it is plain to see why many denounce the charter city as a disingenuous strategy to perpetuate neocolonial north-south exploitation.

Certainly, the concept of Western rule on foreign territory invokes the ghost of colonialism, still a very sensitive and relevant memory in many countries’ national psyche. And yet, for the economic experiment to succeed it is necessary that charter cities be governed by some entity outside of the state to lend credibility to the institutions and ensure reliable enforcement, be it a foreign nation or a private entity. The city will only be successful in attracting the foreign investment necessary to stimulate economic growth if companies have reason to believe that their contracts will be honored and their interests protected; if the country’s own government were able to successfully foster the political and legal climate to create a hospitable investing environment, the charter city would not be necessary to begin with.

One of the few attempts to build a startup city came in 2011 when Octavio Sanchez Barrientos, Chief of Staff to the Honduran President, discovered Romer’s idea and set out to implement it in his country. The project came far enough that the Honduran legislature passed a constitutional amendment allowing for the establishment of “special development regions” that would have an autonomous political and legal framework, though intertwined with the Honduran government. Judges were to be nominated by city authorities but approved by a two-thirds vote in the Honduran legislature, and likewise Honduran lawmakers had to ratify all city laws.

Instead of following Romer’s vision of inviting foreign governments to provide governance, Honduras attempted to establish a “transparency committee” made up of disinterested specialists who could oversee the appointment of governors, supervise their rule and guard against corruption (Romer served as chair; members included economists, investors, think tank owners and Nobel laureates). In the words of Sanchez, “It is easier to create a board of trustees than to give control of part of your territory to a foreign nation.”

But even without explicit foreign governance, after Honduras first voted to approve the initiative an outcry ensued from a broad range of groups, from Honduran citizens to Latin American solidarity and California Bay Area groups to the Occupy Wall Street movement. Opponents denounced the initiative as “anti-democratic land grabbing and repression” instituted “under the guise of poverty reduction,” and “devoid of democratic structures.” It is true that democracy was meant to enter only gradually into Honduran charter cities. The transparency commission planned to oversee governance until it deemed the citizens ready to elect representatives.

Though valid, such criticisms weigh the vague ideal of democracy higher than tangible human welfare. The reasoning behind the initial suspension of democracy seeks to rectify governance issues that plague Honduras and similar countries – for the charter city to be successful, the best laws and practices must be laid down from the outset, and it is easier and safer to let a highly educated and experienced committee of economic experts to discern and implement these than to leave governance to the whims of the public. Though today it is taboo to doubt the unfaltering wisdom of majority rule, history provides ample cases of charismatic leaders who take advantage of popular support to govern corruptly and unjustly. To enable prosperity and development, pure democracy may not be the safest route, at least initially.

Romer sidesteps the issue of democracy by pointing to the complete freedom of each individual to choose whether to move to the charter city. Even if they lack representation in government, citizens implicitly agree to the laws of the city – its charter – when they elect to move there. In this way, Romer distinguishes his vision from colonially ruled cities of the past: “At every stage, there’s an absolute commitment to freedom of choice on the part of the societies and the individuals who are involved.”

But getting the general public to accept such a view is challenging to say the least, and constitutes the greatest roadblock to the Honduran charter cities though they were never, as an Al Jazeera opinion piece put it, “blatantly colonial”: Honduras deliberately chose to eschew Romer’s suggestion of inviting foreign, rich countries to govern.

Instead of foreign governments or Honduras’ failed board of trustees structure, future projects may look to international organizations like the World Bank or the United Nations to provide personnel for public services like schools, police forces and courts, and to preside over legal matters.

Alternatively, private corporations can take an active role in city governance. Songdo, a new South Korean planned city is also the world’s largest private real estate project. Real estate firm Gale International and domestic conglomerate POSCO Construction and Engineering have majority ownership and control over the city, with the South Korean government only providing public goods like schools and hospitals. To attract investment, the government copied Asian free trade zones like Pusan and Shenzhen in implementing very lax land and labor regulations and generous tax laws. Economically prosperous and sustainably designed, Songdo provides a model for a successful startup city, even if it is not technically independent from the South Korean government.

Even if the world were to embrace the idea of the charter city, there is of course no guarantee that this initiative would be an unqualified success. Even the charter city’s ideological founder and greatest advocate concedes that the idea has its limitations. “Just as many startup firms will fail, we should assume that many startup cities will fail too,” Romer admitted in an interview. But he continued to put into perspective the possible risks of the endeavor: “This is still worth doing because the cost of many failures is very small compared to the benefits offered by even one success.” After decades of largely fruitless attempts by well-meaning organizations like the World Bank to discover the panacea for poverty, development needs a radical new approach.

