Human rights groups argue that this systematic resettlement is part of a broader effort to make Ukraine a part of Russia without territorial conquest. The Russification of Ukrainian children physically takes children out of their homes while mentally shaping their identity from Ukrainian to Russian. 

The kidnapping is a microcosm of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. While territory and sovereignty are at stake, so are identity and history. 

Glimpse from the Globe sat down with Douglas Becker, a professor of international relations at the University of Southern California and a historical memory scholar, to discuss the importance and complexity of historical memory in this war. 

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Q: What is Historical Memory, and how is it different from history?

A: History is telling a narrative of the past; memory is the filtering of that narrative for contemporary purposes. It’s the way in which people reading history will remember that history, whether they lived through it — a distinct personal memory — or it is filtered and negotiated by the historians or very much by political and social actors.  

Q: Would you say that, in this case, Russia and Ukraine have shared histories but differing historical memories? 

A: Well, they definitely have histories that intertwine, but you used the word share, and that’s complex. The notion of a shared history is decidedly Russian. The idea is that Russia and Ukraine are intertwined so much so that many Russians consider Ukraine to be “‘Little Russia.’” Ukrainians push back pretty directly on that notion of a shared history. They would rather agree on the idea of an intertwined history. Increasingly that narrative is taking on a colonial form. So Ukrainian history and identity are forms of resistance to the Russian narrative.

Q: So, are these conflictual views an example of a difference in historical memory?

A:  That’s part of it, but memory is a little more complex than that. Think of the Hollywood trope where the same event is viewed from multiple perspectives and perceptions of what’s happened. There are all of these elements of history, but memory might isolate one of these factors or arguments. 

Q: American news coverage tends to focus on tangible explanations for this war. Since memory is so intangible, how much of this war would you say is based on a difference in historical memory and identity? 

A: I actually think that there has been a lot of conversation about identity because there’s been terribly little emphasis from an IR perspective, from a traditional realist perspective, on resources. The question then is, how much of identity is tied to history and memory? Memory scholars like myself understand identity as not static but rather flexible, organic and developing. President Biden and the United States tend to focus on protecting Ukraine as a democracy from an authoritarian state. They’re not citing history and historical memory as much — Ukrainians will. A better way of putting this is Ukrainians telling Putin, “you’re trying to implant your memory in my head.” 

Q: Would it be fair to say then that the war is both a territorial attack and an attack on Ukraine’s memory and identity?

A: Yes, and you can’t unlink the two. What’s driving Russia at this point is a desire to annex Ukraine or ensure that the Ukrainian government is always compliant with the Russians to create, in essence, a puppet state. What becomes the means by which to ensure you win the war would have to be some memory discourse where Ukrainians will accept the Russian role because of the notion that we are all the same nation. 

Q: Earlier, you mentioned that memory discourse could be used for political gain. How does that affect how leaders approach policy? 

A: It must. One issue I constantly wrestle with is the leaders choosing these memories based on what they want to accomplish — memory is a tool to get a policy outcome that they want — and how much of it has to do with the leaders’ own memories and beliefs. How much are issues driven by memory, and how much is instrumental? What Putin is doing in Ukraine clearly has a degree of instrumentality. 

Q: So because this war is largely based on memory and identity, it becomes all that much harder to resolve? 

A: Absolutely. How do you compromise your identity? How do you compromise your memory? When a conflict is over memory as opposed to over territory or resources, it is so much harder to resolve. As conflicts become increasingly about identity, all negotiation techniques fail. Memory battles tend to be existential battles. How do you negotiate wars where if you lose, you lose your identity? It makes these wars more difficult to resolve, and I become all the more pessimistic about the possibility of a resolution.  

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As the Ukraine and Russia war drags on, the stakes expand beyond territory and become more and more existential. Historical memory discourse provides an explanation and analysis of how or if the conflict will be resolved. As time goes on, it becomes less and less likely either side will be willing to lose their identity and memory to negotiation. 

In an unprecedented move in early January, the Russian government resigned and President Vladimir Putin began proposing major constitutional reforms, including a revision that would reset his presidential term and allow him to stay in power past 2024. While Putin seemed poised to create a new, more conservative regime, his previously firm grasp over the Russian state is now coming loose as the result of a poor domestic COVID-19 response and internal conflicts among Russian elites. With increasing discontent among civilians and powerful authorities alike, the future of Putin’s Russia looks bleaker each day. 

When the coronavirus outbreak began expanding globally in early March, Putin was optimistic about Russia’s ability to limit the spread of the virus within its borders, claiming the situation was “under control” and all infections were “contained”. However, as cases rapidly increased, Putin faded into the shadows, leaving Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin to announce lockdown measures in the city and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to encourage similar efforts among regional authorities. In addition, voting on the new constitutional amendments was postponed to a later date, and plans to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in World War II were significantly scaled down. 

Following the implementation of stay-at-home orders, the state of the Russian economy has continuously deteriorated. With major oil output cuts as a result of a global price war and a several week “non-working period” in which nonessential businesses were required to close, the Russian economic output in April was $33 billion less than the previous year. In addition, Russian GDP for the month fell by 28 percent. Although the Russian government has announced some economic programs to reduce the negative impact of coronavirus on civilians, such as cheap loans to businesses and increased unemployment benefits, economists and business people alike have criticized authorities for failing to provide adequate support to Russians. Projections show that the coronavirus crisis will decrease Russians’ disposable income by 20 percent in the second quarter of 2020 compared to the previous year, and a significant decline in living standards is expected. Moreover, unemployment is predicted to hit 8 million before the end of the year. 

This is not the first instance of Russia’s economy retracting under Putin; in fact, real incomes in Russia have declined in five of the last six years. Moreover, official state statistics show that poverty has increased since the beginning of 2018,  rising to 14.3 percent. This stagnation is largely as a result of economic sanctions implemented by Western powers in response to Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. While the Russian government has announced a six-year, $400 billion National Projects effort to improve Russian education, health care, and infrastructure, consultants from Oxford Economics project that these programs will increase GDP growth by only 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points annually. Consequently, it is unlikely the economy will recover anytime in the near future.

Public support for Putin’s leadership is now at an all time low. When it comes to evaluation of the government, Russians tend to most highly value economic performance, domestic order, and international standing, all areas that Russia has been consistently lacking in. According to the Levada Center, in late April, Putin’s approval rating was at 59 percent, the lowest it has been since 1999. Furthermore, poll respondents believed that their regional authorities responded more effectively  to the outbreak than Putin; 50 percent of respondents said that their governors or mayors were “doing their best to deal with the outbreak”, however only 46 percent agreed that Putin and the federal government were doing the same. 

