On the surface, it would appear that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has begun the long-overdue process of eliminating corrupt, power-hoarding oligarchs from national prominence, despite his own status as one of the richest men in the country. In March of this year, Poroshenko removed Igor Kolomoisky, the former governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region and an oligarch with a personal fortune of $3 billion, from power. This came shortly after a volunteer battalion under the control of Kolomoisky captured offices of a state oil firm, followed by an embarrassing standoff between national troops and Kolomoisky’s men. National authorities then charged one of his banking assets, PrivatBank, with fraudulently diverting upwards of $1.8 billion out of the country in August.

With Kolomoisky under scrutiny, President Poroshenko has now shifted his focus to the richest man in Ukraine, Rinat Akhmetov. Akhmetov is hemorrhaging profits from his steel and energy empires as a result of ongoing violence and instability in Eastern Ukraine. He is also having difficulty repaying debts issued in foreign currencies with Ukraine’s devalued hryvnia. In that context, the government’s actions to annul the privatization of parts of Akhmetov’s firm DTEK – which produces the majority of the non-nuclear power in Ukraine – is a clear attack on a weakened target.

Attacking Kolomoisky and Akhmetov gives President Poroshenko the air of a morally superior leader willing to act against corruption and oligarchy in Ukraine. The following, however, are two arguments asserting that Poroshenko chose his targets so as to politically utilize ethnic and religious distrust and position himself as the protector of true Ukrainians. Neither is confirmed, but the chains of evidence exist.

To provide context, nationalism and ethnic distrust have been on the rise in Ukraine. The Western oriented Poroshenko government successfully adopted economic policies prescribed by the EU and the IMF; but with economic reform comes devalued currency, increased prices of necessary goods and increased inequality and hardships for the people. From those difficulties, far right, ultranationalist movements have emerged that support a more independent Ukraine free from either Russia or the West. This is the societal trend that Poroshenko is playing to in Ukraine.

The first suggestion that the attacks are politically motivated is relatively simple: both oligarchs under scrutiny have Eastern Ukrainian power centers. Kolomoisky’s political seat of power was in the Eastern city of Dnipropetrovsk, along with most of his business interests. Akhmetov’s factories are mostly in Eastern Ukraine as well, and he was a great supporter and beneficiary of deposed President Victor Yanukovych’s Eastern-leaning regime. Therefore, it is plausible that Poroshenko is attempting to gain favor in the more Western-leaning areas of Ukraine by invoking existing tensions through the prosecution of prominent Eastern businessmen. Simultaneously, he could be playing to the ultranationalist movements by attacking people with perceived Russian connections.

The second argument may seem more circumstantial, but when taken with the first could prove poignant. Both Kolomoisky and Akhmetov are not purely ethnically Ukrainian: Kolomoisky is Jewish  (outspokenly so) and Akhmetov is a Tatar (Muslim). Most ethnic Ukrainians, however, are Eastern Orthodox. Their last names also indicate that they are not ethnically Ukrainian – neither end in “enko” as most ethnically Ukrainian names do. Both the religious differences and the variance in name structure suggest a cultural and religious divide between the two oligarchs and ethnic Ukrainians, which Poroshenko may be exploiting.

The previous assertions would perhaps hold little meaning if not for the fact that Poroshenko is losing his power base. 97% of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the rate of change under his administration and questions remain about his commitment to combatting oligarchy, despite the examples of Kolomoisky and Akhmetov. In fact, they are the first oligarchs against which Poroshenko has acted. As a result, his popularity numbers are down and he is losing the people’s trust.

Now, Poroshenko and his government are under pressure due to a looming election. Former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, whom Poroshenko beat in the most recent presidential election, is gaining ground in the polls and challenging Poroshenko from the Euro-centric side of the political spectrum. She, too, is using nationalist rhetoric and symbolism—including a famous picture of her holding wheat, a commodity Ukraine is known for producing, with her hair in a traditional braid. Because Poroshenko has failed to convince the public that EU-prescribed economic reforms are attacking the oligarchs or improving the lives of the citizenry, nationalist rhetoric is growing across the political spectrum. In order to regain support, Poroshenko must appear to be protecting Ukrainians from those who would take advantage of them. It makes sense, then, that he would target people who are already disliked for their social status and distrusted for their identity.

The combination of his low approval rating and a general rise of nationalist fervor makes it politically practical for Poroshenko to attack two of the East’s major oligarchs, both of whom are ethnic “outsiders” in Ukraine. But political expediency is not without its potential complications. Ethnic conflict has already impacted Ukraine, with the ethnically Russian majority wanting to disassociate with Kiev. If Poroshenko continues to only prosecute oligarchs that are Eastern-oriented, there may be increased distrust between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Ukraine has had a massive spike in black market weapons sales and a minority that has violently sought increased autonomy just over a year ago – add tension along the same ethnic divisions and conflict could soon follow.

Further escalation in Ukraine might be catastrophic. Any emerging ethnic strife could see the Kremlin use the guise of protection for Russian minorities to exert further influence—perhaps even take tangible military action, which would put the US, the EU and NATO in a tricky situation. If Poroshenko continues to foster ethnic distrust, and if nationalism wins out in Western Ukraine, further conflict escalation will not be far behind. In an attempt to curry political favor, Poroshenko could be leading his country into further struggle and misery.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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There are over 550 million firearms in worldwide distribution. That’s one firearm for every twelve people on the planet. The only question is: how do we arm the other eleven?
                                                                                                                             —Nicolas Cage, Lord of War (2005)

While Lord of War might not be the best movie, it does make a point: there are far too many small arms in the world, they are far too easy to buy, move and sell on the world market, and arms dealers will go to great lengths to sell them to anyone who will buy. The movement of small arms (rifles, hand guns and shotguns that can be used by a single person), many of which were manufactured decades ago, facilitates global, low-scale, brutal conflict. All too often, arms that one nation supplies to “allies” in another state are later used in conflict against the original donor state. Nations that would attempt to exert their material power through arms transfers should be mindful and only give arms in the most dire of circumstances.

Small arms enter the global system when large, rich, industrial nations produce and distribute them as a tool of statecraft. Starting in the 1950s, the USSR had the technology to produce the best small arms line in the world, the Avtomat Kalashnikova-47 (Automatic by Kalashnikov, 1947 model) and its family (including the AKM, AK-74, and RPK machine gun). They produced and distributed these weapons to allied Warsaw Pact states, or transmitted the designs and helped set up manufactories to encourage cooperation with the USSR.[1] This exercise in material power was effective because the USSR had large quantities of an excellent product and the receiving nation often feared for its safety.

Of course, the USSR was not the only nation to trade arms for influence: the US armed Great Britain during WWII through the Lend-Lease program; the Chinese armed the North Vietnamese with Type 56 rifles (the Chinese version of the AK-47) before the Vietnam War; the US armed the South Vietnamese with M16 rifles during the Vietnam War; and so on. Recently, the US armed the Iraqi and Afghan armies to help them fight against extremists and insurgents, and debated arming the Ukrainians to fight against Crimean separatists, who themselves were armed by the Russians. The same qualities that made Cold War arms transfers effective – a good product, a needy recipient and some challenge in which the two can cooperate – make arms transfers effective tools of statecraft today.