Countries and economists should set aside their ideological attachment to Western-style governance and colonial memory to take a chance on the charter city – at best, the world could find itself one step closer to eradicating poverty.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

In the final days of 2015, the governments of South Korea and Japan surprised the world with a deal addressing the issue of Korean “comfort women”. This term describes the thousands of women and girls from Japan’s Pacific-Asian colonies during World War II who served as sexual slaves to Japanese soldiers stationed in the front lines. Foreign Minister Kishida of Japan conveyed Prime Minister Abe’s apology for the women’s treatment and announced that Japan would provide official government funds totaling ¥1 billion ($8.3 million) for a victim’s foundation. Foreign Minister Yun of South Korea announced that both sides would refrain from accusing and criticizing each other internationally regarding an issue that “is resolved finally and irreversibly.” With 2015 being the 50th anniversary of the normalization of Japanese and Korean relations, this was a major breakthrough that analysts predict would change the geopolitics of East Asia by strengthening the anemic Korean-Japanese alliance at the expense of China’s attempts to isolate Japan and increase influence in Korea. However, this decades-old issue is unlikely to be solved heading into 2016.

The issue of comfort women represents the lack of closure regarding Japanese war crimes and grievances during World War II. More than 200,000 teenage Korean girls were taken from their homes and served at front line military bases, where they became victims of institutionalized rape. Each girl had to serve dozens of men per day and according to one testimony, a girl that resisted was “[t]aken to the courtyard and in front of all of us, her head was cut off with a sword and her body was cut into small pieces.” While Korea was the main country where the military recruited girls, women from China, the Pacific islands and South East Asia were also victims.

The crime committed against comfort women is horrific, and the attention surrounding the issue only amplifies the lack of justice regarding Japan’s conquests. Unlike the German war crime tribunals, there was little participation of victim countries in the Japanese ones, as these tribunals largely focused on grievances against the West. Many neighboring countries believe that Japan has not properly accepted and acknowledged its wartime guilt. This is only strengthened by some Japanese politicians arguing that comfort women were necessary (in order to maintain troop morale and discipline during the war) and continuing to visit the Shinto Yakesuni shrine, which many see as a symbol of Japanese militarism. With Japan led by nationalist Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is intent on strengthening Japan’s military and endorsing textbooks that reduce the extent of Japanese war crimes, tensions between Korea and Japan have increased in the past few years—and comfort women have become the crucial point of tension.

The recent deal between both sides is the most progress made in recent history. The last time the Japanese government made an apology was in the 1993 Kono Statement, which was issued by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono. However, Japanese conservatives rejected the statement, making the move seem insincere. Since then, conservatives have made further affronts regarding the issue; for example, Shinzo Abe has long attempted to reduce the significance of the victims’ claims and even to pass a resolution in 2007 suggesting that there was no proof of coercion (playing into the far-right narrative that comfort women were prostitutes). However, after both sides made the recent deal public, Prime Minister Abe called President Park and offered Japan’s “sincere apologies and remorse from the bottom of his heart.” (It is important to note that Japan only apologized to Korea despite the fact that the women originated from all across Asia.) Both sides clearly want to improve economic and security relations, especially concerning North Korea and the rise of China.

While the governments have settled this issue, it does not mean that it is buried in the dustbin of history. In order to be resolved, the people of both countries must also agree to the compromise. Unfortunately, that does not seem to be the case; a day after the announcement of the deal, protests began in front of the Japanese embassy. Some of the surviving Korean victims are voicing fierce objections to the deal, which they say is insincere (since the Japanese government has not admitted legal responsibility) and invalid (because they were not aware of the negotiation proceedings). Furthermore, the opposition party leader Moon Jae-in stated “the deal amounts to a treaty in which the people’s rights are surrendered.”

Complicating the issue further, the Japanese government conditioned their funding on the removal of a bronze statue of a comfort woman sitting in front of their embassy in Seoul. With 7 in 10 Koreans against the removal of the statue and a civic group pledging to erect additional statues, this condition is becoming a major point of contention. President Park came on national television to ask for the country to understand the need for compromise, but it seems that the issue has only been inflamed.

The significance of this deal goes beyond the South Korea-Japan bilateral relationship. It sets a precedent for other countries such as the Philippines and China to levy similar requests. It may also signal a serious attempt by the Abe government to finally resolve war grievances at the inter-governmental level. Geopolitically, it demonstrates Japan’s attempt to repair its image in East Asia amidst plans of militarization and a more assertive foreign policy. For South Korea, it is an attempt to mend a crucial relationship and deflect concerns in Tokyo and Washington, DC that Seoul is drifting into the arms of China. Seoul’s interests lie with developing a closer relationship with Beijing; China is their largest trading partner and wields the most influence in North Korea, the South’s greatest security challenge. Yet through the US alliance system, South Korea’s security partner in the local region is Japan, and DC is most likely pressuring both governments to cooperate in light of China’s rise.