Not only is Putin losing public support, but there is also increasing division among the Russian elites who guide Putin’s policy choices. Some influential groups, such as state oligarchs, are more “liberal” and seek better relations with the West and reduced sanctions. Other longtime private sector associates of Putin, however, do not share these interests;  for them, Western sanctions present an opportunity to improve their relations with the Kremlin. Consequently, there is a growing split between the former, who  advocate for warmer relations with the West to improve their earnings from foreign markets, and the latter, who  seek to deter the development of normalized relations with the West through promotion of increasingly radicalized “Putinism”.

As support for his policies has waned, Putin has resorted to a tried-and-true tactic to coerce patriotism and national unity: shifting attention to international adversaries. In this case, the Putin regime has targeted the Czech Republic, which incited anger in the Kremlin in February after it renamed Pod Kaštany Náměstí Square, where the Russian embassy in Prague is located, in memory of the late Russian political opposition leader Boris Nemtsov. Several weeks later, Prague district mayor Ondrej Kolar removed a statue of Soviet general Ivan Konev, prompting further indignation. Putin took advantage of this opportunity to redirect attention from domestic weaknesses to his consistently nationalistic foreign policy, signing legislation which criminalizes vandalism of Soviet war memorials located abroad. Moreover, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu directly called for the prosecution of Kolar. However, not all actions have been so diplomatic; in April, Kolar was targeted by a Russian assassination plot and the Prague airport, along with multiple hospitals, have been attacked by suspected Russian hackers. These moves sent a clear message that anti-Russia policies in the Czech Republic will not be tolerated and sought to temporarily distract from an unsuccessful domestic response to the coronavirus outbreak. 

Despite his attempts to distract from shortcomings at home, it is clear that Putin’s regime is beginning to crumble and this reality cannot be avoided forever. The coronavirus outbreak has only exacerbated existing issues with Putin’s domestic policy choices and propelled ordinary Russians to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo. If discontent continues to spread among elites that feel their own interests are being threatened by Putin’s choices, there may be enough support to challenge Putin’s rule. 

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict in 2014, an estimated 13,000 people have been killed, and millions more have been displaced. Five years ago, the Ukrainian government decided not to sign an association agreement with the EU in favor of closer economic ties with Russia. As a result of the popular protests that followed, the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted, the 2004 constitution was restored, and the Russian annexation of Crimea soon followed. Although the Russia-Ukraine conflict has faded from many headlines, the war in Donbass between Pro-Russian forces and the Ukrainian nationalist opposition has continued, resulting in thousands of casualties. Even more worrying, the weak international response has allowed the Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue its aggressive tactics against Ukraine and the war to carry on with no end in sight.

Shared Origins: Kievan Rus

The Russia-Ukraine conflict stems from a complex shared history with roots tracing back to the 9th century with the first organized Eastern Slavic state of Kievan Rus. However, both sides have conflicting perspectives regarding the history of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. In the Russian nationalist narrative, although the center of the Kievan Rus state ultimately transitioned to Moscow, there is an overarching unity among the “Rus people”, or the citizens of Russia and Ukraine. Putin himself has proclaimed numerous times that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” who are essentially part of “a single nation in many ways.”

On the other hand, Ukrainian historian Mikhail Hrushevsky argues that there are three branches which descend from Kievan Rus: the Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Belorussians. This perspective leaves greater room for political interpretation and has been widely accepted by Ukrainian historians.

Because both nations originated from the Kievan Rus state, centered in present-day Ukraine, the assertion of Ukrainian independence in 1991 was a great misfortune in the eyes of many Russians as they lost many historical sites to Ukraine including the Kyiv Perchersk Lavra, a monastery in Kyiv associated with the birth of Russian Orthodox Christianity.

From Stalin to Putin: Fear of Ukrainian National Movement

Because many Russians believe that Ukraine’s sovereignty should be limited, Russia has long seen the Ukrainian national movement as a threat. When the last Russian Tsar was removed in 1917 and the Bolsheviks took power, Ukrainian combatants fought back for several years in the Ukrainian War of Independence. Although Ukraine was ultimately forced to become a part of the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks were deeply stunned by this resolve to claim total independence and noted it as a cruel lesson to be learned from.

The Ukrainian people resisted Russian rule once again in 1932 when Stalin decided to collectivize agriculture. When Ukrainian farmers fought back against the policy, Stalin responded by sending armed troops to confiscate land and livestock. Although the food harvest was successful in 1932, the Soviet government withheld the harvest from the Ukrainians, and those who attempted to steal food were executed. As a result, an estimated three million to eight million Ukrainians died from starvation between 1932 and 1933 in the Holodomor genocide.

Although Putin’s rule differs greatly from Stalin’s, there are many notable parallels. Once again, the Russian government today is taking action to dismantle Ukrainian national movement. Similarly, Putin has also pursued a greater Russian “sphere of influence” and policies of Russification, or the promotion of Russian language and culture, to increase state control. Additional similarities include a disdain for Ukrainian independence, enforcement of attacks against “enemies of the government,” and a willingness to kill Ukrainians to serve his goal of legitimizing Russia as a major power.

The Future of Ukraine

Since 2014, war has continued on between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces, particularly in the Donbass region. While many Western nations responded to Russia’s initial military intervention in Ukraine in 2014 with economic sanctions, there has been little international response to recent aggression in the Black and Azov Seas. The currently imposed economic sanctions have fallen short of changing Russia’s behavior, and greater intervention is needed.

A UN deployed peacekeeping mission in the Donbass region could provide a favorable situation for both parties. If peacekeeping forces maintained a ceasefire, this would save thousands of Ukrainian lives at stake and put to rest fears of further Russian aggression, which would be favorable to the international community as a whole. A peacekeeping operation would also create the foundation for the beginning of positive political and economic reform in Ukraine. Additionally, such an agreement would also help Russia save face domestically as the economic sanctions that have created financial struggles for many Russians would be lifted and its’ international reputation would be improved. Although both Ukraine and Russia have expressed interest in a peacekeeping mission in Eastern Ukraine, both have different visions for what such a mission should look like, with Russia preferring a smaller scale operation. As Russia has veto power in the UN Security Council, some concessions to Russia may need to occur in order for any form of a peacekeeping mission to be implemented. However, Ukraine and the West should stay open to discussing the positive aspects of Russia’s proposals as the alternative is the continuation of a devastating war. The priority for both nations should be negotiating an agreement in regards to the deployment of peacekeeping forces, as a neutral third party helping to facilitate negotiations could bring the deadlock in Donbass to an end.

