As an international student from the Philippines, Carl Sijuco, who asked to use a pseudonym for safety concerns, is no stranger to a political culture of hypocrisy. Sijuco said that while he is fortunate to enjoy a very comfortable lifestyle in the Philippines and acknowledges that his partial European ancestry gives him a fair complexion that comes with privilege and status, his country’s deep corruption remains highly visible

The Philippines is a Southeast Asian island nation with robust history, unique geographic features, and more biodiversity than the Great Barrier Reef. It is also a country with corruption and turmoil deeply embedded into its political culture. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index consistently ranks the Philippines in the bottom half of the world in public sector corruption. In many ways, the persistence of government corruption has bred what Sijuco describes as a “culture of complacency,” or an acceptance and expectation of incompetence and crime.

Sijuco explained that the Philippines is in the Ring of Fire and historically has weathered devastating storms. He makes an interesting observation about the relationship between geography and culture. 

“There’s this kind of cultural sentiment that people will just come back and pick themselves up after a storm,” he said. “[But] more and more people are getting upset over that, because that shouldn’t be the norm. We don’t have to persevere through everything; [that mentality just feeds into]how much corruption there is!”

But what does that corruption really look like?

The 2013 Pork Barrel scam demonstrated how blatant this corruption can be. In this scheme, discretionary funds meant to support local governments in providing public goods, like education and culture, were instead siphoned off by government officials using phony businesses as a cover, resulting in hundreds of millions diverted away from public services. The blame was attributed to a few scapegoats, but the roots of the corruption were never addressed. The 2020 Global Corruption Barometer reveals that 86% of Filipinos think government corruption is a big problem, while roughly one in five reported paying bribes that year.

While fund mismanagement and diversion persists, an equally concerning issue is theft through nepotism and cronyism. Duterte’s treatment of his hometown, Davao, is a telling example. After Duterte moved on from his role as mayor of the region, his daughter filled the position and his son assumed the role of vice mayor. After the aforementioned allegations of fund misuse, Duterte’s son stepped down and his other son became vice mayor. 

According to the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, since assuming the presidency, Duterte has awarded almost $500 million dollars in government contracts to his friend, former Special Assistant and Head of Presidential Management Staff and current Senator Bong Go, in their shared hometown of Davao for infrastructural projects that seem often go uncompleted.

However, in the Philippines, holding politicians publicly accountable is often a surefire way to end your career. Maria Ressa, CEO of Rappler, an online media site, was recently jailed for cyber libel after exposing ties between a businessman and a local judge. In the Philippines, honest journalists stand a lot more to lose than their careers. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 149 journalists and media workers have been killed in the country since 1992. Of those deaths, 84 are attributed to the murdering of journalists. Reporters Without Borders ranks the Philippines 138 of 180 countries on the 2020 World Press Freedom Index. 

Additionally, there is a strong nepotistic oligarchy in the Philippines, leaving it stuck in a cycle of unscrupulous governance. The ‘padrino’ system dominates politics, where connections are more important than your merit. While there have been attempts to legislate on the unspoken institution, efforts never gain enough political traction. 

“History repeats itself, but nobody learns and everyone is surprised,” said Sijuco, who noted the power of competing clans and powerful business families.

If you speak with Filipinos about corruption, certain names are often mentioned: Henry Sy and the Filipino-Chinesee SM clan, Zobel De Ayala, and the Filipino-Spanish-Chinesee Po clan, Cojuanco, Villafuerte.  

In one personal instance, Sijuco said that he was socializing with children of oligarchs, and in a conversation learned of how deeply personal and how closely connected corruption was in all of his circles.

“I know my family is corrupt as [expletive], who cares, shots on me!” Sijuco once heard from a friend over drinks. “The Filipino upper class is so detached from the rest of the country.”

While the elites compete over old feuds, 88.6% of Filipino families report worrying about their finances, and around one in five Filipinos are living in abject poverty. The country’s wealth gap is also divided along ethnic lines. The wealthiest are ethnically less Filipino than the poorest. The divisive remnants of the country’s colonialist past and ongoing income inequality issues has created a system with clear winners and losers.  The problem is exacerbated by the country’s political and finance systems. 

”I’ve been pulled over for speeding a few times in Manila, and each time the idea that I’d shoot them some money for a bribe was a foregone conclusion to them,” Sijuco said.“Based on what you look like or what you drive, they know you can afford it.”

A current and more systemic example is the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Facing a vaccine hesitant population, obstacles to vaccine approval, and the second highest death toll in Central Asia, the country is just now starting to see its worst infection spike to date subside, with mandatory lockdowns going into effect nationwide. 

Sijuco discussed how ongoing corruption in the country has exacerbated the public health crisis. He said he knows friends who have paid off medical doctors to falsify negative test results so they would not have to cancel their vacations. 

“They know they’ll be able to afford any treatment they need,” Sijuco said. “There’s this sort of idea that if you’re rich, you’re entitled to break the rules.” 

Sijuco witnessed this inequality every day. Outside the walls of his private high school was a slum and just one hour away from his home, Sijuco describes Tondo, a town built on garbage and waste with no infrastructure and few opportunities for socioeconomic mobilization.

Sijuco described an increasingly common phenomenon of poverty-stricken Filipinos living in graveyards, maintaining the graves in exchange for being allowed to settle. He said the picture of poverty in the Philippines paints a stark contrast to the global image of Manila, full of highrises and nightclubs. Sijuco said Google Image results often paint a wildly inaccurate picture of modernity and prosperity in the Philippines. According to Credit Suisse estimates, the Philippines is the ninth most unequal country in the world.

But Sijuco is cautiously optimistic about the future of his home country. 

“There’s hope, but way down the road,” he said. “Before I’m middle-aged, nothing will probably change drastically unless there’s a complete overhaul of the cabinet, the system, everything. Otherwise, there are too many fingers in too many different pies between different people.” 

When asked if things will get worse before they get better, or if the country may even see another people’s revolution, Sijuco hopes that regardless of the future, transparency is prioritized.

“Well, there probably won’t be another revolution after the last one led to martial law and military dictatorship and I don’t think things will get worse,” Sinjuco said. “With technology, all of these social movements, all eyes on everything: nothing is able to be hidden anymore.”

The post Foreign Perspective: Hypocrisy, Nepotism and Corruption in the Philippines appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

These words, from Canadian philosopher and futurist Marshall McLuhan, emphasize both the necessity of a collectivist attitude and the necessity of coordinated action toward climate change. As the world rapidly approaches the disaster barrier that is 1.5 degrees celsius, it is imperative that the United States takes steps to reach critical climate targets such as net-zero global carbon emissions by 2050. 

Though these may seem like lofty goals, they are now considered essential by many climate experts, if we are to avoid major climate catastrophes that will cost millions of lives, destroy ecosystems and environments and affect trillions of dollars in global revenue. 

Given the extent to which oil and natural gas lobbyists are entrenched and hold influence in American politics, implementing large-scale renewable energy may be difficult to accomplish within the next 10 years. Alternatively, other avenues must be considered to reduce our carbon footprint. A course of action that has been seemingly overlooked is legislation to reduce methane emissions by decreasing the number of cows consumed — essentially, legislation to tackle the meat industry. If deemed politically feasible and in the interest of the administration, President Joe Biden currently faces several alternatives and options for reducing emissions from livestock in order to meet emissions targets.  

Agricultural emissions in the United States account for approximately 10% of all GHG emissions. The largest culprit within the agricultural industry is cattle which — through digestive methane production, transportation, packaging and distribution — directly contributes approximately 30% of all agricultural emissions. The most concerning of these emissions is methane (CH4) — which has a global warming potency 86 times higher than that of carbon dioxide (CO2). 