The next few months will be a crucial test to determine if Seoul and Tokyo can use this deal as a vehicle to repair a strained relationship. The number of living victims is decreasing rapidly, and intensifying protests and a tug-of-war relationship between China, South Korea and Japan make 2016 a crucial year to see if compromise will be sustained.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Throughout the week of October 20, 2015, 1000 family members pulled apart in the Korean War of 1950-53 reunited in an emotional meeting at Mount Kumgang resort, located on North Korea’s east coast. Fathers and sons, husbands and wives, and brothers and sisters who had been separated for more than sixty years wept and embraced each other. This reunion was only the second in the last five years.

The Divided Family Reunions were established in a historic North-South Korean summit in 2000 between the former North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, who won a Nobel Peace Prize that year for his efforts to engage the isolated North Korean state. The short family reunions were meant to be annual, but the worsening tensions between the two states prevented their regular occurrence. Instead, the divided families depend on the current political climate between the two Koreas to determine whether or not the reunions will occur.

The latest reunion was spurred by the uneasy truce reached on August 25, 2015, after military tensions escalated in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The DMZ, which separates the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel, is often called the “most heavily fortified border in the world.” On August 4, two South Korean soldiers were maimed by North Korean landmines, causing outrage in South Korea and an accusation that North Korea purposely planted the explosives near the military guard post. This incident triggered a rapid escalation of conflict; North Korea declared itself to be in a semi-war state and top US military commanders began reviewing the established plan for defending the border in case of an attack.

This episode called to attention, for both South Korean and American officials alike, that little is known of the newest North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-un. He continues to use the Divided Family Reunions as diplomatic tools for “rewarding” North Korea’s brother nation, as they were used under his father. With approximately 66,000 South Koreans on the waiting list for the reunions, North Korea clearly knows it holds a bargaining chip. The most recent meeting that occurred in early October reflect this—it was a reward for the successful resolution of the landmine incident. However, looking at the past five years of Kim Jong-un’s early reign, intelligence officials can agree on this much: he is implementing change in North Korea. It is interesting, then, to think of Kim Jong-un’s decision-making process when agreeing to host the 2015 Divided Family Reunions. What does his agreement tell the world of his political reforms and regime-strengthening strategy?

Change in North Korea is a new phenomenon and must be measured with a different standard than most other countries. The state has more or less remained the same as it was under Kim Il-sung, its legendary founder. Kim Jong-il, like his father, retained an extraordinary cult of personality centered on the idea that the Kim family protects Korea from outside invaders, particularly the US and its ally, South Korea. However, no matter how powerful this cult of personality is, change is inevitable. With a devastating famine during the 1990s – called “the Arduous March” – and the steady flow of outside information into the country, North Koreans are growing discontented with the regime. As is speculated by many top North Korean scholars, such as Professor Andrei Lankov of South Korea’s Kookmin University, by the early 2000s, Kim Jong-il himself recognized that the Kim dictatorship would not last for more than ten to twenty years. But with Kim Jong-il in his sixties by the time of this realization, he decided to let the status quo remain: he, personally, was safe. However, his son is only in his thirties and has just come into power. And it seems as though Kim Jong-un has decided that the time for drastic and widespread change is now.  

Perhaps the first indication that Kim Jong-un was breaking from the established regime mold was when he purged his uncle, Jang Sung-taek, in early January 2013. Jang was thought to be one of the most powerful men in North Korea during Kim Jong-il’s reign, and it was even speculated that he might act as Kim Jong-un’s “regent” until the young dictator learned the ropes. Kim followed this shocking act by purging five out the seven advisors his father had left to guide him, with two confirmed as executed. His other regime changes include reforming North Korea’s agricultural system, changing it from one of virtual servitude to one of sharecropping. He has also quietly allowed a widespread economic upturn with the acceptance of private enterprise, a change from North Korea’s traditional government-controlled system.

With these large reforms, one must wonder the reasons Kim Jong-un has kept his father’s practice of Divided Family Reunions. Kim Jong-il himself was not fond of them, as they brought outside information to the closed state. The influx of knowledge was the main reason Kim Jong-il believed his regime was crumbling; it incenses and mobilizes the North Korean public, inherently threatening and weakening the regime. Excluding the information that North Korean participants could learn from their South Korean families, even their physical differences, such as the large height gap between the two peoples, sheds light on the difference in quality of life.

With all of the potential costs, what are the benefits Kim sees? For one, the talks hold an economic significance for North Korea. The reunions are held at Mount Kumgang resort, which was once a large tourist draw for South Korean visitors. Insisting on holding the reunions at this resort could suggest a desire to stimulate tourist interest once again. Holding these reunions on North Korean territory also provides the closed dictatorial regime with some protection and control over their citizens’ movements. For additional protection, the multiple video cameras and microphone bugs set up in the reunion room ensure that the North Korean participants only spout propaganda to their families’ inquiries on quality of life, promising that they are happy and content with their leader.

