Following the recent mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, in which 17 children died, a partisan chorus, one that has become depressingly familiar to the American public, played itself out once again. Congressional Republicans, extensively and successfully lobbied by the National Rifle Association of America (NRA), echoed their pleas to not “politicize” the tragedy (i.e. enacting any gun control policy that could help prevent a future mass shooting) in lieu of the ever-powerful “thoughts and prayers.” On the other side of the aisle, Congressional Democrats scolded their “morally bankrupt” partners and lamented that elected officials would prioritize NRA donations over the lives of American children.

Ethically, there is no real grey area in this debate. The NRA has descended rapidly into a full-blown conspiratorial and racist cult, preying on and exacerbating the fears of white, conservative Middle America. At a time when mass shootings in the US  are at an all-time high (a statistic so obviously caused by the internationally unmatched proliferation of guns in American society, that to argue otherwise reeks of cultural denial) the NRA uses threatening messages and imagery to encourage further sales. It is an organization with blood — including the blood of innocent children — on its hands, and Democrats are absolutely correct in faulting Republicans for their continual acceptance of NRA money and their ensuing capitulation  to NRA policy-demands. Thus, this article should be read with the caveat that Democrats should absolutely continue this line of attack.

That said, Democrats must reckon with the fact that the illogicality, cowardice and immorality they attribute to Republicans who accept money from a donor who capitalizes on fear and profits from bloodshed, has its rough equivalent within their own party. Indeed, while Republicans accept far too much money from the NRA (only six current Republican congressmen do not accept donations from the NRA), these contributions pale in comparison to electoral donations from the weapons industry, which, while still favoring the more hawkish Republican party, generally crosses completely over party lines.

Intellectually honest liberals should acknowledge and decry the hypocrisy of the situation; in many ways, the NRA is the domestic counterpart  of these weapon industries. Both sell the promise of security, one national and the other individual. Both thus rely on hyping threats and instilling fear in order to turn a profit. And both are far too responsible for innocent bloodshed. The primary reason that domestic gun control  attracts more attention than the military-industrial complex is our psychological, and literal, proximity to the issue: the Parkland victims were our sons and daughters, our brothers and sisters, our neighbors and friends. There is also, unfortunately, an element of ethnicity – white children illicit far more domestic sympathy than their non-white counterparts abroad. And yet, neither of the reasons justifies accepting money from organizations that profit from weapon sales that almost invariably result in innocent casualties. If Democrats want to make a more compelling and less canting case against Republicans accepting NRA money while innocent people continue to die, they should themselves consider rejecting money from the weapons industry. Politicians have a moral duty to scrutinize and potentially reign in industries profiting from the proliferation of deadly weapons, but when these same industries are vital donors, this obviously complicates the entire relationship and can lead to dangerous and ill-conceived outcomes.

Of course, there is a difference between the two. While weapons manufacturers such as Northrop, Boeing, and Raytheon primarily sell weapons to (supposedly) trusted governments with (supposedly) trusted motives (generally the US government, but frequently also foreign allies), the NRA encourages sales to practically any individual, regardless of background or intent. Stated otherwise, in one case weapons end up in the hands of legitimate states, entities that enjoy a monopoly on the means of violence in their territory, whereas in the other case, they end up in the hands of various, unknown individuals.

Further, the US government can police to some extent to whom weapons are sold (i.e. not to rogue states like North Korea or Iran), whereas the NRA prefers a system with no limits placed on gun sales, regardless of an individual’s background. And yet, this ethical superiority can only be drawn out so far. The US recently made massive, billions dollars worth of sales to Saudi Arabia, which is currently engaged in a ruthless, indiscriminate war in Yemen against the Houthis; the same goes for Israel, which has used US-bought weapons to uphold what essentially amounts to an apartheid state, putting once again in question the “background” checks and the US’s commitment to human rights when determining countries eligible for weapon sales.

Furthermore, at a deeper level, the Democratic party, and the American people as a whole, ought to come to terms with the fact that a country as dependent on and infatuated with deadly weapons, and oblivious to the impact of wars waged abroad with the help of US weapons, invite the same sort of reliance on deadly weapons here at home. Wars fought in the often-ambiguous name of “natural security” fosters the same sort of reliance on deadly weapons here at home for often-ambiguous reasons of “individual security, and a country whose defense budget is larger than the next eight countries combined is liable to produce citizens who will equate safety solely with the possession of weapons.

It is worth repeating: this article does not excuse the NRA, Republican senators who gleefully accept its money, or the most radical Second Amendment supporters. It also is not meant to suggest that Democrats should refrain from calling out NRA lobbying and conservatives who bow to said lobbying. Rather, it asks Congressional Democrats — and their supporters — to look at themselves more critically and see the double standard in accepting money from and catering to the demands of the weapons industry.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The first thing one notices when walking around the Israeli-controlled Area C of the West Bank is the litter. Children walk down the street to the neighborhood playground, making sure to avoid empty bottles and deserted chairs. Some of the adults spend time picking up what they can, but in the face of the mountain of trash, the effort can seem futile. They appear at once uneasy and used to the situation.

Only a couple of hundred feet away, however, the trash stops. Here, the streets are clean, the pavement smooth. Those living in the area, whether in the dirty or clean parts, convey acceptance, resignation, or both. But to the outsider, it is staggering. While one community appears cared for, protected, and safe, the other looks as abandoned as the accumulated trash in their streets. How can two different worlds exist in such proximity to one another?

Unfortunately, this stark contrast is all too common  in the areas affected by  the enduring occupation conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. To be clear, the difference in cleanliness  between the Palestinian community and the nearby Israeli settlements is not a reflection of their respective residents’ willingness to clean. The actual reason is both more mundane and more sinister: both communities pay taxes to the Israeli government (a result of the Oslo Accords, which designated a certain area in the West Bank, Area C, as occupied territory under Israeli control), and yet the Israeli government offers virtually no government services — including public cleaning services — in the Palestinian neighborhoods. As B’Tselem, an Israeli non-profit dedicated to human rights, reports, in Area C, the Israeli government essentially ignores “the needs of the Palestinian population.”

Making matters worse, the Palestinian Authority offers virtually no help either. Here in Area C, which covers 60 percent of the West Bank, the Palestinian people are left to fend for themselves, isolated and abandoned. The two seemingly rival governments allow the trash – and with it a feeling of helplessness – to pile up, unconcerned with the people living amongst it.

This is not the only instance in which the Israeli government neglects the rights of Palestinians living under its  control. For example, in places like Hebron, the largest city in the West Bank and home to around 700 Israeli settlers and 215,000 Palestinians, most of the main streets and resident buildings are forbidden to Palestinians (the Israeli Defence Force {IDF} calls this process “sterilizing” the streets), who additionally cannot conduct business, find work, or travel without obtaining a time-consuming permit from the IDF. Further, the IDF frequently grants settlers immunity when they beat up, or even kill, Palestinian citizens, sometimes teens and children, either because they agree with the attack or for fear of upsetting the politically powerful settlers. Indeed, in many settlements, the IDF seems to have increasingly become a private-settler militia. They indefinitely detain Palestinians, including ones who have never been accused of crimes, for days, or even weeks, unconstitutionally blocking them from seeing their lawyers. Israeli prisons have consistently been accused of torture.

This is all illegal and morally disturbing, as is, frankly, the entire Israeli occupation. Also disturbing, however, is that neither could be sustained without both the direct and indirect, explicit or implicit complicity of the Palestinian National Authority (the PA), the Fatah-controlled Palestinian organization that governs Areas A and B of the West Bank as per the Oslo Accords, and Hamas, the militant group that has governed the Gaza Strip since the 2006 parliamentary elections. To fully grasp how both both Fatah, the Palestinian nationalist party, and rival Islamist party Hamas owe their stay in power to Israeli complicity and aid, one must delve into the complex web of factors that binds these seemingly opposing groups to one common interest: maintaining the status-quo.

During the initial Palestinian uprising known as the first Intifada (1987-1991), the Israeli government realized that having to use their own security force to quell the unrest came at too high a political and fiscal price. One way out was to establish a Palestinian governing entity that would be responsible for security — its own (except against Israel), but also (partly) Israel’s. This recognition, in part, led to the Oslo Accords, a set of agreements between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed in Washington DC in 1993. In addition to other negotiated outcomes, the Accords created the Palestinian Authority (PA), an interim body born out of the PLO and charged with (relative) self-governance in the designated parts A and B of the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. This meant tasking the PA with the creation and maintenance of the necessary civil infrastructures  in the Palestinian territories: health, education, and most notoriously, security.

While international law dictates that the “occupying power” must pay for the security, health, education, and sanitation of the occupied, the Israeli government had managed to outsource a large portion of the occupation to the PA, and thus, through taxes, to the occupied Palestinians themselves. With Israel content unburdening themselves of a financial obligation and the PA eager to consolidate the political power the Oslo Accords had granted them, Palestine had become burdened with all the strains of sovereignty without any of its benefits.

Over two decades later, little of the Oslo agreement remains other than that. Worse yet, independent reports indicate that the PA has been rife with corruption, and maintain a security personnel that is almost as ruthless as the Israeli security force, often arbitrarily arresting Palestinian activists and at times even torturing them.

