As the soccer world prepares for its biggest event of the year, many are continuing to question the ethics of holding the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar. Allegations of corruption and severe human rights violations have followed the preparations since the initial selection of Qatar as the host country in 2009. Multiple other factors, including Qatar’s own domestic crises, the history of anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment in the country and the question of the participation of Russian athletes have compounded the controversies even further. However, representatives of Qatar, as well as former FIFA president Sepp Blatter, have suggested that the claims of corruption and abuse are rooted in racism.

Qatar’s selection as the World Cup drew criticism after the country became the smallest ever country to host the tournament as well as only the second country to be awarded host after never having qualified for the event as a team. Qatar had also been branded a “high risk” host by FIFA due to its lack of sufficient facilities and the country’s hot climate. And yet, FIFA executives voted overwhelmingly in favor of Qatar across four rounds, beating out high-market destinations such as the United States, South Korea, Japan and Australia.

In 2011, former FA head Lord Triesman accused the representatives of Trinidad and Tobago and Paraguay as well as two other FIFA executives of “improper and unethical behavior” — including requesting and accepting bribes from Qatari officials in exchange for support for the country’s World Cup bid. Furthermore, a whistle-blower alleged that the former FIFA representatives for the Ivory Coast and Cameroon were paid $1.5 million each by Qatar in order to secure their vote. FIFA cleared Qatar of any wrongdoing in a report published in 2014, but a 2021 investigation by AP later revealed that Qatar had hired a former CIA officer to spy on the FIFA officials who had selected the host World Cup host in 2010.

Despite the allegations, Qatar moved ahead with the preparations and began construction on the infrastructure necessary to host the event. However, concerns were soon raised about the additional strain the World Cup placed on the already mistreated migrant workers in Qatar who suffer under the kafala system, a system imposed in many Gulf countries which creates a fixed sponsorship between migrant workers and their employers. Under the kafala system, employers are able to easily manipulate the dependence workers are forced to place on them, leading to millions of cases of abuse. The system, which often facilitates forced labor, is often likened to slavery.

Qatar’s foreign workforce — about 1.2 million workers originating primarily from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Philippines — make up 94% of its labor force and yet benefit from the least legal and economic protection in the country. The Guardian warned in 2013 that up to 4,000 workers could die during the World Cup preparations due to safety concerns and mistreatment, claiming migrant workers were denied food, water and adequate pay and safety measures. Workers later confirmed these accusations to Amnesty International, adding that they were subject to verbal abuse and threats alongside the deprivation of basic labor rights. In 2014, The Guardian reported that, as construction continued in Qatar, the death tolls of migrant workers were rapidly increasing.

Though Qatar introduced new reforms to the kafala system in 2020 — including allowing workers to change jobs without requiring their sponsor’s permission, a non-discriminatory minimum wage throughout the country, and the abolishment of the exit permit required to leave the country — millions of foreign workers had already suffered in order to prepare Qatar for the World Cup.

As Qatar tried to resolve the highly-publicized labor abuse scandal — one which caused both FIFA sponsors and fans to consider boycotting the event entirely — the country was embroiled in a diplomatic crisis which resulted in severed diplomatic relations between Qatar and several Gulf countries after Saudi Arabia accused Qatar of fostering terrorism. In the aftermath, some claimed that Qatar’s hosting duties were the root of the dispute, while others suggested that Qatar manufactured the crisis to try and “get away” from the event.

Qatar has also been criticized for the country’s conservative views concerning LGBTQ+ rights, with LGBTQ+ fans and players alike expressing their concerns about traveling to a country in which homosexuality is illegal. Qatari officials responded by assuring the public that pride flags would be allowed at the events, though Qatari Secretary-General al-Thawadi warned against LGBTQ+ public displays of affection in 2013, citing Qatari “culture and traditions.”

Though controversies internal and external threaten to overshadow the event, the 2022 World Cup is still set to happen in Qatar. The continued existence of this year’s Cup begs the question — if human rights abuses weren’t enough to cancel the event, what would it take? Maybe it’s time to reevaluate the human cost the world of international sports often generates.

In the four months since the coalition of Gulf States—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates—cut their diplomatic ties with Qatar and initiated a land, air, and sea blockade, little movement towards a resolution has been made. The conflict has drawn international attention as interstate relations in the region have consequently changed. US Secretary Rex Tillerson’s involvement signals the global concern with the situation and the potential destabilizing force these shifting relations hold.

The current crisis dates back to June 5, when the coalition states announced the blockade, citing accusations of Qatar’s financing of terrorism and its ties with Saudi Arabia’s rival Iran. The blockade has interrupted business and trade connections between Qatar and its neighbors. These economic linkages are integral to the Qatari economy, as Qatar imports approximately 40 percent of its food overland through Saudi Arabia and depends on the UAE as a major destination for its oil exports.

Despite potential ramifications for its economy, Qatar has refused to accede to the coalition’s demands. This likely stems from a desire to maintain its autonomy: Qatar is a small country that has faced Saudi Arabia’s “dominating, conservative influence” since its independence from Britain. The ability to not acquiesce in spite of the potential economic consequences can be partly attributed to Qatar’s vast oil reserves, which have allowed it to amass a sovereign wealth fund of an estimated $335 billion. Still, the potential for economic hardship has forced Qatar to adjust its relationships with other countries in the Middle East.

