President Joe Biden and his political allies cheered on Cuban protesters for standing against “decades of repression and economic suffering to which Cuba’s authoritarian regime has subjected them.” But these protests, the largest the country has seen since 1994, emerged from much more than a slow-burning political dissatisfaction that finally boiled over.

The Cuban people needed to tell their leader and the world that they are hungry, dying unnecessarily and fed up with a government that seems impervious to their suffering.

The nation’s economy has suffered alongside the rest of the world during the pandemic, weakened by a drop in tourism and the subsequent decrease in foreign currency, which customarily helps consumers stay afloat. If COVID-19-related economic bubbles weren’t enough, Havana has also confronted financial mismanagement and crippling economic sanctions imposed by Washington.

Protesters and online critics claim there simply is not enough food to go around, and the sparse food remaining on market shelves requires hours of standing in line.

“Do you know what it’s like not to be able to buy my child food from the store?” Odalis, a 43-year-old mother in Havana, said to The New York Times.

Starving children, desperate parents, and an entire country in dire financial straits all face yet another crisis, a resurgence of the global pandemic. After months of keeping the coronavirus at bay, the national healthcare system has met its match in the novel Delta variant. Over the past two months, the number of positive test cases has increased by more than six times, and the medical system can no longer keep up. Hospitals lack sufficient oxygen and space to accommodate the drastic rise in cases, and people are dying at disproportionate rates as a result. In some parts of the country, death rates have climbed to eight times the average rate before the Delta surge.

The healthcare system has long been a source of national pride, with Cuban doctors living and working worldwide, but now, doctors at home claim that the system has buckled under the pressure of the pandemic.

“The funeral homes can’t cope, the hospitals can’t cope, the clinics can’t cope,” one doctor told the Times. Like many healthcare workers who have publicized the realities on the ground in Cuba, this doctor paid for the truth with his job. Despite the threat of job termination, detention and criminal charges, many Cubans have spoken up about their situations.

Cuban protesters succeeded in making their shouts heard around the world. Still, their leader has not only refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of their complaints but has actively attempted to suppress their protests, both physically and virtually.

Prior to the eruption of protests, Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, Cuba’s first non-Castro leader in 60 years, conceded that the pandemic had overwhelmed the country’s healthcare system, but channeled the blame toward U.S. trade embargos, which he says exacerbate medical supply shortages.

President Díaz-Canel responded quite differently to the nation’s problems following July’s protests. The police crackdown arrived swiftly and firmly. Advocates estimate that as many as 800 citizens, including many underage, have remained detained for weeks. Many people have been arrested off the street, many claiming they had nothing to do with the protesters, and police have even begun going door-to-door to issue arrests, often without offering an explanation beyond “vandalism and looting.”

Days after chanting “libertad” in city squares, many protesters have taken shelter in their homes, fearful of losing their jobs and conflicted about speaking up in defense of those already detained for fear of exacerbating detainees’ treatment.

“The Cuban people are brave, but the repression right now is very strong and the effect is being felt,” said one distraught woman, regarding her husband’s extended detention. “There are still families who don’t know where their loved ones are.”

The crackdown on dissent is not limited to the spaces Cubans occupy at home and work but is also affecting online freedoms. Díaz-Canel issued sweeping legislation criminalizing any opposition to Cuba’s Communist Party on social media. The new laws forbid any content with the potential to affect “collective security, general welfare, public morality and respect for public order.”

The document clearly states its motivations as political, explicitly citing its purpose as “in defense of the Revolution.” Critics claim the new limits on freedom of expression are not only politically motivated but that the president deliberately designed the document’s language to be vague, allowing him to continue imprisoning and threatening any dissenters into silence.

The president had only recently authorized internet access, opening the island to online communities in hopes of modernizing the nation’s economy.

Many onlookers suspect this new window into the world beyond helped foment the protests on July 11, allowing Cubans to compare their empty supermarket shelves to those of their geographic neighbors.

A video of a small demonstration in San Antonio de los Baños circulated on Facebook earlier in the weekend and sparked protests in 25 cities around the nation.

Social media allowed Cubans to vent their anger and fan the fire until they gathered the collective energy to confront a government that had failed them. Díaz-Canel issued the new legislation in an attempt to squash communication and mobilization and, more personally, to silence Twitter’s favorite epithet for Cuba’s president “Díaz-Canel singao,” a term that combines derogatory and sexually explicit connotations and does not translate easily to English.

Díaz-Canel only officially took office as the first secretary of the Communist Party in April of 2021, years after being tapped to succeed Raúl Castro, finally bringing the six-decade Castro regime to a conclusion. Many younger Cubans had hoped their new president would guide the country toward more reform, continuing his predecessor’s advances toward privatization and diversifying the economy. Yet, these hopes have dimmed in light of the worsening economic crisis and social unrest.   

Díaz-Canel’s decision to clamp down on dissent, both online and on the streets, will make it more difficult for Cuban citizens to make their voices heard. Still, many Cubans remain defiant, even in the face of so many parallel crises.

“These are laws to scare people,” said Norges Rodríguez, a Cuban telecommunications engineer and activist. “But on July 11, people came out to protest in a country where you can’t protest. I do not believe that a decree will stop the desire for freedom of a population that is fed up.”

LOS ANGELES — The Cuban Missile Crisis. The Bay of Pigs. Guantanamo Bay. All of these infamous events seem to encapsulate a common sentiment around the topic of U.S.- Cuba relations over the years, one marked by tense relations and cautious diplomacy. 

In 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama overcame decades of tension and became the first president to visit Cuba since Calvin Coolidge in 1928. In Obama’s second term, he made it a priority to change the contentious relationship between the two countries. While Obama understood the human rights differences, he believed that the best way to deal with the dispute and promote freedom was through dialogue and positive actions. 

He then set out a plan to develop trade, humanitarian and scientific opportunities. The Obama administration promoted joint medical research, the selling of Cuban medicine in the U.S. and banking for Americans in Cuba. They also wanted to create scholarships for research and build more infrastructure in Cuba. 

The administration hoped that easing restrictions and creating new programs would help facilitate a better economic and diplomatic relationship. Though Obama’s actions were not widely applauded by Cuban Americans like Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ), his arrival in Havana marked a historic beginning to a detente period and the first step to normalizing relations between the two countries. 

That, too, however, quickly deteriorated. The past four years under Trump saw rollbacks in Obama’s policy. Former British Ambassador to Cuba Paul Hare told Glimpse from the Globe in an exclusive interview that, “Trump for largely electoral reasons, thought it would be advantageous, so he could win Florida, to say he would reverse Obama’s policies, which he did pretty quickly, despite the main one of keeping full diplomatic relations.” 

Notably, Trump also re-designated Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” continuing to choke Cuba’s economy with economic sanctions. Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reported the new classifcation of Cuba, and justified the decision by saying that Cuba continually, “[provided]support for the acts of international terrorism in granting state harbor to terrorists.” When this decision was made, the United States only had listed Syria, Iran and North Korea under this categorization. Being classfied as a “state sponsor of terrorism” allows the United States to apply more sanctions, deny foreign aid and restrict the exports of defense materials to the country. 

