At the same time, the eastward expansion of NATO, which the West viewed as integral to safeguarding peace and establishing a buffer zone, is perceived by Russia as “an existential threat to national security.” Particularly, Russia is most concerned recently with NATO expansion as more and more countries are joining the organization. At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, both Georgia and Ukraine were promised to eventually join the Western defense alliance. Four months later, Georgia attacked Russia, killing at least ten Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, to which Russia responded with a full-scale offensive — marking the beginning of the Russo-Georgian war. Although the nature of this conflict is multifaceted, its predominant causes can still be analyzed. These causes can be broken down to the personal interests of Russian President Valdimir Putin, the desires of the Kremlin and NATO’s involvement. 

In the context of the Russo-Georgian war, an individual to analyze is Putin, who (despite not officially being president) still had full control over the country as Dmitry Medvedev, the leader at the time, was Putin’s protégé and aligned his policies through regular consultations with Putin. This effectively made him Putin’s proxy. For Putin, his interest was to ensure the survival of the Russian state and, within that, to maintain his own power. 

The color revolutions, particularly the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in the subsequent year, collapsed pro-Kremlin leaders in neighboring countries, which increased Western influence by Russia’s borders. Preservation of the Kremlin became Putin’s priority during that period, which might have been a contributing factor to the war. Indeed, Putin sought constitutional changes as a means to reclaim power and pursue a more aggressive role in the region which could explain the asymmetrical escalation in 2008 — launching a full scale invasion after just a few casualties. This revisionist sentiment remains even today, where Putin continues to abide by incrementalism in his foreign policy rather than drastic actions — resorting to cyberattacks to undermine NATO solidarity, exploiting international institutions (i.e. UNSC, IMF, APEC) to stifle liberal internationalism, and propagating misinformation to disrupt free elections. All of these efforts are to destabilize Western institutions and democratic systems around the world. 

For the short-term leading up to the invasion, Putin was faced with a triple-challenge: low oil prices from the Great Recession, a stalled constitutional process and socio-economic hardships. The war in Georgia was a diversionary tactic employed to distract from these domestic failures. By ‘rallying around the flag’ against NATO, which over 88% of Russians held unfavourable views towards, Putin increased his approval rating by eight percentage points directly after the intervention and re-consolidated his regime’s legitimacy. This parallels the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, where Putin’s approval rating jumped by 22 percentage points from a historic low post-invasion. 

More broadly, the Kremlin sought to revise the status quo and bring back Soviet glory. The disintegration of the USSR was seen as a humiliating defeat because Russia/USSR lost a third of its territory and half of its population and GDP. The Kremlin has long desired to rebuild the once-great Soviet Union (also known as revisionism) and feels it has the right to “take something back” such as reuniting the ethnic Russians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia with their motherland. Yet, revisionism also can only be a secondary component because it does not explain why Russia chose Georgia to go to war with instead of other ex-Soviet states, which all possess ethnic Russians in varying quantities. Specifically, Kazakhstan and Moldova both have comparatively larger populations of ethnic Russians compared to Georgia. This means that while revision can be a contributing factor to the war, it is not a leading factor because there is no justification for Georgia specifically compared to every other ex-Soviet state. The only difference is Western involvement in the country, which suggests that to be a decisive factor. 

NATO’s involvement in Georgia impacted both Russia’s and Georgia’s decision-making calculus when it promised that Georgia would one day join the alliance. Instead of disbanding after the collapse of the USSR, NATO extended membership to 15 additional countries in Eastern Europe as a means to ‘deter Russian aggression’ through the creation of a buffer zone. Russia on the other hand, has vehemently opposed NATO expansion, perceiving its only goal to be villainizing and containing Russia. 

Furthermore, “NATO expansion broke a promise that various American officials [including Bush and Clinton]had given to various Russian and Soviet officials [such as Gorbachev and Yeltsinthat]that NATO would not expand.” NATO’s hubristic expansion tipped the balance of power in Eastern Europe and was considered an existential threat by the Kremlin, which compelled it to retaliate to seek survival. In this case, Russia felt forced to destabilize the region in an effort to block NATO membership for Georgia, which was promised at the Bucharest summit. Indeed, the war effectively vetoed membership for Georgia because NATO would not accept new members with open territorial disputes. Overall, it’s arguable that Putin has been “protecting legitimate security interests” by destabilizing the region to veto NATO membership. 

By contrast, NATO involvement also emboldened Georgia to become overconfident through moral hazard  — the concept that Georgia engaged in risky behavior (behavior which they wouldn’t otherwise engage in) because they believed they had the full support of NATO. NATO’s open-door policy emboldened Georgia to act arrogantly after verbally pledging membership in 2008. Soon after, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili launched an offensive against pro-Russian separatists and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia as he believed the “West had his back, but he miscalculated and overreached,” confirming that the pledge made by NATO was misinterpreted by Georgia as a blank cheque. In Georgia, sporadic fighting against separatists has been ongoing for years, but it was not until after the Bucharest summit that President Saakashvili decided to strike. In this paradigmatic plight of moral hazard, NATO involvement encouraged Georgia to provoke Russia, confident that NATO would save them in the end. Critically, this was not the case with the invasion of Ukraine, as there were no indications that Ukraine would be part of NATO anytime soon. 

Today, Russo-Georgian relations are in shambles despite the war only lasting five days. After Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, Georgia completely severed all diplomatic relations with Russia. Russia eventually withdrew their troops from Georgia after a month. In its entirety, the war displaced nearly 200,000 people, many of whom were unable to return even today. 

Importantly, many of the issues and patterns in the Russo-Georgian war can still be seen today: the unresolved ethnic tensions in the Donbas and Luhansk regions, the revisionist sentiments of the Kremlin and the antagonistic stance of NATO. Moving forward, it is vital to consider pre-existing conditions within regions, the intention of each state and the impact of the involvement of international institutions.

The government has stated they do not believe these objects are intergalactic, but the public has gone wild with speculation about extraterrestrial visitors with searches and posts about UFOs increasing by over 300%. 

Concerns over security and distrust in the government have increased whether or not these high-altitude objects are otherworldly or just “recreational”. Some far-right conspiracy theorists have alleged that the Biden administration launched these balloons to divert attention away from other pressing issues.

The first incident occurred when the Air Force spotted a Chinese surveillance balloon on Jan. 28, 2023, when the balloon entered U.S. airspace over Alaska. U.S. security officials have stated that the balloon was over “sensitive military sites.” The balloon was shot down on Feb. 4, 2023, over South Carolina after quickly making its way across the country. 

China has said that the balloon was not a surveillance balloon but some sources have made differing claims as to what it is, with some sources saying it was a weather balloon blown astray and other sources saying it was a “civilian airship.” 

The balloon has strained the already tense relationship between the United States and China since the ongoing trade war that started in 2018 due to the alleged theft of technological and intellectual property by China. 

Additionally, the United States has raised security concerns over China’s increase in military spending, their presence in the South China Sea, their human rights abuses in Hong Kong and the “military harassment of Taiwan.” NATO declared China to be a “security concern” in 2021 with China’s development of nuclear weapons.

The possibility of Chinese surveillance amidst these security concerns has encouraged the U.S. government to be extra vigilant and “scour the skies” for other potential surveillance objects that are part of China’s global spy balloon program and is the cause for why the U.S. Air Force has seen an increase in high-altitude flying objects.