Cattle contributes to methane emissions primarily in 2 ways. The first is through a process known as enteric fermentation, which is a natural digestive process in which food is decomposed and fermented, creating a by-product of methane. The second primary contributor is cow manure, which often releases methane as it decomposes under anaerobic conditions in piles or open-pit lagoons. 

Combatting methane emissions is a nuanced issue, and agricultural organizations and scientists alike have been doing their best to tackle the challenge for the past 30 years. Many have sought to reduce emissions through intentional alterations of a cow’s rumen, the stomach chamber in which microbes ferment feed hence producing methane. Others have focused on selective breeding for cows with less methane-producing microbes, as well as experimenting with different feeds that promote better digestion. Nevertheless, emissions from agriculture have actually increased despite efforts in many developed countries to actively reduce methane production in cows.

There are several critical reasons why, even with an average reduction of methane emissions per cow, global methane emissions from cattle have still increased by 10% within the last 30 years. First is the phenomenon known as “meatification” in regions like Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Demand for meat has skyrocketed as purchasing power has increased within these regions, and, as a result, global meat production has nearly doubled since 1990. 

Second, measures adopted have been inefficient at reducing overall methane and GHG emissions. While they have made some difference in reducing emissions per cow, raising cows is still a massively inefficient process. In order to raise a cow for slaughter, you must raise it for two to three years as well as provide it with an exceptional amount of land, water, and food. Moreover, cows produce about up to 21 tons of manure per year, and ineffective manure management can lead to greater methane emissions. On top of that, many of these measures have been adopted inconsistently throughout the globe, given that wealthier nations are more equipped to fund the research and supplies needed to successfully implement these measures. 

Yet, research still continues in these areas despite the limited effectiveness of the measures being developed. Why? The larger answer lies in the fact that improvements and advancements in these areas allow the animal agriculture industry to expand. 

But these scientific advancements cannot fix an industry that is inherently destructive – not only to the planet, but to the health of citizens as well. If the United States is serious about combating the negative externalities created by animal agriculture — including methane emissions from cattle — a new agricultural landscape must be constructed rather than focusing improvements to the current one.

There are several paths the Biden administration can pursue if it wishes to significantly reduce the cattle industry’s methane emissions. The first alternative is cut from the old cloth, but worth exploring nonetheless. It involves feeding cows a specific type of seaweed. A 2018 study from the University of California, Davis suggests that feeding cows seaweed could reduce methane emissions from beef cattle by as much as 82%. Unfortunately, implementing this on a massive scale is near impossible because there is simply not enough of that type of seaweed to sustain a cow’s diet, and there are several logistical challenges with providing seaweed supplements to cows grazing on an open range. 

A second policy Biden mught consider is focusing on supporting the growth of businesses that produce plant-based protein substitutes. Plant-based meat alternatives have historically been frowned  upon, but their popularity has absolutely exploded in the past few years with the success of companies like Beyond Meat. Two out of five Americans have tried plant-based meat, with that figure stretching to over 50% for those 25 and younger. Moreover, plant-based substitutes are expected to achieve a whopping 85 billion dollars in sales in 2030, an 1,847% increase from 2018. This growth has only accelerated throughout the pandemic, as the unsafe COVID-19 conditions endured by many meat processing workers have increased calls for more meat-free alternatives.

Another promising innovation the Biden administration could support is lab-grown meat. Currently, lab-grown meat is still in its infancy in the United States, with plans to serve cultured meat still several years away. However, in the United Kingdom the process is a little further along. There are currently 15 startups focusing on lab-grown meat and they have plans to expand to mass production in the coming years. CE Delft expects that by 2030, lab-grown beef could be just as inexpensive as agricultural beef. Even better news, if lab-grown factories were funded by renewable energy it would reduce total beef emissions by 93%. Lab-grown beef may be the best potential alternative because not only does it allow us to reduce our methane emissions and assuage ethical concerns about animal farming, but it also allows consumers to keep the taste and nutrients of meat readily available in their diet.  

But one notable hurdle the United States faces with both plant-based proteins and lab-grown beef is the political strength of the U.S. agribusiness industry. According to research from New York University, major meat and dairy producers have spent millions on lobbying efforts and campaigns aimed at discrediting links between climate change and animal agriculture. Over the last two decades, ‘Big Ag’ has spent $750 million on supporting national political candidates who hold similar policy stances, with Mitch McConnell, Lindsey Graham, and Joni Ernst among their top recipients. 

Unsurprisingly, these major conglomerates have been able to get away with highly carbon-intensive methods of agriculture, as well as produce food at a very cheap rate due to large agricultural subsidies. The Barack Obama administration tried to check the advances of Big Ag, promising millions of rural farmers that they would fight back against the most powerful players in the industry, only to stop when the major agricultural conglomerates banded together with their congressional allies. 

Nevertheless, the emergence of climate change as a central political issue will facilitate Biden’s ability to check the power of Big Ag. As more and more American citizens express their concern about climate change, Congress will have to listen to its constituents or risk losing popular support. Additionally, with Democratic control over the House, and the Senate nearly equally split, climate policies will face less hurdles than they did under former President Donald Trump. Biden should take advantage of these circumstances to steadfastly push climate action.

And as such, I believe the Biden administration should consider adopting the following measures to mitigate the effect of the meat industry on climate change.

1. Increase investment in seaweed farming products;
2. Increase subsidies to plant-based protein companies in order to promote industry growth and reduce prices; 
3. Decrease or eliminate subsidies to animal agriculture, which keep the price of beef and other animal products artificially low; 
4. Have the EPA classify methane as a criteria pollutant under the Clean Air Act (CAA);
5. Fund research, infrastructure, and production capacities for lab-grown beef;

The climate crisis grows more grim every day. If substantial action is not taken by the Biden administration to fundamentally reduce American beef consumption and minimize animal agriculture in general, the United States will struggle to reach its emission targets, thereby hampering the global climate fight and bringing the world closer to environmental catastrophe. 

The post The Biden Administration Ought to Reduce Meat Consumption appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Over the last few years however, one facet of Thai society, the monarchy, has increasingly come into question. A USC student from Thailand, speaking anonymously for safety concerns and hereafter referred to as TS, said that “people are taking examples from Hong Kong and protests elsewhere” to determine what place, if any, the monarchy has in a modern Thailand.

The anti-monarchy movement began to take hold following the death of King Rama IX in 2016 and the subsequent appointment of his son, King Rama X. The new king, who spends most of his time in Europe and is notorious for his playboy attitude, is not nearly as popular among the people as his father was. His ascension to the throne coincided with political turbulence that had been present and ongoing since 2014, when a successful military coup took over the government and installed Prayuth Chan-ocha as the prime minister of Thailand. The coup occurred after months of protests and conflict between the administration of Yingluck Shinawatra, the previous prime minister, and other political parties. Chan-ocha, who was the general that led the coup, was the only candidate in an election that was essentially a formality. Dissatisfaction and political frustration continued to rise in the country until it finally boiled over in 2019. 

In December 2019, thousands of people took to the streets of Bangkok to protest a ruling by the Thai Constitutional Court that banned and eventually dissolved, the Future Forward party from the Thai Parliament. The party housed some of the most vocal political opposition to Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha. According to Amnesty International, the charges were politically motivated; the court ruled that a loan of approximately $6 million to Future Forward from party leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit counted as a donation instead and so violated the approximately $316,000 donation limit. The protests were also a response to Chan-ocha’s reappointment in March 2019, following an election of questionable legitimacy. 