In a tweet, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez condemned the act, and said that “the political opportunism of this action is recognized by anyone with an honest regard for the scourage of terrorism and its victims.” Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy expressed his frustrations with the decision and recognized in a statement that this action will make the relationship between the United States and Cuba even more strained for the Biden administration. As Biden now takes office, there has been talk of continuing Obama’s legacy to normalize relations between the two countries. 

U.S. President Joe Biden, who served as Obama’s vice president, heavily endorsed previous efforts to seek improved relations with Cuba. Biden’s presidential campaign vowed to reverse Trump’s policy that has “inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights.” Already, eighty Democrats in the U.S. House of Representative have encouraged Biden to roll back sanctions on Cuba and allow travel between the two countries to create “a constructive, productive and civil approach toward Cuba and its people,” according to Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive.  

Calls for lifting U.S. sanctions on Cuba mainly stem from concern for the Cuban economy. Many describe Cuba as a country lost in time, with its infrastructure and economy unmoving from decades ago. The struggling economy saw its first awakening in 2014 after U.S.-Cuba relations were restored and travel restarted to enliven the tourism market. However, these changes were quickly undermined by rollbacks of the Trump presidency and the COVID-19 pandemic. 

In 2020, Cuba’s economy shrank by 11%, setting a three-decade record of decline. Broadly speaking, the Cuban economy last peaked in 1984 and plummeted in the 1990s, erasing almost a third of its entire economy. After that, there were meager economic improvements in 2000 when Venezuela supplied oil at discounted prices, but since the 2008 financial crisis, Cuba never truly recovered. 

Now, the dire state of its economy is taking a toll on the entire demographic, with its population of 11.2 million shrinking and quickly aging. With Biden’s arrival, many are optimistic about Cuba’s recovery with U.S. aid — but it may still be too early for that. At this stage, Cubans are looking towards strides in opening up travel.

“They will be hoping now that Biden does open travel, which will bring a lot of money into Cuba,” said Paul Hare, former ambassador to Cuba. “It will bring tourism, but also Cuban American travel, which is being reduced from the new restrictions.”

As seen by Cuba’s recent governmental action, better relations seem to be desired by Cuba. Cuba’s inner workings have seen significant changes over the years. After decades of isolationist authoritarian policy under Fidel Castro, in 2009, Fidel’s successor, Raul Castro completely reformed his cabinet. He removed several of Cuba’s highest-ranking officials from their posts and dismounted many loyalists of his brother. The political significance of the removal signaled a notable pivoting point for Cuba, signifying an internal political power and Cuba’s divergence from a long period of isolationist policy. 

For the first time in decades, Raul expressed openness to improving relations with the United States. Cuba’s reform has not only been limited to its government but has also been making economic changes to accommodate for the pandemic. The spread of the Coronavirus in Cuba has caused over 65,000 infections and resulted in 387 deaths. While the country was able to keep the mortality rate considerably low, it struggled to keep its economy going and protect its citizens. And the already dwindling economy became even more damaged by a food crisis. 

Since 2010, Cubans have only been allowed to work in businesses in 127 private sector categories specified by the government, mostly encapsulating service jobs in the restaurant or transportation industry. In February, the former policy was abolished, legalizing all private sector businesses except for a list of 124 specifically prohibited jobs. 

This is a fundamental, historic change that we’ve been asking for for a long time,” said Oniel Diaz Castellnos, an owner of a business Cuban consultancy agency. “There are a lot of businesses that were illegal and now can be legalized, and there’s going to be a lot of innovative ideas that will be unleashed. It’s an economic opportunity not just for entrepreneurs but for the country.”

Biden’s entry into office has increased optimism on the U.S.-Cuba relationship. He has openly voiced intentions to roll back President Trump’s harsh foreign policy and continue engagement with Cuba. “Yes, I would. In large part, I would go back,” Biden said. “I’d still insist they keep the commitments they said they would make when we, in fact, set the policy in place.” The Biden administration’s first priority in Cuba would be to support democracy and human rights in the country. White House Spokeswoman Jen Psaki said at a press briefing “[we are committed]to making human rights a core pillar of our U.S. policy,” and “to carefully [review]policy decisions made in the prior administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.”

However, this is not necessarily a guarantee of close diplomacy. Biden’s arrival may mean improved relations between the United States and Cuba, but as the United States battles with COVID-19, diplomacy with Cuba may not be of the utmost importance. The Biden administration is not in a rush to change Cuba policy, which is currently under review, the White House said. 

“The Biden administration clearly has to decide what it’s for and what its policy priorities are,” Hare said. “They’ve got many more pressing issues, and perhaps Venezuela, which is linked with Cuba, is more pressing than actually reformulating a new policy towards Cuba.”

The election of President Donald Trump was a shock and his policies towards Cuba seek to reverse all the progress of his predecessor, Barack Obama. However, another presidential election is on the horizon. In 2020, the United States will elect a new leader. If Donald Trump is re-elected, we can expect this trajectory of restrictions to continue. If a more liberal president takes the oval office, there is a possibility that relations with Cuba will improve and interaction between the two nations will increase. Yet, the next American president is not the only variable in play. Miguel Diaz-Canel is the new president of Cuba. While he was voted into office, he was hand-picked by Fidel Castro to take over the regime. When asked about the island’s revolutionary politics by American lawmakers his response was only “I was born in 1960 after the revolution. I’m not the best person to answer your questions on that subject” (Ahmed-Robles). Where does this new president stand? It is too early to know for sure. 

Today the Cuban people enjoy the growing tourism industry, especially if they are employed by it. I’ve had the opportunity to talk to people from different parts of the tourism industry; including our Airbnb host, taxi drivers, and street vendors in Old Havana. Everyone has said something similar: they like the tourists because they provide the money on which they live and that they hope tourism continues to grow. One person even went so far as to say that they hope Trump doesn’t get re-elected and that the next United States president has a soft heart for Cuba. Unfortunately, tourism is the only industry in Cuba that is seeing success. Booming tourism has been great for many, but it is dangerous because if there is a change in the international climate and tourism declines the Cuban economy will fail. 

Another idea of how tourism can help the Cuban people is an expansion of the private sector. Our guide works for the government and the taxis are part of a government-owned company. If these people could have their own businesses – like the Airbnb’s and restaurants – they would have more money and more success. One taxi driver told us that during the Obama presidency many Americans came to Cuba and brought with them their ideas of capitalism. This created a hunger in many Cubans to become entrepreneurs. Through increased contact with Americans, I think that the Cuban people will want the same rights as citizens have in America, especially in terms of private property and economics. 

