August 5, 2019, marked the end of Jammu & Kashmir’s (J&K) semi-autonomous status under the Constitution of India. India’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led by quintessential strongman Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has continuously called for the revocation of the two major concessions given to Kashmir in the Indian constitution in 1950 – Article 370 and Article 35A, in its electoral manifestos. As part of this restructuring, the Modi government redrew the political map by splitting it into two Union Territories directly under the rule of New Delhi, J&K and Ladakh. The stripping of these constitutional provisions was coupled with large-scale troop deployment, communication blockades, and detainment of prominent political leaders in the region. The crackdown left over eight million people lacking cell phone, landline and internet access. The state also implemented a strict curfew for citizens. It has been six months since the historic decision and as the gradual restoration of civil liberties occurs in the Valley, it is imperative to evaluate the government’s management in the aftermath.

Why is Kashmir Important?  

Kashmir is a valley in the Himalayan region that both Pakistan and India lay claim to. During the partition of India and Pakistan, over 565 princely states were divided and merged with one of the two countries. Kashmir was granted special status after Raja Hari Singh, J&K’s ruler at the time, signed the Instrument of Accession treaty with India in return for help against an invasion of tribesmen from Pakistan. This treaty had one historically exceptional caveat: the local government of J&K would maintain sovereignty on laws in all areas except foreign relations, communications, and defense. The accession of Jammu and Kashmir into India and the formation of “Azad Kashmir” administered by Pakistan was established after the involvement of Pakistani troops as an outcome of this concession and the subsequent UN-brokered ceasefire line in 1949. The ceasefire line, or Line of Control, serves as a de facto border between areas of Kashmir, controlled by the respective countries. Ever since the Partition, this region has been a central point of contention between the two nuclear-armed countries, including two wars. A separatist insurgency against Indian rule has engulfed the state, making it one of the most militarized regions in the world; firings, stone pelting, protests, curfews and communication clampdowns are now a regular occurrence in the Valley.

The dilution of Article 370 and annulment of Article 35A have resulted in significant ramifications for the people of Kashmir in a region undergoing a three-decade-long armed revolt. Article 370 and its provisions allowed the state to have its own constitution, the freedom to make laws, and a separate flag. More specifically, rules on permanent residency, ownership of property, and fundamental rights were upheld by the local government. Non-residents were restricted from purchasing property or settling in the region. Under Article 35A, residents with permanent resident certificates were also entitled to benefits regarding scholarships, employment, etc. Essentially, the significance of this constitutional provision was that it upheld the region’s demographic character and underpinned, to a certain degree, India’s fragile relationship with its sole Muslim majority state.

India’s Government: One Nation, One Law 

India’s BJP led government hails the revocation of J&K’s seven-decade long autonomy as a correction of a “historical blunder”. Their goal is to integrate Kashmir into the rest of India. Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah reiterated that Articles 370 and 35A eroded the economic and democratic foundations of the country,exacerbated corruption and  hindered development. New infrastructure projects in the region will be expedited and the move will be significant in fighting separatism within the region while combating youth militancy among Kashmiri teenagers. Other officials, like the Indian Ambassador to the US, wrote in a New York Times column that the revocation “opens the door to rejuvenate a moribund economy.” However, the Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry has estimated that the clampdown has already cost the state over $1.4 billion. Critics of the move argue that it is an imperative diversion from the economic slowdown that India has been facing under the current administration. 

Opposition parties have raised concerns about the detention of prominent political leaders in the region. National Conference leader Omar Abdullah cites the move as “unilateral and shocking”, and a “betrayal of trust” of the people of J&K. Former chief minister Mehbooba Mufti said the move is symbolic of the BJP-led government’s desire to change the demography of the Muslim majority state. Both Abdullah and Mufti remain under house arrest after being considered “anti-national separatists”. The two are mainstream Kashmiri politicians who have, in the past, braved elections in the region and maintained their allegiance to the Indian state. Such conduct, without conducive dialogue, is a worrisome aspect of how the current administration is handling the issue. Congress leader Ghulam Nabi Azad has gone on to say that the government “wiped out Jammu and Kashmir’s identity”. As a union territory, the federal government has direct control over the affairs in the region. However, Shah, the home minister, and Modi’s second-in-command has said that complete statehood will be reinstated once “normalcy” returns. 

What now? 

Though the internet and mobile services have been cut off previously in times of turmoil, this time  the government has also restricted landlines and television, deeming these measures to be “precautionary”. Cell phone services were available again on October 14th, but the internet remains restricted. A rise in insurgencies may be imminent as the state slowly restores to normalcy. Instances of violence have already prevailed as the so-called “iron wall” dismantles in Kashmir. On October 16th, two civilians were killed in an attack by suspected militants, and three alleged rebels by the Indian Armed forces. Shortly after, shelling carried out on either side of the line of control led to the demise of nine soldiers and civilians. The uncertain state of security makes it difficult for the handicrafts and tourism industries to bounce back fast. Over 1.5 million Kashmiri children remain unable to attend school. Petitions to relax the “virtual blackout” and ease restrictions filed in the Supreme Court of India have not received immediate attention either. The unfortunate truth is that the current state of affairs is all but uncommon in the Valley.

A politically backed mechanism that allows the people of Kashmir to address their grievances is necessary, especially since the disruptive move was not preceded by dialogue with political leaders or civil society members in the region. This misinformation itself does not bode well for India’s democratic foundation. Though the revocation does politically benefit Modi’s agenda by delivering on an old electoral promise from the Hindu nationalist party’s manifesto, it throws Kashmir’s future into uncertainty. The decision can either be a setback to years of peace-building efforts or a game-changer in terms of better governance and security in the region. Kashmir’s special status, coupled with its own constitution and flag, which was situated beside the Indian tricolor on all government property, was a mechanism by which its historic uniqueness was assimilated into India’s vibrant democracy. It was also a mechanism that tried to negate secessionist insurgency and terrorism funneling in from Pakistan. An abrogation of the special status impacts the people of Kashmir the most. Most of them remain fearful to return to living their normal lives, while others refuse to do so as they are adamant to disobey New Delhi.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

History was made last month when 175 countries, including Pakistan, signed the Paris Climate Change Agreement—the largest single-day signing of an international agreement, coinciding with the 50th anniversary of Earth Day. The agreement pledges to collectively limit global temperature rise to below 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit. It also includes initiatives such as a development plan for renewable energy, an International Solar Energy Alliance between India and France and a high-level coalition to set a price for fossil fuels and coal. However, the agreement must be ratified and approved by each individual country and does not go into effect until at least 55 countries, representing approximately 55 percent of global emission, formally join, which could take years.