As a party with both a reliance on Israeli aid and a growing unpopularity (in September of 2017, a poll showed that two-thirds of Palestinians wanted the resignation of President Abbas, and that half of the public viewed the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people), the PA often takes measures to stifle any potential political competition, and especially those who speak out against the group’s relationship with Israel. Recently, this led to the arrest of popular human rights activist and Israeli-critic Issa Amro, the founder of Youth Against Settlement, a non-violent Palestinian resistance group located in Hebron. Amro, whose growing profile has led to a relationship with Senator Bernie Sanders, has spent the last decade cycling in and out of Israeli and Palestinian prisons, despite never having engaged in violent behavior or rhetoric. The devil’s bargain for the PA is clear: to maintain power, they have consented to the replacement of a sovereign state with an undemocratic quasi-police state funded and maintained by its occupiers.

The PA’s consolidation of power seems likely to continue, as the Israeli government is as reliant on the PA as the PA is on Israel; hence the murky web of interdependence outlined above. This may come as a shock to pro-Israeli Westerners who believe Netanyahu when he calls the PA a terrorist organization and dramatically threatens its funding. In fact, as the New York Times recently reported, one of Trump’s recent Twitter tirades threatening to cut Palestinian aid had the Israeli government legitimately nervous. Tzipi Livini, a former Israeli foreign and justice minister in the right-wing Zionist Union party, tweeted, “someone has to explain to Trump what the real Israeli interest is.” It is against Israel’s security and economic interests to cut ties with the PA, which, as documented, helps keep the Palestinian population controlled and complacent.

The Israeli government, and Netanyahu, are aware of this, no matter their rhetoric. As Senator Lindsey Graham said, “I cannot tell you the number of times the Israelis have engaged me to try and stop an emotional reaction by the Congress to terminate aid to Palestine.” Consider that on the same day that Fatah announced its unity government with Hamas (which led Netanyahu to declare that Fatah should no longer be recognized), the Israeli government finally sent the 500 million shekels of tax revenue that it owed the PA. This goes to show that, despite occasionally flexing its rhetorical muscles against the PA for domestic and international effect, the Israeli government is willing and eager to help the party maintain power.  Without the PA, it would not only have to foot the whole bill of the occupation and directly handle all security, but face the prospect of a more radical, non-compliant Palestinian movement.

No discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is complete without mentioning the US. The US government gives Israel a staggering $3.8 billion of aid each year, specifically to bolster its military. This assistance — provided despite Israel’s violations of Palestinian human rights — perpetuates the occupation. Somewhat ironically,  the US also provides the PA with approximately $400 million a year. Perhaps this would be welcome aid if Palestine were a sovereign state that could use the money for social services, and the PA a completely independent political organization ; in reality, these funds largely help bankroll and subsidise the occupation, as they primarily go to the security sector. Furthermore, because of the interdependence of the two economies and Israel’s taxation system’, research shows that at least 78% percent of international aid to Palestinians ends up in Israel’s economy. The opposite is, of course, not true.

Equally important is the less direct but far more deadly interdependent relationship between Israel and Hamas. The Israeli military can use any Hamas attack, and sometimes even simply Hamas rhetoric, to justify security crackdowns and/or military intervention in Palestinian territories. Conversely, Hamas’ popularity feeds on the constant Israeli threat and a feeling of national hopelessness. During peace talks, when at the very least the perception amongst Palestinians is that the occupation might end, Hamas popularity and membership inescapably declines. As Aaron David Miller, a Middle East expert at the Woodrow Wilson Center, wrote, these are “two parties who can’t seem to live with one another — or apparently without one another either.” Here again, maintaining the tense and bloody status quo allows both parties to maintain and slowly increase their respective power.

So what does this all amount to? In theory, the confluence of aims of these three actors — Israel, the PA and Hamas — might provide hope for mutual understanding and thus move along the  peace process. In reality, it only further entrenches the status quo. The Israeli government will continue to rhetorically call for withholding PA funding and accuse it of complicity in violence, while privately benefiting from its existence. The PA will challenge Israeli policy at the UN, plea for an independent and sovereign state, put up inspiring posters that says “We are All Gaza”, all while maintaining its role as providing security for Israel and managing the occupation. Hamas will conduct terrorist operations, Israel will condemn them, but both will benefit from the existence of the other to justify their own policies.

The interdependence among all three helps perpetuate a deadly standstill. Alienated and forgotten in this tangled spider-web of a political trinity are the Israeli citizens clamoring for real peace, and, most of all, the Palestinian people, living under occupation and ill served by their leaders.  Barring a drastic and unprecedented change in heart and policy by the Israeli (and U.S.) government, a change in Palestinian governance — ideally with a non-compliant and non-violent replacement who refuses to help fund and maintain Israel’s occupation — may be the only route left for eventual Palestinian independence.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Well, it’s done. The Iran Deal, formally named the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was finally signed in Vienna on July 14, and the negotiators all went home feeling like winners. Few observers had the foresight to predict such an event would occur less than fifteen years after 9/11 kicked off America’s “War on Terror” and President Bush put Iran in his Axis of Evil. You can read the full 159 page JCPOA here, courtesy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moscow’s masters of propaganda released it first, just like their honored guest Edward Snowden would have wanted. If you would rather not visit a Kremlin website, Buzzfeed embedded the JCPOA document within their coverage of the deal here (just scroll down a bit to see it). Or, if you would rather spend your time reading a novella of the same length, you can stay right where you are for this correspondent’s thorough analysis and insights on the deal of the decade.

This review is broken up into two parts. The first is an in-depth analysis and forecast of how all the signatories (the “E3/EU+3 and Iran”) and other nations will be affected by the deal, and how these actors will adjust their foreign policies as a result. The second section is an exploration of a contingency that your regular news outlets probably haven’t covered: What if Iran already has a hidden nuclear arsenal? Additionally, a summary of the main 20 pages of the JCPOA is available here to explain how the deal works. Feel free to skip around to the parts that interest you most and see the summary for reference. The remaining 139 pages of the JCPOA consist of various appendixes that explain the finer details of the deal. If you’re interested in the precise numbers of centrifuges and other materials Iran is allowed to have, check out the appendices linked in the full text.

Section I: A New Geopolitical Era

Iran
Strategically, Iran wins big from this deal, as long as it allows the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to do its job and it respects the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The execution of this deal will signal a new geopolitical era in the Middle East, one in which Iran and the West will interact regularly. There can be no doubt that the Iranians will be gaining influence in Iraq—once the exclusive stomping ground of NATO forces. The Shia-dominated Iraqi government is already accepting substantial aid from Iran for its fight against the Islamic State (IS), and this aid comes without the kinds of restrictions attached to western aid; Iran will surely try to present itself as a more favorable ally to Baghdad than Washington has been. Furthermore, it would come as no surprise if Iran and the US re-established formal diplomatic relations and reopened their respective embassies within a few short years. After all, President Obama has already reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba, another longtime strategic rival and enemy of the United States. Iran is also in talks with the UK to reopen a British Embassy in Tehran, and British Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond has publicly stated that he hopes to reopen the British embassy there by the end of 2015.

In early 2016, many of the UN and EU administered sanctions against Iran will be removed on “Implementation Day” under the terms of the JCPOA, and the Iranian economy will be poised for a period of significant growth (see the attached document above for a breakdown of the timeline for executing the agreement, among other information). The benefits could be huge, since the Iranian economy has been largely isolated from Western markets for years. As Western businesses move in to claim their stakes in Iran, Tehran will be overseeing Iran’s resurgence onto the global energy markets. Bijan Zangeneh, Iran’s Minister of Petroleum, claimed that the country could boost output to 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) as soon as the deal was signed, and that total output would grow by a million bpd within six months. His claims are unlikely to come to fruition within such a short timespan; however, it is important to remember that Iran exported over 40% of its oil to Europe before the sanctions regime was implemented. Deputy Petroleum Minister Mohsen Qamsari said Iran would attempt to recapture that market share, but first the country will focus on building upon its existing 1 million bpd of exports to East Asian markets.

Iran stated recently that it would not allow American inspectors on the IAEA team in Iran due to suspicions about US motives, and that only nations with formal diplomatic relations with Iran could contribute inspectors to the team. But this is unlikely to make the deal untenable. The IAEA and UN inspectors working in Iraq prior to 2003 were right about the nature of Saddam’s alleged WMD program, while US intelligence was dead wrong, so whatever team the IAEA assembles should be more than competent to carry out its tasks. Iran will only get to keep part of the Natanz center as a base for isotope enrichment research, and the Arak heavy water facility will be renovated and have its activities heavily restricted. On the whole, Iran’s enrichment capabilities under the deal will make it impossible to produce enough radioactive material for nuclear weapons, so long as they hold up their end of the bargain.

The United States
President Obama has been trying to wash his hands of the Middle East since he was first elected in 2008, and the Iran deal may very well be the bar of soap he has been looking for all along. Iraq has been the foreign policy bane of his presidency, and it still is. Iran and the US have both spent years blaming each other for causing problems in Iraq, but Washington knows that there are some small advantages to be gained from having Iran back on the scene in the region. Every IS soldier killed by an Iranian bullet or bomb is an IS fighter that the American military didn’t have to kill. For better or worse, the United States and Iran now have a common enemy. However, no one in the US government will ever admit to stepping aside from Middle Eastern conflicts to let Iran fill the gap, and it remains highly unlikely that Iranian and American forces would jointly conduct operations against IS. As Obama said, “This deal is not based on trust,” and the two countries are still generations away from formulating a cordial relationship.

