On February 3, officials at Memphis Zoo in Tennessee announced the unexpected death of one of their giant pandas, Le Le (which means ‘happiness’ in Chinese). An autopsy revealed that Le Le died of heart disease. 

Le Le and his partner Ya Ya came to the United States in 2003 as part of a joint research program between the Memphis Zoo and the Chinese Association of Zoological Gardens – an initiative focused on panda protection and conservation.

Le Le was initially expected to be returned to China with his partner Ya Ya (‘cute girl’) in April of this year. Due to their scarcity, pandas are usually offered on loan by China, with the expectation of return at the end of the term. Le Le’s death brought grief and sorrow to the global community but also sparked fury among animal rights  and panda lovers, who believe that Le Le and Ya Ya were suffering from mistreatment in the zoo, a factor which they allege caused Le Le’s passing. 

Over the last two years, U.S. animal rights organizations such as In Defense of Animals (IDA) and Panda Voices have repeatedly requested that the Memphis Zoo send their pandas back to a sanctuary in China. The reason for this request stems from their claims of malnourishment, skin disease and excessive caging of the pandas. Disheartening images of Le Le and Ya Ya have circulated, showing both pandas as grubby, distressed and malnourished. This specific image of Ya Ya was tweeted by IDA in late November of 2021. In early 2022, panda activists in both the United States and China expressed similar concerns about Le Le’s and Ya Ya’s health conditions, especially when comparing them to pandas within similar age ranges living in other zoos around the world.

The Memphis Zoo responded to the criticisms and defended itself in a statement after Le Le’s death, calling out misinformation. They explained that they truly cared for Le Le and Ya Ya and had been looking after them and closely monitoring their health conditions. This did not assuage public concerns. Le Le’s death trended on Chinese social media, with Chinese panda lovers calling for the early return of Ya Ya. Some panda lovers residing in the United States have donated money for better food and treatment of Ya Ya and even flew to Memphis to ensure her safety. Meanwhile, others streamed videos about Le Le and Ya Ya’s experience on the digital screens at Times Square in New York City, hoping to bring more public attention to the issue. 

Pandas have been considered an important part of U.S.-China relations from the very start. In 1972, President Nixon’s visit to China paved the way for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. As a gesture of friendship, China gifted two giant pandas to the United States. Since then, more and more pandas have traveled to different countries around the world to promote cross-cultural communication and collaboration, as well as propel research on animal preservation. Currently, around 20 countries in the world have pandas; three U.S. zoos have currently loaned pandas from China. This long-term initiative by China has had dual benefits: not only are people interested in learning about China as a result of pandas, but the joint efforts also contributed to the removal of pandas from China’s endangered species list in 2021. 

Chinese people also refer to giant pandas as Guobao (‘national treasure’), a strong indicator that they take pride in pandas and see them as a representation of their country. According to People’s Daily, four characteristics are essential for an animal to attain status as a so-called national treasure: the animal is unique or mostly owned by a specific country; it reflects the country’s cultural characteristics; it represents the country’s image; and it is closely related to the country’s development. Pandas’ black-and-white appearance echoes China’s philosophical concept of Yin and Yang, and the species is well-built and signals humbleness, peace and harmony. These concepts constitute the national image that China wants to show the world. In fact, one of the mascots during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics was a panda; The 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics also had the panda as the only mascot.

Scholars consider pandas to be China’s soft power, which refers to a country’s values and culture that foreigners find attractive. Sharing these values and cultural aspects with international audiences will pique their curiosity and increase their favorable perception towards this specific country. This will eventually help improve bilateral relations, encourage commerce, communication and other types of exchanges between the domestic and foreign public. In a New York Times article, political science professor Andrew J. Nathan from Columbia University said that pandas constitute an image of friendship diplomacy. Even with tensions rising between the United States and China over the past decade and the American public holding a generally negative view of China, pandas remain an aspect of China that they find positive. The Smithsonian National Zoo’s panda habitat continues to be the destination spot for tourists; when a panda cub was born at the National Zoo in 2020, over 4.2 million users watched the live stream.

Politicians often see panda diplomacy as one-way diplomacy, or China’s political tool to influence the foreign public. However, they fail to understand that panda diplomacy works both ways and carries a reverse effect, as the meanings that pandas embody also make them important to Chinese people. Le Le’s death is unlikely to create further damage to inter-governmental U.S.-China relations overall, as neither the Chinese nor the U.S. government officials have commented on this. The incident also does not carry any direct political implications. Yet it will, to some extent, affect how the Chinese public views the United States, making them believe the country is disrespectful of its relations with China. This in turn may potentially discourage cross-cultural communication and exchanges between the two countries, making them less likely to cooperate in international affairs.

For the Chinese public, giving out their ‘national treasure’ to a foreign country is a gesture of goodwill. However, the death of Le Le and the controversies surrounding panda mistreatment at Memphis Zoo has only made Chinese panda lovers question the sincerity of the United States. Chinese news media commented in an editorial: “The current look of Ya Ya not only breaks the hearts of the Chinese people. We hope that its health condition can improve after returning to China. When even giant pandas are affected and implicated, it indicates the China-US relations are already quite bad. This is a strong warning signal. It shows that the hostile posture of some Washington elites toward China has already affected the normal and friendly interactions between the two peoples.”

The dispute over panda mistreatment in the United States might have also unexpectedly changed and furthered relations between the Chinese public and other countries. The death of Le Le  panda lovers examine how pandas are being treated in other countries. Chinese media as well as content creators compared and contrast how pandas are being treated in different countries. The zoo in South Korea received praise for their care of three pandas. The caretaker Kang Cherwon, who Chinese panda lovers affectionately called “Grandpa Kang,” decided to learn Chinese and teach Chinese to the South Korean-born panda cub Fu Bao, in hopes of reducing language barriers for the cub after she returns to China. In an interview with Chinese media this March, Cherwon introduced the pandas’ conditions in Chinese. Panda treatment in Russia, Qatar and Japan has also been reported more favorably.

China’s panda diplomacy, as a part of public diplomacy, can be considered successful as it promotes positive engagement between China and the foreign public. In essence, China’s panda diplomacy continues to establish cultural ties between China and other countries. Panda lovers across the world are now waiting to see if Ya Ya will recover after she returns to China this April. Her condition and behavior at home will soon provide a concrete answer to what her real experience at the Memphis Zoo was like. What follows might once again cause further reverse effects between the U.S. and Chinese public, hindering cross-cultural interactions and understanding.

