Last month, violence erupted along the disputed ⅓ of the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border. The recent escalation is yet another chapter in a long history of border conflict between the two countries, whose clashes are generally quickly resolved but often threaten to spiral into all-out war. 

While both countries are former Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan is more resistant to Russian intervention, whereas Tajikistan, the poorest country in Central Asia, remains heavily dependent on Russian aid and influence. Until countries in the region are able to break completely free from the Russian grip, this conflict will continue to pose a danger to Central Asians. 

Just last year, over 50 people were killed and several hundred injured in a conflict that originated over water resources. This time around, the toll is even higher, with over 100 estimated deaths (at least 37 of whom were civilians, including 4 children). Hundreds more were injured and tens of thousands were displaced. 

Fighting reportedly began when Kyrgyz and Tajik border guards stationed along the border in the Batken region opened fire on one another. Both sides involved have accused the other of shooting first, but it is unclear who shot first. 

The violence then spread, with accounts emerging of homes being burned and pillaged on both sides of the border and roughly 137,000 residents of the Kyrgyz village of Ak-Sai being forced to evacuate. The two countries signed a ceasefire in Uzbekistan on Sept. 16, though there have been reports of continued shootings since that date. 

Beyond the heartbreaking tragedy of loss and displacement characteristic of any violent conflict, the significance of these clashes is their place as a part of the larger pattern of increasing violence in the post-Soviet space as of late, beginning with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier this year and followed by Azerbaijan’s recent attacks on Armenia. 

Although each of these countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Ukraine) are independent from Russia, that independence came only begrudgingly with the fall of the USSR. Several autonomous ethnic minority regions remain within the borders of modern-day Russia to this day. 

Even for the countries that have managed to break free from Russia’s authoritarian grip, their freedom has, in most cases, been accompanied with varying degrees of governmental instability. In post-Soviet Central Asia, this instability can be largely attributed to the way in which borders were drawn under Soviet rule. 

Very little attention was paid to either the ethnic or geographical makeup of the areas where boundaries were drawn on new maps. Tajik President Emmomali Rahmon underlined this sentiment in a recent speech in which he called out Russia for not supporting and investing in smaller countries after the USSR collapsed.    

In practice, this lack of consideration for post-Soviet countries means there were ethnic Uzbeks who suddenly found themselves living in Kyrgyzstan and ethnic Tajiks who woke up to discover they now resided in Uzbekistan. People were separated from their ethnic group and were suddenly an ethnic minority subject to discrimination. To this day, there remain thousands of kilometers of non-demarcated and delineated borders, which become hotspots for misunderstandings and violence. 

Border disputes and violence between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are not new, but the root cause of this recent aggression may be different than previous occurrences. In the past, border clashes were sparked due to disputes over Soviet-era border demarcations in the Ferghana Valley and water resource issues. This time around, however, there may have been a political strategy involved on the part of Tajikistan. 

Tajik President Rahmon, who has been in autocratic power for almost thirty years, is reportedly stepping down from power soon, and will transfer power to his son. As once suggested by Nicholas II, the last Tsar of Russia, what Rahmon’s rationale may be in drastically increasing border aggression could be to have a “short, victorious war” to boost national morale and demonstrate to its neighboring countries that Tajikistan will still be a force to be reckoned with. 

It is also notable that this recent outbreak of violence between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan started while the 22nd annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was taking place in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, during which the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, among others, met in person. 

There was an opportunity for the Kyrgyz and Tajik presidents to discuss the very real and dangerous issues at the border, but they did not take serious measures to prevent further violence beyond a symbolic commitment to diplomacy. This is especially frustrating considering the recent fighting that broke out appeared to be premeditated in nature, rather than the regularly occurring squabble.

Although the conflict technically started on Sept. 17, there are reports that heavy military equipment and troops were used by Tajikistan three days prior, signaling a deliberate escalation early on in the fighting. Furthermore, Tajikistan targeted undisputed Kyrgyz territory in Batken, which is not near the border, most likely to drive civilians out of the area in what seems to be a planned attack ordered by President Rahmon. 

