Emerging from a shared socialist past, the coalition served to align these nations toward European Union integration, gaining accession to the organization in 2004. The four nations enjoy the free flow of capital, goods, services, and people throughout the EU. Yet, the EU also prides itself on shared democratic norms, expecting its members to uphold these values in return for membership and common economic and political cooperation. In recent years, the Visegràd group has acted in discordance with the EU, reminiscing repressive ideals from the former Soviet bloc and deviating strongly from Brussels’ action plan. 

Accession to the EU promised the V4 inclusion to the world’s largest common market. The labor market situation has improved in all four countries since the start of their EU membership. Poland for example, has received $154 billion from the EU since its accession, more than any other member country. This economic boost helped Poland make massive leaps in infrastructure. The aid, in combination with a higher standard of living, also enabled Poland to retain more of its working population within the country, counterbalancing the outflow caused by joining the EU.

The EU’s eastern members are also subject to paramount foreign direct investment (FDI) from the economic bloc. The inward FDI stock, a value of foreign investors’ equity and net loans to enterprises, accounts for over 40% of the GDP for each of the four Visegràd countries. Proportions of this order exhibit how strongly the V4’s economies rely on the close partnership with the EU and its western affiliates. 

The V4 are also the main topic of interest of the EU’s cohesion policy, an aim by the institution to reduce disparities, improve employment, and support convergence of incomes across its member states. During EU budget distribution from 2007 to 2013, the V4 received half of the total cohesion funding. Such funds unlock large scale infrastructure investments, bringing about economic growth and prosperity. In compliance with this, the Visegràd states were, collectively, Germany’s most important trading partner in 2017 due to their inclusion into European supply chains.

EU membership clearly brings economic development as well as social inclusion to the states left fragile by the demise of the former Soviet Union. Yet, all four countries continuously prove that their belonging to the European common market does not guarantee compliance with any problem-solving or political alignment. Analyzing these acts of non-compliance shows the former socialist identity is still very much embedded in the region, as the V4 are very attached to their nationalistic and authoritarian beliefs.

The most prominent example of disobedience is the migrant crisis of 2015. The European Court of Justice found that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had breached EU law by taking little to no migrants during the crisis. The EU policy called upon member states to properly manage migration flows, sharing the burden and imposing redistribution quotas. 

The three nations disagreed with key EU policy, stating that supporting migration brings more problems to the EU. This lack of burden sharing was met with heavy criticism by other European leaders, leaving countries such as Germany to take in over one million asylum seekers between 2015 and 2016 alone. The anti-immigrant stance also falls in line with the V4’s nationalistic belief in homogeneity, wanting to keep the majority of their population of the same religion, ethnicity, and race.

The Center for European Studies links this lack of burden sharing to the fact that the V4 states had little authority over their borders during the Soviet Union. The stream from East to West left these countries very fragile in the past. A reminiscence of internal and physical division is a harrowing narrative for these countries. However, the group cannot support open EU borders when it benefits from the inflow of remittances and FDI, to then decline the flow of movement when a problem arises.

If the V4 felt that the EU was solely bringing economic development to their countries, would they still nitpick what part of the membership they agree with? Hard to believe. This is why the V4’s viewpoint needs to be considered. In fact, the aforementioned emigration to Western Europe meant that many high-skilled labor forces left their countries. Moreover, the levels of FDI in the Central European countries have bought out the local market. The Visegràd nations cannot establish their own economic landscape as they are now dependent on Western capital.

By not developing their own economic sovereignty, the V4 know that they will never be considered heavyweights within the EU spectrum. As outlined by a lecturer at the Institute of European Studies, the V4 feel inferior to other member countries, essentially being handed out a second-class membership. If not valued as an economic partner, the Visegrad states are in no rush to adapt their political landscape to the rest of Europe. Instead of a successful EU integration narrative, their new narrative is that they are an underappreciated bunch. 

Despite being tied to the West, the V4 don’t want to be bullied into an adaptation of policies such as migrant intake strictly because someone much further West in Brussels says so, a view shared by a Visegrad minister. Instead, many parts of the four countries are driving forward political sovereignty from the EU, pushing further right. And while this viewpoint is not widespread throughout all four countries, it helps to explain their rebellious behavior in terms of foreign policy. 

