NEW YORK — The Biden administration has expressed an interest in reinvigorating U.S.-Canada relations following a virtual meeting between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau early February. The meeting, which was the first between the then newly-inaugurated president and a foreign head of state, focused on each country’s response to COVID-19, economic cooperation during the pandemic and moving forward, as well as other shared interests among the two close allies. As the White House begins forming its foreign policy objectives and global leadership, it is essential to consider the current state of U.S.-Canada relations and where the two countries may be headed moving forward.

“Generally in world politics, there are no permanent friends, but permanent interests. But, there is supposed to be a special exception for some countries,” said Brian Bow, director at the Center for the Study of Security and Development at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, in an exclusive interview with Glimpse from the Globe. “It is not unique to the U.S.-Canada relationship, but Canada has a special relationship with the U.S. and Canadians were happy with that in the first half of the Cold War.”

When former President Richard Nixon reformed the United States’ economic policy in 1971, which is often referred to as the “Nixon Shock,” along with leaving the Gold Standard, Nixon began putting tariffs on products leaving the United States.

“Most countries reacted with hostility, but no one was more surprised than the Canadians,” Bow said. “They assumed it was a mistake that they weren’t on the list of countries that wouldn’t need to pay these surcharges.”

Following the change invoked by Nixon in U.S. international economic foreign policy, Canada had to do some “soul-searching,” as Bow said. Canada began realizing that they needed to have other partners rather than just entirely relying on the United States. Canada tried to diversify its economic partners, but ultimately failed, as penetrating new markets, especially in Asia, can be pricey and full of uncertainty. As a result, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1989, signaling that economic relations would return to normal. This agreement; which eliminated all tariffs on trade, was a precursor to NAFTA, which was then enacted in 1994. 

“Even since then, there have been these recurring periods where Canada hasn’t liked the direction the U.S. has been going in,” Bow said. “The controversy with the Bush administration over the war in Iraq in 2003 was a big one, and the election of the Trump administration in 2016 was another one.”

Bow believes that the current administration in Ottawa is better aligned with President Biden than it was with Trump. That said, he believes there is a possibility of Trump-like rhetoric making its way into Canadian politics in the future. 

“When I was a teenager in Canada, stylish clothing would make its way about five years after it appeared in America,” Bow said. “The same thing can happen with policies and parties in Canada trying on Trump-style rhetoric.” 

The possibility of conservative politicians in Canada imitating the populist and often provocative language of Trump will certainly impact relations between the two neighbors. While this style of rhetoric is not prominent in Canada yet, Canadians, including Bow, are worried this could occur in the future. The next federal election in Canada could see a tight race between liberals and conservatives. Current polls show Prime Minister Trudeau with a narrow five-point lead, but Biden’s win may have an effect on Canadian elections. Many politically engaged Canadians are happy that the Biden administration will be holding office for the next four years; a recent poll showed that four in five Canadians hoped for a Biden win. 

Canadians are excited and hopeful about the Biden administration’s position on various issues, namely climate change. Undoubtedly, the Biden administration is taking the threat of climate change more seriously than the previous administration. Already, Biden has appointed former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry as the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, a new position within the cabinet. Additionally, the U.S., as of February 19, has rejoined the Paris Agreement with the international goal of keeping global warming below two degrees celsius, needed to avoid the most catastrophic impacts of climate change. Canada is also a signatory of this agreement and has fiercely advocated for its importance. Most recently, on February 25th, Biden and Treadau announced that they would be coming together to reach their goal of net zero emissions by 2050 with their “U.S.-Canada Partnership Roadmap.” 

The Partnership works to align the goals and climate policies of each country so that they can cooperate more efficiently. In addition to aligning policies, the plan hopes to create more policies and projects that will promote job growth, address inequality and combat the effects of climate change. Advocating for the creation of clean-energy infrastructure and ensuring that cross-border energy is renewable is at the core of this partnership. Biden and Trudeau also committed to having polluters take responsibility for their damages.