However, the arms stay around long after the conflicts for which they were originally produced and distributed end. By necessity, small arms need to work year after year: there would be no point in designing a weapon that could not be maintained and used repeatedly, so arms manufactured during the Cold War (such as the AK-47 family) remain on the battlefield today.[2] In fact, these guns sometimes turn up in the hands of enemies of the states that originally produced them: the Vietnamese army used their Chinese Type 56s to fight against China in the 1970s,[3] American arms for the mujahideen fighting against the USSR in the 1980’s became the weapons of the Taliban in the Afghan War, and, most recently, ISIS has seized caches of weapons that the US sent to the Iraqi Army, including thousands of American Humvees they repurpose as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDS). The arms do not stop after the conflicts end; they persist in private hands, waiting to be deployed in the future.

Small arms are economically valuable, which makes them effective currency in state-to-state relations and commodities for private owners after the conflicts end. Their longevity means that the arms slowly depreciate in value, and can be used, reused and transferred for decades. After the Cold War ended, stockpiles in cash-strapped former Soviet states made their way to eager state armies, warlords and rebel commanders in Africa and Latin America.[4] The same profit motives that encourage states to transfer arms and encourage private owners to stockpile weapons also motivate corrupt state officials to illegally sell guns earmarked for government use to warlords and rebels. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Ugandan army bases in the southern part of the country reported using massive numbers of bullets and weapons in training programs,[5] yet had little improvement to show for their supposed efforts. Simultaneously, the Rwandan Patriotic Front rebel group, located just to the south and led by Paul Kagame, who had fought alongside Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, suddenly and mysteriously became well armed and ready to fight against the French-armed Rwandan government.[6]

Once small arms enter circulation, it is almost impossible to get them out of the market. Gun buyback programs, sponsored by wealthy nations, often simply attract damaged weapons while the best guns are stockpiled for later. This economic problem persists by design. Since gun buyback programs place a price on a model of a weapon, say fifty dollars for an AK-47, then only guns worth less than that price on the open market will be sold to buyback programs; any AK-47 worth more on the market or in the hands of some future warlord or rebel will be stockpiled instead.[7] Wealthy nations cannot offer significantly more than market value for the weapons, out of fear that private owners will sell their existing stockpiles, use the money to import similar arms, and keep a profit to boot.

So how can concerned states keep small arms from becoming a threat? There are two solutions to the problem: prevention and bullet control.

As is often the case, the best solution is prevention. States should not use transferring arms as a method of gaining influence over other states. Too often, these guns end up in the hands of people who use them against the producer in later conflicts. These guns also end up on the world market, where dissidents looking to disrupt global order acquire and use them. When arms transfers are absolutely necessary, as they might have been when the US was rebuilding the Iraqi and Afghan armies, the stockpiles should be monitored and protected so that they do not fall into the hands of other groups, as the American-manufactured Humvees fell into the hands of ISIS. Finally, if arms transfers are necessary, it would be better for states to buy functioning arms currently on the global market to give to allies rather than producing new weapons to meet the demands. While this is morally hazardous because states do not want to pay off the types of people who have large supplies of these weapons, at least this does not introduce newer, long-lasting and improved weapons into the global market. Any gun will be a menace in the world for decades, so it is better to produce fewer new ones where possible.

The second method is bullet control. While gun control certainly does not work – the arms are too valuable and too durable – new bullets are necessary every time a weapon is fired and they cannot be repaired as easily as the gun itself, if at all. When the USSR was manufacturing AK-47s for every communist peasant in the world, they were also manufacturing billions of bullets to go into those weapons. While the weapons may have persisted over the years, the bullets have been fired in conflicts, and improperly stored ammunition has corroded. New bullets must be continuously produced to keep the old guns firing. If the world can tightly control or stop the distribution of new ammunition, the guns will become useless. International arms producers already agree to UN arms embargos designed to protect at-risk populations. Arms export nations could similarly closely monitor all bullet sales, just as they monitor sales of guns to adhere to international embargos. Without bullets, an AK-47 is hardly more dangerous than a large club.

Global small arms are a significant threat. As Lord of War illustrates, the promise of profit encourages the transport and sale of weapons to new conflict makers. However, with concerted efforts to keep new arms and ammunition off the global market and to track and protect what arms remain in circulation, concerned states can reduce the threat that these weapons pose. One firearm for every twelve people is enough; there is no need to arm the other eleven.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors. 

[1] Chivers, C. J. The Gun. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. 
[2] Chivers, The Gun.
[3] Ross, Russell. Military Force Development in Vietnam. Washington, District of Columbia: Library of Congress, 1984.
[4] Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
[5] Prunier, Gerard. Rwanda Crisis, 1954-94: History of a Genocide. C. Hurst, 1995.
[6] Des Forges, Allison. Leave None to Tell the Story. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1999
[7] Chivers, The Gun.

The post Preemptively Arming the Enemy appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Even with the news consumed by stories from the 2016 presidential race, President Obama continues to be upbraided by political analysts and commentators for each and every mandate, appointment and speech—especially when it comes to his foreign policy. However, with regard to Russia’s recent aggression in Crimea, casting blame upon the current administration may just be a hasty oversight of the nuanced interplay of interests in the Middle East and the intricacies of Putin’s political calculations. Many conservative politicians and pundits have attributed Putin’s audacious military exploits in Eastern Ukraine to Obama’s projection of weakness in the face of conflict in Syria, Iraq and Crimea. But it’s not at all clear whether more aggression from the US would have intimidated or aggravated Putin. In a post-Iraq world, Obama’s softer hand appears the more rational, strategic move compared to the hawkish alternative.

The Red Line on Syria
Politicians love to enumerate examples of Obama’s weakness—it has practically become a hobby on the Hill. The first thing they point to is the administration’s “red line” with Syria back in 2013. When asked if he would deploy US military forces in response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons, Obama stated, “We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is that we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.” Then, in a press conference with Swedish Prime Minister, when asked about using military action in Syria to maintain his credibility, Obama denied the use of military force and distanced himself from the military follow-through that many felt embedded in the “red line”, saying “I didn’t set a red line; the world set a red line. The world set a red line when governments representing 98 percent of the world’s population said the use of chemical weapons are abhorrent and passed a treaty forbidding their use even when countries are engaged in war.”

The President’s vague approach of non-military confrontation was reversed, however, when he sent Congress a request to authorize military strikes in Syria. An apparent political flip-flop, this policy change could have been a mere symptom of President Obama’s greatest flaw: his professorial nature. With past presidents, like George W. Bush, the country became accustomed to absolute, decisive action. When faced with an international conflict, the administration assumed a position, and pursued it vehemently—well-informed or not. Obama – on the other end of the spectrum – has consistently taken prolonged periods of time to reflect on issues, which has often been perceived as indecision and weak leadership.