The people in the tourism industry want there to be more American tourists in the future and want to have the ability to start their own businesses (with more options than just an Airbnb or restaurant). However, new executive orders from the Trump Administration on June 5th, 2018 bring American tourism to a standstill. The regulations prohibit American cruise ships, yachts, and private planes from flying to the island. Travel to Cuba under a United States passport is limited to service missions for the Cuban people; this does not include educational travel or family visits. It is estimated that Cuba will lose over $130 million in revenue due to this change. The reasoning for these regulations is rooted in the Cold War narrative and Cuba being the “communist stronghold of the Western hemisphere”2. Additionally, the island’s relationship with President Maduro of Venezuela is a point of severe contention and the Trump Administration has stated that they are using these regulations as economic pressure to force Cuba to submit to the United States regarding Venezuela. Regardless of your political leanings, the facts of this situation must be addressed. The embargo on Cuba that began during the Kennedy Administration and held in place until Obama’s reforms beginning in 20143. While the Cuban economy suffered, it did not produce regime change or a shift in its foreign policy. Why would we expect the outcome to be different now? The lack of tourism hurts the Cuban people, not the Cuban government. The only privatized sectors in Cuba (Airbnb, restaurants) rely heavily on tourists as customers. Without access to clients this budding capitalism will dry up. The Trump Administration has given the Cuban people a reason to hate the American government once again. Their government will blame its issues on the United States, and the cycle of Cuba being in the hands of dictators rather than its own people will continue.

Barack Obama’s historic trip to Cuba and the subsequent easing of relations has left Cuban and US scholars wondering if this is the beginning of the end for the Cuban Embargo. Since Raul Castro’s ascendence to the presidency, change has been in the air; Airbnb, privatized farms, and joint ventures in biotech have led the gradual trend of reform and marketization after a long period of depressed growth in the post-Soviet 90s. But even as American tourists pour into the country, and Cubans leave the state-sector for newly sanctioned private enterprises, and upper-class, LA-style cafés and brunch joints fill into Havana’s fashionably dilapidated colonial house interiors, it’s important not to get swept up into a melodrama of development. The state and state monopolies still govern the fundamental details of Cuban life, internet is barely there, shortages are frequent, and most who graduate from college must decide whether to take a low wage government job, or work as a tour guide or waiter at a private restaurant.

The state of agriculture is a great case study in the mixed results of Cuba’s reforms under Raul Castro, the hopes of ambitious entrepreneurs posed against the slow machinations of the regime. Since the collapse of the USSR, Cuban agriculture has suffered from low labor productivity, insufficient output, decapitalization and inefficient organization. The resulting food security crisis pushed the government to break-up poorly managed state farms into medium-sized cooperatives called CPAs and UBPCs (“basic units of cooperative production”) that were relatively more efficient, at about 10% the size of the original farms.

While by 1996 Cuba saw a moderate rise in non-sugar agricultural production, a lack of capital, inputs and processing organization meant Cuba still suffered from extensive food shortages, and had to import 80% of their food through the early 2000s. Though UBPCs were better than state farms, they still suffered from bureaucratic government administration, with no freedom in purchasing imports or labor for themselves.

                                                                   Data from ONEI (2014)

The transition to private and small cooperative farms has brought with it a radical shift in average farm size. Where a state farm producing vegetables and roots could average 4,200 hectares, a UBPC collective averages closer to 460, and a private farm only about 16-65 hectares. The return to the family farm model is believed to be key in the current boost in agricultural yields—smaller plots means less managerial costs, more crop-mixing and more labor intensity per hectare, which in the development literature translates into improved labor productivity, more bang per buck.

Usually these changes, which amounts to a massive decollectivization in Cuba, bring with them increased mobility, freedom, profit and quality of life for the independent farmers who can now work their own land, sell their own surplus and begin to accumulate savings beyond the meager wages offered by the state. So why is the majority of food that Cubans consume still coming from the US? Why isn’t total cultivated area in Cuba growing? A number of challenges are still holding farmers back, and preventing improved productivity from translating into real, tangible economic gains:

• Tenure insecurity— Because the Cuban government reserves the right to expropriate farmers from lent land if deemed unproductive, usufructary farmers suffer from intense tenure insecurity, which prevents them from making important investments in the land needed to boost production.
• Capitalization— Buying irrigation and farming equipment requires start-up money, which the state doesn’t provide. This issue is closely tied to Cuba’s dramatically low wage rates, which mean that family members who work off-farm often can’t make enough money to begin the process of capital investment.
• Inputs — Input markets for equipment are organized by the state and often too expensive to access. Certain imports such as diesel or some bio-fertilizers are quoted in CUC, Cuba’s convertible currency, which is valued much higher than the peso farmers are payed in, the CUP—expensive inputs render more serious yield improvements impossible.

In 2012 and 2013, the government took a number of steps to address some of these small farming issues. The granted plot size rose from 13.4 to 67.1 hectares (165 acres) as long as the usufruct recipient was linked to a cooperative or state farm (it was clear the government had gone too small on land grants, providing too little area for sustainable production). The usufructuary was granted permission to build homes and plant orchards on the land. Also, if the contract is not renewed after 10 years, the state is required to evaluate the farmer’s investment on the land and reimburse him. Relatives are able to inherit a plot if a farmer dies during his contract.  Usufructuaries were granted a two-year exemption on personal income tax, and land value tax. But none of these reforms seriously address several major problems in Cuban agriculture: the centralization of inputs in state-run markets, the inability for individual farmers to independently hire labor, and the inability for usufructuaries to rent out land [2].

Policy

• More robust improvements in agricultural yield and cultivated land growth will come from a dramatic liberalization of the market for agricultural inputs, the market for land, as well as a reduction or eradication of the state price system (channeling Vietnam) that delivers quota requirements to individual farms (the so-called acopio system). We’ve seen some success in the expansion of domestic food markets through farmers’ markets in Havana. The next step here is to begin to relax the complicated licensing measures required to sell agricultural surplus in the city. There is also ample opportunity to begin to integrate local food products into the major grocery chains within the country, instead of importing the majority of grocery products. This gradual strengthening of market linkages and private networks will naturally erode the state-centric acopio system of food purchasing.
• In terms of improving tenure security, while the government has already taken steps to improve legal protections and promise of compensation for expropriation, the next natural move would be to lengthen licenses for idle land from 10 years to 20 or 30 years, as is already being done for larger cooperatives.
• In order to stimulate further investment in the land and improve migration into the agricultural sector, the government must begin to offer incentives beyond tax write offs to spur investment in infrastructure and physical capital that will produce long term yield improvements. This includes offers of capital for building homes and barns on the land, in order to improve rural linkages and allow newly landed farmers to organize their household around the farmland for the long term.
• Decollectivization may not in fact have to be actively mandated, as long as the government allows current usufruct farmers to begin to consolidate and improve their holdings, and begins to offer cheaper alternatives for input purchase and capital accumulation we will see interest in independent farming grow. This means allowing farmers to determine their own output levels, the destination of their products and allowing independent farmers to begin to hire their own labor throughout the season so that they can begin to increase their output and cultivated area.

Watching Grass Grow

When South Vietnam was integrated into the communist regime, southern farmers were gradually transitioned to a collective farming system at the expense of rice productivity. As in the Cuban case, many cooperatives involved farmers pooling their land and tours, and sharing output based on time spent working. The poor incentive structure brought on by the high costs of monitoring performance depressed rice production –cooperative farmers had a 52% lower productivity than non-cooperative farmers. An initial attempt at decollectivization suffered from the same tenure security and incentive issues as in Cuba. It wasn’t until the Vietnamese government pushed a more radical set of reforms and liberalizations which included guaranteed compensation for farmers displaced from their assigned land, the privatization of output markets, ending the required sale of food to the state, and a decentralization of input supplies and input markets that Vietnamese agriculture bloomed [3].