In addition to the announcement of the plan, Trudeau said that “U.S. leadership has been sorely missed over the past years… [it is]nice when the Americans are not pulling out all references to climate change and instead adding them.” 

While both countries must implement long-term goals for climate change to protect our planet, the issue of COVID-19 has taken precedent this past year as over 500,000 people have died of COVID-19 in the U.S. alone as of February 2021. 

During the initial meeting between Biden and Trudeau, COVID-19 was the primary focus. Both leaders agreed that cooperation in combating the virus was essential. Canada has struggled to vaccinate its population due to supplies being bought up by larger economies like the United States and United Kingdom. As part of his statement, Trudeau raised the idea of buying vaccines produced in the United States. Canada is currently receiving vaccines from Pfizer and Moderna plants in Europe and Biden’s team reportedly said that it was the administration’s priority to “ensure every American is vaccinated.” 

It is unlikely, however, that the United States would sell vaccines produced domestically to Canada until late summer at the earliest. As of February 20th, 2021, only 2.43% of Canadians had received at least one dose of the vaccine compared to about 14% of the U.S. population. 

Despite the challenges associated with vaccine distribution, the United States and Canada have committed to keeping trade as open as possible. The Prime Minister’s office emphasized “the importance of avoiding measures that may constrain the critical trade and supply-chain security between our countries” in a public statement. Economically, it is in the best interest of both nations to keep borders open and encourage trade to avoid unemployment and increase GDP.   

Although Canadian and U.S. interests are more aligned than in previous years, on his first day in office, Biden signed an executive order to end the expansion of the Keystone XL pipeline, a project supported by the Government of Alberta, a provincial government of Canada. The Keystone XL pipeline, which began planning and construction in 2008, travels from Canada through Texas. The pipeline, which began operating in 2010, was scheduled for an expansion to be able to carry even more oil. Despite the pipeline providing economic benefits to both countries, Biden canceled the project in order to protect the environment and indigenous communities. A January statement from the White House said that “the President acknowledged Prime Minister Trudeau’s disappointment regarding the decision to rescind the permit for the Keystone XL pipeline.” 

Bow said that the pipeline will hurt domestic relations between the local governments and the federal government in Canada, rather than hurting diplomatic relations between Ottawa and Washington. Given that Trudeau is substantially worried about political support in his country, this may be why he showed disdain for the cancellation of the project. 

“The prairie provinces who are the major oil exporters in Canada are the ones who really desperately wanted Keystone to go through, and people in other parts of Canada don’t really care that much about it,” Bow said. “There are real differences between Canadians on those issues.” 

While the Trudeau administration did not express as much distress about the cancellation of the project, in a statement released by the Government of Alberta, Premier Jason Kenney expressed his disturbance with Biden’s actions to cancel the Presidential permit for the Keystone XL pipeline. He highlighted the 2,000 jobs that would be lost due to the cancellation of the project. The statement also said, “That’s not how you treat a friend and ally.”

Even though some of the provincial governments may not support President Biden, there is no reason to believe that the Trudeau administration, which will be in office for at least the majority of Biden’s stay in the White House, will become hostile with the U.S. over this issue, especially as, since the cancellation of the project, Trudeau and Biden have already begun working on several projects together. 

The future of U.S.-Canada relations looks hopeful as the two countries are already working together to tackle global issues such as climate change and COVID-19. However, the  relationship between the two countries can change depending on the issues at hand and the administration holding office. 

With the popularity of Trumpism in the United States and growing support of populism in Canada, both countries could experience major political shifts once the two leaders are up for re-election. However, until then, the neighbors will most likely continue to work cooperatively together and advance the two countries’ unique historical, cultural and geographical relationship.

