Throughout the week of October 20, 2015, 1000 family members pulled apart in the Korean War of 1950-53 reunited in an emotional meeting at Mount Kumgang resort, located on North Korea’s east coast. Fathers and sons, husbands and wives, and brothers and sisters who had been separated for more than sixty years wept and embraced each other. This reunion was only the second in the last five years.

The Divided Family Reunions were established in a historic North-South Korean summit in 2000 between the former North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, who won a Nobel Peace Prize that year for his efforts to engage the isolated North Korean state. The short family reunions were meant to be annual, but the worsening tensions between the two states prevented their regular occurrence. Instead, the divided families depend on the current political climate between the two Koreas to determine whether or not the reunions will occur.

The latest reunion was spurred by the uneasy truce reached on August 25, 2015, after military tensions escalated in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The DMZ, which separates the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel, is often called the “most heavily fortified border in the world.” On August 4, two South Korean soldiers were maimed by North Korean landmines, causing outrage in South Korea and an accusation that North Korea purposely planted the explosives near the military guard post. This incident triggered a rapid escalation of conflict; North Korea declared itself to be in a semi-war state and top US military commanders began reviewing the established plan for defending the border in case of an attack.

This episode called to attention, for both South Korean and American officials alike, that little is known of the newest North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-un. He continues to use the Divided Family Reunions as diplomatic tools for “rewarding” North Korea’s brother nation, as they were used under his father. With approximately 66,000 South Koreans on the waiting list for the reunions, North Korea clearly knows it holds a bargaining chip. The most recent meeting that occurred in early October reflect this—it was a reward for the successful resolution of the landmine incident. However, looking at the past five years of Kim Jong-un’s early reign, intelligence officials can agree on this much: he is implementing change in North Korea. It is interesting, then, to think of Kim Jong-un’s decision-making process when agreeing to host the 2015 Divided Family Reunions. What does his agreement tell the world of his political reforms and regime-strengthening strategy?

Change in North Korea is a new phenomenon and must be measured with a different standard than most other countries. The state has more or less remained the same as it was under Kim Il-sung, its legendary founder. Kim Jong-il, like his father, retained an extraordinary cult of personality centered on the idea that the Kim family protects Korea from outside invaders, particularly the US and its ally, South Korea. However, no matter how powerful this cult of personality is, change is inevitable. With a devastating famine during the 1990s – called “the Arduous March” – and the steady flow of outside information into the country, North Koreans are growing discontented with the regime. As is speculated by many top North Korean scholars, such as Professor Andrei Lankov of South Korea’s Kookmin University, by the early 2000s, Kim Jong-il himself recognized that the Kim dictatorship would not last for more than ten to twenty years. But with Kim Jong-il in his sixties by the time of this realization, he decided to let the status quo remain: he, personally, was safe. However, his son is only in his thirties and has just come into power. And it seems as though Kim Jong-un has decided that the time for drastic and widespread change is now.  

Perhaps the first indication that Kim Jong-un was breaking from the established regime mold was when he purged his uncle, Jang Sung-taek, in early January 2013. Jang was thought to be one of the most powerful men in North Korea during Kim Jong-il’s reign, and it was even speculated that he might act as Kim Jong-un’s “regent” until the young dictator learned the ropes. Kim followed this shocking act by purging five out the seven advisors his father had left to guide him, with two confirmed as executed. His other regime changes include reforming North Korea’s agricultural system, changing it from one of virtual servitude to one of sharecropping. He has also quietly allowed a widespread economic upturn with the acceptance of private enterprise, a change from North Korea’s traditional government-controlled system.

With these large reforms, one must wonder the reasons Kim Jong-un has kept his father’s practice of Divided Family Reunions. Kim Jong-il himself was not fond of them, as they brought outside information to the closed state. The influx of knowledge was the main reason Kim Jong-il believed his regime was crumbling; it incenses and mobilizes the North Korean public, inherently threatening and weakening the regime. Excluding the information that North Korean participants could learn from their South Korean families, even their physical differences, such as the large height gap between the two peoples, sheds light on the difference in quality of life.

