The involvement of North Korean troops fighting on Russia’s side of the war in Ukraine is perplexing. Throughout its entire history, North Korea has never launched a foreign military intervention, so their presence in the Russian-Ukraine war is unprecedented. 

Russia is at a turning point in its history. With the war in Ukraine waging on for nearly three years, its ultimate status remains unclear; however, the war has undoubtedly questioned the U.S.-led global order. After the start of the invasion, Western nations immediately imposed trade and economic sanctions on Russia, effectively isolating it and reducing it to a pariah state similar to North Korea. 

As the war in Ukraine has gone on far longer than Russia anticipated, Russia has begun to run low on ammunition and manpower. Unwilling to back down on Ukraine, Moscow’s options for wartime trade have become largely restricted to the handful of other countries who have similarly been isolated from the Western financial world, such as Iran and North Korea. Russia has already been turning to Iran for thousands of cheap yet deadly drones throughout the war. As for North Korea, the country has spent decades preparing for a war with South Korea and the United States. As a result, outside of Russia itself, North Korea possesses the largest arsenal of artillery munitions of any country in the world. Realizing this and sharing a land border with North Korea, Putin saw a golden opportunity to restock on munitions by shipping artillery shells from Russia’s far east to the far west into Ukraine. 

In exchange, Russia agreed to give North Korea some of its significantly more advanced military technology compared to North Korea’s frozen in time Soviet military armaments. Previously, nearly the entire world including Russia was united in restricting trade with North Korea because of its nuclear weapons program. This restricted North Korea’s military from advancing into the modern day, especially compared to their South Korean counterpart. However, now that Russia has been ostracized by the Western world, its previous cooperation with Western powers has been abandoned, prompting Russia to seek new trading partners to counter its isolation.

The Russian Defence Minister visited Pyongyang in July 2023. Afterwards, Kim Jong Un traveled across the border to meet personally with Putin in September 2023. In summer 2024 Putin personally visited Kim on his own turf in Pyongyang for the first time in 24 years, pledging to support one another in the event of an attack on either country.

This marks a significant departure from North Korea’s previous attempts to normalize relations with the United States during the Trump administration, and realign its relations with Russia similarly as they were during the Cold War era. 

The details of Putin and Kim’s meetings are unknown, but the U.S. state department suggests that, since mid 2022, roughly 11,000 shipping containers have entered Russia from North Korea presumably carrying primarily munitions. Western estimates suggest that roughly 1.6 million to 6 million artillery shells have entered Russia from North Korea worth several billions of dollars. These shells are of debatable quality and reliability but have undoubtedly given Russia the edge in munitions while Russia restocks from their own factories. In October 2024, Western intelligence sources reported that roughly half of the Russian artillery shells used in Ukraine came from North Korea.

North Korea is arguably the most militarized country in the world. North Korea spends 36% of its GDP on military spending, which is nearly the same as Ukraine (37%) with an ongoing invasion across its territory. However, since North Korea is so impoverished, this is only a fraction of the spending the United States and South Korea spend on their militaries. 

Pyongyang knows that once Russia restores itself on munitions, its need for North Korea will diminish. As a result, in order to maintain the relationship and gain further military advances from Russia, North Korea is left offering Russia the only other thing they have that Russia is in need of: its massive reserves of soldiers. Approximately 30% of the entire North Korea population is either actively serving or in the reserves. All North Korean men are required to serve ten year terms while women are required to serve eight year terms. The country has more than 1.3 million personnel in their active duty army. This is almost as much as the 1.4 million U.S. personnel and more than Russia’s 1.1 million personnel.  

The New York Times estimated in October 2024 that approximately 115,000 Russian soldiers have been killed fighting in Ukraine, in addition to another 500,000 that have been wounded. Russia likely considered doing a larger mandate draft as Ukraine has done but it knows it would presumably make the war deeply unpopular. As a result, Moscow calculated the better option for itself is to give North Korea more technology in exchange for manpower. The Ukrainian military suspects that Moscow will use these North Korean troops to deploy in the Russian Kursk Oblast which Ukraine acquired in their counter offensive in August 2024. The presence of North Korean troops in Russian territory leads to frightening implications for the war and the rest of the world. 

Currently, the Ukraine-Russia war is at its worst point for Ukraine since the start of the war, with Russia slowly advancing further into Ukraine’s territory as Ukraine faces extreme artillery and manpower shortages. North Korean forces entering the Kursk Oblast would allow Russian troops to redeploy to the Russian offensive helping to increase their advances. The current North Korean troops are still untested with significant language barrier and operational differences to overcome. However, if North Korean soldiers prove effective it could suggest that these 10,000 troops are only the start of a much larger share of forces entering Russia to help the war effort. 

As for what this means outside of the Russian-Ukraine war, the Korean peninsula has become extremely precarious. In January 2024, Kim Jong Un formally called for an alteration to the North Korean constitution to remove all commitments to a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, he had the constitution changed to label South Korea as the nation’s “primary foe and invariable principle enemy.” In addition, he ordered the arch of reunification, a monument constructed in 2001 symbolizing Korea’s eventual reunification, to be destroyed. These moves effectively eliminate the long standing peaceful reunification of Korea from North Korea’s official policy. This has led several North Korea analysts to suggest that Kim Jong Un plans to go to war with South Korea. The publication does not suggest a specific when or how, only that Kim has made it in his mind to do so eventually. 

That being said, the South Korea military still far outclasses the North’s in almost every way. The rationale for North Korea to invade the South can be seen as extremely irrational. However, with the aid of advanced Russian technology in the form of advanced missiles, submarines, and more, South Korea is on high alert.

The involvement of North Korean troops in Russia’s war against Ukraine marks an unprecedented shift with significant implications for global security. For Russia, North Korea’s vast munitions and manpower alleviate critical shortages, enabling its prolonged offensive. For North Korea, the partnership offers advanced military technology, currently desperately needed by the Kim regime to bolster its aggressive ambitions. This alliance not only complicates Ukraine’s defense but also destabilizes the Korean peninsula, as Kim Jong Un dismantles the long standing peaceful reunification efforts and escalates hostile rhetoric toward South Korea. With authoritarian regimes deepening ties and defying international norms, the ripple effects of this partnership extend far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine, threatening to reshape regional dynamics and global power balances.

