As the only country producing nuclear energy in the Caucasus region, Armenia has relied heavily on nuclear power since 1976. The Metsamor nuclear power plant, located about 35 kilometers from the capital city of Yerevan, generates roughly 40% of the country’s electricity. From its inception as a Soviet-era plant to its current-day operation, the history of the Metsamor power plant is riddled with Russian presence — a presence that tiptoes the fine line of colonization in every chapter it is found.

Today, Russia seems to have taken the long-uncertain future of Armenia’s power plant into its own hands. Currently commissioned until 2026, the life of the Metsamor plant will be extended for another ten years through Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation. 

Moreover, in 2021, Russia expressed interest in deepening its energy investments in Armenia’s nuclear power sector and undertaking larger projects, such as the building of a new power unit at Metsamor. Months later, Russia’s interests would materialize into a signed agreement between Rosatom and Armenia’s nuclear power plant.

Notably, although nuclear power is a large component of Armenia’s energy profile, natural gas remains Armenia’s primary energy import, comprising over 80% of total imports. Russia imports roughly 85% of this natural gas to Armenia while Iran imports the rest, the latter partly in exchange for Armenian electricity exports. 

With Russia deeply entangled in every nook and cranny of Armenia’s energy sector, an emerging pattern of Russian energy colonization in Armenia — a remnant of a lingering post-Soviet legacy three decades after dissolution — seems to rear its ugly head. The Metsamor nuclear power plant is merely one case study highlighting the root causes of Armenia’s crippling energy dependence on Moscow. 

Such a relationship, of course, bears geopolitical implications, as well.

Under the corrupt and criminal leadership of Armenian administrations whose interests aligned more closely with Russia’s than their country’s, Armenia gradually sold its most critical energy infrastructures to Russia. In exchange for securing cheap Russian gas in the short term, the leadership in Yerevan forsook the west’s push for energy diversification. 

Fortunately for Yerevan, after the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Armenia is no longer governed by the corrupt oligarchs who sold their country’s energy sector — and therefore a crucial piece of its independence — to Russia; however, the legacy of their corrupt dealings with Gazprom and Moscow at large will remain for several decades to come.

Furthermore, Russia’s investment in Armenia’s nuclear sector comes amid a broader pattern of energy colonization in the region. Similar offers-turned-deals to invest in Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Belarussian nuclear power have been undertaken by Moscow in recent months and years. 

Meanwhile, the same recklessness Russian President Vladimir Putin employs in his foreign policy seems to be ever-present in Moscow’s nuclear endeavors, which subject the recipient state — or colony, in the Kremlin’s eyes — to significant safety concerns and associated risks.

In securing Yerevan’s long-term dependence for nuclear energy, Russia significantly also gains another degree of leverage over a former Soviet republic whose geopolitical predicament is a national security risk in its own right. Sandwiched between hostile neighbors Turkey and Azerbaijan, not even the Metsamor power plant has been immune to the dangers this entails.

For its own part, Turkey has repeatedly wielded rhetoric about the dangers of Armenia’s power plant, located roughly 15 kilometers from its border, for political gain. Its concerns, cited far too frequently to be genuine, are also largely hypocritical when considering Ankara’s own partnership with Russia for development of its nuclear sector. Moreover, the Turkish- and Azerbaijani-imposed economic blockade of Armenia, which has financially devastated the country, is a main driver for the necessity of Armenia’s nuclear production.

On the other hand, Baku’s aggressive foreign policy, incessant warmongering and expressed ethnic cleansing agenda against the Armenians located both within its internationally recognized borders and outside pose a unique threat in the context of Armenia’s nuclear power plant.

In July 2021, as tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan were boiling over leading up to Baku’s preemptive war against Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan threatened to employ a missile attack against the Metsamor power plant. Self-evidently, the implications of such an attack would be catastrophic, despicable and constitute a direct terrorist threat to Armenia and its neighboring countries.