With all of the potential costs, what are the benefits Kim sees? For one, the talks hold an economic significance for North Korea. The reunions are held at Mount Kumgang resort, which was once a large tourist draw for South Korean visitors. Insisting on holding the reunions at this resort could suggest a desire to stimulate tourist interest once again. Holding these reunions on North Korean territory also provides the closed dictatorial regime with some protection and control over their citizens’ movements. For additional protection, the multiple video cameras and microphone bugs set up in the reunion room ensure that the North Korean participants only spout propaganda to their families’ inquiries on quality of life, promising that they are happy and content with their leader.

The manner in which Kim Jong-un utilizes these events will give outside nations a clue towards his regime-strengthening strategy: will he halt the meetings in order to close off North Korea even more to the outside world, or will he continue them, as a part of his reform akin to allowing the growth of the private sector? The reunions could also serve a larger purpose under the younger Kim’s regime than his father’s. The age of the family members gives the reunion talks a sense of urgency, and Kim could use this urgency as a larger incentive for successful negotiations with South Korea than his father could. Ultimately, Kim remains an enigma to the international world, but his approach with reunions could illuminate his regime agenda.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

In January 2014, North Korea announced that the annual Pyongyang Marathon would be open to amateur foreign runners. (In previous years, the event was only open to elite foreign runners.) Pyongyang seemed to be finally opening up to the rest of the world by hosting a public sporting event—a potentially fun and sportsmanlike way for foreigners to see North Korea. Even Americans, North Koreans’ greatest enemies, were allowed to register in a seemingly apolitical gesture. There were, of course, restrictions for all foreign runners, including a three-hour time limit for the full marathon and mandatory lodging at state-sanctioned hotels. To get into the marathon, runners had to register via a North Korean tour agency like the China-based Koryo Tours, a standard procedure for all tourists traveling to North Korea. The 2014 event was quite successful by North Korean standards: over 300 participants ran the 42-kilometer course through the nation’s capital. 

The anticipation for the 2015 marathon on April 12 was even higher. The North Korean government opened up several hundred spots in the race for foreigners and even disseminated a bizarre promotional video to a remixed version of A-Ha!’s Take On Me. Over 400 tourists registered for the race through Koryo Tours alone. That is, until the North Korean authorities banned foreigners from entering the country due to the Ebola scare. Beginning in October 2014, North Korea restricted its borders and quarantined all foreigners for 21 days. The race was not exempt from these constraints and all foreigners were banned from joining.

According to North Korean propaganda, Ebola is a deadly virus created by the US military to promote its interests abroad and undermine North Korea. With this mindset, it comes as no surprise that North Korea set up harsh restrictions against all foreigners, including those from countries with no exposure to the virus. In early March, the government finally lifted the travel ban and allowed foreigners to continue with their marathon tourism plans. However, the damage was already done. Although some runners had expected stumbling blocks during the registration process and adopted a “go with the flow” attitude, other runners canceled their reservations and race registrations. One tour group, Uri Tours, extended their registration deadline to March 20, but flights out of both Shanghai and Beijing were almost completely full. The only available flights were through Air Koryo, a poorly rated North Korean airline. Tour companies, marathon runners and spectators all got the short end of the stick because of North Korea’s politicized reaction to the Ebola virus. Ultimately, Pyongyang was able to recover from the drama; by April 12, the race had enough registered foreign runners (650) to set a record for its short history.

However, the North Korean government has bigger problems to worry about than the success of its marque marathon. The Pyongyang Marathon fell during a sensitive time; the DPRK’s relationship with the rest of the world has been particularly rocky since February 2013 when the country launched its third nuclear test. Since then, Kim Jong Un and his government have continually threatened their opponents with military force. The 2014 UN report on human rights abuses in the country added even more pressure; in October and November, the UN repeatedly recommended that the North Korean leadership be referred to the International Criminal Court. As expected, the government reacted negatively to these accusations against its supreme leader, calling the report “political fraud.” Furthermore, in March, the US and South Korean participated in joint military exercises, a practice that always elicits an angered response from the North Korean leadership. The military exercises are a display of the heavy military presence at the southern end of the DMZ and a reminder of exactly what North Korea is up against. Unfortunately, the military exercises sparked violent retribution. In March, a South Korean man attacked the US Ambassador to South Korea, Mark Lipper, claiming to be fighting for North-South reunification. The North Korean government called it “just punishment for US warmongers.” North Korea used similar language during the Sony hacks that involved the film “The Interview.”

