At the same time, the eastward expansion of NATO, which the West viewed as integral to safeguarding peace and establishing a buffer zone, is perceived by Russia as “an existential threat to national security.” Particularly, Russia is most concerned recently with NATO expansion as more and more countries are joining the organization. At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, both Georgia and Ukraine were promised to eventually join the Western defense alliance. Four months later, Georgia attacked Russia, killing at least ten Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, to which Russia responded with a full-scale offensive — marking the beginning of the Russo-Georgian war. Although the nature of this conflict is multifaceted, its predominant causes can still be analyzed. These causes can be broken down to the personal interests of Russian President Valdimir Putin, the desires of the Kremlin and NATO’s involvement. 

In the context of the Russo-Georgian war, an individual to analyze is Putin, who (despite not officially being president) still had full control over the country as Dmitry Medvedev, the leader at the time, was Putin’s protégé and aligned his policies through regular consultations with Putin. This effectively made him Putin’s proxy. For Putin, his interest was to ensure the survival of the Russian state and, within that, to maintain his own power. 

The color revolutions, particularly the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in the subsequent year, collapsed pro-Kremlin leaders in neighboring countries, which increased Western influence by Russia’s borders. Preservation of the Kremlin became Putin’s priority during that period, which might have been a contributing factor to the war. Indeed, Putin sought constitutional changes as a means to reclaim power and pursue a more aggressive role in the region which could explain the asymmetrical escalation in 2008 — launching a full scale invasion after just a few casualties. This revisionist sentiment remains even today, where Putin continues to abide by incrementalism in his foreign policy rather than drastic actions — resorting to cyberattacks to undermine NATO solidarity, exploiting international institutions (i.e. UNSC, IMF, APEC) to stifle liberal internationalism, and propagating misinformation to disrupt free elections. All of these efforts are to destabilize Western institutions and democratic systems around the world. 

For the short-term leading up to the invasion, Putin was faced with a triple-challenge: low oil prices from the Great Recession, a stalled constitutional process and socio-economic hardships. The war in Georgia was a diversionary tactic employed to distract from these domestic failures. By ‘rallying around the flag’ against NATO, which over 88% of Russians held unfavourable views towards, Putin increased his approval rating by eight percentage points directly after the intervention and re-consolidated his regime’s legitimacy. This parallels the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, where Putin’s approval rating jumped by 22 percentage points from a historic low post-invasion. 

More broadly, the Kremlin sought to revise the status quo and bring back Soviet glory. The disintegration of the USSR was seen as a humiliating defeat because Russia/USSR lost a third of its territory and half of its population and GDP. The Kremlin has long desired to rebuild the once-great Soviet Union (also known as revisionism) and feels it has the right to “take something back” such as reuniting the ethnic Russians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia with their motherland. Yet, revisionism also can only be a secondary component because it does not explain why Russia chose Georgia to go to war with instead of other ex-Soviet states, which all possess ethnic Russians in varying quantities. Specifically, Kazakhstan and Moldova both have comparatively larger populations of ethnic Russians compared to Georgia. This means that while revision can be a contributing factor to the war, it is not a leading factor because there is no justification for Georgia specifically compared to every other ex-Soviet state. The only difference is Western involvement in the country, which suggests that to be a decisive factor. 

NATO’s involvement in Georgia impacted both Russia’s and Georgia’s decision-making calculus when it promised that Georgia would one day join the alliance. Instead of disbanding after the collapse of the USSR, NATO extended membership to 15 additional countries in Eastern Europe as a means to ‘deter Russian aggression’ through the creation of a buffer zone. Russia on the other hand, has vehemently opposed NATO expansion, perceiving its only goal to be villainizing and containing Russia. 

Furthermore, “NATO expansion broke a promise that various American officials [including Bush and Clinton]had given to various Russian and Soviet officials [such as Gorbachev and Yeltsinthat]that NATO would not expand.” NATO’s hubristic expansion tipped the balance of power in Eastern Europe and was considered an existential threat by the Kremlin, which compelled it to retaliate to seek survival. In this case, Russia felt forced to destabilize the region in an effort to block NATO membership for Georgia, which was promised at the Bucharest summit. Indeed, the war effectively vetoed membership for Georgia because NATO would not accept new members with open territorial disputes. Overall, it’s arguable that Putin has been “protecting legitimate security interests” by destabilizing the region to veto NATO membership. 

By contrast, NATO involvement also emboldened Georgia to become overconfident through moral hazard  — the concept that Georgia engaged in risky behavior (behavior which they wouldn’t otherwise engage in) because they believed they had the full support of NATO. NATO’s open-door policy emboldened Georgia to act arrogantly after verbally pledging membership in 2008. Soon after, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili launched an offensive against pro-Russian separatists and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia as he believed the “West had his back, but he miscalculated and overreached,” confirming that the pledge made by NATO was misinterpreted by Georgia as a blank cheque. In Georgia, sporadic fighting against separatists has been ongoing for years, but it was not until after the Bucharest summit that President Saakashvili decided to strike. In this paradigmatic plight of moral hazard, NATO involvement encouraged Georgia to provoke Russia, confident that NATO would save them in the end. Critically, this was not the case with the invasion of Ukraine, as there were no indications that Ukraine would be part of NATO anytime soon. 

Today, Russo-Georgian relations are in shambles despite the war only lasting five days. After Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, Georgia completely severed all diplomatic relations with Russia. Russia eventually withdrew their troops from Georgia after a month. In its entirety, the war displaced nearly 200,000 people, many of whom were unable to return even today. 

Importantly, many of the issues and patterns in the Russo-Georgian war can still be seen today: the unresolved ethnic tensions in the Donbas and Luhansk regions, the revisionist sentiments of the Kremlin and the antagonistic stance of NATO. Moving forward, it is vital to consider pre-existing conditions within regions, the intention of each state and the impact of the involvement of international institutions.