Ultimately, Armenia’s Metsamor power plant is not only a symbol of Russia’s energy colonization but a testament to the infinitely complex geopolitical disposition Armenia finds itself in. Like every sector of its host country, competing regional interests and Russian hegemony have overtaken Armenia’s nuclear power plant, as well. 

Whether or not the Metsamor plant will weather the storm relies entirely on Yerevan’s long-term planning and the conduct of regional actors. 

The current trajectory, however, seems to be Moscow-bound.

“100% sustainable.” 

Not the words one would typically associate with the Olympics, of all things, but it was one of the big stories of the 2022 Beijing Olympics. 

All venues were powered using green energy, carbon offsetting was used to make up for any carbon emissions produced during the games and more sustainable construction practices were used to build the facilities. 

Despite all of this, one could not help but notice the giant cooling towers that loomed in the background of the big air venue as snowboarders and skiers twirled in the air. While these towers are no longer in operation, they do represent an interesting contrast — not only at the Olympics, but for China as a whole. 

There is no denying China’s growing role in the sustainability movement. Beijing is both the world’s largest producer of solar and wind energy and the largest investor, domestically and abroad, in green energy. In addition, China supplies the vast majority of solar panel materials to the United States and other countries. 

However, one sustainable energy source which has declined in the United States and other countries is surging forward in China, on the trajectory to becoming one of its largest sources of energy. 

That energy? Nuclear. 

Despite this interest in expanding nuclear energy, however, China’s use of fossil fuels — coal in particular — has also risen in recent years. Just last month, the Chinese news agency Xinhua reported that the coal supply will increase in the country, in addition to power plants running at maximum capacity to help meet electricity demand. 

On the one hand, China remains a superpower in renewable energy. On the other, they continue to rely on coal for basic energy needs. 

So, what exactly are China’s sustainable energy goals? And how does nuclear energy fit into the overall picture?

China and Nuclear Energy 

In terms of overall nuclear energy output, the United States remains the highest, holding 30.8% of the global nuclear energy consumption to China’s 13.6%. However, China leads the world in nuclear plant construction and plans to build 150 new nuclear reactors in the next 15 years in contrast to the United States, which has shut down 39 facilities as of April 2021. 

Given China’s massive population, it makes sense that the government will pursue the investment in nuclear energy to complement its green transition. 

This is because nuclear energy is extremely reliable and can produce more energy than sustainable competitors. It has the highest capacity factor out of any energy source at almost 93%, which essentially means it is running at 100% power for almost the entire year. Due to minimal maintenance requirements and longevity, nuclear power plants can run longer and more reliably than other forms of energy, (sustainable and fossil fuels alike). 

“Domestically, nuclear power also makes sense for China from the standpoint of energy security,” said Kelly Sanders, professor of civil and environmental engineering at the University of Southern California in an interview with US-China Today. As the recent conflict in Ukraine has revealed, the fossil fuel market is extremely volatile. Switching to nuclear helps shore up these shortages. 

Sanders also noted how “nuclear is a direct substitute for coal.” Both deliver electricity; thus, one can shut down a coal plant and replace it with a nuclear one, with the added benefits of less air pollution and a more reliable, consistent energy supply. 

It is for these reasons that China and Chinese President Xi Jinping have been adamant about expanding nuclear energy in the country, advertising a plan to spend over $440 billion in the next 15 years to create new nuclear energy reactors. 

This is the type of money countries like the United States aspire to spend on their sustainable energy sector. U.S. President Joe Biden’s recent infrastructure bill, which was passed after months of concessions and push-backs, for instance, dedicates only $10 billion to nuclear projects. This reveals some of the challenges Western democracies face when trying to address the climate crisis — politics, public opinion and budgetary regulations, among other things. China does not face such setbacks. 

China’s Geopolitical Strategy

But China’s desire to expand its nuclear capacities lies beyond its own domestic agenda. China continues to invest heavily in nuclear technology, becoming one of the primary developers of “Generation 4” reactors. It recently placed into operation one such reactor known as the “Pebble Bed”, which is reportedly “incapable of meltdowns.” 