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In 2018, Mexico elected President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a left-wing populist member of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). Although he had long been a divisive figure in Mexican politics, López Obrador entered office with an astounding 53% of the popular vote and a promise to prioritize Mexico’s sovereignty. After multiple failed presidential elections, AMLO (the popular abbreviation for López Obrador) finally achieved the highest office in Mexico on the rising tide of Mexican nationalism, which had dominated Mexican politics for a majority of its relations with the U.S. and had only subsided in the late 80s.

Americans observed Mexico’s return to nationalist tendencies with anxiety, heralding AMLO as “Mexico’s answer to Donald Trump” and anticipating exacerbated tension between the United States and its southern neighbor. However, AMLO and Donald Trump maintained a surprisingly functional, occasionally even congenial, working relationship.

In many ways, Trump and López Obrador were diametrically opposed, but one crucial shared opinion allowed the two leaders to collaborate. Trump was uniquely uninterested in intervening in Mexico’s domestic politics, and AMLO appreciated the absence of American oversight and intervention.

Donald Trump’s platform toward Mexico focused almost exclusively on issues of migration and renegotiating regional trade agreements. Trump’s approach to foreign policy, toward Mexico and many others, was unprecedentedly one-dimensional, relying on his personal business dealings rather than a multifaceted, coordinated agenda. Trump’s narrow focus allowed AMLO to pursue his own domestic agenda with less American influence.

In a recent call with newly elected President Joe Biden, AMLO said “I must mention that we do have a very good relationship with the now president of your country… Regardless of all other considerations, he respects [Mexico’s] sovereignty.”

Joe Biden’s approach to relations with Mexico is a far cry from his predecessor’s. Where Trump relied on his own personal relationships, Biden will rely on a fully appointed cabinet to manage a wide range of issues. One of the many ways in which Trump’s presidency marked a divergence from the status quo was his resistance to assemble a cabinet that could navigate the complexities of a relationship between two countries whose economies, cultures and politics are so inextricably interconnected. Biden intends to reconstruct this infrastructure of diplomacy that will allow him to tackle multiple campaign promises.

AMLO anticipates the increase in American oversight that will come with Biden’s more holistic foreign policy platform. He has already begun sending signals to the incoming American president that he will not tolerate the same amount of American influence as his predecessors. Not only was López Obrador among the last global leaders to congratulate Biden on his victory, but he has also exonerated a former Mexican defense secretary from prosecution for drug trafficking in America and granted asylum to Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks who has been evading U.S. extradition since releasing thousands of Hillary Clinton’s emails in 2016. Many Americans received these actions as slights to the incoming administration, but the sum of these minor affronts is a broader message: Mexico’s president intends to continue pursuing his robust domestic agenda with minimal American interference.

AMLO has championed the charge for Mexican energy independence, a goal which he has ardently pursued since he took office in 2018. An outspoken critic of his predecessor’s energy sector redesign that opened the industry to extensive privatization, López Obrador has repeatedly vowed to restore the dominance of Mexico’s state-owned electricity company.

Recent storms across Texas, a major source of Mexico’s natural gas, resulted in widespread blackouts across the northern half of Mexico. Pointing to these blackouts as evidence, AMLO argued for fortifying Mexico’s own domestic energy supply and in late February put forth a bill that would strengthen the state-owned energy program and limit the involvement of private companies in the energy industry. Ultimately, López Obrador aims to buttress Mexico’s economy from America’s political and economic influence through the centralization and nationalization of the energy industry.

AMLO’s fear that Biden’s election will spell out more roadblocks to his dream of energy independence is not unfounded. Hordes of legislators, environmental advocates and industry experts have criticized his proposed bill for violating carbon emission regulations and trade agreements. These infractions will likely attract opposition not just from his domestic opponents but also from the Biden administration.

Lourdes Melgar, a top energy official under former President Enrique Peña Nieto, said AMLO “has a nationalistic view of how to utilize resources.” Melgar and many other energy experts argue that this policy sacrifices environmental sustainability for an ideological power play. Although the bill is expected to become law within the coming days, Mexico will continue grappling to find a balance between nationalistic impulses, international cooperation, and environmental sustainability.