But radical isn’t really the style of the Cuban dictatorship, whose bureaucracy is deliberately designed to articulate power and obstruct change through sheer largesse and inefficiency. Periodic food shortages, ration books and state pricing are all important parts of a strategy that has kept the Castro’s (along with the military and industry elites) afloat since 1959, and will continue to support whoever else is in charge come “elections” in 2018. Change will come from the people, the urban farmers, the entrepreneurs and biotech scientists who come up with new ways to make do without tractors or fertilizers, who fight food insecurity with organic, family farming methods, sell their surplus in the city to a blossoming network of private restaurants, cafes and farmers markets, while quietly (at first) grumbling to each other about the state’s violently out-of-fashion food monopoly.

[1]  Riera, Olivia and Jonah Swinnen, “Cuba’s Agricultural Transition and Food Security in a Global Perspective,” Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 38.3 (2016) pp.413-448.

[2] Gonzalez, Armando and Mario A. Gonzalez-Corzo, “Cuba’s Agricultural Transformations,” Journal of Agricultural Studies, 3.2 (2015) pp. 175-180.

[3] Pingali, Prabhu and Vo-Tong Xuan, “Vietnam: Decollectivization and Rice Productivity Growth”, Economic Development and Cultural Change 50.4 (Jul 2992). Pp. 697-718.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Towering above the famous — or infamous, depending on your perspective — Mansu Hill Grand Monument in Pyongyang, North Korea stand two massive statues. Looming 22 meters high, the bronze incarnates of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il express gleeful smiles, the former with his right arm outstretched and the latter with his left hand on his hip. The father and son stand approvingly amid communist-themed memorials, as if frozen during the apex of communism’s allure. Indeed, Cold War-era policies that continue today have had a chilling effect on the country and its people, leaving it comatose to international affairs. Though most agree that the Cold War died with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the burial of communism and its countermeasures was not fully six feet under. North Korea and the United States alike stand athwart progress by clinging to policies that isolate one another.

The case is changing for other post-communist countries: after persisting for decades, the Cuban embargo is unwinding with the normalization of relations under the Obama Administration. In 2015, the Cuban flag flew above an embassy in Washington, DC, as did an American flag over Havana, for the first time in the post-communist world. Leaders in both countries recognized that outdated policies intended to isolate Cuba diplomatically and economically had not fostered robustly pro-American or pro-capitalist sentiments. If abandoning isolationism works in Cuba, a former Soviet-aligned country, then it should also work in countries with similar statures. Could North Korea potentially be next?

Despite the initially obvious differences, there exist demonstrable similarities between Cuba and North Korea: both welcomed Soviet support for their revolutionary governments and bore the blunt of American scorn and sanction. As the surrounding world has tended toward democracy and free elections, familial dynasties still control both governments. Raúl Castro inherited the Cuban presidency from his brother Fidel in 2008 after a 32-year reign, and Kim Jong-un followed his immortalized father and grandfather, now prevailing over the 67th year of the family’s regime. As the world becomes inestimably interconnected — coalescing under the promise of partnership, trade and peace — North Korea, like Cuba until recently, is a notable exception that fits the isolationist archetype.

Examining Cuba’s history and relations with the United States may shed light on the prospect of North Korean normalization. Estimates of Castro’s victims during the revolution total no fewer than 8,000 but grow to 70,000 when they include those who died on boats fleeing from the island. The revolution began with Castro and Che Guevara marching across the island shooting political enemies and minorities, and as communism settled in, Human Rights Watch consistently condemned Cuba for its infringements on free speech and press, as well as the repressive conditions in forced labor camps. The Cuban Missile Crisis, instigated by Castro and the USSR, brought the world closer to nuclear war than it had — or has — ever been before. The US resolved the crisis swiftly and peacefully by publically ordering Khrushchev to remove missiles from Cuba. In private, however, it also conceded its own missiles positioned in Turkey. The close encounter with mutually-assured destruction notwithstanding, the US forged common ground after decades of failed isolationist policies, and now normalized relations exist.

Like Cuba, North Korea’s 20th century history is one of pervasive conflict, repression and death. Korea exceeded Cuba, however, by instigating a war in which the US intervened in an attempt to contain it. The war alone killed 400,000 North Korean soldiers and 600,000 civilians. An estimated 800,000–1,000,000 further perished due to forced labor camps, mass killing and intentional starvation. Because many of these conditions persist today, the United Nations declared in 2014 that North Korea’s abuses are without parallel in the modern world.

From these numbers, North Korea’s abuses are clearly worse in degree than Cuba’s, but they are of the same essential kind. In listing the abuses of each country as it does annually, Human Rights Watch uses the same categories for assessing both Cuba and North Korea: arbitrary detention, political prisoners, freedom of expression, travel restrictions and prison conditions, to name a few. Their only difference, therefore, is the degree of severity in each category, not in the kinds of abuses themselves. In addition to the publicized abuses, further suffering likely goes underreported in both countries as a result of strict censorship of the media and a lack of diplomatic participation with other countries and international institutions.

Some foreign policy experts contend that for all of the historical and modern similarities, nuclear weapons are the tipping point that disqualify North Korea from normalized relations. Indeed, the country’s development and testing of weapons is well documented in recent reports of an alleged hydrogen bomb test and a long-range missile test. North Korea’s belligerence on the world stage in spite of international sanctions and reprimand is concerning. The US would do well, however, to resist its impulse to punish North Korea by aggressively isolating it and instead consider alternate policy options that it has successfully pursued elsewhere.

First, the vivid memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis should remind policymakers that Kennedy and Khrushchev reached resolution through dialogue. The threat was almost inarguably more alarming then, and yet it resulted in the establishment of a nuclear hotline between the aggressors and the White House—not silence and sanction. Similarly and more recently, the US negotiated with Iran over its nuclear program and reached an accord. Whether or not the Iran deal succeeds, the US set a diplomatic precedent by demonstrating its willingness to negotiate with what it once declared an axis of evil. North Korea’s nuclear antagonism represents no greater threat than Iran’s considering the precedence given to Iran in nuclear talks and its ongoing status as a state sponsor of terror. Nonetheless, the US has continued to employ its Cold War-era isolating policies toward the former while welcoming the latter into the 21st century of diplomacy and discussion. Should the US abandon its sanctions and scorn, instead availing itself to discussion, it could potentially learn North Korea’s motivations and objectives, laying the groundwork for peace.

If the US moved from the brink of nuclear obliteration at the hands of one Castro towards normal relations with another Castro, and if the US negotiated with one “axis of evil” about its burgeoning nuclear program, then surely North Korea is a reasonable parallel: another nuclear-armed axis of evil ruled by a member of an ideologically adversarial dynasty with a comparable record of abuses and violations. If either side in the debate incurs a burden of proof, it lies not with those encouraging relations with North Korea, but with those insisting on a divergent policy of isolation.

