The coup occurred in reaction to the most recent parliamentary election. On November 8, 2020, one of the leading parties, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won over 80% of the available parliamentary seats. The vote was seen as a popular endorsement of the NLD, which Aung San Suu Kyi has led since 2015. Ms. Suu Kyi has been hailed as a beacon of democracy and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991.  However, her international reputation has suffered following her refusal to condemn crackdowns on the Muslim Rohingya minority in Myanmar, and the subsequent human rights crisis, genocide and migration that has followed.

The election was expected to be ratified in a parliamentary session this week. The Tatmadaw, led by General Min Aung Hlaing, did not endorse the results.

In Myanmar, the Tatmadaw’s influence is felt in all aspects of society, a relic of its multi-decade long rule. It has its own schools, hospitals and food production systems. Its elite are married into the business world and high-ranking members of the NLD. The party also controls the two largest conglomerates with interests in resources, banking, infrastructure, insurance, media and more.

The democratic constitution did little to disentangle the military’s power and in some instances, reinforced it within the new political institutions.

Prior to the coup, the Tatmadaw was constitutionally guaranteed control of the ministries of defense, home affairs and border affairs. It reserves 25% of seats in national and regional assemblies. Also, it has veto authorities over certain amendments to the constitution. 

The Tatmadaw invoked some of these provisions to declare a state of emergency as a justification for the coup, claiming allegations of voter fraud. Under the constitution however, only the civilian leader can claim a state of emergency which lasts for one year. Independent rights groups have criticized the election for excluding ethnic minorities, however, the nation’s election committee accepted the results and found no evidence of voter fraud.

Because of the constitution’s structure guaranteeing certain roles to the military, the Tatmadaw’s power fundamentally does not change with the coup, rather the appearance of power does. Experts have claimed that the military’s actions are still characteristic of the country’s democratic backsliding because the institutions allowing for a people’s voice have been ignored.

While the motives for the coup have not been made public, some suspect the coup provides a means for the military’s leader, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, to stay in power. He was scheduled to retire this year upon reaching the Defense Service Act’s mandatory retirement age of 65. The elected civilian president would have chosen a successor, meaning that the NLD likely would have chosen a more reform minded leader.

The citizens of Myanmar have not reacted kindly to the coup. This past week, tens of thousands of people have protested the Tatmadaw’s actions in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city. Chants of “We don’t want military dictatorship, we want democracy” could be heard throughout the city, and many protesters held posters of Aung San Suu Kyi and other detained officials. The Tatmadaw claims it will hold free and fair elections after reconstituting the election commission, although did not specify when elections would take place.

The Tatmadaw has attempted to prevent the protest through a series of measures, including internet blackouts and false news reports of detained officials’ release.

But protests have spilled over into neighboring Bangladesh, where Myanmar national Rohingya Muslims have taken refuge following previous violent crackdowns on ethnic-minorities by the Tatmadaw.

Few reports of violence have come as a result of the protests, with one instance of gunshots and one report of police authorities using rubber bullets to break up a rally. The Saffron Revolution of 2007, a prior protest movement of similar scale, resulted in at least 13 dead and hundreds injured and arrested. The protests began in response to a state-sponsored jump in fuel prices, but turned against the military rule. The Saffron revolution was considered an important stepping stone in Myanmar’s shift to democracy in 2011. The Tatmadaw has remained largely silent over the public’s opposition to the coup.

Throughout the West, governments quickly condemned the actions of the Tatmadaw, although defining the takeover has been a bit more nuanced. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and President of the European Council Charles Michel denounced the coup and called for the detained officials’ immediate release. U.S. President Joe Biden, however, has criticized the military’s “assault on the country’s transition to democracy” and threatened sanctions, but stopped short of calling the actions a coup.

Nearby countries in Southeast Asia have had more mixed reactions to the recent events. Cambodian leader Hun Sen refused to comment on the “internal affairs of another country;” whereas Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia expressed concern over the Tatmadaw’s actions.

China, the region’s most powerful country, blocked a United Nations Security Council statement condemning the Tatmadaw. China claims that sanctions or international pressure may make the situation worse in Myanmar.

As the events in Myanmar unfold, key things to look out for include the development of protests, the international community’s actions, and the military’s response to each respective interest.

On a periodic basis, several organizations administer international exams for the purpose of comparing primary and secondary students to their international counterparts. Most notable of these exams are the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), organized by the OECD, and the Trends in Mathematics and Sciences Study (TIMSS), managed by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). These exams offer policy makers the opportunity to assess the effectiveness of national education systems with respect to international competition.