Contrary to popular beliefs held among some Republicans, President Obama and his administration are not likely to tolerate any future Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapons program. Obama’s political opponents can cite many foreign policy blunders, such as the unilateral “red line” imposed on Bashar al Assad’s regime, as evidence that Obama cannot be trusted to keep his word in the Middle East. But the reality remains that the US foreign policy apparatus is largely in support of the deal, since it will reduce the overall level of unpredictability of Iran’s behavior. Additionally, the multilateral deal will have widespread support internationally, and it actually has a fairly well designed dispute resolution mechanism for dealing with any misbehavior by its signatories. It is far better to have the IAEA conducting regular inspections under an internationally recognized agreement than it is to have the alternative: Israel and the US creating media hype about Iran’s alleged nuclear capabilities every other year, only to be calmed after motorcycle-borne assassins knock off an Iranian scientist or two. The JCPOA creates a structure for dialogue in the region that has not existed in previous years, and that structure could very well avert a disaster. The US learned its lesson in the Cuban Missile Crisis that being able to communicate with rivals is essential, and the infamous red telephone between Moscow and Washington was born as a result. For once, it appears the US learned something from history.

The E3/EU
The “E3” are the European nations of France, Germany and the UK, and the EU is the European Union, which also took part in the talks since it has collectively passed sanctions on Iran in the past. France, Germany, the UK and the collective EU all make similar gains from this agreement, so it makes sense to analyze them together, despite the nuanced differences between the foreign policies of each of these parties. Europe stands to reap significant economic benefits as Iran emerges from its shell in the coming months. Previously severed diplomatic ties between some EU nations and Iran are likely to be re-established over the short and medium term. Specifically, Iranian flagged cargo ships and aircraft will regain the privilege of using EU ports and airports, which will certainly boost trade. The key commodities in the future Iran-EU relationship will be, predictably, oil and gas.

The E3/EU group has much bigger problems on its hands – namely Russia and the Greek financial crisis – that are far more pressing than the Iranian issue has ever been. The continuation of the Ukrainian conflict has forced Europe to diversify its energy supplies away from Russia by any practical means. It would be no surprise to see firms like BP and Total jump into the Iranian production lines at the earliest opportunity. Not unlike the US, the EU is wholly disinterested in being militarily involved in the Middle East’s conflicts. The EU would also like to see IS disappear while expending as little effort on that goal as possible. The Ukrainian conflict, Greek financial crisis, illegal immigration and Russian maneuvers on NATO’s frontier all outrank Iran-related security concerns in the EU right now. The JCPOA allows the Europeans to take one of their many problems off the list of high-priority issues.

Russia
Russia has been less involved in the actual negotiation process than the US and E3/EU, but there can be no doubts that it sees advantages to having Iran back on the world stage; the precise terms of the agreement are less important to Russia than they are to other signatories. Russia and Iran have a common cause in supporting the Assad regime in Syria, so a tighter relationship between Iran and Russia is likely to develop over the next several years. The removal of UN sanctions targeting Iran will open up opportunities for struggling Russian businesses, especially in the defense and energy infrastructure sectors. Rosneft and Gazprom are just as likely to carve niches in the Iranian energy market as any European energy firm, and increased Russian arms sales to Iran are almost a certainty.

Russia’s foreign policy game is a complicated one right now, and Moscow has certainly not made many new friends in recent months. Iran is also looking for new friends as it comes out of its shell. It will be interesting to see how the two nations align, but even more importantly, where they diverge. The two countries may have a mutually beneficial relationship and shared interests, but they do not necessarily trust one another.

China
Like Russia, China has been a more passive member of the negotiations. If China was not a UN Security Council member, Beijing probably would not have been directly involved at all. But the importance of the UN sanctions against Iran forced China to play a role in the process. As with Russia, the precise terms of the agreement are less important to Beijing than the broader opportunities for trade and strategic realignments that have arisen.

The strategic benefits for China are not as great as they are for the aforementioned signatories. China will grow its existing trade relationship with Iran, especially since every Yuan counts in Beijing these days. It will be interesting to see if China will try to recruit Iran into its sphere of influence via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) economic bloc. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will be another body to watch as global financial actors take aim at Iran. China is an important member of both the SCO and AIIB, alongside Russia. Iran could be more partial to financial tools and economic benefits offered by these bodies instead of their Western counterparts, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). China may also look to Iran as a potential partner for its investments in Afghanistan.

Israel
Israel has nothing to celebrate as a result of the JCPOA, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is making it known to the USA that he is an unhappy man, through both public remarks and private talks. Israel will be making a big lobbying effort to turn Senators against the deal in a last-ditch attempt to prevent its ratification, but it will almost certainly fail.

Given the fire and brimstone rhetoric coming from Jerusalem over the past several months, one would expect the deal to be Israel’s death knell. In reality, the opposite is likely true. Israel now has a direct line to Iran via diplomatic channels in Washington, and vice versa. Even sworn enemies can talk politely on occasion, especially when their interests align. Sure, Israeli forces have been intermittently at war with Iranian supported militants like Hezbollah for decades. But Hezbollah, Iran and Israel all now have a common enemy in the Islamic State. At the very least, Israel probably will not interfere if Iran wants to support the Assad regime and Hezbollah in its fight against IS. But Israel will certainly jump into the fray if anyone threatens its territorial sovereignty, but only its direct neighbors could pose such a threat. The Israeli government’s primary task is self-defense, and this deal will only amplify that reality. Israel’s geostrategic position is never good, but it has been much worse than it is today.

The Gulf Cooperation Council
The GCC nations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar and Oman are nearly as unhappy as Israel. These nations share historical memories that predate their modern countries, and all see a common, imperious enemy waking up on the other side of the Persian Gulf. These Arab nations know that the wealth and prosperity they accumulated over the past decades would have been far more difficult to aggregate in the face of Iranian power, and they took full advantage of Iran being hidden inside its shell for so long.

As a result of high oil prices and American interest in the region, the GCC nations have been able to bolster their military prowess over the last decade. Iran could not easily take on the GCC in a direct confrontation. But the GCC states are worried about covert Iranian support for minority groups that could create civil unrest or spark additional domestic terrorism in their own countries. Sunni leaders have long suspected Iran of attempting to create civil unrest among Shia minority communities in GCC nation in the hopes of causing revolutions to bring new, Iranian approved governments to power across the Gulf. The Sunni-ruled GCC nations won’t tolerate Shia uprisings, as evidenced by Saudi Arabia’s willingness to engage the Houthi rebels in Yemen. GCC governments also oppose Sunni jihadist movements like IS, but they will not cooperate in any counterterrorism efforts on that stage.

Turkey
Turkey is in the midst of serious political flux. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by President Erdogan, lost absolute power in recent elections, and Turkey has yet to form a new government. Meanwhile, it is surrounded by foreign challenges: the Greek economic crisis in the west, Russian resurgence to the north, a medley of intensifying civil war, jihad and Kurdish separatism in the south, and now Iran’s reappearance onstage in the east. The Syrian civil war is the top priority right now in Ankara, and to that end Turkey is reconsidering an incursion into northern Syria to create a buffer zone against the Islamic State and maintaining control over Kurdish militias (the idea was on the table last October).  Turkish foreign policy is always rather opaque, and that is just the way Ankara likes it.

The JCPOA does not appear to threaten Turkish objectives in the immediate future. However, Iran’s consequential resurgence onto the scene does not bode well for Turkish foreign policy objectives over the long term. While Turkey is no fan of the Islamic State, Ankara is still a member of NATO and a fierce opponent of the Assad regime, and therefore is unlikely to cooperate directly with Iran on anti-IS efforts. Furthermore, Turkey trusts Iran about as much as Israel. Ankara could be concerned about Iran supporting Kurdish separatist efforts, which would create enough internal turmoil to take Turkey off the world stage for some time. Altogether, Ankara sees Russia moving south, the Syrian and Iraqi civil war spilling north, and a resurgent nationalist movement among the Kurds. Adding an ambitious, confident Iran to the mix will make Turkey very uncomfortable for the next several years, but Ankara probably won’t play its cards until someone forces its hand.

Syria, Iraq & Yemen
Iran’s foreign policy sights are set on the three highly vulnerable countries of Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Syria and Iraq are sharing a civil war, and both nations are home to Shia controlled governments fighting the Islamic State. In Syria, the situation is even more complicated as a bevy of militant groups jostle for control of the country. Iran would love to have friendly Shia governments secure in both Iraq and Syria, as this would form a belt of Shia nations stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea. Both Damascus and Baghdad already depend on Iranian aid to some degree; these relationships will only tighten as the Iranian economy improves and Iran expends more resources in Syria and Iraq. Both governments will accept as much aid as they can for the least costs, and Iranian demands are likely to be light.