North Korea lost its largest benefactor when the USSR died in 1991, but has nonetheless continued to celebrate communism. A notably invigorating source of Kim Jong-un’s power in North Korea is the very fact that American diplomacy and values do not permeate his polity. For the sake of North Korea’s citizens and a more congenial world order, the US should send its policies of isolating and ignoring North Korea to the grave once and for all. Then, the bronze giants of Mansu Hill Grand Monument would have a reason to smile and extend outstretched arms: not in vain celebration of policies that have plagued the past, but rather for the prospect of relationship with the US and greater global community.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The US has maintained complete dominance over the North American continent at least since the end of the 19th century and arguably since the year 1865. No foreign power has been able to establish a sustained foothold in North America and the Greater Caribbean Basin since the French puppet emperor of Mexico, Maximilian I, was executed during the American Civil War. The obvious exception of Soviet-backed Cuba, from 1962 onwards, and the great lengths the US went to remove and then contain the Castro regime, illustrate the strategic importance of such unchallengeable hegemony over the American near abroad.

This consolidation of the US’s near abroad closely parallels the consolidation of the American home front, which certain Conservative Realist policymakers, from Hamilton to Clay to Lincoln to Teddy Roosevelt, strove to do through the adoption of the Constitution, the adoption of the American System, the preservation of the Union and the progressive reformation that each of those individuals respectively pursued. So American consolidation at home paralleled the rise of American dominance abroad. However, consolidation at home was closely paralleled by development at home, whereas domination abroad was not followed by the infrastructural, social and economic development of the young nation-state’s sphere of influence. Thus, the individual states surrounding the US were left to their own devices to develop while constrained under the US’s military and political dominance of the region. This cap on true political competition shackled policymakers in Canada, Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela to varying geopolitical fates, which in part explains the sheer difference in the current conditions of those states.

Canada, of course, had the best situation of all the neighboring states. Blessed by a British system of governance, vast resources and a reasonably homogenous population, and beset by no particularly harsh struggles, Canada was able to integrate effectively with the US as an attractive neighbor and trading partner—in fact, the biggest trading partner to the US today. The Canadians had already been cowed by the Americans in the War of 1812, after three failed but devastating attempts at invasion by the Americans. They made little pretense of nationalism against the US, and strove to integrate their economy and society with the colossus to the south.

Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela were not so lucky. Beset with the Spanish colonial tradition of a neo-feudal hacienda economy and society, possessing little to no manufacturing infrastructure (but being stricken by the resource curse endemic to many former colonies) and inhabiting tropical and semi-tropical lands more susceptible to disease, they were prey to the social corruption unfortunately common to most of the Latin American republics. Mexico, in particular, might have had an easier time integrating with the US had it not been for the perennial chaos it experienced in its northern border area. Pancho Villa exemplified this trend a century ago; the horrors of the drug wars exemplify it now. Cuba and Venezuela, further away and not directly bordering the US but still strategically significant for naval and commercial reasons, were always targets of US foreign policy, but were never party to a sustained commitment to shared economic development. The rise to power of socialist regimes in both countries during the Cold War further stalled any progress towards a Pan-American coalition or economic zone of which enterprising US politicians might have dreamt.

So now, we of the 21st century observe a curious phenomenon—a US, imperial in its domination of the northern half of its hemisphere and completely unable to effect modernizing change in its near abroad. Regimes sympathetic to its former greatest foe inhabit strategic naval points on the American Mediterranean; vast drug wars of untellable violence consume its southern neighbor, while corruption prevents that neighbor from weeding out the violence or stemming the flow of illegal migrants flooding across the northern border; meanwhile, Canada enjoys all the benefits of a free and orderly society, and exemplifies the benefits of partnership and solidarity of international neighborhood. Canada is integrated into the broader North American system, while Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela succumb to internal weaknesses without being fully let into the broader system.

The regional strategy the US ought to pursue to amend this iniquity, I think, can be put as follows: strive to make the US’s relationships with Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela as much like the US’s relationship with Canada as possible.

Clearly none of the relationships would or should ever actually mirror the US-Canada relationship, as, positivism be damned, national characteristics are real and relevant to the formulation of policy. That said there are a few basic characteristics of the US-Canada relationship that statesmen working on the US-Mexico/Cuba/Venezuela relationships could focus on.

Social stability and integration. The US and Canada are similar in culture and society, largely due to the fact that both have dynamic yet reasonably stable societies. Cuba and Venezuela might have possessed these once, but their present regimes and economic systems appear increasingly volatile; Mexico has struggled with internal dissension for the entirety of its history. Before any kind of regional infrastructure could rise, it would be crucial for the US to do its part to encourage the development of stable regimes and societies in these countries. As the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, nation-building is a borderline impossible feat and can only truly be taken on by nations themselves; therefore, a working partnership coupling local administration and US support is the only way such a policy could ever be effective. In Cuba and Venezuela, this would likely involve improved trade and diplomatic relations justified by the doctrine of power pluralism, the acceptance and outreach to regimes capable of keeping order in their own house. It might also involve advisory relationships, increasingly generous trade deals, and even subsidies to encourage those states’ development towards mixed-market economies and away from the largely statist model both have now. In the case of Mexico, this would involve similar pressure for political reform and immensely generous support for a renewed campaign to extirpate the various drug cartels from the Mexican borderland. It would likely also involve comprehensive immigration reform and deals for shared border security with the Mexican government, and perhaps even drug legalization within the US as an effort to neuter the cartels at their base source of funding. The US would pursue, by whatever practical means possible, the development of orderly, prosperous leviathans in its three primary Caribbean neighbors. Only in this way can the societies of the US, Canada, Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela become a more cohesive unit.

Economic and Political independence, yet unity. The broader North American system would be entirely useless if it became a power-client relationship between the US and its neighbors. While the US must dominate the region politically and militarily to ensure that no outside power can threaten it, the members of the coalition must be treated as equals. Moreover, there cannot be economic imperialism either—while to some degree it is inevitable that regions will specialize, such specialization should not make any one state dependent on any other. Each state should be independent within an interdependent framework, possessing a mixed economy and tied intimately, though not inseparably, to all its neighbors. Each state ought to have its own manufacturing, commerce, agricultural, information, creative, exploitation and service sectors; each should trade reasonably freely with all its neighbors. This North American-Greater Caribbean Bloc, united by continental infrastructure but dotted with national borders and national interests and shepherded by the US, might work wonders to build a prosperous future for the hundreds of millions living within its domain. It is crucial not to centralize too much and wind up with a dysfunctional system (like the EU), yet it is crucial not to decentralize political and military power too much and wind up with a system of ravenous, competing, equally powerful nation-states capable of turning North America into a competitive battleground.

Ultimately, before such a system as this can work, each of the prospective candidates has work to do. Mexico needs to fight corruption and win the drug war; Cuba and Venezuela need to build more sustainable societies; Canada and the US have a lot of nationalist political reform to do on their own. But as they modernize into the Information Age, these states might all align under the common interests of North America. This would be a security and prosperity boon to all, but most especially to the US.