Still, economic concern is present, which has resulted in adjustments to Qatar’s relationships with other countries in the Middle East.

Qatar’s relationship with Iran is a principal cause of Saudi Arabia’s frustration, having maintained closer ties with Iran over the years as a product of their shared natural gas resources. The coalition states’ list of demands included suspending relations with Tehran, but Qatar not only refused to acquiesce to this condition, but it also moved to strengthen relations with Iran.

In late August, Qatar resumed full diplomatic relations with Iran by returning its ambassador to Tehran following a period of 20 months during which Qatar suspended ties in response to attacks on Saudi diplomatic facilities in Iran. Continuous support from Iran in the wake of the blockade accompanied the restoration of ties. Since June 5, Iran has opened its airspace for Qatari airplanes and has provided sea shipments of fresh food. These steps have enabled Qatar to maintain its challenging stance despite facing economic challenges and indicate a bold defiance of Saudi Arabia’s demands and attempts to dictate Qatar’s foreign relations.

Qatar’s alignment with Iran holds global consequences, particularly as the US considers its stance in the conflict. The US must balance its relations and protect its interests in the region. In doing so, it must consider the consequences of siding with each party of the conflict. To align with Saudi Arabia would mean the US would have to leave its base in Qatar, its largest in the Middle East. On the other hand, siding with Qatar as it moves closer to Iran would contradict professed American foreign policy.

Qatar has also turned to Turkey in response to the crisis it faces with its closer neighbors. Turkey quickly sent planes of food to Qatar after the country faced potential food shortages due to Saudi Arabia’s closure of Qatar’s only land border. Qatar has also strengthened its military ties with Turkey. In August, troops from Turkish and Qatar navies undertook a joint exercise, Iron Shield, with the goal of “exchanging information, training senior military officials and improving coordination between the two forces to boost security.” As a more tangible demonstration of their military relationship, Turkey fast-tracked legislation and approved Qatari troops’ deployment to Turkey in the days following the blockade announcement.

Turkey has made its ties with Qatar clear to the coalition states, refusing their requests to shut down its military base in Qatar. Instead, Turkey intends to increase troop numbers to 3,000 in keeping with their agreement and plans to keep a brigade in the country. These are clear signals that the blockade has served to strengthen Qatar’s alignment with Turkey. And like the difficulties posed by Qatar’s relations with Iran, Qatar’s relationship with Turkey poses a similar challenge for the United States, in light of current tensions between the Trump administration and Turkey.

Though largely a cause for concern in the region, the crisis has also proved to be an opportunity for one state. Since the crisis, Kuwait has worked on negotiating between all parties to find a solution. As the typical regional powers are caught up in the conflict, Kuwait has taken this unique opportunity to establish itself as a leader in resolving the conflict.  

Kuwait hopes to successfully restore relations between all parties and normalize ties in the Gulf, warning that the persistence of conflict could result in the collapse of the Gulf Cooperation Council and threats to the security of all countries in the Gulf. In mediating this crisis, Kuwait hopes to avoid these consequences but also fulfill its own interests: sustaining relations with Qatar and the states involved in the blockade and promoting its reputation regionally and globally as a mediator and stabilizing force in the region. It remains to be seen if Kuwait can succeed in bringing together these parties and resolving this dispute.

The US has also undertaken a mediating role. Tillerson has been active in the region in the months following the breakout of conflict. His first attempts came in July, partaking in shuttle diplomacy as he met with leaders in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. Though he signed a memorandum of understanding regarding efforts to fight terrorism with Qatar, the trip yielded little more as the four states insisted that the memorandum was not sufficient. In October, Tillerson returned to the region, emphasizing the importance of finding the resolution as he called for “the GCC to continue to pursue unity.” Again, these efforts proved futile as Tillerson noted Saudi Arabia’s resistance to enter discussions with Qatar.

Changing relations in the Middle East hold consequences across the global community. In a broad sense, the conflict perpetuates instability in a region plagued by insecurity. The Gulf states are typically seen as the region’s pillars of stability. This new rift adds yet another layer of uncertainty to the Middle East puzzle. The US must also be careful in determining its position within the conflict. While Tillerson has maintained a neutral position, he has also expressed growing frustration with the lack of compromise; the world will be watching closely as the US navigates this conflict which seemingly has no near end in sight.

Since Myanmar’s 2011 reforms, the country has been widely re-evaluated by the international community. The US has moved from a policy of isolation and economic sanctions to offering partnership. With diplomatic missions now re-opened, Myanmar has been allowed for the first time to chair ASEAN in 2014. Driving these re-calculations is Myanmar’s geostrategic borders with India and China. It occupies the second largest area in Southeast Asia, has a population around 60 million and offers a significant market opportunity.

The Gulf States have been increasingly looking to their east in search of new markets, labor sources and diplomatic support. Their expanded relationship with Southeast Asian countries, and increasingly Myanmar, is evident through increased trade, foreign aid, investment and tourism. A shared religious culture with the Muslim population in the region has further characterized the relationship.

Interaction between the two regional multilateral organizations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has increased; they have a two-year action plan and there are ongoing ASEAN-GCC meetings regarding opportunities to expand and build on their relationships for security and economic gain.