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“America is back!”

This declaration, made by President Joe Biden, was announced at the Munich Security Conference. After just two months in office, Biden has already been taking on the daunting task of restoring and cementing relationships in Europe. 

In late February, Biden appeared virtually at the Munich Security Conference, an annual international security conference held in Germany. Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Boris Johnson came out of the meeting similarly declaring “As you’ve seen and heard earlier, America is unreservedly back as the leader of the free world and that is a fantastic thing.” 

But while things might appear rosy at first glance, the path to restoring American leadership in the European sphere and reestablishing transatlantic diplomacy is not going to be smooth sailing. There are several key issues that will be sure to dominate the future of transatlantic relations in the coming months — and the next four years. 

Up first on the agenda is reestablishing a positive working relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The multilateral security organization, founded in 1942 and headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, was always a sore point for Donald Trump. The former U.S. President was vocal about his dislike of the alliance and questioned its continued use and whether or not other NATO members were pulling their weight. Conversely, Biden sees the recommital of the United States to its NATO allies as one of the most important points on his policy agenda. He made a point of calling NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in the very first week of his presidency. This singular phone call ensured the public, and the world, that America was re-committing itself to the organization — signaling a critical shift away from the previous outlook of the Trump administration. 

He also sought to correct one of the most damaging military decisions that the Trump administration brought onto NATO. During his presidency, Trump started the process of withdrawing nearly 12,000 troops from Germany, a key NATO ally. The move surprised the Germans and even some members of American military leadership. The United States views Germany as a critical strategic partner, which is evident with its 43 different American military bases. 

In the past few decades, the United States has had positive military relations with the Germans, and there has been no reason to change course on the country’s policy. The U.S. Department of Defense faced bipartisan condemnation from this decision because it made NATO look fragmented and weak. 

However, with each change in presidential administrations, the Defense Department carries out a “global force posture review,” which places all military decisions on pause. The Biden Administration has initiated a freeze on pending military action, such as pulling the U.S. forces out of Germany, and the administration will be reevaluating the decision. 

Already with the freeze in place, and no concrete determination to keep American troops in Germany, the German government is pleased and ready to work with Washington. German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said that, “this signal will be noticed and well understood. It is now up to us to take the hand that Washington has reached out with.” 

Germany has a lot to lose if the United States withdraws its presence. Over 100,000 Americans are currently living in Germany — the largest American community outside the United States. Should the government lose the trust of the Biden administration, the loss of 100,000 people in their communities would be incredibly hurtful to their economy. They also lose prestige and abilities to train their German military forces alongside the United States should the Defense Department continue to pull out from the region. 

On the American side, the United States would lose the country’s only hospital capable of treating trauma patients in the region. Landstuhl Regional Medical Center has served as the trauma center for all military personnel wounded in the Middle East, Europe and Africa, since its opening in 1953. It is beneficial for both sides to work out a favorable negotiation that can carry them through the future. The United States’ maintenance of positive relations with Germany is key to its stable presence in the region.

Across the English Channel lies another set of problems for Biden. For Boris Johnson, a solid working relationship with the Biden administration will ensure Britain can resume its “special relationship” with the United States — a historical and cultural relationship that started in Winston Churchill’s era. 

This relationship exists because the heads of state have emphasized the closeness of American and British values culturally, politically, and economically. Both Biden and former President Barack Obama were against the Brexit decision, but now that it has been fully implemented, Biden remains committed to helping America’s ally across the pond. In fact, Johnson was the very first European head of state to receive a call from Biden after his inauguration. 

Going forward, Johnson will be looking to negotiate a free trade agreement for the United Kingdom in a post-Brexit world. Biden has made it clear that he will not be negotiating a large free trade agreement anytime soon, since the U.S. needs to make major investments at home. But, it’s possible that a smaller agreement could be worked out before the U.S. Trade Protection Authority Act expires in April 2021. Any deal made before that point could be easily slipped through Congress, since the Democrats control the U.S. House of Representatives and are tied with Republicans in the Senate, with Vice President Kamala Harris as the tie vote. But after April, it will be more challenging. 

Another hot topic for the United States and the European Union, in particular, is the China debacle. The EU struck an important investment deal with China less than a month before Biden came into office. Biden’s transition team privately lobbied the EU to wait, and China capitalized on this brief window of opportunity and signed the deal before Biden could be sworn in; even though they conceded some positions to the EU to make it happen. Amid growing economic competition, an ongoing trade war and a increased tension between the United States and China, Europe has a precarious role to play — a delicate balance between economic opportunity and historical allyship.

It is helpful for transatlantic relations, however, that both the Trump and Biden administrations have declared the offenses against the Uyghur Muslim minority in China a genocide, especially since the EU and UK have made similar declarations. Going forward, Biden and his team will be looking to sort out their positions on China and will eventually need to converse with the EU to see where they overlap on policy. A strong policy on China will most likely need to be accepted by the United States’ allies in order for meaningful change to happen.

Yet another complicating issue for Biden and the Europeans is the Nord Stream 2 pipeline set to deliver Russian gas to Germany. Germany has built this pipeline with hopes of diversifying their energy resources, but it leaves the EU vulnerable to more Russian influence within the energy and economic sectors. The deal has been highly controversial in Brussels, and within Washington D.C. EU member states are unable to agree on a common position on the pipeline. Most notably, some countries are worried about Russia’s growing involvement in Europe. The public criticism of Russia has been intensified since the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny by the Kremlin in September 2020. France has publicly said they are against the pipeline, but will let the Germans make the final decision on its outcome. The United States is expected to release sanctions on the Russians soon, but the Germans are expected to remain unscathed for the time being. 