The V4 has also observed how Brexit has left the EU fragile. Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister and perhaps the strongest euroskeptic of the V4, attacks the EU’s weaknesses by stating it “is unable to protect its own citizens, to protect its external borders and to keep the community together, as Britain has just left.” Following the strongest anti-EU sentiments in the region suggests the V4 has identified the instability of the EU. Thus, if it is to stay in the EU, it will not tolerate being treated as a young member within the organization.

The Visegràd group uses that knowledge to its advantage. If these countries do not feel valued as an EU partner, they will not limit the spreading of far right and repressive politics in their countries. In fact, due to the notion of lost sovereignty across their states, they are holding onto their discriminative and nationalistic beliefs even more. These beliefs never truly disappeared with the fall of the Soviet era. If anything, the migrant crisis as well as the perceived disrespect from Brussels has poured fuel on the V4’s non-political alignment with the West.

A more recent example perfectly illustrates the level the repression has reached. Poland and Hungary rejected COVID-19 stimulus funds created by the EU in 2020, explaining that the countries don’t see eye to eye with the rest of the EU on topics such as migration and gender. Allowing the stimulus funds would enable EU countries to force their interpretation on these topics on Poland and Hungary. Instead of easing the effects of the pandemic on its citizens, the two nations would rather block much needed recovery funds, due to the possible implications this could have on migration and gender rights in their nations. 

The mayors of capital cities Warsaw and Budapest were in disbelief by this action. In a joint statement, they sharply criticized their own governments, accusing them of spreading non-liberal ideologies and corrupt interests. Clearly, we can observe a strong divide between the countries’ leaders’, and their capital cities, which are exposed to a richer cultural blend. This divide in itself portrays the stubborn nature of the governments, unable to adapt to changing norms in its own country, and stuck in denial toward cultural diversity and liberalism.

While this is the strongest case of the V4 disregarding EU morals, the far right and repressive ideologies are strong and growing across all four Visegràd states. The fingers are often pointed at Poland and Hungary, and with good reason, but Slovakia and Czech Republic exhibit those same ideologies.

Slovakia has had the most successful rise of a radical far-right in politics. The opposition party to the government has gotten daunting levels of support. The People’s Party Our Slovakia (LSNS) presents itself as a respectable party, yet its extremist affiliations can be discerned very easily. From celebrating anniversaries of fascist war heroes, to putting up billboards condemning LGBT and migrant communities, repressive and undemocratic politics have clearly resurfaced in Slovakia.

An even stronger trend is noted in the Czech Republic, as it isn’t the opposition party but the governing party exhibiting undemocratic politics. Czechian Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has distributed EU funds in an incorrect and corrupt way, giving the money to his own conglomerate instead of the small to medium sized enterprises the funds were meant for. This resulted in convictions by the European Commission. If that wasn’t enough, Czech President Milos Zeman is openly racist, xenophobic, and frequently showcases much stronger alignment with Russian Ideals than European ones.

Real communist power is on the rise once again across the V4. This is not to say that the trend hasn’t occurred across other EU members, but the Visegràd states are specifically placing nationalistic anti-immigrant culture above all else. The EU does not seem to be wholly respected and previous ties with the Kremlin’s ideologies are entertained. As a result, the EU does not give the V4 as much decision making power in Brussels. 

The Visegràd coalition thrived to be part of an economically prosperous and forward-looking Europe, yet strongly disrespects the European identity. At times it seems the countries themselves don’t know what they want to belong to. The identity crisis needs to be resolved, as Europe has worked toward peace for too long to revert back.

How do you solve an identity crisis? By forming an identity. The V4 have relied heavily on EU funds and remittances to promote their economic agenda, but they haven’t identified their own niches in production since joining the EU. The EU needs to encourage this and let industries flourish without intervention. Otherwise, the European market will never truly value the V4, they will continue to treat them as second-class members and in return the V4 will act nefariously toward the organization, creating a vicious loop.

On the EU side, it should offer incentives to the V4. If they adapt their political agenda more to that of the West, they can carry more voice in Brussels. As of now the V4 do not see a reason why they shouldn’t enforce their oppressive beliefs in homogeneity, they need to see a benefit in altering the way their politics is run.

A softer solution in the meantime could be resolutions that resemble the “pact of free cities.” Particularly, the culturally diverse metropoles of the Visegràd states strongly disagree with the oppressive actions of their own governments. If corruption and repression from their own governments prevents them from aligning themselves with the rest of the EU, they should not be punished. A separate relationship should be built between the EU and the cities.

