Since the breakup of Yugoslavia and the ensuing war, governance over Kosovo has remained a contentious topic in global affairs, with international oversight providing much of its legal infrastructure alongside local power brokers. Many of these local leaders have direct ties to the nominally dissolved Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a group designated as a terrorist organization in multiple countries. Among these leaders is Kosovo’s first elected prime minister Hashim Thaçi, one of the founders of the KLA who is currently awaiting trial for war crimes in The Hague.

Cooperation between international actors and local leaders to orchestrate a peaceful transfer of power has required carefully redefining the relationship with the KLA “from ‘terrorists’ to ‘partners.’” As of now, the UN is gingerly withdrawing from Kosovo one agency at a time while balancing international and domestic issues. Establishing Kosovo’s legitimacy will require restructuring of economic and political institutions, international cooperation and long-term conflict mitigation plans. Through sustainable, mutually beneficial and calculated policy implementation that strengthens Kosovo internally, we will see an end to, in the words of international relations professor at the University of Southern California Dr. Douglas Becker, the “international presence [in Kosovo]no one wants.” 

The KLA is a nationalist Kosovar-Albanian militia founded in 1993 as a response to Serbian state-backed violence against students protesting for Kosovar independence. Starting as a small, disorganized group of around 150 men, the KLA quickly became “one of the most successful military organizations in history,” as well as one of the most brutal. As Kosovar nationalism rose, more and more people joined the KLA in taking up arms against Serbia. 

During the following years of conflict, the KLA were not only perpetrators of war crimes—including systemic torture, rape and forced expulsion—but also an organized crime ring. Much of the KLA’s funding came from human trafficking, organ trafficking, sex slavery, money laundering, illegal weapon smuggling, counterfeit currency, migrant smuggling, fraud and drug trade, with an estimated 80% of all heroin headed into Europe passing through the hands of the KLA in 1999. 

When the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia officially ended in June 1999, the KLA filled the subsequent power vacuum. However, they were quickly replaced after the 1999 Security Council resolution 1244 gave jurisdiction of Kosovo to the UN, creating the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and establishing United Nations Administered Kosovo, a time period in which the UN was essentially the Kosovar government. The UNMIK took charge of virtually all government functions in Kosovo, facilitating elections, issuing legal identification documents, adjudicating criminal cases, policing and overseeing immigration. 

By 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, developed a constitution and elected its first prime minister, Hashim Thaçi, ultimately ending UN Administered Kosovo and creating the Republic of Kosovo. As part of their agreement to recognize Kosovo’s independence, the U.S. and EU required oversight by international presences; thus, UNMIK remains a supportive actor in ensuring peace, normalcy and community-building in collaboration with 16 other UN agencies and partners. 

Locally, most political figures are former members of the disbanded KLA, including current prime minister Albin Kurti. Some claim to have abandoned their criminal past while others have faced charges of war crimes, such as Kosovar prime ministers Hashim Thaçi, Agim Çeku and Ramush Haradinaj. An investigation conducted by the Council of Europe found that even while acting as prime minister, Thaçi still controlled much of organized transnational crime, relying upon illegal activities for government expenditures. Although the KLA is officially dissolved, its members have reassembled in one of the main political parties, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). Prime Minister Kurti has openly declared that “the Kosovo Police is a continuation of the liberation army.” KLA dominance presents a massive issue for the prospect of complete UN withdrawal due to its unsustainable nature and criminal history. While decreasing, organized crime remains intertwined in Kosovar politics, with the U.S. Department of the Treasury blacklisting multiple Kosovar politicians and security officials linked to transnational organized crime as recently as 2021.

The UN, European Union and United States are desperate to withdraw: Kosovo presents a major liability for the international actors involved due to the criminal background of the local actors with whom they are collaborating. The United States views UNMIK as having fulfilled its purpose, and states that “a peacekeeping mission [is]no longer necessary.” International involvement is unfavorable for the people of Kosovo as well, inhibiting their desire for international recognition and sovereignty. Serbia also dislikes the international presence and does not recognize the majority of the agencies in Kosovo as legitimate, instead viewing them as an imposition upon their own sovereignty. Logistically, the oversight has simply drawn on much too long and cannot be maintained in the long term. 