Despite being geographically close, with some common cultural and religious threads, and generations of intermarriage stemming from migration and trade interactions, Southeast Asian countries and the Gulf States used to feel more strongly connected to the West than to each other. However, Myanmar’s earliest Muslims were traders, mercenaries and court servants of Persian, Indian and Arab ethnicity who settled in the country in the 13^th and 14^th centuries and married Burmese women. Another strand of shared history is that Myanmar was a British colony for more than 60 years, and the UAE, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar, although not colonies, were British protectorates for decades.

Yet, many stark differences between Myanmar and the Gulf States can be observed. For example, while Myanmar is predominantly a Burman society, only an estimated 60-70% of the people being ethnic Burmans. In contrast, the Gulf States’ native populations are very homogeneous. Myanmar claims to have 135 different ethnic groups, while migrant workers supply most of the diversity in the Gulf States, thus creating different issues for these countries to manage. Myanmar’s aspiring democratic government will have to learn how to respond to public opinion, while the authoritarian Gulf States largely ignore public opinion.

With respect to religion, the Gulf States have majority Muslim populations; in contrast only about 4% of Myanmar’s population is Muslim. The majority of Myanmar’s Muslims are Sunni, aligning them with the Muslims in the Gulf and worldwide, 90% of whom are Sunni. Due to recent Buddhist-Muslim conflicts within Myanmar and the humanitarian crisis with the Rohingya population in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State, a small but very visible percent of the population receives international media attention. Increasingly the Gulf States feel compelled to stand by fellow their fellow Muslims and respond to Myanmar’s dismal treatment of the Rohingya and its Buddhist-Muslim clashes. At an August 2012 extraordinary meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference the Gulf States supported a statement condemning Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya. The Saudi cabinet also spoke out against the violence asking for action from the international community to protect Myanmar’s Muslims. Saudi Arabia provided US$50 million in aid for Rohingya refugees and has also accepted groups of Rohingya as migrant laborers.

Yet, one development regarding this issue concerns the thousands of Rohingyas now held in Saudi prisons after an earlier asylum offer by King Faisal was reversed with the change in monarch. This shows that the Saudis are speaking out of both sides of their mouth on the issue, which may weaken their leverage with the international community when they urge action. Another complicating factor is that the Myanmar government’s failure to adequately respond to the poor treatment of the Rohingya could incite extremist Muslim groups. The religion factor will continue to complicate the relationship because Gulf countries must balance investment in Myanmar, yet admit they are working with a government that mistreats Muslims. In Myanmar the famous opposition party leader and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, has also failed to speak out strongly on the issue, to the disappointment of the international community (a reticence on her part because it would probably be domestically unpopular).

While the diplomatic relationships between the Gulf States and Myanmar are complicated by religious ties, at the same time the Gulf States have great motivation to build a strong relationship with Myanmar. For example, Saudi Arabia has prioritized economic gains rather than religion in foreign policy, especially in its drive to become a major economic and political power by 2020. The emergence of Iran as an adversary and the collapse of Mubarak’s regime in Egypt also increased the Gulf States’ need for new friends and wider circles of influence. Thus they have invited Myanmar to open embassies in their countries. To make this a feasible reality for such a poor country, some of the Gulf States, such as Kuwait, pay half the salary of the new Burmese embassy diplomats.

Because Israel interestingly has had close ties with Myanmar in the past, the Gulf States could also be improving their relationship with Myanmar in order to have as much influence in the country as Israel. China, too, has been very invested in Myanmar and was taken by surprise by the country’s dramatic opening in 2011. Saudi Arabia’s relationship with China has been drastically improving over the past 10 years. As Saudi Arabia seeks to increase its influence with Myanmar, it will want to carefully consider Chinese perceptions of the Saudi involvement in Myanmar, as China is now one of Saudi’s largest clients, importing 19% of it’s crude oil from Saudi.

The Gulf States view the growing market in SE Asia as an opportunity for Gulf business, and they are interested in using land in Myanmar for food security. For example, they foresee that if there is a war between Iran and one or many Gulf States, then the Strait of Hormuz could be cut off making it hard to get food into the region; food concerns are also due to growing Gulf populations and rising food prices. The Arab Spring vividly showed the potential firestorm the region could erupt in if regimes do not keep their populations happy. In contrast Myanmar’s population is mostly rural, working in agriculture. As a result, Myanmar would be a great market for Saudi Arabia’s agricultural chemicals and fertilizers industry.

On another front, Saudi Arabia is extremely interested in possibly using the newly built pipelines in Myanmar to get their oil to China. This would avoid using the Malacca straits, a passageway that could be blockaded in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea or if anyone was trying to cut off China’s energy supply. The realization of this possibility depends on whether Saudi Aramco is the sole and exclusive partner with China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) in the move of oil to the southwest Chinese state Yunnan. Saudi Aramco and CNPC have a contractual agreement, but the details of the contract, and if/when government action kicks in is hard to obtain. CNPC owns and operates the pipelines and so it is most likely it would be required to pay transit fees to Myanmar’s government. Saudi Arabia has decided not to export natural gas, but rather to use that energy for domestic development. It will be interesting to see if this decision is reversed over time because the dual pipelines consist of one for natural gas and one for crude oil. Qatar, the world’s largest producer of natural gas, may also try to utilize the pipelines to export liquid natural gas to China.