Biden certainly has his work cut out for him across the Atlantic. Biden is entering a pivotal era of transatlantic relations, especially after the last four years, and his decisions over the next few months will dictate how the rest of his presidency transpires. Recommitment to NATO, dealing with a post-Brexit UK, relations with China, and the Nord Stream 2 will all pose tough challenges for the administration to conquer. 

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Since his inauguration in January 2019, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has been a close emulator of former U.S. President Donald Trump through both his divisive rhetoric and staunchly conservative politics. In return, the Trump administration consistently praised Bolsonaro, despite his harmful environmental policies in the Amazon and overall anti-democratic attitudes. Under the new administration of President Joe Biden, this is all likely to change. 

Bolsonaro may prove to be a difficult nut to crack for Biden and his cabinet. With the 2022 Brazilian presidential election looming, Bolsonaro wants to appear strong to voters, actively fighting against what he feels is foreign interference in domestic policies. A concern of interference emerged in 2019, when, after two decades of on-and-off negotiations, Brazil and other members of South America’s Mercosur trade bloc reached a free trade agreement with the European Union. While the Amazon was engulfed in flames, French President Emmanuel Macron demanded more robust conservation policies from Brazil as a condition for ratifying the deal. To the despair of South American and European exporters, Bolsonaro doubled down on his climate denial rhetoric, and the deal has yet to be ratified.

Biden’s inauguration comes as the United States faces a multitude of foreign policy challenges, such as repairing their relationship with NATO and competing with China. Nonetheless, dealing with Bolsonaro, diplomatically or otherwise, will be crucial as Biden seeks to return the United States to the forefront of the fight against climate change, one of his signature campaign promises. Early on the campaign trail, Biden took aim at the Brazilian leader. In the September 2020 presidential debate, Biden said: “The rainforests of Brazil are being torn down, are being ripped down. More carbon is absorbed in that rainforest than every bit of carbon that’s emitted in the United States. Instead of doing something about that, I would be gathering up and making sure we had the countries of the world coming up with 20 billion dollars… stop tearing down the forest, and if you don’t, then you’re going to have significant economic consequences.” This jab at the Brazilian president drew outrage from Bolsonaro, who labeled Biden’s comments as “regrettable,” as well as “disastrous and gratuitous.”

Biden will have two distinct routes in maneuvering an already rocky relationship with Brazil: take the path of direct repudiation of Bolsonaro or work to establish pragmatic collaborative ties with his government. 

Significant steps have already been taken towards repudiation. Most foreign policy aides in the administration regard Bolsonaro as a dangerous figure — a “Trump of the Tropics” with no regard for democratic norms, human rights or environmental protection. Their desire is to put forward policies that push back against Bolsonaro’s populist agenda, not just because it goes against what they believe in, but also because it will be more popular among many liberal American voters. It will also satisfy the wishes of activists within the Democratic Party, some of whom have called Bolsonaro a “pseudo dictator” and agreements between the Brazilian leader and Trump Administration trade representatives a “slap in the face of Congress.” Thus, the Biden Administration sees naming and shaming Brazil as a “climate outlaw” or denouncing it for democratic backsliding as good politics. 

In the first weeks of his presidency, Biden and top aides received a long dossier that requested a freeze of all agreements and negotiations with Brazil while Bolsonaro remains in office. The dossier, which was prompted by the U.S. Network for Democracy in Brazil, has the support of many American and Brazilian organizations, including Friends of the Earth and Articulação dos Povos Indígenas do Brasil (APIB) in Brazil, an organization that advocates for indigenous rights.

It condemns the improved relations between the countries during the Trump Administration, under the rationale that the alliance has tarnished America’s role as the fighter for the expansion of democracy. The document recommends that the Biden administration restrict lumber, soy and meat imports from Brazil, unless confirmation is given that these products are not linked to deforestation or human rights abuses, and that the U.S. government reverts the Technology Safeguards Agreement signed under the Trump administration in 2019. 

Despite Bolsonaro’s wishes expressed in a recent letter to the American president, the dossier emphasizes that the Biden-Harris government should not seek a free-trade agreement with Brazil in any form. This conscious effort to distance the United States from Bolsonaro was echoed by Juan Gonzales, a Special Assistant to the President and National Security Council Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere. “Anybody, in Brazil or elsewhere, who thinks they can advance an ambitious relationship with the United States while ignoring important issues like climate change, democracy, and human rights clearly hasn’t been listening to Joe Biden on the campaign trail,” Gonzales said. 

The dossier adamantly warns Biden against engaging in any negotiations with Bolsonaro, as financing joint conservation projects with the Brazilian government could mean throwing money at the problem rather than addressing the root of the issue, which would delay concrete action. The remedy, according to the document, is to attach any financial investment to the demands made by the representatives of Brazilian civil society, indigenous tribes, and other marginalized groups within the country. 

But essentially cutting all ties with a traditional ally and strong trading partner could allow Bolsonaro to further isolate himself from the international community, possibly opening the door for him to continue pushing his undemocratic agenda and reckless environmental policies unchecked. Thus, in order to most effectively fight for democratic values and a progressive environmental policy in Brazil, should Biden work with the Brazilian government or repudiate it?   

To get to the heart of this question, it’s important to analyze U.S. involvement in the region generally. American involvement with Latin America is much more complex than the relationship between these two leaders when viewed through a global lens. Given U.S. concerns regarding Chinese influence in the region, the Biden-Bolsonaro relationship could prove to be pragmatic, instead of one based on repudiation and finger pointing.