Another balloon was spotted over Latin America on Feb. 6, 2023, that China quickly admitted ownership over; however, Chinese officials stated that the balloon was used for “flight training” and was blown off course due to “weather conditions”. The Venezuelan and Colombian governments decided not to shoot down the balloon as it posed no threat but U.S. security officials believe it was another surveillance balloon in China’s fleet.

Both Colombian and Venezuelan officials stated they did not feel the object was a threat to security. The Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs even said they “reject” the attack of U.S. officials, stating “Once again, the United States resorts to the use of force instead of treating this situation with the seriousness and responsibility that the case deserves.” 

The heightened security monitoring and increased presence of fighter jets in the sky makes the United States seem very trigger happy, especially now that the Biden administration just signed an $816.7 billion defense budget. 

It begs the question, why does the United States worry so much? The United States has been vocal about their concern over the Chinese military and power for years and released a statement focusing on China. The United States is worried that China is going to use their military strength to become an international power, yet there is little concern over Japan or India becoming an international power.

The United States has the highest defense budget with over $600 billion more than China. The United States has also released multiple surveillance balloons themselves with the Chinese Foreign Ministry stating that the United States has sent over 600 “warships and planes” over China to gather intelligence. The U.S. Department of Defense even stated they plan on making the military “more mobile, more distributed, more resilient and lethal.”

There are legitimate concerns over China’s nuclear arms and their human rights abuses that have potentially been heightened because the United States doesn’t have the control over China that it has over other countries. The United States has a large sphere of influence, offering military aid to over 30 countries and being linked to 29 countries through NATO. China doesn’t need to rely on the United States for economic or military help and has direct relations with other countries the United States is wary of, mostly the connection with Russia. 

The response to the Chinese surveillance balloon that was spotted over the United States in conjunction with the ongoing concerns with Chinese military power seems to make a legitimate argument for the need for heightened security and a bigger budget. However, it is important to question how much worry is necessary, especially when considering how strong the U.S. military is compared to the rest of the world.

This is another cog in a dangerous trend for the West. Many Pacific Rim nations are forming strategic partnerships with Chinese companies, which have drastically increased their foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region since the turn of the century. 

These moves could destabilize the smaller Pacific Rim states and significantly threaten the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategic framework that has been a core part of President Joe Biden’s foreign policy. 

The Pacific Rim nations are a quagmire in today’s world. Due to the vast amounts of ocean compared to land, these countries developed in complete isolation from the rest of the world. While many of these countries have been independent since the mid-late 20th century, they remain some of the poorest and underdeveloped economies in the world, almost wholly dependent on international aid with very few strong domestic industries. 

The pandemic exacerbated this: Pacific Rim nations were hit hardest by COVID-19 due to travel bans and stringent government-imposed quarantines. These factors make the Pacific Rim vulnerable to China’s often predatory FDI practices through its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other strategic partnerships. 

Chinese investment in Pacific Rim countries is a relatively new phenomenon. The majority of countries in the region previously established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. That number has significantly decreased as Chinese willingness to invest has increased and Taiwan has become more polarized from its neighbors. Countries like Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Tonga and Samoa have all switched allegiances in the past few years. Through various investments,  from building naval bases in the Solomon Islands to constructing telecommunications networks in Vanuatu to an extensive package of loans to Samoa, China’s footprint has significantly increased in the region. A large part of that can be explained by the differences in the structure and goals of the IMF and the World Bank vs. how China and its state-owned enterprises operate.

The growing presence of Chinese investment in Oceania is primarily due to fewer conditions for accessing loans from China than the IMF and the OECD. Meanwhile, China provides loans so long as they can afford to ensnare countries in what is known as “debt-trap diplomacy.” This is where economically fragile companies who can not afford to pay China back are forced to give up government or strategic assets, such as ports. This is already the case in certain countries in Oceania, like Samoa, where nearly ⅔ of their debt ($160 million ) was owed to China, and for a country that holds just an $800 million GDP, that is a massive amount of economic leverage to China. If this trend continues, Samoa likely will become the norm rather than the exception.

The most dangerous example of Chinese influence can be seen in the parliament of the Solomon Islands. Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, in his fourth non-consecutive term, was up for a vote of no-confidence, having been removed from his previous terms in the same fashion. However, Sogavare has strong pro-Chinese tendencies and having spearheaded the beginning of the relationship, the Chinese government did not want him to be replaced. The Chinese government paid off every person who voted against the vote of no confidence, and Sogavare remained in power. 

This demonstrates how China has been taking advantage of countries with weak democratic institutions, like the Solomon Islands and forming strategic partnerships with the promise of a brighter future. Aid could indeed be beneficial for these countries. However, most of the benefits of FDI, especially investment from China’s SOEs, are concentrated in two places: Chinese elites and the South Pacific government elites, with little trickling down. Moreover, China’s soft power allows it to impose its political will on these nations. In Oceania, many nations have already renounced Taiwan as an independent state and instead have chosen to recognize the legitimacy of the People’s Republic of China’s claim to the throne. 

Many argue that whether these nations hold allegiance to China or the West does not matter. However, the intentions of the Chinese government, coupled with the actions and strategic partnerships of Oceania nations, spell significant trouble for future U.S. interests. The United States is taking this seriously after recently committing to send representatives to the Solomon Islands to straighten things out. 

Now let’s make it clear — China is not pursuing monetary policy in Oceania for technology transfer like they may in the United States or the EU. Instead, Chinese SOEs and Chinese money is flowing into these countries to increase Chinese soft power in the region and protect against the expansion of the U.S. Indo-Pacific alliance. There are also serious concerns that strong Chinese partnerships with Oceania could lead to the establishment of military barriers, countering the West’s traditional military dominance in the region. 

The United States, under President Biden’s administration, has been focused on the expansion and strengthening of ties with major players in Southeast Asia and Oceania. While China has been busy cultivating interests through an inflow of capital in smaller Oceanic countries, including the Solomon Islands, the United States seems to be solely focused on the larger, wealthier economic powers. While some relationships have been strengthened (Japan and South Korea), others, such as India, are still somewhat tenuous due to a lack of strong stance taken during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 

Another recent development in the Pacific Rim region is the growing worry of polarization between the Pacific Rim nations. Many are now strongly siding with China or Taiwan and the rest of the West, including Micronesia and Tuvalu. For now, many in these countries welcome competition between the two because they see it as beneficial for getting the best deal, but it could come back to bite them if the United States and China engage in a proxy war. 

Despite Australia being their primary economic supporter, many Pacific Rim countries have increasingly prioritized their relationship with China, despite announcing their intentions to divert almost bilateral aid to the South Pacific away from Southeast Asia and Chinese investment decreasing year-over-year in the region since 2018. 

Why is that the case? This primarily lies in Australia’s historically poor climate policy and seeming inaction to take responsibility for climate change. While many in the developed world say they care about climate change, many South Pacific Islanders are at the frontline experiencing the worst of the effects. For them, climate change is personal, and Australia has done little to rectify the situation. They have an extremely poor climate policy and are one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of coal. At the recent COP26 climate negotiations, Australia had a bad performance committing to zero binding climate targets and receiving a colossal fossil award for the worst overall performance by a country. 

All of these issues have culminated in a shift in power in Oceania. Once thought untouchable, China has slowly chipped away and now maintains a strong presence in the region. Until Australia, New Zealand and the United States commit to a strong climate change policy, expect many countries to keep their allegiances open and even swing towards China. 

As some analysts speak of a “new Cold War” beginning between the United States and China, some have begun to compare the Quad to NATO, a military alliance that was founded to counter the rising power of the Soviet Union in Europe. While Quad leaders insist that this new vehicle for dialogue is simply meant to promote general peace and cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific, the timing suggests that the organization’s newfound prominence is directly correlated with China’s continued rise and increasingly aggressive orientation in foreign policy. 