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Cross-cultural diplomacy is amplified by programs like the Yenching Academy of Peking University and Schwarzman Scholars of Tsinghua University. Each are master’s programs funded by the Chinese government for scholars to learn about China from an interdisciplinary and international perspective. Much like the Fulbright U.S. Student program, these two programs are intended to equip students with the tools to pursue future careers with a globally-minded perspective, and are critical examples of the importance of public tools in the 21st century.

As for differences between the two programs, the Yenching Academy offers a more theoretical humanities-oriented curriculum. Selected Yenching Scholars have the opportunity to choose which area of research they would like to focus their studies in, including subjects from History and Archaeology to Literature and Culture. Schwarzman Scholars take a more professional business-oriented approach. Required courses for Schwarzman Scholars include courses such as “Leadership in Business” and “Leadership in Diplomacy and Security.” 

On an educational level, programs such as Yenching and Schwarzman inform their students about Chinese perspectives — perspectives that are often missing or ignored in Western media coverage of China. They provide the opportunity to refine an understanding of China not only in relation to the United States or Western hegemony but to also humanize its distinct identity and consider the challenges it faces as a nation. 

On the other hand, such programs also disseminate what Western students may believe is Chinese propaganda, above all else. 

Bethany Allen Ebrahimian of The Atlantic writes that because such programs are so closely aligned with the CCP, which has enabled their existence, this often leads to contradictory practices and a moral dilemma. How do these programs reconcile their professed educational purpose with political obstacles? To what extent can students reaping the benefits of these programs be considered “complicit” in the CCP’s political agenda? These are the questions that Ebrahimian believes define the controversy surrounding Sino-American exchange. 

This conflict begins in the very selection process. In the process of investigating the politics of such programs, Ebrahimimian was told by a Schwarzman Scholars spokesperson that CCP officials have firsthand involvement in selecting the students that will participate in the program. 

This aspect of admissions most likely means that the program is geared towards a particular kind of student: one who ideologically conforms to Party beliefs and avoids any dialogue that could be perceived as politically inflammatory. Ebrahimian believes that for a program that advertises itself as a forum for open educational exchange, Schwarzman Scholars appears to still place political interests at the forefront. 

Andrew Jacobs, a former New York Times foreign correspondent based in Beijing, states that a program like Yenching is intended to “raise the global profile of Chinese universities” and increase positive sentiments about China and Chinese education. While this may be an admirable purpose from a nationalistic perspective, it also means that this education is politically-minded and will thus likely entertain a certain vision of national history and culture. 

In those instances, Western students must serve as critical consumers of information. They must consider information presented more widely as less of an educational classroom discussion but as the experience of a Chinese reality. 

In light of these elements, the challenge that programs like Yenching and Schwarzman face is overcoming the political divide that shaped their formation in the first place. Despite the fact that Peking University and Tsinghua University are widely known for their prestige as the two top universities in China, Western responses to these programs have centered on undermining their educational credibility in favor of projecting their own political suspicions onto their institutional caliber.  

According to an article from NPR, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) questioned graduates of the Yenching Scholars program, asking whether or not their time in China had allowed them to participate in Chinese espionage efforts. From the perspective of these graduates, it seems like studying abroad in China has become linked to threatening national security. In looking at the United States’ response, it is paradoxical that the mission to bridge the gap between the United States and China has only widened it. 

Moreover, on a pedagogical level, there is also concern as to whether or not students participating in these educational programs will be able to effectively study in China and from all points of view, especially given the concern of censorship. Topics like the Uyghur crisis in Xinjiang, the Hong Kong protests and Taiwanese independence are fraught with controversy. Potential students may wonder to what extent they are able to freely discuss these topics and how much “debate,” a core component of Western education, is exactly allowed.  

In an article for SupChina, an alumnus (whose name was kept confidential) of the Yenching Scholars program defends the program against such concerns. The student criticizes the NPR article for framing the issue as a problem inherent in the government-funded Yenching Scholars program. They specifically target the article’s assumption that the goal of Yenching is to indoctrinate students into pursuing the Chinese Communist Party’s political agenda. 

In fact, the student says, while subjects are always taught first and foremost from the Chinese government’s point of view, there is also room to nuance those ideas. This is an especially important element given the international bent of the Yenching Scholars program as a cross-cultural collaboration above all else. 

“On several occasions, I personally raised the issue of the Chinese government’s concentration-camp-like policies in Xinjiang, including to a former prominent diplomatic official with deep ties to the Party,” the student writes. “Not once did I feel targeted, harassed or sanctioned for those comments, and often my classmates readily participated in the discussion.”

In contrast, Noah Lachs, a former Schwarzman Scholar, argues the exact opposite: that the very weakness of such educational programs lies in the polarization of the political contexts that contributed to their creation. He expresses that there exists a pressing disparity in Western and Chinese perspectives when it comes to viewing China as more than a one-dimensional concept. This has to do with the dominant narratives cultivated by each country for their citizens, which in turn informs the very nature of how subjects are taught.

“On three occasions when I broached [the subject of Xinjiang](twice with Chinese students outside the Schwarzman program), I was told that Uyghurs were responsible for a ‘genocide against Han Chinese people,’” Lachs writes. “This is not an arguable principle but a falsification. It is not possible to begin a dialogue on human rights or counter-extremism when such assumptions persist.”

To Lachs, there is no possibility of building ideological bridges because of the ways that overarching political differences are fundamentally rooted in individual viewpoints. In other words, there cannot be a dialogue because what the West believes are facts are presented as opinions in Chinese classrooms rather than truth. 

Visually represented, the disparity that Lachs presents is akin to a Venn diagram. The distinct positionality of Western and Chinese points of view implies that there is no commonality, no overlap by which the two can meet.

The contradictions inherent in these two different experiences is emblematic of the political ideologies that surround contemporary discourse about China. Students of Yenching and Schwarzman, along with other educational programs, must be cognizant of their unique roles in cultivating the broader diplomatic relationship between the United States and China. Likewise, there also needs to be a greater understanding of the underlying factors that may undermine this mission.

It is clear that more than the issues discussed, the very programs themselves are rooted in political controversy. As such, it is essential to negotiate sociocultural understandings of such programs within the greater political divide. 

Yet, when it comes to the role of education in the US-China relationship, education cannot be separated from its context. As Lachs writes, perhaps building bridges is not the right term. Perhaps it is evaluating whether or not there are the resources on both sides, particularly on the West’s part, necessary to even begin a discussion in the first place. 