Did Obama make a mistake in his Syria strategy? In the Syria Accountability Act, the treaty on chemical weapons, there is no clause that requires anything beyond sanctions in response to a country that develops chemical weapons. Military actions were never a part of the agreement. Obama’s later request for military support may have been a reaction to pressure from the public and the media. Regardless, the strategy ultimately brought Assad to the negotiating table. The resulting compromise between the US, Moscow and Syria managed to leverage much of the international community in destroying most of Assad’s chemical weapons—a tangible improvement that air strikes and collateral damage couldn’t have accomplished alone.

Though many cite the resulting plan as the epitome of Obama’s weak foreign policy, we should look at the consequences of a foreign policy decision that didn’t resort immediately to military force. As the administration’s national security agenda states, “We must recognize that a smart national security strategy does not rely solely on military power… The use of force is not the only tool at our disposal, and it is not the principal means of U.S. engagement abroad, nor always the most effective for the challenges we face.” With soft posturing and military restraint, one of the world’s most brutal dictators came to the negotiation table, and Russia offered a degree of compliance with international laws and norms. The latter was not an easy task. Though Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov came to Geneva to discuss the question of Syria’s chemical weapons, he continued to deny Assad’s actual use of weapons on the Syrian people and threatened to leave the talks before any deal was reached. It was only after UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon threatened to share the results of an investigation into Syria’s chemical weapon use with the Security Council that the Russians shifted their position. Though a permanent and often obstinate member of the UN Security Council, Russia feared becoming more of a pariah in the UN, which attests to the significant sway of the international community—something that usually finds its strength in a climate of military restraint.

The US’s military restraint accomplished several noteworthy feats: the US didn’t immediately resort to bombing Syria, nor assume the role of the world’s most unwanted policeman (again) and become accountable for the absolute mess that would have and now is ensuing in Syria. Preemptive missile strikes would have forced the US to become more involved and in turn responsible for any awry regime change. The Middle East is a foreign policy Rubik’s cube. Any and all military actions should come as a final attempt, as hastiness risks making the situation incredibly worse, and costs significant political capital.

The immediate military action and show of force that many call “American leadership and strength” wouldn’t have addressed the nuanced and complex forces at play nor attained the same results. Indeed, the end proved an imperfect reduction of conflict, not an end in itself; however, the US mitigated the levels of conflict in a way that a hawkish would have missed all together. Suggesting that Obama’s hesitancy sent Putin a signal of weakness is flawed when considering the cooperation of Russia in a campaign led by the US. Isn’t this reflective, adaptive reaction to complicated situations exactly what leadership entails?

Playing Whack-A-Mole in the Middle East
President Obama’s strategy with ISIS has also become a hallmark of the criticisms political pundits, politicians and the media use against the administration. First, it’s important to admit that the US isn’t “winning the War on Terror”, nor dealing effectively with the proliferation and spread of extremist groups throughout the Middle East. Too often however, this opinion becomes a political ploy under the guise of pseudo-analytical criticism, exploiting the public’s ignorance of the US’s capacity to incite positive change with minimal risk.

Countries like Syria actually provide a perfect example of the limitations to US policy. Fighting groups like ISIS or Al Qaeda either translates into strikes, ground support or the more ambiguous, “logistical support”. In Syria, however, this approach inevitably strengthens the Assad Regime, a brutal dictatorship killing the same innocent civilians targeted by extremists. Arming moderate rebels, however, poses issues as well. The US isn’t free to exude American strength wherever it finds contention.

The media recently inveighed against the President after he equated sending in ground troops to combat ISIS as playing whack-a-mole. The President’s current strategy is comprised of five parts, outlined in his address given on the 13th anniversary of the September 11 attacks:

1. Conducting “a systematic campaign of airstrike”
2. Increasing “support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground” with approximately 475 servicemen
3. Supporting “Iraqi and Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and equipment, ramp[ing]up military assistance to the Syrian opposition”
4. Isolating ISIS politically and economically, and expanding humanitarian support by collaborating with partners

In simple terms, the US launches airstrikes that are coupled by “support” for fighters on the ground, like the Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi forces. Any more aggressive of a strategy would entail a full-fledged war in the Middle East, and indirect conflict with allies like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Aside from a disruption of the broader, regional interests of the US, that war would find very little support from a war-fatigued public after Afghanistan and Iraq. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that Putin sees the President’s restraint as a sign of weakness. If anything, a lack of aggression by Obama might have clued Putin into just how tied Obama’s hands are in foreign military intervention. As conditions continue to evolve rapidly in the Middle East, however, it would prove unwise for Putin to take egregious actions presuming the President’s low level of the political flexibility.

Appeasement in Crimea
This leads to the latest display of “Obama’s weakness” abroad: Crimea. The day Putin officially declared Crimea a Russian commonwealth, major world powers displayed perhaps the most anticlimactic eruption of consternation. German Chancellor Angela Merkel called it an “unjustifiable and inexcusable” act that challenges “the European peace order and international laws.” David Cameron compared it to the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s. French President Francois Holland immediately denounced the illegal action of Putin and called for a “strong coordinated response.” The EU, most heavily impacted by a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty, failed to execute any sort of meaningful action until pro-separatists shot down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, killing 298 people. Its reluctant intervention was met with parallel support by the US, which also announced new sanctions and a freezing of assets for Russian oligarchs.

The criticisms that call for more American strength offer few plausible solutions. Even Senator John McCain, who attributed the crisis to “a feckless foreign policy where nobody believes in America’s strength any more,” had to concede the fact that there was “no viable military action that [could have been]taken.” Other suggestions, like harsher sanctions, are ineffective without European support. While the US only trades about $40 billion a year with Russia, Europe relies on a lucrative trade relationship with its aggressive neighbor to the East, leaving them hesitant to aggravate Putin with more sanctions. With a third of Germany’s gas and oil coming from Russia, a disruption in the supply line would be devastating. What’s more, Russia provides an integral market for $48 billion worth of German products.

Other suggestions also defy European interests. Welcoming Ukraine into NATO is complicated; it’s uncertain whether any Western nations would be willing to come to Ukraine’s aid in the case of a Russian attack. Others, like Ted Cruz, have suggested stripping Putin of authority in international regimes like the Security Council and G8, which would only further antagonize Putin and exacerbate his unwillingness to compromise. Even propositions like those of Lindsey Graham to arm Ukrainian forces would mean unilateralism that upsets our key allies. Merkel responded directly to such suggestion at the Munich Security Conference, saying, “This [crisis]cannot be won militarily. That is the bitter truth. The international community must think of something else.”