Lebanese citizens’ opinions on Hezbollah are varied and many are quite critical of the organization. Throughout Lebanon, Shia Muslims look at the group relatively favorably while Sunni Muslims and Christians have a much more negative opinion of Hezbollah. However, despite disagreements on the stances and actions of the group, 99% of Arabs agree that all Arab countries must cease contact with Israel in response to Israeli military action in Gaza. Hezbollah as an ideological entity is not necessarily well-loved, but it is also one of few groups committed to resisting the Israeli occupation. This then becomes a difficult issue for many Lebanese civilians as Israel continues its attempt to expand into southern Lebanon, in addition to Gaza and the West Bank. It seems that the only solution is the creation of an organization that will both have higher approval from Lebanese citizens and protect the country from Israeli occupation.

In this conversation of Lebanese support for Hezbollah, it is important to understand the religious makeup of Lebanon. While Lebanon recognizes 18 religious sects, there are three major factions, with 31.9% of Lebanese citizens identifying as Sunni Muslims, 31.2% as Shia Muslims and 32.4% as Christians. While all three groups are very close in size, it is interesting to note that Hezbollah is a Shiite group despite Shia Muslims being the smallest of the three largest religious groups. Shia Muslims are the largest group in Iran, however, which is the country responsible for the funding of Hezbollah.

Conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims has been a cause of division throughout the Middle East, with major clashes in both Syria and Iraq. Despite 85% of Muslims identifying as Sunni and 15% as Shia, Sunnis have not dominated militarily and there remains a great sectarian divide in countries like Lebanon. Fear of conflict is not limited to one group, though, with 67% of Lebanese Muslims believing that Shia-Sunni tensions are a big issue. The emergence of Hezbollah has certainly not aided this and, despite having governmental representation, Sunnis and Christians alike feel as though Hezbollah as a governing entity does not represent them.

Notably, in September 2024, an Israeli airstrike killed Hassan Nasrallah, a Hezbollah founder who led the group for over 30 years. Despite disagreements over Hezbollah’s existence, Nasrallah was relatively well-liked due to his resistance to Israel, including overseeing the end of Israel’s 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon.

During an interview in September 1992, Nasrallah asserted that Hezbollah is a resistance party that opposes the creation of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon. Additionally, in their 1998 Statement of Purpose, Hezbollah says, “It should be clear that the kind of Islam we want is a civilized endeavor that rejects injustice, humiliation, slavery, subjugation, colonialism and blackmail while we stretch out our arms for communication among nations on the basis of mutual respect.” 

In the U.S. Counterterrorism Guide, Hezbollah has been classified as a terrorist group since 1997, a designation shared by the Arab League and the EU, among others. Since the group’s inception, it has been responsible for several terrorist attacks around the world. Hezbollah has bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut both in 1983 and 1984, with a total of 101 killed and at least 120 injured.

While Hezbollah was created to force Israel to cede its occupied Lebanese territory, the group has now morphed into a different sort of entity. Now, Hezbollah has transitioned from a military wing to a group with heavy influence in both Lebanese military action and politics. In addition, Hezbollah no longer solely targets the Israeli occupation. A prime example of this is the 1994 operation targeting a Jewish community center and killing 94 people in Buenos Aires. 
Since its inception, the United States has given Israel a total of $310 billion in aid, a vast majority of such being military. While the United States views the Hezbollah attacks as unprecedented, Hezbollah sees the United States as a proxy for Israel, funding the occupation of Palestine as well as southern Lebanon. As the United States continues to fund Israel’s attacks on Gazan civilians, a direct opposition to the goals of Hezbollah, it is difficult to see a future where Hezbollah’s terrorist designation is removed.

Ukraine

After the election, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky congratulated Trump, saying he looks forward to a strong U.S. approach to global affairs. Trump has pledged to end the war in Ukraine but has revealed little plans on how he would do so. The United States provides the most aid to Ukraine out of any other country, and Trump, alongside his Vice President JD Vance have cast doubt on whether they would continue military aid to Ukraine. This would be devastating for the hopes of beating Russia, which is steadily advancing into Ukraine’s Donbas region. President Putin has not congratulated Trump, and re-iterated U.S. hostility towards Russia making them hesitant to make any statements on the future of the two countries’ relationship. However, given Trump and Putin’s friendly-ish relationship (possible collusion between Russian officials and Trump campaign members in 2016 and Trump calling Putin a “genius” for invading Ukraine), it would not be surprising for the Trump administration to reduce aid to Ukraine. Last week, President Biden sent Ukraine official approval to use American long-range missiles to strike deep within Russian territory, a move seen as Biden hedging against Trump’s future plans.

Hungary

Moving westward, another relationship that should be watched is that between Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a right-wing autocrat. Hungary and Russia are close, despite Hungary’s membership in the European Union and NATO. Hungary relies on Russia for gas and is refusing to let aid pass through Hungary into Ukraine. Additionally, Orbán was the only EU leader to endorse Trump for the U.S. presidency and flouted their close relationship. Therefore, under the new administration, Hungary might gain an influx of foreign investment from American companies or enjoy a closer economic relationship. These circumstances suggest there will be good relations between the United States and Hungary over the next four years. 

Poland

Another conservative leader, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda, congratulated Trump on his win. Duda wants to strengthen Poland’s relationship with the United States, but Poland is against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, sending more than $3.5 billion to support Ukraine’s army. Duda’s main goal is to curry U.S. favor and keep the United States in NATO, so it’s no surprise that Duda has tried to become closer friends with Donald Trump. In April 2024, Duda and Trump met in New York City for dinner, and both shared positive sentiments, with Trump stating that he is “behind Poland all the way.” Thus, it would not be surprising to see Poland continue to schmooze up to the incoming president in the coming months. 