Despite these similarities, however, experts say that comparing the Quad and NATO does not capture the large differences between the two organizations, and that at least for now, the Quad is not a formal military alliance on the model of NATO. 

Originating from cooperation between the four countries in the aftermath of the Southeast Asian tsunami disaster, the Quad was first established in 2007. 

“The fact that things went so well after, in terms of cooperation, after the tsunami, I guess convinced the four countries that they could work together on other issues of mutual concern,” said Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at RAND Corporation and professor in the USC Department of Political Science and International Relations. “Its initial iteration consisted of diplomatic meetings as well as military exercises, and was especially supported by then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who saw it as a vehicle to promote liberal values throughout the Pacific.

Although it initially fell apart due to domestic challenges, as well as pressure from China who disapproved of the organization from its very inception, the Quad was reestablished as part of the Trump administration’s rebranding of the Asia-Pacific theatre as the “Indo-Pacific.” This brought India, the second largest country in the world and a rising superpower, into the fold with countries whom the United States has had long-standing security cooperation and arrangements with. This is notable, as India is one of the founders of the non-aligned movement, and has historically avoided involving itself in defense cooperation. 

However, after border clashes with China and China’s long-standing alliance with Pakistan, India has become more assertive. Although the country still rejects common defense arrangements, India is becoming increasingly comfortable with what its leaders have described as being “multi-aligned.” 

Other Quad countries have also recently found themselves in more challenging circumstances related to China. Australia, which was able to sustain its economy despite the 2008 financial crisis on trade with China, has become very concerned about Chinese influence in their country and consequently reversed  much of their China policy, entering into a trade war with the country that has buoyed their economy for decades. 

Japan is extremely concerned about rising Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea, especially around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dao Islands. The country is also wary of increased pressure on Taiwan, a strategically important island for Japan’s own security. 

The United States under former President Trump identified China as an “adversary” of the country and entered into a trade war. Although president Biden has sought to tone down the rhetoric used by Trump, he has been slow to significantly change U.S. policy, as being tough on China remains one of the few bipartisan issues in Washington.

Yet the Quad is not a military alliance in the way that NATO is. The most important difference between the two is a lack of a collective defense arrangement. 

While the US has collective defense treaties with Australia and Japan, none of the other countries are obliged to defend one another. Even when it is apparent that it is meant as a counterweight to rising Chinese power and aggression, the Quad will not name countering China as its uniting purpose, instead citing comparatively vague ideas of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” guided by “democratic values,” and citing issues as disparate as countering climate change and speeding up global vaccine distribution as important goals.

“It’s an informal dialogue,” Grossman said. “It’s not a formalized multilateral.” 

While the Quad may signify to China that there is an increasingly united sentiment among democratic Indo-Pacific nations that their actions are viewed as threatening and of concern, it cannot be said that a line in the sand has been drawn in the way that NATO’s establishment was designed to specifically halt any kind of future Soviet aggression. The Quad’s existence functions more as a vague warning than as a direct threat of war.

The Quad is young, and its future is as uncertain as the future of all countries involved and their relationships with China. It may look to include other Indo-Pacific democracies like South Korea and New Zealand in the future, though those countries also have reasons why they would be skeptical, showing the complicated ecosystem of the modern Indo-Pacific. In South Korea’s case, positive relations with China are seen as essential to any kind of future deescalation with North Korea, the top priority of South Korea’s foreign policy. South Korea is also very suspect of entering into any organizations that include Japan, as it has many unresolved issues surrounding Japanese treatment of Korean people back when Korea was a Japanese colony. 

New Zealand, a Five Eyes member often grouped with Australia, seems like a prime contender, but has recently come under fire for backing out of Five Eyes condemnations of China, possibly due to extensive economic ties between the two countries. In contrast to the days of the Soviet Union where an Iron Curtain economically divided East and West, today’s globalized world has led to even higher opportunity costs in angering powerful nations, even those with opposing values or those that threaten your own country’s security. These challenges even affect current Quad members. While the United States may be willing to start a trade war with China, and Australia desperately looking to diversify its foreign trade partners, Japan has reservations. 

Saori Katada, a professor of international relations at the University of Southern California, said that “Japan has no interest in decoupling from China,” something that might become expected if the Quad were to become more similar to a formal alliance. Other countries in the region, such as Vietnam, might be interested in joining the Quad. However, the forum would then run into the question of what principles the Quad stands for. Vietnam as an authoritarian Communist country, albeit one very concerned about China’s rise, does not fit with the supposed democratic character of the organization. 

These questions of what being a member of the Quad entails for both current and prospective members point to the larger challenges present in the Indo-Pacific. Economic ties and government goals complicate the security picture from being simply divided into pro- and anti-China camps. This in turn limits the Quad’s future ability to ever function as a united bloc.

In light of the circumstances, however, the Quad’s looseness may actually be its strength. By not requiring everything of its participants, the Quad may be able to assimilate diverse countries with diverging interests to act collectively to counter perceived Chinese aggression. 

According to Grossman, that is “the beauty of it, which is that nobody is obligated to do anything, except have discussions because they want to.” Katada also finds the Quad more “creative” than NATO.

The United States seems invested in the Quad’s future. Even as Biden has worked to reverse much of the Trump administration’s policies, he “has kept the Quad around and has actually bolstered it,” Grossman said. China may not have been directly referenced at the Quad’s White House meeting, and perhaps no formal military ties were established, but there was a clear message that these four nations are concerned about China’s rise in a way that transcends domestic politics. 

That message does not look like it will be changing anytime soon. Just don’t expect it to look exactly like the one sent from the democratic world during the Cold War. As Katada says: “This is a new challenge, and a new solution is needed.”

However, for a significant portion of Qatar’s population — the over two million migrant workers in the country — the World Cup has brought a more nefarious and dark context to the country. For over a decade, human rights abuses under the kafala system, the sponsorship-based employment used by many countries in the Middle East to exploit migrant workers and trap them into a modern-day version of slavery, have persisted — all in an attempt to prepare the country for the 2022 games. Most of Qatar’s foreign workers are employed on projects directly or indirectly connected to the World Cup, such as constructing infrastructure for the new city being built for the event, and will transition to work in service-oriented roles as the tournament draws closer.

Apart from Qatar, the other countries that allow the kafala system are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Lebanon. Each country has its own specific provisions and legal framework, but all share the same basic concept: government agencies, local individuals or companies in the country employ foreign laborers through sponsorship permits. In addition to salary, the sponsors cover travel expenses from the workers’ home country as well as housing, usually in communal dormitories or, for domestic workers, in the sponsor’s house.

Legally, the kafala system is under the jurisdiction of interior ministries instead of labor ministries, so sponsored workers do not have the protections extended to other workers under the host country’s labor laws. As a result, many experience forced labor, unpaid or unfair wages and excessive working hours.

Additionally, since only sponsors can extend or end the permits allowing workers to be in the country, private citizens have an inordinate amount of control over their workers’ legal statuses without oversight. Workers cannot switch jobs, quit before the end of their contract or leave the country without the permission of their employer. The penalty for doing so depends on the country but can range from revocation of the workers’ legal status to imprisonment or deportation, even if they were trying to escape abusive circumstances (which is not an uncommon situation). 