Ultimately, in line with the international community, the US must trust diplomacy and collective international pressure. Moreover, the critics of Obama’s response to Ukraine shouldn’t immediately dismiss non-military options as weak. Though the US’s sanctions aren’t crippling Russia’s economy into military restraint in Eastern Ukraine, it is acting multilaterally and allowing the European community to deal with a regional issue. While this more careful approach may not exude military prowess, it does display a more impressive awareness of global complexities—one that will likely lead to more intelligent strategic initiatives than impulsive fits of defensive aggression.

Rhetoric that blames Putin’s aggression on Obama’s feckless strategy remains just that—rhetoric. Though Obama’s overall strategy might not be as effective as many would like, it’s not an expression of weakness, but rather a calculated response in a climate of limited options. The criticisms overlook the nuanced geo-political issues of these regions and the limitations of the international system. Moreover, they don’t consider Putin’s extremely hawkish foreign policy and Russia’s political culture. He’s leading a country fueled by a heightened sense of nationalism and nostalgia for a Soviet-era prominence. Just as in Georgia, the greater the lash-back of the West, the more strongly Putin seems to defy it. The Russian people demand assertive leadership to compensate for years of what many would call condescending international relations by the West. In this way, Putin and his extremely nationalistic cabinet of advisors have come to embody the frustration of their people. Given Putin’s well-known aggressive nature and willingness to take unpopular positions, often siding with other brutal dictators like Assad, it’s wrong to presume that any actions by the US would have restrained his aggressions at the Eastern Ukrainian border. This supposition also relies on the notion that Putin’s political calculations rely exclusively on the US’s foreign policy, which is arrogant at best. It seems most his decisions have been reactions to the New World Order, in which the US’s rules dominate the system and marginalize ideas that challenge the current paradigm. The US acts hypocritically by calling Russia’s intervention in Ukraine’s civil war a breach of sovereignty when it constantly injects itself into the affairs of strategically important countries. Within the complex web of wars, religious and ethnic conflicts, and alliances, any military move by the US may begin a domino effect that transcends even the problems of Russia’s aggression. Therefore, the US flexing its muscle on the international stage becomes almost counter-intuitive.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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In late March 2014, after bloody fighting in Ukraine, the government of Russia approved the annexation of Crimea following an organized referendum by the residents of the peninsula. A vote held in the Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, was widely expected to be a symbolic and meaningless approval of a decision already made. It was; members of Parliament (MPs for short), hardly eager to disagree with Russian President Vladimir Putin, endorsed the annexation by a count of 445-1. Called a “chilling message” by UK Prime Minister David Cameron, and a “robbery on an international scale” by Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Putin announced the thinly veiled land-grab on March 18, 2014.

Ilya Ponomarev, an MP from Novosibirsk, the largest city in Siberia, cast the single dissenting vote to the acquiescence of 445 of his fellow legislators. In an exclusive interview with Glimpse from the Globe, Ponomarev offered his plans as an opposition leader for the political and economic future of Russia, a revolutionary perspective on Putin, and a scathing criticism of US policy towards Russia.

At the age of 14, the Moscow-born entrepreneur began working for the Institute of Nuclear Safety. By 23, he was Vice President of Yukos, an oil company run by the billionaire oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a staunch political opponent of Putin who was imprisoned by the leader for nearly a decade beginning in 2003. Yukos’ assets were seized and sold by the Russian government, and Ponomarev narrowly escaped the company and avoided being thrown in jail. After he left Yukos, Ponomarev launched an illustrious political career that has included a five-year stint as Chief Information Officer for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and culminated in his election to the Duma in 2007.

Since his vote against the Crimea annexation, Ponomarev has been officially banned from Russia on charges that he used money from the Skolkovo Foundation, which supports technology startups, to fund anti-Putin protests. Foreign Policy reported that he still votes in the Duma by having friends smuggle his voting card into the country. Ponomarev currently lives in Santa Barbara, California, fearful of imprisonment – or worse – if he returns to Moscow. The recent shooting of fellow opposition leader and Putin-critic Boris Nemtsov within sight of the Kremlin proves that his fears are not entirely unfounded. In Russia, it is historically dangerous to be a man like Ponomarev. Before Nemtsov, the poster child was ex-spy and known Putin critic Alexander Litvinenko, assassinated in London after drinking a cup of tea filled with radiation poison allegedly by Putin henchmen.

But Ponomarev isn’t phased by any of that: from behind bright blue eyes that betray his eagerness and ambition for change in Russia, the 39-year old began by dispatching the conventional wisdom surrounding the psychology of a man who has kept Russia under his thumb for over a decade: Vladimir Putin.

Once a Spy, Always a Spy

“There is a misconception in the West that the guy is a long term thinker and great strategist with strong character,” Ponomarev told Glimpse. “I think he is none of that.”

For Ponomarev, understanding Putin begins by understanding his background, and specifically his time at the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, better known as the KGB, the police force of the Soviet Union until its breakup in 1991. During the 1980s, Putin worked in East Germany as a paper-pushing officer based in Dresden.

“His professional training as a KGB officer was targeted specifically to him not being able to make any decisions, but to make short term analysis of the data he was given from personal conversations with people, and relaying that data upwards for his superiors and the political leadership of the country,” Ponomarev explained. “None of the KGB officers were ever supposed to make any decisions. They were the implementers of policy, but not those who designed the policy.”

According to Ponomarev, the KGB served as a front for the Soviet Union to employ people who were judged unfit for crafting public policy.

“The policy was designed in the communist party, not in the security forces,” he elaborated. “The KGB was a process to pick up those who were not prepared to be in the policy process.”

Ponomarev said Putin’s shortsightedness as a leader stems from a KGB culture that preached making snap decisions and acting reactively instead of proactively. He pointed to Putin’s management (or lack thereof) of the Ukrainian Civil War as a crowning example.

Massive protests began in Ukraine in November 2013 when the cabinet of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych scrapped a trade agreement with the EU and publicly advocated closer ties with Moscow. In 2014, the protests turned deadly, with pro-European Ukrainians clashing with both the government and pro-Russian rebels in the country’s east. Much to Russia’s disappointment, however, the pro-European movement won control of Ukraine’s government in national elections. In response, Putin orchestrated the annexation of Crimea, a predominantly ethnic Russian peninsula in Ukraine’s south. Ponomarev, the only MP in the Duma who voted against the annexation, said seizing Crimea was more of the same short term thinking that has come to define Putin’s reign of Russia.

“I think that from the very beginning our foreign service totally overslept the whole thing with [the]European association of Ukraine,” he argued. “When the revolution in Ukraine happened, he [Putin] went into Crimea without thinking of the long term consequences for that, but just with one desire: to overshadow the defeat he experienced in Kiev.”

Ponomarev said Putin’s propensity to react rashly is visible in other policy decisions, like his response to the Magnitzky Amendment, a round of sanctions passed by the US in 2012 and imposed on select Russian officials to punish them for human rights violations—namely the 2009 death of a lawyer named Sergei Magnitzky in a Russian prison. Putin responded by passing a law banning Americans from adopting Russian children—a reaction that distracted the media, captivated and diverted public attention, and had nothing to do with the original initiative on the part of the US.