It is dangerous to not recognize this situation as anything but an act of Tajik aggression, because it feeds into a larger narrative of downplaying the severity of or outright ignoring the existence of conflict in Central Asia and the post-Soviet region as a whole. This indifference has devastating consequences on Kyrgyz and Tajik civilians’ lives and inter-country relations, leaving a dire issue out of mainstream international law and media. 

As a result, people’s lives will continue to be harmed, leaving space for the conflict to escalate, all while going largely unnoticed by the international community. Even though it only took place over the course of ten hours, the sheer scale of the violence and lack of effective communication between the Kyrgyz and Tajik leaders makes the prospect of long lasting peace in the region without third-party mediation improbable. 

This can only happen if the conflict is given the global and regional attention it warrants, as well as Western support, such as U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s public show of support for Armenia during this period. 

Russia is also complicit in playing into the narrative that the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is merely another instance of the perpetual skirmishes between the two. By not taking a principled stance and calling on both sides to “de-escalate” the fighting, Russia’s nonintervention is an attempt to maintain its influence over both the Central Asian countries. 

Although the USSR has long collapsed, Russia’s status as a global superpower has resulted in its perpetual push for control over the former Soviet states, and for their dependence on Russia, especially economically. 

For example, just a few weeks prior to the outbreak of violence, Kyrgyz Chairman of Cabinet of Ministers Akylbek Japarov and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met to discuss initiatives for economic cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. 

While Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan saw public protests against Russia’s recent imperialist activities in Ukraine,Tajikistan has remained neutral; although there have been no public demonstrations in favor of Russia’s actions, there have been none against them, either. As long as they remain under Russian influence, Central Asian countries will continue to struggle to resolve long-standing disputes without external mediation and support. 

These factors will therefore only become more imperative as the possibility of further violence escalates. 

Kyrgyzstan’s first constitution was adopted in 1993 under Askar Akayev, the country’s inaugural president. This constitution established a government that split power between Akayev and a unicameral legislature; Akayev quickly moved to expand his role by holding referenda in 1996, 1998 and 2003 that allowed him to appoint high-ranking officials without legislative approval, take control of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy agenda, and undermine the power balance by bouncing the legislature back and forth between a bicameral and unicameral structure. In 2005, allegations of corruption in parliamentary elections sparked a protest movement that would come to be known as the Tulip Revolution and resulted in Akayev being forced from office.

Akayev was replaced by Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who garnered the support needed to win the election by making promises to return to a parliamentary model of government; he did so in 2006 but less than a year later used a referendum (whose results are considered to be falsified) to institute a presidential constitution that essentially reverted the government to its structure under Akayev. Following his re-election in 2009, Bakiyev continued transferring governmental powers to his office directly or to agencies led by his supporters. 

Bakiyev’s blatant power-grabbing bred discontent in the general population and led to nationwide protests in 2010 that resulted in him fleeing and installing Roza Otunbayeva as interim president. She implemented a new constitution that was a complete reversal of Akayev and Bakiyev’s governments; it significantly decentralized power and stripped the executive’s office of many of the capabilities it had acquired over the previous two decades by returning them to their original homes with the prime minister and legislature. Two particularly striking blows to the president’s power were the restriction to a single six-year term and the loss of the ability to initiate legislation. 

Almazbek Atambayev was inaugurated as president in 2011 in Kyrgyzstan’s first democratic transfer of power. Perhaps having learned from Akayev and Bakiyev, Atambayev did not seek to retain power in as bold a manner as they had — though his attempts backfired in a similarly spectacular fashion. Rather than changing the constitution to give himself more power, Atambayev’s 2016 referendum further reduced the president’s power while increasing that of the prime minister, intending to eventually take that position for himself.  