After trading criticism for the last months, working with Brazil’s far-right president may not even be possible for Biden. The strategic approach could be to work with the many actors within the country who have a genuine interest in improving the two nations’ relationship. Within Brazilian society, the Biden administration will find out that it not only has willing allies among activists, legislators, academics and civil society groups who have been opposing Bolsonaro’s policies for the last two years, but also among those who seek a middle ground. The Biden administration could listen and learn from these actors, as the dossier instructs, as well as empower local opposition groups to connect with international pro-democracy and environmental movements. If the fight for responsible environmental policies and a stronger democracy in Brazil is to succeed, it will be led by local players.

As it has become clear, Bolsonaro does not take kindly to international criticism over his environmental policies. Thus, Biden must find other means through which to advance his policy ideas for conservation in the Amazon, like his plan to raise $20 billion from the international community to curb the deforestation and devastating forest fires in the region. One possible course of action is working with the Brazilian ambassador to the United States, Nestor Forster. In an October interview with BBC News Brasil, Forster said that any international initiative that brings resources for the sustainable development of the Amazon and helps to finance those who preserve the forest is welcome, as long as Brazil maintains leadership on discussions. 

Yet, would increased U.S. pressure cause Bolsonaro to cave in? Brazilian congressman Alessandro Molon sure thinks so. “I have no doubt that the change in administration in the U.S. will have an impact on Brazil’s environmental policy,” says Molon, who leads the opposition Brazilian Socialist Party in the lower house. “Until now, Donald Trump served as a support for the Brazilian president to act irresponsibly. Now with the U.S. adding to Europe’s pressure, Brazil is more isolated and the government will find it harder to stay on this foolish path.” 

In case pressure alone is unsuccessful at swaying the Brazilian leader, Biden could use America’s economic leverage to force Bolsonaro’s hand. Biden’s climate plan promises to “impose carbon adjustment fees or quotas on carbon-intensive goods from countries that are failing to meet their climate and environmental obligations.” While it’s unknown if the administration will actually apply those kinds of deterrents to Brazil, there are a scope of trade levers the U.S. could pull, says Lisa Viscidi, director of the Energy, Climate Change and Extractive Industries Program at the Inter-American Dialogue, a think tank focused on relations between Washington and Latin America. 

Although it seems like a ready-to-use solution, American trade pressure may also fail to have a significant impact on the industries that drive deforestation as trade between the two countries has steadily decreased over the last few years. Between January and September of 2020, accumulated trade between the U.S and Brazil totaled $33.4 billion, a 25% drop from the same period in 2019. Regardless, the United States remains Brazil’s second-largest trading partner, accounting for 9.7% of Brazilian exports and 12.3% of revenue. Only China retains a larger slice, buying more than one-third of Brazil’s exports. The United States is not a major buyer of Brazilian beef and soy, the primary goods associated with deforestation, which are exported primarily to China. As a result, André Nassar, president of oilseeds industry group Aboive, which represents the soy industry, says he does not expect the U.S. to try imposing pressure on Brazil through trade as directly as Europe has. “What I do think will change [with the Biden administration]is that there will be a push within Brazil to get control of illegal deforestation,” he says ‒ differentiating between deforestation for agricultural purposes, which is sometimes allowed under Brazilian law, and irregular land grabbing. “If Biden’s rhetoric says, ‘Brazil, you need to get control of illegal deforestation’, we as the private sector would back that.” 

As Brazilian business goes, so goes Bolsonaro. In 2018, then President-elect Bolsonaro expressed his desire to follow Trump and pull Brazil out of the Paris Climate Agreement. Brazilian agribusiness loudly voiced their concerns in Brazilian media about what that could do to Brazil’s image in global commerce, and the country stayed in. “When it becomes clear that there’s a threat to investment, or Brazilian products, the government is going to listen to businesses,” Nassar says.

Beyond direct economic pressure, Biden does have further options on the table in order to achieve his goals with Brazil, if necessary. In January 2020, the Trump Administration announced it was recommitting to supporting Brazil’s bid for OECD membership. In a reversal of his predecessor’s policy, Biden could withdraw U.S. support for the bid if Bolsonaro does not take concrete action in the Amazon. If the Biden administration uses its weight in the OECD to make Brazilian accession contingent on Amazon protections, that would sharply increase pressure from the country’s business community on Bolsonaro, according to Marcio Astrini, executive director of the Sao Paulo-based Climate Observatory.

Although Biden and Bolsonaro have a multitude of clashing policies, they also share some common interests, especially dealing with the situation in Venezuela. The Venezuelan humanitarian crisis and mass migration into bordering Latin American countries, including Brazil, has become a destabilizing force in the region and Brazil has aligned itself with the current U.S. pressure campaign to oust Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. During the Trump administration, the U.S. opposed Maduro through a “maximum pressure” campaign largely rested on progressively tighter sanctions against the regime, with the goal of forcing him out in favor of opposition leader Juan Guaido, the former head of the National Assembly whom the U.S. and more than 50 other countries recognized as the country’s valid interim president.

This hardline policy toward Venezuela was a rare show of support for democracy by the Trump administration. Yet, it was deeply undermined by Trump’s own autocratic tendencies. Under Biden, the U.S. can renew its full commitment to supporting democracy and bring in Brazil as a potential regional partner to deal with the crisis and improve relations simultaneously. 

The future of U.S.-Brazil relations, while rocky, will likely be productive over the next two years as the U.S. reverts to more traditional diplomatic channels. Under Trump, “Twitter diplomacy” reigned, largely overshadowing the usual process. The traditional approach to diplomacy, where issues are negotiated beforehand by mid-level diplomats, will make a comeback and may ultimately be positive for both Biden and Bolsonaro.

The importance of careful but fruitful diplomacy with Latin America’s largest country is especially important currently for the United States. The U.S. is clearly aware that the neglect of Latin America has provided an opening for Chinese influence in the region. The Biden administration will have to be mindful of not pushing Brazil away and straight into China’s outstretched arms. 