Yemen is a different case from Syria and Iraq, since it is a battleground for the Iranian-supported Houthi rebels against Yemeni government forces, the Saudi Arabian military and a smattering of jihadists. Saudi Arabia needs to keep the entirety of its peninsula secure, and will not tolerate an Iranian puppet regime sitting on its southwestern doorstep. The presence of Iranian Scud missiles across the Persian Gulf is enough of a challenge for Riyadh; it cannot afford to have a second front open up in Yemen in any potential conflict with Iran. Tehran can distract Saudi Arabia, and by extension the whole GCC, by supporting a limited Houthi insurgency in Yemen at a relatively low cost and low risk. Iran will continue to support its proxies in Yemen in the near term to keep the GCC members on their toes, testing their patience.

Section II: The Biggest Risk

One question remains that must be answered to justify the agreement: What if Iran already has the bomb? By signing the agreement, every signatory has taken a tremendous risk, while GCC nations and Israel are left to solemnly consider their new security concerns. If it was discovered that the Iranians stashed away a nuclear arsenal while under watchful eyes for all these years, it would be the counterintelligence victory of the decade, and Israel would certainly make the most of its “I told you so!” opportunity. But regardless of whether Iran does have the bomb, it still makes sense for the negotiating parties to conclude this agreement, for several reasons.

First, there’s a good chance the IAEA would discover a hidden nuclear weapons cache, or they would be blocked by the Iranian government from inspecting a suspected arsenal, which would be a violation of the JCPOA. While the IAEA is responsible for the actual inspections, there can be no doubt that a troupe of Western intelligence agencies will feed the inspectors leads and tips while they continue scouring the Persian landscape for nuclear compounds. Either the discovery of illicit materials or a blockage of IAEA activities would indicate malign intentions in Tehran; the sanctions and military posturing of the past decade would snap back into action shortly thereafter.

Secondly, Iran remains vulnerable to second-strike counterattacks from nuclear capable enemies, such as all-but-certain-to-exist Israeli nuclear weapons or nuclear missiles launched from US submarines. Thus, the Cold-War era theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) stubbornly persists in our post-Cold War world. The US is not abandoning their Arab allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), contrary to popular belief on “the Arab Street.” The GCC member nations and Israel have been busy developing their economies and militaries with US aid ever since 9/11, and will continue to beef up their security apparatuses in the future. Quiet Israeli-GCC cooperation will continue unimpeded for the near term, as Iran becomes a common problem and Palestine (remember that place?) falls by the wayside. The evidence speaks for itself: in February, Saudi Arabia granted Israel permission to use its airspace in any future strike against Iran in return for unspecified “progress” from Israel on Palestinian issues. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia bought $1.75 billion worth of Patriot air defense systems from the USA last year to defend against Iran’s considerable arsenal of missiles and rockets.

Third, the strategic benefits for all the signatories far outweigh the costs. Iran has capitulated to most every demand made by Western negotiators in the deal, and that alone shows how desperate Tehran is to conclude the deal. The White House has been gloating about the deal, and has been on a major public relations campaign to generate popular support for it. US Secretary of State John Kerry even claimed that he walked out of the talks on three occasions over the years of negotiations, and that the Iranian negotiators eventually agreed to demands made by Western powers in order to continue the negotiations. The US and its European allies have made a huge step in crafting a sustainable balance of power in the region. Crafting a Middle Eastern arrangement that can exist without active oversight and military intervention has been a goal of Western powers since the occupation of Iraq went downhill shortly after the initial invasion. Iraq is still a work in progress, but the West is confident that the GCC states are strong enough to counter Iranian influence while (hopefully) pounding away at the Islamic State. Having the Iranian segment of the Middle Eastern equation figured out is a massive accomplishment. As for the Iranians, they have been given an opportunity to come out from their isolation and retake their historical place as a regional power based upon the lands of ancient Persia. They will look for opportunities to skirt provisions of the deal, as any self-interested power would, but they cannot afford to squander their ascent. Direct military engagement would cost Iran the opportunities for development it has worked to achieve over the last several years.

So what are the odds that Iran has nukes? Well, that depends on who you ask. You might believe “Reza Khalili”, who wrote a Washington Post article under a pseudonym in 2011 in which he claimed that he was a CIA spy and that the Iranian regime had acquired nuclear weapons from old Soviet arsenals. You might also choose to put faith in Foreign Policy Magazine’s 2015 argument by Graham Allison, who claims the Iranians merely have the capability to produce nuclear weapons in short order if needed. Or, you could go with the testimony of senior US officials, who claimed in a 2012 New York Times article that Iran doesn’t have nuclear weapons and only wants the capability to produce them.

Regardless of if Iran has nukes, has the capability to produce them, or has neither, the deal still makes sense for all of the reasons outlined above. If they do have nuclear weapons, that makes the JCPOA pills much easier to swallow, and the Iranian government is probably struggling to keep a straight face after successfully bluffing the entire world. But logic still compels Iran to sign the agreement even if they don’t have any nuclear weapons stashed away. Remaining a political pariah and isolating a population of 77 million people from the world just for the sake of building weapons that are unlikely to be used outside of World War III doesn’t make sense from any pragmatic standpoint. “The Iranians aren’t pragmatic! They’re radicals!” screams Jerusalem. Well, some are, but not all. The Iranian leadership today is not made up of the angry mob that stormed the US Embassy in Tehran all those years ago. President Rouhani is not Ahmadinejad; Rouhani is a comparably level-headed career diplomat and academic, and has written books like his 1,200 page tome National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy. Political rhetoric in Tehran may be radical, but the thinking going on there is very realistic. The current government understands that Iran is outgunned and outnumbered by the American, Israeli and GCC militaries. Self-destruction is not on the table in Tehran.

Thoughts? Opinions? Disagreements? Feel free to leave your ideas down here in our oft-neglected comment section.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

As the United States teeters on the edge of its third invasion of Iraq in three decades, most recently sending 450 advisors to aid the Baghdad government, the situation in-country isn’t pretty. ISIS stalks the borderlands of the Levant and Mesopotamia, while its primary opponents, the Iraqi Shiites, are bankrolled and advised by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.  This already puts the United States between a rock and a hard place. But further factors – from the raging war in neighboring Syria to the broad regional competition between the Sunni monarchies and Iran to the currently-underway Iranian nuclear deal – make for a more complicated situation in the Middle East than any in recent memory. The American position amidst all this – strapped as it is on all sides, constrained by contradictory commitments and limits – is even more mind-boggling.

The American public doesn’t know quite what to make of this mess. Think tanks, academics and policymakers don’t seem to have any constructive ideas on a way forward, so discussion of “what’s going on” usually devolves into a game of finger-pointing.

Partisan Republicans blame the ongoing chaos on President Obama and his relative dovishness, restraint and inaction. To them, Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech was hopeless pandering to the Muslim world at best, and shameful apologizing at worst. They see the President’s single-minded focus on a (weak) nuclear deal with Iran as appeasement. Worse, they believe the President to have sold out on crucial allies, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. The President’s gradual withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan they consider a resignation to defeat, surrendering a noble cause.

Partisan Democrats place their blame further back, on President Bush and his reckless militarism, trigger-happy attitude and crusading zeal for democracy promotion. To many, the War in Afghanistan was potentially justified, had it ended after the defeat of the Taliban. But the War in Iraq was either foolish adventurism or evil incarnate—the first stage of an aggressive American empire, or otherwise a greedy machination to secure oil supplies. More importantly, President Bush’s insistence on democracy promotion in Iraq and Afghanistan by the sword, and in other Middle Eastern countries by political pressure, was seen as an affront to the rights of those societies. Democrats tend to think President Bush started something he didn’t need to start, for all the wrong reasons.

As is the case with most political debates and indeed most historical ones, both perspectives contain elements of truth. Bush’s reckless bravado did in fact lead us into an unwinnable war, because the goals we set were impossible to attain. Obama’s reluctance to demonstrate American military power did indeed allow rival powers like ISIS and Iran to hack out domains for themselves in which they could operate with impunity, unmolested by American strength. But neither narrative tells a fully convincing story.

So here’s my take on it.

Ever since the First Gulf War in 1991, we were bound to wind up invading Iraq again sooner or later. Saddam Hussein was simply too unstable—we would never be able to trust him to act predictably. The US airstrikes on Iraq ordered by President Clinton throughout the 1990s were made in response to Saddam’s barbarism against the northern Kurds and his willingness to bend the regional balance of power.

Come the early 2000s and the War on Terror, Saddam was not, in fact, supplying weapons to terrorists, or anything of the kind. In fact, his Ba’ath Party was a wholly secular institution—the Wahhabis in al-Qaeda were his rivals. Nonetheless, an Iraqi WMD would be unacceptable for the US, not because the regime might give it to terrorists but because it would immensely change the geopolitical dynamic in the Middle East. The Saudis, Turks, Egyptians and Iranians would soon pursue nukes of their own—and the Saudis and Iranians were known to have close working relations with different groups of jihadist terrorists.

Because we perceived that Saddam would soon become more powerful, we invaded. (Much of the credit goes to the then-powerful neoconservatives in the President’s circle, too; but even had Al Gore then been President, the impetus to attack Saddam would have been strong, for strategic reasons).

I think invading Iraq and deposing Saddam Hussein was a sensible policy, justifiable on strategic grounds. Saddam had proven himself to be irrational and aggressive, an unacceptable combination in a region through which a significant portion of the world’s energy supplies flowed. We needed him out.