Unlike his predecessor, President Biden will not look the other way when it comes to violations of environmental agreements. Throughout his campaign and into the first month of his presidency, Biden has remained adamant about the need to uphold environmental protection agreements and expressed a willingness to reassert America’s role as a leader of international environmental cooperation.

According to Pamela Starr, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network at the University of Southern California, Biden should expect to ruffle some feathers when addressing Mexico’s disregard for carbon emission limits and other sustainability regulations. The new president may not necessarily care that Mexico is striving for energy independence, only considering the repercussions of the tactics employed to achieve self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, increased oversight could set off alarm bells for AMLO and others who remain skeptical of American involvement.

Starr points to Jeffrey Davidow’s metaphor for the complex relationship between the United States and Mexico, “the bear and the porcupine,” which captured the difficulties of navigating a relationship between two closely connected countries when one was overtly interventionist and the other hypersensitive to perceived intervention. This dance between American brashness and Mexican defensiveness defined their relationship until the election of Ernesto Cedillo in 1988.

AMLO has openly asserted his disapproval for his predecessors’ approach to dealing with the United States, accusing Mexico of kowtowing to American interests over the past few decades. His approach to diplomacy marks a return to the era of the porcupine, defined by Mexican nationalism and apprehension of U.S. involvement. In order to avoid returning to the role of “the bear,” the United States must carefully navigate the rising sentiment of Mexican nationalism, an endeavor further complicated by rising nationalism within its own borders. Competing threads of nationalism could cause friction not just within the realm of environmental policy, but also within negotiations of labor, trade, corruption and migration.

According to Starr, Biden’s policy toward Latin America rests on three pillars: corruption, climate change and democracy. Although the ongoing migration crisis will likely monopolize much of Biden’s first year in office, the early months of his presidency could define the timber of their relationship and define the trajectory of negotiations of the other items on his agenda in the subsequent years of his presidency.

Despite AMLO’s initial posturing, he has recently demonstrated his commitment to maintaining a productive relationship with the United States. The two leaders convened virtually to discuss issues of immigration, the pandemic and climate change, and both seemed intent on redirecting the nature of their nations’ exchange away from the blatant antagonism that defined the Trump administration. López Obrador, like many Mexicans, is relieved to work with an American president who does not openly degrade their country.

However, this relief at a return to amiability will not dissuade AMLO from fiercely protecting his plan for energy independence. The past four years have exacerbated a relationship that had been fraught with mistrust for decades. This history of unwelcome intervention and competing nationalist sentiments will guide the next four years of U.S.-Mexico relations.

Biden has already begun to dismantle Trump’s hardline anti-immigration policies, ending the “Remain in Mexico” program and working with Mexican officials to reinstate mechanisms for granting asylum to the thousands of migrants waiting at the US-Mexico border. Biden has already encountered numerous roadblocks: an SUV crash in California left 13 migrants dead and a bottleneck of migrants in encampments at the border. Recent reports predict thousands more migrants from Central America are marching toward this chokepoint, hopeful that the new administration will open more doors for their arrival.

Tensions of migration at the border continue to reverberate throughout the region. With the support of Mexican police and leadership, Guatemalan police confronted a caravan of Honduran migrants in late January in an effort to stem the flow of northbound Central Americans. As the entire region reels from the effects of widespread migration and the ongoing public health crisis, Biden will need to rely on coordination with Mexico to stabilize their shared border and eventually the region.

Constructing a productive relationship after four years of Trump’s nationalism and centuries of prior American interventionism will be no small feat, especially with a Mexican president with his own political agenda that runs counterproductive to American interests in certain sectors.

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Concerned murmurs of “populism” hang over many political movements that emerged in 2016. The word littered headlines, describing political parties, politicians and popular movements in the US, UK, Spain, Italy and the Philippines, among others.