Though the kafala system applies to all foreign workers, racism plays a large role in how workers are treated. People from Africa or South Asia are typically relegated to lower paying jobs and face much higher levels of discrimination than Europeans or Americans. Additionally, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, the contracts offered to Westerners are less restricting and have fairer terms than the ones given to workers from other countries. Gender-based violence is also common; women, especially domestic workers, experience high levels of harassment and sexual assault but often do not report it to authorities, fearing retaliation by their sponsors.

In Qatar, foreign workers make up approximately 95% of the total labor force, with the vast majority working jobs related to the World Cup. A report from The Guardian found that these migrant workers live and work in poor conditions and that over 6,500 South Asian workers have died in Qatar since it began World Cup preparations ten years ago, an average of 12 deaths each week. Nick McGeehan, co-founder of FairSquare Projects, an advocacy group for migrant workers in the Gulf, said that these deaths are directly related to the World Cup.

“A very significant proportion of the migrant workers who have died since 2011 were only in the country because Qatar won the right to host the World Cup,” he said. 

According to the Guardian, the death toll is very likely higher than what is reported from the Qatari government since the findings do not include people from Southeast Asia or Africa, where a significant number of Qatar’s workers come from. 

Because of the spotlight the World Cup has placed on Qatar, the country has pledged to make reforms to the kafala system — though many of these have not materialized. In 2014, Qatar claimed it was abolishing the kafala system and proposed changes that would institute new regulations and penalties to ensure workers are treated fairly and remove the need for permission from an employer for a worker to leave the country or switch jobs at the end of their contract. These changes were implemented in December 2016 and promptly reversed by the emir three weeks later in January 2017 without explanation.

Following the lack of progress on foreign workers’ rights, Qatar signed an agreement with the United Nations International Labour Organization in November 2017 that has led to some lasting reforms. The government has since passed laws allowing workers to collect compensation for abusive situations and establishing dispute committees to fairly mediate conflict between workers and employers. In January 2020, Qatar announced that migrant workers will no longer need permission from employers to leave, though advance notice is required for domestic workers and employers can apply for a permit requiring up to 5% of their foreign staff to seek prior consent to leave. Additional reforms enacted in September 2020 set a higher minimum wage for all workers and allowed migrant workers to switch jobs without employer permission.

However, this string of positive changes may soon be coming to an end. Following the September 2020 kafala reforms businesses argued that the changes were infringing on their rights as employers and the revised laws were sent to the Shura Council, Qatar’s legislative body, for review. After months of deliberation, the Council issued recommendations in February 2021 that would undo much of the progress that has been made. According to Amnesty International, the suggestions include “removing the right of migrant workers to change jobs during their contract, limiting the number of times they can change jobs during their stay in Qatar to three, restricting the number of workers in a company that can change jobs to 15% unless agreed otherwise by the company, and increasing the percentage of workers who require exit permits to leave Qatar from 5% to 10%.” A decision to accept or deny the Shura Council’s recommendations has not yet been made, but the previous reversal of reforms in January 2017 occurred after similar suggestions from the council.

Throughout the last decade, despite the constant push for improved workers’ rights in Qatar, FIFA has been remarkably quiet on the matter. After Amnesty International published a report on migrant workers in Qatar in 2015, FIFA put out a statement saying that they “are on the right track and [are]committed to continue improving to further contribute to the protection of workers’ rights at the FIFA World Cup stadium projects.” FIFA also established its Human Rights Policy in 2017 and published its World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Strategy in 2019, pledging to leave behind “a legacy of world-class standards and practices for workers in Qatar and internationally”, but none of these mention specific actions it is taking beyond “supporting the Qatari government with continued reform.” 

In March 2021, following reports in the media on migrant worker deaths, FIFA President Gianni Infantino acknowledged the tragedy of the deaths, but ultimately warned against a boycott of the 2022 World Cup.

“Our position at FIFA has always been, and will always be, engagement and dialogue is the only and the best way forward to make changes happen,” Infantino said.

Since FIFA has not taken a firm stance on the issue, teams competing in World Cup qualifiers are taking things into their own hands. Players on Norway’s national soccer team lined up before their game against Gibraltar on March 24, wearing shirts that read: “Human Rights — on and off the pitch.” Teams from Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark have followed suit with similar protests.

Though FIFA has historically been opposed to political statements during games and has previously fined teams for taking such actions, a spokesperson for the organization said that they would allow players to continue with such demonstrations.

“FIFA believes in the freedom of speech and in the power of football as a force for good,” FIFA said. “No disciplinary proceedings in relation to this matter will be opened by FIFA.”

The international response has been similarly muted; apart from the European Parliament, which demanded in 2020 that FIFA send a strong message to Qatar that the World Cup should not be “delivered by the assistance of modern slavery,” no other countries or blocs have spoken out, despite efforts by non-governmental organizations to convince them to do so. In 2014 a case was brought against Qatar by the UN International Organization for Labor over the treatment of migrant workers, but this was dropped in 2017 after the country committed to the reforms that the Shura Council recently recommended reversing.

International sports competitions such as the World Cup bring together people from all over the world in a way that transcends cultural and political differences and allows countries to deepen their relationships in a low-stakes environment. Michel Raspaud, a professor at Grenoble Alpes University whose research focuses on the sociology of sports and sports tourism, writes that Qatar is particularly noteworthy for its use of sports diplomacy and has made “sports a major diplomatic axis that provides the country with international recognition, affirming its role as a regional player and contributing to its security [as]a sort of all-purpose safety valve for tension in the short and medium term.” 

However, Raspaud goes on to say that the positive message Qatar is trying to convey through the 2022 World Cup is “undermined by the contradiction between the values of sports that are emphasized (respect, progress, fairness, etc.) and the social and political situation in a country where labor rights and the status of women and foreigners remain problematic.”

As the World Cup draws closer, attention on Qatar will continue to increase and the country will continue to face scrutiny for the actions it takes that affect migrant workers. Qatar is at a major crossroads, and the over two-thirds of its population at the mercy of the kafala system is waiting to see whether it bends to the Shura Council’s recommendations and returns to the traditional restrictions or concedes to international pressure and maintains its recent reforms.

But what has often been overlooked in the crisis is the acknowledgment of how different groups of Yemeni citizens are experiencing the conflict differently. In particular, the extreme circumstances of the country’s seven-year-long instability have led many to ignore how Yemeni women often bear the brunt of the issues caused by the crisis, on top of the gender-based challenges they face due to the discriminatory legal system and the crisis’s effect on the level of gender-based violence.

Data about the Yemen crisis’s death toll varies depending on if one focuses on those affected directly by the conflict or if it is extended to deaths caused indirectly. According to the Yemen Data Project, the country has incurred over 18,000 attacks, of which around half were deaths and half were injuries, as a direct result of the conflict from 2016 to now. This, however, does not include casualties caused by other pressing humanitarian issues the crisis in Yemen has created. The United Nations estimates that over 131,000 have died as a result of the indirect effects of the war in Yemen, including factors such as hunger and lack of access to adequate health services. 

According to the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), a humanitarian non-governmental organization focused on the fight against poverty, an average of six women are killed every day in Yemen due to the conflict. Women and children are also frequently displaced, comprising 75% of displaced individuals. The majority of displacement in Yemen is internal, with Yemenis moving from place to place within the country to avoid fighting, famine, and disease. Some of the displaced are met with humanitarian aid when they arrive at new locations, such as in Marib where the UNHCR, UN, and International Organization for Migration have attempted to provide food and shelter to those fleeing the city of Al Suwayda. 

Women are often disproportionately affected by humanitarian crises in times of civil unrest or war. In the case of Yemen, this inequality is exacerbated as women’s access to work is heavily limited by socio-cultural norms.