Czech Republic and Slovakia

The Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both populist conservatives, have welcomed Trump with open arms.

Petr Fiala, the Prime Minister of Slovakia, and President Biden have enjoyed positive relations, with the U.S. and Slovakia becoming closer over the past four years. The Czech Republic has continued sending military aid to Ukraine, but Fiala is growing weary as the war has surpassed its 1000th day. In September, he stated that Ukraine “will have to be realistic” about the growing possibility of ceding some territory to Russia, even if temporarily.

Fico has ended Slovakia’s military aid to Ukraine and opposes Ukraine’s bid to enter NATO. Slovakia is in the midst of a political crisis, with a sharp divide between Fico’s conservative government and the liberal opposition party. Fico has been consolidating power, undermining media independence, eliminating the office responsible for investigating political corruption and prohibiting protests. As such, expect to see Slovakia drifting towards an Orbán-style populist way of governing, to Trump’s delight.

The fate of Ukraine lies, in large part, in the hands of Trump and Vance. 

Brazil, a pioneer for the Global South and Latin America’s self-proclaimed regional leader, has long been recognized as a potential power in the international system. Initiating its regional-leader trajectory in the 1930s after its adoption of the “national-developmentalist” paradigm, one based on the foundations of industry, Brazil endorsed the promotion of domestic markets through the employment of import substitution tactics, and centre-periphery. Yet the nation’s failed attempts to live up to its full potential in influencing global events have proven insufficient, time and time again. Regional treaties with futuristic, promising proposals such as the Treaty of Asuncion (1991) operated well in their primary years, yet performance from all member countries stagnated as commitment from partner states became less important in their individual agendas — the Treaty of Asuncion dispersing in the late 1990s due to Brazil’s economic crisis whose effect rippled all throughout the region, including in the Argentinian economy’s collapse in 2001. 

In attempts to attain such a goal of regional influence, two diverging approaches were employed: under liberal leadership, Brazil’s attempt at recognition came from avant-garde peacekeeping and notable humanitarian proposals from 1995-2016, whereas under conservative administration, the attempt was directed towards Brazil’s potential economic power in commodity trading. Regardless of whichever approach was taken, success rates have proven inconsistent, with policies not being carried out, agreements being dismantled and audacious claims being contested. Under Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency from 2018 through 2022, the country’s agenda stayed away from regional power and dove deeper into domestic stability given the COVID-19 pandemic and its substantial effects on economies worldwide. With the drastic leadership change from the radical conservative president Jair Bolsonaro, back to extreme liberal leadership under current president Luis Ignacio “Lula” da Silva in Jan 2023, nonetheless, Brazil’s policy agenda returned to the importance of growing regional and international power. 

Amongst many, one of President Lula’s first proposals was the establishment of a joint currency with Brazil’s neighbor and trading partner, Argentina. The currency that would be titled “The Sur” would not be used as a widespread currency. Instead, it would “be a common denominator of trade exchanges,” as understood by Fabio Terra, professor of Economics at the Federal University of ABC. 

Analyzing the currency implementation through different lenses highlights the conflicting outcomes for Argentina and Brazil, with a clear winner and loser in sight. 

 For Argentina, who has been suffering from seemingly-limitless levels of annual inflation approaching 100%, while also owing a $40 billion debt to the IMF for a bailout in 2018, the joint currency approach seems like an efficient bandage on the gaping wound of international debt. For Brazil, nonetheless, binding its monetary flows to such an unstable neighbor would be tying an anchor to a rapidly sinking boat. 

On the other hand, the countries’ bilateral trade is expanding, even “reaching $26.4bn in the first 11 months of last year, up nearly 21 percent on the same period in 2021,” according to the Financial Times. This may motivate the joint currency as a supporting booster between both economies. Yet, it only accounts for 6.5% of their combined gross domestic product. With trade being a crucial primary source of income for Brazil, the establishment of the Sur motivated by facilitated trade with Argentina is no trade-off given its detriments.  In addition, the sectors that pioneer trade in the two countries diverge immensely, from industrial commodities to agricultural goods for Brazil and Argentina, respectively. Such a difference in traded goods results in different responses to trade alterations in global headwinds that might spur from the new currency proposal. 

Furthermore, Brazil’s inflation levels have been thriving on a stable currency regulated by a “vigilant independent central bank,” remaining under double digits throughout the last decade, a staggering 61 percentage points below Argentina’s inflation levels. As highlighted in a recent article by the Atlantic, “Brazil’s monetary policy has credibility in international money markets; Argentina has had to impose capital controls to keep people from buying dollars.” The divergences in the nation’s economic performance economically through the past years can be attributed to significant divergences in policy approaches, which could be yet another issue factor when considering the establishment of the Sur. 

With the launch of the idea to the public eye, significant figures in the realm of international economics have spoken out about their opinions on the proposal. Olivier Blanchard, former chief economist of the IMF, mercilessly characterized the operation as “insane” and “a terrible idea.” For Brazil, doubtlessly, the insanity is clear. Why, then, is the country so headstrong about the merger? Surprisingly, a similar proposal was made in the late 1980s, following the neoliberal influence of chile, to replace the Brazilian Cruzeiro and Argentine Austral as a trade currency, but the idea fell short due to economic turmoil in 1988 sprouted from rampant inflation encountered by Brazil and an arduous debt crisis occurring in Argentina. 

The reintroduction of a joint currency for Brazil can be attributed to the country’s continued attempts to dominate the Latin American region through forms of soft and hard power. Economically, Brazil’s avant-garde approach to lifting Argentina from the ashes of financial turmoil, on paper, would allow it to reinforce its regional dominance as a liberal state providing support to one of its neighbors. Simultaneously, the Brazilian government sees the Sur as an opportunity to challenge the current economic system’s reliance on the US Dollar in trade. From the Brazilian perspective, the support of this idea provides the country with a “reputational boost from being seen to revive regional cooperation,” while also “[clawing]back trade with Argentina it has lost to China in recent years.”

