Defining Hispanic identity is not a contemporary issue — putting racial and ethnic labels on different identities has been ongoing for centuries. In the 15th century, when Spanish colonizers first arrived in present-day Mexico, they created a system of social classes known as the caste system. The system designated a person’s race with their economic status. Essentially, the more Spanish blood a person had, the higher they ranked in the system. The famous painting “Las Castas” depicts sixteen different caste combinations and labels. 

As far back as at least the 15th century, Hispanic people have been judged and evaluated based on how white they are. Whether it’s official documentation or everyday interactions, it feels impossible to escape these classifications. As someone who considers herself a mixed Hispanic (my dad is from Mexico, and my mom is a white American), it feels like everywhere I go and in every first interaction, people are trying to figure out how white I am. Sometimes, it feels as if someone is pulling up an imaginary “Las Castas” painting to my face to determine which classification I fall into. 

The truth is, most mixed people don’t really know their ethnic or racial make-up. When people ask my ethnicity, my most common response is, “I am half white and half Mexican;” but, the reality is much harder to explain and goes beyond percentages and fractions. 

The Hispanic identity is historically a mixed one. Because there were interracial marriages and relationships during the colonial period, the populations of most Hispanic countries have mixed identities to begin with. As time goes on, it becomes harder and harder to separate and put labels on identities clearly. Being Hispanic is not homogenous, and we need to stop acting like it is. 

Furthermore, an emphasis on defining race often plays into ideas of colorism and racism in these communities. A new Pew Research Study states that Hispanics of darker skin reported less access to opportunities and more discrimination compared to those with a lighter complexion. It is important to remember that not every Hispanic person’s experience is the same and most harbor multiple identities. The Hispanic identity is in and of itself an intersection of many experiences and identities. 

On the other hand, as a mixed Hispanic, I am often called “white-washed” or accused of not being a “real Mexican.”  While it is important to point out whitewashing in film and television, for example when characters of color are replaced with white characters, sometimes the term can be used to invalidate someone else’s identity. Although preserving our culture and celebrating our heritage is critical, sometimes I wonder if terms like “white-washed” should be used more carefully. Who gets to decide who is a “real Mexican?” Identity is a deeply personal topic and varies from person to person. 

I grew up listening to Latin music and making tortillas for dinner, but I never learned Spanish fluently and have never stepped foot in Mexico. Even though I identify as a Hispanic woman, I know some people would disagree with me. I also know that other people may identify as the exact same thing but look and have different experiences than I do. 

So where exactly do we draw the line between who gets to be Hispanic and what makes someone whitewashed? If I learned more Spanish as a kid, would that change the box I mark on the U.S. census? If I took a DNA test and it turned out to be 49% Mexican, would I still be Hispanic? 

When identity is defined by race, what languages you can speak, etc., it delegitimizes people’s experiences. Since identity is so personal, finding a definition that incorporates everyone’s nuances becomes harder and harder. It puts unnecessary emphasis on somewhat subjective elements. 

At a glance, the 2020 U.S. census shows that the Hispanic population is shrinking. However, in reality, the demographic is getting more diverse and more mixed. The population, in this way, is actually growing. Instead of viewing the increased numbers of mixed-raced Hispanics as a dilution of culture and heritage, it may be more useful to understand these numbers as a marker of diversity. 

The Hispanic population is a heterogeneous one, comprised of different, unique individuals. In order to understand the Hispanic population, it is crucial to understand all of its nuances and diversities. I identify as a mixed Hispanic woman. These two classifications are not contradictory, rather, being Hispanic means being diverse. 

It means celebrating Hispanic heritage in all its forms, colors and differences. 

The results come amid increased tensions within the country, particularly over the NLD-led government’s mistreatment of ethnic minorities. Aung San Suu Kyi herself, over the past five years, has gone from a “human rights icon” to an “international pariah” for defending the military’s violence against the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic group in western Myanmar. The 2020 elections, although considered the first “fair and free” in decades, are symbolic of a return to authoritarianism in the country. 

The elections did give rise to numerous young, independent candidates, but the NLD, as the dominating force in Burmese politics, has used its power to silence critics. Despite its origin as the democratic opposition to the military, the government has arrested hundreds of politicians and citizens for expressing opposing political views. The party has also usurped control of the media by cracking down on free press and allowing for the censorship of rival party websites.