Thus, the UN is working to strengthen local political, legal and economic institutions to wean Kosovo off international support. Additionally, efforts are underway to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia, including promoting Serbian and Albanian language learning, assisting families of missing persons and providing free legal aid and language interpretation to allow for a smoother transition of power and a peaceful future for the region. According to the UN, a facilitated, gradual withdrawal from Kosovo is the best approach to end this deeply undesired international presence. 

However, tensions have risen within the last few months, amounting to “the worst escalation of violence in years,” with Serbia deploying tanks and artillery to the Kosovar border, prompting the U.K. to send 200 troops to support the current NATO presence. This uptick is the result of a dispute over license plates, with Kosovo demanding Serbian license plates turned over in favor of Kosovar plates to demonstrate a sovereign, united Kosovar state. Ethnic Serb mayors in northern Kosovo resigned in protest of this demand, further contributing to unrest and lawlessness and reinvigorating Serbs’ desires to establish autonomous Serb-majority municipalities within Kosovo. This move and the reaction to it proves nationalism and ethnic identity disputes remain unresolved issues.   

Seeing as the status quo is undesired by all parties involved, any potential resolution would necessitate the complete withdrawal of international forces. However, given the recent developments in conflict, such a withdrawal must be orchestrated in a gradual and calculated manner. A sustainable, mutually beneficial plan should be executed through three main tenets: economic and institutional restructuring, international cooperation and long-term conflict management plans. 

A major hurdle to Kosovar legitimacy is government corruption. The UN must incentivize legal economic activities to dissuade organized criminal activity. Kosovo is well-endowed in natural resources including fertile farmland. The UN should provide agricultural training, subsidies and supplies to reinvigorate this sector and help establish multilateral trade agreements as well as a conducive market environment, which would allow Kosovar goods to be competitive on a global scale. Additionally, farming was a major part of Kosovo’s medieval identity and revitalizing this industry could appeal to Kosovar nationalists. Opportunities for professional development, such as job training, higher education and English lessons should also be installed. 

Politically, legal and lucrative economic opportunities should automatically lessen corruption. Through education, the general public should become more aware of their human rights and therefore more likely to elect transparent officials who better protect these rights. However, the UN should also lead crackdowns on political criminals and help restructure political institutions to eliminate opportunities for future corruption. 

International recognition could also be enhanced if Kosovo were to abandon transnational crime and join the global economy. Countries are more likely to support relationships from which they benefit economically, and if Kosovo can become an international bread basket, especially during a time when the agriculturally crucial country of Ukraine is under attack, they can establish themselves as a critical ally and trade partner. 

Additionally, the UN should advocate for Kosovar recognition within the general assembly. Although the chances of gaining Russian approval are extremely slim, other nations such as Argentina, India and Greece may be more likely to change their views. With increased recognition, Kosovo can operate as a strong de facto state or even an internationally recognized country—Taiwan, for instance, is unrecognized by UNSC member China, yet is still internationally recognized as a sovereign nation. 

A long-term conflict mitigation plan is crucial in preserving an auspicious future for Kosovo. In establishing political institutions, the UN should coordinate between Kosovar Serbs and Albanians to create a joint association to guarantee cooperation. If this matter is not addressed, Kosovo will remain vulnerable to issues like the license plate dispute, where something as seemingly mundane as license plates led to a violent conflict due to a lack of resolution regarding underlying disagreements regarding ethnic identity. The UN must work in conjunction with both ethnic communities to establish institutions and promote long-term collaboration. 

Rather than staying idle in the present, the UN must start actively pursuing a sustainable future by implementing mechanisms that will provide Kosovo strength for decades to come. By redirecting Kosovar interests towards lucrative economic pursuits, the Kosovar government can become more legitimate and capable, garner revenue to strengthen internal political institutions, secure trade partners to embed them into the global economy and establish international allies to validate their sovereignty. If the parties restructure economic and political institutions, pursue international recognition and set long-term conflict mitigation strategies in place, the international community can finally withdraw from Kosovo and put an end to an international presence no one wants.