 While on paper, the idea seems plausible and the potential accomplishments of the plan seem beneficial to Brazil as a growing regional and global power, the detriments coming from the implementation of the Sur would provide a drastic counter effect to such benefits, leaving the country in a worse state than in the outset of the plan. “Hitching Latin America’s biggest economy to that of its perennially volatile neighbor” would not work as smoothly as the neighboring states in question envision it. Not only would the Sur tether instability to Brazil’s economy, diverting investments and furthering trade relations, but it would also prove inefficient for the complications of the free flow of capital and labor across borders — a crucial aspect of currency shock balancing. The Sur simply lacks the mechanism that working currency unions bear: where European farmers transit seamlessly between jobs and member states, “South America’s poor infrastructure makes travel a hassle, and Argentina’s capital controls make getting paid across borders nearly impossible.”

Brazil should not be fooled by the enchanting tale of valiantly rescuing itself, Latin America and eventually the Global South, from dollar dominance marching across the international arena in a white stallion; certainly less so when said stallion, Argentina, has no legs. As a result, the growth potential that has been historically attributed to Brazil’s powerful economy remains — under the plan of the Sur — presently unattainable. 

As the United States recalibrates its international alliances and economic dependencies, India emerges as a pivotal player that could help shape the future of this crucial geopolitical theater.

The world has witnessed a significant shift in the dynamics of international relations. The declining relationship between the United States and China, coupled with concerns over human rights abuses and regional tensions, is prompting a reassessment of the economic and strategic ties between the two nations. 

This is not to say that India is without its own democratic flaws. 

However, the over-dependence of a consumer America on Chinese imports, with a staggering trade deficit of $382.92 billion as of 2022, underscores the urgency of diversifying trade partners.

There is no exact substitute for China. But there is a way for the U.S. to diversify its dependence — India. 

The world’s largest democracy, and now most populated, shares fundamental values with the United States, such as democracy (while questionable), commitment to counterterrorism and engagement with international institutions. These shared principles provide a solid foundation for a deeper strategic partnership. 

Here are some compelling reasons why the United States should consider India as a significant ally:

Democratic Values: For namesake — The alignment of the world’s largest democracy (India) with the world’s oldest democracy (the United States) offers opportunities for collaboration on defense, security, economics and global cooperation. 

Strategic Location: India’s location in the Indo-Pacific region is pivotal for global trade and security. Its rapidly developing infrastructure, including ports, highways and railways, positions India as an essential hub for international trade, countering China’s influence.

Indo-Chinese Strains: The strained relationship between India and China, exacerbated by disputes over initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and border clashes, creates an opening for the United States to foster stronger economic ties with India.

While the benefits of a closer U.S.-India partnership are evident, certain challenges must be acknowledged and addressed:

India’s Relationship with Russia: India’s reliance on Russia for defense procurement and oil purchases may not align perfectly with American interests. Nevertheless, aligning with India in the context of its non-support for the war in Ukraine is crucial for U.S. security.

The Pakistan Question: Closer economic ties between the United States and India could be perceived as a threat by Pakistan, potentially leading to stronger ties with China or other U.S. rivals. Careful diplomatic efforts must be made to navigate this complex situation.

Domestic Policies: India’s protectionist policies aimed at safeguarding domestic industries could pose challenges for U.S. businesses. Incentives such as tax breaks or subsidies can help mitigate these obstacles.

The Way Forward — A marriage of future economic convenience? 

The United States could prioritize discussions with India to establish an exclusive trade agreement through a Trade Policy Forum (TPF) and renew the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) Program. These actions can lead to increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), diversified investment portfolios and more favorable tariff treatments for Indian products.

Additionally, engaging in mega-regional trade agreements that involve India but exclude China, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the India-Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), could be explored. These agreements align with the US policy of “friendshoring” and promote multilateralism, helping maintain U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

To protect America’s national security and economic interests, a trilateral trade agreement involving India, the United States and South Korea might be a strategic move to counter a growing Chinese influence. 

India’s strategic significance in the Indo-Pacific region cannot be underestimated. The potential benefits far outweigh the challenges, making India a key partner in navigating the complex geopolitical landscape of the 21st century.

At its core, this meeting was about searching for a mutually beneficial trade. North Korea reportedly went in the interest of obtaining satellite technology, economic aid and food supplies. In return, Russia is desperate to refuel its dwindling ammunition in order to sustain its war on Ukraine. 

North Korea likely seeks satellite technology for a number of reasons. One is truly for satellites — the country has already failed twice this year to put a spy satellite in orbit and says they will try again in October. They seek more advanced technology to aid this endeavor. 

The other, unspoken reasoning is for nuclear missiles. Both satellites and missiles rely on rocket technology, and the United States and its allies argue that North Korea uses its space programs as a cover for weapons tests. 

This deal could thus be doubly threatening to the West, as it would both aid Russia in its war against Ukraine and support North Korea’s nuclear and weapon proliferation.

Other than posing a threat to the United States and its allies, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation is a violation of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution, which was at the time supported by Russia. A decree also forbids any financial aid or education training that may help North Korea’s nuclear program. Moscow has in the past been hesitant to share such technology with North Korea, over its own concerns about the country’s nuclear arsenal. However, experts now believe that Russia’s priority for its war in Ukraine (and its desire to form strong relationships with enemies of the West) outweighs any previous inhibitions toward North Korea. 

What does Russia seek in return for this nuclear technology? Putin may be interested in the possible tens of millions of old Soviet artillery shells and rockets in North Korea’s possession. Russia has run through its own arsenal in its war on Ukraine faster than it perhaps expected to, and is now desperate for weapons and artillery. 

An obstacle to this deal, though, is another UNSC decree (which Russia also endorsed) that bans North Korea from exporting or importing any arms. It prohibits the transition of weapons in or out of the country. This resolution effectively bans Kim Jung-Un from making this trade and giving Russia their weapons. As such, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has stated that any military cooperation between North Korea and Russia is illegal as it breaks the United Nations Security Council resolutions and other international sanctions.