For 14 years, Yemen was ranked last in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap index, and only in 2021 did it manage to be ranked second to last — ahead of newly-added Afghanistan. According to the 2021 index, Yemen is one of the countries with the largest economic gender gap, at 28.2% of the gap closed so far, and income gap, with women’s income being around 7% that of men. It also has one of the lowest percentages of women in the labor force, at 6.3%, and the lowest number of women in managerial positions, at 4.1%. On top of this, Yemen was ranked 154/156 in female economic participation and opportunity, 152/156 in educational attainment, 95/156 in health and survival, and 154/156 in political empowerment.

This is likely the result of an extremely patriarchal culture in Yemen, rooted in persistent and extreme gender roles. Yemeni women and girls experience forced niqab (a veil that covers the whole face excluding the eyes), divorce shame, child marriage, domestic violence, and honor killings — all of which are aggravated by the extended and ongoing crisis in the country. 

According to Amnesty International, the crisis has forced Yemeni women to take on greater roles and responsibilities than traditionally expected of them and, as a result, the levels of violence they experience have increased. Women and girls not only face extreme danger due to the crisis and fighting in the region between the Houthis and Yemeni Forces (supported by UAE and Saudi Arabia backed anti-Houthi forces), but also security and economic risks due to a discriminatory legal system. Left with a damaged system of services and infrastructure that is unable to properly support them or allow them to seek legal remedy, and further faced with things like arbitrary detentions and the disappearance of male family members, women in Yemen are stepping up and suffering as a result. 

In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325, known as the Women, Peace and Security resolution. The resolution was enacted in an effort to address the fact that women and girls suffer disproportionately from negative effects during and after times of war. This unfair burden is due to the proliferation of social networks and the magnification of inequality, both of which expose women and girls to things like sexual violence and exploitation in greater capacities than in peacetime. In the nearly two decades since its adoption, the resolution has aimed to help affected women by making them participants in peacemaking efforts and politics. 

The resolution has been somewhat successful in some regions, playing a large part in helping women participate in peace processes in their countries. This has meant enabling women to act as signatories on peace agreements, participate in peace talks and negotiation, assist with humanitarian responses and post-conflict reconstruction, or partake in other peace-driven actions.

Nonetheless, women in Yemen are consistently underrepresented in peace talks, even in the face of concerted effort from the UN and other humanitarian organizations to address this gap. So, despite women taking on the roles vacated by their loved ones who may have been lost in the crisis or forcibly taken and held, they are not able to advocate for their own safety. 

This, however, is not the full extent of challenges that Yemeni women face. According to the World Food Program (WFP), in times of crisis, women and girls are put at greater risk for humanitarian issues, on top of the gender-based issues they already experience. One of the most common problems is that girls are often pulled out of school or forced to marry early in order for families to survive, as many are unable to afford food alongside paying for school or an additional child. The WFP also reports that, for women, one of the main dangers is malnutrition. This can be caused by the burden of pregnancy — more than one million pregnant and lactating Yemeni women required malnutrition treatment or prevention intervention in 2019 — or the burden of childcare. These women have to become self-sacrificing to a dangerous extent, often giving up their own food to feed their children.

Right now in Yemen, around 50,000 people are facing famine-like conditions, and 11 million more are experiencing food insecurity. Young children are particularly vulnerable to hunger, with around half of Yemeni children under five expected to experience acute malnutrition, according to the WFP. 

As the Yemen crisis fades from news headlines, due to the nature of it being such an extended conflict, it’s important to stay up-to-date on the current situation. This is particularly true when considering how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the war-torn country and its most vulnerable populations.

COVID-19 is not the first public health crisis to affect Yemen, as cholera, diphtheria, measles, and dengue fever were all reported in the country prior, with cholera affecting a suspected two million Yemenis since 2016. However, Yemen was, and is not, prepared to handle the pandemic. According to the World Health Organization, medical facilities and personnel have not been left alone during the conflict. More than half of the 5,000 or so health centers have closed and many health professionals have been forced to flee. On top of this, health aid has been obstructed by the Houthi and other authorities.

Considering the heavy use of starvation as a weapon of war in Yemen, primarily by the Houthis, the impact of hunger and starvation on an individual’s health and the disproportionate way women experience hunger has escalated the pandemic. In April 2020, the UN humanitarian coordinator in Yemen warned that, based on epidemiological projections, nearly 16 million people in Yemen could be infected by COVID-19 under the current conditions. 

The actual number of cases in Yemen is difficult to know as data on COVID-19 in the country is difficult to collect. The government has only reported deaths in the hundreds, but considering the disastrous nature of the healthcare system and the fact that war makes health crises worse, the number is likely much higher. Still, There is evidence that the country is currently experiencing a second wave of the disease. On top of the expected rise in cholera cases with the rainy season in May, this could be devastating for the population, and it will further complicate and inflame the suffering and discrimination that women in Yemen already face.

There is hope, however, as at the end of March 2021, Yemen received its first batch of COVID-19 vaccines, which included 360,000 doses, 13,000 safety boxes and 1.3 million syringes, through COVAX. This was the first step in the plan to vaccinate the country, with an estimated 1.9 million doses expected to be delivered to the country throughout the rest of the year. Those leading the vaccine effort will be forced to navigate the crumbling healthcare system and figure out how to equitably distribute vaccinations. 

Women are suffering in Yemen as a result of the humanitarian crisis, and the COVID-19 health crisis has only made things worse. It is important to understand and acknowledge the nuanced convergence of humanitarian, security and public health crises in Yemen. Otherwise, it is easy to get lost in the severity and horror often broadcasted and covered through global media. 

“America is back!”

This declaration, made by President Joe Biden, was announced at the Munich Security Conference. After just two months in office, Biden has already been taking on the daunting task of restoring and cementing relationships in Europe. 

In late February, Biden appeared virtually at the Munich Security Conference, an annual international security conference held in Germany. Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Boris Johnson came out of the meeting similarly declaring “As you’ve seen and heard earlier, America is unreservedly back as the leader of the free world and that is a fantastic thing.” 

But while things might appear rosy at first glance, the path to restoring American leadership in the European sphere and reestablishing transatlantic diplomacy is not going to be smooth sailing. There are several key issues that will be sure to dominate the future of transatlantic relations in the coming months — and the next four years. 

Up first on the agenda is reestablishing a positive working relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The multilateral security organization, founded in 1942 and headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, was always a sore point for Donald Trump. The former U.S. President was vocal about his dislike of the alliance and questioned its continued use and whether or not other NATO members were pulling their weight. Conversely, Biden sees the recommital of the United States to its NATO allies as one of the most important points on his policy agenda. He made a point of calling NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in the very first week of his presidency. This singular phone call ensured the public, and the world, that America was re-committing itself to the organization — signaling a critical shift away from the previous outlook of the Trump administration. 

He also sought to correct one of the most damaging military decisions that the Trump administration brought onto NATO. During his presidency, Trump started the process of withdrawing nearly 12,000 troops from Germany, a key NATO ally. The move surprised the Germans and even some members of American military leadership. The United States views Germany as a critical strategic partner, which is evident with its 43 different American military bases. 

In the past few decades, the United States has had positive military relations with the Germans, and there has been no reason to change course on the country’s policy. The U.S. Department of Defense faced bipartisan condemnation from this decision because it made NATO look fragmented and weak. 

However, with each change in presidential administrations, the Defense Department carries out a “global force posture review,” which places all military decisions on pause. The Biden Administration has initiated a freeze on pending military action, such as pulling the U.S. forces out of Germany, and the administration will be reevaluating the decision. 