“That’s very powerful manipulation technology that Putin is a master of,” Ponomarev told Glimpse.

Ponomarev highlighted the most powerful manipulation weapon in Putin’s arsenal: his recurring narrative to the Russian population that acknowledges his corruption and oppressiveness as a leader, while reminding Russians that he is infinitely superior to the post-Soviet Union Russian leaders of the 1990s like Boris Yeltsin, whose resignation in 1999 ironically paved the way for Putin’s first presidency. The strategy has worked; in Russia today, the 1990s evoke memories of a dismal economy and political turmoil, difficulties that many Russians blamed the US for due to its role in breaking up the Soviet Union. Polling data from as recently as 2010 reveals that 59% of Russians still believe the Yeltsin years brought “more bad” to Russia, when given “more good” and “don’t know” as alternative responses. Ponomarev said Putin tacitly acknowledges his shortcomings—but thrives on knowing Russians believe Yeltsin was worse.

“He [Putin] never says, ‘I am good.’ He always says, ‘Yes, I am bad, but others are worse than me,” Ponomarev continued. “He [Putin] has this example of [the]90s where he says to Russians: ‘A lot of my people are corrupt, but look at what was going on in [the]90s. Do you want to go back to that?”

As a result of pro-Putin public sentiment – both genuine and manufactured – opposition leaders are forced to work behind the scenes to avoid criticism and punishment. Ponomarev, who’s face appears on Putin-ordered posters in the center of Moscow behind the banner “NATIONAL TRAITOR,” prefers an opposition that seizes the headlines to one that works from the shadows.

“I think that’s one of the reasons why it is so hard to be successful and to receive enough direction in the general public,” he said. “It would be dangerous in the long term opposition of Russian interests to convince them [opposition leaders]to step back and go into the shadows and not be in the front lines of the newspapers, because people are afraid of them and think they will go back to Yeltsin types.”

With this observation, Ponomarev began to tell his story of opposition and outline his ultimate goal: to unseat the master of manipulation.

The Fates of Thousands

In 1905, the first of three Russian revolutions resulted in a limited constitutional monarchy that reduced the power of the Czar and established a parliamentary body called the Duma, of which Ponomarev is now an MP. Beginning in 1917, rebel forces in the second Russian revolution capitalized on a population exhausted from war, oppressive labor laws, economic depression and widespread government corruption to depose Czar Nicholas II and install a provisional government. A few months later, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, a smaller and more radical revolutionary sect, overthrew the provisional government and eventually formed the Soviet Union in 1922, marking the end of the third revolution in two decades.

During his time in the KGB, Putin kept a picture on his desk of Yan Berzin, a Bolshevik revolutionary who founded the Soviet military intelligence agency. In 2000, he marveled at the similarities between the Bolshevik rise to power and his own ascent to the head of Russia’s government.

“I was most amazed by how a small force, a single person, really, can accomplish something an entire army cannot,” Putin said. “A single intelligence officer could rule over the fates of thousands of people. At least, that’s how I saw it.”

Ponomarev plans to reincarnate the Bolshevik strategy to unseat Putin.

“A small group of political activists, if they are radical enough and if they have messages which are popular enough, can organize with people, crack the power, and seize all of it,” Ponomarev argued. “There was a very marginal sect of Bolsheviks who at best in 1914 had 10,000 members in the organization. Three years passed, and that small political sect was able to claim the power because of economic crises the country went through, power [shifts]the country went through, because of the war, and the crisis in management. This is exactly the crisis we see developing now in Russia.”

Ponomarev recalled the writings of Antonio Gramsci, a founder of the Italian Communist Party who was imprisoned during the Fascist regime of dictator Benito Mussolini. In his “prison notebooks,” Gramsci reflected on the success of a communist revolution in Russia and the failure of similar attempts throughout Europe. Ponomarev summarized his writings as follows:

“He was pointing out that when you have solid civil society and institutions, they balance the power and they create a lot of internal communication channels between the power and society and channel people’s activity in a productive manner.”

Ponomarev indicated that creating those institutions in Russia is essential to the success of the opposition’s effort to replace Putin. He said his personal future in a potential transitional government depends on it.

“The ultimate goal is to change the system in Russia and to come to power,” he declared. “That is the obvious goal for every politician. I myself am no exclusion.”

But in Putin’s Russia, Ponomarev said achieving change through a parliamentary takeover is nearly impossible.

“I am [an]elected official member of the parliament, so I am not neglecting usual normal political ways of getting into power,” he remarked. “But I can also testify that the role of the current parliament in modern Russia is so diminished so it is virtually impossible to accomplish anything, even if you control the entire parliament…even if by some miracle we [the opposition]achieve this [revolution], we would still be able to do nothing without controlling the executive.”

He holds the same realistic attitude toward achieving change through local and municipal elections. Ponomarev described a recent local election in which the elected opposition figure had his entire budget stripped by Putin:

“This spring, despite fraud and pressure and injustice, we managed, for example, to come to power in the largest municipality in Russia,” he said. “As soon as he took an oath in his office a couple of months later, they [Putin] changed the law that regulates income for the city and diverted the income from the city to regional authorities, which are controlled by United Russia [the current ruling party in Russia]—so now our elected mayor is sitting penniless.”

As Ponomarev told these stories, it became clear that the chances for achieving change in Russia through conventional political means are slim. Ponomarev said that given those conditions, change in Russia must come through more drastic measures:

“All our hopes for real changes are with a revolutionary way of changing,” he told Glimpse. “I hope it will not be a violent revolution, but still a revolution nonetheless. What I’m working on is in creating the basis for it, and I think that the basis consists for two parts: organizational structure and political platform.”

He said the organizational structure is being created and refined by his former boss and friend at Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. While he lives in the US, Ponomarev is developing a plan to “organize former USSR dissidents and entrepreneurs to create a political platform and future of Russia after Putin.”

“We believe in a small government, we believe in power to the people and to the local communities, which would be the ultimate source of power, we believe in the separation of powers, we believe in the rule of law, we think that we have to de-monopolize the economy and foster as much competition as possible,” he said.

“We think that the main value in the society is innovation and technological development which is coming out, and lastly we think that Russia does not need that almost-czar style president, but that it needs more of a parliamentary republic and a federalist system and the power cannot be concentrated in one hands.”

The success of that platform rests on the future (and continued failure) of the Russian economy. If profits from oil sales continue to decline, then the possibility of deposing the current leadership increases. Ponomarev said that regardless of the revolution’s (and the economy’s) success or failure, the organization of Russian civil society is cause for extreme concern.

The Deterioration of Russian Society      

According to Ponomarev, the Russian economy faces a turning point.

“What was proclaimed all the time by Russian leadership in general…was to try to capitalize on oil generated wealth to diversify the economy and to modernize it and to go forward in innovations,” he began.