In this same vein, in August of last year, according to American Intelligence, North Korea volunteered 100,000 of its own troops to help Donbas and in September they sold Russia millions of artillery shells and rockets for use in Ukraine. However, both parties heavily deny this claim, though these denials could be truth or just cover for deals that break UNSC treaties. 

There is history to this kind of covert weapons aid between Russia and North Korea. After World War II, the Allies took Korea from under Japanese occupation and divided it between the Soviet Union and the United States. Then, on June 25, 1950, the Communist North, overseen by the Soviet Union, invaded the U.S. backed South. During the war that ensued, the Soviet Union secretly funneled North Korea pilots, aircrafts, machine guns, tanks, materials and medical services. They couldn’t get directly involved due to their tenuous relationship with the United States, who were actively involved on the South Korean side. Any sort of blow up between the two countries could result in a nuclear war. As a result, the pilots had to fly in other uniforms, speak other languages, and pretend to be tourists when on the ground. Armistice was reached in 1953, but since no peace treaty was ever signed, the two countries are still technically at war. 

Following the war, the relationship between the Soviet Union (Russia) and North Korea has fluctuated, but they now find themselves in a very similar, if reversed, position to 70 years ago. Putin even brought up this piece of history during their meeting. He said it was “our” country who first recognized the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a state and “our” country who supported their “war of independence” in the 1950s. Similarly, North Korea was the third country to recognize the independence of breakaway states of Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics in Eastern Ukraine, in reaction to which Ukraine terminated diplomatic ties with North Korea. Perhaps by bringing to mind the times “his” country supplied weapons to their invasion, Putin hopes to endear Kim Jung-Un to contributing to his own invasion. 

It still remains to be seen what the products of this meeting will be, on Russia’s war on Ukraine, on North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, and on our current political landscape. Regardless, this was a meeting ripe with historical and modern implications that will have heavy influence on both the outcome of this particular meeting and on international politics in the years to come.

Though Taiwan only has a population of 23.5 million, its 2022 gross domestic product amounted to about $761.69 billion USD — ranking it #21 in the world — and is projected to reach $990.75 billion by 2028. Taiwan is crowned as one of the “Four Asian Tigers” alongside Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea — the Southeast Asian countries that experienced rapid industrialization and economic growth beginning in the 1960s and 1970s. Taiwan earned the title initially through its export-oriented economic strategies of exporting semiconductors, electronic components and computer hardware. 

Currently, Taiwan plays a vital role in the global supply chain, specifically in the technology sector. They are still a major producer and exporter of high-tech products. Taiwan’s tech companies dominate about “two-thirds of the semiconductor foundry market share with Taiwan Semiconductor Market Company (TSMC) controlling 84% of the production for the most advanced and efficient chips.” As a result, an increased number of “multinational corporations have invested in Taiwan in recent years, and demand for local talent with bilingual proficiency has also increased.” 

Further, the United States’ goal of trying to ‘decouple’ from China, meaning, trying to significantly decrease or sever economic dependence on Chinese supply chains, technology and trade in order to avoid national security risks and intellectual property theft has the potential to strengthen trading ties between Taiwan and the United States. From Taiwan’s perspective, this is another reason for their Bilingual 2030 pursuit — to increase its competitive advantages and international mobility to gain trading partners going forward, especially against competitor suppliers like Brazil, India and South Korea. 

Taiwan’s economic come up story and current success appear phenomenal at first glance. However, a closer look reveals that for both exports and imports, Taiwan’s “relative importance within global trade has fallen steadily since 2000.” In 2000, Taiwan ranked 14th in the world via exports, accounting for 2.3% of total world exports; in 2019, Taiwan ranked 17th in world exports, reducing its share of total exports to about 1.7%. Similarly, the bilateral trade relationship between the United States and Taiwan has greatly diminished. The United States has fallen to the fourth — from the first — largest trading partner for Taiwan since 2000. 

China and ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members such as Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Maynamar have had a competitive advantage over Taiwan through cheap labor and large domestic markets — attracting more foreign investment and trading partners — a key explanation for Taiwan’s diminishing trading relationships. 

In addition, Taiwan’s domestic workforce is predicted to steadily decline over the next decade. 2022 was a year with a historically low number of births and the most deaths ever, indicative of Taiwan going into a negative growth by 2031. Consequently, Taiwan’s economic structure is no longer “labor-intensive, it is technology-intensive,” and now needs to fill shifting industry and talent shortage demands in “biomedicine, green energy, defense, modern agricultural and the circular economy.”

To counter the low fertility rates and push to create a ‘Silicon Valley for Taiwan,’ Taiwan also seeks to gain 400,000 white-collar foreign workers by 2030 with at least 20,000 being Silicon Valley-adjacent innovators and 200,000 overseas students. Despite this goal, Taiwan suffered a 5% decline in total foreigners from 2020-2021 — with some critics arguing Taiwan can make itself more expat-friendly, such as boosting English-speaking rates. 

Coupled together — a decrease in global trade, diminishing trading relationships, negative population growth, shifting industry demands amidst talent shortages and a decline in needed expats explain why Taiwan is desperate to recruit foreign technical workers and boost its labor force. More so, it explains why Taiwan sees becoming a bilingual English-Mandarin nation as a key facilitator to these goals and overall productivity growth. Taiwan can’t supply a cheap, domestic labor force like China and ASEAN members did to increase exports and certain trading relationships. But, Taiwan can boost its English proficiency as a means of reducing barriers to foreign investment and facilitating itself as a a hub for multinational firms looking to enter the Asian market.” Likewise, Taiwan can hope to outcompete Hong Kong. Singapore, India and the Philippines where English is widely used in business, governmental and professional sectors. 

The Bilingual 2030 policy realizes Taiwan’s shifting demands and meets them with a twofold policy. Its first aim is to “help Taiwan’s workforce connect with the world,” and secondly, to “attract international enterprises to Taiwan and enable Taiwanese industries to connect to global markets and create high-quality jobs.” For these aims to be achieved, Taiwan’s workers must not only align their professional expertise with international standards, but also collaborate with counterparts from other countries and work in global markets targeted by Taiwan’s industries. 