Already with the freeze in place, and no concrete determination to keep American troops in Germany, the German government is pleased and ready to work with Washington. German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said that, “this signal will be noticed and well understood. It is now up to us to take the hand that Washington has reached out with.” 

Germany has a lot to lose if the United States withdraws its presence. Over 100,000 Americans are currently living in Germany — the largest American community outside the United States. Should the government lose the trust of the Biden administration, the loss of 100,000 people in their communities would be incredibly hurtful to their economy. They also lose prestige and abilities to train their German military forces alongside the United States should the Defense Department continue to pull out from the region. 

On the American side, the United States would lose the country’s only hospital capable of treating trauma patients in the region. Landstuhl Regional Medical Center has served as the trauma center for all military personnel wounded in the Middle East, Europe and Africa, since its opening in 1953. It is beneficial for both sides to work out a favorable negotiation that can carry them through the future. The United States’ maintenance of positive relations with Germany is key to its stable presence in the region.

Across the English Channel lies another set of problems for Biden. For Boris Johnson, a solid working relationship with the Biden administration will ensure Britain can resume its “special relationship” with the United States — a historical and cultural relationship that started in Winston Churchill’s era. 

This relationship exists because the heads of state have emphasized the closeness of American and British values culturally, politically, and economically. Both Biden and former President Barack Obama were against the Brexit decision, but now that it has been fully implemented, Biden remains committed to helping America’s ally across the pond. In fact, Johnson was the very first European head of state to receive a call from Biden after his inauguration. 

Going forward, Johnson will be looking to negotiate a free trade agreement for the United Kingdom in a post-Brexit world. Biden has made it clear that he will not be negotiating a large free trade agreement anytime soon, since the U.S. needs to make major investments at home. But, it’s possible that a smaller agreement could be worked out before the U.S. Trade Protection Authority Act expires in April 2021. Any deal made before that point could be easily slipped through Congress, since the Democrats control the U.S. House of Representatives and are tied with Republicans in the Senate, with Vice President Kamala Harris as the tie vote. But after April, it will be more challenging. 

Another hot topic for the United States and the European Union, in particular, is the China debacle. The EU struck an important investment deal with China less than a month before Biden came into office. Biden’s transition team privately lobbied the EU to wait, and China capitalized on this brief window of opportunity and signed the deal before Biden could be sworn in; even though they conceded some positions to the EU to make it happen. Amid growing economic competition, an ongoing trade war and a increased tension between the United States and China, Europe has a precarious role to play — a delicate balance between economic opportunity and historical allyship.

It is helpful for transatlantic relations, however, that both the Trump and Biden administrations have declared the offenses against the Uyghur Muslim minority in China a genocide, especially since the EU and UK have made similar declarations. Going forward, Biden and his team will be looking to sort out their positions on China and will eventually need to converse with the EU to see where they overlap on policy. A strong policy on China will most likely need to be accepted by the United States’ allies in order for meaningful change to happen.

Yet another complicating issue for Biden and the Europeans is the Nord Stream 2 pipeline set to deliver Russian gas to Germany. Germany has built this pipeline with hopes of diversifying their energy resources, but it leaves the EU vulnerable to more Russian influence within the energy and economic sectors. The deal has been highly controversial in Brussels, and within Washington D.C. EU member states are unable to agree on a common position on the pipeline. Most notably, some countries are worried about Russia’s growing involvement in Europe. The public criticism of Russia has been intensified since the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny by the Kremlin in September 2020. France has publicly said they are against the pipeline, but will let the Germans make the final decision on its outcome. The United States is expected to release sanctions on the Russians soon, but the Germans are expected to remain unscathed for the time being. 

Biden certainly has his work cut out for him across the Atlantic. Biden is entering a pivotal era of transatlantic relations, especially after the last four years, and his decisions over the next few months will dictate how the rest of his presidency transpires. Recommitment to NATO, dealing with a post-Brexit UK, relations with China, and the Nord Stream 2 will all pose tough challenges for the administration to conquer. 

“This legislation… would build upon the Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act to strengthen the United States’ commitment to hold accountable those who would target journalists for violence and persecution,” Rep. Schiff wrote in a press release. “A free and independent media is essential for a free society, and the United States must stand with journalists around the world who risk their lives to expose corruption, express independent and critical voices and tell the difficult stories that must be told.”

The legislation was initially introduced in October 2020, with companion legislation introduced in the Senate by Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT). In the press release, Sen. Klobuchar discusses the implications of this bill in ensuring that the United States appropriately holds foreign governments accountable for their violations of press freedom. And most recently, Schiff sent a letter to Avril Haines, the Biden administration’s new director of national intelligence, requesting the declassification of reports produced by the intelligence community on the Khashoggi’s murder.

Additionally, a separate bill was introduced in the Senate that directs the U.S. Department of State to establish an ambassador-at-large for press freedom and require civil servants and foreign service officers to receive training on press freedom and media independence issues. “The Global Press Freedom Act” was a bi-partisan Senate effort co-written by Sen. Todd Young (R-IN) and Brian Schatz (D-HI). 

These bills mark an important path forward for the issue of press freedom on the congressional agenda. But this year, in particular, has been a pivotal moment for this issue worldwide. With rising authoritarianism and a brutal crackdown on free expression — from Belarus and Russia to Thailand and Hong Kong — the role of journalists and citizen news gatherers is more important than ever. The Committee to Protect Journalists, an American nonprofit dedicated to promoting global press freedom, reported that 32 journalists were killed in 2020 for reporting the news. A December 2020 whitepaper from the International Federation of Journalists documents that since 1990, 2,658 journalists and media workers have been killed.

These bills also come at an important time this year, during a week where international broadcasting is providing a critical look into countries like Myanmar, where a military seizure of power has resulted in international response and a nation in crisis. In Myanmar, the military seized power from the elected government and swiftly implemented a ban on various social media platforms, internet access and TV networks, once again demonstrating that stifled free expression is a tool of suppression and tyranny. Several outlets are also reporting that journalists have “gone into hiding” following the unrest in the country. Sky News reported that journalists have been observing intimidation campaigns and fear targeting and interrogation from the military.

CPJ also recently released a report on press freedom trends in the Middle East and North Africa ten years after the Arab Spring, which brought pro-democracy protests and uprisings to the region in 2011. The report found that across the region, “many countries trace a similar arc;” where uprisings and revolutions called for democratic reform and openness, many of those same countries — including Bahrain, Algeria, Morocco and others, face further government repression. Additionally, civil wars now rage in Syria and Yemen. 

CPJ said that the historic upheaval of ten years ago has created “profound, wide ranging and evolving consequences for press freedom, making journalism a deadlier and more dangerous profession,” for both local reporters and foreign correspondents. In particular, the most concerning trends include the increase of jailed journalists, vague online media censorship laws, targeted murders and impunity and a hostile media environment.

Thus, it has become increasingly clear that recognizing the importance of promoting a global free press — especially during a decade of political tumult and international uprisings — is an important step forward in establishing the United States as a leader on this front.

National Press Club President Lisa Nicole Matthews and and NPC Journalism Institute President Angela Greiling Keane praised the legislation’s introduction, writing that they “applauded any effort that would serve justice in cases where journalists are killed or otherwise grossly abused.”

While the legislation establishes mechanisms for accountability and brings press protection into the national spotlight of foreign policy attention, it also fills a void that currently exists in government: a lack of institutional work on the issue. While existing agencies like the U.S. Agency for Global Media and the U.S. Department of State survey the issue of press freedom abroad, there still seems to be very few offices dedicated to the issue’s domestic angle. And in the age of fake news and disinformation, protecting the essential work of journalists throughout the world is more important than ever.