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These words, from Canadian philosopher and futurist Marshall McLuhan, emphasize both the necessity of a collectivist attitude and the necessity of coordinated action toward climate change. As the world rapidly approaches the disaster barrier that is 1.5 degrees celsius, it is imperative that the United States takes steps to reach critical climate targets such as net-zero global carbon emissions by 2050. 

Though these may seem like lofty goals, they are now considered essential by many climate experts, if we are to avoid major climate catastrophes that will cost millions of lives, destroy ecosystems and environments and affect trillions of dollars in global revenue. 

Given the extent to which oil and natural gas lobbyists are entrenched and hold influence in American politics, implementing large-scale renewable energy may be difficult to accomplish within the next 10 years. Alternatively, other avenues must be considered to reduce our carbon footprint. A course of action that has been seemingly overlooked is legislation to reduce methane emissions by decreasing the number of cows consumed — essentially, legislation to tackle the meat industry. If deemed politically feasible and in the interest of the administration, President Joe Biden currently faces several alternatives and options for reducing emissions from livestock in order to meet emissions targets.  

Agricultural emissions in the United States account for approximately 10% of all GHG emissions. The largest culprit within the agricultural industry is cattle which — through digestive methane production, transportation, packaging and distribution — directly contributes approximately 30% of all agricultural emissions. The most concerning of these emissions is methane (CH4) — which has a global warming potency 86 times higher than that of carbon dioxide (CO2). 

Cattle contributes to methane emissions primarily in 2 ways. The first is through a process known as enteric fermentation, which is a natural digestive process in which food is decomposed and fermented, creating a by-product of methane. The second primary contributor is cow manure, which often releases methane as it decomposes under anaerobic conditions in piles or open-pit lagoons. 

Combatting methane emissions is a nuanced issue, and agricultural organizations and scientists alike have been doing their best to tackle the challenge for the past 30 years. Many have sought to reduce emissions through intentional alterations of a cow’s rumen, the stomach chamber in which microbes ferment feed hence producing methane. Others have focused on selective breeding for cows with less methane-producing microbes, as well as experimenting with different feeds that promote better digestion. Nevertheless, emissions from agriculture have actually increased despite efforts in many developed countries to actively reduce methane production in cows.

There are several critical reasons why, even with an average reduction of methane emissions per cow, global methane emissions from cattle have still increased by 10% within the last 30 years. First is the phenomenon known as “meatification” in regions like Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Demand for meat has skyrocketed as purchasing power has increased within these regions, and, as a result, global meat production has nearly doubled since 1990. 

Second, measures adopted have been inefficient at reducing overall methane and GHG emissions. While they have made some difference in reducing emissions per cow, raising cows is still a massively inefficient process. In order to raise a cow for slaughter, you must raise it for two to three years as well as provide it with an exceptional amount of land, water, and food. Moreover, cows produce about up to 21 tons of manure per year, and ineffective manure management can lead to greater methane emissions. On top of that, many of these measures have been adopted inconsistently throughout the globe, given that wealthier nations are more equipped to fund the research and supplies needed to successfully implement these measures. 

Yet, research still continues in these areas despite the limited effectiveness of the measures being developed. Why? The larger answer lies in the fact that improvements and advancements in these areas allow the animal agriculture industry to expand. 

But these scientific advancements cannot fix an industry that is inherently destructive – not only to the planet, but to the health of citizens as well. If the United States is serious about combating the negative externalities created by animal agriculture — including methane emissions from cattle — a new agricultural landscape must be constructed rather than focusing improvements to the current one.

There are several paths the Biden administration can pursue if it wishes to significantly reduce the cattle industry’s methane emissions. The first alternative is cut from the old cloth, but worth exploring nonetheless. It involves feeding cows a specific type of seaweed. A 2018 study from the University of California, Davis suggests that feeding cows seaweed could reduce methane emissions from beef cattle by as much as 82%. Unfortunately, implementing this on a massive scale is near impossible because there is simply not enough of that type of seaweed to sustain a cow’s diet, and there are several logistical challenges with providing seaweed supplements to cows grazing on an open range. 

A second policy Biden mught consider is focusing on supporting the growth of businesses that produce plant-based protein substitutes. Plant-based meat alternatives have historically been frowned  upon, but their popularity has absolutely exploded in the past few years with the success of companies like Beyond Meat. Two out of five Americans have tried plant-based meat, with that figure stretching to over 50% for those 25 and younger. Moreover, plant-based substitutes are expected to achieve a whopping 85 billion dollars in sales in 2030, an 1,847% increase from 2018. This growth has only accelerated throughout the pandemic, as the unsafe COVID-19 conditions endured by many meat processing workers have increased calls for more meat-free alternatives.

Another promising innovation the Biden administration could support is lab-grown meat. Currently, lab-grown meat is still in its infancy in the United States, with plans to serve cultured meat still several years away. However, in the United Kingdom the process is a little further along. There are currently 15 startups focusing on lab-grown meat and they have plans to expand to mass production in the coming years. CE Delft expects that by 2030, lab-grown beef could be just as inexpensive as agricultural beef. Even better news, if lab-grown factories were funded by renewable energy it would reduce total beef emissions by 93%. Lab-grown beef may be the best potential alternative because not only does it allow us to reduce our methane emissions and assuage ethical concerns about animal farming, but it also allows consumers to keep the taste and nutrients of meat readily available in their diet.  

But one notable hurdle the United States faces with both plant-based proteins and lab-grown beef is the political strength of the U.S. agribusiness industry. According to research from New York University, major meat and dairy producers have spent millions on lobbying efforts and campaigns aimed at discrediting links between climate change and animal agriculture. Over the last two decades, ‘Big Ag’ has spent $750 million on supporting national political candidates who hold similar policy stances, with Mitch McConnell, Lindsey Graham, and Joni Ernst among their top recipients. 

Unsurprisingly, these major conglomerates have been able to get away with highly carbon-intensive methods of agriculture, as well as produce food at a very cheap rate due to large agricultural subsidies. The Barack Obama administration tried to check the advances of Big Ag, promising millions of rural farmers that they would fight back against the most powerful players in the industry, only to stop when the major agricultural conglomerates banded together with their congressional allies. 