Though Pakistan has signed the agreement, its former climate change record—or lack thereof—is questionable, and Pakistan’s signature does not necessarily reflect its commitment to implement climate change reform as a top priority. In the December COP 21 talks, Pakistan submitted a weak, one-page “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions” document, as it continues to expand coal power.

With hostile neighbors, a powerful military and a developing economy, Pakistan prioritizes terrorism and nuclear development as its national security concerns. However, the threat of climate change will slowly devastate Pakistan’s economic, social and political structure, exacerbating interstate conflict with India through climate-induced transboundary migration. The Pakistani government and its citizens must recognize climate change as a security concern and focus on implementing adaptation policies to control damage from climate-induced disasters.

Pakistan’s Water Crisis
Destructive floods, heat waves and droughts have increased over the last five years, claiming the lives of thousands of Pakistanis, shattering communities and earning it a reputation as one of the most water-stressed countries in the world. Pakistan contributes just 0.8% of global emissions, and yet it stands as one of the more heavily climate-affected countries. These natural disasters have broader repercussions for Pakistan’s agribusiness. As an agrarian economy, Pakistan’s agriculture sector contributes about 24 percent of Pakistan’s GDP, employs half of the labor force and provides the largest source of foreign exchange earnings. With such a dramatic reliance on farmable land, it is vital that crops are supplied efficiently with water and proper irrigation techniques. Due to rising global temperatures, severe droughts and heat waves have affected precious arable land and exacerbated historically dry areas such as the Tharparkar District of Sindh, home to Pakistan’s largest desert.  Deadly heat waves killed more than 780 people in Karachi, a major economic hub, and more than 800 people in Sindh in June of last year. In its third straight drought year, 200 lives have already been claimed since January, 2016.

At the other end of the spectrum, rapid melting of polar ice caps, heavy monsoon rains and rising sea levels have led to massive floods throughout Pakistan. They are destroying homes, billions of dollars’ worth of crops, increasing unemployment and inflation rates, displacing people and killing many.

In 2010, unprecedented monsoon rains flooded the Indus River, hitting Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, spreading South through Punjab, Balochistan and Sindh, killing 1,985 people and destroying 5.4 million acres of crops. Just this month, floods in Northwest Pakistan damaged 1,428 houses and killed over 200 people.

Meanwhile, the Arabian Sea’s rising levels have caused it to flow into the Indus River Delta, leading to land erosion and salinity in freshwater creeks and shores. The salinization of land sinks deep into the surface and makes groundwater aquifers unfit for human consumption. The salinity of water at Karachi’s shores has reached an astounding 35,500-36,900 parts per million (PPM), forcing villages in coastal areas to evacuate because their aquifers became non-drinkable.

Climate-induced transboundary migration and conflict
Devastating natural disasters are causing people to migrate out of their communities and across the border into India. According to the Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change, it is projected that sea level rise will produce 35-40 million climate refugees in the coming years. Sea level rise causes permanent migration, as agricultural commodities cannot be rebuilt in salinized soil.

Of course, Pakistan and India have a history of tense ethno-religious civil conflict. With such a vast number of refugees projected, there is a possibility that India may close its borders or restrict refugees from entrance. In 2012, India built a 2,500 mile fence to seal the India-Bangladesh international border, and its security force established a shoot-to-kill policy. With such stringent regulation of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, there is no doubt that harsher rules may be applied to Pakistani refugees.

Already overpopulated and suffering from its own rising sea levels, Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, will not be able to withstand the mass of Pakistani refugees.

Next steps
Pakistan is not just a victim of external circumstances. Poor water conservation is economically and politically linked to the country’s droughts and floods. Pakistan could mitigate water poverty by reforming conservation and building more reservoirs and advanced irrigation systems to address agricultural, industrial and energy needs. Almost 70 percent of Pakistan’s 11.5 inches of annual rainwater is wasted due to poor storage facilities and silt buildup in water reservoirs.

According to the Pakistan Water Partnership, Pakistan is working to put into effect measures regarding flood water management, waste water recycling and rainwater harvesting. In efforts to minimize disaster risk, the Pakistan Meteorological Department is working on radar systems that provide warnings about the heat waves and floods up to 250 miles away. Additionally, Pakistan should increase its investment in water storage infrastructure and water farming techniques such as drip irrigation, which allows water to drip slowly to plant roots or soil surfaces.

But the Pakistani government’s climate change budget is a mere $586,000. Pakistan needs to work on properly managing its financial resources, specifically toward infrastructure development and water conservation and establish sustainable development goals within its means. Pakistan can develop public-private partnerships between the government and environmental agencies to develop all-inclusive environmental regulation programs. Another option is to seek assistance from foreign entities for funds and environmental expertise.

Pakistan must also realistically restore diplomatic ties with India, at least to the extent of a general climate change consensus. India also signed the Paris Climate Change Agreement, and both states should collectively address the possibility of opening up borders and refugee camps for Pakistanis displaced by natural disasters.

Pakistan’s recent signature in the Paris Climate Change Agreement shows some progress toward combating climate change, but Pakistan must set its own target for reducing emissions and update that mark every year.  The evidence shows that if Pakistan does not make climate change a priority for national security, an environmental butterfly effect will shake the nation’s political, economic and social standing.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Not a day goes by without something going awry in this wonderful, horrible world of ours. Follow any daily newsletter (The American Interest’s Daily News Brief is particularly concise for the amount of detail it provides) and you’ll find headlines that, not too long ago, would have shocked “civilized” readers and dominated conversation for days or weeks. Now they’re daily trivia in places like Yemen, Afghanistan, Libya, Ukraine, the South China Sea and Nigeria, and they are seriously complicating American security policy.

Over the last few years, some commentators have described this rise in violence and chaos around the globe as “The Return of Geopolitics,” or something similar. And truth be told, though geopolitics never quite left, we are seeing a resurgence of conventional great power competition and  violence within supposedly sovereign states as the liberal world order of the last few decades erodes. An unsustainable state system and a decaying international balance of power have provided fodder for a new medievalism—chaotic decentralization and devolution of power to sub-state actors across the Middle East and Africa, and a growing sense of competition between great powers resembling the empires of old in Asia, Eastern Europe and parts of the Middle East. In the chaos, crises are nurtured; and some will grow into true monsters.