Most significantly, the government excluded the votes of more than 1.5 million people, citing security concerns. The NLD canceled elections in over 50 townships, subsequently suppressing votes across ethnic constituencies and forbidding minorities like the Rohingya from participating in the election. Andrew Ngun Cung Lian, a Burmese constitutional scholar, remarked that “[i]n some ethnic areas, people are very hostile to the NLD and support ethnic parties instead… It feels like the NLD took advantage of the fighting to silence ethnic people.” 

Ethnic minority groups make up nearly one-third of Myanmar’s population. About 600,000 people are part of the Rohingya community, who have suffered brutal persecution by the military, ranging from gang rape to forced labor village burnings. Although the Rohingya had faced violence and persecution in other respects for years, they were previously able to vote and run in all elections. 

However, this year, the Rohingya were denied their right to vote, despite orders from the International Court of Justice and calls from international human rights groups. According to Wai Wai Nu, an activist of Rohingya origin and Executive Director of the Women’s Peace Network, “[t]he Aung San Suu Kyi government has shown no political will to restore Rohingya’s rights in Myanmar”. Although Suu Kyi’s party came into power in 2015 motivated to bring democracy to the country, the government has institutionalized the discrimination of the Rohingya and the military continues to enjoy impunity as the violence worsens. 

The military’s abuse of the Rohingya people has been met with intense condemnation from the West. Suu Kyi’s refusal to condemn the ethnic cleansing and her defense at the International Court of Justice in 2018 has led international governments to withdraw their awards and keys to their cities. Bill Richardson, the former American ambassador to the UN under President Bill Clinton and a longtime ally of Aung San Suu Kyi, highlighted the irony of “the international community us[ing]its liberty to promote hers [while]she is using some of the very same legal mechanisms as the military to stifle freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly.” 

In late 2019, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced it was investigating alleged human rights violations against the Rohingya as a possible case of genocide. This is a landmark move for the international community – a significant step in holding Myanmar accountable and bringing justice for the victims. The West’s greatest challenge is taking a tough stance against the persecution of the Rohingya without reinforcing Myanmar’s democratic weakening. Nevertheless, the worsening conflict and the government’s indifference have Western businesses and politicians thinking twice about their presence in the country. 

Myanmar, which had long adopted a “neutralist foreign policy” since the country’s constitution in 1974, may have to search for allies elsewhere as Western support dwindles. China seems to be the most natural choice, although handling China has proven more and more difficult for the Burmese government. 

Not only are China and Myanmar connected by a 2,200 km shared border, but also through China’s ties to ethnic armed groups that control outlying regions of the country. There is generally a negative public opinion towards China among Burmese citizens, and even the Myanmar government and military have worries about China’s growing influence. Yet, it seems unlikely that the NLD will take any significant steps to limit Beijing’s engagement, given Myanmar’s worsening relationship with the West and the necessity of Chinese support for the NLD’s domestic objectives. The NLD relies on Chinese investment and infrastructure funding to spur economic growth and needs China’s political clout to forge peace in the borderlines. 

The next five years of NLD will see Myanmar pursuing an “independent and active foreign policy” by relying on Chinese support while also gradually offsetting their growing influence. Myanmar will look to strengthen ties with other regional partners like India, Japan, Thailand, South Korea, and Singapore. Even so, without Western support, weaning off an “unhealthy reliance” on China is unlikely. 

The NLD remains popular among the country’s mostly Buddhist ethnic majority group, the Bamar, which still views the party as the only bulwark against military absolutism. However, the government has created a climate of repression in the country that may bring about its own downfall. Heading into their second term, unless the government ends its suppressive practices and takes a stance against the military’s persecution of the Rohingya, the future of democracy in Myanmar looks grim.  

This dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan began almost a century ago in 1921, when Joseph Stalin gave the region of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, a Muslim-majority nation. However, almost 90% of the population identified as Armenian and Christian, and this action isolated the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, known as the Artsakh to Armenians, within a country they did not consider their own. 