As far as “isms” go, populism made an indisputable comeback in the last year—but what exactly does this mean? For a term so easily recognized, it appears to carry limited insight if it applies to such a vast array of ideological agendas. Whether a warranted, misused or merely incendiary label, it suggests that there is a shared global sentiment unifying recent anti-establishment movements around the world—potentially stimulated by the same international factors.

 An Empty Qualifier

Attempts to standardize populism reveal conceptual inconsistencies. For example, its recent use in descriptions of US president Donald Trump and in discussions surrounding the UK Brexit movement highlight distinct anti-immigration stances rooted in nationalism. Meanwhile, the Spanish “populist party” Podemos advocates voting rights for immigrants. And as Bolivia’s populist president Evo Morales supports coca cultivation by indigenous farmers in spite of drug problems, Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte—also labeled a populist—conducts brutal drug crackdowns.

This inconsistency isn’t unique to current politicians. Past uses of the label refer to the US 19^th century People’s Party and the Free Silver movement (a rural movement), Peronism in Argentina (an urban working class movement), and even to the Soviet Union’s People’s Democracies of Eastern Europe (a communist movement). A better approach to a comprehensive definition may be to acknowledge that one of its only constants is this historical inconsistency. Despite the lack of a universal definition, another rare constant is its self-evidence: somehow everyone knows a populist when they see one. Beyond this, and beyond its paradox of consistent inconsistency, populism offers very little regularity.

But hurled as an insult, it has proved reliable throughout history in eliciting disdain. Uttered with revulsion, the word “populism” is usually flanked by qualifiers like “aggressive” and “violent.” Clearly, being labeled a populist is not a compliment. It is rarely embraced openly, nor used in favorable descriptions. Despite Trump and his supporters’ re-appropriation of the insult, in which they proudly turn their noses up at “fake” or “mainstream” news, populism carries a negative historical connotation.

Yet it may not be immediately clear why a word that refers to the will of constituents against elite machinations, would be so defiled in democratic societies. On its face, its derogatory use may seem contradictory. Perhaps use of the word reveals just as much about the labelers as those labeled.

Populism is largely rhetorical, and usually combined with other “isms.”

While an all-encompassing definition eludes academics, it’s clear populism can be linked with certain types of rhetoric. For example, many associate it with reactionary nationalism, sometimes in response to a perceived drop in national welfare.

Other populist movements are hinged on the charisma and political maneuvers of particular leaders. Also known as “strongmen,” these leaders make use of a rhetoric that pits a good, wholesome people against corrupt elites or oligarchs. Usually this is done in conjunction with an appeal to ethno-national identity.  Examples of such strongmen can be found in Latin American populism, including leaders like Juan Peron and Hugo Chavez who campaigned on platforms that eschewed existing power-holding institutions in the interest of “the People”—the true national representatives.

USC SIR professor Pablo Barbera is working on a project examining populist rhetoric and the communication strategies of populist politicians on different channels, including social media.

According to him, “Populism thinks that society is divided in two groups. There’s a very large group, which is the People, or the masses, who are morally superior. And then there’s a tiny minority—the elites, who are in power. They’re kind of like parasites, and they’re just trying to enrich themselves, and they are corrupt.”

Thus, one way to make sense of populism’s lack of ideological color is by establishing it as a purely rhetorical rather than ideological ism—a political strategy rather than a coherent platform. In fact, according to political scientist Cas Mudde, populism can be conceived as a “thin” ideology, usually combined with “thick” ideologies like communism or fascism. Because of its inconsistent application to these ideologies, populism looks different every time it is practiced (despite being self-evident), and frequently adopts a distinct national identity—hence its strong correlation with nationalist rhetoric.

Populism can rise in the wake of economic change

Regardless of the personality, rhetoric and ideology that can qualify a movement or a campaign as “populist,” economic and social changes—particularly the exposure of inequality—can trigger the success of populist movements. According to Barbera, two types of factors have led to recent success.