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The current United Nations report on activity in the region indicated that over 7,700 civilians have died preliminarily and over 800,000 were displaced. This prompted a surge in global activism and media coverage during the months of May and June. The tense shortage of foreign journalists in Yemen was quickly reversed as popular outlets like CNN, the Guardian, and Reporters Without Borders sent teams to cover the ongoing conflict. By now almost everybody has seen the photojournalism out of Yemen — images of skeletal children rummaging in rubble for food.

However, by July, as other recent events took over news cycles, the crisis in Yemen once again faded from the public consciousness, and there are, once again, only a handful of correspondents left. Meanwhile, the parallel conflict in Syria has been a staple in the public spotlight: unforgettable and always on the agenda. Western countries and populations always seemed to have an opinion and an active stance on Syria, yet allowed Yemen to slip into the background. 

This lack of Western attention and presence begets certain questions. How does a full-blown conflict get swept under the rug by western media and governments? Was Yemen failed by poor public relations campaigns? Or was it more sinister? Perhaps there are certain actors to truly blame for maintaining the conflict, or not doing enough to stop it. 

This article looks at three specific regional actors, the United States (along with two of its defense firms) and the United Nations to examine each of their motives and involvements to elaborate on their murky role in the ongoing Yemen crisis.

The crisis in Yemen began as a civil war with its origins in the Arab Spring movement of 2011, when the longtime authoritarian leader Ali Abdullah Saleh handed over power to a coalition led by his Prime Minister Mansour Hadi. This transition took place in the wake of popular uprisings against his 22-year regime known as the Yemeni Revolution. Immediately, the new president faced a slew of problems, not the least of which were jihadist and southern separatist rebellions born out of poverty, corruption and hunger. Saleh used this tension to attempt a retake of power, by banding together with Ansar Allah, another rebel group that had been fighting against Saleh for decades previously in a tenuous alliance, based on opportunism alone. They established a northern stronghold, and moved to brutally take over the capital of Sanaa in late 2014 and early 2015. Ansar Allah is now better known as the Houthis — the central rebels fighting today in the Yemeni crisis.

By this point, an alarmed Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates officially intervened in Yemen, with a force that was nominally multinational (but was mostly Saudi and Emarati soldiers), with the goal of stamping out the Houthis and restoring Hadi to power.

This is the second stop on the road to where Yemen is now. Why did Saudi Arabia, the UAE and some of the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations intervene? Officially, it was because of humanitarian reasons. But it is widely accepted that their intervention was done for a geopolitical purpose – a game played between regional powers – which only served to inflate the Yemeni crisis. 

The Houthis, which are Shia, represent a minority in Yemen. Shiism is one of two branches of Islam, practiced by over 10% of the world’s Muslims. The other branch, Sunnism, is dominant in the Islamic world and represents a majority in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and much of the Middle East. The two sects are in a seemingly irreconcilable schism, and there is tense religious tension between countries that adopt differing sects in the state religion.

This brings into play Iran, the only majority Shia country in the world. In the past, tensions across the Arab Gulf have been largely credited as stemming from this intra-faith tension, and the capture of Sanaa in 2015 could have been perceived by Saudi Arabia as the Iranians attempting to turn a former ally into a Shiite and pro-Iran outpost on its own borders. With Iran and Yemen situated on both of the two main chokepoints of the world’s most popular oil route, the strategic value of Yemen’s position remains invaluable to whoever holds sway in the country.

Over the past years, multiple third party observers, particularly in NATO and the Trump administration, have accused Iran of being involved in arming and supporting the Houthis. Iran has repeatedly denied involvement, however, citing an Obama-era U.S. intelligence assessment claiming no association between Iran and the Houthis. Yet, intercepted arms shipments, whistle-blowing from unnamed Iranian and Houthi officials and international estimates strongly suggest that Iran is arming the rebels, although the extent remains unclear. Saudi suspicion may be valid, given that Iran has a track record of supporting groups that have support with Shia populations, particularly Hezbollah. 

Prior to Saudi intervention, Yemen’s civil war was likely going to end quickly in a Houthi victory, when Saudi Arabia and the UAE interpreted this impending win to be a threat to their hegemony in the region and invaded to maintain the geopolitical status quo, which had lost support even with many Yemeni Sunnis. By 2018, the Saudi blockade of Yemen created a massive famine that malnourished 18 million civilians and precipitated appalling humanitarian conditions in the region.

But there weren’t just regional powers involved in Yemen. The United States has been heavily involved with the war. At the beginning of the conflict in 2011, U.S. intelligence relied on the Houthis as key strategic allies in the region for the fight against Al Qaeda. However, when Saudi Arabia intervened, the Obama administration gave its support. This would be a crucial move. The US turned its back on its agent in the region to honor a, “70-year alliance,” and in doing so precipitated the conflict: Saudi Arabia’s air force, responsible for an overwhelming majority of the blockade, airstrikes, and bombings, is entirely dependent on American supply and technical expertise.

At the end of the day, it was not just a political decision, but likely an economical one: private defense contractors are making money from Saudi Arabia, their “most valuable customer abroad” ($115 billion in 2015). Lockheed alone signed multiple $3 billion supply deals with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in recent months. Under the Trump administration not only has America signed an unprecedentedly large 350 billion dollar arms deal with Saudi Arabia, but Raytheon, a leading American defense company, has managed to elevate its chief lobbyist, Mark Esper, to the position of Secretary of Defense. Estimates suggest that Raytheon-supplied military technology has directly resulted in the deaths of 100,000 Yemeni people.