The cracks in that plan are clear: any discussion of continued oil wealth in Russia is mostly smoke and mirrors, and modernization in Russia has ceased; entrepreneurs like Ponomarev have moved their businesses abroad in search of a more politically and economically friendly environment. An entire generation of Russian businessmen and women fear financial and personal ruin, in the style of Yukos and Khodorkovsky, if they are perceived by Putin to be as politically threatening as they are economically successful.

“Right now, what we fear is that all of these discussions about modernizations have not just stopped, they have actually reversed because Putin is seeing all those entrepreneurs and medium/small sizes businesses as the political opposition,” Ponomarev lamented. “The middle class is his natural enemy.”

Demonizing the middle class has come at a great price: Putin’s oppression of political dissidents (and as a consequence, many entrepreneurs) has caused a brain drain of scientists and businesspeople, those who could ordinarily use their skills to stimulate the Russian economy.

“The emigration from Russia this year went up five times than it was last year,” he said. “I am very much afraid that it is a conscious decision by Putin – he is not Stalin and turning people to labor camps in Siberia – he [Putin] is incentivizing them to leave the country and is building a welfare state that relies on oil generated income and nothing else,” Ponomarev said.

But Ponomarev is faced with a dilemma: on the one hand, the Russian economy is rotting from within. On the other hand, the havoc wreaked by the brain drain and declining oil prices increases the success of efforts to topple Putin. If Russian history is any indication, the one thing rotten economies do produce, en masse, is political unrest. For Ponomarev, it’s a necessary evil.

“It is very bad for [the]country, but it is not that bad for the opposition actually because it just speeds up the process of deterioration of society and collapse of the current power,” Ponomarev explained. “Really, I feel very much sorry for my country [since]when I see all those talented, most capable and bright [Russian] individuals in the US or Europe. I meet them outside Russia.”

In the midst of his efforts to organize opposition to Putin, Ponomarev said policymakers in the US seeking to rein in Russia’s corruption and human rights abuses can and should reassess their current policy.

Towards Effective US Intervention in Russia

As Ponomarev sees it, US politicians who design policies to pressure Russia pander to the political desires of their constituents rather than designing effective sanctions, Ponomarev said. While predictable, he contended that the desire for politically “sexy” headlines has clouded their judgment of effective intervention in Russia.

“US policies in general are very much focused on the internal perception of the public, you know, what needs to be done,” he noted. “All the stories are more like [the]US pretending that something is happening, but is really not what is needed to change the situation.”

Ponomarev pointed to a preferred buzzword of politicians: sanctions, a longtime favorite policy of lawmakers seeking to prove to constituents that they are doing something, anything, to resolve an international problem that often deserves a far more nuanced solution. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, both international economic penalties and US sanctions, approved both by President Obama and Congress, cut off Russian banks from US financial markets, imposed travel bans and froze assets of select individuals in the Russian government. Ponomarev said the sanctions are used by Russian elites, namely Putin, to reinforce their power and construct a narrative of anti-West hatred that is readily gobbled up by the Russian public.

“The sanctions, the way they have been structured right now, they tend to hurt rather than to help, to consolidate the elites and the general public against the West and around himself [Putin],” he said. “They help to propagate [a]very simple message to people: ‘America is our enemy, the prices go up because of America’s wrongdoings, they want to put us on our knees.’”

Ponomarev cast the personal sanctions that hit a select few Russian officials in a strictly counter intuitive light. He explained how Putin distributes money to sanctioned individuals from the budget, and even said that Russian officials whose names didn’t show up on the sanction list secretly compete with each other to make their name known in the US so that they too will be sanctioned and compensated by Putin with Russian taxpayer dollars.

“People inside the country are competing to be on that list because when you have say, 100 people, it’s easy to compensate them with government contracts and appropriations, and that is exactly what is happening,” he explained. “Those people on the sanction list either receive promotions or financial help on behalf of our taxpayers.”

To correct the backfire, Ponomarev urged US policymakers to broaden sanctions to a wider circle of individuals in the Russian government and send a clearer message of support to the Russian public.

He put it plainly: “Frankly speaking, I don’t understand the American logic. “If you [US policymakers] say, [‘punish] everyone who is involved in Ukrainian crisis,’ well the government has voted for the war in Ukraine. You are supposed to have all Russian deputies to be on the sanction list, but that is not the case. To make them move, you need to apply those sanctions against a wider circle of people, including those who do not have any visible connections to the decision making process. If you sanction all government [officials], at least then those people who have nothing to do with Ukraine would start asking questions. Those questions would not go to US, they would go to national leadership because they are the source of the problems to them.”

Ponomarev advised combining this with a policy that makes it much easier for regular Russian citizens to travel in and out of Europe and the US, to paint the West in a more positive light to Russians.

“I would, for example, restrict all government workers traveling to US and to European but make those travels as easy as possible for regular people to create the grounds for transitional changes, and position America as a friend rather than an enemy,” he said.

In the ultimate sign of counter productivity, Ponomarev said the ineffective and incoherent connection between US leaders and the Russian public is manifesting itself in the Russian public’s view of the Ukrainian revolution.

He described the backfire this way: “No one in Russia believes we are fighting Ukrainians, they believe we are fighting Americans and protecting Ukrainians.”

It is precisely that insight – and the ability to interpret it – that makes you believe Ponomarev isn’t just an everyday blustering politician with too much bark and no bite. He is, after all, the only man who dared to vote against Putin in the annexation of Crimea. He has a deep understanding of Putin and an acute awareness of the problems that plague Russia. But expectations must be tempered with reality: for as much as he understands Putin, Ponomarev knows that his political and unabashedly revolutionary strategy locks horns with a man who has kept a stranglehold on power for far longer than anyone would have expected. But one thing is for certain: situational factors in Russia are unsustainable. Win, lose or draw, something big is going to happen for the opposition in Russia, and Ponomarev is the man to watch.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

The post Dissolving Putin’s Russia appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Biz Peabody

Nationalism: long thought to be one of the strongest forces in the world. The exact definition of nationalism is the amalgamation of feelings, principles and efforts in the name of patriotic pride for one’s nation or country. The psychological concept of nationalism has always been present in humans, because we’re “programmed” to identify with our groups – our “herds” – who we work with to ensure our survival as individuals and as a species.

What we’re witnessing as these two crises in Gaza and Ukraine unfold is a phenomenon that is becoming clearer as the world globalizes: the clash of nationalism and technology. In the past, the only way for a nation to defend itself was through large-scale war against other nations, but technology is allowing smaller entities to assert themselves on the global stage. In the tragedy of 9/11, it became clear that large-scale war was no longer the paradigm. A group – Al-Qaeda – was able to wage war on the hegemon – the US – and the hegemon was forced to wage its “War on Terror” on an ideology.