The political future of Ukraine remains largely uncertain. Although no candidate holds an overwhelming advantage, elections will take place at the end of this month and the pace of domestic reform has slowed greatly in anticipation. While it is unclear who will next assume office and what approach they will take to address the current climate in Donbass, it is evident that de-escalation in the conflict with Russia needs to be prioritized above all else; only then can the region stabilize and begin to make positive progress.

On February 22, well-known realist scholar and R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago John Mearsheimer spoke at USC in a talk titled “Liberal Dreams & International Realities.”

Glimpse correspondents had the rare chance to interview the celebrated scholar, getting his insight on the challenges facing US foreign policy as the world transitions from a unipolar order based on liberal hegemony to a multipolar one in which realpolitik will play a much larger role. Mearsheimer addressed weighty issues like NATO expansion, nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, the influence of US foreign policy elites, the hypocrisies of liberal American foreign policy, and the rise of China.

The full video is available here.

In January, two days before its slated release, the Ministry of Culture pulled the “The Death of Stalin,” a new film from Scottish director Armando Iannucci, from Russian theaters. The black comedy satirizing Stalin and his inner circle – including Georgy Zhukov, the Soviet marshal extolled for his role in defeating Hitler – in the infamous dictator’s final days would have struck an awkward chord, scheduled to hit theaters mere days before the 75th anniversary celebration of the Battle of Stalingrad. The film was banned on grounds of “extremism,” implying that it is “extreme” to cast celebrated national figures – Zhukov, but increasingly Stalin – as anything less than objects of reverence.

This is not the work of a slick and sophisticated propaganda machine, but the clumsy and heavy-handed gambit of a regime hell-bent on stamping out opposition. Perhaps even a regime in fear.

Putin may have won a landslide victory by most measures – incidentally marking the longest stay in power of a Russian leader since Stalin – but his government’s ever-heightening intolerance toward opposition speech hints at desperation lurking beneath the surface. This rising repression may be effective while the general population remains content, but it evokes the image of a ceiling of tolerance that might one day be hit–but with what consequences?

A return to a Stalinesque reign of terror today is unlikely, though not impossible. Obviously, the ideological platform on which totalitarianism was justified in the Soviet era no longer stands–today Russia positions itself against the debauchery of liberalism as a pillar of Orthodox morality and traditional values. Accordingly, Putin props up his power using an image of himself as guardian of ancient, sacred Mother Russia mixed with the strongman warlord who can stick it to the arrogant West. 

Cast in this light, Putin likely does indeed enjoy overwhelming support in Russia – but any support based on suppression of even the idea of opposition is bound to wane sooner or later in an age when, as repeated hacks and leaks remind us, nothing hidden from the public can remain so for long. Of course, Putin’s precise support figures in Russia could be debated ad infinitum, given the opacity of the data and the inherent difficulty of quantifying individuals’ tangled web of inner lives. In fact, obtaining a percentage of support for Putin is both a futile and an absurd project. Focusing on fluctuating figures drawn from flawed studies misses the wider picture–the meaning and the means of Putin’s support.

What is clear, however, is that any support built on overt and graceless suppression of facts, alternate narratives and viable political alternatives might not take as much to topple as Putin’s apparent monopoly of power in Russia might suggest. Let’s not forget that a driving force of opposition to the Communist regime among the Russian youth – and perhaps the most immediately striking difference reported by those who escaped from behind the Iron Curtain into the capitalist countries – was the suffocating grasp that the Party maintained on the production and circulation of culture, art and ideas, contrasted with the cliched but palpable sense of freedom in the West. But what was necessary for the survival of the Soviet regime – strangling all alternate narratives – is no longer possible in a digital age. As the Russians themselves demonstrated in 2016, in today’s world, secrecy and censorship can only be conditional and temporary.

Let’s also not forget that Putin, like Stalin, is a mere mortal. By highlighting the great dictator’s very humanity in depicting the moment of death in its naked, absurd universality, “The Death of Stalin” poses an existential threat, not merely a political one, to Putin’s regime. Turning into art the notion that every ruler, no matter how totally sublimated into national myth, remains a man who will one day meet an end that is equal parts tragic, comic and banal is enough to make the ground quake under Putin’s project–namely, maintaining his grasp on power by mythologizing himself to the point where he is synonymous with the Russian nation in all its glory.

If this view of Putin is widespread enough to serve as a useful generalization in the country, it is completely beside the point to speak of a public opinion that supports Putin (for there is no public opinion where there is no public–no citizens, only subjects). Supporting Putin is not an active choice but a passive acceptance of an existential truth–but one that was at one point constructed, and one that must be maintained scrupulously–and unscrupulously. As the banning of the “Death of Stalin” suggests, it is one that might be slowly eroding in the deep caverns of national consciousness. To close with another cliché, desperate times call for desperate measures. 

Correction March 31: An earlier version misspelled Georgy Zhukov’s first name as Gregory.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

American media outlets like CNN and Fox News routinely cover Putin’s closest advisors, like Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, but journalists often overlook one of his closest allies, United Russia party member and Mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin. He ascended to the post in the midst of corruption allegations and low approval ratings of his predecessor, Yury Luzkhov. To some, the sharp transition was a relief, while others continued to question Sobyanin’s ability to tackle the problems facing a city of over 12 million residents. Now nearing the end of his second five-year term, Sobyanin has roused thousands of Muscovites with his proposed mass renovation plan that would demolish swaths of Stalinist-era apartment buildings. In this regard, Sobyanin closely identifies with Gorbachev’s vision of a post-Soviet democratic Russia. However, Sobyanin’s implementation and subliminal agendas sharply differ from those of the last Soviet president. What’s more, the success of this project will have a direct impact on both Sobyanin’s and Putin’s bid for reelection in 2018. As Putin’s close political ally, Sobyanin must secure the loyalty of city residents for United Russia. He will soon find out that this is not an easy task.

Perestroika in the 1980s and 90s

The word “perestroika” in Russian translates to “restructuring or rebuilding,” but many Russians today know it as the period between 1986 and 1991 when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev unveiled a plan to modernize a stagnant and primitive Soviet Union. In response to the public’s longing for the same social freedoms as the West, Gorbachev democratized the Communist Party. These drastic changes created a rift in the party, which had long been firmly set against capitalist ideas like individualism. In 1991, a group of orthodox party members staged a coup that failed to oust Gorbachev but further escalated tensions within the government.

