Culturally and politically, the people of Thailand are generally taught that their King is an untouchable god whose power is not to be questioned. The Thai Constitution states at the top that “The King shall be enthroned in a position of revered worship” and that “No person shall expose the King to any sort of accusation or action.” There is also the lese-majeste law, which subjects anyone criticizing the royal family to secret trials and long prison sentences. 

Thailand’s King Vajiralongkorn began his reign in 2016 and was crowned in 2019 following the death of his father. However, Thailand’s King was subject to much scrutiny long before he was crowned. There have been persistent rumors of womanizing and illegal business surrounding the King. He has been married four times ‒ with his first marriage in 1977 to his cousin, Princess Soamsawali, whom he left for an actress, Yuvadhida ‒ and has had a total of seven children. In 1996, Vajiralongkorn publicly denounced Yuvadhida and disowned his four sons from that marriage. He married his third wife, Srirasmi, in 2001 and had another son with her. In 2014, Srirasmi was stripped of her royal title and many of her relatives were arrested for lese-majeste charges. 

Others who were close to the Crown Prince have been arrested for the same charge, including his personal bodyguard, who was stripped of his rank for “disobeying royal commands” and “threatening the monarchy by pursuing his own interests.” He disappeared after these allegations and is believed to have died. The King has also promoted his pet poodle, Fu-Fu, to the rank of Air Chief Marshal. In May 2019, days before his coronation, Vajiralongkorn married a former flight attendant, making her Queen. The severity of the lese-majeste law has prevented any open discussion of the new king’s suitability inside Thailand. 

Shortly after taking the throne, King Vajiralongkornhe demanded that the Thai Constitution be rewritten to allow him to spend time outside Thailand without appointing a regent in his absence, thereby allowing him to rule from abroad. Since then, the King has spent the majority of his time in Germany. He has been largely absent from his kingdom since the coronavirus pandemic hit, leaving his nation to suffer on its own. The King and his entourage of 100 fled to Germany and have been staying at Hotel Sonnenbichl since March. Now, with the protests on-going, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has stated that “We have made it clear that politics concerning Thailand should not be conducted from German soil. If there are guests in our country that conduct their state business from our soil we would always want to act to counteract that.”   

The other man at the center of this protest is Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha. He began his military career in the prestigious 21st Infantry, rising through the ranks and attaining the rank of major general following the 2006 coup. In 2014, he became acting premier of Thailand and drafted a constitution that absolved him of any responsibility for the coup and allowed him to remain a military official while serving as head of the nation. A new legislature was installed, composed of military and police officers, and the sole candidate, Prayuth, was nominated as prime minister. Since becoming prime minister, he has cracked down on any and all perceived forms of dissent. Political forums were banned, freedom of speech was abandoned, martial law was imposed, and politicians, journalists, and critics were detained. 

Protests have ignited in response to Prayuth’s authoritarian action and the King’s overall inaction. The protestors are mostly students, including many high school students. Their dissatisfaction with their education has grown into a broader challenge to the government, the military, and the monarchy. The students are calling on Prime Minister Prayuth to resign, for the Constitution to be revised, for the King to come under the Constitution’s authority, and for the dissolution of the Parliament. Their most revolutionary demand is to limit the power of the monarchy, which has not been challenged for 88 years.  

The protests date back to February when the Future Forward party was dissolved, leaving many young Thais alienated and prompting them to seek change outside the parliamentary system. Things were put on hold due to the coronavirus pandemic that hit Thailand and the rest of the world. Then in August, Arnon Nampa, a human rights lawyer, publicly called for reforms of the monarchy at the Democracy Monument in Bangkok.  

In September, thousands of protestors gathered in Bangkok to call for changes to Thailand’s military-dominated government, the army-drafted constitution, and the exalted status of the monarchy. “We have to conquer our fear because if we don’t come out to fight then our future will not improve,” said Rewat Chusub, a 41-year-old tailor. In response to these protests, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha tamped down dissent by detaining activists. However, this did not stop the protestors as they laid out a plaque on Sanam Luang, the royal field. The embossed seal said: “At this place, the people have expressed their will that this country belongs to the people and is not the property of the monarchy, as they have deceived us.”