Bilingual 2030 will stress college and senior high school education, supplemented by integrating English proficiency at all stages of education. In 2021, 21% of grade 12 and 6.5% of grade 9 students reached the B2 level (high-intermediate level) or higher on the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) for Languages, statistics that make 2030 bilingualism achievable. However, their high performance in receptive skills, reading and listening, were incongruent with their mediocre performance in writing and speaking — which is precisely what Taiwan wants to improve. The Ministry of Education has formulated six goals to bridge writing and speaking gaps and achieve bilingual proficiency. 

First, accelerate the development of bilingual higher education. The Ministry of Education plans to select universities that are able to speed up the implementation of bilingual teaching and make them a beacon for other Taiwanese universities. The ministry will collaborate with the British Council to provide consulting to universities in hopes of achieving the 50-50-50 target by 2030 — at least 50% of all university sophomores should have achieved B2 in listening, speaking, reading and writing, at least 50% of all sophomore and master students should have done at least 50% of their credits in full English for that academic year. 

Second, balance and optimize bilingual conditions for schools at the senior high school level and below. At a glance, this means enhancing students’ ability to use English in daily life, having STEM schools integrate more English, and adopting all-English teaching in English classes. Further, Taiwan seeks to form partnerships with the U.S., U.K. and Australia and have Taiwanese schools establish sister-school partnerships with these target countries — specifically to conduct online bilingual classes. By 2030, Taiwan hopes to have “one in every six schools nationwide to establish a partnership with a foreign sister school.”

Third, develop digital learning. The Ministry of Education aims to distribute technology to remote areas to bridge proficiency gaps between urban and rural areas. Likewise, Taiwanese university students with higher proficiency will online-tutor remote and disadvantaged students. 

Fourth, expand the provision of affordable English proficiency tests to gauge the progress of Bilingual 2030. With the support of the Ministry of Education, Taiwan developed their own English proficiency test — about a half to one-third the price of foreign English tests — to increase access for more rural, economically-disadvantaged demographics. 

Fifth, raise civil servants’ English proficiency. Bilingual 2030 will initially focus on the civil service whose work is integrated with international affairs and where English is pertinent to their job. In the future, English will be taught to all civil servants and the portion of English testing on civil service exams will be increased. 

Sixth, establish an administrative body dedicated to policy promotion and implementation. Bilingual 2030 is still a novel and nebulous long-term initiative and requires various stakeholders to collaborate and reach a consensus. The Bilingual Policy Development Center will “assist with the horizontal integration of measures relating to education, examinations, and training across 31 related government agencies. It will provide these agencies with vertical specialized services ranging from policy research to policy execution and consolidate international cooperation efforts under the policy.” 

In addition to the six initiatives, Taiwan has plans for multiple other ancillary initiatives. For example, there are plans to have “government regulations, policies, and websites in legally binding English” eliminating translation barriers to foreign businesses. The government will also “promote the establishment of an exclusively English-language television station, and both TV and radio broadcasters will be encouraged to produce English-language programming.” While Bilingual 2030 is still ongoing trial and error with each municipality and school having to acclimate the policies to its students, it’s a significant step for the island’s future.  

Taiwan faces various economic challenges which will only be exacerbated in the face of rapid globalization, the rise of AI, its volatile relationship with China and competition from neighboring countries. However, Taiwan can control its future by endowing its workers and future generations with bilingualism, global perspectives and international mobility. 

In May 2023, this acute rainfall caused severe flooding in Italy’s northern region of Emilia Romagna. What began with reports of incoming bad weather concluded with flooding that impacted 50 municipalities, displaced over 30,000 people and caused damages nearing billions of dollars in the agricultural and infrastructure sectors.

The flooding marked one of the worst environmental emergencies for the region since an earthquake in 2012. However, to understand the nature of the event and how the government is handling its aftermath, it is first important to gain a better picture of the conditions and consequences that defined Emilia Romagna’s dark summer season.  

The Flooding – Causes and Aggravating Variables

Starting May 1, Emilia Romagna saw rainfall in the provinces of Bologna, Ravenna and Forlì-Cesena. After an impending storm warning coming in from the Mediterranean, the region reported 200 millimeters of rainfall in 24 hours, equaling over two standard months of rainfall in a single day. In response, Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni declared a state of emergency.  

The situation was exacerbated further by the soil’s inability to retain water. The 2022 droughts slowed the soil’s capacity to absorb water, worsening the severity of May’s massive water inputs. Additionally, terrain in the impacted areas was unable to drain, because two weeks later, the regions saw renewed, heavier rainfall totaling 300 millimeters. These conditions made it almost impossible to counteract the rising water volumes. In many areas, it was reported that torrent water levels rose as much as 20 meters, making it extremely difficult for city officials and individuals to properly react in time. 

Furthermore, Emilia’s geographic makeup is composed of hundreds of narrow waterways and many counties in the region of Romagna specifically do not have extended detention ponds as sources for helping barrier rainfall residue. 

Since the flooding, the regional government has been heavily criticized due to reports that it was provided national funds between 2015-2022 to invest in the development of these mechanisms, but approximately half of the projects were still in development or not operational at the time of the flooding. This discovery increased conversation over preparation protocols for environmental emergencies, particularly regarding improved canal maintenance and cleaning on the part of city officials.  

Additionally, the severity of the May rainfalls has been linked to climate change. The University of Padova released a summary study explaining that climate change has increased temperatures and changed the circulation patterns in the Mediterranean region, affecting the predominance of rainfall in Western Europe. 

As such, Emilia Romagna’s flooding demonstrates that lack of government planning and infrastructure, when brought into contact with drought and climate change concerns, amplified the floods’ severity. 

Damages, Response and Current Developments 

The flooding left many cities, such as the town of Conselice, vastly underwater for weeks. It has been estimated that infrastructure damage to houses and public buildings is near 8 billion dollars. However, causing alarm is also the floods’ effects to the region’s agricultural landscape. Emilia Romagna produces over 20% of Italy’s vegetables, but since the flood some of the region’s largest agricultural produce companies are facing years of losses and rebuilding programs. 