“When they [the Thai Constitutional Court]dissolved the party, that was the first trigger of the protests. People had been trying to fight for democracy through very peaceful means, both in and out of Congress, and when the attempt inside of Congress didn’t work and the party was now very unfairly gone, people started to get really angry,” TS said.

After a months-long break due to efforts to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, the protests resumed in July 2020, largely led by university students and orchestrated through social media. The turning point came in August when a statement by Panusaya Sithijirawattanakul, a 21-year-old student, clarified the demands of the protestors and united them behind a goal of reforming the monarchy and democratizing the government. Sithijirawattanakul was arrested in October 2020 and, as of publication, remains in detention and on her 22nd day of a hunger strike.

TS, who attended four protests during the height of the movement from October to December, described the protests as being highly organized despite having no centralized leader and being pulled together solely through Facebook, Twitter and Telegram. During the protests, people would pass messages back and forth, sending along requests from the front lines for “supplies like umbrellas and helmets to protect against the water guns.”

The protests continued throughout the rest of 2020, and by the end of the year at least 234 people were charged with crimes relating to the rallies, including nine leaders of the movement who are still jailed and awaiting trial. Tensions rose in early 2021 as the government stepped up its response by declaring involvement in the protests illegal and instructing the police to use harsher methods of deterrence including tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons. This has gradually caused protest sizes to shrink from their peak of up to 30,000 people, but protestors still turn out in the 1000s. 

Additionally, Thailand’s lèse-majesté law, which under the king’s orders had been minimally enforced since 2018, is being put to use again to punish protesters. Under the lèse-majesté law, also known as Article 112, insulting or defaming the royal family carries a severe penalty. In January 2021, a 60-year-old former civil servant was sentenced under Article 112 to 43 years and six months in prison (after a four year pretrial detention) for posting audio clips to Facebook in 2014 that were deemed to be critical of the monarchy. The increasing usage of the lèse-majesté law is directly tied to the king, according to TS.

“There’s no written evidence of this but everyone just knows that the king got really mad [about the protests]and told top military people to start using 112 again,” TS said.

The protests died down for a short while following the implementation of these harsher measures but have picked up again in recent weeks, rekindled by the fight for democracy in neighboring Myanmar, where a coup recently installed a military government. In the protests following the coup, activists in Myanmar gave the three-finger “Hunger Games” salute of resistance favored by Thai protestors. Showing solidarity in return, protests in Thailand resumed to the soundtrack of clanging pots and pans, the method of dissent used by protestors in Myanmar. 

Thailand and Myanmar join Hong Kong and Taiwan as two more countries in Asia where democratic movements have recently taken hold. Online activism by protestors has created strong bonds between organizers in the four countries and led to the formation of the so-called Milk Tea Alliance, which recently got its own Twitter emoji — a white cup set against a background of milk tea colours from the countries where the alliance initially formed. Roger Huang, a lecturer on political violence at Sydney’s Macquarie University, says that “the milk tea alliance could potentially turn into a genuine transnational anti-authoritarian movement.”

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and the lèse-majesté law leading to dwindling numbers, the protests of this last year have made great progress in changing public perception of the monarchy and differ greatly from past civil unrest in Thailand. Dr. Tamara Loos, a professor at Cornell University’s Department of History, notes that today “Thai citizens openly challenge the role of the monarchy in Thai cultural and political life, which reveals a revolutionary cultural shift. Self-censorship and lese majesté laws that once prevented Thais from publicly expressing their concerns about the role of the monarchy in politics no longer apply. The institution of the monarchy is now subject to public debate and discussion.”

“We’ve never really had a movement from the bottom up like this,” TS said. “The younger generation definitely has a very different view on the place of the monarchy in Thai society that kind of spreads out to other generations as well [through the protests], and people on the fence are maybe reconsidering or at least reflecting on why they have always had those views.” 

Though protests are still happening, their demands have shifted to the return of their jailed leaders rather than the initial lofty goals of reforming the monarchy. Without clear leadership or direction, the campaign is losing steam and at risk of dying out. According to Dr. Tamara Loos, a likely scenario is “a continuation of protests and arrest of its leaders until the movement is drained of momentum,” followed by “a future conflict between those who want genuine change in Thailand’s political institutions and the military.”

“In the shorter term there’s not really a solution; we’re kind of stuck in a gridlock, but I think there’s been a shift internally and we’re going to see that definitely come out as real changes in the next 10 or 20 years,” TS said. 

The post Foreign Perspective: An Inside Look at the Thai Anti-Monarchy Movement appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

However, for a significant portion of Qatar’s population — the over two million migrant workers in the country — the World Cup has brought a more nefarious and dark context to the country. For over a decade, human rights abuses under the kafala system, the sponsorship-based employment used by many countries in the Middle East to exploit migrant workers and trap them into a modern-day version of slavery, have persisted — all in an attempt to prepare the country for the 2022 games. Most of Qatar’s foreign workers are employed on projects directly or indirectly connected to the World Cup, such as constructing infrastructure for the new city being built for the event, and will transition to work in service-oriented roles as the tournament draws closer.

Apart from Qatar, the other countries that allow the kafala system are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Lebanon. Each country has its own specific provisions and legal framework, but all share the same basic concept: government agencies, local individuals or companies in the country employ foreign laborers through sponsorship permits. In addition to salary, the sponsors cover travel expenses from the workers’ home country as well as housing, usually in communal dormitories or, for domestic workers, in the sponsor’s house.

Legally, the kafala system is under the jurisdiction of interior ministries instead of labor ministries, so sponsored workers do not have the protections extended to other workers under the host country’s labor laws. As a result, many experience forced labor, unpaid or unfair wages and excessive working hours.

Additionally, since only sponsors can extend or end the permits allowing workers to be in the country, private citizens have an inordinate amount of control over their workers’ legal statuses without oversight. Workers cannot switch jobs, quit before the end of their contract or leave the country without the permission of their employer. The penalty for doing so depends on the country but can range from revocation of the workers’ legal status to imprisonment or deportation, even if they were trying to escape abusive circumstances (which is not an uncommon situation). 

Though the kafala system applies to all foreign workers, racism plays a large role in how workers are treated. People from Africa or South Asia are typically relegated to lower paying jobs and face much higher levels of discrimination than Europeans or Americans. Additionally, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, the contracts offered to Westerners are less restricting and have fairer terms than the ones given to workers from other countries. Gender-based violence is also common; women, especially domestic workers, experience high levels of harassment and sexual assault but often do not report it to authorities, fearing retaliation by their sponsors.

In Qatar, foreign workers make up approximately 95% of the total labor force, with the vast majority working jobs related to the World Cup. A report from The Guardian found that these migrant workers live and work in poor conditions and that over 6,500 South Asian workers have died in Qatar since it began World Cup preparations ten years ago, an average of 12 deaths each week. Nick McGeehan, co-founder of FairSquare Projects, an advocacy group for migrant workers in the Gulf, said that these deaths are directly related to the World Cup.

“A very significant proportion of the migrant workers who have died since 2011 were only in the country because Qatar won the right to host the World Cup,” he said. 

According to the Guardian, the death toll is very likely higher than what is reported from the Qatari government since the findings do not include people from Southeast Asia or Africa, where a significant number of Qatar’s workers come from. 

Because of the spotlight the World Cup has placed on Qatar, the country has pledged to make reforms to the kafala system — though many of these have not materialized. In 2014, Qatar claimed it was abolishing the kafala system and proposed changes that would institute new regulations and penalties to ensure workers are treated fairly and remove the need for permission from an employer for a worker to leave the country or switch jobs at the end of their contract. These changes were implemented in December 2016 and promptly reversed by the emir three weeks later in January 2017 without explanation.