For a US as primus inter pares of a North American-Greater Caribbean regional order would be an empire of greater power than the US empire has ever known before. It would know greater security and greater prosperity, become a more vigorous and vibrant society, and command the most fruitful territory on the planet. The political and international ramifications of this development would be huge. But such a system of greater integration cannot arise on its own. A clear vision of such a continental system must come first. It is for us to see whether our statesmen will see any value in it, and only then will its foundations be laid.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

President Obama’s announcement to normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba elicited a plethora of political commentary, particularly from the right and prospective presidential candidates. Though many lauded the president for his leadership in addressing a policy that has, for over 50 years, failed, politicians including Marco Rubio, John Boehner, Jeb Bush and Ted Cruz wasted no time condemning the White House. Senator Marco Rubio, a Cuban-American himself, however, led the charge. While his protestations and impassioned avowal to thwart the president’s initiative seem legitimate, both a political and Orwellian-style literary critique will expose the hypocrisy of his commentary. He obfuscated a complex relationship, culture and regime with sensationalistic rhetoric. And, though certainly not insincere, his claims are entrenched in an outdated Cold War-era disposition that neither align with US nor Cuban interests. His public outrage also happens to conflict with many other aspects of the Senator’s foreign policy.

Following the president’s announcement, Marco Rubio immediately held a press conference and made numerous television appearances in which he vehemently condemned Obama’s foreign policy as one that’s “not just naive, but willfully ignorant of the way the world truly works.” As the son of Cuban immigrants, his perspective on US-Cuba foreign policy seems more an outdated expression of filial obligation than a testament to his politics. As he details his book, American Son, his grandfather, a fervent Castro adversary, became his political inspiration, indoctrinating him with his generation’s Cold War ideology. Growing up among Cuban exiles only solidified this enmity towards the Castro regime. However, with the majority of Cubans under 65 opposing the embargo, his commitment to politics of the past have isolated him from popular opinion. As he caters to a very small population of older, conservative Cubans in South Florida, he alienates not only the younger Cuban generation, but also the majority of Americans who support lifting the embargo. His outrage is therefore a “Washington anomaly”— an emotional rather than reelection-driven political response.

Despite being the Cuba expert in Washington, his family background might have completely disconnected him from pulse of the Cuban people. According to the Senator, the deal between the US and Cuba was predicated upon the “false notion that engagement alone automatically leads to freedom.” However, the White House has repeatedly emphasized that cultivating a relationship with Cuba will enable the US to “renew our leadership in the Americas, end our outdated approach on Cuba, and promote more effective change that supports the Cuban people and our national security interests.” There is no sudden call for a “Cuban Spring,” but rather small, incremental change that comes with greater exposure. President Obama isn’t deluded to believe he’ll single-handedly bring democracy to Cuba, or that the 80 year-old Castro brothers might suddenly eschew communism and come running into the arms of the US to feel the warm embrace of a constitutional republic.

Rubio’s secondary objections are less valid, less ideological arguments than hypocritical inflammatory rhetoric. These changes to US foreign policy to Cuba, he claimed, “will tighten this regime’s grip on power for decades to come and significantly set back the hopes for freedom and democracy for the Cuban people.” That doesn’t sound good. But, one: is that really true? And, two: does this align with Rubio’s foreign policy towards countries with equally questionable human rights violations?

First, Americans should question the validity of his statement. “Decades” is already an exaggeration—the Castro brothers will not celebrate their 103rd birthday with a tight grip on power. Moreover, the US has sustained their reign through isolation. The Castros have deflected from their own ineptitude by blaming Cuba’s financial woes on the US embargo. Although it won’t dissolve completely until Congress decides to legislate, Fidel and Raul Castro’s infamous excuses will inevitably receive more criticism as the US assumes a larger role on the peninsula. Rubio’s accusations are not only less accurate than Americans might assume from a “Cuba expert,” but they also don’t align with many of his other ideas.

As the White House pointed out, Rubio supported the nomination of Senator Max Baucus as the US ambassador to Beijing in order to for Americans to better espouse ideas of democracy and freedom in China. At the confirmation hearing he stated, “I think you’ll find broad consensus on this committee and I hope in the administration, that our embassy should be viewed as an ally of those within Chinese society that are looking to express their fundamental rights to speak out and to worship freely.” He endorsed engaging a state equally criticized for its flagrant human rights violations in a dialogue that he won’t even entertain with Cuba. Moral righteousness is of utmost importance—unless of course we’re talking about an economic super power. Rubio admitted this fact in a recent interview with CBS, when he insisted engagement alone doesn’t lead to freedom, citing the Chinese who are “no more politically free today than they were when that engagement started.” However, when asked if he himself would eradicate ties with China, he claimed “comparing China to Cuba is not a comparable analogy because China is the second largest economy in the world, they have the third largest nuclear arsenal on the planet, and they are the most populous state on the planet.” National interests often hinder the US’s ability to advocate for human rights reform. Given the current landscape of affairs, Americans appear to place far greater value on economic opportunity than the plight of human suffering or oppressive institutions and states, a trend for which Rubio is no exception.

The question also remains: how should the US orchestrate serious political change and human rights reforms without fostering some form of a relationship? The previous policy hasn’t dismantled its dictatorship or improved the conditions for the average Cuban. To expect change with the same policies that have failed for 50 years is not only naive but also obstinate.

Throughout his press conference, Rubio belabored the “brutal dictatorship” point as if it substantiated all his objections. However, it doesn’t quite align with his past statements either. When Americans debate the brutalization of human beings in the hemisphere must they not at least acknowledge Guantanamo—the epicenter of inhumanity? Despite the fact that Rubio condemns Cuba for its human rights abuses, he also demanded Ahmen Abu Khattala, captured suspect for the Benghazi attach, be interrogated and detained in Guantanamo back in June. Then, when Americans learned of the US’s own abuses in the Senate’s report on the CIA torture program, Rubio decided to disregard the US’s own offenses once more. He responded to reports of rectal rehydration and water boarding by tweeting, “Those who served us in [the]aftermath of 9/11 deserve our thanks not one sided partisan Senate report that now places American lives in danger.”

Rubio also expressed concern that normalizing relations with Cuba would not only embolden brutal dictators, but also send a message of US weakness to the international community, saying, “appeasing the Castro brothers will only cause other tyrants from Caracas to Tehran to Pyongyang to see that they can take advantage of President Obama’s naiveté during his final two years in office.” Firstly, the US is one of the last remaining countries to recognize Cuba. In fact, for the 23rd time in history, the majority of the UN General Assembly voted to end the US embargo against Cuba (Yea: 188 member states, Nay: the US and Israel). If Obama’s sending a signal of naiveté, then at least he is in good company. Secondly, the word “appeasement” sends a terrible chill down the spines of all those who have studied World War II, yet, behind the sensationalistic rhetoric lies the implication that diplomatic relations with tyrants denotes appeasement and invites countries to exploit the US’s willingness to work with non-democratic regimes. I suppose that means Americans appease every single dictatorship and tyranny except North Korea, Iran, Bhutan, and Cuba. In fact, by this logic, the US “appeases” some of the most flagrant abusers of human rights and authoritarian governments, such as China, Russia, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe. Yet, cultivating a relationship with Cuba would somehow send a different message? Yes, Cuba may “scheme with our enemies,” Senator Rubio, but that hasn’t stopped the US from speaking with Russia (who supports Iran and the Assad Regime) or many other countries who aid and abet the US’s adversaries.