The short five-year transition period from staunch communism to a partial democracy was difficult for the majority of the populace. While the agricultural sector underwent privatization, store shelves remained empty and food could only be purchased with ration cards. Newspaper stands no longer contained the predictable, filtered news of the Communist Party. Now Soviet citizens had the chance to familiarize themselves with foreign ideas and formerly taboo topics, some of which directly opposed and even upended their worldview. For example, the new and free press under Gorbachev began to document criminal acts within the Soviet Union which previously “would have conflicted with the media’s propaganda function of depicting Soviet society as safer and more crime-free than the capitalist world. ” Although the populace was forced to cope with the uncomfortable democratization of their environment, Gorbachev’s reforms replaced a broken Soviet system with a more democratic government.

Scaling Down
Putin’s agenda does not include political and economic reforms as drastic as those enacted by Gorbachev. In fact, his regime has abandoned Gorbachev’s democratic vision of Russia and facilitated the resurgence of a corrupt and power-hungry bureaucracy. Although a one-party system no longer officially exists, Putin’s United Russia party, which holds the majority of seats in the Duma, the Russian parliament, is the only party with any real authority in legislative matters. To satisfy Western demands for democracy, Russia continues to elect its presidents, cabinet members, and parliamentarians, but even these so called “elections” are not as fair and free as they are purported to be.

Many scholars and politicians alike had high hopes for Putin’s ability to democratize the oligarch-infested government that Yeltsin had left behind. Drastic bureaucratic reforms certainly occurred; notably, he created seven federal districts to centralize power and dismissed many of Russia’s chronically corrupt civil servants. However, Putin quickly filled these vacancies with his KGB cronies, who continued to embezzle and steal just as actively as their predecessors. Today, Putin’s bureaucratic armada is so stained by corruption that only a complete regime change could wipe it out.

However, Sobyanin has not completely abandoned Gorbachev’s democratic pipedream. Elected for his promises to make Moscow a more comfortable city to live in, in 2013, Sobyanin followed through by initiating an expensive and tedious reconstruction project of Moscow’s busiest streets and public spaces. His vision is to “transform a 12 million-person post-Soviet megacity into a sleek environment to rival European capitals.” The driving inspiration of this project is the Western-style “new urbanism,” which focuses on open public spaces that “enhance community connections and alternative transportation modes while de-emphasizing the automobile.” Just as Gorbachev sought to reinvent the political and social climate, separating Russia’s Soviet past from its democratic future, Sobyanin is seeking to redefine a city stained with Cold War-era prejudices and dated philosophies by transforming it aesthetically. However, his implementation of these agendas is problematic. Open squares and walkable streets in Europe were designed to encourage and allow people to congregate, protest and voice their opinions in a common, open space. The irony of Sobyanin’s project is his concern for only the appearance of democracy rather than its real application in urban life. But as it is, aesthetic democracy has been a common theme ever since Putin took control of Yeltin’s crippled administration.

Sobyanin, as a close ally of Putin and United Russia party member, is tapping into the standard Kremlin narrative as he continues to mask his autocratic agenda with claims of “democratization of city streets and squares” and “abandonment of Russia’s dated, Soviet past.” Sobyanin’s vision for democracy could not deviate more from that of Gorbachev.

No Vote, No Problem
Moscow architect Eugene Asse stated that “the idea that you can create democratic-looking spaces without actual democracy in them is worrisome,” and this is exactly the flaw with Sobyanin’s plan. When he was reelected in 2013, the din of drills and bulldozers enveloped the entire city. The first points of renovation were the city’s historic boulevards and wide pedestrian walkways. Large portions of the city were blocked off and public transportation in these areas was either rerouted or cancelled, all without any approval from city residents. In his attempt to emulate the “new urbanism” of European cities, Sobyanin completely circumvented the need for approval from the populace. Herein lies the answer to the suspiciously fast pace of the project. While wanting to modernize the city, abandon repressive Soviet relics, and give public spaces back to the people, Sobyanin is only contradicting himself by not disclosing such matters to his electorate.

Though Sobyanin’s methods are disappointing, they are not surprising. With United Russia holding 343 out of the 450 seats in the Duma, it will prove increasingly difficult to introduce truly democratic initiatives within the city. Gorbachev’s vision of a socially democratic Russia has not been realized under Putin’s autocracy. Kathy Lally of The Washington Post noted that unlike the country’s European neighbors, Russia’s “elections are not fair, courts are not independent, political opposition is not tolerated and the reformers are widely blamed for what has gone wrong”. In this climate, any attempts at democratizing the country’s capital, let alone the country, will be futile.

Destroying the Past, Angering the Present

Within the last few months, Mayor Sobyanin unveiled a plan to demolish Soviet-era homes of more than 1.6 million Muscovites. Some of these apartment blocks were built in hurry under Khrushchev’s leadership, while others stood the test of time under Stalin’s firm regime. Originally Sobyanin embarked on this project to boost his own ratings as well as those of the United Russia party for the next city elections in 2018. However, the backlash has been overwhelming. In May, thousands of protestors and property owners took to the streets to protest Sobyanin’s “renovation plans.” City officials have been accused of “allying with construction magnates to ride roughshod over citizens’ property rights enshrined in the Russian constitution.” Although Sobyanin has promised to relocate residents into homes of equal value and size, his words have been met with great skepticism. Although the original motives to separate Russia’s Soviet past are commendable, the execution is poor. This may be the final straw for many Muscovites as they decide the fate of their city in 2018.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Self-Sufficiency in the Modern World      

Today’s world does not easily lend itself to self-sufficiency. Take, for instance, the United States, a country that is agriculturally independent, but relies on Saudi Arabia for its oil. Liberalist theorists assert that economic interdependence is the road to peace, as countries mutually benefit, taking advantage of plentiful resources and exchanging them for goods they need. Upon hearing the word “self-sufficiency,” most would point fingers at either Cuba or North Korea – both of which are economically isolated with only some reliance on foreign imports. However, few would think of Russia as self-sufficient. From oil to wheat, and from timber to automobiles, Russia has mastered the art of producing enough goods to equip a population of 144 million people. Yet in response to sanctions and unfavorable political sentiments in the Western world, Russia is starting to master the art of self-sufficiency in other areas –particularly its pharmaceutical industry.