In Congress, other than loose networks of representatives interested in the issue and forming groups like the House Caucus on Freedom of the Press, there is no dedicated commission or office dedicated to media freedom issues. While recent legislation does not propose to establish an advisory committee or body within the House or Senate, it does recognize the lack of institutional focus on the issue at the federal level, and instead proposes that the State Department establish the position of an ambassador-at-large on the issue. 

An ambassador to oversee these issues would not only be a symbolic move that demonstrates the United States’ commitment to the issue, but it would also help shape and guide U.S. foreign policy. After all, the United States purports itself as a champion of democracy and freedom of expression — core values enshrined in the country’s founding documents. However, in the past few years, the United States has fallen dramatically short of its values and founding principles. Under President Donald Trump, the White House was a consistently hostile actor toward the press. From barring certain journalists from entering the White House Press Briefings and nearly stopping briefings all together to the president constantly tweeting vicious attacks on the media and failing to condemn violence against members of the press during the insurrection at the Capitol and during the summer’s protests against racial injustice, the United States has strongly positioned itself against the notion that it is a champion of global democracy. This may have historically been the case, but in recent years, American leadership on the issue is nowhere to be found.

However, with forthcoming conversations over newly introduced legislation and the recent arrival of President Joe Biden and a new administration, the United States has the opportunity to return to the world stage, with press freedom at the forefront of its international affairs and human rights agenda.

Syracuse University Associate Professor and Tully Center for Free Speech Director Roy Gutterman wrote in an op-ed for the university that Biden must restore press freedom. Gutterman, an expert on First Amendment law and press freedom issues, wrote that it is Biden’s responsibility to restore the government’s relationship with the media, especially after four years of an administration that portrayed the media as the enemy of the people.

Margaret Sullivan, a media columnist for The Washington Post, wrote in a December op-ed that Biden must take “bold steps” to repair the damage done under Trump. Sullivan calls for a variety of actions the administration should take, including a large and public speech on press freedom and appointing a special presidential envoy on media freedom that would report to the Secretary of State.

Sullivan also aptly notes that Biden should avoid repeating the “bad habits” of the Obama Administration, during which he served as vice president. These habits include opposing the release of public information and cracking down on whistleblowers and government leaks. Sullivan categorizes the Obama administration’s record on press freedom as “deeply flawed,” even going so far as to identify Obama’s actions as having laid the groundwork for the Trump administration’s unprecedented vilification of journalists.

Regardless, it’s clear that press freedom issues are becoming an increasingly important matter at the federal and congressional levels. It’s time for the government to acknowledge that the issue persists at home and in the highest levels of government, while also continuing to monitor the issue abroad. By encouraging cross-sector conversations with media organizations, nonprofits, think tanks and more, the U.S. government can better understand the current media environment. Legislation is an important part of the solution, but increased institutionalized efforts and attention can help restore the United States as a media freedom champion.

Corruption and impunity have been growing in Mozambique for many years. As early as 2013, Mozambican officials hid loans from the public and foreign investors, leading to a scandal that still taints the government’s legitimacy at the highest levels. The loans were used to pay off “questionable debt” for secret maritime projects like an $850 million fishing fleet; according to an indictment filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, the conspirators used these projects “as fronts to raise money to enrich themselves.” The party responsible for the scandal is still in power, and multinational firms continued to conduct business with Mozambique, which made accountability and combating corruption even more difficult. 

Corruption has also given rise to international criminal networks, which have taken advantage of the national political culture that allows elites to evade the law. According to the Organised Crime Index calculated by ENACT Africa, Mozambique ranks 38th in Africa, indicating that criminal networks have captured parts of the government and that there is a very low level of resilience to organized crime. From the heroin trade to ruby smuggling, crime has pervaded throughout the state and created a breeding ground for violent extremists. 

Although the attacks in Cabo Delgado began as early as 2017, terrorism has reached an unprecedented level in 2020. In only the first four months of 2020, violence in this region, led by a group known as Ansar al-Sunna, increased 300% compared to the same period last year. Although the group declared ties with ISIS in 2019, they rarely issue propaganda, have no publicly stated aims, and primarily attack state institutions, all of which suggest Ansar al-Sunna has a local focus. However, the organization has launched increasingly complex operations that have raised concerns within Mozambique and its neighboring countries. 

The state initially dismissed Ansar al-Sunna as merely a group of “bandits.” Yet, as the violence grew, President Filipe Nyusi admitted there was a problem, but experts believe that his government cannot effectively tackle it. Within Nyusi’s party, Frelimo, there is increasing infighting over the economic burdens of the violence. The country’s best soldiers are guarding natural gas facilities. The remaining soldiers, who are undertrained and underpaid, are the only ones left to combat the insurgents. 

Moreover, Mozambican security forces have been accused of committing human rights violations against those suspected of criminal activity. Video and photo footage has come out showing the attempted beheading and torture of prisoners, the dismemberment of alleged armed group fighters, possible extrajudicial executions, and the transport and discarding of a large number of corpses into mass graves. 

The abuse is intensified by the Mozambican authorities’ refusal to allow local and international journalists and researchers to document the situation without repercussions. Deprose Muchena, Amnesty International’s Director for East and Southern Africa, weighed in on the human rights abuses as “… flout[ing]fundamental principles of humanity. The abuses attributed to [Ansar al-Sunna] can never justify further violations by the security forces of Mozambique.” 

The international response to these events has been mixed. After a virtual meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on August 17th, the bloc released a statement saying that it would “support Mozambique in addressing the terrorism and violent attacks.” However, Mozambique is reluctant to allow neighboring countries to interfere given the fragility of the conflict, and the states themselves worry about the possible blowback of getting involved. Beyond Africa, the United States and many other Western nations initially offered to help with military training but soon withdrew from the commitment. 

The government has also turned to foreign defense contractors for help. At the beginning of the conflict, they enlisted Erik Prince, who founded Blackwater, a controversial American security firm. In 2019, the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary network, came to the aid of Mozambique but ultimately proved unsuccessful. They were replaced by Dyck Advisory Group, a South African organization led by Lionel Dyck, who was involved in past conflicts in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. 

These abrupt administrative changes have made it even more challenging to contain the violence. Perhaps the most significant consequence of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado is the worsening humanitarian crisis. Attacks on towns and villages have forced people to flee their homes and abandon their farms. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, over 300,000 people are internally displaced, and more than 350,000 people face severe food insecurity. A recent UN World Food Programme report presented findings from famine early warning system FEWSNET that indicate that communities “will continue to face ‘crisis’ levels of food insecurity… into early 2021.” This is a worrying projection in Cabo Delgado, which has the second-highest rate of chronic malnutrition in the country. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has only worsened this crisis. In the UN Policy Brief titled COVID-19 and People on the Move, the UN Secretary-General notes that “COVID-19 hits the most vulnerable people the hardest, including refugees, migrants, and internally displaced persons (IDPs).” The attacks in Cabo Delgado have forced people into living in crowded and unsafe host communities or camps with limited resources to protect themselves. Thousands have also fled to an International Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) treatment facility in Pemba, the provincial capital of Cabo Delgado, despite the city being one of the largest pandemic epicenters in the country. Raoul Bittel, the head of ICRC’s operations in Pemba, describes how “[p]eople fleeing armed conflict in Mozambique are trading this life-threatening danger for the risk of COVID.” 