That said, the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom was an embarrassment to strategic studies and political theory, not to mention to the US Military. When we went in with something like a third of the troops top generals recommended, we went in unprepared. When we declared that our mission was to turn Iraq into something we would recognize as a functioning liberal democracy, we bit off more than we could chew. And when we assumed that we could attain that transformation by the sword, we set off a rabid insurgency and civil war that killed 4,000 American soldiers and countless more Iraqis. The conduct of the war was a disaster in almost every sense.

It seems that Bush realized his blunders, though, as his Presidency waned. Gone were the annunciations of impending democratic transition, and in were the enterprising generals who practiced revised counterinsurgency strategies. By the aftermath of the Surge of 2007-2008, the civil war had died down and order, the prerequisite of political institutions, was beginning to become a norm. Sunni and Shiite militias both joined us in the fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq and radical militias. The Iraqi people were becoming a nation. We weren’t winning, but we were creating a strategic reality more amenable to our interests.

As the occupation drew on, President Bush left and President Obama entered the Oval Office and, sticking true to his campaign pledges, began reducing the US military presence in Iraq. By 2010 the formal US military presence had been removed from the country, although thousands of advisors remained.

Over the years, the sectarian violence returned and Iraq’s new governing institutions decayed into insignificance. The US-backed Iraqi military did what it could, but it was largely inept in the face of newly radicalizing militant groups. Everything we had fought to build and protect in the Second Gulf War was destroyed; because we left, and because chaos and insurgency returned, we lost the second round of warfare in Iraq.

The third round is brewing; its initial stages began right after we lost the second. Islamist fighters from the war in Syria spilled over the border, and one group in particular – the Islamic State in Iraq – built up its power until it grew strong enough to challenge the Iraqi government head on. Shortly after it declared a caliphate, it began its psychological warfare campaign of social media-publicized beheadings and dramatic, sweeping assaults on government forces, and the Western media began referring to it as “ISIS”. The US responded incrementally, much as it did in Vietnam—a few airstrikes here, some advisors there, now a Special Forces raid and national public statements whenever the public recoiled aghast at some magnificent slaughter or execution.

President Obama has been reluctant to intervene more decisively against ISIS in Iraq, knowing that the US public has no appetite for a third war in the cradle of civilization. He has hoped that the neighboring states whose interests are more directly threatened – Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Iran – would rise to the problem themselves. And they are doing so to a degree. But it remains doubtful whether the final end result of their action will be acceptable to American interests, especially if the Iranians carve out a greater sphere of influence in Iraq and the Sunni states bolster funding to radical Sunni militias to curtail Iranian power. President Obama’s inaction, hesitancy to project US power, and lack of a coherent vision for American policy in the Middle East has allowed regional players to roam about freely and create a scenario roundly hostile to US interests.

At the moment, though, President Obama does seem to be stepping up his game and taking (slightly) more assertive action against ISIS in Iraq. It is not enough yet; but perhaps once the deal with Iran has been reached, he will dedicate more effort to finding a strategic solution for Iraq. It seems clear that deeper US involvement – and far more importantly, wiser US strategic thinking – will be necessary to carve an acceptable endgame in Iraq in particular and the Middle East in general. With luck, Obama or his successor can make the intervention swift and effective, with long-lasting results.

I don’t have a clue what the winning strategy for Iraq might be, and I hope some strategic thinker comes out with one soon. It would most likely involve a splitting-up of Iraq into smaller units, including an independent Kurdistan, and a complete extermination of ISIS’s military forces. The coming deal with Iran will entrench the mullahs’ strategic position, so we would be wise to balance against that by removing Bashar as-Assad in Syria and replacing him with a moderate Sunni regime in Damascus. We would also be wise to continue building up our relations with the Sunni kingdoms, especially our strained relationship with Saudi Arabia—with no large buffer between the Sunni states and Iran, it may be time to beef them up in ways previously unthinkable, perhaps including a permanent forward military presence in Iraq not unlike those we maintain in Europe and Japan.

So who is to “blame” for Iraq?

Both President Bush and President Obama are to blame for the loss of the Second Iraq War. Bush doomed the mission from the start by setting the bar too high and acting recklessly; Obama abjectly surrendered the cause to fate (and American public opinion) in the complete withdrawal of US troops. While Obama’s was more direct and Bush’s more egregious, both errors equally contributed to our defeat.

However, both Bush and Obama learned from their mistakes. Bush began to pursue a more prudent strategy in his second term, while Obama has been less averse to using military force in his later second term. Perhaps there would have been a better outcome if Bush had learned to be a fox earlier, and if Obama learns to be a lion soon. Ultimately it was too late for either to correct their mistakes before time ran out; we can only hope that President Obama’s successor pursues a prudent and firm strategy from the very beginning.

We won Iraq I resoundingly, and we surrendered Iraq II. Iraq III has already begun, as American airstrikes, Special Forces activity and the lily-pad bases now dotting the country demonstrate. There has been no full-fledged invasion, but Americans again go to war in the land between the rivers. It’s increasingly starting to look like Lyndon Johnson’s slow, quiet and public opinion-minded escalation of American involvement in Vietnam.

This will not do—we have a quagmire waiting to happen, a whirlpool waiting to suck in the lives of thousands more American troops. Deeper American involvement in Iraq is unavoidable, contrary to General Dempsey’s claims, but we should make it as effective and decisive as possible so as to save the most blood and treasure while winning the best strategic reality. That means that the next President of the United States has to look clear-eyed at the world, and the Middle East in particular, and determine what strategic reality he wants to leave for his successor. Then he or she must do everything in their power to make that situation a reality—and with luck, that situation will be a stable Middle East with a healthy balance of power maintained by prudent American statecraft. Victory in Iraq is an integral component of a more secure Middle Eastern peace, but victory will be unattainable until we define our objectives for the Middle East moving forward. Just beating ISIS doesn’t cut it.

Were it not for the Middle East’s geostrategic position between Europe and Asia and its vast oil supplies to those continents, perhaps we could ignore it with the leisure with which we ignore Sub-Saharan Africa. But we can’t. As protectors of the liberal international order, we have vital interests in the Middle East that aren’t about to go away. Our duty as a superpower will continue to draw us into the Persian Gulf until Europe and Asia no longer run on oil, or else until we can establish a relatively stable regional order like that which existed from 1945 to 1979. Until then, periodic regional war will be the norm. We must win Iraq III decisively, and create a successful new strategic reality in the Middle East, if we are to preclude an Iraq IV.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Biz Peabody

While the parameters reached yesterday qualify only as “an understanding” to what will hopefully become a fully-fledged agreement within the next three months, and while this understanding currently holds for only 15 years, it is remarkable that such an understanding even exists after more than 30 years of sanctions. Now that Western sanctions on Iran will be loosened and potentially lifted, the Iranian people can expect a significant economic upturn.

15 years seems like a short amount of time for an agreement that regards nuclear capabilities and therefore the safety of the region. However, let’s remember that the Islamic State (IS) only first reared its ugly head last summer, and is now a major global issue. Events such as regime changes, land grabs, alliance breaks and regional squabbles evolve rapidly in the Middle East, and the Iranian government under President Rouhani has proven itself (thus far) to be fairly rational and even-keeled relative to other governments in the region, many of whom are US allies.

Iran could, if it hasn’t already been doing so, assist in the battle against IS. Regardless of whether Israel and Saudi Arabia are uncomfortable with this nuclear deal, and regardless of whether the US would rather have the Sunni Gulf monarchies take down IS instead of Iran, the fact remains that a regional coalition will be needed to restore peace. At this point, peace in the Middle East should be the most pressing goal–a peace that involves the input of all the powerful regional actors, regardless of religion or ethnicity. Perhaps this is a naive hope, but this nuclear arrangement with Iran could move the region in the right direction if the other regional powers can somehow get on board.

As President Obama said yesterday: “when critics of the deal sound off, ask this simple question: do you really think that this verifiable deal is worse than the risk of another war in the Middle East?”

Nathaniel Haas

Don’t disable the Google alerts for “Iranian nuclear talks” just yet. The “deal,” not codified until June 31, is as good as monopoly money until then. Be they 47 Republican senators or the stubbornness of Prime Minister Netanyahu, a myriad of “wild cards” remain.

If the deal does go through, then consider the $1.6 billion a month in oil revenue — hardly monopoly money — that Iran would accrue as a result of the lifted sanctions. With that, expect Iran to scale up its influence for Shiite minorities around the Middle East, be they the President Assad-led government in Syria, or the Houthi minority in Yemen. Continuing to support Shiite governments (and rebel Shiite groups, in the case of the Houthi’s), whose continued exclusion of Sunni Muslims from the governing table has given momentum to the growth of IS, is a most dangerous game of which anyone who hopes for stability in the Middle East must remain aware.

The agreement is only for 15 years–a blip on the screen for a country like Iran, which has been bent on accruing nuclear capabilities for decades. If a permanent agreement is not possible, then world powers can be expected to hope (and tacitly encourage) an eventual regime change in Iran to remove the constant threat of a nuclear theocracy with breakout capabilities.

The way the media has covered the talks, you’d think the Peace of Westphalia has just been signed. As it stands, the deal is a good, albeit temporary one, but leaves much to remain cognizant of in the Middle East. Reducing the threat of a nuclear Iran is important, but certainly not the endgame. Now, consider modifying the Google alerts: “Iranian sphere of influence.”