Despite the circumstances, the situation remained relatively stable until the deterioration of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh announced that it wanted to join Armenia despite its location within Azerbaijan. Three years later, when the Soviet Union fell and Armenia and Azerbaijan became sovereign states, the two countries went to war to determine who would have authority over Nagorno-Karabakh.

The war was incredibly violent, lasting three years and causing the deaths of over 30,000 people. Many of the casualties were attributed to the ethnic cleansing carried out by forces on both sides, which also displaced tens of thousands of refugees. By the time a ceasefire was negotiated, Armenia had taken over Nagorno-Karabakh and much of the surrounding area. While the ceasefire, brokered by Russia, ended the war, the strained relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan persist. Since then, Nagorno-Karabakh continues to be a part of Azerbaijan but is primarily governed by a separatist republic run by ethnic Armenians and supported by the Armenian government. The Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact, the border separating the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, remains one of the most militarized in the world.

The new resurgence of conflict hinted at the threat of an all-out war between the two countries, one that would likely involve the larger powers of Turkey and Russia. These two countries, who had previously worked together to manage the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, have also seen a deterioration of relations this year. In February, Russian airstrikes targeted and killed Turkish soldiers in Syria, and in May, Turkey sent military advisors, drones and Syrian fighters to Libya to oppose a Russian-backed political faction. Turkey and Russia are fighting each other through proxy wars in both Syria and Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh could very well have been the third.

During the war in the 1990s, Turkey fully supported Azerbaijan (with whom it shares an ethnic and cultural heritage), even closing its border with Armenia in solidarity. Turkey and Armenia have long been at odds, with the latter pushing for recognition of the Armenian genocide in 1915 and the former refusing to acknowledge it. Russia has economic ties to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, but has a closer relationship with Armenia. Currently, Armenia hosts a Russian military base and is part of several Russian-led regional alliances that include the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. 

Armenia had already claimed that Turkey is involved in this newest bout of fighting, and accused  a Turkish fighter jet of shooting down an Armenian jet in May. These claims were initially denied by Turkey, but satellite images of Azerbaijan showed parked Turkish planes. Later, Azerbaijan’s president admitted that the planes were there, but said they had not been used in combat. The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has openly declared support for Azerbaijan, and other governments monitoring the situation, including France and Russia, say that Azerbaijan has been attacking Nagorno-Karabakh with Turkish drones. These nations also allege that foreign fighters from Syria are being brought into the conflict by Turkey on behalf of Azerbaijan.

Russia, on the other hand, had called for restraint from the two countries and refrained from getting directly involved. Had Azerbaijan attacked civilian areas deeper in Armenia, a defense treaty between Russia and Armenia would have been triggered, forcing Russia to intervene militarily and counter Azerbaijan. Possibly in recognition of this, Azerbaijan mostly limited its attacks to territory claimed by the Armenian-led separatist government in Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Reactions from the rest of the international community were rather limited. The United States, France and Russia, the leaders of the OSCE Minsk Group that has been working to end the conflict since 1992, issued a joint statement condemning the escalation of violence, as did the European Union. However, no countries in either of these coalitions announced plans to get further involved in the situation. Seeing the reluctance of foreign governments, the Armenian diaspora took to the streets in protests around the world to try and generate media coverage and action. Hundreds of Armenians from all over Europe protested in front of the European Parliament building in Brussels in August. Similar action was taken by Armenians in the United States, particularly in southern California, which has the largest population of Armenians in the country. Despite their efforts, the intervention by foreign governments never came.

Two weeks after the fighting in September began, Russia negotiated a temporary ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to allow  for the return of prisoners and bodies of the deceased. This quickly fell apart following attacks in both Armenia and Azerbaijan the day after the ceasefire took effect, leading to accusations from both countries of violating the truce. This set off another week of fighting until a second ceasefire was established. Once again, it did not even last a full day.