On October 14, thousands of anti-government protestors gathered near Government House and called for the resignation of Chan-o-cha. The next day, a state of emergency was declared and mass gatherings over five people were prohibited. Protests did not stop, prompting the Thai police to use water cannons against peaceful pro-democracy protests in Bangkok on October 16. The police used water cannons laced with blue dye and an apparent teargas chemical in Bangkok’s Pathumwan shopping district and charged in with batons and shields to disperse the protesters. This still did not deter protesters. 

On October 22, Prime Minister Chan-o-cha canceled the state of emergency he had declared the week prior. This was seen as a gesture to help cool the protests. However, protesters continued to march near his office, Government House, demanding that he step down. They also requested the release of their colleagues who were arrested in previous protests. They gave the Prime Minister three days to meet their requests or they would return. 

Prime Minister Chan-o-cha refused to step down and the protesters’ deadline has since passed. But, protesters have stayed true to their word, keeping up the pressure on the government with more and more protests. On November 17, Parliament began a two-day session to review potential changes to the constitution but ended up rejecting five of the seven amendments proposed by the people. Since then, protestors have remained unimpressed with the government’s efforts to appease them, and thousands have continued to take to the streets to voice their grievances. 

The pro-democracy activists have even called for the international community to take action. On October 26, protesters marched to the German embassy in Bangkok, demanding that the German government investigate the King’s activities in Germany. And, more recently, on December 10, pro-democracy activists held a rally at the United Nations’ office in Bangkok, calling for the UN to pressure the Thai government into repealing the lese-majeste law.

As of now, it seems unlikely that these protests will slow down. If anything, these grassroots protestors are becoming more organized and intentional in their aims. This new generation wants change. They do not want to inherit an old Thailand where fundamental rights such as freedom of expression are suspended in the name of reverence to the King. They want a new and freer Thailand where publicly criticizing the King or other royals is not a crime but a fundamental right.

The post Why Protesters Are Fighting for Democracy in Thailand appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Ituri is a northeastern province in the DRC that has seen extensive ethnic conflict occur since 1972. Violence peaked between 1999 and 2003, with an estimated 50,000 deaths. The main root of the altercations is that the Hema community, who are historically herders, were treated much more favorably during the Belgian colonization of the DRC (ending in 1960), placing them higher up on the social hierarchy. Meanwhile, the Lendu community, which is traditionally agricultural, is often the aggressor due to feeling unjustly stripped of land, natural resources and local political power. 

The conflict diminished after 2003 due to European Union peacekeeping missions, but has been reignited since 2017. Part of the reason for this is the continuous nature of the issues, with the disputes never fully ending and with groups holding onto their weapons from previous altercations. More importantly, the reason a complete cessation is so challenging is due to it being far more than a bilateral ethnic conflict. A deeper analysis of the crisis reveals that other military and ethnic groups are involved, including heavy political meddling from exterior actors due to the province’s wealth in resources — especially oil.

Since reigniting in 2017, 360,000 people have been displaced to neighboring provinces and countries, with over 1,000 casualties. Unlike the war from 1999 to 2003, there has not been a structured ethnic militia engaging in the conflict. The violence is mostly carried out by Lendu youths, not necessarily backed by their entire ethnic community, with some Hema youths carrying out reprisals. It is clear that there is no overarching command as assailants claim to be part of different groups, making intervention all the more challenging. 

The DRC’s military, FARDC, is perceived to be a very unstable force due to the levels of corruption and underfunding. FARDC frequently attempts to strike back at Lendu communities to limit their exertion of aggression, but this has just dispersed the youth groups. The dispersion enables them to spread terror in internally displaced camps, and take back some of their lost areas. Lendu youths do not fear the DRC’s armed forces, as they see the army as the natural ally of the Hema’s. Attacking army positions both helps them get rid of their enemy and enables them to take their firearm weapons. 

Aside from the military, other actors involved reveal why attaining peace in the region is such a challenge. These include other ethnic and rebel groups involved on the ground, as well as opposing political entities meddling to reach favorable outcomes. Due to past altercations in Ituri and in the Eastern DRC in general, the bordering countries of Rwanda and Uganda have historical ties to armed groups and rebellions in the region. A Congolese government official claims that migrants from the Hutu community from Rwanda fuel the violence. He asserts that they are involved both as military trainers for the Lendu’s, and as protectors of the Hema’s herds. 