The manner in which Kim Jong-un utilizes these events will give outside nations a clue towards his regime-strengthening strategy: will he halt the meetings in order to close off North Korea even more to the outside world, or will he continue them, as a part of his reform akin to allowing the growth of the private sector? The reunions could also serve a larger purpose under the younger Kim’s regime than his father’s. The age of the family members gives the reunion talks a sense of urgency, and Kim could use this urgency as a larger incentive for successful negotiations with South Korea than his father could. Ultimately, Kim remains an enigma to the international world, but his approach with reunions could illuminate his regime agenda.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

In January 2014, North Korea announced that the annual Pyongyang Marathon would be open to amateur foreign runners. (In previous years, the event was only open to elite foreign runners.) Pyongyang seemed to be finally opening up to the rest of the world by hosting a public sporting event—a potentially fun and sportsmanlike way for foreigners to see North Korea. Even Americans, North Koreans’ greatest enemies, were allowed to register in a seemingly apolitical gesture. There were, of course, restrictions for all foreign runners, including a three-hour time limit for the full marathon and mandatory lodging at state-sanctioned hotels. To get into the marathon, runners had to register via a North Korean tour agency like the China-based Koryo Tours, a standard procedure for all tourists traveling to North Korea. The 2014 event was quite successful by North Korean standards: over 300 participants ran the 42-kilometer course through the nation’s capital. 

The anticipation for the 2015 marathon on April 12 was even higher. The North Korean government opened up several hundred spots in the race for foreigners and even disseminated a bizarre promotional video to a remixed version of A-Ha!’s Take On Me. Over 400 tourists registered for the race through Koryo Tours alone. That is, until the North Korean authorities banned foreigners from entering the country due to the Ebola scare. Beginning in October 2014, North Korea restricted its borders and quarantined all foreigners for 21 days. The race was not exempt from these constraints and all foreigners were banned from joining.

According to North Korean propaganda, Ebola is a deadly virus created by the US military to promote its interests abroad and undermine North Korea. With this mindset, it comes as no surprise that North Korea set up harsh restrictions against all foreigners, including those from countries with no exposure to the virus. In early March, the government finally lifted the travel ban and allowed foreigners to continue with their marathon tourism plans. However, the damage was already done. Although some runners had expected stumbling blocks during the registration process and adopted a “go with the flow” attitude, other runners canceled their reservations and race registrations. One tour group, Uri Tours, extended their registration deadline to March 20, but flights out of both Shanghai and Beijing were almost completely full. The only available flights were through Air Koryo, a poorly rated North Korean airline. Tour companies, marathon runners and spectators all got the short end of the stick because of North Korea’s politicized reaction to the Ebola virus. Ultimately, Pyongyang was able to recover from the drama; by April 12, the race had enough registered foreign runners (650) to set a record for its short history.

However, the North Korean government has bigger problems to worry about than the success of its marque marathon. The Pyongyang Marathon fell during a sensitive time; the DPRK’s relationship with the rest of the world has been particularly rocky since February 2013 when the country launched its third nuclear test. Since then, Kim Jong Un and his government have continually threatened their opponents with military force. The 2014 UN report on human rights abuses in the country added even more pressure; in October and November, the UN repeatedly recommended that the North Korean leadership be referred to the International Criminal Court. As expected, the government reacted negatively to these accusations against its supreme leader, calling the report “political fraud.” Furthermore, in March, the US and South Korean participated in joint military exercises, a practice that always elicits an angered response from the North Korean leadership. The military exercises are a display of the heavy military presence at the southern end of the DMZ and a reminder of exactly what North Korea is up against. Unfortunately, the military exercises sparked violent retribution. In March, a South Korean man attacked the US Ambassador to South Korea, Mark Lipper, claiming to be fighting for North-South reunification. The North Korean government called it “just punishment for US warmongers.” North Korea used similar language during the Sony hacks that involved the film “The Interview.”

The Pyongyang Marathon might have been a success for the country’s tourism industry, and even a sign of a thawing relationship; however, the race did not reveal any fundamental changes in the North Korean regime. It remains authoritarian and dependent on the propagation of a perceived conflict with the US and its allies to preserve domestic stability.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

The Pacific Rim

In Alfred Thayer Mahan’s seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, he argued that sea power was the key to national might. Sea power is measured by the size and power of a given state’s navies. A powerful naval military guards the merchant navy, securing global trade routes. Sea power guarded the very arteries of nations, explaining the supremacy of Great Britain in the Age of Imperialism. Likewise, Mahan argued, the Industrial Revolution in the US created such a surplus of manufactured goods that the US could no longer afford to ignore the need for expanding to new markets. The US needed to expand to new markets to ensure continued prosperity and thus needed to build and maintain a strong naval military.

