While Syria, Libya, and Yemen still face violent conflict as a result of the 2011 uprisings, Tunisia has been lauded as the one success story of the Arab Spring. So when protests broke out in December 2017, continuing on throughout the month of January, and were met with a severe reaction from the government, the world took notice; was the one success story about to unravel? Would we see a return to the days of President Ben Ali’s violent dictatorship?

In late 2010, Tunisian street peddler Mohamed Bouazizi set himself ablaze in the small town of Sidi Bouzid, triggering uprisings both in his own country and across the region. What cause led a street peddler to sacrifice his own life? What latent injustice led his country to internalize his sacrifice and protest a government that in turn would not hesitate to use its security force to violently suppress them? The protests that would soon grip Tunisia were not just about one man’s gesture; indeed, they were rooted in long-held resentments that were felt throughout the country. Specifically, corruption, economic challenges, and ever-decreasing freedom of the press served as significant driving forces in Tunisia’s revolution.

The passion that drove these protests proved successful. On January 14, 2011, President Ben Ali resigned after 24 years in office and left the country. Still, this was no guarantee that the country was headed in a new, democratic direction; indeed, in neighboring countries that followed Tunisia’s example in the greater wave of Arab Spring uprisings, bloody civil war or dictatorial resurgence have been the rule. However, Tunisia forged ahead towards democracy. The people began crafting a new constitution, at times halted by disagreement. It was their neighboring countries’ ensuing destruction that pushed leaders to compromise on these disagreements and address the most divisive issues. And under this new constitution, Tunisians have been able to engage in the political process for the first time in decades.

The success of the new constitution and the beginnings of democracy have not curtailed severe economic challenges, which again have served as the principal force for more recent protests. In late December, around the seventh anniversary of the original 2011 protests, Tunisians again took to the streets. Since the revolution, nine successive governments have been unable to prevent unemployment from rising to 15.3%. The second installment of a $2.9 billion IMF loan was frozen in 2017 in response to the government’s failure to sufficiently reform state finances. Terrorist attacks have also contributed to Tunisia’s economic floundering.

Prime Minister Youssef Chahed’s response in early December—a reform budget of austerity to trim deficits and stimulate growth through deducted subsidies, a reformed pension system, and a reduced public sector—was predicted to fuel even more unrest in the new year. Sure enough, people took to the streets soon after the implementation of the tax and prices hikes on January 1. Protests continued throughout January, eventually culminating in the use of tear gas against demonstrators, the arrests of around 800 people, and the death of one protester.

The government’s fairly heavy-handed reaction has been met with concern by the global community. The UN human rights office expressed concern over the number of those arrested and cautioned Tunisian authorities to maintain rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Indeed, considering the backslide into autocracy in other countries, such repressive tactics are cause for concern, and Tunisians are certainly justified in their frustration. One demonstrator, Issam Chahbani, noted that “There is a feeling of injustice and marginalization here … We’re only asking for jobs and development.” Tunisians feel lost, disheartened by an economic situation that has only worsened since Ben Ali’s departure while the government responds to protests with force reminiscent of Ben Ali’s dictatorship.

The government did promise reforms in response to agitation, though these measures did little to comfort protestors. Government pledges included extra aid for poor families, a review of retirement disbursements that have been underpaid, and the extension of health-care to all Tunisians. President Beji Caid Essebi also visited a neighborhood in Tunis to announce a new youth center. But in spite of these promises, protests continued on throughout January, indicating the populace’s doubts about the government’s ability to follow through and effect significant economic recovery.

These recent events are cause to reflect on the one “success” of the Arab Spring. For all the progress towards stable democracy, the government’s inability to provide economic security to its citizens has severely crippled its ability to create a stable and prosperous society. The Tunisia that has been dreamed of since protests erupted in 2010 does not seem much closer today.

