Yemen is a nation under siege. The state is rife with conflict between the Sunni-majority Sana’a government and the Zaydi Shi’a minority insurgency known as the Believing Youth or the Houthis. The group takes its name from military commander and founder of the group, Hussein al-Houthi, who was killed in a 2004 skirmish with government forces. Both anti-American and anti-Zionist, the group has grown tremendously in numbers; some experts estimate Houthi membership by both armed and unarmed supporters to be close to 100,000 men and women.

Houthi discontent with the Yemeni government truly gained steam in 2004. The opposition group suffered tremendously under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, himself a Zaydite. In 2011, simmering Houthi frustration boiled over during the Arab Spring, as protests spread across the country demanding the resignation of President Saleh. After forcibly resigning due to injuries sustained by a rebel missile attack on the presidential palace, the US backed a governmental transition that replaced Saleh with current Yemeni president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.

The group began its conquest of northern Yemen, successfully consuming the capital and several northern governorates in the country. Discontent grew over the Houthi’s lack of representation in national politics, as well as cuts to fuel subsidies in the Houthi-majority north. The opposition group exploited the lack of military strength in Yemen’s capital of Sana’a and seized the city with almost no resistance. Since then, the Houthis have assumed a supervisory role over government operations, handling the pay of government officials and reviewing documents from the state-owned Safer oil company.

The Houthis clearly have widespread influence politically as well. The group disapproved of Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak’s appointment to the Prime Minister post. Protests in the capital last Thursday forced him to decline the post, and hours later, two separate suicide bomber attacks in Sana’a killed at least 67 people.

Yet, there may be hope for stability, since Islamist and Shiite rebel leaders both approved of President Saleh’s appointment of Khaled Bahah, Yemen’s ambassador to the United Nations, as the new prime minister of the country. While still early in its development, the bipartisan support of Bahah is promising for putting Yemen on the right track in the coming years.

Instability in Yemen is in no neighboring state’s interest. Saudi Arabia, which borders Yemen to the north, is increasingly worried about the effect a pro-Shi’a coup could have on the religious balance of power within the region. Though Iran officially denounced any support for the take over, the mistrust caused by the Houthi overthrow will have lasting effects on diplomacy and peace in the Middle East.

Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) will also prove problematic for creating lasting peace for Yemen in the short term. As a Salafist Jihadist group with growing power in the south of the country, AQAP may exploit religious differences and labels to create a civil war in an attempt to clinch power in Sana’a. The growing secessionist movement in the south also plays well into the hands of Houthi leaders, who could easily split the country to avoid sectarian strife in their newly acquired country.

The struggle for Sana’a has displaced over 30,000 civilians already, and continued attacks and instability in the capital and throughout the country will undoubtedly double or triple the number of people trying to escape bloodshed.

While the Gulf Cooperation Council condemned the Houthi overthrow of Yemen’s capital, they put forward no tangible strategy to eliminating and degrading the group’s power in Sana’a. Without guaranteed stability in Yemen, Saudi Arabia may be the next target for extremist groups able to penetrate the oil-rich country from Yemen in the south and Iraq in the north if the Islamic State continues to march south.

Regional actors must recognize their responsibility to protect the Arab world’s poorest country and realize the importance of restoring order to Sana’a before international terror organizations beat them to the punch.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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Over the past few years, the largest obstacle to Iran’s power projection and influence in the greater Middle East has been sanctions levied against Tehran by the United States, Europe and the United Nations. Tehran’s nuclear program is the main cause, but festering wounds caused by Iran’s own vehement anti-Americanism and the 1979 Hostage Crisis endure, with Iran’s support of Hezbollah against Israel causing even more strain.

Optimism in the West for rapprochement with Iran surged with the swearing-in of the relatively moderate President Rouhani. After President Rouhani visited New York City, held a phone conversation with President Obama – the highest level talk between the two countries since 1979 – and then offered to sit down and talk about proliferation and the possible ending of sanctions, the West was ready to listen. With a possible rapprochement on the line, it is a prime time for the US to analyze Iran’s geostrategic objectives in the context of American involvement in the Middle East and the ongoing Iraqi crisis.

Iran’s Current Geopolitical Position

Iran geopolitical position is unenviable. A look at it’s neighborhood reveals that, contrary to hardliners’ fears of a post-sanctions Iran ruling the Middle East, Iran finds itself in a tar pit of dangers.