International assessments of this nature are a relatively new development beginning with the creation of TIMSS in 1995 and PISA in 1997. Since then, each exam has been administered cyclically: PISA every three years and TIMSS every four. Both exams test subjects such as mathematics, science and reading comprehension. However, the two exams vary in the countries, age groups and types of questions used in their surveys.

Despite differences between the two tests, the latest exam data, drawn from 2011 and 2012, offer generally consistent results. PISA 2012 placed Shanghai, which participated in the survey independent of China as a whole, as the world leader in education. Other top achievers consisted primarily of several East Asian and Western European nations such as Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Finland. The United States scored only marginally above the international average, while countries with lower levels of economic development expectedly attained the worst results. TIMSS 2011 generally corroborated these findings, with most countries obtaining similar positions.

These international exams have a noticeable influence on the education policies of participating nations. The information put forth by exam data serves as an indicator of how well a nation’s students may perform relative to their international counterparts. To countries looking to increase or maintain their current levels of international prestige, the possession of a highly skilled student base is imperative. As domestic benchmarks alone fail to place the performance of students in an international context, international exam results are essential for any standardized international comparison.

The impact of these tests and the fear of “falling behind” can be exemplified by Germany’s reaction to the 2000 PISA exam. Results placed Germany well below the OECD average, exposing major weaknesses in what Germans had long regarded as one of the world’s premier education systems. The exam results and the resultant jolt to public opinion precipitated education reforms centered on increasing opportunities for minorities, lengthening school days and strengthening teaching requirements. On subsequent exams, Germany demonstrated significant improvement; in 2012, German scores far surpassed the OECD average. Though improvements may have been the product of other factors (e.g., continued East German assimilation), these reforms have been hailed as largely successful.

The above chart how longitudinal data can be used to evaluate a country’s ability to improve its education systems. Turkey, whose scores have improved at a rate exceeding that of nearly every other country surveyed, is an example of this application. Despite consistently garnering among the poorest scores on PISA, Turkey succeeded in narrowing the gap between itself and its European neighbors. Complementing the country’s progress is the fact that its scores now exceed the OECD average when adjusted for per capita GDP. Improvements may be attributed to a combination of deliberate changes in education policy such as a near three-fold increase in education spending or Turkey’s significant strides in poverty reduction.

Public attention to scores is perhaps most apparent in the United States, where each release of exam data is typically followed by popular outcry regarding the US’s usually low rankings and statements from officials promising reform. Unsurprisingly, exam results have thus served as a major justification for new nationwide education initiatives. The Common Core Curriculum, a recent and major education reform effort sponsored by the National Governor’s Association and the White House, is advocated for on the basis of improving the US’s international standing. In fact, much of the Common Core Curriculum has been designed specifically to improve the US’s PISA scores.

But to an extent, exam results have the potential to become problematic if they gain undue influence over education programs. Martin Carnoy and Richard Rothstein of the Economic Policy Institute argue that international exams such as TIMSS and PISA fail to account for high levels of poverty and wealth inequality in the US relative to other economically advanced countries, making the US’s poor results misleading. The two contend that the US’s education system, adjusted for inequality, is sufficiently functional and they caution against radical reform efforts. Other observers have linked exam “hysteria” to formerly failed policies that emphasized standardized testing, most notably the No Child Left Behind Act of the Bush administration.

Additionally, for many Americans, test results placing Shanghai and Hong Kong in top spots on the global education spectrum have had the effect of a second Sputnik, spurring a sense of alarming decline at the hands of an international rival. Excessive attention to Chinese results exacerbate an unnecessary but persistent sense of rivalry between the US and China. This hostile mentality may not only be harmful to cooperation, but is severely misguided. To use the results of two highly advanced cities as representative of the entirety of China is analogous to applying the results of Manhattan alone (which would undoubtedly far exceed the US average) to declare the United States the world’s leader in education.

The significance of exam results is further diminished when different exams offer conflicting pieces information. Though studies have demonstrated a correlation between results on the PISA and TIMSS exams, significant differences still persist. For instance, Malaysia, which scored far below the United States on the 2012 PISA, had a slightly better performance on the 2011 TIMSS. The opposite observation is true for New Zealand, which outperformed the US on PISA but underperformed on TIMSS. A likely explanation for these occurrences is that discrepancies in relative score between the two exams may be a reflection of a nation’s education philosophy and curricula. This puts education analysts in a dilemma where they lack the ability to determine which exam results or school curricula are objectively better.