The regional government has estimated that 21,000 agriculture enterprises have been impacted, covering 45% of Emilia Romagna’s agricultural area. Furthermore, studies are still underway to determine the geographic effect on the soil itself. The heavy water levels have largely destroyed the soil structure, particularly the porous part of the terrain in charge of circulating air through the root systems, causing many fruit and wheat plots to die of an asphyxiated environment.

After the summer months, the situation has improved, with water levels removed. However, Italy is now faced with the challenging aftermath of dealing with clean-up efforts and public health consequences.

In many cities, the government issued health advisories and sent mandatory tetanus vaccinations due to sewage systems overflowing and contaminated waterways increasing the risk of infections and bacterial exposure. Nearing the beginning of the summer season, many of Romagna’s tourist beach areas, better known as “lidi,” have also prohibited bathability, impacting the tourism industry. 

Yet, since the flooding, the region has reported expressive displays of solidarity from citizens and the general public. Echoing back to Florence’s flooding incidents in the 1960s, Romagna saw the arrival of “angeli del fango” or “‘mud angels,” a group of volunteers that helped organize the impacted areas to shuttle out waste, as well as aiding individuals in saving residences and personal appliances. The flooding led to mass public support, with some of Italy’s biggest names in the music industry organizing a benefit concert June 24 in conjunction with the culture ministry to raise money for the region. 

Next Steps and Continuity

The more pressing question has become how the government will work at supporting citizens and mitigating the public infrastructure damages. Italy’s population at large does not own extensive insurance coverage. Citizens vastly rely on public government services in exchange for tax payments. Flooding left thousands of people displaced, most of whom do not have any insurance covering their properties in the case of environmental disasters. Worry stems over how Italy’s already largely indebted government will now meet rising pressures to distribute emergency checks to citizens who have lost everything. Italy announced the regional government of Emilia Romagna has been provided an 8 million euro fund, 5,000 per family, for urgent intervention for citizens reporting damages. Furthermore, the government announced on Sept. 25, that beginning Nov. 15 the platform “Sfinge,” used in the past to organize restoration efforts, will be made available for affected businesses and individuals to request compensation. However, criticism over past government aid has laid at the foundation of its bureaucratic steps, which delayed fund distribution and projects for years.

The flooding marked for Emilia Romangna one of the worst environmental emergencies in decades. However, it served as a powerful reminder to remember the upcoming consequences of climate change in tandem with the vitality of well-maintained government services and protocols. The true test will emerge as reconstruction begins and plans come to light over how Emilia Romagna will work to rebuild its agricultural, infrastructure and residential environment. Taking lessons from this flood will be crucial, particularly because the Higher Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA) reported Emilia Romagna stands at a much greater flood risk than the rest of the country due to its plains and lowlands, with climate change looming in the horizon. 

The situation has reached a critical point. Street clashes between Sudan’s warring factions have exacerbated pre-existing humanitarian needs and resulted in the forced displacement of nearly 5.1 million individuals, both within Sudan and across neighboring countries. 

“25 million people, more than half the population of Sudan, [are in]need [of]humanitarian aid and protection,” said Ramesh Rajasingham, Head and Representative of OCHA in Geneva.

The current turmoil in Sudan is a consequence of yet another governmental system breakdown in the nation and is a single crisis within the broader spectrum of political challenges that have occurred throughout Sudan’s history.

In December 2018, a wave of protests erupted in the city of Atbara, driven by grievances over Sudan’s deteriorating economic crisis, escalating food prices, widespread corruption and high unemployment rates. 

These initial protests swiftly spread across the nation, eventually reaching the capital, Khartoum. By April 2019, President Omar al-Bashir was ousted by the Sudanese army following months of demonstrations, bringing an end to his three-decade-long grip on power. The military, holding considerable influence, took steps to solidify its authority by suspending the constitution and imposing a three-month state of emergency.

Protests persisted as demonstrators called for a transition of power to civilian authorities. In an effort to dismantle the protest movement, armed individuals affiliated with the RSF militia killed 128 people in what came to be known as the Khartoum massacre. 

The escalation of violence prompted Ethiopia and the African Union to step in and act as mediators. Following negotiations, civilian leaders and the military agreed to share power and establish a governing body, called the Sovereignty Council, to rule over Sudan for a three-year transition period. 

This council faced significant challenges as military authorities and civilian counterparts refused to cooperate, which, alongside mounting political tension, led to an attempted – and failed – coup by remaining members of President Bashir’s regime. 

In October 2021, a splinter faction from the civilian protesters started a sit-in in front of the presidential palace and called for a military takeover. In response, thousands of pro-democracy supporters came out on the streets in a show of continued support for civilian rule. 

General Burhan and General Daglo, responding to the protests, jointly orchestrated a military coup in 2021 which led to the dissolution of Sudan’s power-sharing government and council, as well as disruption of its transition to democracy. Burhan justified his actions by claiming it was meant to prevent a potential civil war in Sudan, citing the incitement by politicians against the military as a threat. He portrayed his actions as a transitional measure rather than a coup, aiming to maintain stability until the upcoming elections.

More than a year after the military coup, an agreement was signed by the Sudanese military and a coalition of civilian actors that forged a path to a more civilian-centered government. Under the new framework deal, the military would step back and would only be represented on a security and defense council. While the agreement was a major accomplishment and a show of compromise, its success was uncertain as it excluded formal rebel groups and others who had the capacity and power to undermine the transitional government. 

The fear of the agreement’s potential collapse materialized when conflict emerged between the military leaders concerning the integration of the RSF into the national military. Implementing military reforms to establish a competent and standardized national army was seen as one of the first steps to adhering to the internationally recognized agreement for the transfer of power. 

General Burhan advocated for the planned integration of the RSF to take place within a two-year timeframe, while Dagalo insisted on stretching it out over a decade. As a result, disagreement resulted in a struggle for power, with neither displaying any signs of relenting. 