On November 10th, a third attempt at peace was arranged by Russia, under which Armenia will return to Azerbaijan land that it had taken in during the war that followed the fall of the Soviet Union. The agreement, which is also supported by Turkey, deployed Russian peacekeepers along the Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact and required the Armenian forces to withdraw. The Russian peacekeepers are currently scheduled to remain there for five years, and will also be joined by Turkish forces. The ceasefire has held so far, hinting at a possible end to this round of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

Since the news broke, Azerbaijanis have been celebrating the news, reveling in a victorious end to a long, drawn-out conflict. However, public sentiment in Armenia has been anything but relieved. After news of the ceasefire broke, protestors in the Armenian capital of Yerevan ransacked government buildings and attacked one of the Parliament speakers. Many Armenians feel betrayed by Russia, who they considered one of their closest allies. Only time will tell if the ceasefire will last, but whether it holds or not the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan will remain for a very long time.

Ituri is a northeastern province in the DRC that has seen extensive ethnic conflict occur since 1972. Violence peaked between 1999 and 2003, with an estimated 50,000 deaths. The main root of the altercations is that the Hema community, who are historically herders, were treated much more favorably during the Belgian colonization of the DRC (ending in 1960), placing them higher up on the social hierarchy. Meanwhile, the Lendu community, which is traditionally agricultural, is often the aggressor due to feeling unjustly stripped of land, natural resources and local political power. 

The conflict diminished after 2003 due to European Union peacekeeping missions, but has been reignited since 2017. Part of the reason for this is the continuous nature of the issues, with the disputes never fully ending and with groups holding onto their weapons from previous altercations. More importantly, the reason a complete cessation is so challenging is due to it being far more than a bilateral ethnic conflict. A deeper analysis of the crisis reveals that other military and ethnic groups are involved, including heavy political meddling from exterior actors due to the province’s wealth in resources — especially oil.

Since reigniting in 2017, 360,000 people have been displaced to neighboring provinces and countries, with over 1,000 casualties. Unlike the war from 1999 to 2003, there has not been a structured ethnic militia engaging in the conflict. The violence is mostly carried out by Lendu youths, not necessarily backed by their entire ethnic community, with some Hema youths carrying out reprisals. It is clear that there is no overarching command as assailants claim to be part of different groups, making intervention all the more challenging. 

The DRC’s military, FARDC, is perceived to be a very unstable force due to the levels of corruption and underfunding. FARDC frequently attempts to strike back at Lendu communities to limit their exertion of aggression, but this has just dispersed the youth groups. The dispersion enables them to spread terror in internally displaced camps, and take back some of their lost areas. Lendu youths do not fear the DRC’s armed forces, as they see the army as the natural ally of the Hema’s. Attacking army positions both helps them get rid of their enemy and enables them to take their firearm weapons. 

Aside from the military, other actors involved reveal why attaining peace in the region is such a challenge. These include other ethnic and rebel groups involved on the ground, as well as opposing political entities meddling to reach favorable outcomes. Due to past altercations in Ituri and in the Eastern DRC in general, the bordering countries of Rwanda and Uganda have historical ties to armed groups and rebellions in the region. A Congolese government official claims that migrants from the Hutu community from Rwanda fuel the violence. He asserts that they are involved both as military trainers for the Lendu’s, and as protectors of the Hema’s herds. 

Representatives of Congolese security also outline that the M23 movement, a rebel group responsible for violence just south of Ituri in 2012, is attempting to profit from the altercations from the Ugandan side. Former members of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-K), a political party and former rebel group, also own territory in the region, it is historically supported by Rwanda and is currently supported by the Ugandan government. One of the main issues of this crisis has been the continual involvement of foreign ‘invisible hands’ that help organize attacks and provide equipment, a complaint shared by several archbishops in the region. 

Due to the fragile relationship between the two ethnicities, external actors are pitting them against each other in order to rid the areas of inhabitants and exploit the benefits of the land, chiefly natural resources such as gold and oil. The greed for the district’s resources explains the heavy involvement by Uganda and Rwanda. Illegal resource exploitation has long been a pillar of the continuation in violence. The United Nations mission in the DRC explained in 2004 that inter-militia conflict will not cease in the region until the government takes care of extracting the natural resources in a credible fashion. 

However, while natural resources have always played a key aspect of violence in Ituri, oil is a particular resource that was not as prominent in the 1999 to 2003 conflict as now. Ituri is incredibly rich in oil, Lake Albert makes up much of its eastern border and is the main oil source of the region. There has been a substantial increase in oil discovery over the past decade. Therefore, despite the aforementioned history and regional factions of the area contributing to the crisis, oil is now an undoubtable key driver. Lake Albert’s oil exploration is divided into five blocks, with two being on the Congolese side of the lake, and three being on the Ugandan side. The majority of the lake and its basin are located on the Ugandan side, the country has therefore been able to control a favorable majority of the oil. 