Iran is only one of four majority Shi’a countries, the others being Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan. Despite Iran viewing itself as the leader of the Shi’a world, relations with each of these Shi’a countries are strained. Iraq is deteriorating by the day. Bahrain mistrusts Iran due to Iranian sentiments expressing the desire to annex Bahrain, igniting Bahraini Arab nationalism. Azerbaijan and Iran, despite sharing strong cultural, religious and historical ties, mistrust each other. Iran remains suspicious of possible Azeri irredentist ambitions (four of Iran’s provinces are considered part of “Greater Azerbaijan”), while Azerbaijan also remains suspicious of Iran’s maneuvers, particularly after Iran’s support for Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Due to its size, its ability to project significant power and its historical and cultural influences, Iran is a contender for establishing regional hegemony in the Middle East. It faces two rivals, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, one a parallel Sunni theocracy and the other a secular republic. Despite Turkey’s recent political instability, their friendship with the Iraqi Kurds and existing image as an effective partner for the West in Middle Eastern affairs renders it a significant regional power. Saudi Arabia is determined to oppose Iran at every turn. Leveraging its status as a strategic American ally, Saudi Arabia has liberally asserted itself in the greater Middle East, endeavoring to isolate Iran and funding Sunni movements against Iran and its allies. Wikileaks documents reveal that despite warming relations, Saudi Arabia encouraged the Americans to attack Iran in the heyday of the Israel-Iran standoff.

Thus, Iran is relatively isolated in the world. While Iran does have powerful friends in China and Russia, the former does not wish to be heavily involved in the politics of the region and Iran cannot consistently rely on their help. Syria is the only reliable regional ally, but unfortunately for Iran, Assad has been severely weakened in his fight with the rebels, leaving Iran, in terms of immediate surroundings, with few options.

Therefore, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities for its own power projection is understandable. Furthermore, Iran’s overall regional strategy relies on soft power. Facing a Sunni Saudi Arabia backed by the Americans, Iran has opted for pan-Islamic leadership by taking foremost action against its arch-nemesis Israel, thereby not only attempting to rally Muslims to the Palestinian cause, but also attempting to encourage the people of the Middle East to expunge American influence from the region.

ISIS Crisis

The origins of the ISIS Crisis are studded with irony. Before ISIS established a Caliphate, the underground group was funded largely by wealthy patrons in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, secretly wishing to ignite an anti-Shi’a jihad. Although Saudi Arabia has since reduced donations to ISIS, it is clear that America’s traditional allies in the region indirectly contributed to the disintegration of the Iraqi state. This is not to say that Maliki’s own sectarian policies, and by extension Iran’s own meddling in Iraq, share no part of the blame. It is only to say that in this current climate, the US finds itself in an awkward, and oddly opportune, position of needing new allies to help stabilize Iraq.

As painful as it may be for us to work with a member of the “Axis of Evil,” and as upsetting as it is to continue supporting al-Maliki as he violates principles of democratic governance, regional stability in the Middle East is the highest priority for America. The most preferable short-term stable state of affairs would be one in which al-Maliki reigns as a reliable client in Baghdad, a state we are increasingly unable to maintain.

Iran, having carved a sphere of influence through Iraq to Syria, cannot allow a fundamentally anti-Iranian Sunni insurrection to disrupt Iranian designs, much less allow a disruption so close to Iran’s own homeland. Iran also recognizes that in the current situation with a weakened Assad, an increasingly assertive Turkish-backed Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region and a reluctant America, it cannot combat ISIS alone. The Syrian Civil War drained Iran of much political capital as it sought to keep Assad in power. Indeed, it seems increasingly likely that Iran will have to choose which ally to save: Syria or Iraq. Needing stable borders and to prevent spillover conflicts, Iran will likely choose Iraq and seek American partnership.

Rushing into the limelight during ongoing talks between the West and Iran concerning proliferation and the ending of sanctions, ISIS seems to provide an incentive for the Americans and Iranians to recognize their common interests and pursue greater cooperation. For now, the Eagle’s priorities align with the Lion’s.

Future Trajectory

While neat parallels do not exist between 2014 Iran and 1972 China, Nixon and Kissinger’s bold move reminds us today that daring statecraft will always be necessary. America would gain much needed Iranian support in stabilizing Iraq. Additionally, less pressure on Tehran would allow Iran to further entertain the possibility of an Iraq without al-Maliki. While al-Maliki is a reliable ally of Tehran, even the Iranians realize that al-Maliki’s divisive politics are not a suitable long-term strategy for the Iranian sphere of influence, a realization made all the more apparent by ISIS’ insurrection.

Another possible boon is that Iran can play a role in ensuring the survival of the Afghan state. Iranian covert support of the Taliban may run counter to American interests, but in the short term Iran also wishes for a stable Afghanistan, which cannot be guaranteed should American support and manpower in the region dwindle.