Central Khartoum became a war zone as the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) conducted airstrikes aimed at RSF forces who in response, retaliated using artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry. 

The international community denounced the escalation of violence in Khartoum. Volker Türk, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed strong condemnation for the indiscriminate violence, emphasizing that both sides had disregarded international humanitarian law. 

In an effort to hold all those undermining peace in the country, the United States and UK imposed sanctions on five businesses that have been linked with bankrolling and providing support to the Sudanese army and RSF. 

“At least 5,000 people have been killed and over 12,000 wounded” said Volker Perthes, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan. 

6.3 million people – 13% of Sudan’s population – are experiencing emergency levels of hunger – just one step from famine, with the conflict continuing to disrupt access to humanitarian aid, water, food and medicine. 

In an effort to put an end to fighting, Saudi Arabia and the United States facilitated a seven-day ceasefire on May 22 between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This temporary cessation of hostilities provided some respite and allowed limited humanitarian access. 

However, the ceasefire has since lapsed, and the subsequent ceasefires were primarily implemented to facilitate unrestricted movement and the delivery of humanitarian aid across the nation. Additionally, efforts made in July by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to mediate a peace agreement were rejected by the Sudanese army. 

So what happens now?

It’s unclear. The political landscape of Sudan has historically been unstable with a pattern of short-lived agreements. However, continued violence of this nature in Africa’s third largest country poses a real risk to destabilize the wider region and contributes to the mass exodus of the civilian population that bears the brunt of the suffering. 

With current peace talks in Jeddah stagnating, the fate of Sudan hangs in the balance. It is essential that the two military forces, with the well-being of the Sudanese people in mind, accept and adhere to a long-term ceasefire and bring an end to the hostilities.

Nestled between Senegal and Guinea and ruled by the Portuguese for centuries, Guinea-Bissau is a small state with a rich history and culture. Moreover, it was only in the 1960s that Guinea-Bissau underwent its (violent) independence movement, and despite pleas of regional U.S. diplomats, the United States refused to officially recognize its sovereignty for years.

It was not until 1974, after Portugal formally declared Guinea-Bissau independent, that the United States also acknowledged its legitimacy, and immediately following this recognition, the U.S. constructed an embassy in the nation’s capital, Bissau.

Competing with the USSR for regional influence at the time, the embassy symbolized American interest in West Africa, and its opening was followed by a $1 million grant to UNHCR to help resettle displaced citizens from its previous civil conflict. American diplomats went to extremes to woo the government in Bissau, even borrowing the Defense Attache’s C-12 plane to help the then-president locate his former rebel camp in the bush. Yet, when civil war broke out in 1998, the United States abandoned its in-country embassy.

Since the embassy’s physical closure, the American embassy in Dakar has offered its services to Guinea-Bissau virtually; however, during the period of these virtual services, Guinea-Bissau saw three coup d’états, one leader killed in office, and became what the UN classified as “Africa’s first ‘narco-state.’” These developments were not a direct result of the American withdrawal, but U.S. foreign policy has incidentally shaped the situation.

American policies in Latin America during the war on drugs reshaped local politics and forced cartels to look for new markets outside of the region, and as a result of its close geographical proximity to Europe, Guinea-Bissau became the ideal new target for operations. Fueled by its rampant corruption, cocaine flooded the borders at unprecedented rates following a 2012 coup. With fears of losing regional stability, American authorities quickly supported numerous efforts to combat the trafficking. Their aid in addition to the assistance of the international community, particularly the UN, has largely thwarted the presence of drug trafficking in the country, but it has not eliminated it entirely.

Following this anti-trafficking campaign, little American presence has been seen in Guinea-Bissau, but nonetheless in 2020, over twenty years after the United States’ departure, Guinea-Bissau saw its first civilian-to-civilian transfer of power. After the election of the new president Umaro Sissoco Embaló, the U.S. Embassy in Senegal published a statement positioning the United States as “a friend and partner of Guinea-Bissau” with hopes of advancing “peace and security, strengthen[ing]democratic governance, and spur[ring]economic growth and development.”

Yet, it is nearly three years later and the actions of the United States remain inconsistent with these claims as beyond aiding with Covid-19 vaccine distribution, American efforts at building relations have been largely absent.

U.S. President Joe Biden has repeatedly noted a desire to increase United States territorial influence, and the recently published “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa” reiterates this urge. The report suggests that the United States will “Revamp Public Diplomacy Efforts” by ensuring “sufficient human and financial resources to plan, organize, and execute these critical programs,” but without a physical presence in countries like Guinea-Bissau, the United States’ actions do not align with its claims.

While U.S. leaders debate the next steps for policies in Guinea-Bissau, the question of the construction of a new embassy has repeatedly come up. Throughout the world, embassies both assist citizens who live or travel to a host country and “carry out duties related to advancing U.S. interests abroad.” Moreover, the United States has around 168 embassies with sites in all but four sub-Saharan countries. They have strong presences in Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Mauritania and Gabon, even though countries like Guinea-Bissau host far more American tourists. This distribution coupled with continued claims from the United States expressing augmented regional interest makes the absence of an embassy in Bissau extremely glaring.

Furthermore, as a multi-ethnic state with nearly 20% of its territory preserved for environmental conservation, Guinea-Bissau is an ideal location to measure the pulse of West Africa according to politicians, such as Paulo Gomes. Furthermore, with ever-growing mutual interests in democracy between Bissau and Washington, many policy analysts look at the continued absence of an embassy in Guinea Bissau as a “U.S. foreign policy failure.”

Today, Guinea Bissau remains greatly impacted by U.S. foreign policy, even without strong diplomatic ties. Despite this current absence, the Biden administration and future administrations have the chance to enact tangible change and redefine the American image abroad.

Moreover, it is a pivotal point in the development of African politics, and the United States has a unique opportunity to facilitate economic, political and social development, as well as strengthen diplomatic ties if its actions begin to better align with its rhetoric.