It is in the Pacific Ocean that the continuing importance of sea power manifests itself. It was indeed Mahan’s ideas concerning sea power that drove US foreign policy in the early 20th century. In an age of commercial imperialism, the US secured Hawaii’s annexation and gained the Philippines as spoils from the Spanish-American War in the interest of expanding to Asian markets. For Mahan, trade and prosperity came from the barrel of a gun: it was the strength of the navy that ensured trade, a la the “gunboat diplomacy” of Commodore Perry, who forced the opening of the Japan to the outside world in 1852. As the 21st century is making clear, however, influence in the Pacific is also won through other means, namely economic ties. China’s meteoric rise and outflow of investment has won it many partners, and for the US to maintain its primacy in the Pacific, it must more convincingly demonstrate its commitment to the security and prosperity of its Pacific partners.

The Pacific Century?

Throughout history, the geographic center of gravity in world politics has shifted between the major oceans of the world. In ancient times, it was the Indian Ocean, as the hotbed of the Maritime Silk Road between the Emperors of China and the Sultans of the Ottoman Empire. The Europeans by contrast were on the outside looking in, as they tried to carve out their own stake in the trade of silks, spices, ideas and technology stretching from Hangzhou to Constantinople.

The monarchs of Portugal, Spain, England and France looked westward to circumvent the Ottomans and engage more actively with the Indian Ocean trade network. What they found, instead, was a new continent, and the emerging triangular relationships between Europe, the Americas and Africa became the centerpiece for geopolitics starting from the 17th century. The center of gravity of the world shifted westward to the Atlantic during the pre-modern era, where it remains the central ocean today. NATO, a security alliance between the US and Western European countries formed during the Cold War, became the epitome of Atlantic dominance of the world’s oceans. However, as the EU continues to be ensnared in the Eurocrisis, the preeminence of the Atlantic is starting to fade.

The Pacific, long impassable due to its vastness and violent weather, only emerged as a tangible region in the 19th century as the Europeans began establishing Pacific colonies and forcibly opening markets through superior naval military power. India became the Crown of Britain—the anchor of a rich Asian-Pacific trade. The Netherlands likewise gained a foothold in the region through its colonization of Indonesia. China, Japan and Korea were all forcibly opened to world trade by Western or Westernized naval power (Britain and France in China, America in Japan, and Japan in Korea). The US also came into its own as a Pacific merchant empire through trade and conquest. The US’s conquests of Pacific islands such as the Philippines, Guam and Hawaii, combined with the establishment of San Francisco and Los Angeles as thriving ports of trade, solidified the its position as a great power in the Pacific.

The trade-oriented Pacific became a strategic warzone during World War II and the Cold War. Island hopping was the fundamental strategy of the US Pacific Theater, laying the foundation for later American dominance of the Pacific. The Cold War’s stalemate in Europe meant that most of the hot conflicts were actually played out in the Pacific (Korea, Vietnam and China).

The Pacific was given new life with the rise of the Asian Tigers, the newly industrialized economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore that secured the Pacific’s title of the world’s most economically dynamic region. Combined with Japan’s resurgence and the rise of other economies before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, the Pacific’s centrality looked inevitable.

Keeping the Edge

Looking towards the future, it is quite possible that the Pacific will be the new center of gravity of the world. The rise of China has both revived the economic dynamism of the region post-1997 and added a new strategic element to the Pacific once again, as hopes of China happily cooperating with the US and/or transitioning to democracy seem slimmer by the day, and the two states’ relationship status as partners or rivals is constantly in flux.

For the US to keep the edge in the Pacific, its leaders must keep two things in mind. First, despite the continual preeminence of naval military power in the concept of sea power, the Pacific of the 21st century revolves around more than raw military strength.

Pacific power sees an added dimension in multilateral institutions, where China is beginning to compete with the US in trade agreements and economic institutions. The recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit sparked conflicts between the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Chinese-led free trade initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). Some see the US-led TPP, “a free trade agreement that seeks to set high-standard rules for trade, and address vital 21st-century issues within the global economy”, as an intentional move to exclude China. The agreement’s strong emphasis on elimination of trade protection and promotion of intellectual property is seen as a means to gain influence in the region to the detriment of China. China’s RCEP, in response, excludes the US, with Beijing taking leadership over the proposed FTAAP, which the US attempted to shut down.

Additionally, the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank now challenges the Asia Development Bank (Asia’s regional version of the World Bank). The US has pressured countries to not join the bank, seeing the bank as a potential competitor to the US-led World Bank and IMF. Developing countries – and even South Korea – have sour relations with the World Bank and IMF, the latter owing to the austerity measures imposed by the IMF on South Korea during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The IMF’s insistence on conditional loans and structural adjustment programs (basically allowing IMF interference in internal policy in exchange for loans) angers developing countries. By contrast, China’s non-interference doctrine seems to be reflected in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, thus providing a possible counter to US influence in the Pacific.