Following the lack of progress on foreign workers’ rights, Qatar signed an agreement with the United Nations International Labour Organization in November 2017 that has led to some lasting reforms. The government has since passed laws allowing workers to collect compensation for abusive situations and establishing dispute committees to fairly mediate conflict between workers and employers. In January 2020, Qatar announced that migrant workers will no longer need permission from employers to leave, though advance notice is required for domestic workers and employers can apply for a permit requiring up to 5% of their foreign staff to seek prior consent to leave. Additional reforms enacted in September 2020 set a higher minimum wage for all workers and allowed migrant workers to switch jobs without employer permission.

However, this string of positive changes may soon be coming to an end. Following the September 2020 kafala reforms businesses argued that the changes were infringing on their rights as employers and the revised laws were sent to the Shura Council, Qatar’s legislative body, for review. After months of deliberation, the Council issued recommendations in February 2021 that would undo much of the progress that has been made. According to Amnesty International, the suggestions include “removing the right of migrant workers to change jobs during their contract, limiting the number of times they can change jobs during their stay in Qatar to three, restricting the number of workers in a company that can change jobs to 15% unless agreed otherwise by the company, and increasing the percentage of workers who require exit permits to leave Qatar from 5% to 10%.” A decision to accept or deny the Shura Council’s recommendations has not yet been made, but the previous reversal of reforms in January 2017 occurred after similar suggestions from the council.

Throughout the last decade, despite the constant push for improved workers’ rights in Qatar, FIFA has been remarkably quiet on the matter. After Amnesty International published a report on migrant workers in Qatar in 2015, FIFA put out a statement saying that they “are on the right track and [are]committed to continue improving to further contribute to the protection of workers’ rights at the FIFA World Cup stadium projects.” FIFA also established its Human Rights Policy in 2017 and published its World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Strategy in 2019, pledging to leave behind “a legacy of world-class standards and practices for workers in Qatar and internationally”, but none of these mention specific actions it is taking beyond “supporting the Qatari government with continued reform.” 

In March 2021, following reports in the media on migrant worker deaths, FIFA President Gianni Infantino acknowledged the tragedy of the deaths, but ultimately warned against a boycott of the 2022 World Cup.

“Our position at FIFA has always been, and will always be, engagement and dialogue is the only and the best way forward to make changes happen,” Infantino said.

Since FIFA has not taken a firm stance on the issue, teams competing in World Cup qualifiers are taking things into their own hands. Players on Norway’s national soccer team lined up before their game against Gibraltar on March 24, wearing shirts that read: “Human Rights — on and off the pitch.” Teams from Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark have followed suit with similar protests.

Though FIFA has historically been opposed to political statements during games and has previously fined teams for taking such actions, a spokesperson for the organization said that they would allow players to continue with such demonstrations.

“FIFA believes in the freedom of speech and in the power of football as a force for good,” FIFA said. “No disciplinary proceedings in relation to this matter will be opened by FIFA.”

The international response has been similarly muted; apart from the European Parliament, which demanded in 2020 that FIFA send a strong message to Qatar that the World Cup should not be “delivered by the assistance of modern slavery,” no other countries or blocs have spoken out, despite efforts by non-governmental organizations to convince them to do so. In 2014 a case was brought against Qatar by the UN International Organization for Labor over the treatment of migrant workers, but this was dropped in 2017 after the country committed to the reforms that the Shura Council recently recommended reversing.

International sports competitions such as the World Cup bring together people from all over the world in a way that transcends cultural and political differences and allows countries to deepen their relationships in a low-stakes environment. Michel Raspaud, a professor at Grenoble Alpes University whose research focuses on the sociology of sports and sports tourism, writes that Qatar is particularly noteworthy for its use of sports diplomacy and has made “sports a major diplomatic axis that provides the country with international recognition, affirming its role as a regional player and contributing to its security [as]a sort of all-purpose safety valve for tension in the short and medium term.” 

However, Raspaud goes on to say that the positive message Qatar is trying to convey through the 2022 World Cup is “undermined by the contradiction between the values of sports that are emphasized (respect, progress, fairness, etc.) and the social and political situation in a country where labor rights and the status of women and foreigners remain problematic.”

As the World Cup draws closer, attention on Qatar will continue to increase and the country will continue to face scrutiny for the actions it takes that affect migrant workers. Qatar is at a major crossroads, and the over two-thirds of its population at the mercy of the kafala system is waiting to see whether it bends to the Shura Council’s recommendations and returns to the traditional restrictions or concedes to international pressure and maintains its recent reforms.

The post The Modern-Day Slavery Behind the 2022 FIFA World Cup appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

An interview with Francesco Loiola, a USC senior and Italian-born citizen, shed light on the country’s sociopolitical complexities. 

Currently, over 118,000 deaths have been reported in Italy, and the government is again scrambling to contain a new surge and the emergence of variants. As the first European country to enter a full lockdown, Italy has become all too familiar with the imposed stringent restrictions. 

“Italy is fragmented,” Loiola said. “There are parts of the nation where people tend to behave in a certain way.”

Geographical regions are color-coded on a map, depending on their level of contagion. In red-zone areas, individuals cannot leave their homes except for health and work-related reasons, and all non-essential businesses are closed. In orange zones, various shops can open, but restaurants and bars exclusively offer take-away and/or delivery services. In yellow zones, businesses, restaurants and bars may remain open until 6 PM. 

However, over Easter weekend, the entire country was considered a red zone and subjected to a national lockdown from April 3 to 5. In tandem with inoculation delays and medical concerns with the AstraZeneca vaccine due to unsubstantiated claims of blood clot formation, the nation finds itself at a crossroads. 

Vaccination delays across the European Union (EU) inevitably explain Italy’s low vaccination rates, but are not the sole contributing factor. News of AstraZeneca’s vaccine efficacy and health-related concerns halted the EU’s vaccination efforts, giving rise to controversial claims among health and safety experts. A lack of transparency and a disunited front led Italy to temporarily suspend the use of the vaccine until the European Medicines Agency (EMA) granted clearance. In April 2021, the EMA’s Executive Director, Emer Cooke, said there is no clear evidence linking the negatively experienced symptoms, such as clotting and bleeding, to the vaccine. However, the impressions of Italian citizens vary. 

A scientific study published by the European Journal of Epidemiology, “Mistrust in Biomedical Research and Vaccine Hesitancy”, assessed vaccine hesitancy amongst a random sample of 968 Italian citizens. The report revealed that citizen trust in scientific research and vaccine efficacy decreased, especially amongst middle-aged individuals. According to the results, the proportion of citizens willing to receive the vaccination is too miniscule to prevent the effective spreading of COVID-19 within the nation. Trust in the European Medicine Agency is essential to extinguish misleading claims that deter herd immunity efforts. 

“In general, people are aware that there are no side effects but are fearful because of health concerns… some are calling upon Draghi to receive the vaccine on camera and will not receive it until Draghi and the Minister of Health do,” Loiola said. 

Draghi has faced unbearable pressure since winning the Senate’s confidence vote, a formality in creating a new government within Italy. At the request of Italy’s president, Draghi formed his own government in January 2021 to tackle the nation’s health and economic crises.

When Draghi was elected, “newspapers all over the world reported on an Italian giant taking over Italy,” Loiola said. “They called him ‘Super Mario’… this is the first time in 25 years that Italian politics has been shown in a positive light,” posing a direct contrast to the notorious corruption that had taken center stage in Italian politics in years past. 