The UN’s actions have been limited. In early 2018, it seemed as though Yemen would enter an irrecoverable state of conflict, as the fighting reached Hudaydah, the country’s only active port and a lifeline for the entire Yemeni population. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths, backed by his home country the United Kingdom, spent weeks traveling between the Houthi and the allied sides, exchanging information, brokering agreements, and attempting to bring both parties to the negotiating table. Eventually, this led to the signing of the Stockholm Agreement, which called for an armistice and redeployment in Hudaydah, a prisoner exchange program and a neutralization of hostilities in the city of Taïz.

However, the UN’s resolution has been cited as generally weak. Though it prevented a catastrophe, it has not averted the war. Taïz remains a conflict zone, and full redeployment in Hudaydah has not occurred till this date, as conflict seems increasingly imminent. In effect, each party (though particularly Saudi Arabia) has been able to use the Stockholm Agreement as a PR tool and a distraction from the self-generated humanitarian crisis to create plausible deniability.

It seems that Yemen’s present-day condition was born out of several factors. Chief among them is regional geopolitics in a wider ideological and religious conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for which Yemen can be seen as a proxy battlefield. The United States has played no small role in fanning the flames, using Yemen as an opportunity to develop Saudi reliance on U.S. technology, and profit likely in order to strengthen their access to Saudi oil. And the UN, though it may have achieved the objective of preventing an even worse situation, has nevertheless perpetuated the status quo through lax demands and a minimal capacity to enforce redeployment of troops.

And recent events fail to paint a rosy picture. The September 2019 drone strike on Saudi Arabia’s Aramco, which damaged half of all of the Kingdom’s oil production capability, only stoked an increase in hostilities in Yemen. And even disarmament may not seem to be working. In July, Saudi Arabia called for a unilateral ceasefire for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic, but the Houthis rejected it, and fighting continued in a tit-for-tat manner, while the virus takes a devastating toll on the war-torn population. Meanwhile, the UAE, which withdrew all its forces from the conflict to instead support a third breakaway group in the south, the STC, has guaranteed nothing short of a second theater to the conflict.

It seems that the human cost of the war, already unimaginable in scope, will simply continue to get worse until all actors are able to isolate Yemen from their wider strategic ambitions, and work toward ceasing hostilities and permitting self-rule. Unfortunately, that seems increasingly unlikely to occur soon.

We are currently at a critical juncture in the Yemen conflict. As countries grapple with the pandemic, and the conflict has seemingly been put on hiatus, it becomes crucial for people and countries across the world to pay attention to this ongoing issue. As parties begin to look for exit strategies and sensational incidents like drone strikes become more and more common, it is crucial that the media keep reporting on this issue, initiating transparency and accountability, and keeping the pressure up. 

There may never be a chance like this to push for peace when all sides seem to be taking a break. The alternative is a degeneration back into a conveniently ignorable but utterly damaging conflict. 

The post How Did We Get Here? The Yemeni Crisis and What Wasn’t Done To Avoid It appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

As Glimpse From the Globe continues its special coverage of the 2020 U.S. presidential election, it’s important to highlight the differences in key areas of the candidates’ foreign policy agendas. In this piece, we will look at how the incumbent, President Donald Trump, and his opponent, former Vice President Joe Biden, will tackle the United States’ most topical international issues, including the superpower’s role in the Middle East, the global climate crisis, foreign aid, immigration policy, China and trade. 

An overwhelming trend in this analysis is that Trump’s foreign policy agenda is centered around unilateralism and protectionism, while Biden’s is focused on strengthening the United States’ relationships with its allies and promoting multilateral cooperation.

Middle East

The Middle East represents a key pillar of U.S. foreign policy, given its geopolitical significance for the United States’ economic interests, as well as the country’s counterterrorism, military and humanitarian efforts in the region. Whether it’s Iran’s relentless pursuit to acquire nuclear weapons after the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear deal, the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen or the unresolved Israel-Palestine dispute, the upcoming presidential election will determine U.S. action, or inaction, in the region.

Trump: After moving the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and brokering the landmark Israel-UAE peace agreement, Trump can be expected to continue strongly supporting Israel. In January 2020, he released the New Middle East Plan in collaboration with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Trump vehemently opposes Iran and has undertaken many actions against the state including withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, imposing severe economic sanctions in an effort to curb its nuclear program and authorizing the air strike in early 2020 that killed Major General Qasim Soleimani. Trump has also withdrawn U.S. troops from Syria, but has ordered they remain in Iraq. Over the past few years under Trump, the United States has also improved its relations with Saudi Arabia, especially after Trump expressed his support for Prince Mohammed bin Salman even after Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder at the Saudi embassy in Istanbul in 2018. 

Biden: Joe Biden is a long-time supporter of Israel and a self-proclaimed Zionist. Perhaps the only area of confluence we see in Trump and Biden’s foreign policy is vis-a-vis their support for Israel. However, their stances are not totally aligned — Biden opposes Israel’s annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and is a strong advocate for the two-state solution. When it comes to Iran, Biden, like Trump, is strongly opposed to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. However, he believes that Trump’s decision to strike Soleimani without Congress’ approval was an “enormous escalation” of tension and pledges to rejoin the Iran Nuclear Deal. Additionally, it is important to note that Biden has had a long involvement with Iraq policy in his past roles of senator and Vice President, which will likely shape his foreign policy agenda. Unlike Trump, Biden is not warm to the idea of close relations with Saudi Arabia and seeks to stop arms sales with the country.

Climate

In recent years, the scientific community has called on countries to speed up their process of reducing carbon, methane and other greenhouse gas emissions. Climate organizations have alluded to the dire consequences of shifting climate patterns such as food shortages, the spread of diseases and mass migration of animals and humans, making climate change the fastest growing threat to global security.