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Erin Pineda – The Venezuelan Migration Crisis

The Venezuelan crisis is now the largest exodus in Latin America in recent history. As of this March 2019, the number of Venezuelan emigrants worldwide is over 3.7 million, making it one of the largest migration crises in the world today. It is second only to the Syrian Civil War, which created 6.3 million refugees. This number is only expected to grow as rampant hyperinflation continues after hitting the 10,000,000 percent mark this year, shortages of food and medical supplies worsen, and the presidential power struggle between Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó intensifies.

The Red Cross recently brokered a deal between the representatives of the two presidents to deliver aid to 650,000 people. However, this will do little to ease the suffering of millions of Venezuelans currently living in extreme poverty. It will also not stem the tide of an estimated 5,000 people leaving the country every day. As the situation in Venezuela worsens, Latin American countries must begin drafting and implementing policies to prepare for even larger flows of Venezuelans than they have experienced in the last two years.

Border towns in Colombia and Brazil are already feeling the strain, struggling to provide food and shelter for so many migrants at once, even as most migrants continue on traveling to other countries. Many migrants make the journey on foot by walking along the highways from Ciudad Guayana and Caracas to Boa Vista, Brazil or Bogota, Colombia. This long and dangerous journey takes days to complete, and many migrants arrive with no money and in very poor health from the journey. One migrant I spoke with recently reported sleeping with hundreds of other migrants in an old abandoned warehouse without any electricity in Boa Vista, Brazil and having to cook her food over empty paint cans. Although there is a UNHCR shelter in Boa Vista, it was at capacity, and she was forced to look elsewhere. This experience will become the status quo if resources are not allocated to properly care for these migrants. Furthermore, a more coordinated, multilateral effort is necessary to settle these migrants long term.

As a whole, Latin American countries have been welcoming to Venezuelan migrants, maintaining open border policies that allow for these caminantes to enter without penalty. Colombia alone has received 1.1 million Venezuelans so far, followed by 506,000 in Peru, and 288,000 in Chile. This welcoming attitude is mostly because of Venezuela’s reception of Colombians fleeing the Colombian Civil Conflict during the 1960s. With shelters at capacity and no assistance from multilateral institutions like the UN, OAS, and Mercosur coming in the foreseeable future, many wonder when this welcome will be worn out. Right now, this crisis is contained to Latin America. Nonetheless, developed countries must contribute funds to this cause before it becomes a worldwide phenomenon, as happened with the Syrian Refugee Crisis.

Briana Trujillo – When Progressivism and Socialism Don’t Go Hand in Hand: What’s Missing from the American Perspective on Venezuela

At a protest in Caracas, Venezuela against President Nicolas Maduro, a woman says to the camera for a Washington Post video, “People don’t need to be told [to protest]. Hunger spoke to them. And hunger doesn’t need explanations.” Meanwhile, in North America, tweets with the hashtag #HandsOffVenezuela have taken off, demanding Venezuela be left to its own devices. These polarized discussions have lead to back and forth on Twitter between public figures and actual Venezuelans.

The dissonance between the pleas of the Venezuelan people and liberal American ears probably has many roots, but for this writer, one of them is identity politics — or the association of socialism with progressivism regardless of its form. Let’s break down those terms: Progressivism technically means a belief in social improvement through the government, but more loosely, it’s used in reference to progress toward economic and social equality.

So when Americans assume that socialism always (including when it’s imposed) leads a people toward progress, they ironically do the very thing socialism demands them not to do: silence the voice of the common man. Politicians on the left in the U.S., like Rep. Ilhan Omar and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, don’t see it this way. These champions for the liberal movement say they recognize Maduro’s tyranny but still stand against the idea that the U.S. should have any involvement, militarily or otherwise.

In response to that, I acknowledge my own biases — I’m not well-versed in foreign policy, and I speak from an emotional place because I grew up in a suburb of Miami where Venezuelan asylum seekers fleeing from the past president Hugo Chavez were the majority. But to this community, President Trump’s recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s new president was the first thing he has done right in all his Administration.