The Pyongyang Marathon might have been a success for the country’s tourism industry, and even a sign of a thawing relationship; however, the race did not reveal any fundamental changes in the North Korean regime. It remains authoritarian and dependent on the propagation of a perceived conflict with the US and its allies to preserve domestic stability.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Despite the existence of previous cyber incidents more severe than the recent attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, the last month has seen cybersecurity penetrate the American psyche and affect day-to-day news like never before. The involvement of a major movie studio, an anticipated film, two famous actors and a direct effect on moviegoers’ holiday plans have caused fallout from the Sony cyber attack to make national headlines over the last few weeks.

Due to the complex nature of these events, I will provide a timeline before presenting my analysis.

June 20: Sony Pictures Entertainment releases the first trailer for its upcoming comedy The Interview, which depicts an assassination attempt on Kim Jong-un, supreme leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), by American celebrity journalists recruited by the CIA. Kim Myong-chol, executive director of The Centre for North Korea-US Peace and unofficial spokesman for Pyongyang, issues the following statement in an interview with The Telegraph:

“There is a special irony in this storyline as it shows the desperation of the US government and American society. A film about the assassination of a foreign leader mirrors what the US has done in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Ukraine…President Obama should be careful in case the US military wants to kill him as well.”

June 25: Pyongyang releases an official statement promising “merciless retaliation” against the US if The Interview is released. Most notably, the statement contains the following excerpt:

“The act of making and screening such a movie that portrays an attack on our top leadership…is a most wanton act of terror and act of war, and is absolutely intolerable.”

November 24: A month before the scheduled release of The Interview (Christmas Day), Sony suffers a major cyber breach caused by unknown attackers identifying themselves only as the “Guardians of Peace.” Sony employees are unable to access the company’s network, and instead see this ominous image (a large red skeleton making a menacing gesture) on their computers instead. Personal information, private emails and unreleased movies such as Annie, To Write Love, Fury, Still Alice and Her Arms are compromised in the attack. The attackers begin releasing the sensitive data in large dumps over the next two weeks. Due to the aforementioned statement from Pyongyang over the summer, some pundits speculate that the attack was perpetrated by the DPRK in response to the imminent release of The Interview.

November 28: After spending several days over the Thanksgiving holiday restoring functionality to its network and mitigating public relations damage, Sony begins investigating the possibility that the DPRK was behind the attack.

December 1: The FBI announces that it is also investigating the possibility that the DPRK was responsible for the attack. It issues a warning to US businesses announcing that unidentified hackers have used malicious software to launch a destructive cyber attack against Sony. The statement describes the nature of the attack: the malware involved overrides all data on the hard drives of computers affected, and even wipes the master boot record (the mechanism that enables computers to boot up). The result of the attack is that employees cannot use their computers at all—they finish the day’s work with pens and paper. The warning concludes by urging companies to contact the FBI immediately if they detect similar attacks.

December 3: An unnamed DPRK diplomat tells Voice of America that the DPRK was not responsible for the attack. The official states: “linking the DPRK to the Sony hacking is another fabrication targeting the country. My country has publicly declared that it would follow international norms banning hacking and piracy.”

December 7: The Korean Central News Agency, a state-run media outlet, issues a statement calling the attack a “righteous deed” but denies any involvement by the DPRK. The statement also says the following:

“We do not know where in America the Sony Pictures is situated and for what wrongdoings it became the target of the attack, nor do we feel the need to know about it. But what we clearly know is that the Sony Pictures is the very one which was going to produce a film abetting a terrorist act while hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK by taking advantage of the hostile policy of the US administration toward the DPRK.”

December 11: The Interview’s West Coast premiere takes place in Los Angeles at a red carpet event. The event is open to photographers, but closed to reporters.

December 15: Two former Sony employees file the first of several class-action lawsuits against the company, alleging that Sony ignored obvious signs that their computer network was vulnerable to attack. The breach exposes tens of thousands of employee Social Security numbers, medical records and personal emails. The plaintiffs also state in their filing that Sony “kept employees in the dark” regarding the extent of the breach for a week after the attack occurred.