In a similar group-against-nation dynamic, the war between Hamas and Israel is driven by nationalist sentiments, and so is the war fought between Ukraine against its pro-Russian rebels. Aside from the tragedies these two conflicts have created – most recently pro-Russian rebels shooting down commercial flight MH-17, and the 500+ deaths in Gaza and Israel – the conflicts reveal that it is becoming easier for smaller and smaller groups to assert their own brand of nationalism on bigger and bigger entities. Diplomatic efforts to end these conflicts, therefore, must begin focusing more on the global, collective good and less on emphasizing “peace talks” between warring nations. Continuing to simply call for peace between nationalistic entities only underlines differences between groups, which in turn strengthens nationalistic mentalities and further separates peoples.

Jason Tse

Two major crises could not come at a more inopportune time. Now the United States faces trouble on three fronts: the ISIS crisis in Iraq, the MH-17 disaster, and the war in Gaza.

I wrote in a recent piece for Glimpse about how rapprochement with Iran was expedient for our interests in the Middle East. In the US-Iran engagement, Russia had always positioned itself as a close partner with Iran, able to sway Iran to a favorable agreement similar to China’s promises on North Korea.

But, the MH-17 disaster complicates things. Facts are still surfacing, but with the US Intelligence Community confirming that the weapon systems used to shoot down MH-17 were moved quietly back to Russia and Putin’s public attempts to shift blame onto Kiev, it is almost certain that Russian-backed and armed rebels shot down the plane.

This leads the US to a new dilemma: choosing which foe represents the larger threat: Russia or Iran. While it is clear that Russia must be held accountable, the US should take care not to completely back the bear into a corner. At the same time, greater action against Russia, which seems likely considering the global outrage, would signal that a rapprochement with Iran is no longer merely expedient to fighting the ISIS crisis, but necessary now that Iran’s partnership (or at least being out of Russia’s orbit) is required to address both ISIS and Russia. This unfortunately gives the Iranian hand a significant boost as the Americans and Iranians return to the table for extended negotiations.

Luke Phillips

I don’t have too many thoughts on either crisis boiling up this week, not the one in Gaza or the one in Ukraine. I do have thoughts, however, on what the American and overall Western reaction will be to each.

If the timeline of the Ukraine crisis up to this point is any guide, then I think it can safely be said that there won’t be very much in the way of policy innovation in the wake of the tragedy of MH-17. Sure, a few more impassioned speeches will be made in Brussels and Washington about heavier sanctions on Moscow, and much energy will be expended in the time-tested act of finger-waving. But no one in the European Union or US has the political will to make truly meaningful actions against Putin’s Russia, and I don’t necessarily think they should. MH-17, for the tragedy it is, is not particularly important. But, if Russia’s actions began to directly threaten the Baltic States or Poland, then we might see some shuffling of feet in the West.

As for Gaza, that’s even easier. The fight will go on for a few weeks or months, Palestinian and Israeli apologists will absolve themselves and accuse the other side, and one happy autumn day the flag of truce will go up. Give it three years, maybe less, and there will be peace talks in America again. Another few years and they’ll be back at war. However, shifting geopolitical dynamics in the broader Middle East might alter the equation somewhat. In particular, if Iranian-American relations normalize, and the US distances itself from Israel, the Jewish State may be compelled to engage in more vigorous diplomacy. Conversely, if the massive war underway in neighboring Syria and Iraq spreads into Jordan, a more security-paranoid Israel could take aggressive measures in Gaza and even the West Bank to forestall the violence from penetrating its borders.

Time will tell. Prudence is all we can ask of our leaders, restraint all we can ask of those abroad.

Abigail Becker

Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in November 2013, the fighting in Crimea has unfortunately involved many civilians. Because of the nature of the fighting, the death of more innocent people is not surprising. What distinguishes the attack on MH-17 from previous conflicts is the international nature of the event. The crisis in Ukraine has, of course, been an international headline from the start, but for most people beyond the Ukraine/Russia border, it has remained a distant threat. The crash of MH-17 shatters that feeling of safe separation. Almost every continent was represented on the flight, and a number of countries issued statements of sadness and anger. The Netherlands, which lost 193 citizens, has been particularly vocal, and rightfully so.

To make matters worse, the rebels handled the aftermath of the crash with an unbelievable lack of tact and decency. The bodies of the victims were hidden for days after the crash in train cars and the crash site was kept on strict lockdown. Unsurprisingly, there has been no apology from the rebels, Putin or the Ukrainian government. All parties have instead chosen to play the blame game – though most everyone agrees the Russians and rebels are responsible. The botched handling of the victims’ bodies has only increased tensions and polarized the opposing sides. This is no longer a crisis between a state and rebels—it is a conflict between the rebels and Putin, and angered people around the world.

Luodanni Chen

Let’s talk facts. The 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine began on February 23, 2014. During the past five months, two Ukrainian military planes have been shot down in the region: one in June and one just three days before the attack on MH-17. The plane crash in June has been identified as the work of pro-Russian separatists. The large Ukrainian military transport jet was shot down using a shoulder-fired missile when the jet was trying to land at an airport in Luhansk. One month later, another military plane was shot down when it was flying at 6,500 meters. This distance is well beyond the range of shoulder-fired missiles. Ukrainian officials speculated that a more powerful missile had brought down the plane, and the missile was perhaps fired from territories within the Russian Federation. A powerful anti-aircraft weapon that is capable of doing such damage is called the Buk surface-to-air missile. The Buk missile system was developed by the Soviet Union and was in service since 1979. Buk is “capable of detecting air targets at ranges of up to 160 km and hitting them at full altitude range at a distance of over 30 km,” according to the Russian Defense Ministry information. Obama has already confirmed the use of surface-to-air missile in the MH-17 disaster on July 18^th. By connecting these dots, Putin has his fingerprints all over this. What is his next play and how will the international community respond?

Kshitij Kumar

Both the Gaza crisis and the Malaysian Airlines tragedy have resulted in unfortunate, devastating civilian deaths. These were 800+ individuals (400 noncombatants and counting in Gaza, 298 on MH-17) that had no say, no involvement in either conflict. They were casualties of crossfire, and whether their deaths are labeled accidents or unfortunate necessities resulting from the use of civilians as human shields, the loss of innocent life is unjust and disturbing. While the technology of war has evolved to allow high precision targeting and supposedly minimize collateral damage, clearly, this is not what is happening. To add insult to injury, the deaths are being politicized! Headlines earlier suggest that the remains of the dead of the Malaysian aircraft are pieces in an international political ‘game’; a Wall Street Journal article suggested that the very election of Hamas in Gaza forfeited civilians’ rights to be safe from war. The sanctity of life no longer seems to have any value; those who have lost loved ones are apparently not even allowed to mourn.

Yes, there is a bigger picture to look at—there is a greater good (everyone has a different opinion as to what that constitutes) to consider. But in these physical and verbal battles between nations, groups, passions and beliefs, it is imperative that we remember the humanity of those lost—as well as our own.

Update: Kshitij Kumar’s portion received minor corrections 

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

The post The Correspondents Weigh-In: Crises in Gaza and Ukraine appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

This piece will be the first of a special “Weigh In” series that is going to be started on Glimpse, which will focus on momentous current events.