The oil deposits at Lake Albert have often taken the center stage of the relationship between the DRC and Uganda. During the previous Ituri conflict, the Ugandan government altered its alliances with local armed groups frequently to attain its highest possible influence. Its main priorities in choosing alliances were to keep Uganda’s influence in the region high while limiting the DRC’s influence, and most importantly securing the extraction operations of their oil partners, Heritage and Tullow Oil, two foreign companies attempting to maximise profits in the region. Considering the uptake in oil discoveries on the Congolese blocks since the last Ituri conflict, it isn’t hard to imagine why Uganda might still support rebel militias on the Congolese side.

A closer look at these big oil corporations shows how rapidly the link to conflict can be made. 

They are heavily involved in the political climate of the region, oftentimes even directing it, implementing everything but a laissez-faire attitude to their surroundings. In Angola, one of the DRC’s neighboring countries, Heritage Oil hired Executive Outcomes, a private military company from South Africa, in order to drive UNITA (Angola’s second largest political party) rebels away from Heritage’s oil extraction sites. The Executive Outcomes attacked areas under UNITA’s control in accordance with Heritage and the Angolan military. As conflict near an extraction zone tampers an oil company’s ability to do business, it is highly probable that oil firms are taking sides in the Ituri conflicts, in order to ensure continuous profits. 

This assertion is strengthened when considering that Heritage Oil cooperated with Ugandan groups in the 1999 to 2003 Ituri crisis, as well as admitting to the DRC government that it had been striking deals with the leaders of rebel groups occupying Ituri. Heritage is not alone though, the Congolese government accused both Heritage and Tullow Oil of working with the Ugandan army to illegally cross the DRC border for oil exploration purposes, resulting in Congolese fatalities. Seeing as the Congolese government is the one supporting the Hema’s in the Ituri conflict and the two companies along with the Ugandan government seek to act nefariously toward the Congolese government, the aforementioned ‘invisible hands’ supporting Lendu attacks might not be as invisible as they seem. 

Both companies, Heritage and Tullow, still controlled the majority of Lake Albert’s projects until this year, despite there being a handful of smaller shareholders involved. A third company, Total SE, has recently acquired all of Tullow Oil’s stakes on the Ugandan Lake Albert projects, as well as the rights to build an East African pipeline whose source is at Lake Albert. Tullow’s motivation to sell to Total concerned itself with improving its financial situation, although fleeing the conflict-ridden area might well be a secondary factor.

Total has also been one of two major firms involved in exploring the Eastern DRC for more oil deposits. The French company outlined the risks associated with oil exploration in Ituri in a 2013 report, which specifically says that inter-community tensions and conflict dynamics may be affected by the search for oil. It had already identified at this point that certain communities will feel excluded by the benefits that oil brings, creating greater tension. Land ownership has always been a root of violence in Ituri due to competition over resources such as gold, therefore any hope of benefiting from further oil deposits only amplifies the violent meddling by corporations, bordering countries, and the DRC government itself.

The Hemu communities, many of which are now in internally displaced camps, are convinced that the attacks are fueled by the greater political interest toward oil exploration, rather than continued hatred between them and the Lendu community. An Ituri politician and businessman explains that their areas are full of oil deposits, and that chasing out communities with violence is considerably easier than incurring the costs for relocating them to use the areas for oil exploration. It is obviously challenging to uncover which government and oil companies are supporting rebel groups, as they are trying to keep their activities secret. However, the past suggests much greater forces are at war in Ituri than two ethnicities.

The communities of Ituri seem to be much more concerned with agricultural land ownership, the Hema’s want to retain their land and Lendu’s want to expand their influence. However, external actors are blinded by Ituri’s gold studs and particularly the oil deposits surrounding Lake Albert, using previous conflict in the region as an excuse to have no regard for humanitarian decency, pouring fuel on a flame that was slowly fizzling out.