In light of all these developments, it becomes all the more important to readjust current US strategy in the Pacific. Heavy-handed measures like “high-standard trade-agreements” are inappropriate to truly counter China in the Pacific and gain greater influence in the Pacific. Innovative approaches to addressing issues in the region are needed, and these are likely to be found in both trade and non-traditional security and environmental issues. Particularly in poorer Southeast Asian and Pacific Island states, growing environmental concerns are matters of national security. For instance, rising sea levels could increase the salinity of the Mekong Delta, endangering key economic sectors in Vietnam. Likewise, rising sea levels endanger the very survival of small, low-lying Pacific Island states. As a leader in scientific research and an innovator in conservation practices, the US could take leadership in these non-traditional security concerns, providing expertise and knowledge and demonstrating commitment to its regional partners. In doing so, the US could not only create opportunities for cooperation, but also provide solutions that China cannot provide, enhancing its regional leadership.

Second, unlike the Atlantic region, it is currently not possible to dominate the Pacific region. Rising powers and the sheer size and diversity of the Pacific mean that the US cannot adopt a Monroe Doctrine in the Pacific as they did in the Western Hemisphere. Instead, the US should focus on facilitating a healthy web of relationships between Pacific countries.

Current US strategy revolves around the “hub-and-spokes” arrangement implemented during the Cold War. The US attempts to control the Pacific through important relationships and alliances with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan and Australia. These countries, however, do not have particularly good relations with each other. Japan and South Korea continue to rehash historical controversies, with South Korea showing signs that it enjoys China’s partnership better than Japan’s. While the “hub-and-spokes” arrangement functioned in the Cold War due to the US’s military and economic might vis-à-vis its Asian allies who were devastated by World War II, newly assertive and powerful states require a reconfiguration.

The way to a better Pacific security architecture could very well be a greater focus on economic and non-traditional security, with an emphasis on creating win-win situations that allow for more partnerships in areas such as economic development and environmental protection (vital for vulnerable small Pacific island nations). How to handle China is an entirely separate topic, but for now, the US should focus on making the Pacific a rich and prosperous region capable of encouraging healthy economic ties and settling disputes peacefully. It is not enough to only bolster US naval presence in the Pacific or to compete with China with the TPP. The US must take initiative and find creative ways to enhance regional security, reaffirming its commitment and influence in the increasingly vital Pacific region.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

For decades, South Korea has been among the top nations worldwide in student test scores and literacy and graduation rates. Following the Korean War, the administrations of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee moved control of the education system from local school boards to a new Ministry of Education in an attempt to achieve economic development through centralized bureaucracy. The Ministry has been responsible for setting enrollment quotas, certifying schools and teachers, curriculum development, resource allocation, and school administration.

These policy decisions contributed to rapid modernization and economic growth. The adult literacy rate grew from 22% in 1945 to 93% by the late 1980s. Enrollment numbers quickly surpassed those of other industrialized countries such as Japan. In 1985, 99% of students attended an optional year of middle school. In 1987, 34% of secondary school graduates attended institutions of higher education (compared to 30% in Japan and 20% in Britain). Government expenditure on education grew from 2.2% of GNP in 1975 to 4.5% of GNP in 1986.

Accompanying these changes was the rise of an education-centric culture among the South Korean population. The “tiger parenting” tradition that has recently gained attention in the US has been commonplace in South Korea since the early 1990s. Families stress the importance of academic success, no matter what the cost, as the stepping stone to a university education and a respectable white-collar job. The average student spends 13 hours per day at school and logs 5.5 hours of sleep per night. Much of the time in between is spent on homework and further studying.

A “double shift” of school is normal for most students. South Korean families frequently spend thousands of dollars per year on hagwon (known as “cram schools”), which are industrial-scale private schools that tutor high school children every night starting after dinner until around 11pm. South Korea has over 100,000 hagwon today, and roughly 75% of children attend them. In 2012, South Koreans spent $17.9 billion (12% of total consumer spending) on private tuition.

Some families split themselves up geographically so that their children can attend prestigious English-speaking secondary schools. Typically, the mother will move with the children to a planned community bordering a Canadian- or American-run school while the father will remain at home to work, living a pseudo-bachelor life until the children leave for college. A Korean term for these families, kiroji kajok (“goose families,” since they have to migrate to reunite) has made its way into the national vernacular. A recent estimate placed the number of goose families nationwide in the low six figures.

Unsurprisingly, this culture has resulted in consistent top rankings for South Korea’s education system among all countries. In 2014, South Korean students ranked at the top of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in reading, mathematics, and science. In 2011, 64% of the South Korean population had university degrees, well above the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) international average of 39%. In 2014, the OECD’s aggregate index (an average of ratings across several major categories) placed South Korea atop the rankings, with a score of 1.30 standard deviations above the mean. The next closest country, Japan, had a score of 1.03. The United States placed 14^th with a score of 0.39.

In recent years, however, the national conversation regarding education has shifted to include non-academic factors. Since 2011, suicide has been the leading cause of death among young people. 53.4% of South Korean youths who have considered suicide cited excessive academic competition as the main reason. Furthermore, a shrinking middle class has led to a decrease in youth employment. According to a 2013 report by McKinsey & Company, an American consultancy, the proportion of middle class households shrank from 75.4% in 1990 to 67.5% in 2010. This decline was fueled by a shrinking number of high-paying jobs with major business conglomerates; these companies have historically provided the plurality of jobs in South Korea. Earlier in 2014, Statistics Korea reported that youth employment dropped below 40% for the first time since 39.7%. South Korea’s rate of graduate employment among university-educated citizens aged 25-34 is 75%, below the 82% OECD average.