Representatives of Congolese security also outline that the M23 movement, a rebel group responsible for violence just south of Ituri in 2012, is attempting to profit from the altercations from the Ugandan side. Former members of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-K), a political party and former rebel group, also own territory in the region, it is historically supported by Rwanda and is currently supported by the Ugandan government. One of the main issues of this crisis has been the continual involvement of foreign ‘invisible hands’ that help organize attacks and provide equipment, a complaint shared by several archbishops in the region. 

Due to the fragile relationship between the two ethnicities, external actors are pitting them against each other in order to rid the areas of inhabitants and exploit the benefits of the land, chiefly natural resources such as gold and oil. The greed for the district’s resources explains the heavy involvement by Uganda and Rwanda. Illegal resource exploitation has long been a pillar of the continuation in violence. The United Nations mission in the DRC explained in 2004 that inter-militia conflict will not cease in the region until the government takes care of extracting the natural resources in a credible fashion. 

However, while natural resources have always played a key aspect of violence in Ituri, oil is a particular resource that was not as prominent in the 1999 to 2003 conflict as now. Ituri is incredibly rich in oil, Lake Albert makes up much of its eastern border and is the main oil source of the region. There has been a substantial increase in oil discovery over the past decade. Therefore, despite the aforementioned history and regional factions of the area contributing to the crisis, oil is now an undoubtable key driver. Lake Albert’s oil exploration is divided into five blocks, with two being on the Congolese side of the lake, and three being on the Ugandan side. The majority of the lake and its basin are located on the Ugandan side, the country has therefore been able to control a favorable majority of the oil. 

The oil deposits at Lake Albert have often taken the center stage of the relationship between the DRC and Uganda. During the previous Ituri conflict, the Ugandan government altered its alliances with local armed groups frequently to attain its highest possible influence. Its main priorities in choosing alliances were to keep Uganda’s influence in the region high while limiting the DRC’s influence, and most importantly securing the extraction operations of their oil partners, Heritage and Tullow Oil, two foreign companies attempting to maximise profits in the region. Considering the uptake in oil discoveries on the Congolese blocks since the last Ituri conflict, it isn’t hard to imagine why Uganda might still support rebel militias on the Congolese side.

A closer look at these big oil corporations shows how rapidly the link to conflict can be made. 

They are heavily involved in the political climate of the region, oftentimes even directing it, implementing everything but a laissez-faire attitude to their surroundings. In Angola, one of the DRC’s neighboring countries, Heritage Oil hired Executive Outcomes, a private military company from South Africa, in order to drive UNITA (Angola’s second largest political party) rebels away from Heritage’s oil extraction sites. The Executive Outcomes attacked areas under UNITA’s control in accordance with Heritage and the Angolan military. As conflict near an extraction zone tampers an oil company’s ability to do business, it is highly probable that oil firms are taking sides in the Ituri conflicts, in order to ensure continuous profits. 

This assertion is strengthened when considering that Heritage Oil cooperated with Ugandan groups in the 1999 to 2003 Ituri crisis, as well as admitting to the DRC government that it had been striking deals with the leaders of rebel groups occupying Ituri. Heritage is not alone though, the Congolese government accused both Heritage and Tullow Oil of working with the Ugandan army to illegally cross the DRC border for oil exploration purposes, resulting in Congolese fatalities. Seeing as the Congolese government is the one supporting the Hema’s in the Ituri conflict and the two companies along with the Ugandan government seek to act nefariously toward the Congolese government, the aforementioned ‘invisible hands’ supporting Lendu attacks might not be as invisible as they seem. 

Both companies, Heritage and Tullow, still controlled the majority of Lake Albert’s projects until this year, despite there being a handful of smaller shareholders involved. A third company, Total SE, has recently acquired all of Tullow Oil’s stakes on the Ugandan Lake Albert projects, as well as the rights to build an East African pipeline whose source is at Lake Albert. Tullow’s motivation to sell to Total concerned itself with improving its financial situation, although fleeing the conflict-ridden area might well be a secondary factor.

Total has also been one of two major firms involved in exploring the Eastern DRC for more oil deposits. The French company outlined the risks associated with oil exploration in Ituri in a 2013 report, which specifically says that inter-community tensions and conflict dynamics may be affected by the search for oil. It had already identified at this point that certain communities will feel excluded by the benefits that oil brings, creating greater tension. Land ownership has always been a root of violence in Ituri due to competition over resources such as gold, therefore any hope of benefiting from further oil deposits only amplifies the violent meddling by corporations, bordering countries, and the DRC government itself.