But geopolitics – let’s call it “geographical space” for now – is not the only arena of conflict in the 21st century. For all the bombings and beheadings and out-migrations and impoverishments haunting today’s world’s “geographical space”, the world’s cyber space is faced with total anarchy. Hackers of no particular national or corporate origin can humiliate even the world’s mightiest states and wealthiest corporations. Cyber crime and cyber warfare are on the rise, and there are very few effective national institutions regulating and counteracting them, much less international institutions. So, it comes as no surprise when hacker groups like Anonymous release top-secret military documents, when China-originating cyber spies steal US government employees’ security clearances en masse, when North Korea forces the closure of theaters across America by means of cyber blackmail against Sony or when the Israelis manage to shut down the Iranian nuclear program for a few days with a web worm called “Stuxnet”. But these are not the only sorts of cyber attacks that are possible.

With advances in information technology rapidly making transactions cheaper online and physical services more efficient when digitized, the world’s infrastructure and economy are fusing into an all-embracing physical Internet. And when water distribution systems, power plants, retiree insurance archives, social media sites, driverless car networks, online grocery delivery services and digital communications networks are connected in the same system and run by the same technology, they all become vulnerable to attack and disablement by sophisticated online actors. Shut down a country’s power grid in the wintertime or turn off the water reservoirs in a desert state, and see how devastating cyber warfare can really be. It’s only a matter of time before some state or other actor manages to pull such an attack off, and as the world’s economy and infrastructure advance, the threat will only rise.

But there is another threat, beyond geographical space and cyber space, in a third theater. For decades, the United States led the world in space exploration and space technology. But it has since more or less abandoned that pursuit, and other powers are moving in to fill the gaps. China’s space program is rapidly becoming legendary, and India propelled an unmanned craft to the Martian atmosphere in 2014. It’s been well-documented, meanwhile, that NASA is no longer able to supply the International Space Station (ISS) on its own, being bereft of space shuttles; the Russian space program remains American astronauts’ only means of supply in the ISS. All this is happening as strategic developments and technological innovations on Earth render military equipment like satellites in Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) all the more important. Truth be told, Americans don’t really have to worry about a sudden strategic militarization of space by rival powers for the moment. But the fact that the US is no longer at the cutting edge of space exploration, even if it maintains a lead in current space technology, should give American strategists pause.

What happens when the Russians radically update their satellite fleet in such a way as to threaten American orbital dominance? What happens when China or India puts a man on the Moon just to demonstrate that they can? Looking further to the future, it seems clear that whichever nation first discovers a way to exploit and transport the mineral and energy resources of the Asteroid Belt and the Outer Planets will be a wealthy nation indeed. Is it prudent to leave such thoughts to the future, especially when American strategists are competing with strategists who think in terms of decades and centuries rather than months or years? In short, Outer Space may not seem particularly valuable right now, but it certainly will be in the future, and Americans are doing less than any other nation to take advantage of it.

A worsening international situation in Geographical Space, absolute chaos in Cyber Space, and a severe investment deficit in Outer Space. What is a nation to do?

It can prepare for these crises, and more. The US should improve its strategies and bolster its capabilities on all three fronts. The technical skill is there, in every area—the federal government need only bring policy coherence to the picture.

The federal government should continue and expand its partnerships with the cybersecurity industry, for the obvious reason that economic and infrastructure systems are increasingly open to ever-proliferating threats from hackers of all types. For the sake of maintaining an acceptable quality of life for American citizens and upholding the country’s security, the US government now must ensure that American cyberspace is also protected. That will require the formation of new agencies and the distribution of many funds for the purpose. But done rightly, a new emphasis on cybersecurity can prepare America for yet more challenges in the decades to come.

Another critical industry open to public-private partnerships is the space industry. The US government used to engage with NASA at a far more proactive level than it does now, offering generous funds and articulating key and discrete goals (most notably, putting a man on the Moon). US space policy for the last several decades has been lackluster by comparison, and the Eurasian powers’ relative advances in space exploration and logistics are testimony to this. It would be beneficial to reinvest a significant portion of the entitlement-heavy federal budget into a renewed and reformed NASA, and set exploratory goals like landing a human on Mars or establishing a permanent space station in orbit around another planet. Expanding our presence in space will set the United States up for a future where outer space, and all its dangers and opportunities, is more immediately open to its use.

Of course, though it would be beneficial for the US to partner with strategic industries to produce war material, secure its cyber domain and expand its space program, it is very unlikely that, absent a major push like a great international crisis, the Americans will shift their focus from relatively innocuous issues to these truly critical ones. That’s unfortunate, but it’s also how American political history works—it takes a real crisis to get the country moving in the right direction. Long-term strategic thinking is not a natural characteristic of American democracy.

Fortunately (or unfortunately, depending on how one prefers to look at it) there are crises brewing on the horizon. It would be good for Americans to act first before they arrive. But even if they don’t, they’ll act soon enough, once the crises come.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Nepal is a crucible where a new experiment in pluralistic, secular democracy is being forged. Though overshadowed by its neighbors India and China, and riven by poverty and social, economic and linguistic divisions, the country’s current political transition is leading Nepal toward a society that shares in Western political values. The democracies of the West should note this shift and invest in Nepal’s political and economic future.

History and geography divide Nepal by caste, ethnicity, money, region and gender. The three geographic divisions, as in the map below, are the mountains, the hills and the Terai or Madhesh.^[1] The Pahadis (hill dwellers) are richer and a majority. The people of the Terai are poorer. Kathmandu, the capital, and its surrounding valley are in the hills and have long dominated politics.

Nepal’s caste system dates back to 2000 BC, when Indo-Aryans moving from India brought the system with them. The caste system was legalized by Jayasthiti Malla, a 14^th-century king, with the Brahmin (priests) and Chettri (warriors) at the top, the Terai keeping their Indian castes, and the Tibeto-Burmese divided among various strata. The ethnicities occupy distinct regions to some extent.^[2]

All these divisions drive voting behavior, with all groups voting separately as blocs. That voting behavior falls on an ideological spectrum akin to that in the West, though in general all political parties are farther to the left. To the center-right is the NC (Nepal Congress). The NC attracts the old royalists, those who once supported the monarchy, and social and economic centrists and conservatives. The military has long allied with such groups. The left end is the moderate leftist CPN-ML and the more extreme Maoists. All parties are secular in ideology and influence and now renounce violence in theory and in practice. However the Maoists are the political offshoot of a rebel group that fought a civil war from 1996 to 2006, seeking to make Nepal a communist state. The military fought against them with support from the centrists—particularly the royalists. However at the end of the war allegiances shifted and the NC and CPN-ML made common cause in the name of democracy, ousted the king, signed a peace agreement and started work on a new constitution.