In the Soviet era, Russia mainly traded with other communist countries, but produced the bulk of their goods, including medicines, domestically. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, did Russia begin to rely on Western medicines, as the West was far more advanced both economically and technologically. Investor and Vice President at Investo, Balaji Viswanathan stated that “except for medicines, none of the other [imports]are too critical to stall an economy. This is why the erstwhile USSR was able to sustain that long alienating the world markets (foreign trade contributed to less than 4% of Soviet’s GDP)”.

However, the one industry that has long relied on foreign imports is now rapidly being propped up by the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade. On March 11, 2011 then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced the Pharma-2020 plan, “a radical strategy to develop the country’s pharmaceutical industry and diversify the country’s economy through the creation of new jobs and reduction of Russia’s dependency on imports”. It is not a coincidence that the imposition of sanctions by Western countries on Russia has corresponded with the country’s sudden transition to domestic goods.

The Origins of the Sanction War

The consequential sanctions were first imposed with the deadly Ukraine crisis, which first escalated as a result of former President Victor Yanukovich’s decision to take a $15 billion loan from Russia to “move his country toward a planned ‘Eurasion Union’, with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia” instead of having Ukraine join the European Union. Ignoring President Putin’s claims that his country had not mobilized troops to fight against pro-Ukrainian forces in east Ukraine, the Russian military had secured a strong and deadly presence in the Donbass region. While Ukraine was dealing with a weak government and internal turmoil, Russian forces seized the Crimean peninsula, boosting pro-Russian fervor among citizens and asserting their might over Ukraine.

Shortly after this slew of events, Western leaders imposed sanctions in two series. The first targeted members of Putin’s inner circle like President of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, and first deputy chief of the Kremlin staff, Vyacheslav Volodin, as well as senior officials and military leaders. The second series of sanctions, also known as “sectoral sanctions”, hit Russia the hardest, because they prevented financial institutions from lending any money to Russia. Journalist Frances Coppola of Forbes magazine stated that “by imposing sanctions on entities within the financial services and energy sectors, [the]Treasury has increased the cost of economic isolation for key Russian firms that value their access to medium- and long-term U.S. sources of financing”.

In response to these sanctions, Russia imposed import bans of their own in August 2014. Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev stated that all “beef, pork, fish, fruit, vegetables and dairy products from the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia and Norway” would be banned. As a result of this “economic isolation,” Russia scrambled to prop up its domestic production in hopes of becoming self-sufficient. The latest industry to be hit by severe import cuts was the pharmaceutical industry, with 80 percent of Russia’s medication being imported from foreign countries. As a result, Prime Minister Medvedev stated that “domestic produce must account for 90 percent of Russian drugstore stocks by 2018”.

Although the Russian government wants to maintain its assertiveness before the West in light of damaging sanctions, such assertion is ultimately hurting its own citizens more severely than Western economies. With regards to bans on imported drugs, those that will be most affected will be Russians with “orphan diseases” or rare illnesses. These patients rely on highly effective medicines that can only be found outside of Russia’s borders and that “can never be certified in Russia because the procedure requires extensive human testing here — which is impossible because there are simply not enough patients”.

Pharma 2020: A Comprehensive Overview

Since its announcement in 2011, the Pharma 2020 plan has not garnered much media attention. Nonetheless, it is one of Putin’s most ambitious plans. While Pharma 2020 will render Russia almost entirely self-sufficient in the pharmaceutical industry, it will also make Russia technologically competitive with the West.

What exactly does this program entail? It essentially consists of three phases, each targeting a specific aspect of the domestic pharmaceutical industry: improved health care for the Russian people, “improved training of doctors”, and improved “international competitiveness of the domestic pharmaceutical industry” by “encouraging the development and production of innovative medications”. The budget for this plan is 188 billion rubles, “80 percent of which is to be invested toward research and the development of new products”. Many large pharmaceutical companies have already begun building facilities around Russia, while others have partnered with Russian companies in joint ventures.

On paper, Pharma 2020 appears to be a much-needed boost to the Russian economy and pace of innovation. However, before Putin coaxes foreign investors and companies back, there must be a dramatic shift in the political climate with the West. Once tensions are eased, Russia may begin making preparations to become an export-oriented hub of innovation.

A Muscovite’s Perspective

One of the people that has experienced the effect of these sanctions first-hand is my grandmother, and lifelong Moscow resident, Raisa Shumilina. In a brief, 30-minute sit-down interview, she shared her thoughts on the import bans, the situation in Crimea, and how these changes have affected her.

As a handicapped pensioner, her medicines are all paid for by the government. She noticed the changes in produce and medicines in 2014, the year that the sanctions were imposed. Ever since then, she has received “50% imported and 50% domestically produced medicines,” compared to the 100 percent foreign-made medicines she used to receive. When questioned about her feelings towards domestically produced medicines, she stated, “I don’t trust their quality. . .maybe I’m wrong, but at this very moment, I’m skeptical.” She admitted that the new medicines had no noticeable effects on her health, but felt it was safer to rely on foreign medicines. If she has the option to, she pays out of pocket just to be able to own or have imported medicines.

Revitalizing a Struggling Economy

Despite the economic uncertainty and political turmoil that Russia has experienced over the last few years, President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating has sky-rocketed to an impressive 89 percent. Igor Yurgens, the chief economist at the Institute of Contemporary Development said, “The consensus of 80 percent of Russians is that we have to reply, that we will fight.” It is not a surprise that so many Russians support their current leader and his United Russia party.  With the annexation of Crimea and now with the sudden boost in domestic production of goods, nationalistic fervor is more widespread than ever before, and the “we-will-tough-it-out” sentiments that much of the Russian public has expressed are not without reason. If the Russian government continues to invest in local industries and promote the domestic production of commodities, the Russian economy will eventually stabilize. As inflation rates return to healthy levels, unemployment rates decrease, and living standards improve, hopefully the Russian people will finally be able to enjoy the financial and social stability that they have longed for.