December 16: The Guardians of Peace release the following message (note: nonsensical in some places):

“We will clearly show it to you at the very time and places ‘The Interview’ be shown, including the premiere, how bitter fate those who seek fun in terror should be doomed to. Soon all the world will see what an awful movie Sony Pictures Entertainment has made. The world will be full of fear. Remember the 11th of September 2001. We recommend you to keep yourself distant from the places at that time. Whatever comes in the coming days is called by the greed of Sony Pictures Entertainment. All the world will denounce the SONY.”

Immediately following the threat, a number of major theater companies announce that they will no longer be showing The Interview at all, Christmas Day or otherwise. Sony cancels the New York City premiere of The Interview. Homeland Security releases a statement saying that “there is no credible intelligence to indicate an active plot against movie theaters within the United States.”

December 17: In light of the threat made by the Guardians of Peace, Sony announces that it will no longer release The Interview on Christmas Day.

December 19 (morning): The FBI’s National Press Office releases a statement announcing that “the FBI now has enough information to conclude that the North Korean government is responsible” for the attacks on Sony. The FBI’s conclusion, according to the statement, is based on the following pieces of evidence:

1. Technical analysis of the data deletion malware used in the attack revealed links to other malware that the FBI knows to have been developed by DPRK actors.

2. The FBI observed “significant overlap” between the infrastructure (hard-coded IP addresses that indicate the origin of an attack, for example) used in the Sony attack and the infrastructure used in other malicious cyber activity that has been linked to the DPRK.

3. The tools used in the Sony attack displayed “strong similarities” to a cyber attack in March 2013 that the DPRK propagated against South Korean banks and media outlets.

December 19 (afternoon): In an end-of-the-year press conference, President Obama says the following about the Sony cyber attack:

“I think they [Sony] made a mistake…I’m sympathetic that Sony as a private company was worried about liabilities and this, that and the other, but I wish that they had spoken to me first.”

Mr. Obama also warns:

“We will respond…we’ll respond proportionally, and we’ll respond in a place and time and manner that we choose…if somebody is able to intimidate folks out of releasing a satirical movie, imagine what they start doing when they see a documentary that they don’t like, or news reports that they don’t like.”

December 21: David Boies, a top lawyer for Sony, says in an interview with Meet the Press that while Sony will not show the movie in theaters over the Christmas holiday, the film will eventually be released.

December 22: For reasons currently unknown to the American public, the DPRK’s entire Internet system fails for about 10 hours. The country’s computer connections were limited to begin with (roughly 1000 IP addresses compared to billions in the United States) and connections to the outside world were available to only the elite, but networks across the country fail nonetheless. Some people speculate that the outage was the result of a cyber counter-attack.

December 23: Sony announces that The Interview will have a limited theatrical release on Christmas Day (roughly 200 independent theaters). Michael Lynton, Sony’s Chairman and CEO, says that the company will continue its efforts to secure more platforms and theaters to show the film.

December 24: Google announces a partnership with Sony whereby users of Google Play and YouTube Movies can rent or buy The Interview on their computers and phones.

December 25-28: More cybersecurity experts begin to doubt that the DPRK propagated the attack.

Even the smallest details of the above events are worth noting because of the implications that this saga has for future cybersecurity incidents against both private companies and national governments. Although previous cyber attacks against the US have succeeded – and thousands of unsuccessful attacks occur every day – there has never been an attack that has elicited such strong responses from both the American public and American officials. Furthermore, if indeed propagated by the DPRK, then the attack was orchestrated for ideological reasons rather than financial reasons. This fact alone is a new development in large-scale cyber crime.

I will present my opinion on the following questions in this whirlwind of activity:

1. How confident can we be that the DPRK indeed propagated the attack?
2. Did Sony provide a befitting response for private company?
3. Did Mr. Obama provide a befitting response for a US President?
4. Was the US behind the DPRK’s recent Internet outage?

1. How confident can we be that the DPRK indeed propagated the attack?

Despite the ostensible confidence by the FBI in its findings, not enough evidence was released to prove that the DPRK was behind the attack.