The “cheating mentality” in Italian politics, as Loiola mentioned, has led to widespread misconduct, as evidenced by Matteo Renzi’s term as prime minister and the infamous referendum of 2016. The proposed plebiscite encompassed a series of drastic changes to the Italian political system. If passed, it would have allowed for major reforms to the constitution. 

Francesco Galietti, chief executive of a Rome based political risk consultancy expressed concerns about the referendum’s disillusioned goals: “Renzi, like David Cameron, thought he could unite the party with a referendum and all he achieved was to divide it more than ever,” said Galietti. For most, the referendum was tied to the prime minister’s performance in office. Renzi received high approval ratings when initially assuming the role in 2014, but voters became increasingly frustrated over high unemployment numbers, the migration crisis and health-related issues. 

The referendum received unparalleled voter turn-out, with 70% of the population voting ‘no’ not only on the issues at hand but on Renzi’s rule. While Renzi promised to step back after an ignominious defeat, he returned after a month, launching his own party and igniting a governmental crisis amid the pandemic. 

Thus, the most notable effect of Draghi’s emergence into Italian politics has been both the nation’s and the European Union’s renewed trust in Italy. His experience as former chief of the European Central Bank, credited with “saving the Euro,” has gained him immense popularity amongst Italians and political opposition parties. He remarkably received the support of moderate and conservative politicians alike and now leads a six-party government. 

“Draghi’s presence means we have access to a lot more European money because they [the European Union]trust him,” Loiola said.

In addition to restoring transparency, Draghi’s main task is to redesign the recovery plan that determines how Italy will spend 251 billion dollars in loans and grants from the EU. Draghi’s extensive experience in handling financial markets has made him the quintessential leader to lead Italy out of its economic crisis and improve the quality of life for Italian citizens. 

The wave of restrictions has caused a 30% decline in Italy’s industrial production and an economy shrinkage of 8.9%, a comparable recession to Italy post-World War II. 

Record unemployment numbers and business closures drove the masses into poverty. Approximately 36.7 billion euros were lost from the Italian economy due to travel restrictions that halted their tourism industry, which traditionally makes up 13% of their GDP. 

The European Commission is expected to release more information about an EU-wide digital vaccination passport that would allow for a certain degree of tourism. When asked about how Italians would respond to a digital vaccination passport, Loiola said: “At this stage, more people care about the economy… by May, citizens under the age of 60 should start being vaccinated and they comprise a huge majority of the population and those most heavily affected by COVID-19. When they administer those vaccinations… Italy will [encourage]tourism.”

With a clear agenda ahead, Italians are hopeful in a reformed governmental approach that can effectively tackle the myriad of crises that have plagued the nation. With an emphasis on transparency and diplomacy, Italy’s growth may be insurmountable within the next few years, making way for a second renaissance under Mario Draghi’s guidance. 

The post Foreign Perspective: Mario Draghi’s Transformation of Italy on the International Stage appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

SAN FRANCISCO — Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate a real fear of rising opposition forces, fueled by Western social media platforms. On March 10, the Russian government announced it would be slowing down speeds on Twitter as part of a larger effort to crackdown on opposition within the country and impose sweeping national censorship. Russian authorities have increasingly attempted to intimidate social media platforms with warnings, fines and threats of blockage as they begin to mimic the oppressive internet initiatives under the Chinese government. 

The censoring of Twitter comes as a result of the Russian government arguing that social media platforms have played a major role in encouraging dissent nationwide. Alexei Navalny, the de facto head of the opposition movement in Russia, has used platforms like YouTube and Twitter to promote his anti-corruption agenda. Using the internet and other digital means has enabled Navalny to produce viral videos, including his documentary on Putin’s alleged palace, which has reached over a hundred million views on Youtube. 

Since Navalny’s most recent detainment and subsequent imprisonment in February, Russian citizens have been outraged, flooding into the streets to fight for Navalny and against the greater government corruption in the country. Navalny’s two-year sentence in Russia’s colony number two is at a correctional colony in Pokrov. Although Russia describes the facility as their average prison, in reality, Pokrov is considered the maximum level of imprisonment and an institution known for isolating its prisoners and destroying them psychologically. Navalny is one of several Russian political activists that have been imprisoned at this corrective colony. 

Due to Navalny’s success on platforms like YouTube, the Russian government has enacted greater measures to silence western social media platforms. Roskomnadzor, Russia’s federal executive body in charge of supervising media and mass communications, began the slowdown of Twitter in order to tighten the control of social media platforms following Navalny’s internet success. In February, Putin advocated for officials to monitor said platforms more closely, arguing they encourage children to participate in unsanctioned and illegal opposition protests. 

However, these attempts at censorship date back to 2012, when a law was implemented allowing the government to block or blacklist online content it deemed inappropriate. Since then, the Russian government has only increased its level of censorship. 

In 2014, the Russian State Duma passed a law requiring the personal data of Russian users to be stored on Russian servers. The government has continuously fined apps like Facebook and Twitter for their lack of action but have failed to ban either platform, possibly to avoid further public resentment. The Russian government successfully blocked LinkedIn in 2016, both because of its unpopularity in Russia and the company’s failure to adhere to Russian user data guidelines. 

During the Crimean crisis, Russian authorities banned Alexei Navalny’s blog and Kasparov.ru, owned by Garry Kasparov, a chess grandmaster and World Chess Champion, known for its condemnation of Vladimir Putin. Roskomnadzor often blocks specific Facebook or Wikipedia pages and blogs, like a 2014 Facebook page protesting the prosecution of Alexei Navalny for inciting violence or “unsanctioned mass protest”. 

In April 2018, Roskomnadzor banned Telegram for its refusal to grant the Federal Security Service access to encryption keys, but lifted the ban in 2020 due to its ineffectiveness and particularly Telegram’s ability to work around the limitation. 

In December 2020, the Russian government implemented a new bill for anyone defaming the government online and sentencing them to jail for up to two years. Another bill signed into law that same day bans online discussions of law enforcement officials and judges’ personal information or property ownership. In doing so, the government is able to silence any allegations of corruption on part of officials. 

The Russian government passed a new law in January 2021, that fines companies annual revenue by 10% if they fail to block illegal activity. One example of “illegal activity” is rallying the youth to participate in unsanctioned protests. In January, the government threatened and then proceeded to fine social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, TikTok and Vkontakte, a Russianowned social media platform, for allegedly promoting protests to minors. On January 28, Putin announced that he has given the government until the first of August to create more thorough rules for foreign tech companies choosing to work in Russia. Additionally, he is requiring those same companies to open offices in the country. 

Even though Russian officials have been mostly ineffective in definitively censoring popular social media platforms like Reddit, YouTube and others, their authority over television gives them lasting control. Television, Russia’s most popular medium for entertainment and information, is government-controlled. Nearly 74% of the Russian population watches national television channels. Of the three main nationwide news broadcasters in Russia, Channel One and Russia TV are government owned, while the third, NTV is owned by the state-controlled natural gas-giant Gazprom. The majority of the population that indulges in Russian news is thus fed government-propagated information rather than unbiased news. Due to television being predominantly in the hands of the government, social media has become an even greater outlet for younger generations to engage in critical debate. 