Before the end of his term, Atambayev placed his supporters in positions of power within the government and heavily backed the presidential bid of Sooronbay Jeenbekov — who won the 2017 election because of this endorsement — because he believed Jeenbekov could be controlled. However, a breakdown in their relationship resulted in Jeenbekov removing Atambayev’s allies from government positions and amending Kyrgyz law so that past presidents could not hold state positions without losing presidential immunity. After publicly criticizing Jeenbekov and the Parliament for this, Atambayev was stripped of presidential immunity and accused of a host of crimes, including corruption and illegally releasing criminals. An operation to arrest Atambayev resulted in an officer’s death and the addition of charges (including murder and organizing mass riots) due to his resistance efforts; he has since been sentenced to 11 years in prison. Though Atambayev was the first president to take power peacefully, he could not let it go the same way, further perpetuating the cycle of instability in Kyrgyz politics. 

Jeenbekov’s tenure as president lasted only three years and ended due to Kyrgyzstan’s third and most recent revolution, provoked by parliamentary elections in October 2020. Rumors of vote-buying and fraudulent voter registration were rampant in the lead-up to the election; Jeenbekov dismissed these as false, but the election results clearly favored the parties associated with election tampering. Peaceful protests quickly turned violent and led to Parliament annulling the results just two days after they were announced. Jeenbekov then went missing for several days, only to emerge a week after the election was annulled to announce his resignation. 

The presidential election, held in January 2021 to decide Jeenbekov’s successor, was won by current president Sadyr Japarov. Japarov’s ascendancy to president surprised many as he had not been a particularly standout politician prior to his meteoric rise. His success can largely be attributed to a framing of the uprising as an anti-elite, anti-status quo movement that sought to return power to the people. Japarov garnered support from the masses by pushing populist ideas such as nationalizing natural resources and plans to redistribute wealth. Additionally, he was aided by his reputation as an “ordinary guy,” which diverged from the rest of the political elite associated with the corrupt government. 

Though he has only been in office a short while, Japarov has already significantly altered the structure of the government. A referendum held just three months after he was elected returned the country to a presidential system that gave the office of the executive more power than it has ever had. The president can now appoint and dismiss judges and other high-ranking officials, strip parliament members of political immunity and initiate laws and referendums. The new constitution greatly erodes the system of checks and balances by giving the president significant leverage over the other branches. The term limit was also amended to allow a president to be reelected to a second term. 

The other major power shift included in the new constitution is the bestowing of significant political power on the Kurultai, an unelected assembly that previously served solely as a consultative body. The Kurultai, which has historically been composed of elders and elites, now can suggest the removal of government officials from office, appoint judges, and propose new laws. It is essentially a duplicate of Parliament, but one that is solely under the control of the President and is unbeholden to voters. Members of the Kurultai tend to be more conservative and orthodox and would likely pass spiritual and moral laws to create a legal basis supporting the shift to traditional values that Kyrgyz culture has already been experiencing over the last few decades. This latest form of the constitution represents a dangerous step back toward a government that is functionally authoritarian and under the complete control of the President.

The political instability and constant constitutional changes Kyrgyzstan has experienced over the past 30 years have had a profoundly negative impact on the nation’s people. According to Saniaa Toktogazieva, Associate Professor at the American University of Central Asia, “there is an unprecedented level of legal nihilism” in Kyrgyzstan today due to the country’s history with politics. The ceaseless shifting of government structure and policy — along with the uneven implementation of the law and the lack of compliance by government officials — has caused people to become increasingly distrustful of the government and legal system. The law is only as powerful and effective as people’s belief in it, and in Kyrgyzstan, that belief has been steadily worn down. When there is no trust in the law, people fall back on social and religious norms, resulting in an increasing Islamization of the population and a return to traditional values. 

Kyrgyzstan is at a turning point in its political history. It can either become a country guided by religion and conservative principles or live up to its reputation as the beacon of democracy and freedom in Central Asia. Only time will tell which path it will take.