Trump: Trump is doubtful of how much human activity contributes to climate change and is a strong advocate for expanded fossil fuel production and use. He withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement, which set higher standards on vehicular emissions and imposed new and stricter regulations on power plants, and rescinded Obama’s Clean Power Plan. Over the past few years, Trump has also slashed funding to the Environmental Protection Agency and has repealed dozens of other environmental regulations. In August 2020, he finalized a plan that allows drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, part of his efforts to open almost all U.S. waters and protected lands to oil and gas drilling. Apart from this, he also hopes to expand new oil pipelines throughout the United States and reduce automobile fuel efficiency standards.

Biden: Biden has released his version of the “Green New Deal,” a climate plan that aims to ensure that the U.S. economy has net-zero emissions by 2050. He is vehemently opposed to new drilling and fracking on public federal lands and pledges to rejoin the Paris Agreement. He aims to reduce the United States’ carbon footprint in transportation, agriculture, and housing sectors and halt the flow of foreign aid to coal-fired power plants overseas. To encourage countries to implement green policies, he also wants to offer debt relief and expand G20 climate efforts. Though Biden is criticized by some environmental activists and organizations for not being more aggressive on climate change, his policies toward climate change demonstrate a stark contrast to Trump’s approach.

Foreign Aid and Multilateral Cooperation

Multilateral diplomacy and foreign aid are key aspects of the liberal international order and are often propagated through international institutions. International institutions serve as both a framework and a platform for international engagement, debate, and cooperation. The United States has been the chief architect of alliance building through international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), World Bank and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

Trump: Trump has withdrawn from several international alliances and organizations such as the Paris Agreement, Iran Nuclear Deal, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the UN Global Compact for Migration. Most recently, amid the global coronavirus pandemic, Trump withdrew the United States from the World Health Organization (WHO), the international organization responsible for coordinating the world’s pandemic response. Regarding U.S. allies, Trump has often questioned the relevance of NATO in the post-Cold War era and has been critical of organizations such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Even relationships with long-term allies of the United States, such as the European Union (EU) have not been stable under his presidency. And, with regard to foreign spending and assistance, budget proposals under his administration have cut foreign aid spending by almost a third.

Biden: In contrast, Biden’s “Summit for Democracy” plans to convene all democratic countries in a single forum to discuss three major global issue areas — fighting corruption, addressing the rise of authoritarianism and combating the proliferation of human rights violations. If elected, Biden not only pledges to rebuild the U.S. Department of State but has also stated that he would re-enter alliances and agreements that the United States has left under the Trump administration. Biden has pledged to reenter the Paris Agreement, for example. Biden has also continuously warned against the current rise of populism as seen in waves throughout the world and calls for increased international investment in collective security and prosperity. In a Biden administration, one could expect the United States to reenter the liberal international order and place a heavy emphasis on multilateralism and global leadership.

Immigration

Immigration has long been an important issue in the American political scene and despite the countless number of American families that can trace their family history to migrants, many voters approve of isolationist and nationalist immigration policies. The debate over immigration in the United States has reared its ugly head in the form of rising xenophobia and bigotry, a critical aspect of Trump’s rhetoric throughout the 2016 presidential election.

Trump: Immigration is a huge issue for Trump, who has championed a zero-tolerance immigration policy since his candidacy in 2016. In 2019, he attempted to complete his vow of building a wall on the Mexican border by shutting down the federal government, and declared a national emergency on the southern border, allowing him to allocate federal funds to this project. Additionally, the president threatened tariffs against Mexico if the country didn’t improve their own border enforcement. The administration has also imposed a zero-tolerance border crossing policy, which has led to the separation of families at the border and mass incarceration of migrants. In efforts to keep migrants from reaching or staying in the United States, he launched the Remain in Mexico program, which requires asylum-seekers to stay in Mexico as they await their immigration proceedings. Additionally, Trump has brokered “safe third country” agreements with Guatemala and Panama, allowing for migrants who travel through those counties to be deported back if they do not apply for asylum there before they arrive at the U.S.-Mexico border.

In 2017, Trump instituted a ban on incoming travel from several majority Muslim countries. While the original executive order was rejected by courts, a revised version banning travel from Iran, Syria, Libya, Somalia and Yemen was passed. There have been a number of legal changes that Trump has promoted to attempt to reduce immigration overall. He has reduced the cap on the number of refugees accepted into the United States every year to less than 18,000, down from around 80,000; shifted the definition of asylum to no longer include survivors of domestic and gang violence; ended temporary protected status for citizens from Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti and El Salvador; and sought to end the Obama-era Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which has prevented the deportation of 700,000 individuals who were brought to the United States as children. 

Inside our borders, Trump has expanded interior enforcement raids, although his deportation numbers do not meet the peaks seen under the Obama administration; attempted to withhold federal funds from sanctuary cities; and, in July of 2020, attempted to revoke the visas of international students studying online, only to reverse the order after MIT, Harvard, USC and 17 states filed lawsuits against the policy.

Biden: Biden and Trump’s immigration policies stand on polar opposite sides of the spectrum. The former vice president has condemned the current administration’s policies as “racist” and “morally bankrupt.” However, Biden grapples with a past painted by restrictionist policies under the Obama administration. 

Biden wants to overturn policies that separate families at the border, establish public-private networks that address humanitarian needs, and make DACA permanent. He opposes the president’s ban on several Muslim majority countries and would eliminate the ban if elected. Additionally, he wants to extend temporary protected status to citizens of El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sudan and Venezuela, as well as use aid packages to stabilize the countries that migrants originate from. He also backs a 2013 immigration reform plan developed under the Obama administration, that focuses on strengthening border security, cracking down on employers of undocumented workers, creating a path toward earned citizenship, and streamlining the legal immigration system. 