Education experts report that South Koreans have mixed emotions about their education system. The international ranking numbers are impressive and the envy of many nations (including the US). But some administrators believe that this academic success has come at the cost of students’ emotional well-being. Professor JuHo Lee, a former education minister, believes that intensive education was appropriate during Korea’s rapid economic growth, but may now be unnecessary. “We now must look into the ways to reform our education system, not based on test scores, but based on creativity and social and emotional capacities,” he said in January 2014.

Few countries in history have achieved the rapid growth that South Korea has in recent decades. The success of its education system has transformed the country from a war-torn region to an industrialized player on the world stage. However, recent statistics detailing the results of heightened academic pressure, along with the appropriate concern by key administrators, mean that the next decade may hold great change for South Korean education.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Today, the US enjoys quite a high degree of soft power globally, particularly in Asia. The infiltration of American values and culture into the East is evident in the success of American pop music icons and Hollywood films, as well as the appeal of elite American universities. Interestingly, the US government invests virtually no resources in soft power in Asia, excluding humanitarian aid—it almost never funds the cultural items exported to Asia.

The idea and implementation of soft power has become extremely important to the small nation of South Korea. In the last decade, Korean pop culture has experienced an international boom through Korean dramas and “K-Pop.” Koreans are so invested in this new soft power that it has its own word in Korean, hallyu, which literally translates to “Korean wave.” PSY of his “Gangnam Style” fame is the epitome of this phenomenon. Under the current president Park Geun Hye, the Korean government has more than doubled its financial endorsement of Korean pop culture abroad and has expressed hopes that hallyu will lead to strengthened cultural friendliness and economic partnerships. The long-term effects of hallyu are yet to be seen, but the growth of K-Pop fandom on virtually all continents has the Korean government excited.

In comparison to South Korea, China has invested even more resources in its soft power, but with disappointing results. Xi Jinping, the president of China, launched the campaign for the “Chinese Dream,” a rebuilding of the nation’s culture and reputation. Through this campaign, Xi is striving to counteract American cultural influences. The Netflix drama House of Cards proved to be quite popular among Chinese viewers, but the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was quick to paint it as a demonstration of Western corruption and greed. However, the show maintained its strong following. Another product of Hollywood, Transformers: Age of Extinction, became the highest grossing film in China ever, surpassing the previous record holder, James Cameron’s Avatar. In comparison, Chinese artists and films see marginal success in the US. One such artist is Jia Ruhan, a classically trained Chinese singer akin to Celine Dion. The CCP scouted, trained, recorded and promoted Jia with the expectation that she would reach stardom in the States. Yet, you have probably never heard her name or purchased her album, which is unsurprisingly “in line with the image of the Chinese government.” Starlets like Jia are consistently drowned out by news of China’s dodgy actions, like the backlash from the Beijing Olympics, and the political nature of Confucius Institutes, academies established to promote ancient Chinese values. Oftentimes, because of the CCP’s obvious interest in popular entertainment, other Asian nations see Chinese soft power as propaganda or thinly veiled political hard power. Rather than improving China’s image and accelerating the Chinese Dream, Xi Jinping’s brainchild has soured the impression of China in a number of Eastern nations.

Which country, then, has an effective soft power policy in Asia? It seems that India is the nation that best understands the intricacies of soft power. In order to harness, but not control, India’s soft power worldwide, the government funds Bollywood film festivals, art exhibitions and Hindi conferences around the world. These are designed to simply spread awareness of Indian culture, not to promote its policies or generate content as the CCP desires in China.

While the cultural soft power of India has certainly increased in strength and visibility, the government has also utilized humanitarian aid and economic relief to add another dimension to soft power. In Afghanistan, India rose in popularity when it sent economic, rather than military, aid to stabilize the Afghan government. Major financial donations to the UN Democracy Fund (among other funds) also promote a modern and generous image of India. In fact, polls show that many Southeast and Central Asian nations think India is a better partner than China because it is less aggressive.

This financial facet of soft power, unlike Bollywood and Hollywood cultures, is indeed state-run. Despite its political nature, it is critical to the success of a country’s soft power. In the case of the US, South Korea and India (among others), the state does not have influence over pop culture, but, because it recognizes the benefits and necessity of soft power, it uses money to boost its image abroad. For instance, the US gives billions of dollars every year to natural disaster relief and foreign aid. While those numbers might compose a mere 1-2% of the federal budget, the international perception of the US is still improved as images of American officials providing vital aid hit the press. India and South Korea also embrace their roles as donors to the international community. India has one of the world’s fastest-growing foreign aid budgets, while South Korea recently joined the Development Assistance Committee, a prestigious subset of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. All of these nations have effectively used their economic strength in conjunction with cultural soft power to improve the global image of both the people and their government.