Discounting potential motives and past behavior, the situation is still essentially a “he said, she said” situation. The FBI has clearly stated that it believes that the DPRK propagated the attack, and the DPRK still denies its involvement. Pyongyang even offered its assistance: “As the United States is spreading groundless allegations and slandering us, we propose a joint investigation with it into this incident…we have means to prove that this incident has nothing to do with us.”

The statement ends with a promise of “grave consequences” if the US rejects the joint inquiry proposal, also noting that the accusations by the FBI have “hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership.”

From a technical perspective, attribution is usually difficult with cyber attacks. The FBI could have a smoking gun, or they could have little actual evidence. The uncertainty stems from the lack of evidence released, and some experts are beginning to question the validity of the FBI’s accusation. Kurt Stammberger, a senior vice president with the cybersecurity firm Norse, said: “We [Norse] are very confident that this was not an attack masterminded by North Korea and that insiders were key to the implementation of one of the most devastating attacks in history.”

On December 23^rd, two scholars at the War Studies Department of King’s College London published a scholarly paper describing the key challenges in attributing cyber attacks. The authors, Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, conducted focus groups with commercial security software vendors and spoke to intelligence officials to survey the state of attack attribution practices. Their paper outlines the process of finding a culprit and communicating that information.

The authors’ first point is about the victim’s ability and willingness to respond to the cyber attack with an investigation. Although seemingly obvious, this assertion raises an interesting question about the FBI’s resources: “The more severe the consequences of a specific incident, and the higher its damage, the more resources and political capital will a government invest in identifying the perpetrators.” The Sony attack was certainly prolific enough in terms of reputational and financial damage done to the company (Variety estimates that the company stands to lose $75 million) to warrant a large amount of leeway given by Washington for an FBI investigation of the attack.

Furthermore, the attack struck a nerve with many Americans, who judged Sony’s response as a failure of free speech and an act of censorship. Given the attack’s impact on Sony, as well as the strong emotional reaction from the American public, I believe it likely that the FBI was given adequate resources by Washington to conduct a thorough investigation. Nonetheless, the fast turnaround time (18 days from announcement to conclusion) still raises questions about the investigative methods employed, and calls into question the conclusion that the DPRK did indeed propagate the attack. The majority of Rid and Buchanan’s 30-page paper, in fact, deals with the challenging issue of determining who propagated a cyber attack. The authors argue that attribution is rarely an open-and-shut case. “On a strategic level, conclusions are further removed from forensic artifacts, and may contain a significant amount of assumptions and judgment,” they write.

The authors’ third point is about communication of the results of an investigation. The FBI’s statement clearly outlines the reasons why it believes that the DPRK instigated the attack, but fails to provide actual evidence. I do not mean to imply here that I think that they should provide evidence, as doing so would jeopardize their sensitive process, but I do mean to say that the lack of evidence is ample cause for numerous experts to question the validity of the result. Rid and Buchanan seem to agree: “Publicising intelligence can harm sources as well as methods,” they write. Unfortunately, there is no easy solution here. The tension between the public’s desire for hard evidence and the FBI’s need to protect its information-gathering process cannot be resolved.

The authors’ final point is about the credibility of all parties involved. As mentioned previously, few can doubt the resources or capabilities of the FBI. The DPRK, though, may be a different story. Is it possible that the DPRK could have executed such a successful cyber attack on American soil? Previous cyber incidents, such as the DPRK’s attack on South Korea, would seem to indicate so, but this question may never be answered definitively.

While arguably lacking capability, the DPRK did not lack motive. The DPRK’s propaganda machine is well oiled; decades of history have shown that the government will go to extreme measures to defend the sanctity of the supreme leadership. Furthermore, The Interview charted new territory: never before has the assassination of a current government official been so prominent. Imagine if a major Russian movie studio had planned to release a comedic movie about the assassination of Mr. Obama on its most celebrated national holiday. Needless to say, there would have been plenty of uproar from the American public; it is not a large leap to say that many would have believed the movie to be anti-Western and anti-American.

Although the threats and extreme statements about war and merciless retaliation seem to be empty, they are threats nonetheless. While it is unlikely that the DPRK would resort to physical violence or acts of war over just The Interview, it is obvious that Pyongyang wanted to send a strong message and assert itself. If the DPRK was indeed behind the attack, then Pyongyang certainly celebrated a wide victory given Sony’s strong response.