Nevertheless, Russia still has a lot more catching up to do to match the West’s pace of innovation and economic growth. An ambitious, but unrealistic goal, Putin’s Pharma 2020 plan should be postponed to a later date, as it will take many years before Russia fully restore relations with the West and begins to enjoy an adequately stable economy. Although the economy is at a much more stable place than it was in the winter of 2014, it still has a long way to go. With the ruble’s unhealthy dependence on oil prices and the lack of foreign investment, the country will not be able to financially support and promote domestic industries. The abundance of oil means Russia will not abandon the resource so easily, but the lack of foreign investments is a problem that Russian policymakers can solve. Controversial policy moves like the annexation of Crimea and the backing of the Assad regime make Russia a powder keg of instability. To revive the flow of capital, Putin needs to address his critics’ concerns and cooperate with the West, the source of many potential funds. If Putin continues to destabilize his country’s economy with an aggressive foreign policy, Pharma 2020 will never receive enough money to become a reality.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

On April 6th, Donald Trump ordered an attack on Syrian regime assets, “retaliating” against its most recent use of nerve agents against his civilians. The attack came in the form of 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles strikes, which, according to the Pentagon, targeted “aircraft, hardened aircraft shelters, petroleum and logistical storage, ammunition supply bunkers, air defense systems, and radars.”

Though the US media has thus far generally restrained from calling this attack an “act of war”, referring to it simply as a “warning”, there can be no question what it actually was. Would the US government or, for that matter, its media, not consider itself under attack and embroiled in war if its own government property was targeted by 59 airstrikes? Of course it would. Sovereign governments have an (understandable) tendency to consider unwanted military strikes on their soil, against their assets, as acts of war, regardless of what heinous acts they might previously have committed.

Still, war comes in all shapes and sizes, and it remains unclear what type of war Trump just initiated. The question remains whether the Tomahawk strikes were meant as “merely” a deterrent to Assad and his regime against the future use of chemical weapons, or if it suggests the beginning of another round of US-led regime change in the Middle East.

As his actions this past week have demonstrated, Trump’s impulsiveness and inconsistency makes this virtually impossible to tell. Tellingly, 2013 Trump’s tweet “What will we get for bombing Syria besides more debt and a possible long term conflict? Obama needs congressional approval,” may as well be directed at 2017 Trump.

This evidently isn’t the first time a President’s actions in office have departed from his campaign rhetoric.  Yet what is uniquely troubling about Trump is that his actions in office also have markedly departed from his earlier rhetoric while in office. Indeed, it was only a mere couple days before the airstrikes that Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary, suggested that there was a “political reality” of Assad in power that the US had accepted.

It has thus become increasingly clear that Trump’s foreign-policy doctrine is that he has none.  In some cases, his unpredictability may benefit US interests; here, however, it only serves to raise the stakes of conflict, intentional or not, with all the moving parts in Syria, and, most notably, Russia and ISIS.

Russia

The most pressing concern is how these strikes affect what had appeared to be thawing US-Russia relations. Of all the outside actors, including the US, Russia has by far the most at stake in Syria. Putin made the fateful decision several years ago that he would use the Syrian conflict as his means of returning Russia to the global, and specifically Middle Eastern, decision-making stage. If Trump and his administration thought that this missile strike would deter Russia from continuing their support for Assad, the Kremlin’s response over the last couple of days should have made it abundantly clear that this is most definitely not the case, and that, in fact, the strike may have unwittingly ratcheted up Russia’s presence in Syria.

Already, Moscow has indicated that it will increase military support for the Syrian regime, as evidenced by its moving “its most advanced ship in the Kremlin’s Black Sea fleet to tartus, the Russian navy’s port in Syria, ” positioning it near the “two American ships that carried out Thursday’s strikes.” Furthermore, Russia has announced its new commitment to strengthen and improve “the effectiveness of the Syrian air defense system.” And, perhaps most strikingly, the US government has confirmed that the Russian military suspended a communications hotline meant to mitigate for the risk of US and Russian air force collisions over Syria’s crowded airspace.

Thus, when Russia warns the US that they also have their “red lines” in Syria, mimicking Trump’s language, and that they will “respond” with force if these lines are crossed, or when Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev claims that the US and Russia are now “on the verge of a military clash,” this should not be interpreted as hollow rhetoric. While it remains highly unlikely that Russia will react military against the US for the strikes, tension between the two nuclear powers has undeniably increased, and with it, the potential for a damaging miscommunication.

Whatever one’s thoughts on the strike and its merits, it should be abundantly clear that it has not helped Russian-US relations. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is scheduled to travel to Moscow later this week, and, suffice to say, the tone and topic of the conversation has now changed dramatically. Any talk of cooperation against ISIS and radical terrorism, or non-proliferation, has officially taken a backseat to US aggression in Syria and Assad’s role going forward. One can only hope the events hasn’t derailed the possibility of immediate cooperation on global issues.

ISIS

Though many have claimed that removing Assad is a key element in defeating ISIS, or at least in diluting its potency, in the short-term fighting on two fronts (Syrian regime and ISIS) is clearly less efficient than focusing solely on the terrorist organization. In fact, this is something that Trump himself seemed to realize during the campaign trail, frequently engaging the audience by asking “Wouldn’t it be nice if we got together with Russia and knocked the hell out of ISIS?”

Though the US and the Syrian/Russian/Iranian coalition have not seen eye to eye on the fight against terrorism in Syria (and that’s probably an understatement), the Syrian regime and its allies have still allowed the US to bomb terrorist havens and fly over Syrian territory with practical impunity. Whether this implicit understanding still remains in force is now seriously in question.

Syria could either purposefully retaliate against the US by activating their air-defense system against US aircraft or, just as likely, misinterpret US aircraft as threatening the regime and react accordingly.

Either way, the fight against ISIS has gotten significantly more complicated.

What Next

More importantly than Russian and ISIS’ actions, or Iran’s and Syria’s for that matter, is what the US does next; most pressingly, whether this the strikes were only in response to the chemical weapon attack that left 86 Syrian civilians dead, or if it indeed it signals a stunning reversal of Trump’s foreign policy.

If it is the former, then, while it is still an act of war, still complicates relations with Russia and other actors, and is still of dubious legality (how flexible is the Authorization to Use Military Force against al Qaeda exactly?) one can at least breathe more easily knowing we aren’t yet engaging in a broader offensive against the regime.

If it is the latter, however, which recent history (think Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya) suggests it might be or could inexorably lead to, then many more question arise. For one, what exactly is the eventual strategy for replacement? Before endorsing any sort of attack on a foreign country, one should wonder what the political strategy for ending the war — which extends far beyond chemical weapon use — truly is. As bad as Assad is, and he is a murderous dictator, there is no proof yet that the increasingly factionalized and radicalized rebels will be any better. Groups like ISIS have so far shown an ability to thrive when left in a power vacuum.

In the same vein, is the question of how exactly a full-fledged intervention in Syria would differ from the failed nation-building experiments in the Middle East that we have seen in recent years?