Why does Rubio’s fiery opposition to Obama’s policy change matter? Aside from asserting himself as a foreign policy leader in the Senate and winning conservative approval by berating the president, he isn’t exactly seeking constituent approval. Come 2016, his speeches might boast his consistent disapproval of Obama’s “naive foreign policy”; however, raising his head above the political parapet might not be advantageous with such a distant foreign policy issue. However, his role in the Senate has serious implications for the US’s new stage of foreign policy. Marco Rubio plans to not only derail Obama’s plan to lift the embargo, but also threaten to impede the funding of the new embassy and the appointment of an ambassador. With a Republican majority in Congress, it’s certainly possible Americans won’t see any move to lift the embargo, but Rubio might also galvanize enough support to challenge the president’s orders. As a rumored 2016 presidential candidate, his foreign policy matters and augurs badly for the future of US-Cuba relations. How might a Rubio presidency set back this diplomatic milestone? For now, however, Americans must hope that with US support, new infrastructure, technology and exposure will incrementally change Cuba’s social and political dynamic.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Luke Phillips

Finally. Decades after the Castro regime ceased being a true geopolitical threat, the US and Cuba will finally begin the long, slow process of formalizing their relationship, thawing it out of the Cold War-era stalemate and opening the way for something new and potentially fruitful.

A quick look at the map of the Caribbean reveals that, if controlled by a hostile power, Cuba could be a dagger pointed at the heart of the US. But, if controlled by a power friendly to US interests, it could easily prove a huge boon to the economy of the Greater Caribbean–the necessary piece for a great network of ports, refineries and passageways from which the mineral and agricultural goods of the US and Mexican heartlands might be improved and offered to the world. This network was the diamond in the eyes of pre-Castro US and Latin American statesmen, but the Cuban Revolution halted it in its tracks. Now that there can be real economic and political progress between the US and Cuba, expect all the Caribbean countries, especially the US, Mexico and Cuba, to reap the benefits of a rejuvenated trade network in the Greater Caribbean Basin.

Jack Anderson

It’s nice to see that Cuba is no longer a potential destination for the Marine Corps. Cuba now needs to become a destination for the Peace Corps. Under US embargoes, Cuban economic development stalled for years. For instance, stories of well-educated doctors abandoning their medical profession to drive taxis were commonplace. Furthermore, the Castro regime’s reform efforts have not been able to bring many improvements. Revived US-Cuba and Latin America-Cuba relations may provide the spark needed for development (and possibly the emigration of Cubans from Miami to Havana).

Additionally, this reconciliation gives Cuba greater international recognition for its role in the Colombia-FARC negotiations, which have been traditionally held in Havana. Reconciling with the US and brokering a peace settlement in Latin America’s longest running conflict may very well put Raul Castro in contention for a Nobel Peace Prize, if he can pull it off successfully.

Biz Peabody

Obama noted that reopening the US-Cuba relationship is geared towards “renewing our leadership in the Americas” and that this sudden policy change — if it gets through Congress — is clearly going to boost what has been a steadily declining economic situation for the Cuban people.

But let’s look at this issue from an international perspective: the US, though certainly correct to pursue this policy shift for the good of Cuba, its people, and US business and ideological interests, needs to be wary of how the international community will view the new partnership. US allies in other parts of the world are bound to question this 180-degree policy shift towards a regime that has been an ideological enemy for fifty years. Our allies in the Middle East, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which are primarily concerned with IS’s territorial advancements and the extent of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, have relied almost exclusively on US commitment to their causes. Now, after a few years of watching the US teeter back and forth between potential rapprochement with Iran and, more recently, flirt with an official alliance with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in the face of the IS crisis, long-term US allies have to watch as the US fixes its relations with an oppressive, communist regime without demanding or requiring any real changes on Cuba’s part. Who’s not to say the Obama administration will pull another wildcard from its deck and do the same with Iran — and this time, at the expense of valuable, long-standing alliances?

Nathaniel Haas

While the decision by the Obama administration to normalize relations with the Cuban government is important for both geopolitical and economic reasons, it is mostly significant for an entirely different reason.

Beginning to normalize relations did not happen in a vacuum isolated from domestic political factors. US policy towards Cuba has been obsolete for years; the 1996 Helm’s Burton Act that codified the embargo was only passed after the Cuban air force shot down two civilian planes operated by a Miami-based Anti-Castro cohort. If normalizing relations was so important from an economic and foreign policy perspective, then it would have been done long ago. Instead, the unique political position of the Obama administration made steps toward normalization both possible and practical.

The political genius of Obama’s decision is threefold. First, with midterm elections out of the way, the announcement at reconciliation signals Obama’s desire to leave a legacy as a President not afraid to act on his own and who refuses to be encumbered by Congressional gridlock. Second, with an incoming Republican majority in both houses of Congress and an upcoming Presidential election, the decision could not be more timely. While the President was able to unilaterally ease some travel and trade restrictions, only Congress can totally lift both the travel ban and the embargo on economic activity originally put in place in 1996. Doing so has already exposed divisions between potential Republican Presidential nominees: it was assailed by Florida conservatives Marco Rubio and Jeb Bush, but embraced by Libertarian Rand Paul. Third and finally, polls reveal the decision is widely popular among the young Latino voting base, not just in the Cuban-heavy and perennially important swing state of Florida, but across the country–another valuable contribution to the Democrat effort to hold the White House come 2016.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

President Juan Manuel Santos has agreed to peace talks with the FARC and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), a smaller terrorist guerilla force, in a major step towards long-term stability in Colombia. These talks in Havana, Cuba, are seen as a welcome change after former President Álvaro Uribe’s tough stance against the FARC (an internationally recognized terrorist organization), which revealed no solid advancements toward peace but destabilized the FARC’s military power. The talks have been complicated since their beginning in November 2013 by violence from various paramilitary groups on both sides.

Resolution is not only paramount to the Colombian people, but also critical for Santos’ political career. Leading up to the June presidential elections, Santos based his campaign on promises of peace and an end to the FARC. Many Colombians, including some victims of FARC attacks, have expressed faith in Santos’ policy of negotiation, but if talks go downhill, Santos risks dramatic drops in approval and loss of power to the more conservative Democratic Center party (Centro Democrático), led by former President Uribe and his protégé, Óscar Iván Zuluaga.

Although the president’s efforts to establish peace in Colombia are appreciated by many, his measures are not sufficiently bold or thorough. Thus far, the discussions in Havana are of a decidedly political, rather than social, nature. Government delegates have focused on the politicization of the FARC and the “interests of democracy” rather than the cultural and economic reforms – including land reassignment and farming reforms – requested by attack victims and the majority of Colombian citizens. Moreover, the land reforms demanded by the people have taken a back seat to the economic interests of the business elites – Santos’ supporters – who own and control much of Colombia. Although this plan may encourage business and economic growth (another major element of his platform), these peace negotiations may only lead to another form of violence, this time from frustrated citizens instead of from the FARC and other militant groups. By putting his political needs before the desires of the people, he may have jeopardized the stability and safety of his country.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

If a democracy topples somewhere in the world, but no one is around to witness it, did it really fall? Time after time, this has been the Obama administration’s style: to pick-and-choose its battles while turning a blind eye towards others. The current focus has remained the Ukraine-Russia crisis over 5,000 miles away, and is only becoming more intense. First came the battle of sanctions between Presidents Obama and Putin, and then the Malaysian Airlines crash added to the White House’s already full plate. But what about the turmoil consuming next-door neighbor Venezuela? Though Venezuela further spirals into destruction, Obama continues to ignore the grave issue just south of our borders.