His motives, however, are still deeply questionable. Is Trump simply a selfless champion of human rights around the globe and a stand-up president? No, I certainly think the concerns that America is acting in its own self-interest with Venezuela are valid. But as much as Americans want to stick to their guns in their distaste for the current President, and as much as they are suspicious of America overstepping its boundaries in Latin America, they cannot hide behind a veil of faux progressivism. Maduro’s socialism is anything but progressive. To say the Venezuelan people want to be left alone, to deal with Maduro on their own, is a gross misinterpretation of the situation.

Ishani Desai – Venezuela: A History of Socialism Gone Wrong

Venezuela currently is suffering one of the – if not the – most severe economic collapse in modern history. Inflation has increased to 10 million percent from 112 percent in 2015. The migration crisis has worsened as the number of Venezuelans who have fled to neighboring countries and elsewhere has increased to 3 million within the last three years. Venezuela’s current President has said continuously he will help to rectify the crisis but so far, his efforts have failed as the countries plummets into a seemingly irreversible economic and political turmoil.

Previously a thriving country, Venezuela had struck gold when oil was discovered, leading to Venezuela’s dominant role in the oil market and its rise in its oil exports. However, this rapid economic growth from the 1920s to the 70s was stopped by the decline in global oil prices leading to a market contraction and a hit to the Venezuelan economy in the 1980s and 90s. This economic period worsened, hurting the mindsets of hopeful Venezuelans until the introduction of a new leader, Hugo Chavez. Chavez was just one of the multiple leaders across Latin America who promised reforms to promote the fundamental tenets of socialism against what was perceived to be the evil of capitalism, Europe, and the United States. All three were believed to have caused the initial downfall of Latin American countries after their colonial freedom. During this time, Chavez raised workers’ wages, expanded the budget to allocate more money to social services and attempted to control rising domestic prices with price ceilings meant to stabilize the economy and government control. Nonetheless, these reforms proved to not be effective given the ongoing decline of oil exports and oil reserves of the nation, as well as the rampant corruption within the government that seemingly promised to champion the rights of the disadvantaged.

Chavez died in 2013 amidst the current economic crisis known today. Maduro, Chavez’s successor, took his position after narrowingly winning the subsequent presidential election. Although the opposing Democratic Unity Party took control of the National Assembly, Maduro’s Socialist Party had continued to prevail given his control of the military and creation of a new legislative body meant to pass laws directly under his favor. In other words, Maduro had effectively transitioned Venezuela from a democracy into an authoritarian government to enact what he perceived were the best laws meant to uplift Venezuela from economic turmoil. Maduro gave himself more power than what was legally acceptable and had further entrenched himself into a hole from which he cannot escape. If he chooses to escape now, the only alternative he has is prison or worse, if the public is not accepting.

Currently, Maduro’s policies to counter hyperinflation – from raising worker wages to cutting public spending to devaluing the currency to attempting to associate himself as the “new Bolivar” to using a cryptocurrency that cannot be traded in the market – has only worsened the country’s situation. His socialist policies have closed off Venezuela from most of the world as he continues relying on the failing oil industry. He does not acknowledge the failure of the diversification in the Venezuelan economy. Furthermore, Maduro’s government ignores the IMF, an organization meant to oversee the global economy and aid suffering economies, and instead calls them them a pawn of Washington and says the country’s struggles are the result of an “economic war” led by the United States.

Perhaps Maduro has long ago removed himself from socialism, shown by his current actions to transform the government and operate on a militarily powered front. However, what cannot be ignored is that the socialist ideas used to fund efforts to improve an already failing economy since the 90s proved ineffective and has led to one of the worst humanitarian crises in the 21st century. Meanwhile, Venezuelans struggle to satisfy their most basic needs and no longer have any voice in their beloved country.

For an in-depth look at Venezuela by Desai, click here.

Stuart Carson – The Trump Administration’s Dishonesty

  Since the fraudulent re-election of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in May of 2018, the Trump administration has been particularly hawkish on the rogue nation-state. In January, the Administration recognized Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido as the rightful head of state. In February, the U.S. State Department imposed sanctions amounting to a near embargo on Venezuelan oil and tacked on a new round of visa restrictions on five associates of the Maduro regime. In April, Venezuela’s central bank became the most recent target of Trump’s campaign of slow suffocation. Though these policies have yet to oust Maduro, they have most certainly been tumultuous for the Venezuelan economy and the legitimacy of Maduro’s governance.