The Trump administration must answer these questions, and deal with the complicated reality of having targeted Assad’s regime, and having upset the Kremlin and perhaps handicapped the fight against ISIS in the act, before any full objective judgement on the strikes can be made. But with Trump’s penchant for impulsive and gut-based foreign policy, I’m not holding my breath.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

As it pertains to the supposed relationship between Russia and Team Trump, and especially between Russia and President Trump himself, there currently exists two vastly different criticisms coming from the Democratic party.

The first criticism concerns the seeming inability of several high-profile Trump appointees or surrogates to tell the truth regarding their relationship with Russia(ns). It is completely fair to worry about the persistent “alternative facts” Paul Manafort, Jeff Sessions, Mike Flynn, et al. have brought forth, and as such is reasonable to insist on an independent Congressional inquiry into possible collusion between Trump’s campaign team and the Kremlin to undermine Hillary Clinton’s campaign. In fact, testifying to Congress this past Monday (March 21), James Comey, the maligned head of the FBI, admitted that his agency is currently investigating “possible links between donald Trump’s presidential campaign and Russia.”  Any coordination with a foreign power to manipulate the presidential election would be both illegal and dangerous, and should be treated as such.

But there is a second, persistent critique of the Trump/Russia relationship, and this one is more questionable.  It concerns Trump’s stated desire to improve ties with Russia in order to cooperate on larger strategic issues and to avoid conflict.  In this, the Democrats’ attacks are becoming frighteningly reminiscent of Mccarthyism and the infamous red scare. This type of attack coming from the Democratic party is hypocritical and dangerous; hypocritical because the original champion of a friendly “reset” with Russia was none other than Barack Obama himself, a frequent target of neoconservative and liberal interventionist critique for his military restraint towards Russian aggression in both Ukraine and Syria; dangerous because it could lead to a deleterious chilling effect, deterring US officials or the administration from any sort of mutually beneficial cooperation and, worse, may very well may push a sensitive, impulsive and unprepared President to the brink of an escalation with Moscow.

If America’s various misadventures toppling Saddam Hussein and Muhammar Gaddafi has proved anything beyond the fact that history repeats itself, it’s that the constant vilification of a foreign leader and his regime can precipitate military confrontation between the two countries. This type of hysterical demonization creates a “with us or against us” mentality, presents bilateral foreign policy as a zero-sum game and ultimately undermines peace prospects between the two nations.

While it is an exaggeration to say, as some have, that Russia’s electoral interference have set off an inevitable return to the Cold War, it is true that US-Russian relations, and the potential for escalation into conflict, has not been this high since Gorbachev’s peace prize. Consider Sergey Rogov, Moscow’s academic director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies, who was quoted in the New Yorker as saying, “Not in in a generation has the enmity run this deep.” He continued with an ominous warning: “I spent many years in the trenches of the first Cold War, and I don’t want to die in the trenches of the second.” Rogov remembers the harsh, demonizing rhetoric that slowly grew into full-scale conflict decades ago — his warnings of a return to the same levels of animosity should not go unheeded.

Already we are seeing how aggressive rhetoric can morph into aggressive actions. When reports came out that the Trump campaign worked to alter the language in the GOP platform during the convention, deleting an overt call to provide weapons to the Ukrainians, the predictable criticism from neocons was met with equal derision from the Democratic establishment. In fact, some even saw it as proof that Trump was essentially a Manchurian candidate. Never mind that President Obama had himself resisted calls to arm the Ukrainians with deadly weapons, under a reasonable fear that this would unnecessarily provoke Russians into more bellicose behavior in a region that is far closer to Moscow’s vital interests than to Washington’s. We saw it again in these past two weeks, when Senator Lindsay Graham’s bill, blocking any federal effort to relieve Russia of international sanctions, was met with significant support — with more Democratic Senate sponsors than Republican ones.

Politicians and citizens alike who don’t hunger for the prospect of a nuclear war should recall the infamous story of how the patience, savvy, and independence of a single Russian officer during the Cold War prevented what could have been one of the most disastrous conflicts in mankind, when he deliberately withheld (what he believed to be false) information from his own government so as to prevent an irreversible escalation. While the threat of nuclear war is less acute than it was at that time, the story serves as a reminder that geopolitics can, and will, never be the same in light of the spread of nuclear weapons; one simple miscommunication can lead to the annihilation of an entire country.  Belligerent and aggressive rhetoric, and the vilifying of an entire country, only serves to increase the possibility of a potentially fatal miscommunication. It is no mere coincidence that the Doomsday Clock is now three minutes before the hour — the closest it’s been to midnight since the 1980s.

There is every reason to be seriously concerned, and to seriously investigate, ties between Trump and his aides on the one hand, and Russians on the other, in particular any collusion between the two aimed at tilting our elections. And there is every reason for the US to confront Russia diplomatically on serious issues, such as potential war crimes in Syria. But this shouldn’t excuse the dangerous xenophobia that has now plagued political discourse regarding Russia. As Rogov indicates, this type of unabashed zero-sum rhetoric when it comes to US-Russian relations can only last for so long before escalating into conflict.

The Democratic party has an enormous amount of valid complaints and rebuttals, and holds the moral high ground on the vast majority of issues against Donald Trump and his administration. However, the more they obsess with this Russian issue, and go on fishing expeditions, they will not only seem irrelevant if there is no smoking gun, they will also continue to ignore some of the very real damaging policies affecting millions of American lives that the Trump administration has been pushing through. This fixation on Russia isn’t one of them, and doesn’t serve them, the American people, or the prospect for peaceful international relations in general.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

If President Putin signs it into law, a new piece of Russian legislation will soon relax the punishment for domestic violence. The measure has been widely denounced in Western media across the political spectrum, but within Russia itself, the argument gets hazy. Though the law faces significant opposition, it also has the support of many politicians and even some women’s rights activists.

Regardless of whether it is enacted, the law will have limited impact on domestic violence, gender inequality and family relations in Russia. These issues permeate Russian society on all levels – cultural, political, religious – and legal measures can only do so much. Still, this is a step backwards. On the brighter side, the dialogue surrounding the new legislation sheds light on the current state of gender and family relations in Russia. Debates over domestic violence expose deeper injustices that would take years to rectify. Unfortunately, in today’s Russia, women’s rights are being dismantled, not strengthened.