For years, Roskomnadzor and the Russian government have been building an infrastructure to minimize the freedom of speech online. Many have argued that this push for censorship is akin to China’s government monitored internet. However, the main difference is that China’s censorship was embedded from the beginning of the internet’s expansion. As a result, the distinction between China’s government propaganda and its internet are blurred. The Chinese government strategically blocked potentially unsettling information regarding COVID-19 and any negative coverage on China’s handling of the virus. But, their censorship goes deeper than just blocking unwelcome information and rather uses specialized technology to create false, alternative narratives to controversial issues. In Russia, digital entrepreneurship was encouraged until the anti-government protests in 2011 and 2012, making it significantly more difficult for Russian officials to censor the free-internet in the same way as China. Although both regimes are similar in their oppressive tactics, Russia’s late entrance into the sphere of censored internet puts them at a significant disadvantage as social media companies have built an infrastructure to fight against government bans. 

But, Russian officials have been hinting at a “sovereign RuNet”, a platform designed to tie Russian citizens to the internet regardless of if they were to disconnect from the World Wide Web. The purpose, the government argues, is to block Western observers and intruders from cutting Russia’s communication link; yet, many activists believe this Russian controlled internet would allow for more censored content that is directly cut off from the external world.

Rather than directly force its citizens to join, officials are attempting to coax Russian social media users to switch platforms from Western apps to Russian social networks like VKontakte. Vkontakte, along with the Chinese-owned platform TikTok, have previously agreed to ban certain content that may encourage protesting in Russia. Vkontakte is known to be linked to the Russian government. 

In order to further their government-controlled internet bubble, Gazprom Media has committed to creating a video platform called RuTube in order to potentially replace Youtube. On top of that, the corporation also bought rights to “Ya Molodets”, an app that strives to resemble or, even better, replace TikTok.

The purpose of Russia’s government-run array of social media platforms isn’t only to better censor Western media content, but also to destroy the potential of viral videos that the Kremlin believes could promote dissent. That way, the government is better prepared for another Navalny figure who has the potential of encouraging younger audiences to revolt. Although they can’t directly replicate China’s successful government-censored social media platforms, they can and are trying to smear and suppress the platforms that go against their regime. 

Overall, this begs the question of whether or not Russia’s strategy for censorship will be effective in the long-term. Even though China has successfully incorporated their oppressive political tactics into their citizens’ everyday lives and thus acts as an example, Russia is unable to double-down in the same way due to their lack of control over free speech on the internet.  Jailing or eliminating opposition leaders and troublemakers as a means of censorship is nothing new. 

Yet, Putin is beginning to demonstrate a real fear that opposition is spurred on by the free internet. Russia’s inability to tackle Silicon Valley’s influence in its country could create a serious obstacle for their regime in the near future. However, Putin has curtailed similar mass protests before, like the 2011 protests, showing that Navalny might not be as real of a threat as the western media paints him to be. Navalny’s prior commitments to nationalist groups, his history of making xenophobic and controversial videos, along with his constantly fluctuating views on economic and social issues have caused Russian citizens and Western observers alike to be skeptical of a Navalny Russia. But, even if Navalny’s success as the de facto leader of the opposition is unsuccessful in dismantling Putin’s regime, the Kremlin’s lack of control over the free internet could pose significant problems for their future political success.

The post Creeping Veil: Tracking the Increase in Russian Internet Censorship appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Mexico’s current administration. led by President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and his party MORENA, has not only been completely negligent of Mexico’s environment and sustainability potential, but it has also implemented several new regulations that threaten the environment and Mexico’s clean energy sector. 

Most recently, on March 3, an initiative to reform the Electric Industry Law was passed by the Mexican Congress. This reform practically monopolizes electricity production under the state owned Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), making it harder for foreign investment to reach the renewable energy sector. 

“[The new reform] threatens the compromises established under international treaties, both commercial agreements as well as protection of investments and the environment, for example the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement,” said Mexico’s Council for Business Coordination in a press release addressing the reform. 

By making it harder for private companies to invest in the energy sector, the country’s electricity production will fall into the control of the CFE which only produces around 15% of its electricity with renewable sources. 

This is not the first time Lopez Obrador’s government has threatened clean and renewable energies, as last year he blocked the development of clean energy infrastructure projects citing “issues regarding the pandemic.” In May 2020, the National Centre for Energy Control and Secretary of Energy [NAME], under the guidance of Lopez Obrador’s party, introduced a series of legislative acts that limited the amount of energy that private companies could produce and the number of permits they could acquire. 

This legislation also allowed the administration to stop all of the necessary tests for the new sustainable energy power plants to start production. Lopez Obrador cited “energy security concerns due to the pandemic” as justification for this legislation, even though studies could not find any link between renewables and their effects on national energy insecurity. 

These new regulations became so alarming for Mexico’s environmental commitment, that the UN and several other governments and international institutions shared their concerns with the Mexican government. 

The UN’s environmental organization, the UNEP, reported on its yearly renewable energy investment report that Mexico had a 1.800 billion dollar deficit from its initial investment commitment of 6.1 billion. 

“This shows that there is a lack of political will more than any problem related to Covid-19. Mexico should be equipped with renewable energy sources.” said Dr. Ulf Moslener, head of research for the UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate and Sustainable Energy Finance, in a comment for the EFE.

All of this regulation and legislation are just some of the many logistical obstacles that Lopez Obrador has presented to the development of clean energy sources in the country. The main and most direct attack, however, comes in the shape of his beloved passion projects. These involve the construction and further development of massive infrastructure projects, which include a train that will cut through the Mayan jungle as well as an oil refinery.

The “Tren Maya” is a planned 1,460 km railway project to be built in the Mayan Riviera as well as Obrador’s dream tourism booster. This project however, brought a lot of environmental concerns from experts, activist groups and local indigenous populations. The building of the tracks would cut through an estimated 12,000 individual trees. This not only endangers 178 different types of flora, but also threatens the lives of several species. Among them the Jaguar, from which 1,800 of the 4,000 remaining in the country are found within that region and would have their natural habitat disturbed by the constant movement of people and goods throughout the jungle. 

To top it all off, Obrador had previously stated that the train would run, for the most part, on electricity, however, last year it was confirmed that it would run primarily on diesel fuel that would be imported from abroad. All of this would ultimately contribute to the pollution of the Mayan jungle. 

This never-ending dependency on oil perpetuated by Lopez Obrador’s government is exacerbated by another one of the president’s passion projects, the Dos Bocas oil refinery‒ a 9 billion dollar mega project that would be able to process 340,000 oil barrels a day. 

Starting an oil refinery in the 2020s is just one more nail in the coffin that is Lopez Obrador’s lack of commitment to the environment. This project not only demonstrates that polluting energy sources are prioritized over clean and renewable ones, but it also reveals  his administration’s hypocrisy within their environmental discourse. 

During Lopez Obrador’s campaign in 2018, he rushed to criticize a then-active airport project for being built on top of a “lake,” as it threatened the environment. However, once in office, all of these environmentalist facades have been thrown out the window with Lopez Obrador putting forward even more damaging projects and legislation. 

The core of this hypocrisy lies on the fact that, in the end, his campaign promises were never about the environment ‒ they were simply a ploy to gain popular support. He assured the public of his commitment to environmental protection throughout his campaign with promises such as  “of course we have to save the lake,” referring to an airport built on an already dried up lake bed where construction had already begun. Yet, while once in office, he justified being against eolic energy because wind turbines are “ruining the landscape.”

A country’s economic development can be achieved without severely compromising the environment, as long as appropriate mitigation strategies are implemented. However, in the case of Lopez Obrador’s passion projects, mitigation has not been a part of his primary focus; putting his own reputation, caprice and interests above all else. 

Obrador always prides himself as being against neoliberalism and the previous administration’s corruption and thirst for money, but as it stands today, it seems like he is no different. 