Though voting falls along social divides, Nepali democracy is still secure—a point of considerable strategic import to the West. In the current political climate, no group has the majority, as the charts below show. There is more than one dominant party, and power has stably switched hands before. Other destabilizing elements that bedevil young democracies are also absent or weak. One such element, civil war, is unlikely to repeat itself. Another, a strong monarchy, is gone for good now. Kings have effected coups in Nepal’s historic past, deposing elected leaders in 1961 and 2005; however, republics rarely revert to kingdoms, and the military is now considered apolitical. Communists, a potential antidemocratic force, are subject to the whims of the electorate, and suffer periodic electoral reversals that keep them from monopolizing power. Democracy is also strengthened by the influence of Nepal’s other neighbor, India. The NC traces its origins to the struggle for Indian independence in the 1940s when the founding leaders of the party allied with Indian nationalists.

Figure 3. Demographics of Nepali diversity.^[3]

For democracy to function in a heterogeneous country, compromise helps. Here, too, Nepal has made considerable progress. The Maoist civil war – demanding social justice for the oppressed – was waged at a time when the king held most of the power. Maoists have since compromised, renouncing violence. The peace agreement that ended the civil war required them to lay down arms, with some of their fighters getting integrated into the national army. The party is now explicitly committed to democracy. The NC has also compromised, jettisoning hopes for a constitutional monarchy. The NC, long allied with royalists, had supported the institution of the monarchy even when it politically opposed the king himself. The Maoists and ethnicity-based parties want states based on ethnicities; the NC and CPN-ML fear this would sunder the nation-state. This disagreement is, however, likely temporary. More states implies more variation in wealth and a stronger need for federal taxation to redress the greater imbalances. Maoists, however, want a loose federation. The current draft with fewer states might well stick; the Maoist position wanting more states strengthens central power, a contradiction of aims.

So despite divisions, or perhaps because of them, Nepal looks set for democracy, secularism and political openness, a future likely to raise its strategic relevance to the West. Primarily, the developed countries of the West can help with investments and technology. Nepal has eight of the world’s ten tallest peaks, including Mount Everest; the Himalayas contribute to tourism revenue, and developing tourism requires investment. While the country is prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes, these tragedies have little long-term effect on social and political conditions.[4] This topography also creates potential for hydroelectric power generation, coveted by energy-hungry India and China. Hydroelectric power is reusable and generates no carbon emissions and the West, along with the rest of the world, has a clear stake in promoting it.

The US, specifically, is in the best position to help. It looms large in Nepal’s economy, and the US is Nepal’s second largest export market, after India.[5] It also provides development assistance under programs such as the Economic Supports Fund program, but the net annual assistance is just 45 million dollars and could be significantly expanded. The US, also, has the West’s main organic constitution. Britain, for instance, has none; the constitutions of other Western democracies such as Germany, Italy and France are practically post-World War II creations initiated under allied guidance. Spain’s constitution is post-Franco; Greece too has a recent constitution.

However, politically, missteps have dogged US-Nepal relations. America labeled the Maoists terrorists until 2006. While the Maoists acted brutally during the civil war, the insurgency was driven by the genuinely dispossessed and was not anti-American in nature.[6] While the culture and the context differ considerably from the Western, and American, experiences, the Nepali populace has shown a similar basic aspiration for a democratic, pluralist, secular society that guarantees broad equal rights to the most vulnerable. The tolerance for consensus building demonstrated by both political leaders and the populace testifies to that aspiration. The US is in a position to help with technical expertise on constitution writing, something Nepal desperately needs after it failed to draft a secular, republican constitution in 2008 due to state delineation issues. In June of this year, Nepal’s major parties reached a consensus on a host of legal issues causing gridlock, and are now ready to give a constitution another try. The West, and America in particular, can provide needed help, along with trade facilitation, capital commitments, and targeted aid for human development. These are investments likely to be repaid in the future with a friendly country in a strategic location between India and China.

[1] “Nepal: Country Profile,” Nepal and Bhutan: Country Studies, ed. Andrea Savada (Library of Congress, 1993), xxxiv.

[2] Nanda Shrestha, “Chapter 2. Nepal: The Society and Its Environment,” Nepal and Bhutan: Country Studies, ed. Andreas Savada (Library of Congress, 1993), 74.

[3] Caste demographics adapted from “Appendix: Table 1,” Federalism and State Restructuring in Nepal: The Challenge of the Constituent Assembly, (Kathmandu, Nepal: United Nations Development Program, 2007), http://www.ccd.org.np/publications/report.pdf (data from 2001); regional demographics from Nanda Shrestha, 66 (data from the 1981 census); language demographics adapted from Yogendra Yadava, “Linguistic Diversity in Nepal Perspectives on Language Policy,” Seminar on “Constitutionalism and Diversity in Nepal, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, August 22–24, 2007, http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/midea/pdf/Yogendra.pdf.

[4]“Nepal: Country Profile,” xxxvi; Nanda Shrestha, 57.

[5] Bruce Vaughn, CRS Report for Congress. Nepal: Background and US Relations (Congressional Research Service, 2005), 17.

[6] Bruce Vaughn, 9–10.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

1,267,401,849. That’s the number of people who live within the borders of India—a country one-third of the size of the US with more than four times the population. By 2030, India is expected to become the largest country by population in the world, overtaking China. By 2050, the population is estimated to reach 1,620,050,849—a massive number to feed, house, educate and employ.

These are numbers that the India government is desperately trying to avoid. Thus far, the main method of population control has been mass sterilization. In 1973, then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency in response to mass riots in Delhi over high inflation, poor standards of living, and corruption. Disillusioned with the government, Indians called for her resignation. In order to relieve the welfare burden on national institutions, Gandhi enacted a drastic measure: the forced mass sterilization of more than six million people. The victims were mostly men, since vasectomies were much less expensive and easier to preform than the tubal ligations required for women. The coercion came in many forms, including banning unsterilized people from working government jobs, withholding water from irrigation projects until village quotas were met, and retaining teacher’s salaries until they underwent sterilization surgery. The campaign ended in March 1977 when deadly anti-sterilization protests broke out in the northern states. Though the current sterilization program is less draconian than that under Gandhi, Modi’s government still uses this method of family planning to control its ever-expanding population.