Jack Anderson

President Obama has wanted to get the US out of the Middle East since taking office. This automatically leaves a military power vacuum that could be filled by Iran. Pulling out of Iraq and the wider Middle East to a substantial degree without coming to some kind of accommodation with Iran would have been disastrous for the US and its Sunni allies in the region. The Middle East has not had to worry about overt Iranian incursions since before the time of Saddam Hussein, as he and other rulers retained Sunni power in the majority of nearby nations. Israel and the Gulf states can easily withstand covert Iranian efforts and the works of its proxies, but overt influence from Tehran is about to become a real factor.

Iran is not the sum of the headlines it generates, and neither is Israel or Saudi Arabia. All three use extreme rhetoric to appear tougher in the international arena. This deal is about structuring a balance of power in the region that Saudis, Iranians, Israelis and Americans can all live with, regardless of how it tastes. The key is stability. States need to prosper in order to be stable, and Iran has not been prospering. This deal seeks to give Iran a chance at prosperity and internal stability, even with a nuclear industry, in exchange for less aggression and regional calm. If it works, then Obama would actually deserve a Nobel Peace Prize.

Dan Morgan-Russell

This is not that big of an accomplishment. There is no deal yet; there is only an agreement on the framework of a deal. Baby steps don’t count when nuclear weapons are involved.

Furthermore, is this drawn-out and likely fruitless diplomatic effort even worth it?

President Obama is wasting too much time, effort and political capital on this deal with Iran to call this a victory. The risks of a nuclear Iran are not that great. While I normally disagree with neorealists like American political scientist Kenneth Waltz, I agree that letting Iran get the bomb would not radically change the Middle Eastern political landscape. Israel, with its sizeable nuclear arsenal, will still be there in the morning. Saudi Arabia, Syria and other regional powers will not begin building their own weapons. The president needs to save his political capital in the Middle East for combatting IS or encouraging the Palestinian peace process.

If Iran will not come to the table so the US can focus on bigger fish, then leave the table and let the sanctions and the centrifuges continue.

Jason Tse

I tend to be a bit of an optimist about US-Iran relations. While it is true that this is at most a medium-term agreement with plenty of barriers to a final agreement by June, today’s news was an encouraging step in the process.

Others have spoken on security implications, so I’d like to present other reasons why the US should continue pushing towards an agreement with Iran, and why the lifting of sanctions is good not only for Iran, but also for the US.

The reasons are twofold: commercial and cultural. Iran’s economic woes are pronounced due to the sanctions. Conversely, the economic potential of Iran is robust. Consider that in 2014, the IMF calculated Iran’s nominal GDP as 32nd in the world, ahead of countries such as South Africa, Malaysia and Chile. 2013 UN data estimate Iran to be 27th, ahead of even Taiwan and Thailand. If Iran achieved this under crippling isolation, I can only imagine what greater integration into the global economy will yield for both ends of the economic relationship.

More intangibly, increased exposure between Americans and Iranians can inspire new and currently unimaginable ideas. Iran stands on a rich history, whereas modern American culture holds strong appeal among Iranians. There is much to learn from each other. Greater connectivity also tends to reduce the chances of serious conflict, much like how chances of conflict between China and the US are significantly mitigated given the levels of contact between everyday peoples.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Correction: The previous version of Jack’s response erroneously mentioned “Sunnis, Shia, Jews and Americans” as key players in the nuclear agreement. The article has been corrected to list Saudis, Iranians, Israelis and Americans.

I discovered the app while keeping in touch with a dear friend who currently resides in Israel. I downloaded it out of curiosity and thought it would allow me to know whether or not someone I knew was in danger. I experienced, as many users have reported, a range of emotional responses with Red Alert: anger, sadness, fear, anxiety, or a sense of control or solidarity. Despite not being physically in Israel and experiencing rocket fire first hand, this application solicited an empathic response by solely providing me with the knowledge of the attack. The emotional effect of this app, regardless of design, may set a new precedent in the application of communication technology in times of war.

Red Alert has received over 1 million downloads with users all over the world. The original app was only available in Hebrew until Ron Dermer, the Israeli ambassador to the US, was testifying before a congressional subcommittee and his phone went off. Subsequently, Rep. Mark Meadows (R-NC) asked if the app was available in English and so Dermer contacted the app’s developers. The app has been popular in the US and worldwide, as well as in Israel where the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) encourages its installation. Though the app is developed independently, it gathers data from IDF intelligence. Therefore, there is no perceived intermediary between the information and the people.

Some observers have questioned whether or not the app simply creates “unneeded hysteria” considering that those under the threat of rockets are warned by sirens and the app does little to change one’s ability to find cover in 15 seconds. As it was explained to me by a friend: “even with the Iron Dome intercepting a rocket the sirens still go off and you need to find cover… the falling debris is still dangerous.” Furthermore, the app does not give precise locations and in that regard is no more informative than existing channels of information.

The comment section provides a relatively unfiltered look at how other users feel with the ability to comment on each individual rocket attack. The majority of comments are positive displays of solidarity and hope for an end to the conflict. However, there is certainly a persistent minority of users whose comments reflect the vitriol that can only perpetuate the cycle of violence that has plagued Israel for decades.

As summer drew to a close, the conflict between Hamas and Israel seemed intractable. In the final week of the conflict my phone went off constantly. I would awake to dozens of notifications of rocket attacks. Just before the ceasefire, my friend informed me: “I had to switch off Red Alert. It was making me miserable. I figured I would notice the siren anyway.” I too felt miserable and helpless since every notification reminded me of what I knew already: the situation is awful for all involved.

The recent rise of the Islamic State, specifically the videotaped beheadings of three British and American journalists, showed the world how the evolution of social media and mobile technology can effectively be used for (repulsive) propaganda. With Red Alert,the technology has entered the political domain of war in a unique way by successfully managing to reduce the emotional distance, albeit in a limited fashion, between those living in a conflict and those who are observing it. The consequences and future applications of social media and mobile apps in warfare are hard to foresee at this point. Will a renewed connection to war and the common space for sharing reactions spark pacifist sentiments or increase acrimony and aggressive behavior?

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

The CNN app on my phone, which informs me of global and domestic events multiple times throughout the day, has stopped mentioning the current Gaza crisis. Is my phone getting tired of hearing about these continuous attempts to broker successful peace talks between Israel and Hamas? Is it losing faith in diplomacy’s ability to instill some kind of change in this conflict? Is that also why the media’s reporting on this crisis has slowly trickled out?

In the past two weeks, the Egyptian-sponsored talks between the two sworn enemies first fell apart when Hamas rejected a US-backed, Israeli-supported peace proposal; Hamas cited that none of its demands were met. Rockets and airstrikes were exchanged until last Tuesday, when the Egyptians brokered a new ceasefire. The new proposal appears only slightly more neutral, however, directing Israel to loosen its hold over Gaza’s border only to allow humanitarian organizations to begin rebuilding. But the accepted proposal does not directly address the larger issues of the Israeli blockade on Gaza and Hamas’ demands for a seaport and airport. Egypt promises to reopen negotiations within the month to address these larger issues. It’s not surprising that Egypt has been playing such a patient role in these negotiations, though: the country has a lot riding on peace between these two entities.

I want to get something straight first. It’s not unusual that Egypt has taken up the role as peacemaker. Historically, Egypt has pushed and prodded its image as the “Arab leader” of the Middle Eastern states: it is by far the most populated country in the region, has for the most part kept up a strong military alliance with the United States and was the first Arab country to acknowledge Israel as a state when Egypt’s leader, Anwar Sadat, signed the Camp David Accords in 1978. In this sense, it isn’t hard to see why Egypt is and has for many years taken a lead role in facilitating peace between Palestine and Israel whenever conflicts arise. If Egypt succeeds in establishing peace, even if for a little while, then it will be praised for its diplomatic genius by the US and regional peers. And, if Egyptian diplomats fail, well, at least they tried, right?

Yet, what is so curious about this round of conflict resolution is that the Egyptian cease-fire proposal has continuously favored Israel’s interests. In the original proposal, the Israeli blockade of Gaza’s borders and economy would simply be loosened, not lifted, and Israel would be allowed to retain its hold on the Gaza territory: unacceptable conditions from Hamas’ perspective. In the past, failure to appease the Palestinian delegation would result in Egypt rushing to fix its proposal to better suit both sides; favoritism towards the Palestinians – Egypt’s Arab allies – was not uncommon. This time was different: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan called on Hamas to accept the proposal. Since when does the Arab world conspicuously side with Israel over Palestine? And since when do the Arab states in the Middle East region support the Jewish state over another Arab one?

This is no longer about the Arabs of the region versus the Israelis. It’s about stamping out Islamism and every one of its far-reaching tendrils, which includes groups like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (both of which, by the way, are internationally recognized terrorist organizations). Even the powerful Arab governments in Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which may have funded extremist Sunni religious groups in the past, are quickly denying any involvement in these groups’ actions once the groups gain power in the region. These Arab governments, regardless of their alleged shared interests with these groups in the past, are terrified of Islamism once it is powerful enough to threaten their national security. Because of Islamism’s proven ability to topple regimes, they consider such terrorist groups a direct threat to their security. It’s a complicated situation that varies for each government and their relations with each group, but, as pertains to the current Palestinian-Israeli crisis, the Arab governments are willing to put aside their previous fervent dislike for Israel if it means they might be able to destroy Hamas.