Protests, which took root in early February, have escalated into widespread violence between disgruntled citizens and government officials and only seem to be growing more intense. The anger stems from a multitude of problems left unresolved by the late President Hugo Chávez and his Bolivian Socialist Revolution. Although, former vice president and Nicolas Maduro, who assumed leadership following Chávez’s death, hasn’t been able to match the charisma or effectiveness of Chávez. Fed up with a skyrocketing national crime rate, a shortage of basic goods, mediocre infrastructure, healthcare and educational institutions, and a toppling economy, protestors – mostly students – have flooded the streets.

What has Maduro done to quell disorder? Rather than address these serious problems plaguing his country, he has responded to demonstrations with violent crackdowns on basic political freedoms, especially freedom of speech through intense media censorship and demonstration suppression. Further, he has spewed fallacious and unfounded statements pinning the “fascist” United States as the scapegoat for the country’s hardships. Unfortunately, the violence may aid the resurrection of a dictatorial Venezuela from the collapse of an only-recently democratized nation.

The question posed by many Americans in response to international crises is as follows: why should we care about dilemmas brewing outside of our borders? In the case of Venezuela, there are imminent and severe repercussions that could affect the United States as well as the global economy if the violence is not contained and the country slips into totalitarianism.

First, there are economic ramifications. Absent of China’s case of intense economic growth under an authoritarian regime, democracies tend to promote long-term economic prosperity. Although history offers cases of several prosperous non-democratic regimes, these countries accrued wealth only in the short-term. The GNP of the Soviet Union, for instance, eclipsed that of the US for an extended period of time. However, the USSR could not sustain its rapid economic growth, and on the heels of the collapse of its economy came the collapse of the regime. An optimal environment for economic development arises amidst guaranteed freedoms, not government oppression. It is this liberalization, which authoritarian regimes lack, that encourages long-term economic development.

The prevailing reason why Venezuela must maintain this type of economic environment is the influence of the country’s massive oil industry. Venezuela has not only been a long-time energy exporter to the United States, but also provides substantial amounts of oil to Latin American and Asian countries. Of significance is that Venezuela’s influx of hard currency comes from exports to the United States, not China. China accepts roughly 640,000 barrels per day from Venezuela as repayment for loans exceeding $40 billion that have been accumulating since 2008. This has lead Venezuela to marginally reduce its exports to the United States as compensation. Coupled with crippling infrastructure, as the oil industry continues to collapse, so will Venezuela. Given that the current protests are largely focused on the economic failures plaguing the nation, the disorder will only become exacerbated as the oil market, constituting 95% of national revenue, crumbles.

While the US may not be drastically affected by a plunge in Venezuelan imports, countries that are wholly dependent on Venezuela for their oil imports certainly will be. For instance, the stability of Cuba hinges on Venezuela’s oil production, as Cuba imports the majority of its oil from its Latin neighbor. If exports to Cuba drop substantially, unrest may very well follow. Potential unrest in Cuba would also be detrimental to delicate US-Cuba relations. The importance of promoting prosperity of the Venezuelan oil market thus transcends the aim of restoring stability to the country; it also directly affects the security of other nations geopolitically significant to the United States. Even though our dependence on Venezuelan oil has diminished, the industry still practically controls the state of many other countries.

The other major focus in promoting stability and democracy in Venezuela is the prospect of peace. Democracies in which citizens enjoy abundant civil liberties are less likely to collapse into chaos, making it crucial that Venezuela does not deteriorate into an authoritarian nation. The overbearing oppression of freedoms in response to the protests will only worsen the situation, and no legitimate steps towards improvement of the nation’s flaws can be taken amidst such a suffocating atmosphere. If the economy of Venezuela is to be salvaged, unrest must first be quelled.

In America’s eyes, it is dangerous to have such turbulence so close to home. The United States and Venezuela have long had tense relations, especially under Chávez, who fabricated a sense of Latin American nationalism under the pretense that the United States posed an ultimate evil to Latin America. And now, with fingers being pointed at the United States by the government amidst the chaos, the anti-American sentiment that had been planted by Chavez only continues to burgeon.

Furthermore, America’s hopes for improved relations remain a distant prospect thanks to irresponsible politics. When the protests had just begun in early February, Maduro expelled three American diplomats from the country, having accused them of orchestrating the whole ordeal by recruiting students to the protest. In a childish response, Washington countered in the same manner, hastily expelling three Venezuelan diplomats. This action only fueled criticism of the United States by the Maduro’s administration and in no way contributed to mending relations. The White House should pursue improved relations with Venezuela while pushing for Maduro to restore basic human rights. Instead, it has chosen to continue to jeopardize its already minimal chance of creating an ally out of an already antagonistic nation by partaking in the Venezuelans’ “blame game.”

While unrest continues less than 3,000 miles south of our borders, Obama continues to focus on Asia and the Middle East. At least thirty-nine people have now been killed as a result of protests in Venezuela against the crippling economy, and hundreds more have been injured. If nothing else, with grotesque human rights abuses rising as political freedoms continue to be suppressed and masses of protesters are dragged away in handcuffs for practicing their democratic right to speech, it behooves the United States, as the global bastion of democracy, to maintain that legitimacy and act from a humanitarian standpoint. Congress must take diplomatic initiative and urge Caracas to restore basic political freedoms and peace to the streets of Venezuela. Only after this is done can any real progress be made towards improving the fickle state of the country, beginning with economic restructuring.

But how could the United States actually intervene in the situation without provoking greater violence? A military presence in the country is out of the option given the dark history of US imperialism in Latin America and Venezuela’s well-known disdain for the US fostered under the Chavez presidency. This would only fuel the fire already burning against the US. And, Americans know very well from attempts such as Iraq and Afghanistan that military interventions designed to promote democracy typically end in failure. Another option is to impose an embargo on Venezuela’s oil exports. However, sanctions of this nature would most likely only worsen the economic crisis afflicting the country and contribute to Maduro’s campaign against the United States. The US must be careful as to not take any kind of action that could potentially be used as evidence by Maduro for his baseless claims of Washington attempting to topple his regime.

Considering the less-than-perfect relations shared between the US and Venezuela over the years, the best solution as of now is to apply the pressure indirectly through third-party Latin American countries. Venezuela will certainly be more willing to listen to other Latin American governments on issues than any mandates coming from the “fascist” Obama administration. The question that stands, however, is whether the White House would even be willing to make as much as a small effort to communicate these concerns to other Latin American administrations. Recall when the violence in Syria was first escalating, when Obama drew a humanitarian “red line” which he swiftly recalled after receiving criticism for never following up his rhetoric with action. Based on the Obama administration’s track record, it seems more likely than not that it will continue to discount the grave situation brewing next-door in Venezuela until its full repercussions are felt by the United States, at which point it will be far too late for the White House to take any considerable action.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.