The National Family Health Survey for 2005-2006 showed that 37.3% of women in India have under gone female sterilization, largely because of monetary incentives from the government. The sterilization is usually a tubectomy, a procedure in which the fallopian tubes are surgically tied together. In the US, this procedure is done with minimally invasive techniques, usually takes 25-30 minutes and requires a day of bed rest. In India, the surgeries are often done in under five minutes, where doctors are expected to perform hundreds per day. The women are usually only allowed to rest for an hour before being sent back to their homes, a journey that can take hours on badly paved roads. These unhygienic and dangerous conditions are the reason why the mass sterilization of Indian women has come to the attention of the Western world.

In November of 2014, 15 women died after undergoing tubectomies at a “sterilization camp” in the district of Bilaspur in Chhattisgarh. Improper medication was cited as the official cause of death, but the surgeon at the camp admitted to performing 83 surgeries in six hours, calling into question the cleanliness and accuracy of the surgery, as well as whether state governments were once again imposing quotas on their doctors. Their deaths also brought to light the gender and class issues that have accompanied the policy of population control. Only 1% of men in India undergo vasectomies today, a cheaper and far less invasive surgery. The National Population Policy 2000 stated: “The active involvement of men is called for in planning families, supporting contraceptive use…further, currently, over 97 percent of sterilizations are tubectomies and this manifestation of gender imbalance needs to be corrected.” While the language of this policy seems promising and at the very least aware of the gender imbalance of sterilization practices, in reality there has been little reform.

The incentives provided by the state for women to undergo the surgery also call into question the ethics of the policy. Women are paid roughly 1,400 rupees (about $23 USD) for the surgery. Since most patients are from rural farming communities, this sum can be equivalent to a month’s income. Some women are compensated with pots and pans, or even food, an enticing offer in a country where 21% of the population is undernourished. Condom use in India is barely 6% and mostly in urban areas because their use is seen as only a habit of prostitutes and those with sexually transmitted infections (STIs).

While the idea of sterilization might seem extreme to those in the US, about 36% of American women undergo the surgery, a number remarkably similar to that of Indian women. According to a 2008 study, “About 700,000 female sterilizations are performed annually [in the US], half of which are performed within 48 hours post-partum. Sterilization is performed following 10% of all births. Approximately 345,000 female sterilizations are interval procedures, meaning that they do not occur immediately following pregnancy. Approximately 500,000 vasectomies are performed annually for a rate of 9.9 procedures per 1000 men aged 25 to 49.”

Theoretically, sterilization, done willingly, safely, hygienically and equally to both men and women, is an effective and ethical means of population control. However, in India, women are dying as a result of the current program. Their safety must outweigh the national goal to reduce a rising population. The national government should instead implement a mass education program, designed to educate all Indian citizens on family planning. Though it would surely be resource exhaustive, such a program would allow for a higher quality of life for both men and women, as well as curb population growth.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

A streamlined public transportation system is an important element of any modern city’s infrastructure. Metro and subway systems reduce traffic, cut emissions and connect populations. Look to Asia for prime examples of such systems; Japan is home to 82 of the world’s 100 busiest train stations and famous for its timely and clean trains; Seoul’s metro system is the longest in the world and equipped with Wi-Fi and 3G data access in all train cars; other Asian cities, such as Hong Kong and Guangzhou, have garnered worldwide acclaim for their clean, spacious, and high-capacity subways; even in Pyongyang, North Korea, the subway system is a well-used piece of infrastructure.

On the other side of the continent, city governments within India are working to build public transportation systems on par with those systems in East Asia. This is an important step in the success and development of India—its population is set to overtake that of China within the next 20 years, and it is only reasonable that its infrastructure and public transportation systems are up to standard as it continues to grow.

In part, it is a burgeoning consciousness of environmentalism that powered the recent surge in the construction of public subway and bus systems in India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has stressed the eco-friendliness of India’s expanding subway networks, especially of that in New Delhi. Today, the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) is a large institution, servicing 2,500,000 people or more each day, but Modi has even bigger plans for the system. The government has begun construction on a number of new stations in Delhi to further improve the flow of the DMRC and to reduce Delhi’s pollution from cars and industrial sites. Together with other growing Indian metro systems, the DMRC will be a major feat of infrastructure upon completion with at least 6,000,000 daily passengers. While the numbers might pale in comparison to the tens of millions using subways in large cities across East Asia, India’s progress in public transportation reflects well on the government’s environmental policies—to have 6,000,000 people forgoing cars is no small victory. The DMRC has also received attention from the UN as the first public transportation system built under the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change. On the surface, everything seems to be going smoothly for the Delhi metro system.

Modi and his ministers, particularly Urban Development Minister Venkaiah Naidu, have touted the environmental benefits of the DMRC, projecting the image of an eco-friendly government and urging Indians to be more environmentally conscious. For Modi’s government, the developing subway systems are proof that the government is playing its part in reducing emissions. Naidu has even repeatedly encouraged ministers and government officials to use the Delhi Metro every Wednesday; Naidu rode the Metro to the airport, although it is unclear whether other ministers have followed suit.

In conflict with their domestic rhetoric, Indian leaders sing to a very different tune on the global stage. In anticipation of the UN climate summit in Paris in November 2015, the Indian government has declared it will not create a plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. India, after all, is a developing country, and Modi believes that his government’s main priority is to reduce poverty and grow the economy, not to reduce the country’s carbon footprint. India’s greenhouse gas emissions have been a point of concern for developed countries in Europe and North America, but the Indian government has insisted on honoring its own priorities. There is, then, a disparity between India’s environmentalism abroad and at home.

For Modi, this inconsistency is purposeful and strategic. Encouraging environmentalism at home shows that he cares about the health of Indians and cities’ livability; cleaner cities are conducive to a healthier, happier and more supportive population. The growing infrastructure, particularly the DMRC, also employs a great number of people, from construction workers to engineers and suppliers. He has not only created jobs by promoting green life choices; he even runs the metro system at a profit. Modi has capitalized on environmentalism at home, using it as a social and economic tool. His approach to the international stage stems from the same motivation: business development. While domestic environmentalism provides some form of revenue for India, cooperating with developed nations to cap emissions does not. India’s economy relies on industries like mining that will be stunted by environmental restrictions imposed by the international community. Modi cannot afford economic stagnation. Partaking in an emissions cap agreement will put India at a disadvantage, and it is simply not in line with Modi’s business-centric platform. By refusing to join in an environmental agreement, Modi also demonstrates to Indians that he values Indian interests above all else, a potent nationalist message.

To date, Modi has focused heavily on internal business and government interests. But, at what point do his international responsibilities outweigh his domestic duties? As a leader of one of the world’s most populous countries, Modi’s choice has global, lasting consequences. If he cooperates with developed countries, then India’s international image would improve and people around the globe would benefit from less pollution. But if Modi stands his ground, he could build India’s economy further. International leaders claim that the world cannot afford more emissions from developing countries like India, but Modi believes that India cannot afford to limit itself in the middle of its economic boom.