The reason why this issue hits so close to home for Egypt is clear if we look at its recent past. Not too long ago, Egypt elected President Mohammad Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood party—a political choice that disintegrated fairly quickly when Morsi and his party began showing signs of taking more liberties than democracy would allow. The Egyptian military ousted Morsi and, since this past June, has put Al-Sisi, a military man, in his place. Al-Sisi, for his part, is determined to destroy any remnant of the Brotherhood in Egypt. He has declared them a terrorist organization and has in the past year imprisoned and killed many of their followers. With Hamas, too, Al-Sisi is clear about his position, announcing in a statement that Hamas, and not Israel, is to blame for the countless civilian deaths in Palestine throughout the crisis this summer. Even the Egyptian media condemns Hamas for being a “tool of a regional Islamist plot” to destabilize Egypt yet again.

So, for arguably the first time, the states leading the Arab region find their interests aligned with those of Israel. It is in the best interests of both to delegitimize and destroy Hamas, and both will work together towards achieving this goal. Does this mean Israel has finally found its regional niche in this united Arab-Israeli fight against a terrorist group? Perhaps—though with the current uncertainty in the region it’s hard to tell in the long run, and long-held biases don’t necessarily die so easily. For now, though, Egypt and its peers are focused wholeheartedly on the desperate quest for regional stability.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Biz Peabody

Nationalism: long thought to be one of the strongest forces in the world. The exact definition of nationalism is the amalgamation of feelings, principles and efforts in the name of patriotic pride for one’s nation or country. The psychological concept of nationalism has always been present in humans, because we’re “programmed” to identify with our groups – our “herds” – who we work with to ensure our survival as individuals and as a species.

What we’re witnessing as these two crises in Gaza and Ukraine unfold is a phenomenon that is becoming clearer as the world globalizes: the clash of nationalism and technology. In the past, the only way for a nation to defend itself was through large-scale war against other nations, but technology is allowing smaller entities to assert themselves on the global stage. In the tragedy of 9/11, it became clear that large-scale war was no longer the paradigm. A group – Al-Qaeda – was able to wage war on the hegemon – the US – and the hegemon was forced to wage its “War on Terror” on an ideology.

In a similar group-against-nation dynamic, the war between Hamas and Israel is driven by nationalist sentiments, and so is the war fought between Ukraine against its pro-Russian rebels. Aside from the tragedies these two conflicts have created – most recently pro-Russian rebels shooting down commercial flight MH-17, and the 500+ deaths in Gaza and Israel – the conflicts reveal that it is becoming easier for smaller and smaller groups to assert their own brand of nationalism on bigger and bigger entities. Diplomatic efforts to end these conflicts, therefore, must begin focusing more on the global, collective good and less on emphasizing “peace talks” between warring nations. Continuing to simply call for peace between nationalistic entities only underlines differences between groups, which in turn strengthens nationalistic mentalities and further separates peoples.

Jason Tse

Two major crises could not come at a more inopportune time. Now the United States faces trouble on three fronts: the ISIS crisis in Iraq, the MH-17 disaster, and the war in Gaza.

I wrote in a recent piece for Glimpse about how rapprochement with Iran was expedient for our interests in the Middle East. In the US-Iran engagement, Russia had always positioned itself as a close partner with Iran, able to sway Iran to a favorable agreement similar to China’s promises on North Korea.

But, the MH-17 disaster complicates things. Facts are still surfacing, but with the US Intelligence Community confirming that the weapon systems used to shoot down MH-17 were moved quietly back to Russia and Putin’s public attempts to shift blame onto Kiev, it is almost certain that Russian-backed and armed rebels shot down the plane.

This leads the US to a new dilemma: choosing which foe represents the larger threat: Russia or Iran. While it is clear that Russia must be held accountable, the US should take care not to completely back the bear into a corner. At the same time, greater action against Russia, which seems likely considering the global outrage, would signal that a rapprochement with Iran is no longer merely expedient to fighting the ISIS crisis, but necessary now that Iran’s partnership (or at least being out of Russia’s orbit) is required to address both ISIS and Russia. This unfortunately gives the Iranian hand a significant boost as the Americans and Iranians return to the table for extended negotiations.

Luke Phillips

I don’t have too many thoughts on either crisis boiling up this week, not the one in Gaza or the one in Ukraine. I do have thoughts, however, on what the American and overall Western reaction will be to each.

If the timeline of the Ukraine crisis up to this point is any guide, then I think it can safely be said that there won’t be very much in the way of policy innovation in the wake of the tragedy of MH-17. Sure, a few more impassioned speeches will be made in Brussels and Washington about heavier sanctions on Moscow, and much energy will be expended in the time-tested act of finger-waving. But no one in the European Union or US has the political will to make truly meaningful actions against Putin’s Russia, and I don’t necessarily think they should. MH-17, for the tragedy it is, is not particularly important. But, if Russia’s actions began to directly threaten the Baltic States or Poland, then we might see some shuffling of feet in the West.

As for Gaza, that’s even easier. The fight will go on for a few weeks or months, Palestinian and Israeli apologists will absolve themselves and accuse the other side, and one happy autumn day the flag of truce will go up. Give it three years, maybe less, and there will be peace talks in America again. Another few years and they’ll be back at war. However, shifting geopolitical dynamics in the broader Middle East might alter the equation somewhat. In particular, if Iranian-American relations normalize, and the US distances itself from Israel, the Jewish State may be compelled to engage in more vigorous diplomacy. Conversely, if the massive war underway in neighboring Syria and Iraq spreads into Jordan, a more security-paranoid Israel could take aggressive measures in Gaza and even the West Bank to forestall the violence from penetrating its borders.

Time will tell. Prudence is all we can ask of our leaders, restraint all we can ask of those abroad.

Abigail Becker

Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in November 2013, the fighting in Crimea has unfortunately involved many civilians. Because of the nature of the fighting, the death of more innocent people is not surprising. What distinguishes the attack on MH-17 from previous conflicts is the international nature of the event. The crisis in Ukraine has, of course, been an international headline from the start, but for most people beyond the Ukraine/Russia border, it has remained a distant threat. The crash of MH-17 shatters that feeling of safe separation. Almost every continent was represented on the flight, and a number of countries issued statements of sadness and anger. The Netherlands, which lost 193 citizens, has been particularly vocal, and rightfully so.

To make matters worse, the rebels handled the aftermath of the crash with an unbelievable lack of tact and decency. The bodies of the victims were hidden for days after the crash in train cars and the crash site was kept on strict lockdown. Unsurprisingly, there has been no apology from the rebels, Putin or the Ukrainian government. All parties have instead chosen to play the blame game – though most everyone agrees the Russians and rebels are responsible. The botched handling of the victims’ bodies has only increased tensions and polarized the opposing sides. This is no longer a crisis between a state and rebels—it is a conflict between the rebels and Putin, and angered people around the world.

Luodanni Chen

Let’s talk facts. The 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine began on February 23, 2014. During the past five months, two Ukrainian military planes have been shot down in the region: one in June and one just three days before the attack on MH-17. The plane crash in June has been identified as the work of pro-Russian separatists. The large Ukrainian military transport jet was shot down using a shoulder-fired missile when the jet was trying to land at an airport in Luhansk. One month later, another military plane was shot down when it was flying at 6,500 meters. This distance is well beyond the range of shoulder-fired missiles. Ukrainian officials speculated that a more powerful missile had brought down the plane, and the missile was perhaps fired from territories within the Russian Federation. A powerful anti-aircraft weapon that is capable of doing such damage is called the Buk surface-to-air missile. The Buk missile system was developed by the Soviet Union and was in service since 1979. Buk is “capable of detecting air targets at ranges of up to 160 km and hitting them at full altitude range at a distance of over 30 km,” according to the Russian Defense Ministry information. Obama has already confirmed the use of surface-to-air missile in the MH-17 disaster on July 18^th. By connecting these dots, Putin has his fingerprints all over this. What is his next play and how will the international community respond?

Kshitij Kumar

Both the Gaza crisis and the Malaysian Airlines tragedy have resulted in unfortunate, devastating civilian deaths. These were 800+ individuals (400 noncombatants and counting in Gaza, 298 on MH-17) that had no say, no involvement in either conflict. They were casualties of crossfire, and whether their deaths are labeled accidents or unfortunate necessities resulting from the use of civilians as human shields, the loss of innocent life is unjust and disturbing. While the technology of war has evolved to allow high precision targeting and supposedly minimize collateral damage, clearly, this is not what is happening. To add insult to injury, the deaths are being politicized! Headlines earlier suggest that the remains of the dead of the Malaysian aircraft are pieces in an international political ‘game’; a Wall Street Journal article suggested that the very election of Hamas in Gaza forfeited civilians’ rights to be safe from war. The sanctity of life no longer seems to have any value; those who have lost loved ones are apparently not even allowed to mourn.

Yes, there is a bigger picture to look at—there is a greater good (everyone has a different opinion as to what that constitutes) to consider. But in these physical and verbal battles between nations, groups, passions and beliefs, it is imperative that we remember the humanity of those lost—as well as our own.