2. Did Sony provide an appropriate response as a private company?

As mentioned above, the American public reacted strongly to Sony’s decision to pull The Interview from theaters. Despite the numerous allegations that Sony “let the terrorists win” and “sacrificed free speech,” I believe that the company responded appropriately to the threat.

First of all, a threat with the magnitude and seriousness of the one that Sony received can never be taken lightly. The reference to September 11^th alone is an immediate red flag that demands a thoughtful response. The threat by the Guardians of Peace to target movie theaters also triggers an emotional response, given the history of incidents like the Aurora shooting in recent memory.

More importantly, though, we have to remember that Sony is a private company with business interests. Its decision to pull The Interview was not, in fact, a loss for free speech, as so many would like to believe. As a company, Sony received a threat that promised horrible violence and death to moviegoers. Even if the chance of those events actually occurring was slim, Sony made the correct decision. Why endanger the lives of thousands of people and risk the reputational ruin of the company?

Furthermore, the issue was determined by the FBI two days later (after Sony’s decision not to show The Interview) to involve a foreign national government. Do we expect a private American company to have a standoff with the government of the DPRK? Such issues are meant for the American government, not private sector, to decide. Sony had to protect its own interests (not to mention the public safety of moviegoers) immediately.

Finally, it is important to remember that individual movie theaters (both large movie chains and independent theaters) acted even before Sony did. Especially given the unwillingness of theaters to screen The Interview, Sony was wise to avoid risking a humanitarian tragedy.

3. Did Mr. Obama provide a befitting response for a US President?

First of all, the fact that Mr. Obama has been talking openly over the last few days about the DPRK as instigators of the attack seems to indicate that the FBI’s unreleased evidence may be stronger than most experts think it is.

I believe that Mr. Obama’s categorization of the attack as “cyber-vandalism” and not cyber warfare is correct. Despite the strong rhetoric from the DPRK, it is unlikely that the attack was intended as a true act of war. It seemed to be a long shot revenge attempt on Sony that resulted in surprisingly successful chaos on American soil due to discord between the company and the American people.

The problem with Mr. Obama’s response is that he bought into the public rhetoric that Sony’s business decision to pull The Interview was somehow an act of censorship. This meme is convenient because it provides an easy explanation for an otherwise complex situation. Unfortunately, it is misleading. In an interview with CNN, Mr. Obama said the following: “If we set a precedent in which a dictator in another country can disrupt through cyber a company’s distribution chain or its products, and as a consequence we start censoring ourselves, that’s a problem.”

Again, there is nothing about the situation that involves censorship. Sony made a legal and measured business decision. Unfortunately, Mr. Obama has offered the company little support, while repeatedly vowing a “proportional response” on a national level to the DPRK. The President’s first priority here should have been supporting Sony in its decision to protect the safety of the American people. Instead, he publicly criticized Sony and offered little understanding of the company’s business decision.

This case is an example of having your cake and eating it too. If Mr. Obama wants to categorize the act as cyber-vandalism and make the issue one of censorship, then perhaps the government could have subsidized Sony for some of its losses or supported an online release of The Interview. The main problem here is that the American government left a private corporation with the responsibility to manage the fallout from an attack by a foreign government. Mr. Obama offered nothing himself but a vague and predictable threat.

4. Was the US behind the DPRK’s recent Internet outage?

While some have speculated that the DPRK’s Internet outage was also the result of a cyber attack, this possibility is unlikely. Although Mr. Obama promised a response to the attack, disabling the country’s limited computer connections would hardly qualify as proportional to the attack on Sony. China has also denied its involvement in the outage (the DPRK’s Internet is provided by a Chinese company).

In reality, the DPRK or its Chinese provider may have taken the system offline in advance of a possible cyber threat. It is also possible that independent hackers took down the system. Given the timing of the outage, though, mere coincidence was probably not the cause. Regardless, I think that the outage is unlikely to affect directly any relations or talks between Washington and Pyongyang in the future.