Modi has managed to balance economic and environmental interests regarding the construction of the DMRC; his next challenge is to find that balance on a global scale and place India on the same platform as powerful developed nations like the US and China, economically and environmentally.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

There is a narrow but growing sector at the nexus between clean energy and international development—one that may be leveraged to simultaneously address both climate change and wealth inequality. Developing states are increasingly taking advantage of this synergy to galvanize their economies with zero carbon footprints. At the heart of this movement is solar energy, the energy source that will soon be a major catalyst for international sustainable development.

Energy poverty, the state of living without access to household electricity, is concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and India, and is moderately prevalent throughout the Middle East and South America. Of the one and a half billion people living in energy poverty around the world, nearly 85% are in rural areas, which lack the complex infrastructure of a city that allows electricity to be transmitted through a grid. Solar energy is the solution to powering these underdeveloped regions, because it is a natural, renewable resource that allows citizens the freedom to harness electricity for themselves.

While other types of clean energy require public utilities to harvest and allocate electricity through vast networks, solar energy sidesteps the barriers of centralized energy as a type of distributed generation. Both wind and hydroelectric power demand large-scale construction and capital, not to mention the ownership of viable land and rivers. Even nuclear energy, which has the potential to power hundreds of households, calls for the most extensive upkeep and a preexisting grid. Solar alone fits the bill for small-scale development, because photovoltaic cells are modular, which allows batteries to be independent and easily scalable, ranging in size from a single lantern to a solar farm.

Flexibility is essential to powering rural areas, because the energy infrastructure is decentralized. The small-scale version of a centralized system is the microgrid: a generator that supplies electricity to multiple users. Because village communities typically consist of less than 100 households, pushing the electricity through a grid over great distances is more expensive than building a smaller power source. Originally, microgrids were only a temporary interim between a centralized power system and distributed electricity generation. But, more than ever, rural populations are adopting microgrids as a permanent solution since they allow developing regions to leapfrog building a complex energy infrastructure and start employing modern technologies immediately.

Looking to the future, decentralized, renewable energy will be a major component of environmental resilience. As fossil fuel prices fluctuate, solar energy is particularly important in low-income regions, which are extremely susceptible to the impending shortage of global oil. Additionally, damage to major power plants can shut down entire neighborhoods and take days to fix; but, if a single microgrid suffers from mechanical failure or a natural disaster, then the others will remain intact. Climate change will inevitably hit impoverished and marginalized communities the hardest because they cannot afford rising market prices of kerosene, oil, or coal, nor can they tolerate the pollution of natural resources, which they may use for water, shelter, or income. Solar energy is not only a short-term solution to electricity, but must also be a long-term solution to development.

To date, several developing countries have begun to adopt substantial solar energy projects. In early 2014, Schneider Electric, specialists in energy management, introduced the Microsol Project to Kenya: the creation of village-size public utility models that use solar thermodynamics to provide drinking water, heating and electricity to dozens of households. With a lifespan of 20 years, a Microsol produces 50 MWh/year, 1000 m³/year of clean water, 800 MWh/year of heat. Annually, 50 MWh would provide over 100 rural households with two lights and a cell phone charger, or the equivalent of five American households. In July, Dharnai became the first village in India to be entirely solar powered, serving 2,400 residents, two schools, one health centers and over 50 growing businesses. This is just one of many instances in India where solar energy fosters community and entrepreneurship; to produce one’s own power is liberating, and this equips students and business owners with the ability to work at night and embrace modern technologies. In addition to sustainability, distributed solar energy allows rural areas to leapfrog into the modern economy.

Even in the developed world, however, solar is becoming a major asset. For example, more than half of Germany’s energy is now generated by the sun. Thanks to China, panel production escalated to meet Germany’s demand, the price of solar energy has fallen by 70% in the last five years. As the upfront cost of going solar continues to drop, it becomes more and more expensive for households, and whole cities, to stay dependent on fossil fuels. Environmentalism no longer has to be incentivized morally, but can be inspired by the prospects of long-term economic advantage and equality.

Despite these successes, sunlight is not the catch-all, end-all solution to international development. Though solar energy has made significant progress in certain countries, those without sufficient sun exposure may have to wait for a more long-term solution, like storing solar power in batteries, to become affordable. The presence of NGOs has also boosted the presence of solar, but regions that gain less nonprofit attention suffer from the high upfront costs of solar installation. While the cost of solar panels has dropped by over 99% per watt since 1997, and now sits below retail prices in the Western world, the transition remains daunting for rural populations in developing countries. However, access to a personal cell phone and lighting at night has a high rate of return for loans and investment; microfinance has already begun to play a leading role in support for solar energy. Furthermore, solar panels, once established, require negligible maintenance and zero operating costs after an initial investment.

The looming prospects of global warming and volatile fossil fuel prices have jumpstarted a solar revolution. As solar energy becomes cheaper and more developing regions catch on to its multifaceted potential, the outlook of the next few decades is hopeful that clean energy will simultaneously combat climate change and provide electricity around the world.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors. 

China is rising. This is an unequivocal fact that has not gone unnoticed by the world, not just the United States, for whom China now is a peer world power. Most aware of China’s increasing might are those countries in China’s periphery, including Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and India. Tensions are often high between China and its neighboring Middle Powers, which know that the Dragon cannot be checked by one nation alone. As a result, a classic international balancing act is quietly forming—one that is eerily reminiscent of the European powers’ response to the German threat just prior to World War I. The Middle Powers have recently forged closer relationships in order to collectively serve as a counterweight to the rising regional hegemon.

The necessity of such a counterweight-coalition of Asian states is clear when looking at Beijing’s military assertiveness. The dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, in which Japan has the legal upper hand, has been suggested to be the site of World War III’s potential beginning. There is also significant friction between both China and Vietnam and China and India over border disputes. China has recently behaved in a manner that has earned it the label of a regional “bully.”

Further reason for these countries allying is that the role of the US is unclear. These nations would rather not rely on a diplomatically awkward US, who is trying still to find a middle ground between supporting traditional allies and preventing reckless maneuvers. America’s foreign policy focus is primarily on the Middle East crises while its domestic political scene has become drastically polarized, both of which factor into the Asian perception of American inattentiveness and thus inability to serve as a dependable ally.