The most infuriating part of the current Ituri conflicts is that much like the rest of the DRC, the region is incredibly rich in natural resources, but this wealth actually inhibits its development rather than benefiting it. Total SE outlined in their 2013 report how oil exploitation could lift up entire communities and the DRC’s economy in general, sadly this assessment strays far from reality. Military and rebel groups are clearly being strengthened by nefarious actors, the economy is being distorted as the agriculturally-intensive sector is getting eclipsed by the greed for oil, and border tensions and internal corruption is bound to worsen.

The international community can attempt to halt conflict with peace delegations as it did in 2003, but this does not solve for the invisible hands manipulating it. Local humanitarian groups offer significant help in relieving the ample health problems in internally displaced camps. However, until there is greater credibility and transparency from the governments of the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda, as well as by the oil corporations, local aid is all that can be done for the moment.

Parliamentary elections were held in August after two pandemic-related delays. Approximately 71% of voters participated in the election and overwhelmingly voted for the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP). This party is led by Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, two brothers who have long been involved in Sri Lankan far-right politics. The SLPP won 145 seats out of the 225-member Parliament while their main opposition, the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), won only 54 seats. The SLPP is an offshoot of the previously powerful Sri Lankan Freedom Party, and the SJB originates from the older United National Party. Both of these traditional parties only received one seat in Parliament each, suggesting that the public is now eager to deviate from customary politics.

Several of the remaining 24 seats were taken by parties allied with the SLPP, giving the SLPP, and therefore the Rajapaksa brothers, control over Parliament for the next five years. This comes nearly a year after the election of Gotobaya Rajapaksa as president in 2019. His brother, Mahinda Rajapaksa, was appointed the prime minister again in August after serving the previous term. 

The History of the Rajapaksas: Conflict, Division, and Monopoly 

The Rajapaksa brothers have long captivated Sri Lankan politics and been ambassadors of the populist movement to uphold a Sinhalese Buddhist-controlled government. In 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa campaigned with the election slogan “One Country, One Law,” implicitly rejecting the notion of power-sharing with minority Tamil and Muslim communities. Mahinda Rajapaksa served as the president of Sri Lanka from 2005 to 2015 and led the government to victory over minority ethnic Tamils in a 26-year long civil war. 

This ethnic conflict began as a result of tensions between Tamils and the majority Sinhalese-Buddhist population. Tamils had long argued that they had been systematically marginalized by the Sri Lankan government since the country’s independence in 1948. In 1983, the Tamil Tiger rebels killed 13 soldiers, triggering anti-Tamil riots that started a civil war with a death toll of over 100,000 civilians. In the final violent stages of the war, the government murdered 70,000 innocent Tamil civilians. 

While Mahinda Rajapaksa was president during this time period, his brother and current president Gotabaya Rajapaksa led military operations as the defense secretary. The United Nations directly accused Gotabaya of ordering the military to commit war crimes during the war. Gotabaya has shown his disregard for these serious allegations multiple times. Only a few months after his election, the president withdrew from a 2015 UN Human Rights Council resolution that required the country to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and international law violations. In March of this year, Gotabaya pardoned a soldier sentenced to death for killing 8 innocent Tamil civilians, including 3 children, during the civil war. 

Furthermore, the Rajapaksa brothers have a history of stifling dissent, nepotism, and manipulating the law to increase their political power. During his 2010 presidency, Mahinda added the 18th Amendment to the country’s constitution, resulting in an expansion of presidential power. The amendment removed the two-term presidential limit and withdrew the requirement for presidents to seek approval from the Constitutional Council before appointing judicial positions and heads of independent commissions. 

As a result, loyalists to the SJPP, including direct relatives, became the head of independent commissions. This allowed the Rajapaksa brothers to indirectly influence decisions related to public services and election conduct. The defeat of Mahinda in 2015 largely occurred as a result of protests from minority groups and complaints of economic failure. 

Last Year’s Glaring Warning Signs

However, the power of the Rajapaksa regime has once again been solidified with the results of the 2019 and 2020 elections. Their resurgence in popularity is due to weariness with political infighting and economic instability under the power of traditional parties. However, despite their popularity, political analysts and minority group leaders are concerned that SLPP will pave the way for eventual militaristic rule and disenfranchisement of Tamil and Muslim minorities. 