A Qatari company, Ooredoo, is one of the two granted a telecoms license in a recent high profile bid in Myanmar. The license is good for 15 years and allows the largest foreign investment to date. Ooredoo said it would invest up to $15 billion in two years to bring all but 10% of the population on a 3G network, a quicker time scale than the government requested. Estimates as to when the company can expect to turn a profit on its investment are not clear.  Vodafone and China Telecom withdrew their bids saying the project did not offer sufficient returns. If this is the case, it may be that Ooredoo, which is partly a state owned company and a subsidiary of Qatar Telecom, has been told by the Qatari government that it will be compensated for the low returns; it may signal that the project is more important for its diplomatic and profile building investment rather than profit.

With respect to migrant workers from Myanmar, there are many in the Gulf States. As of 2004 it was estimated that there are 1.5 million Burmese migrant laborers in the UAE, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. There is a general concern with the treatment of foreign laborers in the Gulf countries and Burmese workers have been subject to the same dismal conditions that have been reported about other groups: for instance, reports have stated they are not paid the amount originally promised, work in different functions than what they signed up for, and have extremely long hours. However, the Myanmar employment agencies may be unfairly providing misinformation to the laborers being sent to the Gulf States.

There is no information about increased Gulf tourism in Myanmar, though growing numbers of Gulf citizens have been documented visiting Indonesia and Malaysia. Myanmar has a growing sense of nationalism and if Myanmar citizens feel that the Gulf States are expanding the relationship only to extract resources, obtain agricultural products or use the pipelines to get oil to China, the Burmese could resent the Gulf States for not taking the time to invest in the surrounding community. Tourism could be an opportunity for growth in the relationship, especially since Qatar Airways is one of the main airlines providing service to Yangon.

There is nevertheless a danger – if the religious conflicts in Myanmar spiral out of control, which is not an unlikely possibility given the violence in Rakhine State – that the Burmese will attack anything they view as a connection to Muslim Rohingya, such as companies from the Gulf States. Sensationalist press, in a country where free press is less than a year old and the media and population are still figuring out how to handle responsible journalism, could start rumors about the connections of these companies to Rohingya and encourage people to boycott the businesses.

Among the opportunities also lying in the Gulf States and Myanmar relationship, Myanmar could learn lessons from the Arab Spring as it works to build democratic institutions. Although the majority of the Gulf States survived the crisis without radical change, Myanmar could, for example, learn from Kuwait and Bahrain, which seem to be working towards a constitutional monarchy, a strategy to involve a new class of ruling elites and political participants, while at the same time keeping the old guard engaged and not threatened from an overthrow of the government.

Conversely, the Gulf States can observe Myanmar’s challenges as the country transitions from an authoritarian to a democratic government, assuming their governments could easily find themselves in a similar position. Because Myanmar’s military has long been the most influential force in the country, one challenge as the country transforms is to avoid spooking the military into clamping down for fear there will be retributive action against them or that they will be dramatically disenfranchised.

Many Gulf States and Myanmar also have comparative circumstances with both being well endowed with natural resources. The Gulf States have generally been able to use their natural resources profits to develop the state and to benefit the population. Myanmar could learn from the distributive states. It is hard to imagine what Myanmar could have been like today if natural resources profits coming from, for instance, energy sold to China and Thailand, had been invested in education and healthcare (allocated less than 5% of total budget), rather than the military (currently allocated at over 20% of the budget).

The Gulf States could further increase their influence in Myanmar by providing scholarships for Burmese students at Gulf universities. Graduates of strong engineering programs would produce qualified candidates for Myanmar’s energy sector, infrastructure, agriculture and service industries that in turn would benefit Gulf companies investing in Myanmar. Myanmar would benefit greatly in a technology transfer from Gulf States companies, and that could attract more investment by Gulf state owned enterprises, especially those supported by deep pockets and capable of taking on large scale projects with risky returns.

Lastly, although unlikely to happen, the Gulf States could play a constructive role in the Rohingya conflict. They could offer asylum or agree to resettle portions of the Rohingya population, initiate a mass guest worker program (adhering to international labor standards), or instead of providing aid money to the Rohingya, which makes the Burmese government suspicious, invest in Myanmar’s peace process.

The relationship between the Gulf States and Myanmar is one of contradictions, but also one with possibly immense growth. A mutually beneficial, although highly complicated and potentially politically difficult partnership between Myanmar and the Gulf States currently is in the making in the ongoing expansion of their relationship, a process that should be most interesting to follow into the future.

Anne Gillman recently graduated from The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and is currently a Presidential Management Fellow in the International Trade Administration in the Department of Commerce.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

They have been called barbarians, terrorists and murderers. Even Al Qaeda has disavowed them. The group has been known as ISIS as well as by ISIL, but its latest name illustrates its power: the Islamic State, or IS. Their ambition is both frightening and impressive—their leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, proclaimed their goal to ultimately conquer Rome, leaving a state that stretches from the Middle East to Europe in their wake. Such threats and proclamations are often vacuous, so why are we concerned about this one? The creation of a state requires one of two things: international support (which IS certainly lacks) or the power to reinforce their desires with deadly force. We are concerned about IS because they have weapons that they are more than willing to use. We are concerned about IS because they have our weapons.