All of his projects are fueled not by a desire to make an impactful change, but to leave his own mark on Mexican history. The evidence of him favoring oil over renewables and his own environmentally damaging projects over those from the previous administration, highlights that this is not a battle between his administration and unsustainability, it is just a way for him to fulfill his whims in whatever way possible. 

This is not a new era for Mexico’s environmentalism, it is just another tantrum-prone and greed driven demagogue trying to leave his mark on the Mexican history books.  

The post How Mexico’s New Administration is Harming the Environment appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

When asked about who would replace Putin as the next president of Russia, if the amendment allowing him to run for office again was not passed, Putin responded “I can tell you from my own experience that in about two years, instead of the regular rhythmic work on many levels of government, you’d have eyes shifting around hunting for possible successors, It’s necessary to work, not look for successors.” Putin’s response made it blindingly clear that he is not interested in deciding or even discussing any type of successor. Putin’s historical iron grip on the Russian government makes his unwillingness to name a replacement unsurprising. Still, there are several possibilities of who would follow Russia’s longest serving leader since Stalin. 

Possible Successors

During the massive reorganization of Russia’s government in January, Mikhail Mishustin, former head of Russia’s Tax Service, was appointed as Prime Minister. This was a surprise both within and outside the Russian government. Mishustin was replacing Dmitry Medvedev, president of Russia from 2008-2012, and was a relatively unknown and low profile government official before assuming the office. It remains unclear whether Mishustin is a temporary figure or if his appointment symbolizes a future role in post-Putin Russia.   

Dmitry Medvedev would have previously been a likely candidate to succeed Putin as Russia’s next leader. Recently, Medvedev’s political and public standing have plunged after allegations of corruption and embezzlement. Medvedev was once Putin’s right hand man and enjoyed popular approval from the Russian public, but that is no longer the case. Inflation and falling incomes motivated Putin to remove his longtime ally and Medvedev was demoted to chairman of Russia’s security council. While the former president Medvedev may not be completely out of the fold, his reputation and recent demotion likely preclude him from replacing Putin. 

Part of the reason it is difficult to predict who will replace Putin is by design, by naming a successor Putin would be inviting the possibility of change and uncertainty into his government. The most influential opposition leader in Russia, Alexei Navalny, stated “The only goal of Putin and his regime is to stay in charge for life, having the entire country as his personal asset and seizing its riches for himself and his friends.” Navalny is heavily biased against Putin, however if Putin’s goal is in fact solely to maintain power, his successor may be decided through a power struggle following Putin’s demise. This scenario is concerning to the international community as it would open the possibility of instability within Russia. 

What Does Russia After Putin Look Like

The predominant question about Russia after Putin is whether it moves towards or away from freedom and democracy. According to Freedom House, a nonprofit organization that rates countries based on political rights and civil liberties, Russia ranks in the bottom fifth of democratic nations in the world. While many might assume that the Russian public would demand less censorship and government control of the media after Putin, this might not be the case.

Under the first presidency of Boris Yeltsin after communism’s collapse, Russia experienced a rapid onset of capitalism and western democratization. This led to financial instability of the Russian Federation and Yeltsin’s eventual resignation. Under Putin, Russia has seen a strong economy and powerful international posturing. This has come at the cost of free media, yet Putin maintains an approval rating of 59% according to a poll conducted by the independent research center Levada. It is unclear if freedom of speech or the economy would be the most important issue under Russia’s next leader.

An analysis of Russia’s current leadership illustrates how Putin has intentionally kept the line of succession vague, focusing more on maintaining his own power. A constitutional amendment passed in the summer of 2020 allows Putin to remain Russia’s leader until 2036. Putin has also signed legislation to expand immunity for former presidents, which implies that he has considered his own well-being after retirement. As for now, “Next year, Putin enters as a brutal, not benevolent, autocrat, ready to isolate Russia to an even greater extent,” according to Andrei Kolesnikov, a Russian domestic policy expert at the Carnegie Moscow Center. 

Conclusion

There is currently very little clarity on who would replace President Vladimir Putin if it were necessary. Plenty of candidates exist, but none share the same popularity or fame as the shirtless horseback riding autocratic leader. Russia will likely be faced with a similar situation after the death of Stalin, in which a power struggle ensued to determine the Soviet Union’s next leader. Regardless, it would appear that Putin has no plans to resign any time soon.  

The post The Possibilities of a Post-Putin Russia appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

The state of press freedom in the Philippines must be considered in terms of its implications for media law and the state of global media rights worldwide. What’s happening with the country’s erosion of press freedom can in fact serve as an important warning for democracy and democratic ideals across the globe. 

The arrest of two journalists in the Philippines represents the decline of freedom of speech, and in effect, democracy, in the Philippines. Ressa, who was found guilty of “cyber-libel” with her former colleague under the Philippines’ 2012 Cybercime Prevention Act, had long served as an outspoken critic against President Rodrigo Duterte and his administration. As the co-founder of news site Rappler, she criticized Duterte’s “war on drugs,” exposing the corruption underlying political measures that have claimed the lives of more than 12,000 Filipinos. 

A minor correction to a previously published article allowed Ressa to be tried. According to Rappler’s official timeline of the case, Santos Jr’s article in question linked former chief justice Renato Corona to allegedly corrupt businessman Wilfredo Keng. While the article was published in 2012, before the cyber-libel act was signed into law, it was edited again in 2014 to correct the misspelling of a single word. In 2017, Keng filed a complaint against Rappler regarding his representation in the article. The fact that the article was edited after the passing of the cyber-libel law allowed the two journalists to go to trial. 

This technicality appeared to be only a strategic explanation behind Ressa’s arrest. It is the latest in a series of Duterte’s accusations against Rappler, many of which include allegations of tax evasion and promotion of “fake news.”

According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), the Philippines currently ranks 136 out of 180 countries in the 2020 World Freedom Press Index. In 2019, it was 134, still a sharp contrast from its ranking of 127 in 2017. These are telling statistics to the decline of democracy in the Philippines. Ressa’s case should be analyzed as a case study of the suppression of journalists’ freedom of expression when it comes to criticizing the government. 

In fact, the Duterte administration’s crackdown on media outlets is a clear indication that when there is a threat of political exposure, journalists are often the first scapegoat. 

Since Duterte came into power, there have been numerous attempts by the government at controlling and even threatening the media. The Bayanihan To Heal As One Act was brought into effect in March 2020 during the coronavirus pandemic. Although it was described as a means for the government to exercise all powers necessary to manage the pandemic, RSF states that in all actuality, it has appeared to be a cover for the administration to avoid accountability for their public health management. 

According to RSF, the government has used this law to justify their arrest of journalists who report on coronavirus prevention measures in the Philippines. Yet this isn’t all. In addition to current actions taken during the pandemic, Duterte has historically shut down any media that is often critical of the administration. The large Phillippine broadcast network ABS-CBN was forced to cease operations earlier this year for “alleged biased reporting.” This isn’t a surprise, given the president’s crackdown on press freedom as a whole, which includes prosecuting journalists, proclaiming journalists as worthy of “assasination,” and a slew of political actions taken against media outlets perceived to not align with the government’s agenda. 

“Such practices,” writes RSF, “are the prerogative of totalitarian governments.”

As such, it is important to acknowledge press freedom as a key component of democracy. The current state of press freedom in the Philippines serves as a clear reminder that unwarranted censorship is often weaponized as a means of silencing individuals who aim to accurately and truthfully inform the public of the government’s doings. 

As many have noted, Ressa’s arrest and the overall role in the decline of media freedom in the Philippines implies a greater threat that authoritarian leaders and governments pose to human rights. This is more than a domestic issue, but a global one. 