But, Biden’s pro-immigrant stance conflicts with his senatorial record, which includes voting for a law that increased penalties for illegal immigration and expanded the government’s deportation authority in 1996; supporting the Secure Fence Act in 2006, authorizing 700 miles of fencing along the southern border; and, in 2008, proposing to jail employers of undocumented workers, crack down on sanctuary cities, and build more fencing to prevent the entry of drug dealers at the U.S.-Mexico border. 

China

Since former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping began to revamp the Chinese economic and trade strategy in the 1980s, China has been transforming itself into an economic juggernaut. As we enter the 2020s, China will seek to shed its image as a developing country with an unmatched economy and grow into a true global leader. This has not gone unnoticed by U.S. leadership. Former President Barack Obama’s “strategic pivot” towards Asia in an attempt to counter CCP influence in the region, as seen with the creation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While both candidates have similar platforms regarding grievances held against the CCP for human rights abuses, territorial disputes in Taiwan and the South China Sea, intellectual property theft and unfair trade practices, each candidate proposes a different strategy for interacting with the rising superpower.

Trump: President Trump has often criticized international institutions like the WTO and multilateral trade deals like the TPP — from which Trump used an executive order to withdraw the United States — for creating advantages for countries other than the United States. Thus, his game plan against China has often revolved around unilateral actions aimed at weakening the Chinese economy and strengthening U.S. producers. Most outstanding in this plan was a series of tariffs on over $350 billion worth of Chinese goods into the United States. Using national security concerns to justify the trade war, Trump has imposed tariffs on goods such as solar panels, washing machines and other household appliances, as well as agricultural products. This led to the US-China Phase 1 Trade Deal which called for the United States to reduce tariffs in exchange for Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products. 

Trump has also taken aim at the Chinese technology sector, which many intelligence agencies have argued is guilty of stealing technology from the United States as well as other countries. In 2018, Trump helped push reforms that allowed for the U.S. government to investigate and intervene in foreign investment into domestic companies, particularly taking aim at Chinese venture capital in U.S. technology firms. Additionally, he has imposed restrictions on Chinese tech operations and products in the United States, such as Huawei, Wechat, and TikTok. 

Other instances of Trump challenging China include being the first president since 1979 to speak to Taiwan’s President and proposing arms sales to the island, ending Hong Kong’s preferential trade status following China’s national security law restricting free speech in the region, and imposing sanctions on companies involved in human rights abuses of the Uighur Muslim minority in China. 

Biden: While Biden agrees with the President that the CCP must be held accountable for breaking internationally accepted trade rules. committing human rights abuses and challenging the U.S. energy, infrastructure and technology sectors, he ultimately believes that unilateral tariffs do more harm than good — citing damages to U.S. manufacturing and agriculture industries. He also thinks that the Phase One Trade Deal focuses too much on agricultural purchases rather than changes to Chinese business practices. As opposed to the United States acting alone against China, Biden believes that the United States must rebuild frayed relations with the world’s democracies — including EU member states and U.S. neighbors, Mexico and Canada — and then approach China through multilateral pressure. Biden believes that this is the best way to force the CCP to subscribe to internationally accepted trade and human rights standards. Biden also supported the Obama-era TPP trade pact and the admission of China into the WTO in 2001, showing a strong belief in the use of international institutions to engage with the growing economic powerhouse.

Trade

The backbone of American influence abroad in the post-Cold War era was the Washington Consensus and its focus on an open and liberal international trade and financial system. Rising inequality has led to skepticism toward international institutions on both sides of the aisle. But once again, though both candidates acknowledge these issues, their tactics differ on proposed courses of action. 

Trump: Donald Trump has been vocal about his ‘America First’ agenda since the first weeks of his candidacy in the 2016 election. In his opinion, the United States must combat an international system that is rigged against it and is to be blamed for a large trade deficit, reductions in U.S. manufacturing and the offshoring of American jobs. To combat this, Trump has focused his trade policy on removing the country from allegedly unfair trade deals and renegotiating bilateral agreements to the country’s advantage. President Trump has called the WTO a disaster and has crippled the organization by refusing to nominate judges to its appeals court. In the Asia-Pacific, the President pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, renegotiated bilateral trade conditions with Japan and other member countries and launched a trade war with China that cost the U.S. hundreds of billions of dollars. 

Across the Pacific Ocean, the president oversaw the rewriting of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and signed the updated U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which was passed by the U.S. Congress following amendments including strong labor and environmental considerations. Across the Atlantic, Trump has been taking shots at the EU’s trade relationship with the United States, which he calls “worse than China.” In 2019, he placed tariffs on $7.5 billion of EU goods in retaliation to the EU’s subsidization of aircraft manufacturer, Airbus. 

Biden: The former Vice President’s grievances against international trade stems from a lack of consideration for environmental and labor protections. Biden believes that the United States should take charge of the creation of “the rules of the road for the world” to make climate change and human rights centerpieces of the international order. Biden was a part of the negotiating team during the construction of the TPP, joining Obama in the belief that the best counter to China’s influence in the Pacific Rim would be to build a trade deal in the region focused around the United States. Additionally, he voted to pass NAFTA and approved of the revised USMCA, supporting the additional labor and environmental protections. He believes that “aggressive” retaliation is necessary for countries that break international trade rules and that the rules need to be more thoroughly enforced. Ultimately, Biden wants to use free trade as a tool to strengthen ties with African states, thereby opening up new markets to U.S. businesses.

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Though this is not a complete list of Trump and Biden’s stances on these critical global issues, it is important for the American populace to gain a basic understanding of how each candidate has impacted global affairs and how they are projected to impact international issues in the future. Additionally, an introductory awareness of how each candidate seeks to position the United States within the international system is of extreme importance, especially as the world continues to grapple with the ongoing economic, political and social impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The post Trump vs. Biden: A Side-by-Side on Key Foreign Policy Issues appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.