The Hemu communities, many of which are now in internally displaced camps, are convinced that the attacks are fueled by the greater political interest toward oil exploration, rather than continued hatred between them and the Lendu community. An Ituri politician and businessman explains that their areas are full of oil deposits, and that chasing out communities with violence is considerably easier than incurring the costs for relocating them to use the areas for oil exploration. It is obviously challenging to uncover which government and oil companies are supporting rebel groups, as they are trying to keep their activities secret. However, the past suggests much greater forces are at war in Ituri than two ethnicities.

The communities of Ituri seem to be much more concerned with agricultural land ownership, the Hema’s want to retain their land and Lendu’s want to expand their influence. However, external actors are blinded by Ituri’s gold studs and particularly the oil deposits surrounding Lake Albert, using previous conflict in the region as an excuse to have no regard for humanitarian decency, pouring fuel on a flame that was slowly fizzling out.

The most infuriating part of the current Ituri conflicts is that much like the rest of the DRC, the region is incredibly rich in natural resources, but this wealth actually inhibits its development rather than benefiting it. Total SE outlined in their 2013 report how oil exploitation could lift up entire communities and the DRC’s economy in general, sadly this assessment strays far from reality. Military and rebel groups are clearly being strengthened by nefarious actors, the economy is being distorted as the agriculturally-intensive sector is getting eclipsed by the greed for oil, and border tensions and internal corruption is bound to worsen.

The international community can attempt to halt conflict with peace delegations as it did in 2003, but this does not solve for the invisible hands manipulating it. Local humanitarian groups offer significant help in relieving the ample health problems in internally displaced camps. However, until there is greater credibility and transparency from the governments of the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda, as well as by the oil corporations, local aid is all that can be done for the moment.

The post Why Oil Is the Hidden Agent of Chaos in the Ituri Conflicts appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

In 1994, an estimated 100,000 Rwandans were killed between April 7 and July 15. The genocide was sparked by the death of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, a member of the Hutu ethnic group, when his plane was shot down on April 6, 1994. Many suspected that Paul Kagame’s Tutsi rebels, an opposing ethnic group, were responsible for the attack. This led the Hutu government to launch a genocide against the Tutsi in retaliation. 

Colonialism and the Rwandan Genocide

In analyzing the history of the Rwandan Genocide, it becomes clear that the anomosity between ethnic groups during the genocide can be tied to colonialism. The Rwandan population was essentially made up of two ethnicities, the Tutsi and the Hutus, with distinct characteristics separating both. Characteristically, the Tusti are generally taller, lighter in skin tone, and have a longer, more slender nose than the Hutus. The main social distinction between the two groups is that the Hutu were typically farmers and the Tusti were cattle herders. The social system in Rwanda was based on the fact that the Hutus would work for the Tutsi in exchange for cattle. In 1884, when Germany formally colonized Rwanda, the large Hutu population was subjugated as the working class, with the minority Tutsi population as the ruling class. This subjugation was solely based on the observation that Tutsi were more Caucasian, and thus, more fit to rule. 

After World War I, Belgium inherited the colony as part of the League of Nations mandate. Belgium allowed the existing Tutsi monarch to continue its control over the Hutus. The Belgians considered the Tutsis to be superior to the Hutus, leading Tutsis to enjoy better jobs and educational opportunities in the early 1900s. Further, the Belgians provided military and political support to the Tutsi as long as they maintained policies of Belgium’s colonial rule. Consequently, resentment among the Hutus grew throughout the years.

Following World War II, the mindset of many European nations changed in regard to colonialism. This shift in belief systems was felt in Rwanda, most noticeably in the Hutu population, which was tired of the existing oppressive social system. In 1959, the Hutu participated in riots where more than 20,000 Tutsis were killed and many more fled to neighboring countries. The existing Tusti government was overturned and replaced by Belgian-backed Hutus. And in 1962, amid a growing global movement for decolonization, Belgium granted Rwanda independence, leaving the Hutus in power. 

Rwanda’s Grapple Post-Decolonization Internal Turmoil

With the Hutus in control of Rwanda, the tables turned — the Tutsis were viewed as the inferior ethnicity. But in 1993, Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana faced diminished popularity as he dealt with Rwanda’s worsening economic state. Tutsi refugees in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Freedom (RPF) group, led by current Rwanda President Paul Kagame, with the intention to overthrow Habyarimana and return home. 