IS has two methods in its weapons-acquisition strategy. The first is stealing: it has pillaged Iraq and Iraq’s Kurdish military force, gaining weapons the US once provided to the country to secure itself from insurgents. In early June, IS took hold of two large weapons depots in Iraq and obtained 400,000 military-use items. The US airstrikes are being conducted not only to kill IS members, but also to destroy such American weapons stores in Iraq. The US is effectively attacking both sources of IS’s power: its number of men and its looted weapons. IS’s anger and retaliation to the airstrikes, in the form of the killings of James Foley and Steven Sotloff are thus unsurprising.

The second method is taking full advantage of the Middle Eastern black and gray markets for arms. According to the Congressional Research Service, the Middle East has the world’s most quickly developing arms market. Tracking weapons in such markets is an impossible task, which aids IS’s mission. Also to IS’s benefit is that instability breeds further instability. Destabilized countries flood markets with arms, specifically small and light weapons (SALW), which in turn are used by rebel groups and terrorists to foster even greater instability.

Why the preference for SALW? They are easily accessible, relatively inexpensive and easy to employ and maintain. IS knows what is best for them and they destroy what they know they can’t have, such as “weapons like M1 tanks, M113 armored personnel carriers, MRAP heavy armored trucks, and other multi-million dollar pieces of equipment.” Destroying such weapons keeps them out of Iraqi Security Forces’ hands.

Despite the difficulty in tracking SALW in the Middle East, the original sources can still be traced. IS is, at its core, one of the many Syrian opposition groups. Weapons smuggled into Syria find themselves in terrorists’ hands. These arms arrive in Syria from Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, among other states. Middlemen private arms merchants facilitate this network. The chain does not begin with Middle Eastern states, however. They did not create the weapons themselves. They purchased them, and not through an illegal market. The problem of SALW begins in legal markets, with transactions on paper and not shrouded in secrecy: the sale of arms from the West.

In 2012 alone, the EU exported €39 billion worth of arms, including €9 billion worth to the Middle East alone. Even more significantly, 2012 was a record year for the sale of small arms to the Middle East—almost €265 million worth. The US is also culpable: earlier this year, the Obama administration finalized an arms deal worth $11 billion with Qatar. The US has inadvertently provided not only weapons, but also training, as it has been revealed that US instructors at a Jordanian base trained Syrian rebels that went on to join IS. Canada, too, just finalized a $10 billion arms deal involving light armored vehicles with Saudi Arabia.

We are duly afraid of the IS. It is a monstrosity—and the West is Dr. Frankenstein. The West is the original source of IS’ power. It has men, weapons and ideology on its side, but weapons enable and give clout to the other two. Whether they are stealing the weapons or obtaining them from black markets, they are manufactured at here, at home. And yet, as we continue an airstrike campaign, we continue selling arms to the Middle East. Even the most vociferate gun advocate would agree that it does not make sense to give a gun to an unstable human. So why are we giving guns to an unstable region?

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Over the past few years, the largest obstacle to Iran’s power projection and influence in the greater Middle East has been sanctions levied against Tehran by the United States, Europe and the United Nations. Tehran’s nuclear program is the main cause, but festering wounds caused by Iran’s own vehement anti-Americanism and the 1979 Hostage Crisis endure, with Iran’s support of Hezbollah against Israel causing even more strain.

Optimism in the West for rapprochement with Iran surged with the swearing-in of the relatively moderate President Rouhani. After President Rouhani visited New York City, held a phone conversation with President Obama – the highest level talk between the two countries since 1979 – and then offered to sit down and talk about proliferation and the possible ending of sanctions, the West was ready to listen. With a possible rapprochement on the line, it is a prime time for the US to analyze Iran’s geostrategic objectives in the context of American involvement in the Middle East and the ongoing Iraqi crisis.

Iran’s Current Geopolitical Position

Iran geopolitical position is unenviable. A look at it’s neighborhood reveals that, contrary to hardliners’ fears of a post-sanctions Iran ruling the Middle East, Iran finds itself in a tar pit of dangers.

Iran is only one of four majority Shi’a countries, the others being Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan. Despite Iran viewing itself as the leader of the Shi’a world, relations with each of these Shi’a countries are strained. Iraq is deteriorating by the day. Bahrain mistrusts Iran due to Iranian sentiments expressing the desire to annex Bahrain, igniting Bahraini Arab nationalism. Azerbaijan and Iran, despite sharing strong cultural, religious and historical ties, mistrust each other. Iran remains suspicious of possible Azeri irredentist ambitions (four of Iran’s provinces are considered part of “Greater Azerbaijan”), while Azerbaijan also remains suspicious of Iran’s maneuvers, particularly after Iran’s support for Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Due to its size, its ability to project significant power and its historical and cultural influences, Iran is a contender for establishing regional hegemony in the Middle East. It faces two rivals, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, one a parallel Sunni theocracy and the other a secular republic. Despite Turkey’s recent political instability, their friendship with the Iraqi Kurds and existing image as an effective partner for the West in Middle Eastern affairs renders it a significant regional power. Saudi Arabia is determined to oppose Iran at every turn. Leveraging its status as a strategic American ally, Saudi Arabia has liberally asserted itself in the greater Middle East, endeavoring to isolate Iran and funding Sunni movements against Iran and its allies. Wikileaks documents reveal that despite warming relations, Saudi Arabia encouraged the Americans to attack Iran in the heyday of the Israel-Iran standoff.