Nevertheless, the emergence of climate change as a central political issue will facilitate Biden’s ability to check the power of Big Ag. As more and more American citizens express their concern about climate change, Congress will have to listen to its constituents or risk losing popular support. Additionally, with Democratic control over the House, and the Senate nearly equally split, climate policies will face less hurdles than they did under former President Donald Trump. Biden should take advantage of these circumstances to steadfastly push climate action.

And as such, I believe the Biden administration should consider adopting the following measures to mitigate the effect of the meat industry on climate change.

1. Increase investment in seaweed farming products;
2. Increase subsidies to plant-based protein companies in order to promote industry growth and reduce prices; 
3. Decrease or eliminate subsidies to animal agriculture, which keep the price of beef and other animal products artificially low; 
4. Have the EPA classify methane as a criteria pollutant under the Clean Air Act (CAA);
5. Fund research, infrastructure, and production capacities for lab-grown beef;

The climate crisis grows more grim every day. If substantial action is not taken by the Biden administration to fundamentally reduce American beef consumption and minimize animal agriculture in general, the United States will struggle to reach its emission targets, thereby hampering the global climate fight and bringing the world closer to environmental catastrophe. 

The post The Biden Administration Ought to Reduce Meat Consumption appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Muskan and Rashid’s story is only one that represents the numerous and widespread challenges interfaith couples are facing in India. These couples have faced targeted persecution by Indian authorities under the new anti-conversion laws instituted across the country. The new laws are being publicized to halt “Love Jihad,” a term coined by Hindu nationalist factions to imply that Muslim men trick Hindu women into marriage for the sole purpose of converting them to Islam.

In India, marriage is a social process and practice, the boundaries of which are often defined by customs, traditions and even prejudices. Marriages within the Hindu community itself are primarily performed within caste groups, with only 11% of marriages per year being inter-caste marriages. The stigma is further heightened for interfaith marriages, making them even more of a rarity in the Indian social fabric, with only 2.1% of women who marry outside their faith. 

State legislatures have historically passed laws to regulate religious conversions, and currently, nine states have provisions regulating religious conversions to varying degrees. Even though lawmakers from the ruling Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) claim that the laws are not meant to target any specific religious communities, the majority of the cases registered under the law in states like Uttar Pradesh have been against Muslim men. 

The Love Jihad conspiracy and the resulting anti-conversion laws seem to be just another additive to the ruling party’s ongoing conquest to further marginalize India’s 200 million Muslims through various legal measures. The passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019, which provides citizenship to only non-Muslim refugees from neighboring countries, along with the government’s strict criminalization of the Muslim “Triple Talaq” divorces, has left little to the imagination when it comes to the ideological standing of the ruling party.

“This law will prevent innocent girls being forcefully converted on the pretext of marriage,” said Narottam Mishra, the home minister in BJP-ruled central state of Madhya Pradesh. Prime Minister Modi, meanwhile, has mostly remained silent on the issue and the Central Government has said it has no plans on drawing up federal legislation on the matter, and will leave it up to the states. 

The Love Jihad conspiracy is not the creation of the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi nor his party, the BJP. Rather, it is the culmination of the continuous stereotyping of Muslim men as “predatory” since India’s colonial days. In 1924, a Muslim bureaucrat from Cawnpore (now Kanpur) was accused of “abducting and seducing” a Hindu woman and forcibly converting her to Islam. The idea later gained political relevance in the late 2000s when it was taken up by fringe Hindu-right groups in southern India, eventually leading to quasi-legitimizing orders by state courts that ordered probes and annulled interfaith marriages. Later, it was used by the BJP to stir up communal tensions and cause riots in other parts of the country for electoral gains. 

The Love Jihad conspiracy has proven to be wildly successful talking for the BJP, triggering all the right politically-conducive anxieties — a majoritarian pseudo-victimhood in the secular republic, patriarchal insecurities in an increasingly modernizing India and blatant Islamophobia that unites Hindu nationalist sympathizers like no other factor.

On January 6, 2021, The Supreme Court of India refused to stay the enactment of the latest anti-conversion laws in states across the country, thus indirectly giving green lights to laws resembling the one that was used to arrest Rashid and Muskan. Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, implemented a law called “the Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion” causing much uproar as it established a set jail term of ten years for a marriage conducted for the sole purpose of religious conversion. 

However, the onus of determining the “validity of a union” has been placed on the same authorities and police who already harass and intimidate interfaith couples who seek to marry. India does not have a uniform civil code due to the diverse array of historical customs and traditions of different communities. As a result, couples must register their marriages through laws that govern personal relationships and disputes of their specific communities. 

Interfaith couples, meanwhile, have used the Special Marriages Act of 1954 that requires verification from local authorities, a waiting period of thirty days, and mandates the publication of their intent to wed in a newspaper in case objections might arise. The law also vests the authorities with the power to investigate any complaint against the couple, which puts interfaith couples in a precarious position as most of them seek to get married without parental consent or knowledge.

As much as the Love Jihad conspiracy is about the broader project of Hindu nationalism and the implicit strokes of Islamophobia it contains, it is also about policing women’s sexuality and choices. Marriages of choice are extremely rare in India (only 4%) as the concept of arranged marriage, parents’ choosing brides and grooms for their children, reigns supreme. The practice of picking spouses might come off as just conserving familial customs of elderly respect, but it is equally about preserving puritanical standards of caste, class and religion. Now, the Indian state is willing to police love that does not measure up to those puritanical parameters.

The post India’s Anti-Conversion Laws and the “Love Jihad” Myth, Explained appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

In what many see as a response to the Hong Kong protests of 2019, China passed the Hong Kong National Security Law in June 2020, which criminalizes offences of “secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces to endanger national security”. Johannes Chan, former Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong, criticized the law as ambiguously worded and questioned how peaceful protests act such as chanting slogans and flying banners could be seen as violations of the law.

These policies prompted opposing statements from foreign countries. British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab asserted that it was “a flagrant assault on freedom of speech and freedom of peaceful protest,” while then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the “draconian law” destroys the territory’s autonomy.

Since then, countries have been taking action; most notably, a few governments have  enacted new immigration measures for Hong Kong’s citizens. In July 2020, the United Kingdom announced a policy proposal immediately after the law went into effect, opening an immigration tunnel for Hong Kong citizens who hold the British National Overseas passport (BNO). The BNO is a passport issued by the UK government for Hong Kong citizens born before July 1, 1997, the day of handover of the city. Citizens born after that day are eligible for the HKSAR passport issued by China instead.