Yet, despite the enumerated reasons for misgivings about Tunisia’s viability as a stable, democratic state, it is not time to give up on this Arab Spring success story. Protests similar to those last month have been common since 2011, and, though recent protests resulted in excessive arrests and some use of force, there has not been a significant return to the extreme repressive tactics of Ben Ali’s regime. Indeed, the very fact that these protests have continued each year indicates that Tunisians are allowed to speak out and express their grievances against the government, a dramatic shift from Ben Ali’s strict policy against any dissidence.

Another sign of hope is President Essebsi’s commitment to progress for women. Last year he lifted the ban on Muslim women marrying men outside their faith, and this year he is expected to make Tunisia the first Muslim country to grant equal inheritance to men and women. Though such steps may not seem particularly revolutionary, they are signals of the government’s response to a strong women’s movement in Tunisia. It remains to be seen if Essebsi and his government can execute when it comes to his people’s wishes for economic stability and prosperity.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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While much of the world is caught up in the heated, controversial presidential race in the United States, citizens of Haiti are far more concerned with having their first fair, democratic and uncorrupt election.

This year, former Haitian President, Michel Martelly, was constitutionally required to step down after his five-year term. In October 2015, before his term ended, the country held its first round of presidential elections; but due to claims of corruption and fraud that triggered numerous protests, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) decided to postpone the elections in December and then again in January. Since then, Haiti has been left with no official president. As protests continue and the UN attempts to stay involved, it is essential that the international community disengages and allows Haiti, led by a qualified interim leader, to develop its own stable institutions to deal with its electoral crisis.

The Destabilizing Effects of International Aid

When news of Haiti’s electoral crisis broke out, the international community — including the UN and the “Core Group” (Brazil, Canada, Spain, France, US, EU and OAS) — encouraged the country to advance the elections without addressing the political irregularities. The rationale was that the earlier Haiti has a President, the closer it would be to forming a legitimate government.

In the UN’s three-hour hearing in mid-March, ambassadors of the United Nations Special Representative and Head of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) claimed that the country must have stable institutions in order to address its socio-economic challenges, including ongoing food security crisis, cholera deaths and police violence. Due to these challenges, the UN pressured Haiti to move forward with its elections, no matter how fraudulent the first round was, claiming that going to the polls would be the only way to encourage democracy.

But as a result, it seems that the approval of the UN and US in Haiti is becoming increasingly unfavorable. By holding elections with the current system in place, future instability and protests are guaranteed. Unfortunately, the international community is likely to remain in the country; it has a history of interfering in the country’s politics and is already invested in the situation, so much so that the UN Security Council is assessing the need for a peacekeeping presence in Haiti. As the UN does so, Haiti’s citizens still face the effects of cholera, amplifying their skepticism of foreign aid. (The UN received considerable criticism for bringing the cholera outbreak to Haiti with Nepalese peacekeepers who carried strains of the disease.)

The US in particular has been investing in the Haitian situation, having already supplied more than $33 million to the elections. This means that its interests lie in having an election winner so that the money isn’t wasted—not in whether the process was fair. Unfortunately, this international influence dismisses the need for an assessment of the internal issues causing corruption in the Haitian government. Now, Haiti’s citizens hope to ensure better leadership in their next administration through protests against international involvement and the current election process.

The Cause of the Protests

Former president Martelly, largely supported by the international community, took office in 2010 shortly after the magnitude seven earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince, Haiti’s capital. The earthquake killed at least 300,000 people and cost the government up to $14 billion in infrastructure, buildings and homes. The consequences of the earthquake were not just limited to cost: the earthquake also created increasing polarization and tension, as citizens grew angry about the slow pace of post-earthquake reconstruction. During his term, Martelly failed to lessen the economic turmoil and was unsuccessful in pushing Haiti towards democracy, as he had promised during his campaign. Thus by 2012, the resulting high costs of living, growing unemployment and suspicions of corruption ultimately undermined the populace’s trust in Martelly’s political agenda.