Thus, Iran is relatively isolated in the world. While Iran does have powerful friends in China and Russia, the former does not wish to be heavily involved in the politics of the region and Iran cannot consistently rely on their help. Syria is the only reliable regional ally, but unfortunately for Iran, Assad has been severely weakened in his fight with the rebels, leaving Iran, in terms of immediate surroundings, with few options.

Therefore, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities for its own power projection is understandable. Furthermore, Iran’s overall regional strategy relies on soft power. Facing a Sunni Saudi Arabia backed by the Americans, Iran has opted for pan-Islamic leadership by taking foremost action against its arch-nemesis Israel, thereby not only attempting to rally Muslims to the Palestinian cause, but also attempting to encourage the people of the Middle East to expunge American influence from the region.

ISIS Crisis

The origins of the ISIS Crisis are studded with irony. Before ISIS established a Caliphate, the underground group was funded largely by wealthy patrons in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, secretly wishing to ignite an anti-Shi’a jihad. Although Saudi Arabia has since reduced donations to ISIS, it is clear that America’s traditional allies in the region indirectly contributed to the disintegration of the Iraqi state. This is not to say that Maliki’s own sectarian policies, and by extension Iran’s own meddling in Iraq, share no part of the blame. It is only to say that in this current climate, the US finds itself in an awkward, and oddly opportune, position of needing new allies to help stabilize Iraq.

As painful as it may be for us to work with a member of the “Axis of Evil,” and as upsetting as it is to continue supporting al-Maliki as he violates principles of democratic governance, regional stability in the Middle East is the highest priority for America. The most preferable short-term stable state of affairs would be one in which al-Maliki reigns as a reliable client in Baghdad, a state we are increasingly unable to maintain.

Iran, having carved a sphere of influence through Iraq to Syria, cannot allow a fundamentally anti-Iranian Sunni insurrection to disrupt Iranian designs, much less allow a disruption so close to Iran’s own homeland. Iran also recognizes that in the current situation with a weakened Assad, an increasingly assertive Turkish-backed Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region and a reluctant America, it cannot combat ISIS alone. The Syrian Civil War drained Iran of much political capital as it sought to keep Assad in power. Indeed, it seems increasingly likely that Iran will have to choose which ally to save: Syria or Iraq. Needing stable borders and to prevent spillover conflicts, Iran will likely choose Iraq and seek American partnership.

Rushing into the limelight during ongoing talks between the West and Iran concerning proliferation and the ending of sanctions, ISIS seems to provide an incentive for the Americans and Iranians to recognize their common interests and pursue greater cooperation. For now, the Eagle’s priorities align with the Lion’s.

Future Trajectory

While neat parallels do not exist between 2014 Iran and 1972 China, Nixon and Kissinger’s bold move reminds us today that daring statecraft will always be necessary. America would gain much needed Iranian support in stabilizing Iraq. Additionally, less pressure on Tehran would allow Iran to further entertain the possibility of an Iraq without al-Maliki. While al-Maliki is a reliable ally of Tehran, even the Iranians realize that al-Maliki’s divisive politics are not a suitable long-term strategy for the Iranian sphere of influence, a realization made all the more apparent by ISIS’ insurrection.

Another possible boon is that Iran can play a role in ensuring the survival of the Afghan state. Iranian covert support of the Taliban may run counter to American interests, but in the short term Iran also wishes for a stable Afghanistan, which cannot be guaranteed should American support and manpower in the region dwindle.

Security and politics aside, Iran also brings a largely untapped market to the table. Sanctions have prevented Western businesses from pursuing opportunities in Iran. With Iranian overdependence on oil exports, cueing the need for diversification and a rich resource base that includes large reserves of hydrocarbon, investment and partnership opportunities for American businesses abound. For instance, California-based World Eco Energy has reportedly signed a conditional $1.175b deal in Iran to turn waste into energy.

Iran, for its part, will perhaps have even more to gain from a partnership with the Americans. Booming economies, solutions to macroeconomic woes brought about by sanctions and liberalized oil exports aside, Iran would simply have more space to maneuver. No longer drawing the ire of a powerful ally of Saudi Arabia, Iran can set out to expand its economic and political influence.

For instance, recognizing the apprehension of surrounding Gulf States to the possibility of a resurgent Iran, Tehran sent a delegation to Kuwait, the UAE and Oman. This move is beneficial on many fronts since it allows Tehran to look past sectarian differences and work towards solutions for the ISIS crisis, perhaps even paving the way for future talks on Gulf cooperation and energy policy.

On the flip side of the coin, increased room for Iranian maneuvers might also mean greater Hezbollah activities against Israel. However, this can be checked by greater American security commitments to Israel, agreements with the Iranians themselves, or by the simple fact that solving the ISIS crisis will require even more political capital and resources from Iran, already partially depleted from the Syria Civil War.