Without the US as the leader, even in the background, which nation has risen to lead the coalition of Middle Powers? One initially thinks Japan, since it has historically enjoyed substantial US support, including a significant role in the counter-China alignment. It is not, however, the key player for a number of reasons, first being its strained relationship with South Korea, another Middle Power. For perspective, tensions are so high between these two states that Japanese leader Abe is as unpopular in South Korea as North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. Secondly, Sino-Japanese relations are at a point where diplomacy seems to be a futile endeavor. The two nations’ intense rivalry might seem like a catalyst for Japan to serve as the Asia-Pacific ringleader, but in reality, such a relationship will not lead to effective counterbalancing but rather an unhealthy polarization against China. The most effective leader must function as both a lodestone and a counterweight simultaneously.

Enter India. New Delhi has been building economic and military relations among the Middle Powers. India joined Vietnam in joint military exercises only a few months ago, and the relations between their navies and armies are being bolstered. India and South Korea agreed to double their annual trade to $40 billion by 2015, as well as increase military ties. Prime Ministers Abe and Modi enjoy a particularly friendly relationship that has spawned an agreement to “upgrade and strengthen” their defenses together alongside heavy reinforcement of their bilateral trade. India has demonstrated that it has no aggressive intentions towards the periphery by forging amicable relations between them and itself: this makes India the ideal state to spearhead the balance against the Chinese threat.

Moreover, India does what Japan cannot: sustain a working relationship with Beijing. Even as their respective troops glared at each other from across the border, Modi celebrated his birthday by hosting China’s president Xi Jinping. The two laid out a trade deal in which China will invest $20 billion in Indian infrastructure projects, a significant increase from the $400 million invested by China in the last decade.

India is in a position where it will be tugged upward as China rises itself; on the other hand, if China’s belligerence increases, India can rely upon its Middle Power coalition to balance against Beijing and function as a prominent ally to Japan, Korea, Vietnam and the others on the periphery. The Middle Powers are proving that they do not need the US to secure themselves, and India is proving itself to be an astute international security architect.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors. 

In India, old habits of LGBTQ legal and cultural intolerance die hard. Just last week, Delhi University made waves in its decision to allow students interested in post-graduate programs to indicate a third gender (transgender) on their applications. Many see this as a promising first step towards breaking down the patriarchal culture that reinforces so-called traditional gender roles.

Yet, even after a successful appeal to decriminalize sexual activity “between consenting adults of the same gender”in Delhi’s High Court in 2009, India’s Supreme Court reversed the ruling four years later as both a shock and disappointment to LGBTQ rights activists in the world’s largest ‘democracy’. The controversial Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code –which is still in effect –criminalizes acts of intercourse “against the order of nature” punishable by hefty fines and imprisonment up to 10 years.

Despite legal setbacks, there remains hope within the political sphere. Ashish Shelar, the leader of India’s largest political party (the Bharatiya Janata Party) acknowledged the repeal of Section 377 as a “pressing need”and promised to raise the issue with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. India’s Health Minister Dr. Harsh Vardhan too seems to recognize the importance of changing the country’s attitude towards LGTBQ rights. In a recent interview, he acknowledged that “everybody has human rights and it is the job of the government to protect them.”

Yet many critics are skeptical that any substantive changes will occur considering the political necessity of appeasing the country’s conservative voting bloc. India’s inability to reconcile a shifting global culture on the role of LGBTQ issues represents a significant bottleneck in the country’s progress as an emerging economy and world power. Nearly 70 years after the partition of India, the country remains torn between archaic pre-colonial laws and modern Western culture.

Hijras, as members of an ancient community who identify as transexual or transgender, also suffer from discrimination and have just recently been recognized as citizens with “every right to enjoy their human rights.” However, with various statutes still limiting the community’s ability to celebrate important rituals (such as a castration ceremony for those entering the community), significant barriers remain in place to full acceptance and flourishing in Indian society.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken an important step in addressing some of the major issues crippling Indian society, including the acceptance of rape culture, the unequal treatment of women –particularly in the lack of public bathrooms available to girls in schools –and the common practice of sex-selective abortion in India.

Modi has presented himself as a crucial piece of the puzzle of LGBTQ recognition in India. By seeking to equalize the legal and social standing of women in Indian society, Modi opens the door for conversations about other issues important to other minority groups in the country, including the LGBT and Hijra communities. Without question, Modi has the overwhelming support of the nation’s executive business leaders according and his BJP party handily won the majority of seats in the parliamentary election.

Modi must capitalize on the momentum of his first 100 days before so-called political necessities force him to fall short on his visionary proposals to improve life in India in both the social and economic realms. Modi’s focus on the security of women is essential for India to progress into a country, but other issues, like the treatment of LGBTQ individuals and prevalence of corruption and bribery, cannot be put on the back burner. Living in fear and despair is a constant struggle for LGBT people in India, and no truly substantive change can come from the country without recognition of these issues.

India is growing by leaps and bounds economically, and the country’s prospects for the future in world trade are immense. But without addressing key issues at home, such as women’s and minorities’ rights, India is cutting its nose off to spite its face. Focusing on fixing the domestic troubles of the country will pay off major dividends in the long term. The political party that recognizes and implements these changes first will undoubtedly get the worm.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

On July 15, during the latest BRICS Summit at Fortaleza, Brazil, the five countries of the BRICS Group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) announced the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB), a new international development bank aimed at assisting international development in the global South. The five countries also agreed on a Contingency Reserve Agreement (CRA), setting aside funds for emergency situations and to solve short-term liquidity crises.

What was once a Goldman Sachs acronym meant for businessmen looking for opportunities to tap new markets has now become a bloc of countries claiming to be the leaders of the developing world. The establishment of the BRICS institutions has given rise to much interest and speculation in the West.

Grievances Against IMF

The NDB and CRA are the latest institutions established in response to the Western-dominated international financial system. Set up at the end of the Second World War to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Great Depression, the Bretton Woods institutions were meant to act as the lender of last resort and provide governance over the international economy. Since then, the Bretton Woods institutions have acquired a rather sour reputation among developing nations.

The perception that the West dominates the Bretton Woods institutions is hard to disprove. Both the IMF and the World Bank are headquartered in Washington, DC. In the World Bank, only the United States holds vetoing power, while in the IMF, the United States alone controls 16.75% of voting power, while the BRICS combined hold only 11.03%.