Thomas D. Armstrong

Recent op-eds have labeled Putin as a mastermind or a megalomaniac fool. I am of the opinion that Putin is a megalomaniac mastermind exploiting a disempowered US. However, debating Putin’s psychological profile is less constructive than analyzing the economic foundation of his regime. Putin and his Russia survive on energy revenues, and war is only making him richer. Unlike 2008, when Putin invaded Georgia, oil prices have held steady. In fact, the threat of sanctions on Russia have only driven oil prices marginally higher, up $2 dollars to $110.8/bbl as of writing. Putin is financing expansionist dreams (and his own savings account) thanks to his near-monopoly on Russia’s energy industry. Therefore, the best way to rein him in is to drive global energy prices down. The US can accomplish this quite easily with a reformed national energy policy. Currently, the US is sitting on an unused 727-million-barrel underground cache of crude oil, and is producing more and more natural gas by the day. If the US were to supplant Russia as Europe’s primary natural gas provider, and flood the global market with American oil exports, energy prices would plummet. A decrease from $110/bbl to $80/bbl would cost the Russian oil industry alone an estimated $120 billion, plus billions more in foreign exchange earnings. Putin is a deft leader, but even he could not survive such a sustained economic collapse.

Nick Kosturos

Russia’s move to deploy soldiers in Ukraine is indicative of feelings of insecurity rather than confidence. Putin knows that such a large loss of influence in Ukraine, a critically important country in economic, cultural, and geopolitical terms, would be devastating to Russia’s ultimate goal of increasing its regional sphere of influence and international prestige. Putin’s domestic considerations and tensions can also shed light on these aggressive actions. If a small country like Ukraine can successfully stand up to the Kremlin by ousting its man from Kiev, what will Russians think of a leadership unable to control their “Small Russia?” Russia is acting out of desperation, not strength. Putin’s clownish justifications for Russia’s military actions do not hold up to scrutiny and are made under a façade by what I recently labeled an “imitation democracy.”

While the West has multilaterally condemned this act of aggression, which is a positive first step, it should now increase pressure on Russia to relent. In order to force Russia to withdraw and accept Ukraine’s sovereignty and a chance at a peaceful political transition, the West must maintain a multilateral and wide-ranging coalition of rejection, isolating Putin via sanctions on both his allies and competing oligarchs (including their overseas funds and visas), and by supporting Ukraine’s new government through assistance and advisement. At this point, conventional military power projection against Russia is not a viable option – no matter how tempting – as it could spark an unintended military provocation leading to conflict. The current situation is very difficult to manage, although the international community should know that the West ultimately has the upper hand. Russia’s desperate authoritarian strategy based on oppression is doomed to fail in the long-run.

Luke Phillips

The situation in Crimea is nothing more than the Russians managing their own geopolitical periphery, and so far as it has to do anything at all with expansion, it is only due to the fact that Russian power is presently contracted to levels far below what Moscow would like. America would do and has done the same thing in the event of revolutionary unrest in our neighbor states, as is evidenced by our interventions in Mexico a century ago and in Cuba a half-century ago.

The question here, I think, is what the United States is going to do about it. Part of our grand strategy since the end of the Cold War has been to keep the Russians from establishing formal or informal dominion over the former U.S.S.R. Another part has been supporting the thin veil of liberal international order that girds the power politics flowing subtly underneath in an effort to at least grant a semblance of order and harmony in international affairs. These imperatives have come under increasing pressure in recent years, but in 2013 and 2014 more than ever before. I don’t know what the proper policy response should be, but I hope it isn’t more of the lectures, gestures, and silences with which President Obama responded to the Russians in the Snowden and Syria affairs.

Jacob W. Roberts

America is in no position to intervene nor should it.  To the western world, Putin’s actions appear nefarious, but from the perspective of many Russians he is acting well within the parameters of international law.  Professor Tatiana Akishina of USC argues that, since the prime minister of Ukraine’s semi-autonomous Crimea region has called upon Putin for military support, his intervention is in accordance with international law.  Moreover, America has intervened with greater frequency and intensity over the past century, thus it is highly hypocritical of US authorities to castigate Russia for meddling within its region.  That being said, it is somewhat disturbing to witness Russia fail to respect the sovereign rights of an independent nation.  One can only hope that Putin’s intervention into the region will be short lived.

Alessandro M. Sassoon

There is a risk of ethnic cleansing. It starts with classification. Weeks before this conflict made the front pages of the New York Times, reports emerged that Russian-Ukrainians in Crimea were being given Russian Passports. Russians have lived in Crimea for some 200 years, and Ukraine has held the territory for half a century. Then there are the Tatars, the people for whom Crimea is an ancestral home dating back to the Mongol Khan Empire. The Tatar population, which accounts for 13% of Crimea’s inhabitants, is predominantly Sunni Muslim. Under Stalin’s Russia, the Tatars were accused of collaborating with Nazi Germany and deported en masse to other parts of Russia (read: Siberia). It should come as no surprise then that they are more keen on being governed by Ukraine than by Russia. As things stand, there are three populations with strong ethno-nationalist tendencies who inhabit a geographic area they all feel they have a historical, political, or legal claim to. Of the eight stages of Genocide, we’ve passed #5: polarization. That means preparation, extermination, and denial are next.

Sabrina Mateen

Before this conflict, my knowledge of Ukraine consisted solely of “ex-USSR”. I assumed the region consisted of Russian natives, and that they were considered to be allies with their ex-country. However, with the news of an outbreak of civil war, it has become apparent that there are opposing nationalities, languages, and mindsets that are all helping to tear Ukraine into pieces. The conflict seems to be reaching increasingly dangerous heights as Russia begins to put pressure on Ukraine in the form of planned military drills and in one case, an unspecified military presence that looked to be Russians supporting Crimeans. Although the conflict is being called a civil war, it is beginning to seem like one of the many moves Putin has been making to restore Russia to its USSR-era square footage. It is important to see what the United States plans to do, as the Obama Administration is already under scrutiny after the ill-advised response to the crisis in Syria.  Any move from the newly war-shy United States will be seen as an escalation in a conflict that has all the makings of a new Cold War.

Kerry Collins

Recent developments in the volatile Ukraine situation show the autonomous Crimea region voting to join the Russian Federation. Crimea has a Russian ethnic majority and is predominantly Russian speaking, so it might not come as a surprise that the region is in support of the secession. If it is what the people want, then perhaps the region should have never been a part of Ukraine to begin with. These recent moves that Crimea has made are violations of international law, which puts the United States in a tough response position. The President has been making frantic calls to Putin urging a diplomatic end to this crisis, but to no avail. Meanwhile, Putin doesn’t seem particularly concerned with US warnings. What the EU and the US bring to the table are economic sanctions, and it will be interesting to see if those “sticks” are enough to make Putin falter.

The post The Correspondents Weigh-In: Crisis in Crimea appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.