In conclusion, I believe it unfortunate that the narrative regarding the fallout from the Sony cyber attack has been centered on the future of Hollywood and free speech. The lesson to be learned from this situation is instead about the relationship between the private sector and the government in the wake of cyber incidents. In this case, the United States may have set a dangerous example for the future. That a private company is being so widely blamed – by both the public and the American government – for being the victim of an attack ostensibly propagated by a foreign government is troubling, to say the least.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

You can keep screaming and kicking. Hell, cry your heart out and shout at the top of your lungs until an avalanche erupts on Mount Everest. You still won’t get what you want.

For the past month now, Kim Jong Un has been floundering in his own seething anger as he continues to drag out his usual outlandish temper tantrum akin to one thrown by a child over a can of SpaghettiO’s in the canned foods section of the supermarket. Desperate for attention, the dictatorial tyrant has spewed yet another nuclear threat at the annual Foal Eagle military exercises between the United States and South Korea that he disapproves of so immensely. Consequently, two DPRK mid-range ballistic missiles originating from Pyongyang soared overseas for about a few hundred kilometers before plummeting into the ocean. This outburst takes place as the leaders of the U.S. and South Korea met with the president of Japan at the Hague,

Well, Mr. Kim, you’ve certainly grabbed the attention you were seeking. With unusual haste, the United Nations Security Council met behind closed doors on Thursday emerging with a unanimous condemnation of the missile launches. The Security Council’s North Korea sanctions committee is also investigating the possibility of expanding the U.N. blacklist to encompass more North Korean nuclear entities in addition to those already listed, although it will most likely take several weeks for an agreement on the action to be reached.

While South Korea, the United States, and the UN are interpreting his most recent antics as an international threat, this seems little more than another one of Kim’s outlandish outbursts of inconsequential aggression that will quickly blow over as Foal Eagle operations approach their close in April. One may recall last year’s Foal Eagle operations when Kim publicized threats of hurling nuclear missiles at the United States in retaliation to its warm relations with the South. To this threat, Washington responded by hurriedly deploying a series of missile interceptors to Guam, complementing those already stationed at Fort Greely, Alaska. But this action was intended only to warn North Korea that the United States is certainly capable of matching its bombastic rhetoric. Needless to say, no defensive action was necessary as Foal Eagle activities came and went without any intervention from the ballistic dictator. This year’s scenario is a carbon copy; we can safely assume that Kim’s most recent threats are as hollow as ever.

Unless Kim’s threatening actions transcend mere intimidation, we know well enough that there is no real threat at hand here. Each year, North Korea becomes enraged by these annual military drills ensuing in the South, and each year reacts with threats of nuclear action that dwindle to oblivion with the culmination of the exercises. Although it is estimated that the missiles launched Wednesday are capable of being launched to Japan, Pyongyang will stop short of sending the missiles over the Japanese islands. Moreover, everyone knows that even Psy’s “Gangnam Style” has more hits than North Korea’s faulty missiles ever will. So no need to take cover from the illusory war threat – Kim will surely simmer down as the coming weeks pass.

Is it worth considering that perhaps the troublesome leader has some new antics up his sleeve? Every year, there is the possibility that if Kim does not elicit the immediate reaction he wants from his enemies, he may attempt to launch a small-scale ground attack against the South. Knowing very well from previous tantrums that the playpen fence barring him from South Korea is far too strong to tackle, Kim may try throwing the ball over this time. What that ball would be – a missile, propaganda balloon, etc. – is anybody’s’ guess.

Even still, it is highly unlikely that Kim will match his rhetoric with reality. The plan is an ugly backfire waiting to happen. Chances that North Korea’s actions would be met with a response of equal nuclear force from the international community are slim to none. So the way that I look at it, as Kim’s outlandish pouting and grumpy attitude drags on, there are really only two options that the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, and the U.N. can take; these states can either look past his tantrums and troubling rhetoric or, in the case that North Korea does end up pursuing a ballistic strike, take military action forcing Kim into a timeout.

Nevertheless, North Korea’s nuclear capacity remains limited. The world will most likely yet again witness the disappearance of North Korea’s meandering threats with the culmination of Foal Eagle in early April. The annual military exercises will continue, despite Kim’s belligerent disapproval. The most to take away from this entire situation is that the only “explosive” thing at play here is Kim’s infantile temperament. We’ve seen this childish temper tantrum erupt and wane one too many times already. So stop banging your fists and causing a scene, Kim – you’re still not getting your SpaghettiO’s.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff and editorial board.