In the October, 2015 elections, the top two contenders that emerged were Jovenal Moise, a banana plantation owner and Martelly supporter, and Jude Celestin, an engineer with the goal of eliminating government corruption. Although Moise was declared the leading candidate of the race, Celestin (along with 90% of Haitian citizens) were suspicious that the election was fraudulent and rigged. Celestin halted his campaign, refusing to continue until the elections were made fair. As a result, talk of corruption, tampering with ballots and other irregularities in the voting process triggered a public response and led to 318 protests throughout the country. While Haitian demonstrators began burning electoral offices and vehicles, causing multiple CEP members to resign, they also attacked schools that served as voting stations. In December and again in January, the CEP deferred elections to April, 2016 in order to protect the voting citizens of Haiti from more violence.

The CEP’s decision to postpone has given Haiti a window of time to reform its elections and ensure they are fair—and more importantly, to encourage its citizens to vote. However, the international community’s obstruction of this process indicates that Haiti may be better solving the crisis alone.

A Qualified Leader: Jocelerme Privert

Despite the current situation, the postponement of the election has offered a glimpse of hope for stability in Haiti: Jocelerme Privert. A former Senate leader of Haiti, Privert has been chosen by Haiti’s political leaders to be the interim president for 120 days. In filling this position, he has taken on what seems a nearly impossible task: bringing Haiti’s polarized political parties close enough to steer the country towards a legitimate election. Privert’s appointment is a crucial first step in the direction towards democracy, because he will represent the public rather than the international community throughout the reconstruction period.

How does President Privert plan to steer the unstable nation towards a democratic and peaceful future? This question may have been answered with his selection of an interim Prime Minister. After meeting with numerous political parties, religious groups, businesses and human rights leaders, Privert came to the conclusion that the best fit for the job would be US-educated economist, Fritz Jean. Although he has no political experience, Jean is generally accepted as a competent and honest leader.

Much can be said about Jean’s appointment to this position. Specifically, it suggests the high value that Privert places on Haiti’s financial stability as a prerequisite for free and fair elections. It is also a statement that working with economists to establish economic growth is an important first step for political stabilization. Privert and Jean must prove that they can right Haiti’s path. Yet in order to do so, the international community must give Haiti the space it needs to solve its issues on its own.

Looking to a Brighter Haitian Future

While the UN believes that the delays in the election process are hindering Haiti’s ability to address economic, social and security challenges, it fails to recognize that taking additional time to ensure a proper election process is, in itself, improving democracy. Privert has committed to holding the previous administration accountable for its corrupt governance and has shown domestic legitimacy in managing this crisis. Haiti would be better off if the international community left its internal politics be.

As for now, it is a waiting game to see if Privert and Jean can lead Haiti to stability with a fair electoral process amidst the international community’s pressure and influence. Without this, Haiti cannot expect to see democratic progress, effective earthquake reconstruction or a reduction in poverty and disease outbreak.

The much-anticipated third attempt at a presidential election is scheduled for April 24, 2016.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

A previous version of this article appeared with an image that the editorial board deemed to be unethically manipulated. We apologize for the oversight and have updated the image to be in line with journalistic standards.

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Venezuela’s recent downward spiral illustrates the profound economic and political effects oil price fluctuations have on the world’s oil-producing countries. Venezuela’s economic crisis continues to go from bad to worse. The Venezuelan Bolivarian socialist economy has collapsed from a fatal collision of low oil prices and poor economic policy. The result is economic chaos, from rampant inflation to import fraud to shortages of basic consumer necessities. As the economy plummets, political unrest builds in Venezuela.

Current president Nicolas Maduro, Hugo Chavez’s handpicked successor, has sought to continue the Chavez socialist dream and align himself squarely with the revolutionary leader’s popularity and charisma. However, as falling oil prices have made government spending (especially spending on major social programs) unsustainable and destroyed the economy, Maduro has been confronted with the failure of his political vision. He has turned to attacks on political opposition to appear strong and United States-bashing and conspiracy theories to distract his people—for example, claiming that, “there’s a world campaign against Venezuela.” Recovery for Venezuela will not come easily or at all as long as sound economic policy comes second to rhetoric, and the nation’s economic and political instability will have implications for both South America and the United States’ interests in the region.