Not only does this showcase China’s technological growth, but it also reveals their desire to export these reactors to other countries, similar to China’s dominance in the solar panel industry. 

For example, Pakistan has long been a valued customer for Chinese nuclear reactors, with five having been built in the country since 1993. China also recently established an $8 billion deal with Argentina. Moreover, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it is projected to build 30 reactors by 2030 in a number of participating countries.

As China continues to innovate and produce more efficient reactors, this only further incentivizes other countries, especially in the developing world, to invest in this technology. This, in turn, increases China’s export abilities. 

But it is not all smooth sailing. Many countries remain skeptical about China and its business practices. For one, the United States is an unlikely destination for this technology. As of Aug. 2019, the United States added one of China’s state-owned nuclear companies to a blacklist for allegedly stealing military technology. Romania also canceled its nuclear deal with China and instead signed a partnership with the United States. Other deals with countries such as Kenya and Egypt have also stalled. 

In a larger sense, this skepticism of China’s nuclear program stems from a larger fear of nuclear energy, its potential for disaster, its huge price tag and the toxic waste. “A lot of the world is scared of building more nuclear power plants”, said Sanders. “The world opinion on nuclear energy took a big hit after Fukushima.”

In addition, China has not yet signed various international treaties that set standards for liability in the case of an accident, making other countries more cautious when it comes to importing Chinese reactors and technology, let alone investing in nuclear energy in general.

There is also the problem of uranium. 

China hopes to gain independence from competitors in the energy market through nuclear expansion, and yet, over two-thirds of the total mined Uranium supply in the world lies in Australia, Canada and Kazakhstan. China, meanwhile, only has access to around 4% of the world’s Uranium supply. Thus, until nuclear energy begins to transition away from Uranium as a chief source of fuel, China and its partners will continue to rely on other countries for its supply. 

However, Sanders also noted that uranium “is pretty easy to mine, and pretty easy to move, unlike natural gas.” Because of this, “it is a pretty uncontentious fuel to import,” hinting that China should have no issue finding its share of Uranium.

The Broader Context

China’s investment in nuclear energy and its larger push towards renewables comes against the backdrop of declining U.S. leadership in this field. To this point, former U.S. President Donald Trump oversaw a reversal in policies aimed at combating climate change. In response, China criticized Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement and reaffirmed its own commitment to meeting future climate goals. 

Although Biden rejoined the Paris accord and has since tried to reestablish the United States as a champion of environmental sustainability, other countries are increasingly turning to China for leadership in tackling the climate crisis. The EU and China have sought cooperation with each other and recently staked out new goals to combat climate change. China no doubt sees this U.S. drop-off as an opportunity to take initiative and establish itself as a global leader in environmental policy. 

It should be noted that through China’s BRI, the production and implementation of high-carbon facilities, mostly coal-fired power plants, are being introduced to host countries. However, many of the projects funded by BRI threaten biodiversity, as well as important ecosystems and water resources. 

Thus, in the coming years, it appears that China will continue to be a leader in sustainable energy practices at home. However, whether this extends to their development partners is yet to be determined. 

This dichotomy calls into question if China’s green transition is for the purpose of sustainability, or merely a political strategy to gain leverage on the global stage. 

The impact of Trump’s criticisms is still felt in Washington today. On the one hand, Biden has faced pressure from dozens of senators, Democrats and Republicans, who are committed to expanding upon the deal to include expanded compliance from Iran in regards to its ballistic missile program. Meanwhile, the administration has been the subject of scrutiny from diplomats from France, Japan and Germany, who manufactured a 2003 deal with Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities and have served in an intermediary role between the two countries since 2018.

Biden’s insistence that Iran must make the first move toward compromise to maintain negotiating leverage has, in the eyes of the European Union, halted potential discussions and pushed Iran to explore other avenues. The ability, or lack thereof, of Biden to orchestrate any semblance of effective diplomacy at a time when Iran may only be months away from nuclear capabilities will test his multilateral approach to the Oval Office and will potentially determine the balance of power in the Middle East for years to come.