Of course, any partnership does not make Iran our friend. Iranian support of Hezbollah and Taliban cannot go unheeded. The values and interests of Iran still clash with the American’s. Iranian ambitions must still be curbed through continued support and reassurances of key allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. It is a fine game the Americans must play: to engage in offshore balancing without too often lending a hand to any one party. Nevertheless, cooperation with Iran can expedite Middle Eastern stability, giving the United States much needed breathing room to address domestic problems and reevaluate its foreign policy strategy in the Middle East.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

The war in Afghanistan is the longest armed conflict in United States history. As it comes to a close, veterans will return to this country with wounds visible and invisible, and our Coalition partners will look to us for leadership on the care of those veterans. If there is one group of people that do not deserve to be subject to the whims of domestic politics, it is our nation’s veterans. Our men and women in uniform fight to keep our political process strong, not to be victims to its peculiarities at best, and its hypocrisies, at worst. Especially recently, our government has failed at this mission.

It has been a troubled few weeks for United States veterans. First, there were revelations that administrators at Veteran’s Affairs (VA) hospitals across the nation lied about wait times for treatment and cooked the record keeping books in order to make bonuses and meet performance quotas at the expense of providing healthcare to veterans. The scandal led to the resignation of General Erik Shinseki, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.

Then, in a prisoner exchange on May 31, 2014, the Taliban released Bergdahl in exchange for five of their own incarcerated at Guantanamo under the condition that they remain in Qatar for one year. Nearly five years earlier, on June 30, 2009, Bergdahl walked off his military base in the dead of night – whether he intended to return remains a mystery – and was captured by the Taliban in the hours that followed. The Haqqani Network, a Taliban outlet created by the United States’ early mishandling of the war, help Bergdahl captive.

While veterans in Phoenix waited in pain for essential treatment, Bergdahl too languished in Taliban prison. Bergdahl was tortured and, in a proof of life video provided to the United States government in December, appeared to be drugged, non responsive and frail. The plight of Bowe Bergdahl is, in many ways, similar to the plight of veterans back home in the United States who waited weeks, even months, for healthcare from their country. Both Bergdahl and veterans denied coverage at the VA made incalculable sacrifices for their country. Both Bergdahl and the veterans back home found themselves at a moment when they needed their country most.

Unfortunately, the vast majority of American civil society has inexplicably failed to make this connection. The media and the public have expressed indignation at the failings of the VA to provide adequate healthcare to our veterans, while politicians in Congress have – in uncharacteristically fast fashion, for Congressional standards – passed legislation to overhaul the VA. Their bill would give veterans access to more providers, give the department secretary more power to fire employees and force more transparency to fix problems like fudged wait times before they become an epidemic.

This outrage is justified, and we should be proud of our leaders for taking steps to remedy the problem. But the question still remains: where is the equal outrage to the treatment of Bowe Bergdahl? Where too is the appreciation for his safe return?

Politicians and the media were quick to condemn Bergdahl’s release in a public relations blitz tantamount to character assassination. The objections – mostly from Congressional Republicans – were numerous. They included allegations that the Obama administration had released dangerous enemy prisoners, used vital resources to free an alleged deserter and broken a law requiring the administration to give Congress a 30-day notice before transferring any detainees from Guantanamo.

An article in the Washington Post, shamefully titled “Why the Bowe Bergdahl deal is a political loser,” cited a CBS news poll that revealed 49% of Americans think that the deal will increase the threat of terrorism against the United States, and 56% think that the price paid was “too high,” statistics likely borne out of the statements of politicians and pundits, and statistics that miserably fail a fact check. First, though the five Taliban officers released have been connected to al-Qaeda, there is no evidence that they supported its international jihad against the United States. Captured just weeks after the United States invaded Afghanistan, the Taliban five were actually fighting other Afghans in the country’s civil war, according to CIA director John Brennan. Second, the deal mandates that they stay in Qatar for a year—by the time they “return to the battlefield,” the US will be well on its way to a full withdrawal from Afghanistan. Taliban expert Anand Gopal has said that of the five – who haven’t been with the Taliban since 2001 – only two have the potential to impact the battle between Afghanistan and insurgents.

Articles like the one above are self-fulfilling prophesies, because their misinformation is to blame for the very statistics they cite. If anything, the Taliban five and their allies are more likely to pose a threat to the United States because of how they were treated and detained in Guantanamo, not because of the ties they had to an organization 13 years ago.

I don’t know if Bergdahl was a deserter. It is appalling that some would suggest an American soldier who fights to defend the right to be innocent until proven guilty is convicted of desertion in a trial by media, and not in a trial by a jury of his peers. Anyone who doesn’t wait for the facts to come in is making a terrible mistake.

The Taliban threatened to execute Bergdahl if news of the prisoner exchange leaked. This obviously does not absolve the Obama administration of breaking the law, but it does offer a compelling reason why they chose secrecy over transparency. This should be the sole source of outrage over the Bergdahl release, because it is completely isolated from Bergdahl’s character. Tragically, elected officials have mixed criticism of the Obama administration with criticism of Bergdahl and the deal that saved his life.

Both the swap for Bergdahl and the scandal over healthcare provisions at the VA have highlighted a dangerous misconception among politicians and the media that demands fixing. Our veterans have risked their lives to defend the principles of life and liberty that we hold dear. Some have made the ultimate sacrifice and all return scarred. For those who live on, it is the duty of the United States to honor their sacrifices, and every time we fall short of this goal is one time too many.