Russia and Serbia’s friendly relations date back to 1999 with the breakup of Yugoslavia. They further developed in 2008, when Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. Kosovo, as of March 2022, is recognized by 177 countries. This includes over half of UN member states and 80% of the EU and NATO. In support of Serbia, Russia refuses to do so, and they constantly veto motions related to Kosovo’s ascension as a recognized country. 

Russia is now putting pressure on Serbia to return this act of goodwill. As the rest of the world slams Russia with sanctions, Serbia continues to be a key customer for critical Russian industries, notably energy: Serbia imports roughly 91% of the natural gas it consumes, with almost all of that being from Gazprom, a majority of state-owned energy company. What’s more, Serbia is doubling down, attempting to secure a new deal with Gazprom within the coming months.

Leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Serbia has been trying to, in a sense, play both sides. Serbia applied for EU membership in 2009. Since then, it has attempted to strengthen its relationship with its members while also doing so with Russia and China. Since 2017, President Aleksandar Vučić has orchestrated this balancing act. As Vučić’s chance for reelection on April 3 grows closer, he continues to play to Serbia’s diplomatic and ethnic ties with Russia. Reelection would certainly mean more of the same.

Russia’s actions have further alienated it from many other countries, mainly by way of heavy sanctions. This has caused it to lean heavily on its few allies, including Serbia. With strong external pressure to denounce Russia and Russia’s push for support during their time of need, Serbia is essentially being pulled thin in the middle between its pro- and anti-Russian allies. 

But there may come a time very soon when Serbia is forced to pick a side.

If this were the case, Serbia’s support would more likely fall completely toward Russia than away from it. Russia’s early support of Serbia has not been lost on the country’s government or its citizens. Despite the EU-wide flight ban, Serbia’s initial response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was to increase its national airline’s air traffic to Russia. While this has been somewhat ruled back due to criticism from the EU, AirSerbia still offers one flight to Moscow a day. This has stood as a loophole, allowing Russians to flee to the EU through Serbia.

Serbia has had long-standing disputes with several of its Balkan neighbors, but they reached a boiling point during the Yugoslav Wars from 1991 to 2001, where the different ethnic groups fought for territory. Following the war, territorial lines were drawn, but they were done in a manner that poorly reflected the spread of the different ethnicities. The area of Kosovo was majority ethnically Albanian but within Serbian borders, and these tensions ultimately resulted in Serbia’s ethnic cleansing of the majority Albanians. Since then, Albanian and Kosovan relations with Serbia have remained poor.

As war rages in Ukraine, many believe Putin is also using the opportunity to exploit pre-existing tensions to increase Russia’s influence in Serbia. Albania is a member of NATO, and Kosovo is on a path to membership. When comparing this situation to the circumstances surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many similarities are eerily evident. Albania is a member of NATO, and Serbia is mostly supporting Russia, escalating the bad blood that already exists between the two countries. Current circumstances have caused Kosovo to press even harder for a quicker membership to protect its sovereignty.

Given Russia’s current attempts to further its influence in Serbia, membership in NATO for Kosovo would have massive implications for Serbia and the greater region. For one, this would further increase Kosovo’s legitimacy as an independent state. It would also more clearly define the border between NATO and Russia’s sphere of influence. Beyond this, just as Russia interpreted Ukraine’s attempt to join NATO as an act of aggression, pro-Russian Serbia could interpret Kosovo joining NATO in a similar fashion.

On the other hand, joining NATO could compel Kosovo to take more aggressive action toward separation from Serbia. If one of those two things occurs, or both, it could spell chaos for the Balkans. The result could be another proxy conflict between Russia and a multilateral organization.

While this is a real possibility, some measures could prevent this from happening. Serbia’s admittance into the EU could help ease tensions with neighboring countries while simultaneously distancing it from Russia. In this case, Russia would likely struggle to maintain its influence in the area. Admittance into the EU would also disincentivize aggressive action from Kosovo or Serbia if Kosovo were admitted into NATO. 

Another factor that could influence Serbia’s relationship with Russia is the duration and outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. With a severely crippled economy, Russia’s value as an ally would be significantly lowered. This could again cause Serbia to sway away from Russia and into the EU. However, such a move is also dependent on the citizens of Serbia, who have, for the most part, voiced strong support for Russia’s actions concerning Ukraine.