When journalists are repeatedly condemned for their reporting, media worldwide actively pays the cost. When journalistic value is not attributed by its truthfulness, but how well it conforms to a political agenda, it becomes no longer journalism but propaganda. Journalists are fundamental in holding those in power accountable, and the Philippines’ crackdown on press freedoms tells the public to be wary of the inevitable parallels that occur across the world with political leaders, exposure of political corruption and the subsequent harassment of the journalists who bring to light those truths.

While it may be unreasonable to lambast authoritarian regimes as a whole, Ressa’s case demonstrates the extent to which a government that claims to be democratic will attempt to silence journalists. Her case is not an isolated incident, and it is only the latest example of how suppression of journalists is the first step to an eroding democracy in the Philippines, a country where democracy is supposedly built into the constitution. 

By undermining the very foundation of the Philippines’ government through the media, the Philippines should not be considered a true, comprehensive “democracy” as the word applies to the ideal of freedom of expression. Democracy implies a sharing of information, but most importantly it requires the power of the citizens to keep the government in check without fear of retaliation. 

In recent years, Duterte’s efforts to keep the media silenced have not gone unnoticed. After the ABS-CBN closure, the Philippines STAR voiced a strongly worded editorial in early 2020, arguing that it is necessary to prevent the shutting down of media organizations by political powers, as broadcast franchises must be free to operate without fear of political retaliation. 

Journalists across the world have echoed their support for not only Ressa, but also press freedom. Sixty media freedom groups and organizations, including RSF and the International Center for Journalists, initiated the #HoldtheLine campaign to support Ressa in her quest to preserve and sustain democracy. The campaign has so far passed around a petition for the Philippine government to drop all charges against Ressa and Santos. American media such as USA Today have derided Duterte’s actions through opinion articles. David Kaye, the independent United Nations expert on freedom of expression, has condemned Ressa’s case and asked for a reversal of the arrest, claiming that criminalizing the press only demonizes journalism and prevents open debate in favor of political power. 

When the government attempts to keep citizens in line and thwart individual liberties, it is no longer a democracy but an authoritarian state. International agencies and organizations must pay attention to the case of Ressa and the Philippines, which can serve as a precedent for how the media and democracy are regulated for the world. 

The post Press Freedom in the Philippines Is Critical to Media Worldwide appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Corruption and impunity have been growing in Mozambique for many years. As early as 2013, Mozambican officials hid loans from the public and foreign investors, leading to a scandal that still taints the government’s legitimacy at the highest levels. The loans were used to pay off “questionable debt” for secret maritime projects like an $850 million fishing fleet; according to an indictment filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, the conspirators used these projects “as fronts to raise money to enrich themselves.” The party responsible for the scandal is still in power, and multinational firms continued to conduct business with Mozambique, which made accountability and combating corruption even more difficult. 

Corruption has also given rise to international criminal networks, which have taken advantage of the national political culture that allows elites to evade the law. According to the Organised Crime Index calculated by ENACT Africa, Mozambique ranks 38th in Africa, indicating that criminal networks have captured parts of the government and that there is a very low level of resilience to organized crime. From the heroin trade to ruby smuggling, crime has pervaded throughout the state and created a breeding ground for violent extremists. 

Although the attacks in Cabo Delgado began as early as 2017, terrorism has reached an unprecedented level in 2020. In only the first four months of 2020, violence in this region, led by a group known as Ansar al-Sunna, increased 300% compared to the same period last year. Although the group declared ties with ISIS in 2019, they rarely issue propaganda, have no publicly stated aims, and primarily attack state institutions, all of which suggest Ansar al-Sunna has a local focus. However, the organization has launched increasingly complex operations that have raised concerns within Mozambique and its neighboring countries. 

The state initially dismissed Ansar al-Sunna as merely a group of “bandits.” Yet, as the violence grew, President Filipe Nyusi admitted there was a problem, but experts believe that his government cannot effectively tackle it. Within Nyusi’s party, Frelimo, there is increasing infighting over the economic burdens of the violence. The country’s best soldiers are guarding natural gas facilities. The remaining soldiers, who are undertrained and underpaid, are the only ones left to combat the insurgents. 

Moreover, Mozambican security forces have been accused of committing human rights violations against those suspected of criminal activity. Video and photo footage has come out showing the attempted beheading and torture of prisoners, the dismemberment of alleged armed group fighters, possible extrajudicial executions, and the transport and discarding of a large number of corpses into mass graves. 

The abuse is intensified by the Mozambican authorities’ refusal to allow local and international journalists and researchers to document the situation without repercussions. Deprose Muchena, Amnesty International’s Director for East and Southern Africa, weighed in on the human rights abuses as “… flout[ing]fundamental principles of humanity. The abuses attributed to [Ansar al-Sunna] can never justify further violations by the security forces of Mozambique.” 

The international response to these events has been mixed. After a virtual meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on August 17th, the bloc released a statement saying that it would “support Mozambique in addressing the terrorism and violent attacks.” However, Mozambique is reluctant to allow neighboring countries to interfere given the fragility of the conflict, and the states themselves worry about the possible blowback of getting involved. Beyond Africa, the United States and many other Western nations initially offered to help with military training but soon withdrew from the commitment. 

The government has also turned to foreign defense contractors for help. At the beginning of the conflict, they enlisted Erik Prince, who founded Blackwater, a controversial American security firm. In 2019, the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary network, came to the aid of Mozambique but ultimately proved unsuccessful. They were replaced by Dyck Advisory Group, a South African organization led by Lionel Dyck, who was involved in past conflicts in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. 

These abrupt administrative changes have made it even more challenging to contain the violence. Perhaps the most significant consequence of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado is the worsening humanitarian crisis. Attacks on towns and villages have forced people to flee their homes and abandon their farms. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, over 300,000 people are internally displaced, and more than 350,000 people face severe food insecurity. A recent UN World Food Programme report presented findings from famine early warning system FEWSNET that indicate that communities “will continue to face ‘crisis’ levels of food insecurity… into early 2021.” This is a worrying projection in Cabo Delgado, which has the second-highest rate of chronic malnutrition in the country. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has only worsened this crisis. In the UN Policy Brief titled COVID-19 and People on the Move, the UN Secretary-General notes that “COVID-19 hits the most vulnerable people the hardest, including refugees, migrants, and internally displaced persons (IDPs).” The attacks in Cabo Delgado have forced people into living in crowded and unsafe host communities or camps with limited resources to protect themselves. Thousands have also fled to an International Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) treatment facility in Pemba, the provincial capital of Cabo Delgado, despite the city being one of the largest pandemic epicenters in the country. Raoul Bittel, the head of ICRC’s operations in Pemba, describes how “[p]eople fleeing armed conflict in Mozambique are trading this life-threatening danger for the risk of COVID.” 

Even with the country’s abundance of natural resources, investment prospects are dwindling as the situation in Cabo Delgado worsens. To experts, Mozambique should serve as a warning to other countries that prioritize their business interests over their people. In the words of Michelle Gavin of the Council on Foreign Relations, “Perhaps, if a decade ago, the international community had expended more energy supporting the civil society actors who have been calling action to these deep-rooted problems –and pressed harder to support solutions– Mozambique today might demonstrate more resilience, and the outlook would be less bleak.” 

The violent insurgency and resulting humanitarian crisis in Mozambique have exposed a profound weakness in a state that once showed tremendous promise. In promoting international trade and elitism over equitable socio-economic development, the government has fostered a culture of corruption and continues to do so despite the worsening conflict. 

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