Even with the country’s abundance of natural resources, investment prospects are dwindling as the situation in Cabo Delgado worsens. To experts, Mozambique should serve as a warning to other countries that prioritize their business interests over their people. In the words of Michelle Gavin of the Council on Foreign Relations, “Perhaps, if a decade ago, the international community had expended more energy supporting the civil society actors who have been calling action to these deep-rooted problems –and pressed harder to support solutions– Mozambique today might demonstrate more resilience, and the outlook would be less bleak.” 

The violent insurgency and resulting humanitarian crisis in Mozambique have exposed a profound weakness in a state that once showed tremendous promise. In promoting international trade and elitism over equitable socio-economic development, the government has fostered a culture of corruption and continues to do so despite the worsening conflict. 

Who makes up the internet?

India’s internet penetration rate stands at ~50% ‒ one of the poorest statistics in the world. Access has long been consolidated in urban, richer locations, though it is increasing in rural India due to affordable data plans and smartphones (even then, there are concerns about whether usage is being calculated appropriately). According to a 2020 UNICEF report, only 24% of Indian households have internet connections with which they can access remote learning.

Significant rural-urban and gender divides in internet access are obvious, but there is little data on the role of caste. Generally speaking, the Indian caste system consists of four castes. In order of precedence, these are the Brahmins (priests and teachers), the Kshatriyas (rulers and soldiers), the Vaisyas (merchants and traders), and the Shudras (laborers and artisans) These make up the upper castes of the Indian caste system. A fifth category falls outside the varna system and consists of those known as “untouchables” or Dalits. One 2019 study by the CSDS found that 29% of the people in India’s Dalit communities have used social media (compared to 46% in caste-privileged communities). High usage was seen only in 8% of Dalit communities, and 9% of OBC communities. Smartphone ownership too was found to be much lower. 

“Social media usage data suggests that the social media space has always been upper-caste dominated and continues to be so.”

The internet, of course, exists beyond social media. For many, a lack of access to the internet, rooted in their social and economic marginalization, hinders their ability to work, receive an education, and survive in an increasingly digitized world. India’s BharatNet program aims to connect 250,000 gram panchayats (village level grassroots organizations that make up the local self-governance system in India) via optical fiber by 2023, but the implementation of this program has been slow. Aditi Agrawal from MediaNama writes, “1,07,260 gram panchayats are still not connected and if work continues at the pace it did in January-August 2020, the project would take 6 years and 8 months to complete.”

How can narratives about the democratizing power of the internet be considered true when massive caste-related access gaps still exist? These statistics ‒ and the ones we don’t see ‒ reiterate the fact that social dynamics don’t cease to exist on the internet. In fact, the internet becomes an extension of our physical lives right from the moment of access. 

Even where there there is access, there is inequality

This July, Dilip Mandal, an expert on media and sociology, wrote about how India’s subaltern ‒ Dalits, Adivasis, Muslims, and other backward classes ‒ have not been able to challenge oppressive powers as effectively as once thought possible. This is attributed to the replication of social hierarchies ‒ the domination of privileged castes ‒ in the digital space. The internet is widely considered to be a public sphere, a realm of politics where strangers come together to engage in the free exchange of ideas. However, Mandal rightly asserts that India’s public sphere itself is hegemonic and distorted thus resulting in a similarly distorted online realm.

Here are the key highlights from a 2019 Oxfam and Newslaundry report on the representation of people from different caste groups in Indian media:

• Of the 121 newsroom leadership positions, 106 are occupied by journalists from the upper castes and none by those belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. 
• Three out of every four anchors of flagship debates are upper caste. Not one is Dalit, Adivasi, or OBC. 
• For over 70% of their flagship debate shows, news channels draw the majority of the panelists from the upper castes. 
• No more than 5% of all articles in English newspapers are written by Dalits and Adivasis. Hindi newspapers fare slightly better at around 10%. 
• Over half of those writing on issues related to caste in Hindi and English newspapers are upper caste. 
• Around 72% of bylined articles on news websites are written by people from the upper castes. 
• Only 10 of the 972 articles featured on the cover pages of the 12 magazines under study are about issues related to caste.

The threat of the Internet

The internet has brought with it a new set of potential issues, including the looming threat of state surveillance, privacy concerns, and the seemingly inevitable rise of technology-enabled state power. These are novel concerns for many and their rise terrifies me, but that is partly because my privilege has shielded me from an experience of life where surveillance is the norm. This is one of the many functions of caste. These concerns are only heightened under the current hyper-nationalist government.

Surveillance is a part of the process through which the dominant castes uphold their power over the oppressed castes. Privacy is the privilege of the oppressors, as has been reiterated by many Dalit-Bahujan writers and activists.

Examples of tech’s rising role in enforcing the caste system are plenty: GPS-enabled trackers tagged on Swachh Bharat (translation: Clean India) sanitation workers, the leakage of Aadhaar numbers of scheduled caste students by the Andhra Pradesh government website and the broader concern of caste-based geolocation, the surveillance and resulting criminalization of Dalits’ rights defenders, the internet shutdown in Saharanpur after a fatal caste atrocity, COVID-related personal data leaks that reveal people’s names and caste locations and hence carry the potential for abuse, the many instances of the exploitation of personal wants, needs and identity by big tech and many more instances.

This violence and violation, alongside political harassment, hyper-nationalism and the disproportionate representation of dominant castes on the internet, are a grave cause of concern, and conversations surrounding it deserve more space in the mainstream.

Mulling on social media

Recently, as #DalitLivesMatter trended online in light of caste-based violence in Hathras and systemic oppression, I wondered whether my opinion — as a woman from a dominant caste — urgently required space on social media. My conclusion was that it didn’t. 

Caste-privileged proclamations of allyship overwhelm conversations, leverage virality, and are celebrated — despite, or perhaps due to, their mediocrity. All of what is said has already been said before by people from Dalit and Bahujan communities, and I feel acutely aware of having taken up space similarly, now and in the past. 

Our proclamations are transient and fleeting, yet we are convinced that our opinions are entitled to space. This is a function of both what Dilip Mandal called replicated social hierarchies as well as the neoliberal rooting of Instagram and the social currency it demands.

Anti-caste activism and identity

Professor Mandal said that his once-held assumption that social media will allow India’s voiceless underclass to express themselves has been proven both right and wrong. The wrong is illustrated above ‒ but the right holds immense power.

Tejas Harad, journalist and founder of The Satyashodhak, writes about the sense of community that Twitter has given Dalit youngsters, and how “social media was, finally, a platform where lower-caste individuals could come together to overcome geographic and cultural boundaries”.

Even six years ago, Sunil Gangavane, working on PUKAR’s research on caste identities on social media, spoke of how students in urban cities are more likely to seek out caste-related communities online than to talk about caste in physical spaces. 

There is the power of archiving and sharing, through platforms and blogs like RTI, Velivada, and Dalit Camera. There is art, music, community, and discourse, and the best memes on the internet. The internet has aided this process of creativity, self-empowerment, solidarity and emancipation.

While the internet is not inherently democratic, and privacy concerns are rising, it’s up to all of us ‒ technologists, researchers, allies, students, and people who love️ the internet ‒ to work collaboratively to create a healthier cyberspace that prioritizes the safety of vulnerable communities. This, especially in the Indian context, requires a critical anti-caste lens on all of the things that make up our digital realities. 

It is imperative to think about ‒ and act on ‒ how systems of oppression enter and influence this space we call home. We must remember that the internet is what we make of it ‒ it has the potential to reproduce caste dynamics, exacerbate them, or challenge them.