Update: Kshitij Kumar’s portion received minor corrections 

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

While the new leader was warmly met by the eager masses ready to move past the repressive Ahmadinejad era, there was no telling whether his words would bear fruit. Rouhani’s potential to affect such change was eclipsed by a shadow of doubt stemming from the supposition that he would serve as merely yet another slave to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and his Islamic regime. So has Iran’s “angel” Rouhani upheld his rhetoric presented during his campaign since entering office? Now, more than 6 months into his presidency, the gulf between his words and actions can be qualitatively tracked.

Appeasing the Hardliners

How has Rouhani performed thus far in winning the favor of governmental hardliners while working towards his progressive reform plans? At the start of his presidency, Rouhani took initiative to begin thawing strained US-Iran relations with a visit to the United Nations. You may recall his fifteen-minute phone call with President Obama during the trip, a call that garnered both support and criticism. Regardless of the critics, this phone call was a huge first step in the right direction towards reconciling US-Iran relations considering that the two states have not shared this level of contact since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Furthermore, Khamenei approved of Rouhani’s October trip to the United States. Although unable to appease hard-liners on the issue as they derided his approach, as long as the President is able to maintain the Supreme Leader’s support, he will be able to ward off hard-liner criticisms in his advances towards a relaxed relationship with the West.

Catering to Reformists

During his reign thus far, Rouhani has been performing a careful balancing act; he has struck a careful balance between the hardline and reformist camps while avoiding alienating Khamenei and other key government players. The new President has successfully garnered and maintained support from notable predecessors, including popular former reformist President Mohammad Khatami and former President Akbar Rafsanjani, one of the pillars of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, who remarked that “Rouhani’s success in New York is the mark of the divine victory.” Although not to the degree which former president Khatami was able to mobilize the “Iranian street,” Rouhani seems to have been met with considerable success in galvanizing the reformist camp, namely the youth who have warmly accepted his overtures to reduce Internet censorship.

Ending Sanctions

Perhaps his most significant achievement thus far has been unveiled at the negotiation table with Western powers. Back in November, Rouhani was able to successfully reach a temporary deal with the United States while entering into a year-long negotiation period to construct a permanent deal to ease sanctions. The $7-billion USD received by Iran in sanctions relief created room for a rise in the Iranian Rial and a minor stabilization of the national economy. Both the initial agreement and the overtures by both parties have been called nothing short of “historic” in the media.

Economic Viability

As mentioned, some of the easing of sanctions has seen a rise in the purchasing power of the Rial thereby providing Iranian citizens with some relief. Analyst groups claim that “last year, with economic pressure at its peak, Iran suffered from severe hyperinflation, and the Rial became the least valued currency in the world. This is no longer the case, as the Rial has gained significant value in 2013’. However, further economic steps must be made; the nuclear deal with the West has yet to come into full form, and whether Obama will be able to convince Congress to further repeal sanctions will prove to be a major determinant of whether Rouhani’s reform efforts retain momentum.

Relations With Israel

Thanks to his reputation as the new face of Iran, Rouhani has garnered a considerable amount of positive press and, for the most part, positive attention from the West – which has acted as a negative force against Israel. Within a month of Rouhani’s holding office, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dubbed him a “wolf in sheep’s clothing,” immediately dismissing him as nothing more than another mere slave to the Islamic regime. However, it seems that Israel emerged as the real loser in this love triangle between the United States, Iran and itself, failing to turn the West against its enemy as it had hoped. Within weeks after the Prime Minister’s fiery comment, Iran successfully brokered the temporary deal with the United States. Since then, public Israeli threats and comments against the country have subsided as the country now seems more preoccupied with the Palestinian question than the Iranian-nuclear issue at the moment.­­­

Human Rights

The human rights issue is arguably the weakest front of Rouhani’s presidency thus far. The leader’s promises on this subject seem to be little more than empty rhetoric, as notable action has yet to be taken to restore basic human rights and create equality among members of the citizenry. Premature optimism for Rouhani to improve civil rights issues has all but withered as the only observable change has been a steep rise in executions since he took office.

Another warning sign in his term stems from the detainment of prisoners within the country. The government’s minor gesture of releasing a few political prisoners in December did little to placate the mounting concerns of relatives and families of those still imprisoned, including activists of the “Iranian Street.” Additionally, despite early promises to address the house arrests of Green Revolution leaders Kharibi and Mousavi’s house arrests, not even a mention of the issue has been made. The president has remained silent even amidst mounting claims from close family and friends that their health is deteriorating significantly as a result of being confined within their households for several years now.

Whether Rouhani’s strategy to maintain popular support follows that of his predecessor Khatami’s path remains to be seen. In the middle of Khatami’s second term, his base fell apart due to youth and women disenfranchisement. Rouhani’s track record on human rights and freedoms may very well be what determines his support from his base.

Implications for U.S.-Iran Relations

Despite his shortcomings on the human rights dilemma, Rouhani’s successes have provided the Iranian regime with some degree of legitimacy it had been lacking for years, both in the eyes of the international community and the Iranian electorate. The real question for the Obama administration, however, is whether the Rouhani government’s newfound political capital and prestige is enough to placate conservative Hawks in Congress on both sides of the aisle who have been itching to introduce further sanctions. Any new congressional sanctions against Iran would not only spell the end of the current deal but would most likely set back nuclear negotiations by a number of years. Yet Rouhani, a veteran statesman and diplomat, is keenly aware that the halls of Congress are just as significant an arena for statecraft and diplomacy as the negotiating table. Rouhani’s foreign minister Javad Zarif has recently made a concerted effort to promote lobbying of their position to Congress via the small-but-growing Iranian-American lobby already present in the country.We will know soon enough how far Rouhani is willing to go to make good on his campaign promises in seeking to uplift the Iranian state.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff and editorial board.

Last summer, President Barack Obama vowed to employ a military intervention in civil war-stricken Syria if either side resorted to use of chemical weapons.

This summer, there has been confirmation that the conflict has crossed that “red line.” It’s your move now, Mr. President, but remember – whatever you decide to do, it’s a little too late to avoid checkmate.

Instead of drawing a line and waiting around playing the “sitting duck” game, the United States should have provided the Syrian rebels fighting in the civil war with military aid from the start. By passively watching the progression of what started as a peaceful protest of President Bashar al-Assad met by harsh government crackdowns, the international realm has allowed the situation to escalate into a full-scale civil war. The incumbent Assad regime – backed by Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iran and Russia – is fighting a rebel opposition backed by al-Qaida. By remaining inactive in the civil war, the West has played a clear role in allowing the death toll in Syria to continue to skyrocket. So the way I see it, the White House will tolerate the appearance of radical Muslim organizations in the conflict, and will tolerate the countless numbers of civilians killed daily, but the moral compass for some reason only prevails when the use of chemical weapons is introduced into the situation.

So what exactly will the Obama Administration do? Well, the answer is simple: do what has always been done. The White House has decided to supply military support through arming the rebels with “light” weapons. The United States is going to arm al-Qaeda-backed rebel forces who have already faced an astronomical death toll and most probably view the US with little credibility, thanks to our delay. Does anyone else see the obvious problem here? President Obama needs to take a note from history and consider the repercussions of what he is planning to do. Remember when the United States decided to arm Bin Laden and his supporters in the 1970s to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan? Those forces were then used to build up al-Qaeda as we know it today, which turned swiftly against its creator and spawned a massive terrorism campaign met by President George W. Bush’s infamous and seemingly endless “War on Terror“.

Is it too far-fetched to suppose that the Syrian rebel fighters will undoubtedly turn on the United States with animosity for its delay in assistance? Perhaps. But I don’t think it’s throwing the ball too far out of the park to say that with nearly 100,000 civilians already dead, from a humanitarian standpoint it may have behooved the White House to act more promptly. But then again, there is that consideration that the United States doesn’t really feel any sort of humanitarian obligation to the international realm, and particularly to the Middle East. Not only that, but our intervention within the region has been sporadic and confusingly contradictory. For instance, while the Obama administration saw no problem in thrusting its military forces into Libya in 2011, and liberally continues to dowse Yemen and obliterate countless innocent citizens with drones, it holds reservations in assisting the Syrian people from what appears to be escalating into a new-age genocide. Likewise, the administration has worked effortlessly to combat al-Qaeda by locating and killing Osama bin Laden, yet it continues to bolster al-Qaeda bases by arming al-Qaeda-backed rebel fighters in Syria.

Had the United States decided to act two years ago, in 2011, when the civil unrest began, it may have actually had a legitimate shot at quelling the war against Bashar al-Assad and his regime while at the same time preventing the rise of extremist groups such as al-Qaeda. That time has passed, so all we can hope for is that the Obama administration decides to intervene strongly enough. So let’s hope the White House is going to arm the Syrian rebels with more than just light weapons; without supplementing mere ammunition with antitank rockets and antiaircraft systems, there is little hope that the Syrian rebels will be able to finally put an end to this bloodshed and emerge victorious. With vital United States national security interests – namely containing al-Qaeda and preserving the security of Israel – being threatened by the civil war, it is now more urgent than ever for the Obama administration to take action to protect not only national interests but also human dignity and put a stop to the coldblooded carnage plaguing Syria.