The UK’s immigration policy stated that BNO holders and their dependants can apply for the BNO visa, which grants them the right to live and work in the UK.  Applicants will be able to apply for a permanent resident status after living within the country for five years.

Liu Xiaoming, China’s ambassador to the UK, claimed that Britain’s action has infringed on China’s sovereignty and undermined international norms. On January 29, 2021, the Hong Kong government announced that they would no longer recognise the BNO, meaning that BNO holders would not be able to enter or leave the Hong Kong border or demonstrate identity with the passport.

This means that for Hongkongers to depart, they would need an HKSAR passport. However, the British government has found a way around China’s response to their policies. The UK stated that BNO citizens do not need a valid BNO passport to demonstrate their BNO citizenship, thus they would not need a BNO passport to enter the UK. 

Other countries have also moved to enact similar immigration policies. Canada launched its Hong Kong Pathway immigration scheme, which allows all Hong Kong residents to apply for open work permits. Australia also loosened its VISA policies by allowing Hong Kong students to stay within the country for up to five years upon graduation from an Australian university. 

The threat to freedom of expression posed by the National Security Law has already made emigration a popular topic among Hong Kong citizens, and new immigration schemes by different countries have prompted debate. Jacky Yau, a student from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, said that the uncertainty of Hong Kong’s future is one of the key reasons why he thought about leaving the city.

“We don’t know how much time Hong Kong has before it becomes exactly the same as China,” Yau said. “We might lose all the freedoms that we once enjoyed, and that’s not something that many of us want to see.” 

When asked about what country he would want to move to, Yau suggested Taiwan as a preferable destination.

“Lots of people have raised concerns about the problem of discrimination in Western countries, and Taiwan is just both culturally and linguistically closer to Hong Kong,” Yau said.

Clarence Ip, a Hong Kong citizen currently studying at the University of California San Diego, wants to stay in North America after graduation. He considers Canada as a viable option because of its new immigration scheme.

“I’ve looked into countries like the UK, Canada, the [United States], and I’ve looked into both the BNO program and the Canada youth program,” Ip said. “I feel like the Canada youth program is more beneficial towards the younger people of Hong Kong, but I have not seen anything from the [United States] yet.”

In September 2020, Congress proposed the The Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act of 2020, which would provide temporary protected status for Hong Kong residents who have “well-founded fear of persecution if the individual asserts such fear.” After the bill was passed in the U.S. House of Representatives and moved to the Senate, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) blocked the bill, asserting that the bill was Democrats’ effort to advance their immigration agenda and would be used by China to send more Chinese spies into the United States.

With China further tightening its grip on Hong Kong, emigration is increasingly being seen as the best option for HongKongers to preserve their freedom. Fortunately, foreign countries are offering to take the city’s residents. But moving away from home and immigrating into a new country could prove to be another round of tough challenges for the Hong Kong people.

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In 2018, Mexico elected President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a left-wing populist member of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). Although he had long been a divisive figure in Mexican politics, López Obrador entered office with an astounding 53% of the popular vote and a promise to prioritize Mexico’s sovereignty. After multiple failed presidential elections, AMLO (the popular abbreviation for López Obrador) finally achieved the highest office in Mexico on the rising tide of Mexican nationalism, which had dominated Mexican politics for a majority of its relations with the U.S. and had only subsided in the late 80s.

Americans observed Mexico’s return to nationalist tendencies with anxiety, heralding AMLO as “Mexico’s answer to Donald Trump” and anticipating exacerbated tension between the United States and its southern neighbor. However, AMLO and Donald Trump maintained a surprisingly functional, occasionally even congenial, working relationship.

In many ways, Trump and López Obrador were diametrically opposed, but one crucial shared opinion allowed the two leaders to collaborate. Trump was uniquely uninterested in intervening in Mexico’s domestic politics, and AMLO appreciated the absence of American oversight and intervention.

Donald Trump’s platform toward Mexico focused almost exclusively on issues of migration and renegotiating regional trade agreements. Trump’s approach to foreign policy, toward Mexico and many others, was unprecedentedly one-dimensional, relying on his personal business dealings rather than a multifaceted, coordinated agenda. Trump’s narrow focus allowed AMLO to pursue his own domestic agenda with less American influence.

In a recent call with newly elected President Joe Biden, AMLO said “I must mention that we do have a very good relationship with the now president of your country… Regardless of all other considerations, he respects [Mexico’s] sovereignty.”

Joe Biden’s approach to relations with Mexico is a far cry from his predecessor’s. Where Trump relied on his own personal relationships, Biden will rely on a fully appointed cabinet to manage a wide range of issues. One of the many ways in which Trump’s presidency marked a divergence from the status quo was his resistance to assemble a cabinet that could navigate the complexities of a relationship between two countries whose economies, cultures and politics are so inextricably interconnected. Biden intends to reconstruct this infrastructure of diplomacy that will allow him to tackle multiple campaign promises.

AMLO anticipates the increase in American oversight that will come with Biden’s more holistic foreign policy platform. He has already begun sending signals to the incoming American president that he will not tolerate the same amount of American influence as his predecessors. Not only was López Obrador among the last global leaders to congratulate Biden on his victory, but he has also exonerated a former Mexican defense secretary from prosecution for drug trafficking in America and granted asylum to Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks who has been evading U.S. extradition since releasing thousands of Hillary Clinton’s emails in 2016. Many Americans received these actions as slights to the incoming administration, but the sum of these minor affronts is a broader message: Mexico’s president intends to continue pursuing his robust domestic agenda with minimal American interference.

AMLO has championed the charge for Mexican energy independence, a goal which he has ardently pursued since he took office in 2018. An outspoken critic of his predecessor’s energy sector redesign that opened the industry to extensive privatization, López Obrador has repeatedly vowed to restore the dominance of Mexico’s state-owned electricity company.

Recent storms across Texas, a major source of Mexico’s natural gas, resulted in widespread blackouts across the northern half of Mexico. Pointing to these blackouts as evidence, AMLO argued for fortifying Mexico’s own domestic energy supply and in late February put forth a bill that would strengthen the state-owned energy program and limit the involvement of private companies in the energy industry. Ultimately, López Obrador aims to buttress Mexico’s economy from America’s political and economic influence through the centralization and nationalization of the energy industry.