The drop in oil prices dented the economies of many oil-producing countries around the world and had an especially significant effect on highly oil-dependent economies like Venezuela. Oil is Venezuela’s economy—Venezuela’s petroleum revenues account for about 50% of the country’s GDP and contribute more than 95% of the country’s hard currency income. It has been estimated that President Maduro’s government will require oil prices of about $117 a barrel in 2015 just to break even with government spending. As oil prices hover around $60, the economy faces a fiscal chasm.

The revenue-budget gap has been made much, much worse by historically poor economic policy. For example, strict currency controls (including an overvalued, three-tiered dollar-to-bolivar exchange rate) along with a heavily import-reliant economy have fueled a raging currency black market, incentivized fraudulent imports and created shortages of essential consumer goods like food and medicine. These extreme shortages have been created by several factors including a lack of diversified domestic production, price controls and scarce funds with which to pay for imports. The scarceness of consumer goods has truly brought the economic crisis home for ordinary Venezuelans who frequently must do without or wait in extremely long shopping lines. In February, Venezuelan officials at last announced and began to implement a plan to tackle one major political roadblock and retool currency controls—but this change may well be too little, too late.

Meanwhile, the economic crash has evolved into political instability, with massive street protests rocking Caracas since February 2014. Protestors, mainly students, have focused on social and economic problems like the collapsing economy and shortages of basic necessities. Although protest-associated violence seems to have peaked in early 2014, the causes of Venezuelan instability have not been addressed; Venezuela’s economy remains dire, Maduro’s approval ratings are around 25%, and the fairly recent imprisonment of well-known opposition leaders such as the mayor of Caracas has amplified public outrage. Smaller protests and demonstrations continue to occur and the country teeters on the brink of fresh unrest, while political opposition groups and leaders remain highly visible and vocal. Maduro does not fully control the media or public political debate, and will likely continue to face noisy opposition and low approval ratings.

Distract, deny and blame has been Maduro’s chosen response to political upheaval—Maduro has become a bit of a conspiracy theorist, claiming that the imperialist US government is plotting a coup against him, creating artificial instability and threatening Venezuela’s statehood. The Obama administration’s first major response was a March Executive Order that declared Venezuela a national security threat and placed sanctions on seven Venezuelan officials accused of corruption and violating human rights. Maduro sought to make political hay out of this move via noisily aggrieved measures such as starting a 10-million signature petition drive (to be presented to President Obama at April’s Summit of the Americas) and banning several US diplomats from the country, saying, “They can’t come to Venezuela because they are terrorists”. Such scapegoating techniques have neither significantly improved his domestic approval ratings nor done anything at all to address the real economic, political and social problems Venezuela faces. Meanwhile, Maduro has sought to enhance his personal power, winning expanded decree powers in the name of “anti-imperialism” in the face of supposed US aggression.

Venezuela is in the midst of a storm of economic disaster and political turmoil, made much worse by falling oil prices but inseparable from corruption, deceit and mismanagement in politics. As President Maduro fails to implement substantive political and social reforms or practical solutions to the country’s economic problems, Venezuela will remain a domestically unsteady and destabilizing force in South America. The United States will also remain closely involved as Maduro works to dodge blame and incriminate US “imperialism”, and as the US tries to achieve policy objectives in proximate countries, such as attempting to normalize relations with Cuba. Of all of the world’s petro economies dented by the oil price dive, Venezuela has fallen fastest, loudest and hardest because, in Venezuela, instability runs deeper than oil. President Maduro’s Chavez-socialist policies and interest in building personal power have historically trumped realistic economic policy. Venezuela today combines this problem of governance with collapsed oil prices—economic chaos and political unrest has been and will continue to be the result.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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