Soft power, then, is ultimately a balancing act between the government and the culture of a nation. China’s approach is generally too overbearing, if not threatening. The CCP’s mission to control cultural soft power actually damages its international image, especially when combined with its reluctance to give foreign aid. The United States, on the other hand, allows its cultural soft power to independently run its course in addition to supplying humanitarian aid. As other states look to grow their own soft power, they should follow the leads of India, the US and South Korea. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, is looking to promote Southeast Asian culture around the world. They would be wise to foster a soft power policy that gently blends economic aid with culture free of an overt political agenda. With social clout and generous economic assistance, governments can then pursue hard power foreign policy goals with less resistance.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

You can keep screaming and kicking. Hell, cry your heart out and shout at the top of your lungs until an avalanche erupts on Mount Everest. You still won’t get what you want.

For the past month now, Kim Jong Un has been floundering in his own seething anger as he continues to drag out his usual outlandish temper tantrum akin to one thrown by a child over a can of SpaghettiO’s in the canned foods section of the supermarket. Desperate for attention, the dictatorial tyrant has spewed yet another nuclear threat at the annual Foal Eagle military exercises between the United States and South Korea that he disapproves of so immensely. Consequently, two DPRK mid-range ballistic missiles originating from Pyongyang soared overseas for about a few hundred kilometers before plummeting into the ocean. This outburst takes place as the leaders of the U.S. and South Korea met with the president of Japan at the Hague,

Well, Mr. Kim, you’ve certainly grabbed the attention you were seeking. With unusual haste, the United Nations Security Council met behind closed doors on Thursday emerging with a unanimous condemnation of the missile launches. The Security Council’s North Korea sanctions committee is also investigating the possibility of expanding the U.N. blacklist to encompass more North Korean nuclear entities in addition to those already listed, although it will most likely take several weeks for an agreement on the action to be reached.

While South Korea, the United States, and the UN are interpreting his most recent antics as an international threat, this seems little more than another one of Kim’s outlandish outbursts of inconsequential aggression that will quickly blow over as Foal Eagle operations approach their close in April. One may recall last year’s Foal Eagle operations when Kim publicized threats of hurling nuclear missiles at the United States in retaliation to its warm relations with the South. To this threat, Washington responded by hurriedly deploying a series of missile interceptors to Guam, complementing those already stationed at Fort Greely, Alaska. But this action was intended only to warn North Korea that the United States is certainly capable of matching its bombastic rhetoric. Needless to say, no defensive action was necessary as Foal Eagle activities came and went without any intervention from the ballistic dictator. This year’s scenario is a carbon copy; we can safely assume that Kim’s most recent threats are as hollow as ever.

Unless Kim’s threatening actions transcend mere intimidation, we know well enough that there is no real threat at hand here. Each year, North Korea becomes enraged by these annual military drills ensuing in the South, and each year reacts with threats of nuclear action that dwindle to oblivion with the culmination of the exercises. Although it is estimated that the missiles launched Wednesday are capable of being launched to Japan, Pyongyang will stop short of sending the missiles over the Japanese islands. Moreover, everyone knows that even Psy’s “Gangnam Style” has more hits than North Korea’s faulty missiles ever will. So no need to take cover from the illusory war threat – Kim will surely simmer down as the coming weeks pass.

Is it worth considering that perhaps the troublesome leader has some new antics up his sleeve? Every year, there is the possibility that if Kim does not elicit the immediate reaction he wants from his enemies, he may attempt to launch a small-scale ground attack against the South. Knowing very well from previous tantrums that the playpen fence barring him from South Korea is far too strong to tackle, Kim may try throwing the ball over this time. What that ball would be – a missile, propaganda balloon, etc. – is anybody’s’ guess.

Even still, it is highly unlikely that Kim will match his rhetoric with reality. The plan is an ugly backfire waiting to happen. Chances that North Korea’s actions would be met with a response of equal nuclear force from the international community are slim to none. So the way that I look at it, as Kim’s outlandish pouting and grumpy attitude drags on, there are really only two options that the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, and the U.N. can take; these states can either look past his tantrums and troubling rhetoric or, in the case that North Korea does end up pursuing a ballistic strike, take military action forcing Kim into a timeout.

Nevertheless, North Korea’s nuclear capacity remains limited. The world will most likely yet again witness the disappearance of North Korea’s meandering threats with the culmination of Foal Eagle in early April. The annual military exercises will continue, despite Kim’s belligerent disapproval. The most to take away from this entire situation is that the only “explosive” thing at play here is Kim’s infantile temperament. We’ve seen this childish temper tantrum erupt and wane one too many times already. So stop banging your fists and causing a scene, Kim – you’re still not getting your SpaghettiO’s.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff and editorial board.