Since the beginning of his presidency in 2019, Gotabaya has appointed several retired military officers to different civilian administration positions. Former officials have been placed in charge of the Ministry of Law and Order, the Ministry of Human Resources and the Ministry of Finance. With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Health was also placed under the charge of a military official. Predictably, the Sri Lankan pandemic response, while praised internationally, has been characterized by heavy surveillance and strict police enforcement. In addition, Gotabaya has placed the Ministry of Defense in control of 37 government agencies, including the police and the secretariat for non-governmental organizations. Gotabaya has simultaneously stalled in appointing a Minister of Defense, which places him in de facto charge of the Ministry and allows him to make military decisions unchecked. 

The Gotabaya administration has also attacked the minority Muslim community as tensions within the country have worsened after the Easter terrorist attacks. With reports of militaristic witch hunts and threats against Muslim activists, many Muslims are concerned about the repercussions of the Rajapaksas’ rule. On September 29, the government announced a ban on cattle slaughter in a political attempt to satisfy the majority Sinhalese Buddhist communities. This legislation especially impacts the mostly Muslim-owned slaughterhouses and beef stalls. 

Authoritarianism Under the Rajapaksa Dynasty

Now, with a majority in the Parliament and both brothers occupying the government’s two most powerful positions, the SLPP has the power to propel the country towards authoritarianism. The Rajapaksa brothers are currently pushing for a rewrite of the 19th Amendment, which was passed after Mahinda was unseated as president in 2015. This amendment was created with the purpose of decreasing executive power, a move that the brothers aim to reverse. The Rajapaksas also aim to abolish the 13th Amendment that provided autonomy for provinces and encouraged power-sharing with different minority groups. 

In another extreme move, the SLPP proposed a 20th amendment that allows Gotabaya to control ministries, have total power in appointing ministers and public service leaders, and be immune against possible prosecution. A particular clause that removes the ban on dual citizens in public office has been criticized heavily. This move will further empower the Rajapaksa family by paving the way for appointment of several relatives with dual citizenship. 

Several petitions were filed to include a public referendum to vote on the amendment, with the Supreme Court agreeing that certain clauses in the amendment required public approval. However, revisions were made to remove these clauses and the 20th amendment was passed on October 22 with 65 legislators voting against it. 

Making Amends for the Past

Sri Lankan political analysts and leaders within the Tamil and Muslim communities warn that these moves by the nationalist Rajapaksa brothers could worsen the relations between majority and minority communities. The Tamil Guardian, a news organization dedicated to ethnic Tamil affairs, has published several scathing pieces on the danger of the Rajapaksas. The recent actions of the brothers have also spurred criticism from major human rights organizations such as the UN as well as allies including the United States and India. 

However, the empty condemnations from these international actors have not been paired with substantive action or threats that could alter Sri Lanka’s path. In addition, these countries and the UN in particular have drawn criticism in the past for their failures to protect innocent Sri Lankan civilians during the ethnic war. 

An internal report released by the UN revealed the failures of senior UN staff located in Sri Lanka to adequately respond to the ongoing crisis. In particular, the withdrawal of UN staff from the country in 2008 was criticized as a move that allowed the government to carry out human rights violations without witness. This same report called out the lack of international publicity for this crisis. Former UN official Edward Mortimer pointed out the political motives behind the difference in reaction to the Libyan civil war, stating that “it didn’t get publicity like in Libya… Sri Lanka doesn’t have much oil and isn’t situated on the Mediterranean.” 

Moving forward, ethnic division and extreme nationalism will continue to foment in Sri Lanka unless the international community takes an active role in condemning the anti-democratic actions of the Rajapaksa brothers. The past failures of international players led to the ethnic genocide and fragmentation of the Tamil population and have now allowed tyrannical rule to creep into Sri Lanka unchecked. The same rhetoric and rulers have recovered to full power, refueled by growing nationalist sentiment and recent events, including the Easter attacks. 

Now, the international community needs to pay attention to the outcomes of this monumental election season. Most importantly, they need to work to preserve democracy in Sri Lanka with the same vigor and scrutiny given to foreign issues they have a vested interest in.