The historically rocky relations between the two countries — characterized by the CIA-led coup of democratically elected Prime Minister Mosaddegh in 1953, the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis in 1979, and the assassination of top military commander, General Qasem Soleimani, in 2020, to name a few — were put on display when Biden ordered a series of airstrikes on Iran-backed militias in Syria in late February as his first demonstration of military force. The airstrikes were supposedly a response to rocket attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, which Iran denied involvement in. That same week, Iran rejected the European Union’s proposition to moderate informal nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington. 

While Biden’s willingness to extend a diplomatic hand through the EU and prevent the nuclearization of one of the United States’ biggest military rivals, the first such offer in four years, reflects the new administration’s intent to revive global cooperation and internationalism, Iran’s cold response has made restoring the JCPOA one of the administration’s early challenges. Evidently, it will not be as diplomatically simple as lifting sanctions and returning to the 2015 deal, though the State Department recently reported that they are ready to do so. A new round of negotiations must be conducted, whether on Pennsylvania Avenue or a neutral location, with leverage being sacrificed on both sides.

It seems this is already underway. At a meeting in Vienna between intermediaries on April 6, representatives of the United States and Iran agreed to establish a joint commission that will work to simultaneously lift U.S. sanctions and halt Iranian nuclear development, thus officially beginning the negotiation phase, however indirectly.

However, after signing a 25-year, $400 billion dollar oil agreement with China in late March, Iran seems positioned to recuperate some of its economic losses from the devastating 2018 sanctions that Trump reimposed, thereby putting pressure on the Biden administration to concede to Iranian demands. The agreement signals that Iran is moving on from stalled negotiations with the United States and looking to the East for economic relief and potential military support down the line. 

In fact, the Iran-China deal also expanded military cooperation between the two nations, including joint research, training, intelligence and weapons development, with the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stating that, “China firmly supports Iran in safeguarding its state sovereignty and national dignity.” Yet U.S. officials seem rather unconcerned with the military aspects of the agreement, citing its lack of specificity and non-binding commitments. 

Even so, the economic leverage that the United States had over Iran as a result of Trump’s 1600 reimposed sanctions will continue to slip as Iran furthers its relations with China. With Iran entertaining other opportunities for relief and perhaps turning toward a more internationalist approach to foreign policy, the JCPOA’s salvation should not be seen as an inevitable conclusion.

Yet the most effective strategy for Biden remains the consolidation of U.S. nuclear demands. While a minority in Washington have continued to criticize the 2015 deal, most Americans opposed Trump’s diplomatic departure in 2018 and still support the JCPOA on its own, which was a landmark achievement of diplomacy and nonproliferation. And, as Iran has restated numerous times, they have no interest in renegotiating or expanding upon the JCPOA, efforts that will become increasingly slim if a new Iranian president takes office in June.

The lifting of some Trump-era sanctions will allow Biden to still maintain leverage in negotiations while also giving the diplomatic discussion some much needed momentum. Even so, such momentum might not get the JCPOA restored or a new nuclear deal established before it’s too late and Iran has already developed full-scale nuclear weapons. For the foreseeable future, Biden will continue to work in a race against time, which may require first rescinding some sanctions and returning to Obama’s Iranian approach in order to get the ball rolling faster. In fact, former weapons inspector and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security David Albright believes that “Iran could explode a test device within nine months; build a basic nuclear weapon in a year; and in two years, affix a warhead to a ballistic missile”.

Ultimately, Biden’s surprising refusal to cave into Iran’s pre-negotiation demands reflects his hard-nosed centrism and the slow U.S. return to diplomatic multilateralism following the Trump presidency. While many would have expected an immediate attempt to restore the JCPOA at all costs before the Iranian national elections, the administration seems sluggish to deliver on one of its key campaign promises. As negotiations stall and Iran approaches nuclear capabilities, expect to see a more desperate and conciliatory Oval Office to Tehran, the EU, and the American public.