Security and politics aside, Iran also brings a largely untapped market to the table. Sanctions have prevented Western businesses from pursuing opportunities in Iran. With Iranian overdependence on oil exports, cueing the need for diversification and a rich resource base that includes large reserves of hydrocarbon, investment and partnership opportunities for American businesses abound. For instance, California-based World Eco Energy has reportedly signed a conditional $1.175b deal in Iran to turn waste into energy.

Iran, for its part, will perhaps have even more to gain from a partnership with the Americans. Booming economies, solutions to macroeconomic woes brought about by sanctions and liberalized oil exports aside, Iran would simply have more space to maneuver. No longer drawing the ire of a powerful ally of Saudi Arabia, Iran can set out to expand its economic and political influence.

For instance, recognizing the apprehension of surrounding Gulf States to the possibility of a resurgent Iran, Tehran sent a delegation to Kuwait, the UAE and Oman. This move is beneficial on many fronts since it allows Tehran to look past sectarian differences and work towards solutions for the ISIS crisis, perhaps even paving the way for future talks on Gulf cooperation and energy policy.

On the flip side of the coin, increased room for Iranian maneuvers might also mean greater Hezbollah activities against Israel. However, this can be checked by greater American security commitments to Israel, agreements with the Iranians themselves, or by the simple fact that solving the ISIS crisis will require even more political capital and resources from Iran, already partially depleted from the Syria Civil War.

Of course, any partnership does not make Iran our friend. Iranian support of Hezbollah and Taliban cannot go unheeded. The values and interests of Iran still clash with the American’s. Iranian ambitions must still be curbed through continued support and reassurances of key allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. It is a fine game the Americans must play: to engage in offshore balancing without too often lending a hand to any one party. Nevertheless, cooperation with Iran can expedite Middle Eastern stability, giving the United States much needed breathing room to address domestic problems and reevaluate its foreign policy strategy in the Middle East.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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I heard a joke once. The joke was that Winston Churchill, who in 1921 was serving as Secretary of State of the British colonies, had created the British protectorate Transjordan (now the country of Jordan) by drawing an arbitrary line through Saudi Arabia. The odd zig-zag shape the border creates is supposedly the result of Churchill’s hiccups following a particularly drunken lunch.

Some joke, when thousands of people are displaced because of a hiccup. But whether or not Churchill told this story in jest, and whether or not he really had one too many the day he created the border between what is now Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the fact remains that it is no joke, and no secret, that the borders of the Middle East were artificially created by the French and British almost one hundred years ago. Today, the world watches in disbelief as many of the Middle Eastern countries repeatedly collapse into instability.

It’s important to study the history of this instability before proposing solutions. In 1915, the Ottoman Empire had been watching its power decline in the face of European global domination for almost two hundred years. Its final, fatal mistake was joining World War I on the side of Germany. As the war continued, it became clear that the Ottoman Empire was not going to survive. Britain and France, the two imperial powerhouses at the time, signed a secret pact called the Sykes-Picot Agreement, splitting the Ottoman territories of the Middle East based on their strategic interests. The agreement drew the borders of (roughly) modern day Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine and Egypt. It placed each state under the control of either French or British mandate, allowing the two powers to rule those territories “until each mandated state was judged fit to govern itself.”

The system that the Sykes-Picot Agreement forged in the Middle East was not to last long. All of the states created under the agreement eventually did gain independence from their mandate powers. And all of these states have experienced at least occasional, if not continuous, instability and strife in the last one hundred years since the mandate system split them apart.

Above all, instability created by the Arab Spring in 2011 was a wake up call. Not only for the authoritarian regimes that had dominated the governments of the Middle Eastern states since “independence” who were overthrown, but also for the millions of people in the Middle East who had been living under severe repressive conditions for decades. The entire world, too, was shocked by the spread and success of the Arab Spring; few times in history have we observed the stability of an entire region completely fall apart at the same time.

It should have been clear then that if that many people were demanding and fighting for change, something was wrong with the physical nature of the Middle East and its role in global society – the Arab Spring was but a delayed reaction to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The countries that make up the region had been forced into the Westphalian system – where nation states, not ethnicities or religions, are the dividers of people – by imperialistic powers that cared only for geostrategic and economic dominance. The ethnicities, religions and politics of the people of the region had absolutely nothing to do with the borders that separated them. Could this be why the Middle East has been condemned to conflict? Has democracy never seemed to work in these countries because they cannot be governed by people who never intended to interact with each other?