AMLO’s fear that Biden’s election will spell out more roadblocks to his dream of energy independence is not unfounded. Hordes of legislators, environmental advocates and industry experts have criticized his proposed bill for violating carbon emission regulations and trade agreements. These infractions will likely attract opposition not just from his domestic opponents but also from the Biden administration.

Lourdes Melgar, a top energy official under former President Enrique Peña Nieto, said AMLO “has a nationalistic view of how to utilize resources.” Melgar and many other energy experts argue that this policy sacrifices environmental sustainability for an ideological power play. Although the bill is expected to become law within the coming days, Mexico will continue grappling to find a balance between nationalistic impulses, international cooperation, and environmental sustainability.

Unlike his predecessor, President Biden will not look the other way when it comes to violations of environmental agreements. Throughout his campaign and into the first month of his presidency, Biden has remained adamant about the need to uphold environmental protection agreements and expressed a willingness to reassert America’s role as a leader of international environmental cooperation.

According to Pamela Starr, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network at the University of Southern California, Biden should expect to ruffle some feathers when addressing Mexico’s disregard for carbon emission limits and other sustainability regulations. The new president may not necessarily care that Mexico is striving for energy independence, only considering the repercussions of the tactics employed to achieve self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, increased oversight could set off alarm bells for AMLO and others who remain skeptical of American involvement.

Starr points to Jeffrey Davidow’s metaphor for the complex relationship between the United States and Mexico, “the bear and the porcupine,” which captured the difficulties of navigating a relationship between two closely connected countries when one was overtly interventionist and the other hypersensitive to perceived intervention. This dance between American brashness and Mexican defensiveness defined their relationship until the election of Ernesto Cedillo in 1988.

AMLO has openly asserted his disapproval for his predecessors’ approach to dealing with the United States, accusing Mexico of kowtowing to American interests over the past few decades. His approach to diplomacy marks a return to the era of the porcupine, defined by Mexican nationalism and apprehension of U.S. involvement. In order to avoid returning to the role of “the bear,” the United States must carefully navigate the rising sentiment of Mexican nationalism, an endeavor further complicated by rising nationalism within its own borders. Competing threads of nationalism could cause friction not just within the realm of environmental policy, but also within negotiations of labor, trade, corruption and migration.

According to Starr, Biden’s policy toward Latin America rests on three pillars: corruption, climate change and democracy. Although the ongoing migration crisis will likely monopolize much of Biden’s first year in office, the early months of his presidency could define the timber of their relationship and define the trajectory of negotiations of the other items on his agenda in the subsequent years of his presidency.

Despite AMLO’s initial posturing, he has recently demonstrated his commitment to maintaining a productive relationship with the United States. The two leaders convened virtually to discuss issues of immigration, the pandemic and climate change, and both seemed intent on redirecting the nature of their nations’ exchange away from the blatant antagonism that defined the Trump administration. López Obrador, like many Mexicans, is relieved to work with an American president who does not openly degrade their country.

However, this relief at a return to amiability will not dissuade AMLO from fiercely protecting his plan for energy independence. The past four years have exacerbated a relationship that had been fraught with mistrust for decades. This history of unwelcome intervention and competing nationalist sentiments will guide the next four years of U.S.-Mexico relations.

Biden has already begun to dismantle Trump’s hardline anti-immigration policies, ending the “Remain in Mexico” program and working with Mexican officials to reinstate mechanisms for granting asylum to the thousands of migrants waiting at the US-Mexico border. Biden has already encountered numerous roadblocks: an SUV crash in California left 13 migrants dead and a bottleneck of migrants in encampments at the border. Recent reports predict thousands more migrants from Central America are marching toward this chokepoint, hopeful that the new administration will open more doors for their arrival.

Tensions of migration at the border continue to reverberate throughout the region. With the support of Mexican police and leadership, Guatemalan police confronted a caravan of Honduran migrants in late January in an effort to stem the flow of northbound Central Americans. As the entire region reels from the effects of widespread migration and the ongoing public health crisis, Biden will need to rely on coordination with Mexico to stabilize their shared border and eventually the region.

Constructing a productive relationship after four years of Trump’s nationalism and centuries of prior American interventionism will be no small feat, especially with a Mexican president with his own political agenda that runs counterproductive to American interests in certain sectors.

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Boba, the soft and chewy tapioca pearls that make up the “bubble” in “bubble tea,” was invented in Taiwan in the late 1980s. While boba’s origins are technically unclear, as many shops have claimed ownership of its invention, the drink’s positive global reception closely parallels Taiwan’s reputation on the international stage. 

In late 2020, Taiwan’s New Power Party announced new passport designs as part of the political initiative to reinvent Taiwan’s identity. One passport design that garnered the most attention for its striking combination was of a blue bird with a cup of bubble tea perched atop its head. The novelty of the design gained widespread attention, with international media outlets from Quartz to CNN Travel covering and commenting on its unique creativity. 

In the end, the bubble tea design did not take first place and consequently, was not selected as the final passport. Yet according to Quartz, the design competition itself is representative of larger conversations about Taiwan and its place in debates about mainland China. This is because the competition, which originally began as an initiative to remove the term “Republic of China” from the Taiwan passport, involves Taiwan’s desire to rebrand themselves as quirky and creative — and separate from mainland China. 

Since the onset of the pandemic, the Taiwanese people have aimed to promote a positive image of their home, viewing the negative rhetoric about mainland China as an opportunity to define themselves as a separate entity altogether. For many residents of Taiwan, this has meant affirming a distinctly Taiwanese identity and sharing this distinct identity and unique values with the outside world. Representing that identity involves a concerted publicity campaign, strategic nation branding and public diplomacy efforts to market the island to the world. To start, Taiwan has sought to market boba as a popular global consumer good, representative of the island’s most prized cultural icons.

Bubble tea, in that regard, is an effective choice to best represent Taiwan. As a form of gastrodiplomacy, the drink has come to symbolize Taiwan’s innovation in not only food, but also culture. In addition to the bubble tea shops found on almost every block, bubble tea has taken on a new life of its own abroad. 

The real agents of Taiwan’s soft power, however, are the Taiwanese people who are bringing boba out of Taiwan and into an increasingly globalized world. Wanpo, for example, is a famous milk tea chain in Taiwan that recently opened its first U.S. location in Palo Alto, California, near Stanford University. Other famous Taiwanese milk tea chains like Tiger Sugar — best known for its brown sugar drinks — have taken the lead in opening shops all over the world, from Europe to Oceania. 