For politicians and pundits, it is unfortunately too easy to speak out in favor of domestic solutions to domestic veteran problems while treating the Bergdahl case with such a different eye. That needs to change. Our veterans have fought to defend the right of “all men to be created equal.” That means that all veterans, whether they are home or imprisoned abroad, deserve equal assistance when they are in their darkest hour of need. Whether we have to pass legislation or exchange the prisoners of the enemy, no price is too high to pay.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff and editorial board.

There are generally two types of monarchies that exist today. The first type is as an absolute monarchy, in which the sovereign possesses supreme autocratic powers over his state and people. The second type is a constitutional monarchy, in which a system of government is established by a constitution or convention that mandates some form of an elected government overseen by a monarch. In almost all monarchies, succession is hereditary. Only a few monarchies, such as Cambodia and Kuwait, allow citizens to select a new sovereign from within the royal family. The majority of monarchies have an ironclad succession process. This continuous rotation of power and wealth among a select few royal families ensures the survival of an elite class that is inaccessible to the general population.

Absolute monarchies still exist today, but they are very few in number. These countries include Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Brunei, Swaziland, and Vatican City. In these nations, the sovereign has absolute control over his state’s resources and population. Powers include setting the country’s general direction, such as Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal, who directed Saudi Arabia’s budget to match his personal priorities of technological and economic progress to modernize society in the 1970s. On the other hand, monarchs may utilize their state’s resources to satisfy their personal needs and desires, such as the acquisition of luxury items such as Oman’s “Super Yacht.” In these societies, there is virtually no opportunity for representative government and all power is concentrated in the hands of one person. No wonder absolute monarchies frequently draw heavy criticism from the international community

Even if an absolute monarch’s dramatic level of power seems foreign and excessive to the democratically oriented observer, this level of authoritarianism is to be expected from such a system of government. More surprising and interesting are the powers reserved for royals of constitutional monarchies with democratic systems of government, or shadow monarchies. There is a diverse set of countries that fall into this category, including Norway, Belgium, Sweden, Thailand, Jordan, and Denmark. Perhaps the most significant and popular shadow monarch of the contemporary period has been the Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom (UK), who officially exercises authority over 15 Commonwealth realms in addition to the UK. Official descriptions regarding the duties of the monarch in England suggest a more “ceremonial” role as a symbol of “stability, continuity, and national focus” rather than an executive role. However, England does not have a written constitution, and many of the duties that have been undertaken by Parliament were delegated by the monarchy out of “convention.” In other words, the Queen has transferred some of her official duties as Head of State to the Parliament, although she can invoke her right to royal prerogative at anytime. The legislature in the UK can pass laws, but those possible affecting “the Crown’s interests” must receive the consent of the Monarch. The Crown has invoked the power of the royal consent and veto for at least 39 pieces of legislation in the contemporary period. The Queen also possesses other powers such as dismissing/appointing the Prime Minister and other ministers, declaring war as head of the Royal British Armed Forces (British soldiers swear allegiance to the Monarch), and making treaties. The royal prerogative in the case of the Queen of the UK and other Commonwealth realms is very robust, and her powers are clearly more than strictly ceremonial.

Not all shadow monarchies possess the same degree of power, however. Belgium and Sweden stand on opposite ends of the spectrum of constitutional monarchies. The Monarchy of Belgium is relatively powerful and similar to the Monarchy of the United Kingdom. The King is endowed with numerous powers according to the Belgian Constitution, such as signing and promulgating laws passed by the Federal Parliament, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and appointing/dismissing ministers of government. In addition, Article 88 of the Belgian Constitution states, “the King’s person is inviolable, his ministers are responsible.” This law basically means that the monarch possesses immunity from any type of prosecution. Clearly, the Monarch of Belgium is rather powerful and can dominate his elected counterparts if he so chooses. However, the Monarch of Sweden is much weaker in comparison. Sweden’s monarch was essentially stripped of his executive authority in 1975 by legislation, thus reducing the sovereign to a purely ceremonial role. Therefore, the King of Sweden is no longer considered a chief executive of the government and does not have nearly the same degree of reserved rights or privileges as the King of Belgium.

Besides conventional governmental authority and power, many monarchs also hold a position of religious or moral authority. The King of Thailand, for example, is designated as the “Upholder of the Buddhist religion and Upholder of all religions.” The British monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, is awarded the title, “Supreme Governor of the Church of England” and is frequently referred to as the “Defender of the Faith.” These roles, while sometimes not well defined, endow various monarchs from across the globe with a sense of moral authority and superiority. By being placed at the head of religious life in addition to political life, these monarchs are afforded even greater power, influence, and legitimacy.

Shadow monarchies that permeate the globe are vestiges of a different era. As the United States seeks to foster a democratic world order, it is rather perplexing that some of these monarchs still possess such tremendous power today. Elected governments of constitutional monarchies seem to be chipping away at the authority of their respective sovereign monarchs through legislation or convention, but much power still rests in the hands of this elite class. Debating the moral implications and efficacy of these monarchical systems is a different matter, but it cannot be denied that the power of these monarchs is certainly underestimated and, perhaps more importantly, unknown.