On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana’s plane was shot down and chaos ensued. The Hutus suspected the attack was done by the RPF, however these allegations have never been substantiated. In retaliation, the Hutu, hoping to grasp any last bits of power left, began purging and murdering any political leaders supporting the Tutsi rebels. The extremist Hutu regime carried out a genocide of Tutsi populations and moderate Hutus in order to squash opposition. In just 100 days, the BBC reports that over 800,000 people were killed — this time was known as the ‘100 Days of Slaughter.’

At this time, Paul Rusesabagina, a moderate Hutu, was the manager of the Hotel Mille Collines, a luxury hotel in central Kigali. Rusesabagina bribed soldiers that were hunting Tutsi and moderate Hutus and also maintained connections with several embassies in order to protect those sheltering at the hotel — amid the genocide, Rusesabagina was viewed as a hero for many.

In July 1994, the RPF finally captured the capital of Rwanda, and the Hutu regime collapsed. The RPF were seen as victorious, resulting in the departure of nearly two million Hutus from the country. Rwanda instated a multi-ethnic government with a Hutu as president and Kagame as his deputy. However, after the president was accused of inciting ethnic violence and subsequently imprisoned, Kagame became president and Rwanda led with a Tutsi government. 

In 1996, Rusesabagina fled to Belgium for fear of his safety. Once he left Rwanda, he became an outspoken critic of the government and Kagame. He co-founded an opposition party, the Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change. This opposition has an armed wing known as the National Liberation Forces, which has claimed responsibility for attacks in Rwanda since 2018. Kagame and his government had been trying to capture Rusesabagina and other critics like him. 

Current Developments and Autocratic Conditions

Since the Tutsis overtook the government, Rwanda has been heralded as an example of economic growth and development. However, the nation has also been accused of human rights violations for alleged extrajudicial killings and crackdowns on the press. This was seen in Kagame’s run for his second presidential term in 2010. Opposition media was repressed, several journalists were murdered. Additionally, numerous critics of Kagame have disappeared or been killed in recent years. The most recent occured in 2013, when Patrick Karegeya, a former Rwandan spy chief, was found dead in a hotel room in South Africa. 

In 2015, Kagame backed a constitutional amendment that would allow him to run for a third term. Voters approved amendments to the constitution that now allow Kagame to serve a third seven-year term; in addition, he is eligible to serve two five-year terms after that, giving him the potential to hold the office until 2034. 

Kagame’s repression of the press, intimidation toward his opponents, and passing an amendment that would allow him to rule for 31 years severely contradicts Rwanda’s stance as a democracy. Instead, it is an authoritarian state pushing for the superiority of Tutsis over Hutus. As a result, critics like Rusesabagina refuse to go back to Rwanda, as they know they will be punished for speaking against the authoritarian regime posed as a democracy. 

On August 31, however, Rusesabagina appeared in handcuffs in Rwanda’s capital. His adopted daughter, Carine Kanimba, and other human rights activists voiced their concerns that this was “the latest example of the Rwandan government targeting critics beyond its borders.” Kanimba and the rest of his family claim that their father was kidnapped by the Rwandan government as they said “he would [have]never voluntarily return to Rwanda.” 

Kagame has insisted that “there was no kidnap… He got here on the basis of what he believed and wanted to do.” Rusesabagina faces charges including terrorism, arson, and murder. Rusesabagina’s family and supporters fear he will be the next victim of Kagame’s mission to eliminate any opposition to his reign. Rusesabagina’s arrest has drawn international concern and calls for his release. 

A Democracy Far From Perfect

Kagame feels threatened by Rusesabagina’s opposing coalition: the Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change, and his government continuously claims that Rusesabagina funds rebel groups. In 2010, Rusesabagina asserted that the government was using these claims to conduct a smear campaign against him. With his arrest, it looks like Kagame seeks political retribution against Rusesabagina. 

Rusesabagina is expected to be granted a fair trial — but the reality may be far from fair. Claude Gatebuke, a Rwandan who survived the genocide, said that, “the story of Rusesabagina, who is a Hutu person, presents a problem to that dominant Tutsi narrative.” 

It is likely that Kagame will do everything in his power to indict Rusesabagina, and continue his “assertion that he is the hero of the genocide, responsible for saving his people and rebuilding the country, and is the only viable leader of Rwanda.”   

The post Paul Kagame’s Rule in Rwanda: The Impact of the Rwandan Genocide on Current Civil Crackdowns appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.