Yet, bubble tea is more than a purely commercial venture. Al Jazeera reports that bubble tea has become a prominent driving force for Asian American communities, particularly in the San Gabriel Valley near Los Angeles, where nearly 525,000 Asian Americans reside. For Asian American youth, in particular, consuming the drink serves as a bonding experience and a means of establishing unity through cultural affiliation. 

Boba’s popularity within Asian American enclaves is largely attributed to the Taiwanese immigrant communities that first brought it to the United States. Since the early 1990s, it was Taiwanese immigrants who opened the first shops dedicated to bubble tea. According to Clarissa Wei in LA Weekly, decades-old Taiwanese-run bubble tea shops like Tapioca Express, Quickly and Ten Ren can be credited with originating the bubble tea culture. 

TPumps, which has shops located all throughout the Bay Area, has created their own spin on traditional bubble tea by adding a unique range of flavors to the mix, including peppermint, gingerbread and guava. Boba Guys, too, is no stranger to innovation. The milk tea chain boasts relatively never-before-seen creations such as espresso milk tea and black sugar hojicha. 

Both of these chains, originally inspired by the traditional drinks of Taiwanese shops, are created and run by Asians in the United States. In the United States especially, bubble tea has evolved beyond merely a “Taiwanese” drink to its own type of international cuisine, one that incorporates a variety of flavors. It’s a testament to the global reach and widespread acceptance of Taiwan’s gastrodiplomacy.

The evolution and proliferation of bubble tea in other countries demonstrates its status as a drink with its own individualized international appeal. In that way, bubble tea indirectly symbolizes what Taiwan aspires to represent to the international community: innovation, adaptability to global interests and accessibility. Through economic and cultural means, bubble tea has achieved an international reach and fanbase. 

Even as its popularity has become an international phenomenon, bubble tea is fundamentally Taiwanese. This is evidenced by its origins and the perpetuation of its iconography in the Taiwanese political and cultural collective consciousness. From Taiwanese diplomats posing for photos with bubble tea to the creation of a “milk tea alliance” in promotion of Taiwanese democracy, bubble tea has become a political force to be reckoned with and a source of pride. 

Bubble tea’s cultural popularity has come to represent what Taiwan’s government desires for the nation as a whole. Conceptually, bubble tea represents a Taiwanese identity, primarily because only Taiwan can claim ownership of its creation. 

For that reason, Taiwan has launched bubble tea-related advertising campaigns and has stressed its association with the world-famous drink through Taiwan tourism guides. These endeavors in branding have contributed to the positive association between Taiwan and bubble tea culture.

Bubble tea has become part of a fundamental soft power campaign, and its role in Taiwanese gastrodiplomacy is based on the assumption that bubble tea wasn’t just created in Taiwan, but that at its core, it is Taiwan. In terms of future international endeavors, it’s unlikely that bubble tea on its own can lead to any concrete political upheaval. However, it’s worth paying attention to as a form of Taiwanese marketing. 

Taiwan’s positive image abroad as a democracy is correlated with the popularity of its gastrodiplomacy, as seen in the aforementioned “Milk Tea Alliance,” a digital solidarity movement with participants from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Myanmar and Thailand. The movement derives its name from the idea that despite the differences in how the drink is made from region to region, the regions all share the same core democratic values. Since its founding, participants have rallied supporters online to retaliate against Chinese nationalist bots asserting Chinese authoritarianism. 

According to the Atlantic, with the work of the Milk Tea Alliance, milk tea has become an “anti-China” symbol. Moreover, it has become an advocacy platform for democracy worldwide. It’s an example of how bubble tea is more than just a cultural tool, but has become emblematic of a larger geopolitical movement. 

The closest bubble tea shop doesn’t just sell bubble tea. For Taiwan, it sells a national image. 

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In July 2016, in response to North Korea’s rising nuclear threat, the US and South Korea announced their decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), an antimissile battery built to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. China quickly objected to THAAD on the grounds that it would weaken its nuclear deterrence capabilities and decrease Chinese influence in the region. To coerce South Korea to disable and remove THAAD, China launched a year-long campaign of economic retaliation, targeting the consumer goods, entertainment and tourism industries. Though it faded quickly and quietly, the THAAD dispute reveals much about the current limitations of China’s power, as well as its potential.

China specifically raised concerns that THAAD’s X-band radar, which monitors THAAD’s surroundings, had too large a scope and could gain information about China’s military actions further inland. However, US defense officials have pointed out that an existing, similar instrument deployed in Japan has a comparable, marginally smaller scope. While China’s claims were technically weak, they were understandable symbolically. Many Chinese found it concerning for the US to deploy a military weapon on neighboring South Korea’s territory – a neighbor who had been recently improving relations with China.

After over a year of tensions, in late October 2017, South Korea and China suddenly announced that they would work towards improving bilateral relations. South Korean media content started re-appearing on Chinese platforms that had previously stopped showing it, the consumer goods and tourism industries began to pick up their lost momentum, and the short-lived protests against the South Korean conglomerate Lotte Group had mostly ended.

Looking closer, the limited impact of its economic blows reveals the boundaries of Chinese power. The first retaliatory action to make headlines was limiting Chinese viewers’ ability to access and consume South Korean entertainment. Popular South Korean celebrities also cancelled or suspended public appearances in China. Even within the gaming industry, Beijing tightened regulations to make South Korean games’ entry into the market more difficult. These industries have felt some impact from the ban and experienced a decrease in the trade surplus of media content in the first nine months of 2017. Nevertheless, the entertainment industries were not significantly hurt by China’s ban, as they expanded their presence in other markets.

China also targeted certain South Korean consumer products, including food products, cosmetics, and automobiles. South Korean carmakers Hyundai and Kia both experienced the effects of the THAAD dispute and saw significant drops in Chinese sales. Although many companies have felt a negative impact, the decrease in some sales were compounded by other factors like boycotts from Chinese citizens and not necessarily strictly by Chinese policy. The South Korean cosmetic giant AmorePacific cited both stagnation of the domestic economy and the decrease in tourism after March 2017 as reasons for slowing sales growth and decreased operating profit.

As China was and still is the number one provider of tourists for South Korea, tourism was the industry that experienced the largest setback during the THAAD controversy. Chinese policy was partially responsible, as regional travel companies suddenly stopped selling package tours to South Korea, but other factors like concerns for safety and political tensions, anger at Lotte Group, and increased negative perceptions of South Korea also contributed to decreased tourism, one study showed. Overall, the number of tourists fell by 3.29 million in the first nine months of 2017 as compared to 2016, leading to a total $6.8 billion loss for the tourism industry.