“One is underlying; and the other is a trigger. The underlying is that there are a lot of citizens in many countries that are suffering the consequences of globalization, and technology is making the skills of blue-collar workers in many countries obsolete,” he said.  “So that means there’s a lot of people unemployed. For them, objectively their economic situation is much worse now than it used to be. There’s also a trigger, and I think that’s the economic crisis.”

Though its inconsistency prevents populism from forming a “thick” ideology, certain conditions and features add dimensions to populism beyond pure rhetoric. Economic gaps appear to fuel populism. Historically, industrialization has been accompanied by the rise of populist movements.

This is true for the US in the 19^th century, but perhaps even more for Latin American industrialization at the beginning of the 20^th century. In the wake of these changes, the political system in place no longer accurately represents the resulting new and/or displaced groups. These groups—whether the rural poor or a new working industrial class—whom the political system failed to represent become, in a sense, “up for grabs.” Thus, perhaps most simply, populism is the manipulative mechanism employed by politicians on either side of the political spectrum to win the vote of these disenfranchised groups.

Arguably, the changes and uncertainty of the 21^st century mimic the gaps left by industrialization in previous eras of growth. The downturns and transitions of the 2008 recession and the advent of the Internet which has been described as “the greatest technological surge since the industrial era,” combined with huge demographic shifts and the rise of global terrorism all contribute to a very different-looking world in the new century.

The economic and security ramifications of this “newness” and uncertainty can render certain populations ripe for political manipulation. The feeling of disadvantage is inherently economic. Political freedom, explains The Atlantic, is inextricable from economic freedom. Economic freedom here is understood as an equal ability to compete in the marketplace. In left-leaning populist platforms, this makes redistributive policies and land reform particularly appealing. On the right, it means standing up to a corrupt elite that betrays the national interest.

The reactions these platforms have elicited in the US are not only seen through the Trump and Sanders campaigns in 2016, but in the increasing failure of the US bipartisan “duopoly” to represent Americans. More evidence is the growing percentage of self-identified independent voters. A recent Glimpse article by Senior Correspondent Luke Phillips illustrates how both candidates utilized the American working class frustration with globalization and growing inequality.

Populist politicians capitalize on this antiestablishment sentiment through the “us vs. them” rhetorical framework mentioned above. An “us vs. them” rhetoric is not exclusive to populism, but it is a necessary condition. This framework can be split into two camps, as described by political scientist Werner Muller. An exclusive populism seeks to shut out stigmatized groups. In Europe, these are refugees. In the US, immigrants. In Latin America, inclusive populism is more common, in which increased representation is demanded for stigmatized groups such as the poor and the indigenous.

However, “us vs. them” in the populist dimension rarely addresses class conflict. Rather, it relies on a narrative of ordinary, honest people exploited by corrupt elites. Populists build coalitions within specific demographics and cast them into these roles. For example, Donald Trump received support from both the poor and the wealthy: his coalition brought together blue collar workers, wealthy white women, and even prominent names in the finance industry—proving that his rhetoric was not class-oriented.

In both, there is a strong grassroots component. Regardless of whether it panders to an agrarian movement demanding land reform, or a reactionary working class, populism is presented to the public as a bottom-up solution. This goes back to its etymological roots—populism is for the plain folk, for the masses, for the opposite of the elites. It serves those who feel somehow disadvantaged or usurped of what is owed them. Because of this, populism often champions democracy.

“Populists are usually, at least at first, ultra-democratic. For example they’re huge fans of direct democracy like referenda, popular initiatives. The whole Brexit referendum that happened in the UK is something that the populist party in the UK had been demanding for a long time,” Barbera said.

What populists ignore, however, are systems of checks and balances. Unlike direct democracies, parliamentary democracies can aggregate the interests of the population and represent them equally, taking into account minority groups.