Regardless of the ultimate outcome, Russia’s push into Ukraine has already impacted the Balkans. While only time will tell, the already tense region could see sweeping changes in the near future.

In the new agreement, Serbia and Kosovo agree on the establishment of a single market, guarantee a free flow of people, services and capital, and create railway and highway links. Although Serbia and Kosovo have previously had many negotiations towards the betterment of bilateral relationships, the improvements were minimal. Tensions between Serbia and Kosovo actually increased in 2018 when Kosovo imposed a 100% tariff on goods imported from Serbia. Considering that Kosovo used to be a Serbian province and its 2008 independence was never recognized by Serbia, the sudden achievement of a deal in 2020 was unexpected.

What was even more surprising was a Facebook post by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Maria Zakharova. She posted a photo of President Vucic and Trump at the Oval Office and another photo featuring Sharon Stone’s rather provocative leg-crossing scene from the American thriller “Basic Instinct.” Commenting on the two photos, Zakharova implied that instead of sitting as if he was being interrogated by Trump, Vucic should present himself more confidently. 

Zakharova’s reckless remark immediately sparked wide-spread vexation, and Vucic himself commented on the situation, saying that “the primitivism and vulgarity she showed speaks about herself, but also about those who have given her the job.” Although Russian President Vladimir Putin and Zakharova herself later apologized for this misconduct, The White House meeting reveals an underlying shift in Serbia and Russia’s historically close relationship. Considering the European Union has always tried to normalize the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, the agreement will undoubtedly improve Serbia’s relationship with the EU. What is more, the Serbia-Kosovo agreement contains political items that may indicate Serbia’s effort to distance itself from Russia. This leaves the future of the Serbian-Russian alliance uncertain and makes clear Serbia’s intention to strengthen its relationship with the EU. 

Serbia and Russia are both Slavic and Orthodox countries that have traditionally always been allies with each other. Ties between the two countries strengthened in 2008 when Kosovo, an autonomous Serbian province with an ethnic Albanian majority, declared its intent to leave Yugoslavia (which includes the current-day Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia). To fight against Western pressure to internationally recognize Kosovo as an independent country, Serbia sought help from its Slavic brother, Russia. Since then, Russia has supported Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity regarding Kosovo, refusing to recognize Kosovo’s independence. The two countries have also formed close economic partnerships and collaborated militarily. Russia’s investment in the Serbian economy totaled up to $4 billion in 2019, and it is expected to invest another $500 million over the next two years, while also supplying the country with natural gas.

Serbia is also the only Western Balkan country that purchases Russian weaponry. In 2016, Serbia signed an agreement on the purchase of the Buk air defense complex for its military. When Aleksandar Vucic assumed the Presidency in 2017, news media in both countries eulogized the friendship between Serbia and Russia. Putin is the most popular foreign leader in Serbia due to his understanding of Serbia’s national culture and interests.

Nevertheless, the two countries do not always have the same goals, and Serbia cannot completely side with Russia due to geographical and economic reasons. Serbia’s geographical location illustrates it’s strategic position: caught in between two rival powers in Europe, with the European Union in the West and Russia in the East. Russia is able to support Serbia’s stance on Kosovo and provide military assistance, while the EU brings more economic benefits to Serbia. A report from the EU delegation to Serbia mentions that the EU has long been a major trading partner with Serbia, receiving, on average, 67% of Serbia’s total exports. Meanwhile, around 60% of Serbia’s total imports of goods come from the EU member countries every year, showing deep economic ties between Serbia and the EU. 

Besides this, almost all of Serbia’s neighboring countries (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Croatia) are EU members, leaving Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as the only two countries that support Russia in the Western Balkans. As Vucic stated during an interview this March, Serbia is always on a path towards greater collaboration with the EU. Serbia has demonstrated this commitment by backing the EU denouncement of the Presidential election in Belarus — a Russian ally — and suspending the 2020 “Slavic brotherhood” military drills with Belarus and Russia due to “great and undeserved pressure from the European Union.” The previously mentioned Serbia-Kosovo agreement also indicates that Serbia will diversify its energy sector, where Russia has an entrenched role. Interpreting the meaning of this economic diversification, the U.S. envoy to Belgrade said it “means [Serbia’s] distance from Russia.” 