The Bretton Woods institutions are also accused of acting on behalf of the West as interventionist powers. Whereas the IMF is meant to provide emergency funds in the crisis situations, often aid comes with strings attached. The IMF will subsequently work towards restructuring economies, forcibly opening markets for Western investors and imposing harsh austerity and fiscal responsibility measures. Developing and emerging countries from Brazil and Russia to South Korea and Argentina (where the government recently defaulted much to the ire of American creditors) blame IMF restructuring programs for historical or current economic woes. In the South Korean case, heavy-handed intervention in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (1997 AFC) resulted in harsh austerity measures and near-excessive Western acquisition of Korean assets. Public anger against the IMF and perceived economic neo-colonialism remains to this day in South Korea, where the 1997 AFC is called the IMF Crisis.

Dissatisfaction with the current Bretton Woods institutions have left developing countries searching for alternate funding sources. In the aftermath of the 1997 AFC, Asian nations set up a currency swap called the Chiang Mai Initiative to pool resources should another crisis arise. The Bank of the South was established in 2009 also to circumvent use of the Bretton Woods institutions for South American states. However, neither has been used to date. Furthermore, none of these initiatives sought to directly challenge the Bretton Woods institutions on a global scale until now.

The rising power of emerging economies, particularly of China, combined with Western economic debilitation during the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has convinced the BRICS that they can now carve their own destinies. As the BRICS themselves say, the BRICS combined make up 41.6% of the world’s population, 19.8% of global GDP, 16.9% of total global trade (combined value of exports and imports), and their combined GDPs grew more than 300% in the last decade. They deserve more than 11.03% of voting power and condescending Western negligence.

What’s at Stake

As the BRICS countries come together to establish new institutions, they pledge to do things differently from the Bretton Woods institutions. The NDB will practice an equal voting system, with all of BRICS having one vote in the Bank. The idea is that as collective leaders of the developing world, all should have equal say in NDB matters.

Beneath the façade of cooperation however is an arena broiled in politics. Of particular interest are Russia’s interventionist intentions and Indian and Chinese competition for global leadership.

For Russia, increasing international pressure from the West has forced Russia to look East and beyond for much needed cash and support. The NDB is the perfect candidate for such a support base. Perhaps the NDB will end Russia’s dependence on the Bretton Woods institutions. Should this come to pass, Russia will be more emboldened in its actions knowing it can afford to lose sympathy from the West.

For India, the NDB provides much needed catalyst for Modi’s new presidency. The Modi Administration’s publishing of the first budget had led to some disappointment due to lack of direction. For Modi, this was a chance to re-galvanize enthusiasm for his administration by showing global leadership. Yet, much to India’s disappointment, high expectations for the BRICS institutions have been dashed. India was the party that fought the hardest against China during negotiations, wishing to base the NDB in India rather than China. The compromise was that the first President of the NDB would be Indian, but it is clear that India must look elsewhere to reach its potential and exercise leadership.

For China, nothing short of global leadership is at stake. Being the richest of the BRICS nations, China sees itself as the natural leader of the BRICS and sees the potential to use these new institutions to widen its global influence. The decision to place the headquarters of the NDB in Shanghai as well as China’s large contributions to the CRA clearly signals China’s dominance in the group.

The BRICS Institutions also lend China a much-needed chance to bolster its reputation abroad. China’s aid is notorious for propping up authoritarian states and for turning a blind eye to the benefactors’ human rights abuses. Chinese aid is largely perceived to be merely a tool in China’s overall geopolitical strategy. While it is clear the American government uses aid to further national interest, the IMF and World Bank help “legitimize” American aid, making it more politically palatable. The BRICS institution promises to fulfill the same function for China, with the CRA’s objective of non-interference also matching up nicely with China’s own protocol of non-interference.

Future for the BRICS Institution?

Many see the NDB as a potential rival to the IMF and World Bank. Some may even see it as the latest development in an ongoing Sino-American rivalry, with the newly established Shanghai-based NDB rising to challenge the Washington-backed IMF. Others still, including the World Bank President Jim Yong Kim, believe the new institutions can complement the Bretton Woods institutions.

Whatever the viewpoint, it is clear that there are still many questions going forward for the NDB and CRA. The first concern is simple. There seems to be a lack of overall vision and inner coherency for the NDB and CRA. The BRICS countries indeed have little in common with each other. The starkest difference is that Brazil, South Africa and India are democratic, while Russia and China share authoritarian systems. China’s economy is 28 times the size of South Africa’s. Some have even speculated that the only thing holding the BRICS together is their dealings with China. In contributing to the NDB pot, China had wished to shell out more, but South Africa could only spare $10 bn. Constrained by equal contributions and equal voting power, the Chinese had to lower funding for the NDB from $100 bn to $50 bn, already exposing a potential problem in the BRICS institutions.

Second is a concern over leadership capabilities. None of the five BRICS countries have extensive experience governing multilateral organizations. Perhaps the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of China, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) of Russia, South African participation in the African Union and Brazilian participation in Mercosur may count as multilateral experience. However, the former two are seen as extensions of national ambitions rather than true instances of multilateral governance, while all of the mentioned organizations are restricted in their membership by continental and regional lines. In terms of leading a global front, all five BRICS will find themselves experimenting and improvising, without the IMF’s wealth of experience gained from decades of consensus building and programs.

Another valid question is whether the BRICS Bank merely reflects the Beijing Consensus. Considering clear Chinese dominance of the BRICS, speculation arises as to whether China through the NDB will truly provide a voice for emerging economies, or whether the NDB is only an extension of China’s national ambitions. The BRICS countries accept Chinese leadership only with great caution. While all are eager to use the BRICS institution as an expedient way to gain access to Chinese cash, they are mistrustful of Chinese intentions in leading the BRICS institution. The levels of mistrust combined with the lack of coherence leads to serious questions about the potential effectiveness of the institutions.

Finally, the effectiveness of NDB and CRA themselves are in serious question. Both the NDB and CRA have small cash pools, with $50 bn and $100 bn respectively. While the NDB seeks to provide developmental loans to the developing world, development projections by the World Bank for South Asia alone estimates $2.5 trillion over the next 10 years. Argentina’s recent default saw it drop about $15 bn in debt. Should Argentina, along with many other developing countries, look to the NDB and CRA for an IMF workaround, those institutions would likely face such challenges.

It’s still far too early to predict the trajectory of the newly established BRICS institutions, but its clear that many challenges still remain. If the BRICS institution can gain traction and become a powerful international financial institution, it might very well become the IMF’s next competitor or partner, depending on whatever trajectory the BRICS set. It’s difficult to tell whether the BRICS institutions will become an extension of Chinese economic diplomacy, a formalized way to gain access to Chinese funds, or a truly multilateral institution reaching out to the developing world and providing an alternate voice to a global economy dominated by Bretton Woods.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.