What Barbera sees as most harmful are the inconsistencies contained within the rhetoric.

“On paper, giving power to the masses and getting rid of the corrupt elite sounds great, but there’s all these logical fallacies. The first thing is that the democratic system already gives the power to the masses. Second, most politicians are not corrupt. They’re kind of like picking out the black sheep and saying the whole thing is polluted,” he said.

On the other hand, use of the word could also be trigger-happy response of the opposition.

Populism is often wielded by the opposition to classify anti-establishment movements as radical or extreme.

Conceptual inconsistencies have not stopped populism from being hurled as an insult. For populists themselves, the label is an elite response. From this perspective, the label itself serves as a rhetorical tool to shut down uprisings that threaten current power-holders. The underlying implication is that “the people” are incapable of voting in their interests, or at least manipulated into voting against their interests.

Branding a political movement as “populist” cites a Freudian notion in which individual inhibitions dissolve as people are “stirred up,” evoking dormant “cruel, brutal and destructive instincts.” In short, groups or “masses” are designated a mind of their own, which is subsequently associated with primitive instincts. But this generalization is colored by ideology. After all, not all constructions of “the people” are created equal, so ideology renders the labelers alternately defenders and condemners of popular movements.

If populism fills the gaps created by economic changes of the time, and is used by elites to decry movements deemed “too extreme,” any definition of the term must consider the era’s conception of the political center. During the Cold War, for example, because the Soviet Union made frequent appeals to “the people,” the populist label became even more loathsome. Because the subsequent use by any politician of “the people” was wont to generate US suspicion, populist rhetoric changed. Now, in the 21^st century, hardly any politician makes direct reference to the political group.

Populism and “the People”

Communication between populists and constituents is unconventional, and as a consequence these politicians share a curious relationship with the media. According to Barbera, there are two frameworks for analyzing communication between politicians and their constituents generally. The first is top-down, in which the mass media broadcasts messages to the population, which doesn’t have an input. The second framework, on which Barbera believes populists rely heavily, is bottom-up. In this approach, the population sets topics and concerns, which the politician picks up on and addresses.

A couple factors make this second framework the ideal communication strategy for today’s populists. First, populists generally don’t have a good rapport with traditional media, who dissect and criticize populist talking points. These criticisms threaten to disrupt the narratives created by populists related to corrupt elites and playing to popular dissatisfaction. While Hungary’s Victor Orbán quelled the opposition press through more traditional measures in response (shutting it down), other tactics involve absorbing or reframing criticisms. Trump supporters have done both—absorbed the “deplorables” label, and spun negative press into “fake news.” This is not unlike their European counterparts. One European study found that when criticizing mainstream media, populists employ five recurring themes: erroneous reporting, criticism of ownership, naming and shaming, discursive contestations, alternative phraseology and the promotion of other media outlets.

The other reason bottom-up communication works so well with populism is precisely because of the abundance of alternative media outlets thanks to the Internet.

“Now with social media it’s so easy to put out a message and it goes viral—it doesn’t matter if you’re a farmer in the middle of Iowa or a journalist. Everybody has the same power. So, I think populist parties, or parties that have a populist strategy, take advantage of that as a way of giving voice to the ordinary people in our country,” Barbera said.

At its core, populism implies a fear of the “tyranny of the masses.”

Populism can also be conceived as an answer to the question, “are there limits to democracy?” The answer depends on the existence of a belief that a body of constituents can be as tyrannical as a dictator. In other words, democracy can be abused for something that is not, overall, good for society. Because the populist label describes a lack of faith in the democratic mass to vote in their interest, its use implies that what would otherwise be a system of direct democracy must be checked. The manifestation of this implication in the US, for example, is the electoral college.

Regardless of ideological orientation, populism can be a good thing in a democracy. It pushes to the forefront underlying or unresolved issues that have not been addressed by institutional channels. That way, even in quelling a populist movement, the political center is still broadening the scope of the conversation.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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