In matters of rhetoric, the Administration has been just as combative. After Guido declared himself the leader of Venezuela in January, President Trump pledged to “use the full weight of United States economic and diplomatic power to press for the restoration of Venezuelan democracy.” At a campaign rally in February, the president told a raucous crowd that “all options are on the table” for Venezuela. Other members of the Administration have been just as forceful in their remarks. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo referred to Maduro as a “sick tyrant” in February, while National Security Adviser John Bolton called Maduro a “dictator” clinging to an “illegitimate claim to power.” Unfortunately, it appears that the Trump Administration is more concerned with empty and aggressive posturing rather than the people of Venezuela, as shown by its asylum policies.

In 2017, 27,629 Venezuelans applied for asylum in the United States. From January to September of 2018, more than 20,100 Venezuelan refugees petitioned the United States for asylum, marking the third year in a row that Venezuelans made up the largest group of asylum applicants in the country. Those who flee Venezuela face widespread food shortages and an epidemic of violence that has given Venezuela one of the world’s highest murder rates. However, instead of advancing American humanitarian efforts to assist these refugees, Trump has curtailed refugee admissions, pushed for the construction of a border wall and cancelled the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.

If the word of the United States is to be taken seriously, the Administration must grant special immigration status to the roughly 70,000 Venezuelan asylum seekers currently in the United States. This would mean offering Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforcement Departure Programs to Venezuelan asylum seekers. Such programs would provide special legal immigration status to Venezuelan refugees and protect them from being wrongfully deported by ICE officials. Yet, despite the clear and achievable policy path towards alleviating the humanitarian crisis, key officials in the White House oppose such actions because they would be inconsistent with the President’s war on immigration, asylum seekers, and refugees. If Trump does win his war on immigration, Trump’s policies and rhetoric towards Maduro will ring empty and dishonest towards those the President ought to be most concerned with – the Venezuelan people.

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In its most recent presidential election in December 2017, Chile elected conservative billionaire Sebastian Piñera over leftist candidate Alejandro Guillier. The decisive 55-45 percent victory signals a political shift for the country which has been dominated by the center-left coalition for the last 37 years. The only other disruption of the Left’s power during this era was Piñera’s first presidential term, 2010-2014.

Piñera’s reelection could put many of former president Michelle Bachelet’s policies at stake, as they hinge on socialist values. However, Piñera maintained a very moderate tone throughout his campaign and promises to uphold some of Bachelet’s most progressive laws such as ensuring free university tuition for the country’s poorest 60% of students. His commitment to easing social inequality, accommodating the country’s powerful left wing, and dramatically strengthening the economy will likely clash with the right wing coalition Chile Vamos’ goals, and could be a source of conflict for the veteran politician.

Sebastian Piñera assumed office on March 11 in an unusual political climate, both in Chile and in Latin America more broadly. Chile now joins Brazil, Argentina, and Peru as part of the growing list of countries that recently elected conservative leaders in response to corruption or economic frustration at the hand of leftist administrations. The case of Venezuela has been a particularly strong driver for this continental shift, as its economic crisis has made its neighbors wary of socialism. This became evident during the Chilean elections as voters referenced the possibility of a “Chilezuela” under Guiller, given his passionate commitment to the Bachelet’s leftist policy.

Piñera’s agenda, however, offered voters a slightly more reliable alternative. The Harvard-educated economist is business-focused and has promised to double growth after taking office by reducing bureaucratic obstacles. He wants to cut corporate taxes and instigate $40 billion worth of investment projects related to mining, energy, and infrastructure that stagnated under the previous administration. He expects the rapid growth to help fund pensions, health care, and free education (which shows a change of heart from when he was previously in office, during which time he referred to education as a consumer good.) Voters had good reason to believe in his promises given that economic growth remained around 5 percent per year when Piñera was first president.

However, a number of challenges have already begun to arise for the president-elect. He will not have a majority in either the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies, and will likely have to assign half of his administration to getting anything approved in Congress. Additionally, by striving for moderacy in his campaign, he had to distance himself somewhat from the agenda of his party, Chile Vamos. For example, many conservatives are unhappy that Piñera plans to continue providing free university tuition to poor students, a Bachelet-era development. Some tension has already arisen following Piñera’s criticism of Chile Vamos’s cabinet proposal: “the parties made a very broad (proposal), so in the end all of them were seen, all their people, but they gave up their influence.”