When I spoke to my mother about the measure, she was upset but not surprised. “Women and children in Russia have no more rights,” she said. Growing up in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia, she expects very little from the authorities. The system is not just corrupt but also cruel, so people are scared to involve the police in their lives. For the same reason, she wasn’t at all shocked that 385 of 387 members of the Duma had voted for the measure, even the mere 12% who are women. All of those seats are bought and sold, she explained. The only people who actually participate in Russian politics do it for the perks: money and connections. The idea of going into government to enact positive change is an idea that has yet to reach Russia.

No lasting damage, no problem

In January, the Russian parliament—the Duma—voted to decriminalize non-recurring domestic violence that causes no ‘lasting damage.’ This decision reverses a previous trend towards harsher policies. In 2016, the Duma had decriminalized poboi (battery without lasting harm, the least violent of assault) but kept a maximum two-year sentence for domestic violence. previously, there had been no legal distinction for domestic violence within the general category of violent crime. If this new law passes, punishment for a first offense of poboi will be softened to a 30,000 rouble fine (around US$500), community service or a 15-day detention. If incidents by the same perpetrator occur within one year, however, those will still be treated as criminal cases.

More significantly, all domestic violence cases will now be prosecuted in the private realm. This means that the responsibility for gathering evidence and bringing forward a case will fall on the victim. Before, law enforcement bodies could initiate persecution of a crime. The argument for the new law, though, claims that violence within the family is a private matter and should be handled accordingly. In practice this will make it even more difficult for a woman to escape a violent situation and to get her abuser behind bars. In addition to the more arduous process, the emotional stress for a woman to gather evidence and bring forward a case against a family member will be a powerful deterrent. This part of the legislation more than any other will keep victims from finding safety and achieving justice.

The circles of hell: gender and politics in Russia

The bureaucratic environment in Russia already makes it infamously difficult to bring forward domestic violence cases. “It’s the circles of hell, it goes on and on,” said one woman who tried and failed to bring her prosecutor to justice. Another domestic violence victim, Marina called the police when her husband threw her out of a second-floor balcony, putting her in a wheelchair with multiple serious injuries. Instead of arresting the husband, they told her, “It is your family matter; you quarrel and then you reconcile.”

Accurate statistics are hard to obtain, but according to official statistics, around 40% of violent crime in Russia occurs within the family, and 80% of violence against Russian women comes from a husband or partner. The actual figures are even higher, given that the statistics came from the Russian government and are most likely underreported. And the problem is growing: according to the Anna Centre for the Prevention of Violence, there were 20% more reported assaults on women and children in 2015 than in 2010. But fewer than 30% of women who call the Anna Centre’s abuse hotline report their case to the authorities. And of those who did, 80% remained unsatisfied with the response.

If he beats you, it means he loves you: a sexist tradition  

This phenomenon reflects a long-standing cultural tradition revived in today’s reactionary Russia. An old proverb goes, “If he beats you, it means he loves you.” The saying has survived for centuries, tracing back to a household manual called Domostroy, which first appeared in the 16th century during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Secular but permeated with Christian Orthodox morality, the text presents physical punishment for women and children as a “mere blessing” that prevents “death of the soul.” In addition to teaching new wives on how to manage their servants and distill their vodka, Domostroy instructs young Russian women to obey their husbands and know their place. When my mother married, my grandmother gave her a copy.

Though the book is dated and few today take its advice seriously, this attitude towards women is alive and well in modern Russian society, guarded by the Orthodox Church. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Church holds huge social and political influence in Russia. It supports the new law as a means to keep the government from interfering with a husband’s or parent’s so-called right to administer discipline; according to scripture and tradition, “the reasonable and loving use of physical punishment [is]an essential part of the rights given to parents by God himself.”

According to gender rights activist Alyona Popova, “traditional, or rather archaic, values have become popular again.” Activists and high-profile celebrities have been increasingly speaking out against domestic violence, but the response is often that the women “were asking for it with frivolous behavior,” or “knew who they were marrying and should have known better.’” Such attitudes reflect a culture of victim-blaming, in which both men and women often see crimes against women, including domestic violence and sexual assault, as something the woman invites and therefore can prevent.

Part of this return to traditionalism can be understood as a reaction to the communist state’s overbearing control of all aspects of citizens’ lives. Russians today are understandably wary of laws that grant the corrupt state access to their private sphere. People prefer to sort out their affairs themselves, since calling the police usually just means inviting more trouble into their homes, a sad reality carried over from the Soviet era. The rationale for the new legislation clearly reflects this fear. ‘The family is a delicate environment where people should sort things out themselves,’ argued Maria Mamikonyan, head of the All-Russian Parents Resistance movement, a group that lobbied for decriminalization.

A long road ahead

Though the new legislation will certainly not bode well for women’s rights in Russia, the issue has been oversimplified in Western media to two clear-cut and opposing sides: the corrupt and repressive Russian government granting free reign to abusers on one side, activists fighting for women’s rights on the other. In fact, not all Russian women oppose the legislation, not even in the activist community. Marina, the domestic abuse victim quoted above, agreed that ‘the law must distinguish between slaps and beatings,’ with only more violent cases like hers treated as criminal offenses. Others have brought up the possibility that with a less harsh punishment in place for minor offenses, women will be more willing to report violence without fear that their partner will end up in jail.

This is not a very strong argument, but the reluctance of some Russian women to punish their partners and abusers reflects a deeply ingrained cultural acceptance of violence in the family. In a Moscow Times article, Daria Litvinova collected testimonies about domestic violence from NGO workers and ordinary Russian citizens. According to Anna Centre’s Larisa Ponarina, relatives often disown women who report domestic violence because “keeping the family together and standing behind the father of her children is more important.” Even more appalling, the following is an account from an anonymous Moscow resident who often hears the neighbors fighting and calls the police: “the wife, with bruises all over her face, shouts at the officers, saying it is none of their – or my – business. Once they tried to arrest the husband, and she went in fists first.”

As we can see, while strong legislation is key, domestic violence in Russia begins and ends with cultural attitudes. As long as the mainstream mentality accepts a threshold for permissible domestic violence, women will continue to suffer everyday abuse. It wouldn’t matter much if the official punishment for domestic violence remained two years of jail time; police and lawyers still often ignore and refuse to prosecute the few cases that women attempt to bring forward. In a society where identifying as a feminist is a radical admission, women will continue to “bear the violence silently, hide bruisings from public and blame themselves.” In a country where domestic violence does not exist legally or in the minds of most people, it will remain a sad fact of everyday life for thousands of women.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.