Though these several underlying issues may undermine the usefulness of exam results, it’s undeniable that in many cases the PISA and TIMSS exams offer meaningful insight into the performance of national education systems, which is why it’s no surprise that an increasing number of countries opt to take them. With 40 countries surveyed in the 1999 TIMSS report to over 60 in 2015, and 32 countries surveyed in the 2000 PISA to nearly 70 in 2015, the importance of international exams seems likely to only amplify. But, as with many pieces of data, exam scores lack the ability to provide a fully comprehensive portrayal of an education system, and must therefore be applied to policy decisions with discretion.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Putin has been pushing for an energy deal with China for nearly ten years, and rightfully so. China, and Asia more broadly, has a vast market for oil and natural gas with its megacities and booming economy. The deal between Gazprom and CNPC gives Russia a foot in the door of this profitable energy market. Providing up to 20% of China’s natural gas needs, the deal finally solidifies the Sino-Russian alliance that Putin has been advertising. What’s more, the two countries will be paying with their own currencies, the ruble and yuan, completely bypassing the American dollar, which is traditionally used in energy transactions. Although the dollar has long been the international reserve currency of choice, Russia’s VTB and the Bank of China’s decision to trade in domestic currencies stresses the exclusivity of the Eurasian trade deal; the US is not welcome. Although this alone does not significantly destabilize the petrodollar, it certainly undermines American relevance in the deal and indicates Putin’s increasing focus on relations with Asia.

Putin’s meeting with Xi Jinping also comes on the heels of Obama’s four-country Asia tour in April. After a canceled trip to Asia during the October government shutdown, Obama’s tour demonstrates the president’s desire to make good on his foreign policy goal to “pivot to Asia.” In his visit to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines, Obama focused on strengthening economic and military relationships. The trip resulted in increased numbers of American military personnel and equipment stationed in the region; yet, thus far, Obama’s plans for future economic partnerships have not been realized.

Neither the Malaysian nor Japanese leadership approved Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to increase connectivity between the Asian and American economies. Despite domestic backlash from Democratic Senators and Congressmen, Obama has continually pushed for more economic cooperation across the Pacific. Obama, like Putin, hopes to benefit from the expanding Asian markets; the TPP would eliminate tariffs between the US and several Latin American and Asian states. According to Don Emmerson, a political scientist at Stanford, “Americans cannot afford to deny themselves…the opportunities for trade and investment” present in Asia, but Asian leaders, however, seem less enthusiastic. In Japan, Abe refused to join the partnership due to the protected five sacred areas of Japanese agriculture. In Malaysia, political “sensitivities” and economic concerns also halted progress. The TPP has major implications for American and Asian economies (Japan is America’s biggest trading partner in Asia aside from China). Thus, although no agreement was reached during the tour, the American, Japanese and Malaysian leaders promised to continue negotiations. These promises give President Obama a glimmer of hope that soon the Asian governments will be more receptive to the partnership. It should be Obama’s mission, then, to adjust the TPP to be more beneficial for all states involved, especially those with heavily protected domestic industries.

TPP negotiations were also designed to reestablish American’s military presence in East Asia. The US military will continue to maintain operational control of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea. This agreement gives the US command of South Korean troops in the event of war with North Korea. In Japan, Obama reassured Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that the Senkaku Islands (or the Diaoyu Islands, as they are known in China) would fall under American protection in the case of a threat. These uninhabited islands have long been disputed by Japan and China, who both claim ownership of them. Obama’s declaration of support for Japan’s sovereignty in the maritime dispute is a signal of disapproval to China, whose military actions in the East and South China Seas concern many Asian states. As expected, China was not pleased by Obama’s remarks.

These figures make China impossible to ignore. Combine the country’s military expansion with its rapidly growing GNP and it becomes one of the greatest forces in the world today. China’s enormity and consequent impact on its neighbors, from Japan to the Philippines to Russia, have forced other world powers to readjust. Putin and Obama have played their hands, each trying to get ahead in the Asia-Pacific. Putin’s natural gas deal has created a buffer for conflicts in Europe and Obama’s efforts to increase economic cooperation and American military presence in Asia also indicate increased interest in Asia. It remains to be seen how other world leaders will react to the growing relevance of East Asia in global issues.

In early May, European Union (EU) leaders met with Shinzo Abe to reaffirm their positive relationship. At the meeting, the leaders discussed further economic and political ties, although no specific agreements were signed. The leaders of the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will also hold a summit in October. Will Europe, like Russia, turn to China, Asia’s largest power, or invest in ties with other East Asian nations alongside President Obama? Regardless, it is clear that the “turn to Asia” is a legitimate and global phenomenon.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff and editorial board.