This question was not voiced during the Arab Spring. The question of borders has only recently been provoked by the near-collapse of the Iraqi state under the Sunni militant group ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), which aims to create its own Islamic state under Sharia (strict Islamic law). At the time of this writing, ISIS has invaded and taken control of southwestern Syria and major northern Iraqi cities, officially declaring a caliphate – an Islamic state – in the region. Within the border of what was only a month ago the state of Iraq, there remains a makeshift Kurdish state in the northeast and the significantly weakened Shia majority government in Baghdad.

Many of the questions posed in the last few weeks by the media and global governments are centered on how to stop ISIS from destroying Iraqi and Syrian “sovereignty” – basically, the governmental “right” to control the land defined by the current, Westphalian borders. The insinuation is that ISIS does not have the right to claim the territory that it has taken over. Based on the history of the region and how it was created, though, it has been debated whether the rest of the world has a right to decide this question.

It is not disputed that ISIS has already been the cause of countless human rights violations. But, so have the Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes that found that the only way to tie together their disparate groups of citizens was to strap them together with oppression and violence. Perhaps what the Middle Eastern states need in order to finally end a century of instability is to be allowed to split by natural borders – by borders drawn based on ethnicities, religions and political groups – not by those borders created by arbitrary, imperial hiccups.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

The post Redrawing the Middle East appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Last week, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced that Iran has no interest in building nuclear weapons, either for national prestige or for security reasons. He went on to remark that he is willing to sit down with President Obama and discuss a rapprochement between the United States and Iran. President Obama cautiously agreed, and the agreement has led to both criticism and applause within their respective governments. Few details have emerged, but the foreign policy community has already started chiming in on this surprising development.

In a year where the Russians have agreed to mediate negotiations for a Syrian truce and disarmament, perhaps nothing should come as surprising. Yet on the Iranian question, no greater shock could have come, save perhaps a preemptive strike by the Americans and/or Israelis. The United States and Iran have been diplomatically disengaged from each other since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and for the last 10 years relations have only worsened as the two states have played a sort of game of thrones over the ashes of Iraq and influence in the Gulf region. The Iranian nuclear program, funded for decades before the fall of the Shah by the very Western governments which now so viciously condemn it has for the last decade been the most visible point of contention between Iran and the United States. Additionally, Iran’s aspirations for regional leadership and dominance ensured that there has been no shortage of American efforts to contain the Shia nation and prevent it from upsetting the regional balance of power. The seeming radicalism of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, most callously expressed in his denial of the Holocaust, did not help the diplomatic situation in any way.

When Rouhani succeeded Ahmedinejad, there was buzz among the Western media suggesting that this man might be “our man;” he seemed progressive and democratic enough and his words sounded good. Add on to that the events of the Green Revolution in 2010 and the subsequent Arab Spring and there seemed to be an inkling that liberal populism might provide Rouhani the legitimacy necessary to fundamentally change Iranian policies – both foreign and domestic. But after a brief media honeymoon, his fame died a slow and quiet death, as Iranian policy did not appear to differ significantly from that of Ahmedinejad.

Fast forward to today, when we see Rouhani apparently making baby steps in a progressive direction. He has renounced over a decade of Iranian security policy, while making overtures to integrate Iran with the international community. As many commentators have noted, this should not be seen as a sudden change of heart; the Iranian President is undoubtedly still confined by certain limits and boundaries. Nevertheless, this change in tone marks a critical shift, one which will certainly have profound effects on the region. Already the Saudis and Israelis have voiced their disapproval of impending US negotiations with Iran. I recall becoming disillusioned after years of catching the oft-used “Israeli strike on Iran closer than ever before!” headline and resigning myself to the conclusion that the United States and Iran would remain enduring enemies, periodically exchanging harsh words but never anything more. It appears that this state of affairs may soon change.

This saga illustrates an interesting principle of politics best articulated by former Secretary of State George Kennan: “No other people… is entirely our enemy. No people at all… is entirely our friend.” Shifting power paradigms tend to manifest themselves in surprising ways; to the futurist or to the contemporary observer, this development may appear seemingly irrational, yet to the historian looking back it seems perfectly sensible. And thus great shifts in the balance of power are common occurrences in world politics, with many of them marking new political eras.

In 1992 the Europeans signed the Maastricht Treaty and established the European Union. Between 1989 and 1991 the Soviet Union crumbled and the world map was redrawn. In 1973 the People’s Republic of China turned on their former Communist friends in the Soviet Union and instead began working with the United States. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the former colonies of the old European empires claimed their independence. And in each case, observers were shocked; only two or three years earlier there would have been no indication that radical change was on the horizon. This is how the present cooling of relations between the United States and Iran should be viewed: a political anomaly that does not make sense now but one day will be heralded as a major breakthrough in international relations.

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