The hardest hit by this economic dispute was Lotte Group, the South Korean conglomerate that sold the South Korean government the land it used to deploy THAAD. Before the conflict, Lotte owned more than 100 department stores and supermarkets in China, but since February 2017, the Chinese government closed more than 70 of them, citing safety concerns. Lotte Group closed the remaining stores after large protests at numerous storefronts. Recently, Lotte Group announced that it would sell all of its stores in China, abandoning its previous effort to expand its presence in the Chinese market.

Despite all of these negative impacts, the South Korean economy as a whole did not suffer significantly from Chinese retaliation. In fact, total Chinese exports increased in 2017; in the first eight months of that year, South Korean exports to China rose by 12 percent. Despite China’s economic might, many Chinese businesses rely on South Korean companies as part of their supply chains, which helps explain why only three main industries were hit.

Though it came out largely unscathed by China’s economic attacks, it would be difficult to argue that South Korea – and the US – definitively won this dispute. Granted, THAAD is still fully operational today. However, during reconciliation talks, Seoul assured Beijing that it would not seek additional THAAD deployments nor join a trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan. China may not have achieved its full desired outcome, but it did succeed in placing some boundaries on its neighbor’s future behavior. Meanwhile, the popularity of domestic boycotts bolstered the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) power at home.

More than anything, this dispute demonstrated the scope of China’s global clout. Its failure to effect THAAD’s removal revealed that its international influence remains limited by its integration into the global economy. In other words, China can only tolerate cutting off its corporations from foreign markets up to a point. Moreover, China clearly still faces bigger security questions surrounding North Korea. However, as China’s economic might continues to grow, it could become a more viable tool for asserting Chinese power globally, as well as garnering domestic support for the CCP.

In the coming weeks, the remnants of this heated dispute will fade as the region turns its attention to the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics. With North and South Korea planning to march under a united flag and create a joint women’s ice hockey team, there are modest signs of peace and hope. But even as the world comes together for 17 days of symbolic unity, the underlying distrust in the region caused by this conflict cannot be swept aside with colorful flags and cheerful processions. While nations applaud each others’ athletic accomplishments, the THAAD battery lies a mere 125 miles away, casting an uneasy shadow over the celebrations.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Those individuals who believe Edward Snowden is a hero who exposed Big Brother should think twice. It may be easy to support an increasingly popular culture of Internet leaks and freedom of information for all things sensitive, but it is more difficult to examine the long-term consequences and implications of Snowden and other leakers’ actions for U.S. national security. While leaking has occurred long before Snowden and Manning, a new culture of internet freedom in which every tech-savvy person can be a world hero by disclosing government secrets seems to be growing in the U.S. I am very wary of this misguided “culture of leaks.” The leaking of sensitive information, even if well-intentioned, exposes some of our nation’s most sensitive sources and methods to terrorist organizations and foreign intelligence services, which makes us all less secure.

Let’s start with Snowden. This man did not merely blow the whistle, he trumpeted a storm. Snowden could have chosen to carefully release only the documents that succinctly showed violations of NSA surveillance policy and a potential overstepping of government surveillance, but instead he opted to flee to Russia and Hong Kong with multiple computers filled with highly-classified NSA security programs and other sensitive data. I am still dumbfounded that a man who preaches privacy and freedom would scurry away to Russia, one of the most oppressive great powers in the world today. In addition to this highly questionable circumstance, Snowden’s seemingly indiscriminate release of sensitive information cost the U.S. government dearly in research and development, resulted in a loss of international prestige, turned attention away from regimes that actually oppress their people, and damaged U.S. national security capabilities. Responsible whistleblowing takes restraint, thoughtful planning, and thorough exhaustion of internal channels, standards that are seemingly absent from Snowden’s actions.

Now that we understand Edward Snowden is no Deep Throat, I want to touch on Wikileaks, one of the biggest players on the receiving end of our leak culture. I am astonished that an organization dedicated to the mass transmission of our state secrets to all peoples and governments commands respect among so many fellow citizens. If these were the days of the Cold War when America faced the more discernable threat of a nuclear-armed “Evil Empire,” I doubt as many Americans would be supportive of a global databank of U.S. sources and methods ripe for the picking. My generation seems to forget that it is not just terrorists in the Middle East that threaten our national security, but also foreign governments. Just about every competent nation is constantly seeking to penetrate our private industry and government to steal sensitive trade information and government secrets. Indeed, there is no such thing as a “friendly” intelligence service. These foreign intelligence services and hostile transnational groups have already scoured Snowden’s leaked data and have adjusted their methods accordingly. I would not be surprised if Snowden was already debriefed by Russian intelligence officers. U.S. citizens should be more wary of global institutions that eagerly await more leakers to approach them for “assistance.” Organizations like Wikileaks, unlike the Intelligence Community, do not have a loyalty to our country and are working to further their own interests, which can vary from world fame to fulfilling certain ideological goals.

As Snowden relaxes and drinks Russian vodka at a dacha (cottage) near Moscow, U.S. national security professionals are in damage control mode. Now more than ever, our adversaries have a better understanding of how our national security apparatus operates and have adapted their operations accordingly. These groups include both terrorist cells that are constantly planning to attack U.S. and Allied targets, as well as foreign intelligence services that seek to steal our industry trade secrets and sensitive government information to gain an economic, political, and military edge. Indeed, I would be very hesitant to readily praise Snowden, Manning, Anonymous, and other distressing groups or individuals. As a concerned citizen, it’s up to you to counter this malice with two easy actions. First, read a few books and/or articles about our security services and the threats facing our country to gain a more complete understanding of current global challenges and the proper function of our Intelligence Community. To start, I would personally recommend Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy by Mark Lowenthal and a student subscription to The Economist. Second, and most importantly, consider finding ways to become involved in our government in order to responsibly facilitate the improvements you may wish to enact. This involvement could range from grassroots advocacy activities such as writing letters to your Congressman to interning for an Executive branch agency, an NGO/think tank, or Congress. We should not have to wait for unlawful and misguided security leaks for calls to activism and civic involvement. Our generation needs to make a more robust effort to become involved in the governmental process, and perhaps even work directly for the institutions that run our government in order to face these challenges. Our country deserves no less from our generation, and mere armchair activism via social media will not suffice.

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