The high potential for partisan conflict, lack of support in Congress, and very lofty goals imply that Piñera may have promised more than he can deliver. I predict that the progress he aims to make by streamlining bureaucratic processes will be balanced by the stagnation of any new proposals in Congress. Therefore, social issues such as changes to state pension plans and the education system will be minimal.

However, Piñera’s term in office will likely see the economic growth promised by his campaign. The economy grew during his previous term because the price of copper was high, and, luckily for Piñera, the price of copper is predicted to rise 3 percent during 2018. Additionally, the GDP is predicted to grow 3 percent in the upcoming year, which will pave the way for his proposed spending plans.

The big question is how Sebastian Piñera will be able to navigate the Chilean political climate given the pressure he will receive from Chile Vamos and the still-primarily-leftist government and population who have set very high expectations. A lot falls on his shoulders, but Piñera has made it this far by emphasizing faith and unity: “each time that we Chileans have confronted each other, and seen each other as enemies, we have suffered our greatest defeats and greatest grief. We all know that each time we have united as Chileans, we have achieved our most beautiful triumphs, and our greatest victories.” We will see if Piñera is able to maintain this level of optimism as he settles into his new office.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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To be fair, identifying necessary reforms in a country plagued by environmental issues, social and economic inequality, and political malfeasance is no easy feat. If Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and their band of merry men released a statement with too many calls for reform and policy changes, the bar would be set unreasonably high. At the same time, if in the Third Plenum they called for insufficient changes there would be tremendous public outrage that might precipitate political activism.

In this case, being vague is the best approach. If China’s leaders prescribed legitimate reforms for their economy and political systems, just think of the instability it might prompt. The millions of migrant workers who are denied health insurance, educational opportunities, and economic freedom would get overexcited. Calls to curtail environmental pollution would give the millions of Chinese who live in cities with toxic PM 2.5 levels such a sense of relief that they might pass out on the streets during rush hour, dying of asphyxiation from exhaust fumes. Discussing democratization or even more transparency in government might distract Foxconn workers from assembling iPads. It is clear that rushing into reforms without proper thought and consideration is a bad decision for a country still in the early phases of development.

Engaging In Premature Reform is Dangerous

For now the safest way to engage in reform is by avoiding said reform at all costs. They say the longer you wait for policy changes the better they feel. The right time for reform implementation, however, remains unclear. One can’t simply engage in pre-hegemonic reform. At the moment, the party is simply waiting for that special generation to come along. The wait of course will be worth it.
China’s 18th Party Congress can’t be upfront about the fact that reforms may be only attainable in the far-away future. China’s 1.3 billion people are bursting with all kinds of desires to experiment politically, economically and socially. If China was too upfront about its intention to postpone reform, there might be a nasty schism and nationwide protests. And it isn’t that the Communist Party doesn’t want to reform with its people. It just doesn’t feel ready.

How to Lead on Your Population in the Most Effective Way

Sure you can’t engage in it, but you definitely can talk about it. Even just saying the word over and over can excite your countrymen enough without succumbing to their desires. It’s for this reason that in the Plenum Communiqué there was a lot of mention of reform and other words that are sure to excite its disgruntled, frustrated citizens. According to a press release by the Beijing News, no prior Third Plenum report had as many uses of the word ‘reform’.

The Plenum stressed that to comprehensively deepen reform, we must hold high the magnificent banner of Socialism with Chinese characteristics, take Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important ‘Three Represents’ thought and the scientific development view as guidance, persist in beliefs, concentrate a consensus, comprehensively plan matters, move forward in a coordinated manner, persist in the reform orientation of the Socialism market economy, make stimulating social fairness and justice, and enhancing the people’s welfare into starting points and stopover points, further liberate thoughts, liberate and develop social productive forces, liberate and strengthen social vitality, firmly do away with systemic and mechanistic abuses in all areas, and strive to open up an even broader prospect for the undertaking of Socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Chinese readers must have gotten excited just reading this. “Persist…”, “concentrate…”, “stimulate…” This proactive language would leave any reform-deprived person brimming with optimism, if only for a while. One Chinese blogger wrote, “In the end it’s not important whether the document is consistent from beginning to end, because everyone can find what they need in it.” So long as Chinese citizens are satisfied with their government toying with reform, the Communist Party may be able to kick the can down the road and refrain from true policy changes for some time. Sure, citizens’ reform frustrations will continue, but at least everyone can be assured that no one is rushing into any big decisions.

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