Ascent to Stardom

Xiaomi Inc. is an Internet service and consumer electronics company founded in April 2010 by Steve Job’s Asian twin, Lei Jun (see photo). Selling high-end smartphones at near production costs, Xiaomi has challenged Asia’s top smartphone providers in the Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong markets. In the second quarter of 2013, Xiaomi became the fifth-largest supplier of handsets in Mainland China. In August, Lei poached top Google executive Hugo Barra to orchestrate Xiaomi’s global expansion. And shortly thereafter, a “flash sale” of 100,000 Hongmi-model smartphones ($135 compared to the $750+ iPhone) sold out in 90 seconds. In October, Xiaomi sold 100,000 of the luxury Mi3-model smartphones ($327 for 16GB or $410 for 32GB) in 83 seconds. Less than four years after incorporation, Xiaomi has gained Apple-like popularity and a market valuation at $10 billion (equal to Lenovo or double that of Blackberry). Xiaomi executives project smartphone sales in the neighborhood of 20 million units by year’s end.

International Expansion

But they aren’t satisfied. At a recent media event in Taiwan, Lei and Barra announced their expansion into the Southeast Asian market, specifically Singapore and Malaysia. Why? Singapore and Malaysia have the necessary technological (network coverage) and regulatory (welcoming governmental and legal institutions) infrastructure for Xiaomi’s entry. Further, the people of Singapore and Malaysia are smartphone fanatics. Smartphone penetration in Singapore and Malaysia is at 87% and 80% respectively. Comparatively, the United States is at 60%.

Xiaomi may succeed in its initial expansion—despite entering a saturated market—for four reasons:

1. Fandom: “Flash sales,” and the social media blitzkrieg surrounding these events, have generated frenzy among middle-class shoppers eager for the newest smartphone. Further, Xiaomi allows its customers to actively shape its software platform. Miui, a spinoff of Google Android software, is updated nearly every week based on the suggestions of its 5.1 million members. Client-customer collaboration has boosted Xiaomi’s popularity in China and promises to do the same in Southeast Asia.
2. Increased competition: Samsung has run a near monopoly in the Southeast Asian smartphone market. But three Asian companies, Huawei, Lenovo and LG, are challenging its dominance and eating away at its market share each successive quarter. Xiaomi could benefit from an increasingly diverse market.
3. Subsidies: Singaporean and Malaysian telecom operators offer smartphone subsidies. Thus, Xiaomi phones could be free with the purchase of a contract—an enticing offer for those who disheartened by the larger sticker price of a Samsung or Apple handset.
4.  Apps: Singaporeans and Malaysians love apps. In fact, they score highly (Singapore at number one) in the World Mobile Readiness Index, a metric that calculates a population’s willingness to pay for mobile apps. Singaporeans’ and Malaysians’ willingness to pay for apps perfectly accommodates Xiaomi’s business model. Xiaomi has razor-thin profits on smartphones (compared to a company like Apple that has a 55% profit margin on the iPhone) and therefore relies on apps and accessories to generate profit.

Litmus Test

Xiaomi’s success in Singapore and Malaysia will be indicative of its potential success outside the Chinese mainland. Xiaomi has thrived in the Chinese market where Apple holds less than 5% market share and Google Play (Google’s “App Store”) is not officially available. How Xiaomi competes in areas where Apple and Google have a stronger grip will be telling. If unsuccessful, Xiaomi will likely retreat to China. If successful, look for Lei and Barra to deepen expansion in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Philippines—a country with a higher Mobile Readiness score than Malaysia and Hong Kong yet with only 15% smartphone penetration. The Filipino market would be wide open to an injection of Xiaomi products.

China’s difficulty in accumulating soft power has been well documented. However, much to the chagrin of some Americans, China’s soft power, particularly its global economic influence, is on the rise. A burgeoning tech market has begun to stimulate international growth for a number of Chinese companies (think Lenovo, Baidu, and Haier). Xiaomi’s success in Southeast Asia could demonstrate or precipitate greater success of Chinese companies in foreign markets. As a result, Chinese communication technology may attain the “cool factor” of Apple or Samsung products—which are widely regarded as fashionable and reliable. In short, Xiaomi may trigger consumers of Chinese tech products around the world to begin prizing the “Made in China” tag rather than associating it with mediocrity. And such a rise in economic influence is a necessary characteristic of any great power.