Though Serbia has displayed an interest in joining the EU, it is less likely that a formal offer will take place any time soon due to the presence of unresolved problems. The first and most crucial barrier towards EU entry lies in the recognition of Kosovo as an independent country. Although Serbia and Kosovo were able to normalize economic relations, Vucic has made it clear that Serbia will reject EU membership if it means recognizing Kosovo’s independence and letting it become a member of the UN. Speaking on this issue in a press conference, Vucic said: “It is clear what our answer will be. If you want a direct answer, it is no.” Moreover, Vucic claimed that most Serbians prefer to keep the Serbian-Kosovo relationship as it is. This is mainly a result of Western policies in Serbia in the 1990s, such as NATO’s illegitimate bombings of Yugoslavia in 1999 during the Kosovo War, which resulted in the death of around 1500 people. This unhealed wound makes it even harder for Serbia and Kosovo to reach a final compromise.

Aside from the aforementioned grudges against Kosovo, Serbia’s increasing connections with Russia, China, and the United States also worry the EU. The Serbia 2020 Report drafted by the European Commission mentioned that “Serbia continued to develop intense relations and strategic partnerships with a number of countries worldwide, including Russia, China, and the U.S. Serbia… needs to progressively align its foreign and security policy with that of the European Union in the period up to accession.” These relationships include having frequent high-level meetings and military cooperation with Russia, increasing cooperation with China, and supporting the United States by moving the Serbian Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. By pointing out these issues, the EU implies that it hopes Serbia will keep its distance from Russia, China, and even the United States as it seeks EU membership. However, the EU cannot expect this effort to happen anytime soon, because Vucic openly claims that Serbia is not planning to sacrifice its current relationship with these countries. In his address at the 74th Session of the General Assembly of the UN this September, Vucic said: “…Serbia chooses the independent foreign policy, [and]independent decision-making as its path towards the future. And that is why we don’t hide [it]anywhere, and not even in this hall, but we praise good and friendly relations we have with the People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation, and wish [for]better and better relations with the USA. because our job is to take care of our people, we do not care what someone else in the world might tell us.” The statement is sufficient to manifest Vucic’s refusal to prioritize the EU’s demands by weakening ties with Russia, China, and the United States.

Another obstacle to Serbia’s EU accession is that Serbia doubts the EU’s ability to support European countries in times of crisis. This was especially evident after the EU’s decision to ban the export of essential medical equipment to countries that are not EU members during the coronavirus pandemic. Criticizing European solidarity as nothing but “a fairy tale on paper,” Vucic turned to Russia and China and was able to receive immediate medical and economic aid. In response, the EU — fearing Russia and China’s increasing influence in Europe — provided 93 million euro in economic aid a few days later.

Vucic claims that Serbia intends to maintain an independent foreign policy and is not trying to please either the EU or Russia. This is demonstrated by the fact that Serbia does not always side with Russia, often opposing its Slavic brother on a series of issues, as well as the fact that Serbia has not expressed much enthusiasm about joining the European Union, especially after the EU’s initial reluctance to help Serbia during the pandemic. For now, it seems Serbia is committed to maintaining a neutral stance and gaining support from both the EU and Russia while seeking to strengthen other potential partnerships outside Europe, namely with China and the United States. 

Yet, Serbia will remain a prospective candidate for EU membership, despite Vucic’s recent criticism of the alliance and the EU’s hesitation to expand its ranks. Given that the EU’s previous expansion brought in Eastern European countries with issues of corruption and economic troubles, Serbia will need to demonstrate greater political and economic stability in order to earn an invitation. Furthermore, France, one of the EU’s key leaders, is especially uncertain about welcoming new members, believing the alliance should focus on achieving greater consensus between the existing members. Nevertheless, it is clear that, despite Vucic’s claims of an independent foreign policy, Serbia seems to be leaning towards the EU and shifting away from Russia. Though Serbia will likely continue to play both sides for now, it seems its end goal lies with the EU.